Georgia State University ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University History Theses Department of History Spring 5-2-2018 THE CONFEDERACY’S “HARDEST HITTER”: REEVALUATING JAMES LONGSTREET’S CIVIL WAR RECORD ON THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE Joseph Callaway Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses Recommended Citation Callaway, Joseph, "THE CONFEDERACY’S “HARDEST HITTER”: REEVALUATING JAMES LONGSTREET’S CIVIL WAR RECORD ON THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE." Thesis, Georgia State University, 2018. https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_theses/119 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CONFEDERACY’S “HARDEST HITTER”: REEVALUATING JAMES LONGSTREET’S CIVIL WAR RECORD ON THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE by JOSEPH DEWITT CALLAWAY Under the Direction of Wendy Hamand Venet, PhD. ABSTRACT James Longstreet is most often remembered by scholars of the Civil War and Civil War hobbyists as a general who favored defensive tactics over offensive ones and generally loathed launching large-scale assaults. This thesis argues that this common perception is incompatible with the facts gleanable from a close inspection of Longstreet’s war record. By tracing the preparation, execution, and accomplishments of his four largest-scale assaults during the Civil War, I seek to reposition Longstreet in Civil War historiography as the most innovative, creative, and ultimately successful subordinate commander in terms of assuming the tactical offensive. INDEX WORDS: Robert E. Lee, Army of Northern Virginia, Stonewall Jackson, Second Manassas, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, The Wilderness THE CONFEDERACY’S “HARDEST HITTER”: REEVALUATING JAMES LONGSTREET’S CIVIL WAR RECORD ON THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE by JOSEPH DEWITT CALLAWAY A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University 2018 Copyright by Joseph DeWitt Callaway 2018 THE CONFEDERACY’S “HARDEST HITTER”: REEVALUATING JAMES LONGSTREET’S CIVIL WAR RECORD ON THE TACTICAL OFFENSIVE by JOSEPH DEWITT CALLAWAY Committee Chair: Wendy Hamand Venet Committee: Jeffrey Young Electronic Version Approved: Office of Graduate Studies College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University May 2018 iv DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Brant and Peggy Callaway. Thank you so much. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would especially like to thank my advisor Dr. Wendy Hamand Venet, without whose help this project would not have gotten very far. I would also like to thank Dr. Jeffrey Young for serving on my committee. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Venet and Dr. Young for their support both in securing me funding and encouraging me throughout my entire graduate career. The road has not always been an easy one, and I owe them a great deal. I would also like to thank Dr. Joe Perry of Georgia State University. Like Dr. Venet and Dr. Young, he was a great source of inspiration during difficult times. He, along with Dr. John McMillian, helped me grow immeasurably as a writer. Their willingness to read overly-drawn out, rambling papers and make constructive suggestions proved invaluable when I was working on this project. I would also like to thank several other of my mentors in my pursuit of writing and the study of history, as the completion of this project has been a long time in coming. Dr. Randy Reid, Sally Harris, Dr. H. William Rice, Dr. J. Ryan Stackhouse, and Dr. Charles Upchurch all encouraged me to keep working and reminded me why I find studying history inspirational. I wish you all the success you deserve. Alex Fahey-Ho was my friend most crucial to the writing of this thesis and my graduation. Her keen editing skills helped a great deal of my writing, but her encouragement and unwavering friendship, which sustained my resolve during some very bleak times, were even more valuable. So, thank you, Alex! I know life has great things in store for you and yours. A handful of other personal friends and relatives who, whether they realized it or not, were instrumental in the completion of this thesis deserve mention: Brantly Callaway (my grandfather), Dr. Brantly Callaway (my brother), Sharon Callaway, Paul Callaway, Haley vi Callaway, Ansley Roan, David Criner, Wister Cook, Andrew Lastrapes, John Pratt, Tony Salloum, and Ben Williams. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. v 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 2 Chapter 1: Second Manassas, August 30, 1862 .................................................... 14 3 Chapter 2: Gettysburg, July 2, 1863 ..................................................................... 33 4 Chapter 3: Chickamauga, September 20, 1863 .................................................... 72 5 Chapter 4: The Wilderness, May 6, 1864 ........................................................... 108 6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 132 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................... 137 Secondary Sources: ....................................................................................................... 137 1 1 Introduction Shortly after the Civil War, John Bell Hood, a subordinate commander in James Longstreet’s 1st Corps throughout much of the conflict, summed up his estimation of his former chief. “Of all the men living,” he remarked, “not excepting our incomparable [Robert E.] Lee himself, I would rather follow James Longstreet… He was our hardest hitter.” Significantly, Hood was referring not to defensive tactical operations, for which Longstreet is now most famous, but to offensive ones. This thesis seeks to rectify the common perception among professional historians, students of the Civil War, and Civil War hobbyists that Longstreet thrived primarily on the defensive. I argue that a full appreciation Longstreet’s role as a wing/corps commander in the Civil War requires a heightened focus on the battles in which he launched his most devastating attacks. This thesis will reposition Longstreet in the historiography by examining the tactics he employed and the scope of his achievements in four of the largest assaults he coordinated and executed during the war: ones at Second Manassas on August 30, 1862; at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863; at Chickamauga on September 20, 1863; and at the Wilderness on May 6, 1864. Tracing these assaults reveals the magnitude to which Longstreet’s conception of offensive tactics evolved as the war progressed. Contrary to the verdict of much of the historiography, Longstreet was the most successful subordinate commander on either side in terms of offensive tactical innovation and launching large-scale assaults.1 Before analyzing these innovative tactics and major assaults, it is important to ask the question: Why is Longstreet now remembered largely as a general who thrived only on defensive tactics and consistently and often bitterly opposed Lee’s penchant for going on the offensive? 1 O.P. Fitzgerald, Judge Longstreet: A Life Sketch (Nashville: Barber & Smith, 1891), 19. Judge Longstreet is a biography of Augustus Longstreet, James Longstreet’s uncle, and includes Hood’s quote. 2 The first plausible answer is that his record on the tactical defensive was so impressive that it obscured his offensive one. In addition to his renowned stand at Antietam, Longstreet most famously defended Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg, where he bloodily repulsed wave after wave of Union assaults. However, despite the brilliance of these performances, Antietam and Gettysburg were the only major battles in which Longstreet fought exclusively on the defensive. They were outnumbered by the battles in which Longstreet launched major assaults. This first answer, then, is largely unsatisfactory. A close attention to Longstreet’s war record proves that Longstreet’s defensive resume should not overshadow his offensive one.2 A second, better answer to the question of why many historians perceive Longstreet as a general who considered defensive tactics infinitely superior to offensive ones is that popular and professional historians have been and remain preoccupied with the Battle of Gettysburg, in which Longstreet did advocate for the defensive, at the expense of other battles. But even concerning Gettysburg, many historians distort Longstreet’s performance in the interest of presenting a tidy and convenient narrative that depicts Longstreet as overly invested in a defensive tactical philosophy. Scholar James M. McPherson is perhaps the most celebrated contemporary historian who promulgates this view. In Battle Cry of Freedom, McPherson asserts that “Longstreet liked best the tactical defensive” and that his absence from the Battle of Chancellorsville blinded him from the superior opportunities offensive tactics tended to create. Some historians even imply that Longstreet’s hesitance to assault the Federal position at 22 For an excellent narrative of the Battle of Antietam, see Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (Wilmington: Mariner Books,