Di ssenting poses Marginal youth, viral aesthetics, and aff ective politics in neoliberal

Cristiana Strava

Abstract: In the spring of 2014, an unprecedented wave of police raids swept over every lower-class (sha‘abi) neighborhood across Morocco. Dubbed “Operation Tcharmil,” the raids targeted young, lower-class men that matched viral online images in which track-suit-wearing teens boastfully displayed status objects and white weapons. Drawing on the theoretical apparatus of the “aff ective turn,” in this article I unpack the structural and historical factors that shaped both popular reac- tions and policing actions toward the sudden, online visibility of a politically and economically disenfranchised group. I situate this episode within current debates about the entanglement of neoliberal disciplinary regimes and the reproduction of particular social orders, and argue that attention to such outbursts can help us revitalize and rethink existing notions of class. Keywords: aff ect, margins, neoliberal, policing, selfi es, Tcharmil, urban, youth

It was a late Saturday aft ernoon in the spring of my confusion, he shook his head, also staring 2014 when I was leaving the neighborhood of in the direction of the police vans. “Maybe they aft er having spent the day at are chasing away the street vendors?” he mused, a local jam‘iyya (community organization) ob- as we continued to watch the incomprehensible serving the activities of their “street arts” youth presence of such a show of force. Another boy club. As I stepped out onto the curb and headed ran up and edifi ed us: “Th ey are picking up ev- for home, I noticed that an unusual level of eryone without an ID,” he breathlessly managed commotion had overtaken the area. Four police to say. Trying to make light of what seemed like vans were parked at the top of the street and po- an unusual situation, I said I might get in trou- licemen in riot gear were running up and down ble because I always forgot to carry my ID. Th e the narrower alleys that branched out from the second boy answered: “No. Th ey’re only picking one I was on. Surprised, I asked Samir,1 one of up the boys. Especially the ones who have the the young boys I recognized from the derb (al- banda haircuts.” What he meant was the fash- leyway), what was going on. Seeming to share ionable cut all teenage boys had been getting

Focaal—Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology (2020): 1–18 © Th e Author doi:10.3167/fcl.2020.072005 2 | Cristiana Strava that year, a Mohawk style that emulated football a growing “sense of insecurity due to delin- players’ haircuts and had become a signature quency,”3 which was presumably getting out of look, fi rst among the local Ultras (organized hand in these neighborhoods. In the press, the football supporters) then for young sha‘abi timing of the state’s action was linked to the in- (lower-class) men around the country (fi gure 1). tervention of King Mohammad VI a month aft er In the following days and months, similar the armed robbery of a hair salon in an upscale raids swept every lower-class neighborhood in neighborhood of , followed by the large cities across Morocco, drawing national mobbing of a local professional football player media attention. An offi cial report later claimed (Jaabouk 2014). Although the aforementioned that a staggering 103,714 arrests had been car- crimes were not unprecedented and there had ried out nationally in the fi rst three months of been no offi cial statement from the monarch, 2014 (El Aff as 2014). Offi cially, the action was according to speculation in the media, the King described by the authorities as a fi ght against had demanded the Interior Minister increase

Figure 1. Young man sporting a banda haircut. Source: Tchârmil Public Facebook Group.2 Dissenting poses | 3 eff orts to ensure that citizens feel safe in their which both are embedded. Th e “turn to aff ect” cities.4 Before the authorities unleashed this has allowed urban ethnographers working in wave of arrests targeting male youth from pre- places marked by violence to home in on the carious neighborhoods, a growing clamor of productive force of concepts like “threat” (see voices on online forums and Internet groups Caldeira 2000). As Brian Massumi points out, had also been demanding an end to what they by paying attention to how a “felt reality of threat described as the “war” that was raging on the legitimates preemptive action” we can elucidate streets of Casablanca, claiming that a new class how actual facts become superseded by “aff ec- of youth were threatening the everyday life of tive facts of fear” (2010: 54). In Morocco, as “honest citizens.” How was it that an apparent elsewhere, the expansion and entrenchment of youth fad triggered not only an intense episode urban inequality has been accompanied by a of public alarm but also a sweeping police op- proliferation of such “aff ective facts” across so- eration? And what can this episode illuminate cio-economic classes. Middle and upper-class about social and political dynamics in contem- voices, their anxieties and the aff ective econ- porary Morocco? omies they mobilize have become particularly Th is article draws on ethnographic mate- instrumental to how social fears are dealt with rial gathered through sixteen months of fi eld- in Morocco. In this article I consider the inter- work between 2013–2014 (and shorter visits play between these voices and the institutional between 2016–2018) in and around Hay Mo- popularization of neoliberal logics that shape hammadi, a mythicized but maligned area of not only offi cial policies addressing inequality, Casablanca. It is part of a broader project inves- but increasingly feed off and back into popular tigating the (re)production and spatialization of conservative discourses about civic rights. socio-economic diff erence in urban Morocco I begin by situating the episode of the police since colonial times, using long-term partici- raids against the background of historical and pant-observation and online ethnography that political forces responsible for the spatialization prioritizes the experience and practices of mar- of inequality and the production of particular ginalized communities, while also attending to aff ects about urban lower-class areas and the governmental and non-governmental actors. communities that inhabit them. I then recount Early on in my fi eldwork, I began volunteering the unfolding of the police raids and reconstruct twice a week at the above-mentioned commu- the main debates they helped to fuel. I argue nity-based organization (CBO),5 and had been that these debates are