Printed by David Syme & C Collins S t~'eef. imMitee ldb,ourne. publisher c.1. ot " 'l'he A• •e," 233 AVIATION GOOD NEWS FOR STUDENT PILOTS

SAFETY. DIGEST The question of issuing student pilots with their Flight Radio Operator Licences. This has meant that own copies of Aviation Safety Digest has long been all students who did their training at controlled a bone of contention. Many students have justifiably D .e p a r· t m e n t of Ci vi I Aviation Austra l ia airports and were required to obtain radio operator pointed out that they, of all people, should be the licences before they could be sent solo, were auto­ No. 44 DECEMBER, 1965 ones to get the Digest so that they have ready access matically placed on the Digest distribution list as to a fund of "ready made" experience to help them soon as their radio licence was issued. develop a proper appreciation of the elements of good airmanship in the formative stages of their Whilst this arrangement was probably satis­ flying careers. factory as far as the majority of student pilots were .. concerned, it did not in any way provide for the The Department, on the other hand, has been conscientious student training at a non-controlled mindful of the fact that there is a very large per­ aerorome, who did not require a Flight Radio Contents centage of student pilots who do not complete their Operator Licence. fiying training, many who "give it away" before It also contributed nothing to reducing wastage, reaching first solo stage, and some who don't even as many of the student pilots who get as far as begin their flying training at all. The Department taking out Flight Radio Operator Licences, do not has no practicable way of assessing which students continue their flying training beyond the early Good news for Student Pilots 1 fall into these categories over the years, and although stages. it has been sympathetic to the student's problems, it To overcome these anomalies and yet still avoid After 30 Years, It's still Happening 2 has also been conscious of its stewardship of public money and understandably reluctant to commit a the high wastage rate that would be involved in large number of copies of each issue to what virtually distributing the Digest to all student pilot licence Human Balloon 8 amounts to the waste paper basket! holders, the Department has now decided to make a selective distribution to student pilots who have The degree of wastage that would be involved can reached solo stage, who have logged not less than Abandoned Take-Off 9 be appreciated from a few figures. In all, 5ome 16,000 15 hours flying and who are receiving regular flying copies of the Digest are now being distributed free instruction. The problem of determining which of charge each quarter. There are at present more students are eligible, will be met by making the dis­ Watch Those Turns 10 than 7,000 student pilot licences current, and they tribution through the training organizations and by are increasing by about 20 per cent. each year, so A nostalgic moment for Sir delegating to them the responsibility for ensuring Hudson Fysh , Chairman of Correction 13 that a decision to issue the Digest to all student that copies of the Digest are issued individually to Qantas, as he taxies a restored A vro 504K on to the tarmac pilot licence holders would increase the present those students that meet the entitlement qualifica­ during a brief ceremony at distribution by nearly half as much again. But tions. At the same time the Department will dis­ Kingsford-Smith Airport, Syd­ Mountain Slopes Claim a 180 14 ney, to mark the airline's 45th because as few as about 50 per cent. of student pilot continue issuing the Digest through the post to anniversary this month. Sir Hudson inaugurated the first licence holders ultimately qualify for a higher grade students who hold Flight Radio Operator Licences. Qantas services with an identical of licence, a very substantial proportion of this Avro biplane in 1920. The Qantas From the Incident Files 16 Recipients of the Digest, other than student pilots, Boeing 707 " Winton" seen in the increase in distribution would be to no effect. will not be affected by this new arrangement and background of the picture is will continue to receive their indvidual copies named after one of the original Agricultural Flying and Common Law - 19 This argument of course is of little consolation Qantas bases in Queensland. through the post as before. The replica Avro on permanent to those keen students who would make good use of loan from the Australian War their own copies of the Digest, but up to now the The Department has already written to all train­ Museum in Canberra, has been Journey into Nowhere 20 faithfully restored by Qantas problem has been met to a degree by providing ing organizations to ascertain the number of copies maintenance personnel and is to become the central exhibit of aero clubs and flying schools with library copies of each will require to achieve this distribution, and it Qantas' aviation museum in Sydney. Overseas Accidents In Brief 27 the Digest which were intended to be available to is intended that the change in policy will take effect students for study. Circumstantially, the Department with the issue of Aviation Safety Digest No. 45, in has also issued the Digest to all persons taking out March, 1966.

Aviation Safety Digest is prepared in t he Ai r Safety Investigation Branch and published quarterly. Enquiries and contributions f or publication should be addressed to The Editor, Aviation Safet y Di gest, D epartment of Civil Aviation, Box 1839Q, P.O ., Elizabeth Street , MELBOURNE, C .1 . Except for that m aterial which is indicated t o be extracted f rom or based on another publication, in w hich case the authority of the origi nator should be sought, t h e mat erial contained herein may, with acknowledgment, be freely re­ produced in publications intended. prima1ily f or circulation in the Aviation I ndustry. All other publication, w hether by the printed word, r adio, or t el evision, must have the prior approval of the Department of Civil Aviation. D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 S - 1

at a height of about 200 feet, two fences and skidded through and cleared of timber except for began a gentle left turn to return the gap in the trees. The aircraft trees and hedges forming wind to the aerodrome. h it the third fence obliquely, and breaks on the boundaries of some As he looked at the manifold finally came to rest facing baci{ paddocks. pressure gauge to throttle "the towards t he aerodrome. The cap­ The investigation ·beg·an at the good engine" p~ck to METO power, tain ordered evacuation and, with site on the afternoon of the acci­ the captain ·saw the starboard dent. The aircraft was intact but the first officer, quickly completed rn~edle was indicating only 40 had suffered damage to both wings inches instead of the take-off th e post-impact an d fire drills and nacelles and to the fuselage, power setting of 45 Y2 inches. The while the h ostess helped the pas­ mostly from imp'.;'.. ct with fence first officer checked the starboard sengers out t hrough the cabin posts. All con trol surfaces and throttle and pitch levers, but they door. No fire broke out and four systems were intact and capable of were both fully forward . Already minutes later t he captain turned normal operation. The wing flaps the airspeed was below 80 knots on the battery switch again and and undercarriage were retracted. and the aircraft was beginning to reported the outcome of the forced The aircraft had touched down in lose height, and the captain saw landing t o Melbourne Communica­ a substantially level fore and aft there would be no hope of getting tions Centre. attitude on a heading of 256 back to the aerodrome. Seeing a degrees, with the port wing slightly gap in the trees ahead of the air­ INVESTIGATION above the horizontal and the craft and a clear run beyond, the undercarriage retracted. The first captain headed the aircraft in The aerodrome at Warrnambool ground contact had been made by that direction, holding the nose up lies six miles north-east of the the rotating starboard propeller, as much as possible to try and town in open farming country 250 over a distance of about 75 fee t. reach the clear area: A stall warn­ feet above sea level. Runway 31 The por t propeller had then con­ ing buffet forced him to lower the h as an effective operational length tacted the ground intermittently nose again and he flew the air­ of 4,500 feet with an obst ructional for a further distance of 590 feet craft on to the ground with wheels clear gradient of 1 : 40. The site in the course of which the aircraft and flaps retracted. Th e aircraft of the accident was one mile west passed through two post and wire touched lightly before reaching the of the north-western end of the fences before the wheels made con­ first line of trees, sliced th rough runway where the terrain is level tact. The aircraft then slid for

One minute after taking off from Warrnambool, Victoria, a Douglas DC.3 force-

landed in a field with one engine feathered. The aircraft was superficially damaged as it

careered through three fences and slid to a stop, wheels up, but none of the 2 0 passengers

or the crew of three was injured.

The DC.3 was departing on the within safe limits and the take-off instruments and the airspeed indi­ second stage of a regular public weight was 23,778 lb. Maximum cator. The take-off up to and in­ transport flight from Hamilton to permissible take-off weight is cluding the point of lift-off was .,I Melbourne via Warrnambool. It 26,200 lb. completely normal, but almost had flown to Hamilton the day immediately afterwards the cap­ Engines were started and at 0811 tain sensed that an engine had before and had remained there E.S.T. the aircraft reported to overnig·ht. In the morning, the failed and ordered the first officer Melbourne "Taxiing Warrnambool to retract the undercarriage. Be­ crew completed all their pre-flight for Melbourne." Weather condi­ requirements, nine passengers lieving that the port engine was tions were fine with a temperature at fault, the captain eased back boarded the aircraft, and it took of 56 degrees F and a light westerly off from Hamilton at 0736 E.S.T. the port throttle and called on the wind. After all pre-take-off checks · first officer for a check identifica­ Twenty minutes later the aircraft had been satisfactorily completed, arrived at Warrnambool where tion of the defective engine. See­ the aircraft lined up on Runway ing the port throttle retarded and eleven passengers joined it and 31. freight was loaded. A load state­ the captain holding on starboard ment prepared by the first officer The captain made the take-off rudder, the first officer called and signed by the captain, showed from the left hand seat, with the "Port Engine !" The captain then the aircraft's centre of gravity was first officer monitoring the engine feathered the port propeller and,

