War on the Cheap: U.S. Military Advisors in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-12 War on the cheap: U.S. military advisors in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam þÿO Lavin, Brian P. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47833 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA DISSERTATION WAR ON THE CHEAP: U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE, KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM by Brian P. O’Lavin December 2015 Dissertation Supervisor Daniel Moran Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2015 Dissertation 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS WAR ON THE CHEAP: U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE, KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM 6. AUTHOR(S) Brian P. O’Lavin 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT Following the Second World War, the United States assumed the mantle of world leadership from Great Britain and faced two concurrent pressures on the world order: communism and anti-colonialism. Confronted with the responsibility of containing the global menace, President Harry Truman promised U.S. military advice and assistance to free nations fighting against oppression. An analysis of the U.S. advisory missions in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines shows a pattern of perceived success that overshadowed the operational and strategic environments in which these missions took place. This pattern contributed to a misguided belief that advisors would be sufficient to fix South Vietnam’s fundamental flaws. Unable to persuade South Vietnam to implement changes that would make it more effective, but unwilling to walk away, Washington stayed the advisory course in Vietnam when all signs were pointing toward its inability to affect the internal situation’s most critical elements. In Vietnam, the United States discovered that the model it had previously tested—and perhaps thought perfected—failed in the face of the most motivated anti-colonialist communist foe it faced during the Cold War. This paper challenges the contemporary mythology of America’s early advisory efforts and the true efficacy of advisors in general. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF advice, assistance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, Vietnam War, Greek PAGES Civil War, Huk Rebellion, Korean War, KMAG, JUSMAGP, JUSMAPG, MAAGV, military 299 advisors, James Van Fleet, Edward Lansdale, Ngo Dinh Diem, Ramon Magsaysay, Samuel T. 16. PRICE CODE Williams, Lionel McGarr 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited WAR ON THE CHEAP: U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE, KOREA, THE PHILIPPINES, AND VIETNAM Brian P. O’Lavin Commander, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1996 M.A., United States Naval War College, 2009 M.A., American Military University, 2011 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN SECURITY STUDIES from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2015 Approved by: Daniel Moran Richard Hoffman Professor of National Security Director, Center for Civil-Military Affairs Relations Dissertation Supervisor David Anderson Helen Anderson Professor of National Security Professor of National Security Affairs Affairs James Russell Professor of National Security Affairs Approved by: Mohammed Hafez, Chair, Department of National Security Affairs Approved by: Douglas Moses, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Following the Second World War, the United States assumed the mantle of world leadership from Great Britain and faced two concurrent pressures on the world order: communism and anti-colonialism. Confronted with the responsibility of containing the global menace, President Harry Truman promised U.S. military advice and assistance to free nations fighting against oppression. An analysis of the U.S. advisory missions in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines shows a pattern of perceived success that overshadowed the operational and strategic environments in which these missions took place. This pattern contributed to a misguided belief that advisors would be sufficient to fix South Vietnam’s fundamental flaws. Unable to persuade South Vietnam to implement changes that would make it more effective, but unwilling to walk away, Washington stayed the advisory course in Vietnam when all signs were pointing toward its inability to affect the internal situation’s most critical elements. In Vietnam, the United States discovered that the model it had previously tested—and perhaps thought perfected—failed in the face of the most motivated anti-colonialist communist foe it faced during the Cold War. This paper challenges the contemporary mythology of America’s early advisory efforts and the true efficacy of advisors in general. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. ADVISOR OVERVIEW ...........................................................................3 B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES .........................................................8 C. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................10 1. Cold War.......................................................................................10 2. Military Advising and Counterinsurgency ................................13 3. Greek Civil War ...........................................................................15 4. Korean Conflict ............................................................................18 5. Philippine Hukbalahap Insurrection .........................................19 6. Vietnam Conflict ..........................................................................22 D. OVERVIEW .............................................................................................28 II. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN GREECE: THE BIRTH OF CONTAINMENT .................................................................................................29 A. FROM BRITISH OCCUPATION TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE ..............................................................................................30 B. BELLIGERENTS ....................................................................................34 1. Greek Communists ......................................................................34 2. Greek Nationalists ........................................................................35 C. BATTLEGROUND..................................................................................39 D. ACT I: U.S. INVOLVEMENT—DOLLARS AND SENSE .................39 E. ACT II: GENERAL JAMES VAN FLEET TAKES OVER ...............47 F. DEMOCRATIC ARMY MISTAKES ....................................................58 G. ACT III: THE FINAL PUSH..................................................................61 H. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................67 III. U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN KOREA: BACKING INTO CONTAINING COMMUNISM .........................................................................71 A. FROM JAPANESE OCCUPATION TO COLD WAR DIVISION .................................................................................................72 B. BELLIGERENTS ....................................................................................75 1. North Korean Communists .........................................................75 2. South Korean Nationalists ..........................................................76 3. Chinese Communists ...................................................................77 C. BATTLEGROUND..................................................................................77 D. CREATING A KOREAN SECURITY APPARATUS .........................80 1. Communist Insurgency ...............................................................88