rooted in a narrative shift following the activities of their youth programs that promotes a reductive view of “responsibi- for a year when the police raids began in 2014. I lization,” particularly with regard to the lower did not work with the youth who were arrested classes. As I elaborate below, this shift has been during the raids or who were involved in local aided by the progressive delegitimization of crime. Moulay Maarouf and Tayeb Belghazi’s social justice discourses and their replacement (2018) work based in complements mine with agendas framed by a politically neutraliz- in this regard. Instead, my analysis here is pri- ing human-rights approach as a consequence of marily focused on the socio-cultural categories, the (incomplete) neoliberalization of Moroccan anxieties, and debates that emerged around and spaces and forms of governance. I use neolib- were co-productive of the moral panic mobi- eralism both in the sense of a structural force lized throughout this policing episode. and as an ideological agenda that prescribes I draw on the rich theoretical apparatus of models for economic and socio-political sub- the “aff ective turn” (Ahmed 2004; Berlant 2011) jectivities (Ganti 2014). In exploring how in this to make sense of the intensely moralizing re- context discussions about class and associated sponses elicited by the visibility of a perceived struggles and grievances become displaced onto violent “other,” and the wider urban context in other markers of diff erence—such as embodied 4 | Cristiana Strava ways of being in space, tastes, and education (or atic of a global condition of urban marginality. the perceived lack thereof)—my aim is to revi- Home to North ’s oldest and once larg- talize debates on class and its usefulness for a est slum, and celebrated for its dynamic labor historical anthropology of lived neoliberalism. unions that played a crucial role in the an- Th e unprecedented role of online spaces and ti-colonial struggle, the neighborhood fell into “viral” images during this episode leads me to disfavor during the reign of King Hassan II argue that online platforms are emerging as (1961–1999), who ushered in a period that is a signifi cant discursive space through which now commonly known as the “” claims about belonging are increasingly medi- (Sanawāt ar-Rus.ās.) due to the unprecedented ated and negotiated in unstable and aff ect-laden brutality with which all forms of dissent were ways. I conclude that both the moral panic and repressed (Miller 2013: 162–184). Th e 1965 heightened policing of young, urban lower-class student riots constitute a turning point in this male bodies as a consequence of their apparent timeline. Sparked by new education regulations sudden (online) visibility point to growing ten- meant to limit the access of an estimated 60 sions inherent in the reproduction of local and percent of high school students to a Baccalau- global social orders, while also highlighting the reate degree, and thus a lifeline out of poverty unsettling affi nity between neoliberal logics and and into the middle class, the riots began with authoritarian practices. school strikes and sit-ins and ended in city-wide unrest that brought together laborers, bidonville (slum) dwellers, and students. In the aft ermath, Situating the margins union and student activists alike were forcefully disappeared and sent to secret detention centers Currently home to more than fi ve million in- where they were either killed or held and tor- habitants living in an increasingly socially and tured for years. Hay Mohammadi is infamous spatially fragmented urban landscape marked for housing one of a few urban subterranean by stark economic disparities (United Nations torture centers in the country. Militants were Habitat 2008: 74; see Haut Commissariat au held mere feet away from residential quarters, Plan 2018), Casablanca bears little resemblance while their jailers lived in modernist apartment to its Hollywood aura. In the contemporary blocks above ground (Slyomovics 2012). Moroccan social imaginary, the city is fre- Th e offi cial acknowledgement of these crimes quently associated with urban sprawl, pollution, in the late 1990s and the subsequent process a high degree of socio-economic decay and ano- of truth seeking and communal and individ- mie, but also wealthy enclaves sporting names ual reconciliation (Dennerlein 2012) has led like Prestigia (Fr.) and a spirit of ruthless indi- to the area’s association with a variety of af- vidualism and market liberalization connected fective registers (see Navaro-Yashin 2012). In- to the city’s semi-offi cial identity as Morocco’s habitants have found the opportunity to speak commercial capital. A twenty-fi rst-century “neo- and refl ect not only on the history of violence liberal metropolis” (Bahmad 2013: 17), the marking neighborhood spaces, but also on the history of Casablanca’s development is synon- continuities between the current state of ma- ymous with colonial industrial expansion and terial and social degradation and past regime extraction of cheap labor, technocratic methods actions meant to punish and ghettoize the com- of urban planning, and attempts to control po- munity (Strava 2017: 333). Th ese conditions tentially volatile populations (Rabinow 1995; were further exacerbated by the introduction of Rachik 2002). structural adjustment policies and market lib- Considered a mythical neighborhood in the eralization reforms in the 1980s, which led to , Hay Mohammadi epito- massive job losses in local industry and a signif- mizes many of the problems deemed symptom- icant growth in informal activities (see Cohen Dissenting poses | 5