2 AVIATION SAfETY DIGEST 1

nearly 400 feet before the port wing Two days later the dismantled firing." The captain had listened needles reading lower than nor­ about 75 knots. They passed very decrease in power was heard just struck a line of fence posts nearly aircraft was brought back under but the engines only seemed to be mal. He could not remember what low over a clump of trees at 62 afterwards, but no engine mal­ parallel to the aircraft's landing quarantine to Melbourne Airport a little out of synchronization. On the reading was. knots, and the aircraft begun to functioning was apparent. The path. This caused the aircraft to by road where further detailed the sector from Hamilton to Warr­ shudder. He called Melbourne to power decrease was described as swing sharply to port and brought examination and testing was car­ nambool on the morning of the When the captain asked for his report they were force landing being "rather like a reduction from it to rest on a heading of 108 ried out by Departmental engineers accident, he noticed that the port "identification," the first officer when the captain said he was going full throttle to % throttle on one degrees, some 1,350 feet beyond the in the operators' workshops. engine did not seem quite the same looked at the throttles noting that to put it down through the gap in engine". Passengers in €he aircraft as usual and he told the first offi­ the port one was retarded, and saw the trees. The touchdown itself were not conscious of any yaw and initial touchdown point. A detailed examination of the cer he knew now what he meant-­ that the starboard rudder pedal was quite gentle. the evidence of ground witnesses starboard propeller established that It was evident from ground the engine did have "a bit of a was well forward, before iden­ indicated that the aircraft main­ at the time of the major impact markings that the starboard pro­ burble". The engines were on tifying the port engine. He then tained the runway heading until it was rotating with the blades on Statements obtained from wit­ peller was rotating and the blades crttlse setting at the time and all called the feathering drill and it began a gentle turn to the left the fine pitch stops. Further in­ nesses on the ground and from were at relatively fine pitch when indications were normal. the captain feathered the port some of the passengers confirmed beyond the aerodrome boundary at they first struck the ground, while spection of the failed starboard engine. By this time the aircraft that the take-off was normal until a height of about 150 feet. It con­ it was equally evident that the engine established that the No. 7 The run up before taking off was low and the ASI was showing tinued turning through about 50 blades of the port propeller were cylinder inlet valve stem had frac­ from Warrnambool was also nor­ the aircraft became airborne. A in the feathered position and were tured across the valve retaining mal, the captain said. He heard 9 not rotating. collet groove, allowing the valve the engine "go" just after lifting Impact damage to the engines to drop into the cylinder, where off at V2, and described it as was confined mainly to the pro­ it was hammered by the piston much the same as a simulated pellers. All three blades of the star­ until the cylinder head failed. A engine failure on a training flight. board propeller were bent back laboratory examination estab­ He said he had instinctively held evenly, but only two blades of the lished that the valve stem the aeroplane straight with firm port propeller had come into con­ fracture was caused by fatigue rudder and aileron before realiz­ tact with the ground. The engine cracking. The valve had been in ing that it was starboard rudder cowls were dented in several service Ior a considerable period and aileron that he had applied. places and some cylinder cooling and the fatigue failure was attri­ He thought "dead foot dead fins had been broken. The oil buted to normal ·operating stresses engine" and wound on rudder cooler supports and scoops were over an extensive service life. No trim. He started to ease back damaged and the engine mounts defects were found in the engine the port throttle intending to fea­ were distorted. The rocker hats on other than the structural damage ther when he called out "Identify", the two bottom cylinders were also to the No. 7 cylinder assembly. It to the first officer. The first officer damaged. The starboard engine was evident that the valve stem called the feathering drill and was found to have sustained a had failed during or immediately he feathered the port engine structural failure in No. 7 cylinder. after take-oft' and that the engine when the aircraft was about over the aerodrome boundary. The cap­ A large portion of the head had had continued to run until the separated entirely from the cylin­ aircraft flew into the ground. In tain could not recall the boost and der and had been retained in the this condition, the engine would R.P.M. reading at t he time of the nacelle only by the engine cowling have been capable of delivering engine failure or immediately be­ about 800 shaft horsepower, 67 per fore feathering acti-on was taken. and baffle. cent. of the power normally avail­ He thought the aircraft was at There was no evidence of any able for take-off. about 200 feet when he realized it pre-impact defect or malfunction­ was losing height. ing in the aircraft structure or An examination of the port pro­ the associated control and peller confirmed that the blades The first officer said he moni­ hydraulic systems, and it was found were in the feathered position at tored the instruments during that the electrical and instrument impact. The port engine was take off, all of which appeared systems had been operating nor­ checked for mechanical integrity normal, and called V2 at 82 knots. mally. The fuel system was fully without disturbing any vital com­ As the captain lifted the aircraft serviceable and there was no sign ponents and as this did not reveal off, he dropped his hand ready to of contamination. The aircraft evidence of any defect, the engine retract the undercarriage. At this was carrying 170 gallons in the was installed on a test stand for time he thought he saw a slight main tanks and 70 gallons in the ground testing. It ran normally drop in one of the manifold pres­ al!Xiliary tank. No unserviceabili­ and developed full rated power. A sure needles, but could not remem­ ties had been reported by the crew further detailed inspection of its ber which one. At this instant the at Hamilton and there was no fuel and ignition systems showed captain called for "gear up." He evidence of any having developed no sign of any malfunction. felt the aircraft's acceleration de­ during the flight to Warrnambool. Giving evidence during the in­ creasing while the undercarriage The operators had maintained the vestigation, the captain said that was retracting, but could not aircraft properly and had complied on the flight from Melbourne to remember feeling any swing. When with all mandatory modifications Hamilton the day before the acci· the captain called out that they and insp ections required for dent, the first officer thought he had lost an engine he looked up DC.3s. could hear "some sort of back- and saw one of the boost gauge

AVIATION SAfETY DIGEST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 degrees before making a shallow 750 shaft horsepower, for instance, this time. If the port engine had had failed and took action ac­ descent to the ground on a would be within this tolerance in fact lost power completely as cordingly. westerly heading. area but, with only this power, the pilot believed, retarding the The identification of an engine The captain had joined the the aircraft would be incapable of port throttle would have had no failure in a DC.3 is a process in operating company in 1957 af~er maintaining height even at the effect on the rudder "feel" already which confusion can easily arise, training in the R.A.A.F. and gam­ optimum airspeed. Thus, in the produced by the engine failure, and and great care must be exercised. ing civil flying experience ·on circumstances to which the aircraft so n o advantage for identification The company operations manual several types nf light aircraft. He was committed by the feathering purposes could arise from this lays down the procedures to be had served as first officer on DC.3's, action, the captain's decision to action. On the other hand, in the followed. The primary method of Bristol 170's and Viscounts, after make a forced landing cannot be actual situation that arose on this identification is by analysis of foot which he was transferred to first questioned, and the evidence sug­ occasion of a partial power failure pressures, employing the axiom officer duties on Electra aircraft. gests he executed the forced land­ in the starboard engine, retarding "dead foot, dead engine" but the In the middle of 1964 he underwent ing in a very creditable manner. the port throttle would have first officer's verification is required masked the aircraft's tendency to a flight check for requalification as There was no evidence however before any feathering procedures a first officer on DC.3 aircraft and yaw to starboard and, as the are begun. The closing of the to support the captain's deduction throttle was closed further, a flew 46 hours in this capacity, pre­ that it was the port engine that throttle as the first item of the paratory to command training for tendency to swing to port would feathering procedure then serves had failed. Examination and test be felt. Thus no advantage was to DC.3's. At the end of August he running of the port engine showed as a further check that the faulty began command training and flew be gained from retarding the engine has been correctly identified. conclusively that this engine was throttle p rior to positive identi­ a total of 164 hours as pilot in capable of running normally dur­ Identification by rudder pressure is command under the supervision of fication of the defective engine, best suited to the case of a complete ing the flight. Had the captain but rather a high risk of disguis­ a training captain. In December shut down the starboard engine engine failure, where the yaw is he underwent a route check with ing the identity of the defective immediate and substantial. Iden­ and utilized the power that would engine was introduced. the company's DC.3 Flight Cap­ have been available from the port tification in the case of a partial tain who recommended the pilot engine, the aircraft could have The captain described the loss of failure is more difficult because the for promotion to DC.3 command. A been flown back to the aerodrome power as similar to a simulated yaw and the consequent rudder few days later he was given 6 hours and landed. Alternatively, if for any engine failure on a training flight, pressure is correspondingly less, 50 minutes flying training during other circumstance it became de­ but it is significant that the first and in these circumstances engine which th e sequences for a first sirable to utilize more power than officer was not conscious of any instrument readings become more class endorsement and a first class would have been available from yaw and that the other witnesses important. instrument rating were completed. the port engine alone, the star­ described only a change in power In this case when the failure On the following day he was re­ board engine could have been left rather than a complete loss of occurred with the throttle set for examined in some sequences in­ operating, despite its defect, at power. If the port engine had take-off power, the loss of power cluding engine failure on take-off least until the aircraft had been failed suddenly and completely, would not have been very appar­ and, on completing them to the established in safe flight with rea­ there would have been a marked ent from the tachometer because satisfaction of the Flight Captain, sonable clearance from obstacles. yawing moment to port and, the propeller governor would have he was certified as competent to be with the change in engine noise reduced the blade angle to main­ issued with a first-class airline In circumstances such as these, that would have resulted from the tain the RPM setting, but the transport pilot licence and a first ,. the decision to feather should only failure it is very probable that it manifold pressure gaug·e would class instrument rating. be made after considering the would have been noticed by the have shown a significantly lower operational requirements in rela­ The newly promoted captain then . ~: fi rst officer. None of the passen­ reading. It was this lower manifold tion to the risk of fire and the began normal route flying· in com­ The failed No . 7 cylinder head removed from the starboard engine gers commented on any sensation pressure reading that the crew mand of DC.3 aircraft and con­ possibility of further structural such as a swing or a sudden reduc­ finally noticed and thus realized tinued in this capacity up to the After feathering the port engine, aircraft at the relevant gross damage if the defective engine is tion in engine noise. that a partial failure had occurred time of the accident, when his total left running. In this particular in the starboard engine. the captain became aware that full weight would be t heoretically It is possible that in making his flying experience amounted to case, there is little doubt that the power was not being developed by capable of climbing at 40 feet decision the captain was influenced It is evident that the captain, be­ 6,172 hours. On DC.3 aircraft, his aircraft could have performed the starboard en gine, and with the per minute, but in this case by the "burble" he had heard in lieving he had applied starboard experience was 174 hours in com­ satisfactorily with one propeller consequent loss of aircraft per­ the aircraft was in a turn and its the port engine on the previous rudder, followed the identification mand, 213 hours under instruction feathered, and t he decision to formance, he saw he would not be airspeed was less than that re­ stage of the flight, and that when procedures only to the extent that or supervision, and 1739 hours as feather the defective engine was able to return to the aerodrome quired for optimum single-eng·ined he sensed the engine failure, he he used the axiom "dead foot, dead co-pilot. and manoeuvred the aircraft to­ perfo rmance. The potential climb the correct one, but there was no operational need for haste. was consciously or subconsciously­ engine" to deduce that the port en­ wards open ground. The investiga­ performance would thus have been predisposed to associate it with gine had failed, and that he re­ ANALYSIS tion left no doubt that it was the n egated by these factors. Other The sequence of events descri·bed this condition. In immediately r e­ tarded the port throttle almost im­ The investigation established starboard engine and not the port factors to be considered include the by the captain anct first officer tarding the port throttle, the cap­ mediately he felt the loss of power that the aircraft lost power on one engine that had suffered a partial actual performance capability of in their statements shows that the tain produced a situation which and before he requested the first engine just after it had taken off. failure shortly after the aircraft this particular aircraft as com­ captain retarded the port throttle disguised the power asymmetry officer to verify. In so doing he did The captain's statement that he att ained V2 speed. Despite this, it pared with the theoretical capa­ and began the actions that led to caused by the defect in the star­ not follow the prescribed proce­ shut down and feathered the port remained capable of delivering bility of the type, and the fact that the feathering of the port propeller board engine. It is not surprising dures and h is decision to feather engine was confirmed by the :find­ about 800 shaft horsepower. Per­ the figure of 800 shaft horsepower almost immediately the loss of then that because he found he the port engine was based on evi­ ing that the port propeller was in formance data for the DC.3 aircraft is an estimate carrying some power was felt. No reference to was holding on starboard rudder, dence that was insufficient for the feathered position at impact. indicates that with this power, the degree of tolerance. A figure of engine instruments was made at he deduced that the port engine correct identification.

6 AVIATION SAFETY DIGEST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 7 Although it could be said that ranted feathering· so hurriedly and qualities of an emergency pro­ the first officer likewise had not there was no valid reason why the cedure for any aircraft, is that it followed the prescribed procedures captain should not have followed shall be capable of being carried the prescribed engine failure pro­ in failing to make use of the engine out in an unhurried manner cedures to which he had been wi thin the time likely to be instrument readings to check the trained. identification, the captain's action available to the crew, assuming the emergency occurs in the in retarding the port throttle before COMMENT most unfavourable circum­ requesting identification foiled Why is it that an accident can stances. Thus there is no need the proper performance of this result from a relatively simple to cut corners in carrying out duty. It seems probable that when emergency such as this one? Even any emergency procedure be­ the first officer was requested to while this issue of the Digest was cause it a leady has an inbuilt identify the failed engine, he saw being prepared, a similar engine safe-time factor. Indeed, it is the port throttle was already closed failure in a DC.3 at a training dangerous to do so, for it is vital and concentrated on relating the aerodrome in New South Wales that proper attention be g iven to rest of the feathering actions to produced the same response. For­ each item in its own right. the engine that the captain had t unately this aircraft was within It seems that the established selected. gl iding distance of the airport and there was no accident, but emergency procedures most fre­ The evidence suggests that the this does not mitigate the error. quently break down with partial identification and feathering were And this time the pi lot in com­ or intermittent engine failures carried out in haste and that mand was an airline training because they are so much more the captain feathered the engine captain! difficult to identify than com­ about the time the aircraft crossed plete failures. It is difficult to the aerodrome boundary. The cir­ The DC.3 has now been with simulate partial engine failures cumstances in which the engine us for 30 years, but throughout and so all a pilot's training in failure occurred however, were not its history defective engines have engine-out proced'ures is geared unusually difficult. The engine had bee·n wrongly identified and acci­ to the handling of complete failed after the aircraft had dents have occurred simply be­ failures. In emergencies li ke reached its take-off sa-fety speed cause pi lots did not take suffi­ these, therefore, the emphasis As a DC-3 accelerated through night maintenance at Rockhamp­ ments differently. Even within the must be placed on corre·ctly fol ­ but before the undercarriage was cient time to properly assess the 70 knots while taking off from ton and had been refuelled when one organisation, the method of selected up. The flight was being emergency and follow their lowing the identif ication proce­ Rockhampton, Queensland, the port the work was completed. No oil ordering may vary with different conducted in visual me~eorological engine failure procedures posi­ dures laid down and not on the engine oil pressure dropped sud­ was added at the time, the refuel­ types of aircraft. Because of the conditions and the weather was tively and unhurriedly. Why the hasty pushing of a feathering denly from 80 to 50 pounds per ling attendant advising the certi­ confusion that these differences good, and at the aircraft's gross panic? Undue haste is so often a button which should be seen only square inch. The take- off was fying engineer that the oil levels can obviously engender, it is weight for this take-off, it would trap, and in neither of these as a final action in the emer­ abandoned and the aircraft re­ were adequate. The aircraft was extremely important that orders have been capable of climbing on latest cases was there any justi­ gency drill. In both the Warr­ turned to the tarmac. The oil accordingly cleared for flight. for fuel and oil be stated clearly one engine even with the faulty fication for feathering in such a nambool and the New South tanks were dipped and it was found It was later found that neither and concisely and that operators engine windmilling. It is under­ hurry. Procedures do hove a pur­ Wales cases, the purpose of this that the quantity in the port tank the engineers responsible for the satisfy themselves that refuelling standable that the captain would pose and, if a pilot "pushes the drill was defeated by unwar- was only 13 Imperial gallons in­ work, nor the crew, had checked attendants understand exactly have been anxious to shut down wrong button," his error can 0ranted haste in altering the stead of the desired 17 gallons. the quantities in the tanks or even what quantities are to be pumped the defective engine as soon as pos­ usually be traced to his failure to throttle settings, thereby de­ inspected the fuel and oil caps be­ into their aircraft. sible to reduce the risk of fire or follow the procedures that are stroying what evidence t here Experience obtained over the fore the aircraft departed. It was In this particular case it is clear structural damage, but no other designed to preclude such a hap­ was for positively determin­ years by a number of operators has also found that, in dipping· the oil that the refuelling was left solely circumstance in this take-off war- pening. One of the essential ing which engine was defective. shown that loss of oil pressure can tanks, the refuelling attendant had to the oil company attendant and occur in DC-3s during take-of! used a dip stick calibrated in both was not subsequently checked by with oil tank quan tities at 15 gal­ United States gallons and Imperial the engineers who were in attend­ lons or less. The fall In pressure gallons. Although the two sets of ance or by the crew. Some crews is caused by the oil surging to the DUMAN BALLOON 1 calibrations were engraved on in fact, seem to have fallen into rear of the tank as the aircraft opposite sides of the dipstick, the the habit of leaving· this responsi­ In checking the flow of high pressure helium from a small orifice, a mechanic placed a accelerates, temporarily uncovering markings had become obscure, and bility entirely to oil company at­ finger over the opening. In a matter of a split second the gas pierced the skin and penetrated the engine off-take. Indeed, as long it was possible that the attendant tendants, particularly at country the flesh as far as the armpit. His finger was swollen and pale and gas pressure could be felt ago as May, 1957, the Department had read the quantity in U.S. gal­ airports, and it may be a tribute through the skin along the arm. Immediate medical treatment relieved some of the pressure and wrote to all Australian DC-3 lons and accepted it as Imperial to the efficiency of these employees restored circulation but it took four days for the gas to be completely absorbed. operators informing them of the gallons. that there are not more occur­ In this incident the pressure was 6000 pounds per square inch and the orifice, which was only problem and stipulating that for There have been several occa­ rences of this sort. However, re­ 0.007 in. in diameter, produced a needle-like stream of helium travelling at a sonic velocity of about any take-of!, the minimum permis­ sions in the past where misunder­ sponsibility for correct fuel and oil 2800 feet per second. It was estimated that the helium expanding in the arm tissue increased in sible quantity in a standard 24 standings h ave arisen over quanti­ contents undeniably rests wit h the volume at a ratio of 200: 1. gallon DC-3 oil tank would hence­ ties of fuel and oil to be added to crew of an aircraft and the inci­ Exposure to such extreme pressures is rare, but the accident does serve to remind us that com­ forth be 17 Imperial gallons. aircraft. This is hardly surprising dent suggests room for improve­ pressed gas streams, whether at 6000 or 60 pounds per square inch can be dangerous. Never allow In this latest incident, the air­ when it is considered that almost ment in this aspect of pre-flight compressed gases to come into contact with the body. United States Navy "Safety Review" craft involved had undergone over- every operator orders its require- checking. AVIATION SAfETY DIGEST 8 D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 9 STALLING ACCIDENTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM Aircraft Type Height Attitude of Aircraft

1. Dart Kitten 50' Stalled in 80° banked turn. 2. PA-23 200'- 300' Stalled in turn at slow speed during approach to land. 3. Jackaroo 500' Stalled in turn at 50 knots. 4. DH-82 500' Stalled in 60° banked turn. 5. Miles Gemini 100' Stalled when turning with one engine out. 6. Auster 100' Swung on take-off and stalled in subsequent turn.

Our own aircraft have fared no better:- STALLING ACCIDENTS IN AUSTRALIA Aircraft Type Height Attitude of Aircraft

1. DH-82 400' Stalled after baulked approach. 2. Vic ta 200' Stalled during unauthorized low flying. 3. C-172 30' Stalled after overshoot during attempted precau- tionary landing. 4. DHC-1 80' Pilot attempted very steep turn with full flap and half power to align aircraft for landing. 5. PA-25 50' Stalled during turn at low speed after take-off. 6. Auster 100' Instructor failed to prevent student from stalling· aircraft during approach to land.

- ~-- We can gain a better appreciation of the reasons front of the pilot's mind is THE STALLING SPEED - - =-;:--=--'---:::..- ._ for accidents of this type, by looking briefly again INCREASES IN A TURN. at the aerodynamic principles involved in turning an aeroplane. But by how much does it increase ? The ans\ver is a simple mathematical one; it increases as the (With apologies to Otto Lilienthal) To ma ke an aernplane turn, a force must be square root of the load factor, the factor by which applied towards the centre of the turn required. To impose this force on an aeroplane, the total air reaction must be inclined from th e vertical towards - and know your Recovery Techniques the centre of t he desired turn so that its horizcntal component provides just enough force to make the aeroplane t urn and keep it turning. This force is i{nown as the "centripetal force." In a correctly balanced t urn, the inclinat ion of A study of a number of reports of accidents that have occurred in recent months the reaction is produced by banking the aeroplane in Australia and overseas, leads us to believe that many of us would do well to tak e as shown in Fig. 1. OW represents the weight of the a fresh look at what can happen to stalling speeds under different conditions of fiight .. aeroplane, and OL the lift it develops. The lift and at the recovery techniques that should be employed to obtain optimum control component is of course vertical in straight and level response if a loss of control is precipitated. flight, but now is inclined to the vertical at the angle of bank. The vertical component OA of w OL, balances the weight of the aeroplane, whiie the horizontal compon ent OC of OL provides the neces­ The number of light aircraft accidents that of the factors that can cause an aeroplane to stall sary centri.oetal force. FIG. 1. have occurred in recent months as a result of during a turn. The seriousness of the situation is incorrectly executed turns, suggests that some pilots demonstrated by the following summaries of some As the oanK ~., ~ncr eas ed, so must the total lirt the lift increases in a t urn compared to the lift re­ are inclined to take too many liberties with their typical accidents in the United Kingdom and in produced by the wings be increased to maintain quired for straight and level flight . This is clearly aircraft and that they may have forgotten some Australia. height, and this increase in lift will also cau~e an illustrated in Fig. 2. In (C) with 60 degrees of ban k increase in the stalling speed. So one of the essential the wings are producing twice as much lift · as facts of flight t hat should always be in the fore- they were at (A) in straight and level fiight. The