2004). So while outsiders can safely commend ing in currency thanks to the eponymous police offi cial commemoration eff orts (oral history raids (offi cially named “Operation Tcharmil”). projects, heritage initiatives), they are less likely While it was diffi cult to accurately date the to consider the impact of economic reforms on term’s appearance, its spread was aided by the the community, and frequently fault the inhab- use of online social networks for the display itants of the neighborhood for what they see and circulation of photos intended to capture as the degradation and involution of the area. what appeared to be a dress-style. In colloquial With youth unemployment on the rise,6 inhab- , charmoula signifi es a marinade or sea- itants from Hay Mohammadi have had to con- soning used for the preparation of meat. Most tend with an image of the neighborhood that of my interlocutors speculated that the reason is colored by such epithets as “open air prison” why the term mcharmil (someone taking on the or “cemented slum” (bidonville en béton). Th ese Tcharmil style) caught on was owed to its deri- maligning stereotypes were particularly re-en- vation from the butcher knives employed in the forced aft er the suicide attacks of 2003 and preparation of charmoula and donned by some 2007, which targeted upscale hotels, restaurants of the youth in the circulated photos as a way of and night clubs in the city center. Perpetrated by impressing viewers (fi gure 2). un(der)employed, radicalized youth from the As the raids went on for months and both impoverished and disenfranchised slum quar- online and conventional media continued to ters adjacent to Hay Mohammadi, the attacks report on them, I spoke to young men in Hay heightened state and popular discourse crim- Mohammadi about how they saw the unfolding inalizing lower-class areas (Cavatorta 2006). debates and panic. Youness, one of the skillful Th is has been accompanied by the re-emergence break-dancers from the neighborhood who reg- of a powerful popular argument linking a re- ularly attended the “street arts” program and surgence in Islamic extremism with “disenfran- favored a dress style that might identify him as chised urban youth” (see Bayat 2007). It is thus mcharmil, claimed that in his understanding that at the time of the raids, like in other places Tcharmil was merely a new label for an exist- in the region, people between the ages of 15 and ing fashion. Th e banda haircuts were paired 30 constituted almost two-thirds of the neigh- with tracksuits, visible white socks sticking borhood’s demographic make-up, posing both from brand-name sport shoes, and large gold local concerns about their proper place and role watches.7 Youness concluded it was a fad and a in society, as well as signifi cant educational, po- new one would soon replace it, and thus did not litical and economic issues for the Moroccan take seriously the boastful self-association with state (Bogaert and Emperador 2011). crime displayed in some of the circulated pho- tos. Th e general consensus seemed to be that at some point in 2013 young, mostly lower-class, Posing dissent men began posing in these “outfi ts” for photos that they would then upload to their own so- At the time of the raids, it was diffi cult to disen- cial media profi les or several “fan groups.”8 Th e tangle the ideas and perceptions of those who availability and aff ordability of smartphones in decried a lack of safety on the streets of Casa- recent years meant that youth from places like blanca and their identifi cation of a particular Hay Mohammadi were now also producers and typology of the male aggressor from the actual not just consumers of “social photography” (see emergence of a new masculine youth subculture Jurgenson 2019). Th e aesthetic eff ect and look on the urban margins, as prevailing discourse displayed in these images was far from novel seemed to suggest. Very soon, though, a term for in its reference to global hip-hop culture, cap- designating this “new type” of male delinquent tured in boastful display of status symbols like appeared. Th is term was Tcharmil, quickly gain- gold watches, “gangsta” dress styles, and hyper- 6 | Cristiana Strava

Figure 2. Example of a Tcharmil pose with butcher knives. Source: Tchârmil Public Facebook Group. masculinized poses against derelict urban ar- fi e” photography in general and Tcharmil poses chitectures (fi gure 3). Th e originally intended in particular, they claimed, was a way of doc- audience for the images seemed to mainly umenting their lives and experimenting with consist of youth from similar socio-geograph- fashions outside of school or parental control. ical contexts—lower-class, densely populated As Th eresa Senft and Nancy Baym (2015) argue, neighborhoods on the outskirts of large cities— such internal “selfi e-economies” are produced places that ordinary Moroccans circumvent or by a complex entanglement of motivations that avoid, unless they inhabit them. With the viral cannot be reduced to pathologizing labels like spread of this selfi e-meme, these spaces now ex- “narcissism” or straightforward rebellion. Deniz tended into shared online platforms and assert- Yonucu’s (2011) and Pascal Menoret’s (2014) ively claimed their presence. analyses of rebellious youth have suggested that As such, Tcharmil was overwhelmingly de- such provocative appropriations and ostenta- fi ned by its viral and virtual visibility. Th is is tious displays of what the state labels delinquent not to suggest that the young men involved in behavior need to be understood as an ambiva- or associated with Tcharmil had been invisible lently articulated response and aff ective reaction either on- or offl ine before. But as increasing to the violence that neoliberal forces, coupled socio-spatial fragmentation and “enclavization” with the local presence of authoritarian regimes, has come to mark urban space in Morocco infl ict on young lower-class male bodies and (Newcomb 2017: 126), and the proximity of lives. Certain Moroccan journalists reporting (undesirable) social “others” can be managed on the raids seemed to share this view, asking by carefully maintained degrees of economic that this fad be critically read for ways it spoke and physical barriers (see Schielke 2012: 47), to growing social inequalities in the country young lower-class men in Casablanca are both (Majdi 2014). Most reports in the media, how- frequently confi ned to their neighborhoods and ever, were more inclined to describe the mcharm- must carefully curate their appearance when en- lin (plural) as engaging in acts of intimidation by tering spaces that are associated with the (upper) displaying butcher knives and stolen goods (as middle classes (see Ghannam 2011). Among my was speculated about the smartphones and gold young interlocutors in Hay Mohammedi, “sel- watches). Some of the photos that were circu- Dissenting poses | 7 lated online as illustrations of Tcharmil did ap- teenage boys posed with long butcher knives, pear to be connected to illegal activities such as were, however, a minority among the multitude the sale and consumption of hashish. Th is type of images depicting young boys (and occasion- of photo never featured people, but depicted ex- ally girls) wearing track suits and proudly dis- clusively an inventory of illicit and haram sub- playing status objects like smartphones, brand stances like cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs (fi gure name clothing or sports shoes considered fash- 3). Th ese photos, together with those in which ionable at the time (fi gure 4).