D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 10 AVIATION SAFETY D IGEST 11 full power applied, and the wings levelled. Because speed away from the stall, so decreasing the angle VERTIC A L · t · the recovery from a normal correctly executed steep COMPONENT OF LIFT of attack of the wings. EQUAL turn requires the use of considerable top rudder, it The correct recovery action to be takc-m when TO WE I GHT follows that, if the aircraft is in a steep turn when the aircraft has been allowed to enter a spiral dive a stall becomes imminen t, levelling the wings will near the ground is a little different. Initially, power WEIGHT require co-ordinated use or r udder as well as ailerons. should be reduced to prevent the spiral "tightening", 0 0 e 0 The application of power assists the recovery action th e wings should be levelled, again with co-ordinated BANK . 00 30° 60° 70° 75° by increasing the airflow over the win g and tail rudder and aileron, and the aircraft then eased out LOAD FACTOR 1 ·0 1 ·15 2 2·9 3•86 surfaces, thus decreasing the stallin g speed and in ­ of the dive. At this point, especially if the airspeed STALLING SPEED 60knots 64knots 85knots 102 knots 118 knots creasing the response of both rudder and elevator is low, re-application of full power can aid the control. The use of power also h as the beneficial recovery, as with the recovery from t he stail, by FIG. 2. eff ect of helping to accelerate t he aircraft to a hig·her improving con trol response and by enabling the aircraft to climb immediately. stalling· speed in straig·ht and level flight is 60 knots, The recovery action to be taken if control is DOWN-GOING W ING All too frequently, throughout the history of avia­ so with 60 degrees of bank, the stalling speed will lost such as during a poorly executed steep turn, tion, pilots have found themselves in trouble when be depends on whether the 9.ircraft has hecn perr.1itted their atten tion has been divided between flying t.heir 60 x v'2 aircraft and looking at something on the ground, or to approach the stall or whether it has entered a = 60 x 1.414 Flight Pa th when they have been possessed by an :rresi:.t.ible, spiral dive. If the onset of a stall is detected, for = 85 knots. spur of the moment, urge to demonstrate their !lying Notice that in (E) of Fig. 2, with a load factor of example from the stall warning horn or light, from ability to lesser mortals watching· from below. . d 3.86, i.e., with the wings producing nearly four times a sloppy feel in the con trols, or from airframe buffet­ W The modern light aeroplane is usually v0ry docile Relative in to handle in normal flight, even at the stall, but, as much lift as in straight and level flight, the ting, the control column should be moved forward, stalling· speed is nearly double its basic value, and as like its ancestors, it can still become a killer if the angle of bank steepens further, the rate at which con trol is lost during a turn at low altitude when the steep attitudes attained may make recovery the stalling speed increases in a balanced turn rises UP-GOING W ING very rapidly. At 80 degrees of bank it would be 144 impossible in the height available. knots, at 81 degrees, 150 knots, and at 82 degrees it The best possible insurance against this risk is would have risen to 162 knots ! The accident to the t he ability to recognize the conditions that bring Dart Kitten already mentioned is a particularly in­ about this ch ange in character, coupled with a sound teresting example of this effect. The Dart Kit.ten is knowledge of t he principles involved in executing an ultra-light aeroplane and cruises at 66 knots. Its Flight Path correct t urns. As a further safeguard, pilots should normal stalling· speed is only about 28 knots, yet it have a thorough understanding of the recovery was stalled during a steep turn because the stalling FIG. 4. techn iques to use if control is lost. speed h ad become equal to the speed at which the aircraft was flying·. It will be obvious from all this c: JJ7 ATCH THOSE T URNS AND LIVE ! -(I) that an aircraft flying at low speed can tolerate only a relatively small angle of bank before the onset u c;rl' the stall. '+­ '+- The danger of losing control is increased if the . (l) aircraft shouLd drop a wing while flying close to the I CORRECTION stall with the wings at a large angle of attack, as 0 In th e September issue of t he Digest we told the story of an accident represented by the point X on the lift curve in Fig. u in which a Cessna 175 struck the water whilst engaged on a shark spotting 3. As the wing drops, the angle of attack of the

12 AV I ATION SA FETY DIGEST 0 E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 • 13 Mountain Slopes Claitn a 180

Working as a team from an agricultural airstrip in the Liverpool Ranges, north of nose of the aircraft came around, while adversely affecting the air­ terrain that they could' neither out­ Merriwa, New South Wales, two Cessna 180's were spreading gypsum on mountain slopes he had obviously seen that the craft's climb capability probably climb nor out-manoeuvre. A num­ turn was carrying· him int0 the maide little difference to the final forming part of an adjoining grazing property. The stri p, aligned east-west, lies in o ber of these accidents have been wall of the valley, and had steep­ result. reported from time to time in the volley 2000 feet above sea level, surrounded by mountain ridges rising in places to well ened it sharply in an attempt to Dig·est as a warning to pilots who over 3000 feet. The slopes being treated, actually pa.rt of the northern wall of the volley, The aircraft was trapped and clear the trees. This action would the accident virtually inevitable are sometimes obliged to operate were one and a half miles due north of the airstrip, and to reach them the aircraft hod to 1 have increased the aircraft's stall­ once the pilot had flown too far in blind valleys. climb 800 feet from the strip . ing speed substantially and al­ up the narrowing, steep-sided blind Don't ignore the safety messages though it could not be definit.ely J valley. In climbing further up the embodied in these accidents. If established that the aircraft had valley before beginning the t urn, you must fly in a. blind valley, stalled before it hit the tree, it is he may have been influenced by make sure you leave yourself room The day was fine and mild with Rating and his total experience was in the day. It was found that on highly probable that it was at least the reduced rate of climb demon­ to turn back, and that you do not a light south-easterly breeze, and almost 3000 hours. One third of all his earlier flights, the pilot had "semi-stalled" and slipping in. strated by the aircraft on the first fly into a position where you have the aircraft were taking off into this time was agricultural experi­ climbed into the east along the The weather conditions would run after refuelling, apparently t ci make a violent manoeuvre to the east and turning within the ence on Cessna 180 aircraft. southern wall of the valley and had have been conducive to a minor not realizing the valley narrowed avoid surrounding· terrain. confines of the valley, as they begun his climbing turn 1back to the The pilot of the other Cessna was subsidence in the valley on the so abruptly. Even so, because the climbed back towards the treat­ spreading area at a point where There is one other point to the only person who actually saw leeward side of the hills and by aircraft's clearance on earlier runs ment area. Because the 'alley the valley was approximately a watch, which, though evidently not the crash. After spreading a load, mile wide. He had followed this flying a further 400 yards up the was only 50 to 100 feet aJbove the narrows sharply two and a half a factor in this particular accident, he was holding on the western side procedure for approximately 21/.i valley, the aircraft would have trees after completing the climbing miles to the east of the strip, the of the treatment area before re­ turn in a much wider part of the has been responsible for otl:lers: hours and a number of times the come under the influence of sub­ point at which it was necessal'.'y for turning to the strip, and watched valley, the danger of flying into an Be careful that you do n ot become aircraft was sighted completing its sidence from the eastern wall at the aircraft to begin their t.urns the ill-fated aircraft as it made its turn between 50 and 100 feet above even slightly narrower section spatially disoriented from the ef­ was critical. Carrying 8 cwt. loads, climbing turn in the valley. It the valley's blind end. In the re­ should have been clear. fect of a sloping valley flo or. This the trees on the northern side of stricted manoeuvring area avail­ both the aircraft began operations then banked sharply to port, a the valley. On the flight on which phenomenon can lead pilots into able to the aircraft near the end COMMENT at 1130 hours, and by early after­ stream of gypsum issued from its the accident occurred, however, the the error of believing the horizon of the valley however, it is doubtful noon each had completed about 20 hopper, and it plunged into the pilot did not follow the same route This accident need not have hap­ to be well above the true horizon if the turn could h ave been com­ loads. At 1330 hours, one air·craft valley side. The owner of the pro­ as previously and before com­ pened. Its theme is t he same as line, to the detriment of the air­ pleted successfully even in still-air came in to refuel. The loader driver perty on which the strip was mencing to turn, flew some 400 that of many other accidents in craft's performance just at a time conditions and the subsidence topped up its tanks to 25 gallons, located, was working in the valley yards further up the valley where which pilots have allowed their when optimum performance is along the eastern valley wall, loaded its hopper with another 8 midway between the airstrip and it narrowed sharply to a width of aircraft to become trapped amid vital to safety. cwt. of gypsum and the pilot took the accident site at the time and about 800 yards. At this point the off again. The aircraft was back for noticed that on its final run the aircraft would have been only 300 another load soon afterwards and aircraft flew further up the valley yards from the " blind" eastern wall once again the pilot took off into than previously before beginning of the valley. the east. Five minutes later it its climbing turn. Less than a crashed and burnt on the valley minute later he looked up to see It was calculated that in the air­ side two and a half miles north­ the aircraft banking steeply, high space available for the final turn, SPREADING AREA west of the strip, killing the pilot up on the northern wall of the a 180 degree turn would require 75 .. instantly. ,, valley. He lost sight of it, heard degrees of bank, and this would the impact and saw a column of raise the indicated stalling speed Examination of the wreckage at black smoke rising from where it to about 80 knots. Although in the site of the accident showec!. that had disappeared. fact the aircraft had only to turn the port wing had first struck a through 160 degrees to avoid the 1 large tree well below the tcp of Because the aircraft hact been northern wall of the valley, this the ridge. The aircraft had t hen refuelled shortly before the acci­ was sufficient to commit it to a nose-dived into the ground, burst dent, it was .being flown at a some­ rate of turn requiring more than 1 into flames and rolled 150 feet be­ what higher weight than during the 60 degrees of bank. fore coming to rest upside down. previous hour and a half, apart No evidence was found of any from the one flight completed since Apparently the pilot had not defect or malfunction which could refuelling. The temperature would realized that such a steep turn have contributed to the accident. also have increased as the day wore would be required, for he had begun ,The pilot held a Commercial on, and as a result of these factors, it at a rate similar to the turns Licence with a Class 1 Agricultural the aircraft's rate of climb would he had made further down the Rating and a Bl Flying Instructor's have been lower than it was earlier valley on previous runs. As the

14 AVIATION SAFET Y DIGEST ~·---- Blind Flying-The Hard Way

A flying instructor was giving a student pilot dual instruction in a DH.82. Seated in the front cockpit and dressed in a flying suit with a triangular nylon scarf tucked into the neck, the instructor bega.n Lhe first take-off. As the aircraft left the ground the scarf was blown upwards over his face, obscuring his vision. Wind currents in the cockpit made it difficult for him to pull the scarf down again and he had to lean out into the slip-stream before he could clear the scarf from his eyes and see where he was going. The wind blew the scarf free, and the instructor was able to climb away safely. Because it was the student's first period of Too . much of a Good Thing flying instruction, he was of no help in controlling the aircraft dur­ After taking off from Port Lin­ by winding the elevator trim for­ dent, the instructor said that al­ student pilots against happenings Applying excessive amounts of ing the emergency. of this sort. Today, however, when coln, S.A., on a regular public ward as far as it would go. Even though he had given over 1,000 grease to lubrication points hours instruction in DH.82s, he had most training takes place in cabin transport flight, the crew of a DC.3 so, a pronounced tail-heaviness re­ The instructor afterwards re­ achieves nothing except to allow enacted the take-off with an ex­ never heard Of this happening be­ aircraft, it is easy to see that poten­ found that they were unable to un­ mained, requiring a lot of forward pressure on the control column. dust and grit to collect on and perienced pilot in the student's fore. tial hazards like these may not lock the undercarriage down-latch Later when the aircraft was in­ around moving parts. In the case seat, and found that as soon as In days gone by, when most fly­ always be recognized. Pilots who in order to retract the gear_ The spected by an engineer it was of control linkage greasing points the aircraft became airborne the ing training was carried out in still fly open cockpit aircraft would aircraft returned and landed at found that a stone had become in control surfaces, it 1s conceiv­ scarf again blew over his face in open cockpit aircraft, it was an in­ do well to profit by this flyi!1g in­ Port Lincoln and it was then found lodged in the trim tab drive able that a sufficiently large accu­ the same way. Reporting the inci- structor's responsibility to warn structor's unnerving experience. that the down-latch spade on the sprocket in the tailplane. mulation of grease and dirt could starboard undercarriage was jam­ eventally affect the static balance med in the locked position by a Unlikely though it seems, the of the control surface itself. Keep­ small stone which had become two incidents show that matter ing lubricated parts wiped free of NO CHARGE wedged between the spade and a flung up by the landing wheels can surplus grease and dirt should help nut on the latch housing. The become a source of trouble especi­ to prevent problems of this sort A Beech Bonanza was departing between the aircraft and the tower The second lesson from the inci­ latch operated normally after the ally if it can stick to something. developing. dent is one for both pilots and air stone had been removed. The latch from Sydney Airport for Banks­ returned to normal. As it hap- town. The aircraft was cleared to pened, the aircraft's unauthorized traffic controllers: The pilot was spade on a DC.3 is greased regu­ expecting to take-off and when he larly and it is possible that the the runway holding point and, after take-off did not conflict with other running up, the pilot reported saw the flashing green light he stone was thrown up by the wheels BUSH FLYING HAZARD traffi c. assumed it was his take-off clear­ during the take-of!, and became "Ready". The tower instructed the Landing at a station airstrip in The pilot, who was the manager aircraft to line up but no acknow­ This incident points two nseful ance. With a more adequate know­ lodged in excess grease adhering ledge of light signals, however, he to the fitting around the grease the Northern Territory after a brief of a Northern Territory pastoral ledgement was received and the lessons. The first is that the com­ flight to locate livestock, the pilot company, would have been no aircraft failed to answer further munication difficulty was caused would have realised that it was a nipple. signal only to taxi. The tower of a Piper Cub saw a kangaroo leap stranger to the menace that kanga­ calls. At this point the tower con­ entirely by the low state of the air­ In another recent incident, a from a patch of scrub beside the controller, on the other hand, roos pose in the outback to any Beechcraft 18 taking off from strip and cross in front. of the air­ troller sough t the assistance of a craft's battery. While the engine should have foreseen that a signal Moorabbin Airport, Vic., developed craft just as he touched down. He sort of fast moving vehicle. He was following Electra to instruct the was idling at the holding point no to taxi at that stage could cause a tail-heavy condition immediately braked hard to avoid a collision but caught simply because t.he kan­ Bonanza to return to the tarmac generator power was available and confusion, because the pilot was it left the ground. The undercar­ the aircraft struck the animal with garoo bounded on to the airstrip and when this also failed, he the charge in the battery was in­ already on the end of the runway riage was raised, the engines were the starboard landing wheel. The right in front of his aeroplane. No directed a series of green signal sufficient to enable the radio to expecting a clearance to take-off. throttled back to below climb force of the impact, on top of the doubt other bush pilots are equally lamp flashes at the aircraft, in­ operate properly. Had the pilot In this case therefore either white power, and the aircraft returned harsh braking effect, nosecl the air­ wary, but now that many city­ tending that it should taxi clear recognised this, communication flashes (return to starting point on and landed on the departure run­ craft over enough for the pr0peller way. The pilot said that aftei: he to strike the ground, bending the based aircraft operate into the out­ of the runway. The pilot, seeing could have been maintained 'lt the the aerodrome) or red flashes (taxi had advised the tower that he was blades. Only the slow landing back, there may be some pilots who the green light, accepted it as a holding point by increasing the clear of landing area in use) would returning, he had attempted to speed of the aircraft prevented it are not familiar with this unusual clearance and took off. Imme­ engine power until the generator have been a more appropriate correct the out-of-trim condition going right over on to its back. but nevertheless real hazard. diately he did so, communication cut in. signal.

16 AVIATION SAFETY DIGEST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 17 FROM THE INCIDENT FILES AGRICULTURAL FLYING AND COMMON LAW In recent months, the Deportment hos received o numbe.r of complaints from people ob­ jecting to agricultural a ircraft flying low over their p roperties. Some of the complaints hove Boeing damaged by Volcanic Ash come from householders who hove merely registered annoyance; others, more serious, hove been mode by poultry formers whose birds hove panicked and smothered one another when aircraft Approaching the island of Bali NEW GUINE'A READERS newspapers, or even sight-seeing flew over the hatcheries and pens. The inc idents raise the question of the liabil ity of pilots and while en route from Brisbane to Although this incident is of in­ flights into the vicinity of erupting operators for damage caused to property in the course of agricultural operations. Singapore, the crew of a Boeing 707 terest mainly to airlines that ope­ volcanoes. A few minutes of flight A brief look at the' legal requirements for operating an aircraft in agricultural work will saw a large cumulo-nimbus cloud rate high speed jet aircraft. and in ash-polluted air such as the help us to see the implications more clearly. the majority of our readers may situated over the north-east part well ask what it has to do with Boeings encountered, could cause We start with the proposition that if a person is are performed beyond a range of 2,000 feet from of the island in the vicinity of the them, it also has a message in it rapid wear in the engine and re­ appropriately licensed and the aeroplane is reg·!ster­ an occupied building. But if a pilot wishes to fly Agung volcano and rising to about for the small piston engine aircraft duce its overhaul life by as much ed an d has a Certificate of Airworthiness and so on, nearer than that to a house or building in which 50,000 feet. While still flying in operator. It is not unusual for as 80 per cent. Remember this if then that person may fl y the aeroplane, provided he people are living he must get permission from the clear air, a few minutes before light aircraft to undertake rescue you should happen to be flying any­ complies with Air Navigation Regulations and Air occupier. If he flies within that range without such permission he can be prosecuted and fined for a operations, photographic flights for where near an erupting volcano ! Navigation Orders. For our immediate purposes reaching the coast, the aircraft the relevant ones are A.N.R. 133 and A.N.O. 20.21: breach of the law. suddenly ran into a patch of slate­ The material part of A.N.R. 133 reads as fol­ Here we should note the distinction between like hail which lasted for about 25 lows:- civil and criminal law. A criminal offence is one seconds. As the aircraft emerged SOFT DRINK CAN 'EXPLODES "133 (2)...... an aircraft shall not fiy over­ for which a penalty is provided, in this case by into the clear again the r.rew saw IN AIRCRAFT ·CABIN ( a) any city, town or populous area at a l:;wer the Air Navigation Regulations. The charge that th e cockpit windscreen had height than 1,500 feet; or is laid by the Commonwealth, and any penalty im­ the appearance of having been Returning· to his aircraft after the aircraft is to be left in th'e open for (b) any other area at a lower height than 500 posed by the court on the pilot or operator is for a it had been parked in the summer breach of the law only and is quite irrespective of sand-blasted. The flight continued a length of time. It is also c good idea feet. sun for two days at Perth Airport, to keep them away from the immediate (3) The provisions of sub-regulation (2) of this any litigation by persons who feel they have a and as the aircraft passed abeam of the owner found that a tin of soft regulation shall not apply if- rightful claim for damages to property as a result the cumulo-nimbus cloud, the crew drink he had left in the cabin, had vicinity of the windscreen and instru­ (b) the aircraft is engaged upon aerial work of the same act by the pilot or operator. saw that the volcano was erupting exploded. Apart from spattering ment panel. A face-full of lolly water, or of a nature which necessitates low fiying On the other hand, a civil or common law action into the base of the cloud. When lemonade over the upholstery, the even your favourite brand of a le, could and the owner or operator of the aircraft is one in which a person has suffered loss (e.g., the the aircraft was inspected after explosion caused no damage but be most disconcerting during toke-off ! has received from the Director- Gtneral poultry farmer whose birds died when frightened by landing at Singapore, sand- blast it illustrates that cabin tempera­ either a general permit for all fiights or the low flying aircraft), and takes legal action type erosion and pitting were found tures can become.surprisingly high a specific permit for a single fiight to be (through a private solicitor) for recompense for on the nose and on all flight sta­ inside aircraft parked in the sun. made at a lower height while engaged upon the damage he has suffered. The fact t hat tion windows. Four windows were such aerial work.'' an aircraft may not have been flown "with­ The can manufacturers said replaced. The leading· edges of the As related specifically to the aerial agricultural in 2,000 feet horizontally of a building occupied by wings and tail also showed similar that, at temperatures of the order industry, is therefore an offence to fly at a heig·ht persons," is not, in itself, necessarily germane to an of 140 °F, the internal pressure in but lighter damage, and slight lower than 500 feet unless- action of this sort and the liability aspects are a soft drink container will rise to damage was found on the engine (1 ) engaged in agTicultural operations; anc1. clearly indicated in the note which follows paragraph about 100-110 pounds per square cowlings and landing lights. (2) permission has been given by the Director­ 3.2 of A.N.O. 20.21 :- inch. The cans are designed to General. " Attention is directed to the fact that the per­ Another Boeing aircraft which withstand considerably higher This brings us to A.N.O. 20.21 which provides­ mission granted in this paragraph 3 does not confer had been flying from Singapore to pressures and are, in fact, sample "3.1- Pursuant to Air Navigation Regulation on an operator any rights, as against the owner of Brisbane at the same time h ad tested to above 160 p.s.i. during 133 (3) (b), permission is hereby granted for air­ any land over which the operations may be con­ diverted 130 miles off course to try manufacture. Testing at this craft to operate at lower heights than that pre­ ducted, or prejudice in any way the rights and to avoid the effects of the eruption pressure will cause the ends to scribed in Regulation 133 (2) (b) of the Air Naviga­ remedies which any person may have in common but was, nevertheless, in the dust bulge but has not been known tion Regulations while engaged on agricultural law in respect of any injury to persons or damage bearing cloud for about 13 minutes. to produce an eruption of the side operations and inspection fiights relating thereto to property caused directly or indirectly by the After the encounter the crew found seam, as occurred in the a ircraft. for which an appropriate aerial work licence is operator." the engine pressure ratio indicators This type of failure has, however, held or which are classified as private operations for Nos. 1 and 2 engines were slug­ been produced in laboratory tests Although the responsibility of initiating proc.:!ed­ under the provisions of Air Navigation P..egu.!ation gish in operation and suspected by subjecting a filled can to tem­ ings of this sort lies solely with the person con­ 191 (1) (iii) . cerned, an action to recover loss may be taken that they had been contaminated peratures of the order of 140°F 3.2- Notwithstanding the permission granted in against a pilot or operator i·egardless of whether by volcanic ash. An inspection after for several days, thus producing a paragraph 3.1, aircraft engaged on agricultural or not a breach of the regulations has been proved the aircraft arrived at Brisbane creep-fatigue type oJ failure. This operations and inspection fiights relating thereto in a criminal case. revealed slight abrasions to the is believed the most likely explana­ shall not be fiown below a height of 500 feet above It is intended in the near future to make some cockpit windows and landing lights. tion of the can failure in the air­ craft. the terrain within 2,000 feet horizontally of a amendments to A.N.R. 133 and to A.N.O. 20.21 to Two of the windows were changed. building occupied by persons except with the per­ more clearly define the circumstances in which The affected engine pressure ratio COMMENT : mission of the occupier." operations may be conducted at less than the nor­ lines were also blown through and So we see that, because the Director-General has If you corry drink cons in your a ir­ mal minimum altitudes. The proposed changes will the indicators afterwards operated given authority to agTicultural operators to fl y under not, however, affect the principles outlined in this satisfactorily. craft we suggest you •emove them when 500 fezt, no offence is committed while such flights disserta tion.