Figure 3. Tcharmil “still life,” in which drugs, cash, and status objects like sneakers are displayed against a Moroccan salon background. Source: Tchârmil Public Facebook Group. 8 | Cristiana Strava

Figure 4. Example of young women posing “Tcharmil style.” Source: Tchârmil Public Facebook Group.

According to rumors circulated through on- ieties of specifi c places with specifi c histories” line groups and also recounted by my research (2000: 83). Morocco’s recent history is rife with participants, the police initially tried to have such class anxieties that have been politically the images found on the main online Tcharmil and economically stoked, as public education, forum removed. As Luise White has observed, the main motor for social advancement in post- rumors can “be a source of local history that independence Morocco, can no longer guaran- reveal the passionate contradictions and anx- tee a middle-class position in an era of shrinking Dissenting poses | 9 labor markets and increasing fi nancialization Th e arrests nevertheless continued unabated, of urban space (Bogaert and Emperador 2011; while the conversations I followed in the on- Cohen 2004: 68–70). Moreover, the appeal of line discussion forum “March against insecu- these rumors points toward the power exerted rity [in Casablanca],” the largest dedicated to on the social imaginary by a strategy of deal- middle-class voices concerned with a purported ing with growing inequality by progressively rise in criminality, derided the idea of human obscuring or concealing those whose precari- rights violations and quickly devolved into calls ous living circumstances run counter to offi cial for harsh punitive measures, with some sug- discourses that paint Morocco as North Africa’s gesting re-opening secret detention centers for aspiring economic powerhouse (Strava 2018). the mcharmlin. Th is common claim put forth What eventually happened was that the raids that those who took on the style should expect proceeded to remove from the street young low- repercussions, demonstrating what Stuart El- er-class men who matched the images and give den calls “a disturbing faith in the effi cacy of them “disciplinary haircuts” while in custody state violence” to address a sudden outburst (Crétois 2014). of public disturbance (2011). A small number of commentators in the same forum suggested that the socio-political root-causes behind the Aesthetics and/as emergence of this “youth subculture” should neoliberal aff ective politics be considered, but a considerably larger num- ber dismissed their arguments as une foutaise Newspapers, weekly magazines, TV news, and (nonsense). As the group reached 21,000 mem- Internet sites maintained a regular cycle of re- bers at the peak of the police raids, a frequent porting on both the arrests as well as their jus- commenter wrote: “One must stop fi nding ex- tifi cation for months to follow. Th e authors of cuses [for these acts] (the economy, politics, ed- some of the online articles wondered whether ucation, poverty). Citizenship is not only about this phenomenon was indeed all that new and rights, but also responsibilities.”12 In the same not just another passing trend. Several com- thread, others proposed retaliatory measures mentators in a dedicated online group cautioned against anyone matching the Tcharmil descrip- against reifying it as a “gang movement” when it tion: “We should not wait until they [mcharm- appeared to be just a fashion.9 An opinion piece lin] attack you and then we arrest them. Too bad in the French-language weekly TelQuel cau- for those who wear a suspicious haircut or dress tioned against the criminalization of an entire [style]. Th ere is a price to pay. In any case if this group of already disadvantaged young people,10 brings some peace to the citizen it is not bad.”13 and, aft er one young man who had been sum- Th e aesthetics of Tcharmil—captured through marily detained during one of the police raids gritty, low-quality phone images, and the asso- committed suicide while in custody, the presi- ciation with counterfeit merchandise—further dent of the National Centre for the Study of Hu- aided in this “othering” by not lending itself man Rights and Democracy (CEDHD) stepped easily to middle-class appropriation. Instead, in to plead for “a more reasoned response” on the Tcharmil youth were quickly presented with the part of the authorities (Strava 2018). Speak- a foil: the Kilimini child. A popular culture term ing with former political detainee and human in circulation for much longer than Tcharmil, rights activist Fatna El Bouih about the raids, the origins and precise etymology of Kilimini she echoed commentators in the press who are also blurred. One of my long-time interloc- reminded the public that such arbitrary mea- utors claimed that it was derived from the mis- sures of enforcing security were reminiscent pronunciation of the French [Qu’est-ce] qu’il/elle of the dreaded, repressive era of the “Years of est mignon(e) meaning “isn’t he/she sweet,” an Lead,” and should therefore be reconsidered.11 exclamation that was ostensibly associated with 10 | Cristiana Strava middle-class children who behaved according (Azzami 2014). Th e words of the letter appeared to social norms, but also used as a way of mock- to carry less aff ective weight than the images ing middle-class aff ectations or those who were accompanying it, and the solidarity march pro- seen to lack “street-smarts.” Other interlocutors posed under the banner “We are all Moroccan from Hay Mohammadi agreed on this etymol- youth” never took place. Th e contrast posed ogy, stressing that Kilimini youth had early by the images of aspirational-looking, cultured bedtimes, never used swear words, spoke good