18 AVIATION SAFETY DIGE ST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 19 as 'no radio' for his next leg. Sitting down, he filled reserves, the flight across the rolling plains of Eyre in details to Whyalla. He didn't use a computer and Peninsula passed without incident and he touched declined an offer of a route forecast to Whyalla­ down at Ceduha just before 10 a.m. he'd been given one to Parafield and Whyalla before Knight turned his aircraft off the runway and he left Nhill, he said. He stood up when he had followed the paved taxiway back towards the finished and handed in the form. "What can you apron. The engine, which had been bellowing fell me about the country between Ceduna and healthily since he'd started it at Whyalla, suddenly Cook ?" he asked. coughed once or twice and died. The reason was Journey The duty con tro!ler, an ex-pilot with a wealth obvious. He let the aircraft roll to a stop, undid h is of experience in South Australia, went over the route harness and walked the remaining 100 yards to the with him, suggestin g he should aim to intercept the ftigh t information office. The Meteorological Officer • transcontinen tal railway about 15 miles east of Cook on duty greeted him, Knig·ht explaining that tlle and follow it in. Knight nodded his agreement; small amount of fuel he had left had run to the rear into thanked h im and picked up his papers. The con­ of the tanks when the tail came down. troller watched him as he- turned to go. He seemed "Could you get hold of the fuel agent for me ?" airmanlike and capable, but very tired. he asked. The Met. man phoned the agent for him. On the tarmac, Knight boarded his aircraft and "Get him to bring out a few oranges, too, if he can," Nowf.er - st arted the engine again. Receiving the tower suc­ Knight added. While he waited, he leant against cessfully this time, he copied take-off instructions the table and discussed the tul'bulence. " Do you and departed via the s t. Kilda lig'ht aircraft corridor think it would be any better along the coast ?" "Well, there's always a sea breeze along this part of the coast in the afternoon, and conditions would be smoother." Knight nodded. "I'll probably stick to the coast as far as Fowler's Bay then turn inland. The sea breeze should be some help." Twenty minutes passed and a vehicle went past the office. It pulled up by the fuel depot and Knight went out to meet the · driver. Together they refuelled the aircraft from a At Ceduna, on the Great Austra lian Bigh t, his newly acquired ex-R.A.A.F. Wackett CA.6. His 44 gallon drum. It took 31 gallons. an aerodrome groundsman was spending h i::­ wife was to join him in Perth , fiying from Melbourne " Must have had three gallons left when I landed," Sur.day fishing a m ile off- shore. The day was by airline th e day after he set off. Knight remarked. "I'm going to refuel again at Cook, fine and clear and the ligh t south-easterly breeze so I shouldn't have any worries this time. I'm g·oing rippled the surface of t he bay, m aking it sparkle On Saturday morning 13th January, 1962, Knight direct to Cook. I did think of going via the coast, in th e noon-day sun. From the aerodrome came drove to Moorabbin Airport. It was already later but I'll proba•bly be better off sticking to the direct a dist an t high pit ched whine of an air craft tak ­ t han he intended, but he had been up lat e the night route." He dipped the oil tank a nd the agent added ing off, a nd a single engined low wing aeroplane before and had slept in. His aircraft, smart in a fo ur pints. "She looks to be in good condition," the agent climbed out over t h e t own a n d set course to t h e fresh coat Of paint, and with only a thousand hours in its log book, had already been pushed from its observed. "Better than one a chap used to have west. The fish erma n wa t ched it with detached around here". interest. It seemed to be on a bout t h e righ t h ead ­ hangar and was waiting for h im on the tarmac. Knight made a pre-fiight inspection, stowed his lug­ Route followed by aircraft and Search Areci. "She's going like a charm," said Knight. "I'd ing for Cooi{ or Forrest, though more t o t h e like a modern aircraft of course. But they're too nort h t han usual. Must be following t he east­ gage securely in the rear cockpit, and went to submit his Flight Details. This done, he returned to his to follow the eastern coast Qf St. Vincent's Gulf. pricey for me just yet. These Wacketts do a good west highway, he though t, and went back t o h is aircraft and strapped himself in. The 7-cylinder "The set's brand new again," he told the tower as he job but they're like an old car - you have to drive fishing. Super Scara•b turned over noisily on· t he starter, set course. them all the way. It's a long way on your own too - I don't think I'll do it again". A few m inutes lat er the a ircraft droned over caugh t and roared into life. Knigh t called the tower Landing at Whyalla, late in the afternoon th e aboriginal mission at K oonibba, twenty miles on VHF and taxied out. He was on his way at last. Knight took a taxi into town and booked into a hotel. They checked both tanks for water , Knight nort h-east of Ced una. M ore than three y'Gars He put a trunk line call through to his wife in signed for the fuel and ·collected his bag of oranges, The fiight over the ranges to Nh ill, where he Melbourne to report progress, and went to bed. thanked the agent then walked ·back -to the Met. were t o elapse before i t was seen again. refuelled, then across the sparsely settled Mallee He was up early next day and rang the aero­ Office. He asked for details of the upper winds country to the irrigated Murray farmland and the and for cloud heights, then went through into the lush Adelaide Hills was uneventful. Letting down drome refuelling service. It was Sunday morning and the n umber was not answering. He waited a adjoining Communications Office. He filled in a ten minutes out of Parafield, Knight called the tower Flight Details form showing his time intervals -to * * * on 118.7 Mc. There was no reply. He tried again, while then tried again .but it was no use. He went Jim Kn ight had learned to fly in Western Aus­ to the aerodrome and checked his tanks again. Forrest via Cook at 5000 feet together with a SAR­ then again without success. Continuing his ap­ TIME of 0830 G.M.T. and he handed it to the Com. tralia, gaining his private licence, and had since proach, he got a 'green ' from the tower, landed and There should •be just enough fuel to make Ceduna. He decided to press on. Officer. logged several hundred hours on a number of dif­ taxied in. "Could I use your phone before I go ?" he ferent single-en gine types. For two years he had Five minutes later Knight climbed the stairs to It was a typical fine mid-summer's day "and he asked. been working in Me~bo urn e and with h is annual the tower to cancel his S.A.R. His V.H.F. receiver didn't wait to phone his Flight Details through to The Com. Officer passed him t he phone. He leave due in January, planned a holiday trip to h is had been intermittent during the fiight from Adelaide. Flying· conditions were hot and turbulent, consulted the directory and rang the chief pilot home State, flying himself across th e continent in Moorabbin, he explained, and he would flight plan but apart from a few misgivings a:bout his fuel of the Ceduna Flying· Medical Service and asked if

20 AVIATION SAFET Y DIGEST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 21 there was any 80 octane fuel at Cook. Knight ex­ the F.27 carried out a night search over the Wac­ Hughes sighting ,and a search plan for the follow­ Nevertheless, it was decided to once again cover plained he had ordered fuel to be sent from Kal­ kett's proba:ble tracks, watching for fires and signal ing day was drawn up. The area north of the both the primary probability area and the second goorlie. But in case it hadn't arrived he wondered lights. On Tuesday, the search force, reinforced railway and east of the 128 deg. meridian seemed the area of probability based on the Hughes sighting" if there was fuel available that he could use. His by a second DC. 3, a R.A.A.F. Otter, an F.D.S. Cessna most promising. The primary probability area was extended to the reserves were not enoug·h to fly non-stop to Forrest. 182 from Kalgoorlie, a private Auster and a PA.22, north-west of Cook, and tied in with the area pre­ Because of the difficulties being experienced in viously searched to the north-west of ljughes. The chief pilot gave him permission and they completely saturated the proba:bility area, working navigating accurately in this remote and virtually talked for a few minutes, Knig1ht mentioning he had on a one mile visibility basis, and making sweeps featureless desert country, the Rescue Co-ordination All reasona•ble areas had now been searched previously flown to Perth in a Proctor that was for­ at 90 degrees to the previous day's search patterns. Centre decided that the search patterns would need at least once and the primary probability area and merly owned by the Flying Medical Service at The search area was extended along the coast as to be flown by large aircraft well equipped with other probaible areas had been covered by up to four Ceduna. Finally, he asked a few details about the far as the Head of the Bight and the Nullarbor Plain radio. A DC.4 flew from Adelaide to supplement searches using a visibility distance of one mile. So aerodrome at Cook and hung up. Knight closed and the probability area was widened. Two Doves the six other multi-engined aircraft in the search far the intense effort had failed to add one single the door and walked down the steps to where his operating· courier flig·hts from Adelaide to Maralinga area while three light aircraft scoured track3 and fact to the knowledge that the Wackett had left aircraft was parked on the apron. He climbed in, searched along their tracks from Ceduna to Watson, areas of scrub immediately to the north-west of Ceduna on the 14th and had set course in the right fastened his harness, started the engine and taxied and on their return ftig·hts covered the area south Hughes. By Sunday, 21st J anuary, a week after direction. Beyond that nothing definite was known out. Five minutes later the Wackett lifted off Run­ of the railway line between Fisher and Immarna. t he Wackett had disappeared, all areas of probability but the reported sighting at Hughes seemed a sig­ way 23 and set course towards the west. The Cessna from Kalgoorlie landed twice at Nullar­ and reasonable possibility had been searched. nificant piece of evidence and could be justified bor Homestead to investig·ate hearing reports and the other light aircraft checked a further five re­ Three hund*red and fifty* miles* away at Forrest, ports of smoke. Many of the hearing reports that beyond the Head of the Bight and across the flat had come in suggested the Wackett had been fol­ 27 s{ s • 276 N.M. and featureless Nullarbor Plain, the duty Com. Officer lowing the ·coast and so the coastal route from AREA OF PROBABILITY looked at the clock again. It was six hours since the Ceduna to the Head of the Bight was flown three r··· ...... - . ~"""--=--"•-~ m"s/ \"om CEDUNA Wackett had left Ceduna and still there was no times. AREA SEARCHED i sign of it. He logged the Uncertainty Phase in the So far, the search planning had been based on station journal, typed out the Urgent SAR Message, the assumption that the Wackett would not have GROUND . ~ 83 N .M. \ "" and transmitted it. Minutes later Ceduna Oom. crossed the transcontinental railway, but now it \ Aircraft found came on the air to pass a report from the Flying seemed possible tJhat the pilot might have overshot SEARCH p 11,, here 28-3"65 Medical Service Network that the aircraft had not the railway. The railway line had become overgrown . \ . reached Cook. in many places since the introduction of diesel I Back in Adelaide, the Senior Operations Officer locomotives, making it more difficult to distinguish at Adelaide Airport declared the Distress Phase, and than when steam trains were running, and some \ the Search and Rescue Organization swung into pilots who knew the area believed it would be easy action. Police stati'ons, outpost radio transceivers to miss, especially while flying high and looking into \ and telephone subscribers west of Cedu11a were the sun over a radial engine. Had the aircraft checked ·first for hearing· or sighting reports, and flown beyond the line, it was thought that the pilot the train controller at Port Augusta was asked to would maintain his heading until ten to 15 minutes \ contact railway sidings along tJhe line from 100 miles after his E.T.A. Cook, then turn north for a further east of Oook to as far as Forrest. A D.C.A. Aero ten or 15 minutes. If he had still not sighted the Commander at Adelaide was readied for a night line by this time it was likely that he would turn flight to Ceduna with additional Com. and A.T.C. on to a reciprocal heading, descend . to a lower alti­ staff and two storepedoes, and an airline DC.3 was tude and fly south ag·ain until he sig,hted the rail­ fORREST oEAKlN requisitioned at Adelaide Airport to ·be at Ceduna way, the east-west road or the coast. By this time in time to refuel and begin searching at first light. the aircraft would be nearing the end of its endur­ llEID Meanwhile, three airline aircraft flying between ance and the pilot would presumably land as near LOONGANA Perth and Adelaide were diverted via Forrest, Cook as possi·ble to one of these g·eographical features. and Ceduna calling and listening on the Wackett's The fact that the railway at Cook is only 60 miles V.H.F. frequencies. Ceduna reported that the F.M.S. north of the coast, and the presence of a distinct Cessna 210 would be ready to begin searching there line of timber at the northern extremity of the at first light, and from MeLbourne the D.C.A. Fly­ Nullarbor Plain, 40 miles north of Cook made it diffi­ ing Unit advised that their Fokker Friendship would cult to imagine the pilot flying very far to the north. be leaving in the morning. During the night The search on the third day was based on this several hearing reports came in from a native camp theory, using 12 aircraft. at Tallowan Hut 120 miles west of Ceduna. The That day, a report came in that two fettlers at only sighting report was th e one from Koonibba. Hughes, 55 miles west of Cook, had seen a single The Rescue Co-ordination Centre at Adelaide Airport engined aircraft pass over Hughes on the Sunday assessed an area of probability around and beyond afternoon, flying from south-east to north-west. the Ced una-Oook track, and plans were made to The time of sighting was consistent with the dis­ search it first using all availa:ble aircraft working tance the aircraft could have covered since leaving to a visibility distance of two miles. Ceduna. The men were fl own to Ceduna for interro­ The first day's searching on Monday 15th Janu­ gation and their description t allied with that of ary covered the entire probability area and investi­ the missing Wackett. A Dove carried out a night gated two fire sightings. That night the crew of sweep over a presumed track plotted from the

22 AVIAT ION SAFETY DIGEST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5· 23 from considerations of endurance, ground speed and They found the Wacket t resting normally on Daylight came at last. Now, he knew, the search water today . . ." The diary ended with personal heading. The search area comprised huge expanses its wheels in the red sand at one end of the clear­ for him would be well under way and there was messages for his wife. of uninha:bited plain and sandhill country and it ing· between two parallel ridges. At first glance it no reason why they shouldn't find him soon. Eagerly, was possible that the Wackett could have been appeared intact, and it was only after a closer look he pegged out a ground to air signal in front of missed, despite t he coverage already given. The * * * plausibility of the Hughes report warran ted yet an­ that impact damage was evident. The pilot had the aircraft and set about getting a scrub fire going. Why did this tragedy happen? What was it that other search of the whole area using four D.C.A. obviously made a powered approach from the west Having no matches, he held a piece of rag under made this experienced pilot fly so far oft' ' course that aircraft and a ·chartered Dove. into the 300-yard clearing and h ad ground-looped one of the fuel tank drains to soak it with petrol, one of the greatest aerial searches in Australia's then climbing up on the wing to open the engine history failed to find him, and left him to perish in On Thursday 25th, hopes were raised when the to starboard as the aircraft had run into thicken­ cowling, ignited the cloth with a spark from the one of the most inhospitable parts of the continent ? crew of one of the Aero Commanders sighted fires ing scrub and spinnifex at the eastern end. The battery and threw it into a patch of scrub. Dozens of theories and counter questions spring north of Maralinga which appeared to be of human flaps were still fully down, the sta1'board one dam­ to mind. Did the pilot go to sleep at the controls origin, and a ground party carrying a portable V.H.F. aged from having ridden over a small mulga tree, Slowly the hours passed as he looked and and let his aircraft fly on unguided ? Highly un­ tr!l_nsceiver, set out by Landrover from Maralinga and the scrub- had torn the fabric in places as the listened for signs of aircraft searching for him. He likely in a Wackett and in the tul'bulence of the hot to investigate. The patrol did not expect to reach aircraft jolted to its final resting place. The three trjed to work out where he could be, reconstructing afternoon. Did his watch stop and he lose track the site for at least two days and the aerial search years of exposure to the scorch ing sun and the his flight to see where his navigation had gone of the time and distance he had flown ? No, he had continued throughout Friday, Saturday and Sunday. wind had also taken its toll; the paintwork was wrong; he had been shaken to find there was a recorded the time he landed. Why then did he allow Finally on Monday 29th, the ground party radioed blistered, in places the wind-driven sand had eroded difference of 30 degrees between the compass indica­ himself to cross the transcontinental railway ? Why that they had investigated all the fires and found the finish down to bare metal and the rudder hinges tions in the front and rear cockpits. At 1610 that did he go on fiying over the sandhills when his map that they had been lit by natives. There was h ad succumbed to their many months of fiapping afternoon he wrote, "24 hours on ground. Sighted showed that he should be over the Nullarbor Plain? now no prospect that the missing pilot could still no aircraft." in the winds. Four scattered seat cushions, a piece Even on the direct Ceduna-Cook track, Fowler's Bay be alive and on Tuesday 30th, 19 days after the of blanket, the remains of a signal pegged out on fie ate his last remaining orange as he watched and the Head of the Bight are clearly visible from as Wackett had disappeared, the search, after cover­ the ground, and a day to day diary scratched on low as 3000 feet-why then did he go on without ing 26,000 miles involving 760 flying hours in eighteen the desert dawn break for the second time. With the fuselage panels behind the rear cockpit, poig­ sighting these landmarks ? At Cook, the railway is different aircraft, was abandoned. his earlier optimism daunted now, he rationed his nantly told the story of the pilot's agonizing wait drinking to eke out the dwindling supply of precious only 60 miles north of the coast-why didn't he turn for the rescue aircraft that never arrived, but apart water. Already the day was hot and even at this around and fly south when he hadn't sighted it after * hour the myriads of black flies swarmed around him a reasonable time ? And why did he still think he * * with maddening persistance. He rigged a makeshift was south of the line when he landed, as his final Three years later, a Lockheed Hudson based at shelter by nailing a blanket to the wooden leading diary entry suggests ? Oodnadatta was carrying out an aerial survey of edge of the wing and took what refuge it afforded Difficult as these questions are, they become even desert country well to the north of Maralinga. It beneath the aircraft. It was little enough, but at more puzzling when set beside the pilot's claim to had rbeen working in the area for several weeks least it offered shade from the harsh, withering sun have flown the route to the west before. If the when ·on 28th March, 1965, its crew reported sight­ throughout the day. Still no aircraft came. When pilot's compass was out 30 degrees as he later be­ ing an abandoned single-engined service aircraft the sun went down he came out from his shelter lieved, how did he naviga te accurately from Whyalla lying between sand ridges 135 miles due north of and lay on top of the wing. After the scorching heat, across Eyre Peninsula to Ceduna, as he must have Maralinga. At the Department's request the Hud­ the coolness of the night was like a tonic. done to reach Ceduna with such slender fuel re­ son crew photographed the aircraft and there was serves ? Was the compass upset while the aircraft no longer any doubt of its identity. The lost Wackett Wednesday came and went, another day of fierce was on the ground at Ceduna ? If so how ? And if was 180 miles north-north-east of its destination, heat with not a cloud in the sky and still no sign or we do assume the compass was out 30 degrees how more than 40 degress oft' the Ceduna-Cook track, sound of searching aircraft. On Thursday morning do we explain the aircraft being 42 degrees off track ? an d 83 miles from th e nearest part of the search his spirits rose a little again when he found a box What route d id it follow to the landing site ? area. of matches amongst his luggage and he lit a fire in the clumps of spinnifex on the edge of the clearing. These questions can never 'be answered with cer­ An investigation team led by the Department's from a note suggesting that the front cockpit com­ "Hope someone sees it," he scratched on the side of tainty, but if we accept the pilot's compass was 30 Senior Inspector of Air Safety from Adelaide, sup­ pass could have been 30 degrees out, they offered the fuselage. But still no one came. Now he was degrees out when he left Ceduna it becomes possible ported by Commonwealth Police from Maralinga, no explanation for his gross navigational error. Both getting desperate-today he'd have to try and do to surmise what might has happened. To do so set out over the sandhills for the site ·on Saturday compasses had been dismantled. something, even if it meant leaving the aircraft. emphasises yet again that with navigation nothing· 3rd April. In the stifling· heat and heavy sand, the can ever be taken for granted. The pilot was tired going· was extremely difficult and the first vehicle It was not hard to reconstruct the events of At dawn next morning he was back with his and in a hurry to be on his way. He rejected the gave in with a broken axle after 22 miles. A replace­ those few days more than three years earlier. Nearly aircraft and resignedly wrote his final entry. "De­ easier coastal route in favour of the shorter direct ment was despatched from Maralinga but it was four hours after he had set co urse from Ceduna cided to make a dash on foot north to the-'but was track, gave only the briefest thought to his flight 24 hours -before the party could go on and only on that fateful Sunday afternoon and only seven too weak in the legs. When taking the front compass planning-, and was in the air again as soon as he another 26 miles could be ·covered before nightfall minutes rbefore his fuel would have been exhausted, out I found both front retaining bolts were missing could be. After his turbulent flight that morning he on the Sunday. On the morning of Monday, 5th, the pilot had picked out the most likely looking and the rear one loose enough to let the whole thing might well have decided to climb into the calm air the party broke camp at dawn and before the day patch in the waste of sand ridges and had made swing about 15 degrees ... I used the alcohol out of above the three eighths of strato-cumulus at 8000 was out achieved a position only 12 miles to the a precautionary landin g. It was 1610 Central Stan­ the compass to rub over my face and body to make feet. Above the cloud layer, his view of the more south of the Wackett. Progress throughout was dard Time as he switched oft'. He wouldn't be over­ it cool for a while. D.C.A. may not have been look­ distant landmarks such as Fowler's Bay and the painfully slow, deviations to find passable gaps in due at Forrest for another two hours yet and it ing for me. I put in Flight Details at Ceduna at 12 Head of the Bight would have been obscured. the ridges, overheating engines, frequent tyre re­ would be well and truly dark before anyone really saying I was going to Cook and then to Forrest. My As well as being tired, he was hungry. Accord­ pairs and the ever-present swarm of ·black flies all started looking for him. He had two gallons of water Sartime at Forrest was 6 p.m. Central Time so they ing to his diary he hadn't. eaten a proper meal ~ince adding to the party's tribulations, and it was after and' with nothing· more to do but bide his time, he should have started an alert on Sunday night ... lunch time two days before and certaiqly he'd had midday on Tuesday, 6th, before the expedition finally made himself as comfortable as he could and waited Someone could have forgot. At noon today it will little, if anything, since leaving Whyalla early that reached its goal. for the lonely night to pass. be one week since I had a meal . . . I'll run out of morning, He ate some of his oranges as he flew,