youth against those of presumably crass if not French, and dressed in a clean, “proper” fashion. outright delinquent, tracksuit-wearing teenag- Implied, but not stated, was the fact that in order ers potently demonstrated the social performa- to be a Kilimini child, one needed to be part of tivity of the medium, but also its susceptibility a middle-class family with the socio-economic to index reductive readings of diff erence. means to provide such things as French educa- Th e growing availability in recent years and tion and clean, fashionable clothes. Claiming intensifi ed use of new media technologies and to bridge this dichotomy, another online group platforms has led to a vast and global prolifer- was constituted: “Anticharmil or the incita- ation of grassroots movements, forms of con- tion to reading.” According to its founders, the testation, and alternative political engagement. group attempted to go beyond opposing a Kili- Kerstin Schankweiler’s analysis of what she mini stereotype in its response to the Tcharmil broadly calls “selfi e protests” and the ways in aesthetic.14 In reaction to the photos of sports which these make use of a “body-driven [ico- shoes, gold watches and illegal substances, the nography] to trigger a sense of anxiety when Anticharmil encouraged Moroccan youth to beheld by the viewer” and thus provoke a reac- take and circulate photos of their books, or tion (2017), is salient in the case of Tcharmil. themselves reading. In an open letter, illustrated Crucially, the use of digital technology and the with an image of a young woman surrounded by immediacy of interaction facilitated by social book covers in Arabic and French (fi gure 5), the platforms and new media, helped not only to creators of the group called for a halt to the stig- visualize the phenomenon for those who had matization and criminalization of urban youth never set foot in neighborhoods like Hay Mo-

Figure 5. Th e image headlining the “Anti-Tcharmil” manifesto. Source: fr.le360.ma Dissenting poses | 11 hammadi. Th e aff ordances of this medium for as youthful, tacit appropriation, and experimen- excessive, ostentatious, and mimicked forms tation with what might be read as an assertion of display also worked to dislodge the subject of “rough masculinity indexing working-class and image from the socio-historical context of values and forms of sociability” (Wacquant their production. To those “outside” the partic- 2009: 205) became subject to the correctional ular aesthetic economy of Tcharmil and for the gaze of local elites and the state, inviting their authorities, this aspect enabled the reading of own “othering.” I suggest that the reactions and mcharmlin youth as agents of an actual, homog- fervor with which the Tcharmil selfi es were enous subculture, one reductively understood as mobilized both on- and offl ine need to be con- solely connoted with criminality and perceived sidered as indicative of the struggle over the through a narrow, morally conservative register policing and defi nition of forms of belonging about the impending dangers of youthful delin- and ultimately “citizenship” in a neoliberaliz- quency. By considering all of the photographic ing Morocco. Th ese forms, as Lauren Berlant poses to belong to and index a radically new, poignantly shows, are increasingly shaped by and hence “other,” youth gang presence, the aff ective economies and aesthetic reactions authorities could harness their aff ective power of “aspirational normativity” (2011: 164). Th e and unleash a sweeping operation, without hav- Tcharmil raids remind us, however, that collec- ing to deal with prolonged evidence gathering tive readings and appropriations of such aspi- and due process, thus illustrating what Mas- rations (expressed as consumer desires) can be sumi calls the “conditional logic” of aff ectively strongly classed and aestheticized. As such, the legitimated preemptive acts (2010: 55). Shored performance and display of diff erent forms of up by a gaze that saw lower-class male bodies cultural capital, its consumption, and the class and practices as undeserving unless proven oth- aff ects associated with each played a central role erwise, the preemptive tactics of the Tcharmil in the way the Tcharmil phenomenon was visu- raids produced their own target. alized, articulated and dealt with by authorities In her work on the construction of white in- and middle classes in Casablanca. Th e valuing jury and attitudes of fear in the face of asylum by the urban lower-classes of material posses- seekers in the , Sara Ahmed (2004) sions and status objects such as watches, mo- proposed the concept of “aff ective economies” torcycles, or brand-name clothing was vilifi ed as a way of theorizing the modalities through for potential links to criminal activity or judged which certain images appear to mobilize intense as lack of taste and education. Th is ironically emotional responses to certain groups, while allowed those who already possessed such de- also contributing to the reinforcement of par- sirable commodities to turn to books as a sign ticular ideas about that group’s identity. Ahmed of distinction and civic responsibility (see Bour- demonstrates how it is the very ambiguity or dieu 1987). lack of an individualized identity of the feared “other” that is both produced by and produc- tive of such economies of hate: “Such fi gures of “Responsibilizing” lower-class youth hate circulate, and indeed accumulate aff ective value, precisely because they do not have a fi xed During the police raids, it was diffi cult to remain referent” (2004: 123). Th e reductive reading of a detached observer of the on-going debates the Tcharmil image as the marker of an anon- and criminalization of those associated with the ymous threatening mass of humanity, which Tcharmil look. On the one hand, someone from denied lower-class youth their individuality, be- an upscale neighborhood could have described came the currency in which the particular aff ec- as mcharmil many of the teenage boys I knew tive economy of alarmed Casablancans traded. from the “street arts” program and had grown Th ose who toyed with the image of mcharmlin fond of over the year. Th ey were incredibly tal- 12 | Cristiana Strava ented and skilled break-dancers, but could also cies and funds, signifi ed a radical shift not only spend aft ernoons hanging out on street cor- in the distribution of money and power across ners neglecting their homework, occasionally the third sector but also in the logics and prac- engaged in petty theft for fun (see Wacquant tices aimed at addressing inequality (see Bayat 2009: 205), and were extremely proud of their 2013; Clément 1995). Nike Air Max shoes. On the other hand, several In this new ideological landscape, the lan- of my adult interlocutors in Hay Mohammadi guage of social justice that had been central believed that urban peripheries were indeed to previous contestation movements (Desrues experiencing a loitering and delinquency prob- 2012) became progressively delegitimized and lem, unrelated to the Tcharmil fad. Mr. B., the replaced by the mantra of “responsibilization” director of the jam‘iyya where I regularly at- (Hache 2007). Th is logic operates in two ways: tended the youth program, a strong advocate for on the one hand, it functions to shift the burden entrepreneurial solutions and empowerment of socio-economic security from the state to in- discourse, was one of the local community lead- dividuals as autonomous, rational actors; on the ers who subscribed to this view: “Between one other, it becomes the fi eld on which a politics of café and another café you fi nd a café. Th e youth morality that stigmatizes and blames the poor (drari) waste their time watching football and for their own predicament16 has gained increas- TV channels from the Gulf [states] that rot their ing political currency (see Hache 2007). As Mr. brains. When they are not doing that, they loiter B.’s comments illustrate, this shift has led to a in the street (fi zanqa) doing nothing, throw- narrow political conception of individual mo- ing away their lives.” In the context of Morocco, rality and action based on behaviorist notions where mundane household chores are intensely that have produced an idea of the “self that is gendered and very seldom counted as econom- in theory detached from its historical and social ically productive (see Ait Mouss 2011), un- or conditions” (Hache 2007: 18) and whose actions under-employed men, and young able-bodied are considered “the simple sum . . . of free will” men in particular, are increasingly likely to be (Wacquant 2009: 10). By 2014, this language had seen as bodies to be disciplined and rendered not only gained signifi cant purchase among the productive by the gaze of neoliberalizing actors Moroccan authorities and local elites, but had and institutions.15 also become fi rmly institutionalized through Th is view has been progressively institution- a vast array of third sector programs. Echoing alized, beginning in the 1980s, and aided by a what Mike Davis has called the “NGO-ization series of reforms that gradually dismantled and of impoverished urban communities” (2007: defunded social-support structures across the 77–82), this transformation was signifi cantly country as the direct consequence of the struc- aided by the political and social climate fol- tural adjustment and liberalization reforms lowing the suicide attacks of May 2003. In their imposed by the IMF and the World Bank (Co- aft ermath, the Moroccan state, with the help of hen 2004). Among other signifi cant changes in international donors, was able to consolidate economic and labor market policies, human- this shift to “responsibilization” by drawing on rights-based discourse and the NGO model the increasingly popular trope of Islamic radi- came to complement and, in places, replace calization, and redoubled its eff orts supporting public welfare provisioning. While a variety of NGOs that focused on rendering urban delin- associational forms preceded and survived this quency and forms of loitering not only undesir- transformation—from Islamic charities focused able but as symptomatic of radical criminality. on the collection and distribution of alms to On Casablanca’s margins, this has meant trade unions and civil rights organizations—the the growing presence of NGOs and CBOs, emergence of the NGO model in the late 1990s, such as the one directed by Mr. B. whose pro- supported by international development agen- grams I attended, focused on helping “youth Dissenting poses | 13 at risk” through activities that employ “street the case of Hay Mohammadi, non-productive arts” and the language of “children’s rights” as forms of “hanging out” in the street were stig- a way of combating the pernicious infl uences matized twice: once as the marker of unemploy- of the street, and preemptively “de-radicaliz- ment or troublesome youth, and a second time ing” disenfranchised youth.17 When their re- criticized as an excessive form of lower-class lei- belliousness was not channeled into sanitized sure principally associated with street sociality artistic pursuits, lower-class youth were “re- or the much frequented and male-dominated sponsibilized” through a variety of public pri- coff eehouse. As a growing body of literature vately funded programs and activities meant also attests, within increasingly precarious ur- to incorporate them into vocational training ban landscapes, morally and politically con- schemes