24 AVIATION SAFETY DIGEST D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 5 25 possibly not giving much attention to navigating, the inevitable and landed while he still had power apart from maintaining his compass heading. for a precautionary approach. Meanwhile, the aircraft would have actually been Whatever the actual sequence of events during tracking a;bout 330°T and would have crossed the the flight, they could hardly have been very different. railway between Barton and Immarna nearly an And in any case, although they were the means by hour before his ETA Cook. which the pilot went astray, they were not the root The pilot would no doubt have descended some cause. The real reasons could probably be listed minutes before he expected to sight the railway and under three headings: Physical Fitness, Flight Pre­ was probably surprised to find himself over sandhill paration, Airmanship, with the fi rst one leading to country. The upper winds he'd been given at Ceduna the other two. Fatigue in the human element of flight, caused by lack of rest and inadequate meals had indicated a northerly airstream at altitude. If it over an extended period, can h ave consequences as had strengthened, he may have thought it could have dire in their own way, as fatigue in some vital part blown him south of track. From his previous flight of an aircraft structure. Surely the real lesson is to the west some years before, he may have remem­ that pilots need to be as concerned for every facet of bered that there were sandhills south of Colona, and their own fitness for flight as they are for those of at this stage it is possible that he altered his heading the aircraft they fly ! a few degrees to the north. At any rate, it seems he flew on in the same general direction until some 35 stop. He then returned to the minutes after his ETA Cook, expecting to intercept of Good Mointenonce," which dealt with * * * the problem in some detail ond em­ cabin to remove the log books and the railway. Apparently believing he could not have This then is the story of the Wackett and of Power lost when phasised the importance of adequate some personal effects, and unsuc­ missed the line, and with his fuel position becoming the tragic end of its pilot so far as we will ever maintenance. know it. It helps us to understa nd why one of the Throttle cable fails cessfully used the aircraft's fire ex­ critical, he then turned north to find it as quickly In post yea rs, porticulorly in oircroft tinguisher on the burning engine. as possible. biggest aerial searches ever mounted in Aus­ fitted with Gipsy se ries engines, throttle tralia was unsuccessful. We cannot. truly explain A single-engined light aircraft control Ii nkoges we re reodi ly accessible The airport staff also tried to con­ Unknowingly tracking about 030°T now, he flew how or why the aircraft finished so far from its with a student pilot at the controls and could be fairly thoroughly inspected trol the fire with dry chemical ex­ on, expecting the line to come into view at any destination but we have put forward our best was engf).ged in circuits and land­ in the course of the doily inspection tinguishers but without success, guess. You may have another theory. Whatever ings. While climbing away after the schedule. W ith the tightly cowled, hori­ moment. Another 30 minutes dragged on and still zontally opposed engines in widespread and the aircraft burned to destruc­ there was no sign of it. Now with only 40 minutes really happened to the Wackett after it left fifth take-off, the engine started to use today, however, it is a lmost impos­ tion. Ceduna, we do know from other experiences that lose power at 400 feet. The pilot fuel left he realized his situation was serious. If he sible to examine the throttle cables in Examination of the port engine flew south again h e'd only be backtracking· to an there is no substitute for care in preparation for advised the tower of his emer­ ony detail wit hout resorting to the often a. flight, nor for alertness and sound judgement fuel system showed that the fuel unknown position and would be faced with a forced gency, then closed and re-opened tedious work of removing the engine in its conduct . P erhaps you now feel, as we do, the throttle but to no effect. cowls completely. pump outlet elbow had fractured landing in the sandhills; Surely h e must sight the this is the message Jim Knight would have through the threaded section in­ railway soon ... Thirty minutes later he bowed to This, of course, places o greater re­ wanted to pass on. The pilot, who was engaged in sponsibil ity on the shoulders of moin­ side the fuel pump body, and that only his second period of solo fly­ tenonce engineers, who perform 100- the pump itself had been vibrating ing, had not received any forced hourly inspections on these aircraft. En­ on its mounting bolts, despite the landing training, and the aircraft gine control linkages m ust be carefully examined a t these inspections ond certi­ fact that these were lock-wired. crash-landed in a •building con­ fying engineers must assure themselves The vibration of the pump had struction yard, striking several there is no danger of the linkages probably induced stresses in the concrete beams. The aircraft was foi ling in service. elbow fitting, which was being re­ destroyed and the pilot seriously strained by the rigid steel fuel pipe, injured. and eventually culminated in the failure of the fitting. The fracture Examination of the engine con­ Engine Fire in Flight had allowed fuel to spray out and trols showed that although the Entering the circuit area of his be ignited by the engine exhaust . th rottle control knCanada full throttle position, the carburet­ PA-23 completed his pre-landing tor throttle lever was only 10 de­ checks which included switching on grees from the closed position. The th e electric fuel booster pumps. He swaged .flexible outer casing of t he th en noticed fuel leaking from the throttle cable had failed and was port engine n acelle and closed the Controls jammed by detached from the forward end of port throttle, but the engine caught the rigid casing ahead of the in­ fire as he did so. Unrestrained Cargo strument panel. Department of Transport, Canada The pilot, who was the sole occu­ While approaching to land at a pant of the aircraft, switched off private airstrip, a Piper Cub was COMMENT: Failure of throttle control the booster pump and, with smoke seen to suddenly assume a nose-up linkages hos been responsible over the filling the cabin, made an emer­ attitude, stall and spin. The air­ years for o large number of incidents to gency lan ding on the nearest run­ craft struck the ground in a steep light a ircraft in Austrolio. T he December, n ose-down attitude, killing the 1963, issue of tfie Digest (No. 36) con­ way and abandoned the aircraft tained on a rtic le, " The Insurance Value as soon as he could bring it to a pilot, who was the sole occupant.

D E C E M B E R, 1 9 6 S 27

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It was found that two cardboard door of the aircraft. About three winds rotating in opposite directions and cartons of groceries and a chain inches of the aileron trailing edge streaming rearwards from each wingtip saw, together weighing· 180 lb., had was damaged. of an aircraft. The energy of the tu rbu­ been loaded on to the rear seat, and rence at its source is directly proportional had ·been secured by the seat belt The towing crew had acted con­ to the wingspan loading of the and a piece of rope. trary to instructions in failing aircraft and inversely proportional to move the steps and the ground to the airspeed. Thus, the most violent During the flight the fastened power unit clear of the aircraft and vortex turbulence is likely to be found seat 'belt had apparently slipped in not positioning a wing tip look­ in the woke of large swept-wing jet a ir­ off one of the cartons and,· as the out. craft during an approach to land or aircraft was approaching to land, Airline Bulletin immediately after toke-off - the very the carton had slid forward until its phases of flight in which another oi rcroft forward top edge was resting is most likely to fly into its woke. In against the front seat, with VorteJX Turbulence rough air, the whirling funnels con be the near lower edge of the expected to break up and weaken in box still on the forward In instructor was g1vmg a stu­ less than a minute but in calm a ir, part of the rear seat. The dent pilot circuits and landings in vortices of large magnitude con remain rear seat control column stub and a PA-22 at Tucson Airport, Ari­ dangerous for several miles behind the torque tube had forced a hole in zona, U.S.A., using the 4,200-foot generating a ircraft. 12R runway. At the same time, a the base of the carton and had A following light oircroft encountering been jammed in a "nose-up" posi­ Boeing 707 was carrying out cir­ cuits and landings on the 12,000- the woke of a large jet, such a s during tion. Compressive buckling of the on approach to land, coul d be subjected foot 12L runway. The two runways forward edge of the hole in the to extremely high upsetting forces. For carton showed how the pilot had are parallel and 800 feet apart. example, the downwosh of a ir between tried to force the control column The Boeing· had taken off and the vortices could well exceed the climb back into the forward position was turning cross-wind as th e performance of a small aircraft, while when he found himself in diffi­ PA-22 was making its third ap­ the roll ing rates induced in the core of the vortices could be greater than those culties. proach to land. At 50 feet, the nose a chi eved with fu ll aileron. A light Department of Transport, Canada of the PA-22 suddenly pitched up aircraft crossing behind a heavy aircraft and the port wing dropped violent­ and encountering its troil of vortex tur­ ly. The aircraft failed to respond bulence, would be subjected to four sud­ den near-vertica l gusts,- UP, DOWN, to control corrections, veered to Comet Damaged DOWN 1 UP in rapid succession as the port and crashed into the ground. peripheries ~f ea ch of the two vortices Both ·occupants were injured, one were encountered in turn. Beca use there during Ground would be sufficient time between each seriously. pair of blows for the pilot to react with The surface wind at the time was elevator control, this could compound the Handling effect of the second pair of gusts and a steady 080/ 10 and the loss of con­ could result in the structural strength of trol was attributed to the Boeing's the a irframe being exceeded. For t his A Comet arriving at London Air­ wingtip vortices being carried rea son pi lots encountering such severe port taxied to its assigned stand turbu l~nce shoul d try to suppress their down-wind into the light aircraft's normal reaction and allow their ai rcraft on the tarmac, but over-ran the approach path. position slightly. It later 'became to " ride with" the turbulence-induced necessary to reposition it rearwards C.A.B., United States loads. and in preparation the towing crew One slightly encouraging aspect of pushed the front and rear passen ­ COMMENT: The problem of vortex this rather dismal overall picture is that, turbulence generoted ot the wingtips of . for the destructive potential to persist, ger steps away from the aircraft the vortex turbulence must remain in the doors. One of the crew boarded the heavy aircraft is a serious one in the United States, where large numbers of compact cylinders of between 15 and 20 feet diameter in wh ich it was generated. aircraft to operate the brakes while li ght aeroplanes share prima ry a irpo rts a second stood by the ground The chances of flyi ng into such a na rrow with heavy jet transport aircraft, and it bond of a irspace ore thus relatively power unit to pay out t he power has been the subject of studies by the small, particularly away from the imme­ lead which was still connected to National Aeronautics and Space Admin­ diate vicinity of aerod romes. Never­ the aircraft. istrotion. Although warnings on vortex theless, with more and more small aero­ planes mixing it with " heavies" a t our turbulence have appeared in the Digest primary airports in Australia, the poten­ The nosewheel of the aircraft on a t least two previous occasions, we tial for vortex turbulence accidents is was resting in a drainage gully and would be well advised to heed the lesson increasing. As in the occident quoted, the tug had to use considerable of this latest accident and re fresh our the area of greatest danger is downwind power to start the aircraft moving. minds on the hazards associated wi th from the path of a heavy aircraft land­ ing or taking off. A few instances of When the resistance was overcome, the phenomenon. encounters have already been reported 12.000 CONTROLS the aircraft rolled back suddenly Like a ll clear a ir turbulence, vortex in Australia, but there have been no and the port aileron collided with turbulence is invis ible, but if the vor­ serious consequences so far. Let's keep the passenger steps, which had it that way. Keeping your d istance from tices could be seen, they would appear large a ircraft is the only sure way to been moved away from the rear os a pair of narrow ho rizontal whirl- avoid the danger ! Twelve thousand controls in the form of muscles are operated by the Ibis in working its feathers alone. That's a few more than you've got to worry about. The Ibis has to 28 AVIATION SAFETY DIGEST rely on instinct not reason- but he never pulls the wrong lever. The I bis is a good pilot.