or develop their “entrepreneurial” servative ideas about time and the way bodies skill sets (see Paciello et al. 2016).18 As Susanna mark it—that is by engaging (or not) in socially Trnka and Catherine Trundle (2014) point out, and politically sanctioned forms of labor—have this limited conception of responsibility does been recuperated by neoliberal logics and rein- not do justice to the many other available forms forced as the measure of one’s moral and social and meanings that local communities may en- worth, which those confi ned to diff erent forms act on the basis of other logics and within a of boredom and waiting must constantly ad- variety of potentially competing frameworks. dress (see Elliot 2016; Mains 2007). According Indeed, in Hay Mohammadi, neoliberal ideas to this logic, “all time is a potential ‘investment’ about self-reliance co-existed with daily respon- in one’s future” (van Oort 2015), and the failure sibilities to give and receive care, be it of kin or to capitalize on this resource even in a context neighbors, in an ongoing eff ort to make precar- of scarce opportunities is seen as a fundamental ious lives livable (Strava 2017). For example, the demonstration of irresponsibility. same young men who could be seen aimlessly loitering on street corners were also occasion- ally called upon to look aft er younger siblings Conclusion or help single mothers with various chores, and encouraged to attend Friday prayer once they Media panics are prone to act as smoke screens reached their teens. But as Yasmine Berriane’s defl ecting conversations that would be more work (2010, 2016) has shown, the offi cial treat- dangerous to those in authority (Hall 1978). ment of socio-economic inequality in Morocco Despite the heightened collective alarm that as a question of (limited) “empowerment” (see was expressed in online forums, it soon became Bono 2013) has led to the exponential growth of clear that Tcharmil was far from being a vast, state-approved organizations running a variety organized crime phenomenon. Th e minor drug of programs that promote discourses centered dealers and the relatively small sums of money on values like “self-suffi ciency” and “personal that were reported as confi scated during the po- accountability.” lice raids indicated a fragmented scene of street I argue that it was the growing entrench- violence and petty crime on the urban fringe. ment of these ideas that lent critical weight to Not quite a subculture and certainly not an or- the aff ective reactions aimed at Tcharmil youth. ganized movement, I suggest that the young Capitalist societies have developed the tendency mcharmlin boys of Morocco’s urban margins to respond to non-productive forms of being- appeared to be threatening to the socio-political in-the-street in two ways: either “stigmatize it order, not because they had engaged in a direct within an ideology of unemployment or taking form of collective protest, but for what Bayat it up into itself to make it profi table” through calls “collective presence” (2013: 111). Th e vis- regulated and approved forms of consumption ibility and online presence of dispersed, atom- and leisure (Buck-Morss 1986: 112–113). In ized individuals proved more destabilizing than 14 | Cristiana Strava the actions of an organized movement, because of urban life in a growingly unequal city. In a they triggered the neoliberal aff ects of local fi rst instance, setting my account and reading of middle-classes and elites, whose anxieties had the ethnographic episode of the Tcharmil raids been fed by decades of eroded education and against this background of historical, spatial employment opportunities, as well as the elu- and political transformations, I argue that the sive and tantalizing promises of globalization popularization of particular logics about who (see Montgomery 2019; Wacquant 2009: 4). Th e can make (specifi c) claims to urban space, and oft -rehearsed refrain from online discussion ideas relating to disciplining those identifi ed as forums, echoed by political actors and author- “(ir)responsible poor” need to be seen as part ities, claimed that the uneducated could not be of a longer history of authoritarian rule and granted rights before they knew how to also as- liberal economic practice. By highlighting the sume responsibilities, something the mcharmlin strong currents of historical continuity that run were found to be severely lacking. Comments below the surface of contemporary institutions, about the need to harshly discipline the lower- logics, and practices, it becomes apparent that class male body illustrated this “zero-tolerance” disciplining practices are not only historically mindset that saw citizenship as a right and priv- (re)produced through complex and contin- ilege to be granted only to those who could gent socio-political processes, but also strongly “aff ect” deservingness. Overall, the unfolding amenable to being recycled and re-used. of these conversations, taken together with the Second, I propose that by considering how progressive institutionalization of third-sector aff ective economies are increasingly becoming initiatives aimed at “responsibilizing” lower- a crucial conduit for the re-production and mo- class youth and their practices, are indicative of bilization of neoliberal logics and institutions, the entrenching of hegemonic orders that fi nd we are better able to critically reexamine cur- it productive and legitimate to draw on a grow- rent practices of criminalization and punitive ingly popular and established logic of disciplin- surges aimed at inequality and disenfranchise- ing and policing. Aided by conservative public ment. As these aff ects become increasingly, yet opinion in a city marked by stark inequality unstably, indexed by the performativity of par- and already mired in petty crime for decades, ticular classed aesthetics, this will require tak- Moroccan authorities were and continue to be ing seriously the dissenting self-fashioning and able to target the disenfranchised with excessive presentation of lower-class bodies and practices. punitive measures, without having to acknowl- Not in a manner that leads to their romanti- edge the structural and historical causes of local cizing (see Bayat 2013) or essentializing into poverty and crime. notions like “culture of poverty,” but in a way In my attempt to unpack the signifi cance of that re-politicizes and historically grounds fac- the historical, spatial, and aesthetic dimensions ile assumptions and received ideas. My reading that became wedded in the key articulations of the Tcharmil phenomenon as a heavily gen- accompanying this moment of “punitive” out- dered and classed, if politically ambiguous and burst, I have found it productive to draw on incomplete, excessive articulation of youthful the conceptual tools provided by the “aff ective dissent aims to contribute to such an agenda turn.” By ethnographically starting from the that situates and complicates established under- real and discursive spaces and dynamics that al- standings about socio-economic identities and lowed “feelings of insecurity” to trump discus- available forms of resistance in the region. sions of actual lived socio-economic precarity, Finally, despite the country’s proudly as- it became possible to discern the importance of sumed label as the “exception to the Arab an incongruous assemblage of histories of po- Spring,” recent mass protests over access to in- litical repression, derelict urban spaces, erratic frastructure, economic development, and social policing, and the everyday lived experiences reforms (Schwarz 2018) serve as reminders that Dissenting poses | 15

Morocco has not addressed underlying causes stated: https://www.facebook.com/Tchârmil-47 of enduring injustice and inequality. By disrupt- 6074615838935. ing normative understandings and analyses of 3. For a look at how the blurring of distinctions urban marginality, neoliberal moral logics, and between “insecurity” and a “sense of insecurity” the politics and geographies of dissent, we can gain the power of mobilizing punitive reactions, see Loïc Wacquant (2009). better sharpen our analytical apparatuses and 4. Th e Interior Ministry is considered to be the remain attuned to the fact that the neoliberal institutional locus of the monarchy’s power. As city is not a fait accompli, to paraphrase Jamal a so-called sovereign ministry, the king directly Bahmad (2013), but rather an unfi nished and appoints its head regardless of results in legisla- unstable project—not only open to but also in tive elections. much need of critique. 5. For a discussion of the distinction and relation between newer forms of associations and older institutions like Dar Shabab (youth club) run Acknowledgements directly by the Ministry of Youth and Sports, see Yasmine Berriane (2016). I am deeply indebted to my interlocutors in and 6. In 2017, youth unemployment in Morocco around Hay Mohammadi for their generous climbed to 28.5 percent, averaging 18 percent participation in the wider project this material over the past decade (International Labor Or- ganisation 2017). is drawn from. I would also like to thank the 7. Th e overall aesthetics are comparable to the anonymous reviewers for their instructive and British youth subculture of “chavs.” For an ac- helpful feedback on previous versions of this ar- count of the media’s role in the vilifi cation of ticle. Th e research that this article is based on working-class culture in Britain, see Owen was funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation, Jones (2011). the UK-ESRC, the Foundation for Urban and 8. Several dozen public Facebook groups ded- Regional Studies (FURS), and the KHI-Max icated to collecting individual poses are still Planck Institute. active, although receiving less traffi c in the post-2015 period. Th e most popular of these, Tchârmil, counting upwards of 45,000 follow- ers. See https://www.facebook.com/Tchârmil- Cristiana Strava is Assistant Professor in the 476074615838935/?fref=ts. School of Middle Eastern Studies at Leiden Uni- 9. Public comments read and archived from the versity. She is a social anthropologist trained at now-defunct open online group, on 22 April Harvard University (BA) and SOAS, University 2014. See https://www.facebook.com/pages/ of London (MARes, PhD), with a broad in- Marche-Contre-Linsécurité. terest in everyday urban spaces and practices, 10. Several journalists questioned the methods and legitimacy of arbitrary arrests and detention of socio-economic inequality, and the politics of minors. See TelQuel archive http://telquel.ma/ planning and development regimes. ORCID iD: tag/tcharmil. 0000–0002–2622–2125. 11. Th e state selectively used its power to police Email: [email protected] public space. Inhabitants complained that these “security actions” were erratic and came in spurts, only when the king or his loyal adminis- Notes trators could be moved to intercede and compel the local authorities to act. 1. I make use of pseudonyms in order to protect 12. Retrieved from the online group Marche Contre my interlocutors’ privacy. L’insécurité, 22 April 2014. 2. All images in this article are found in the pub- 13. My translation from French original. Archived lic domain and are used in a citational man- on 13 April 2014 from https://www.facebook ner. Source for all images, unless otherwise .com/pages/Marche-Contre-Linsécurité. 16 | Cristiana Strava

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