國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所
碩士論文
National Sun Yat-sen University
Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies
Master Thesis
加 拿大與中國 的 關係發展
The Development of Canada’s Relations with China
研究生「 菲利普 Philippe Brunet
指導教授「顧長永 博士 Dr. Samuel CY Ku
中華民國 103年 6月
June 2014
摘 要 :
⽪耶爾 ．埃利奧特． 特魯多所領導的⾃由黨派政府因提出終⽌中國在國際
間被孤⽴的想法震驚了許多⼈。當時新上任的加拿⼤總理下定決⼼要確保他
的國家能承認共產政權。然⽽，由於當時與加拿⼤關係最為密切的盟友，美
國，並不認同此舉，中國與加拿⼤建交⼀度不被看好。這篇論⽂探討究竟是
何種原因驅使兩國政府能在歷史上如此敏感的時間點迅速地改變⾃⼰的⽴場。
除此之外，此論⽂也會去探討因兩國間所做出的改變⽽造成的負⾯影響。最
後，此論⽂會深⼊研究鞏固中加關係 的因素以及恐造成破壞彼此關係的潛在
因素。
關鍵字：政治、政治變化、加拿⼤、中國、美國、政府 Abstract:
Pierre Elliott-Trudeau’s Liberal government shocked many by expressing his wish to end China’s international isolation. The new
Canadian Prime Minister was determined to ensure that his country could recognize the Communist regime. Sino-Canadian rapprochement seemed impossible at a time when Canada’s closest ally, the United States was opposing the movement and China was shunned by the Western world.
This thesis will explore the reasons that could explain how it is that the two governments suddenly shifted positions at such a politically sensitive moment in history. Furthermore, while existing accounts of Sino-Canadian rapprochement highlight both countries’ external relations, this thesis will explore the outcomes of such a political change. Lastly, this thesis will look into factors that keep the Canadian-Sino relation strong and factors that could potentially damage or rupture the relation.
Key Words: Politics, Political Change, Canada, China, United States, Government. Table of Content:
Introduction ...... 1 Research Motives ...... 1 Research Purpose ...... 2 Research methods ...... 2 Research Approach ...... 3 Littereture Review ...... 3 Structure of Thesis ...... 6
Chapter 1: Canada in Asia ...... 8 History of Canada and China . . . . . 8 History of Canada and Japan . . . . . 9 Why Canada leaned towards China . . . . 10 Trudeau’s Role ...... 13 Canadian perspective in the “One China” policy . . 15
Chapter 2: Political and Economical Impacts . . . . 24 How the relation with China evolved . . . . 34 The consequences of ignoring Japan . . . . 28 The creation of the Asia Pacific Foundation Act . . 31 Canada and the United States post Canadian-Sino relation . 32
Chapter 3: Contemporary Issues . . . . . 36 Chinese immigration to Canada . . . . . 36 Possible causes for rupture . . . . . 39 The Conservative Harper government . . . . 40 Canada, China, Taiwan and the case of Kosovo . . 45
Conclusion ...... 49
Bibliography ...... 53
Tables:
Table 1: Percentage of Canadians Supporting Recognition of the PRC, 1950-1966
...... 26
Table 2: Share of the Japanese Import Market, Selected Countries (%)
...... 30
Table 3: Foreign Investment in Canada
...... 35
Table 4: Flows of People from China to Canada at the Turn of the 21st Century
...... 38
Abbreviations:
Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada APFC Association of Southeast Asian Nation ASEAN Canada-China Scholars’ Exchange Program CCSEP Foreign Direct Investment FDI Kuomintang, Nationalist Party KMT General Preferable Tariff GPT North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO People’s Republic of China PRC Republic of China ROC United States US
Introduction:
The relationship between Canada and China was, for quite a while, was seen as an addition to the American’s relation with China. This is reflected by the fact that Sino-American relations have overshadowed the vast majority of scholarly study of Canada-China relations. While it is true that its southern neighbor, on all levels, influenced Canada during the Cold War period, a change in federal government saw Canada establishing its own foreign policy.
Before Pierre Elliott-Trudeau, Canada followed the United State’s example in foreign policy, and agreed on the majority of issues. For many years, it was no secret that Canada’s main concern regarding foreign affairs was its relationship with the United States. In comparison, the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) clearly did not rank as high as the United States did on Ottawa’s policy agenda. As a matter of fact, before Trudeau took power, Canada was seen as an “American Satellite” on the international scene. For Canada, the rapprochement to China marked a new day. Gone where the days where foreign policy was dictated by others and in where the times where Canada would seek to meet its own interests and reach its own goals as a nation.
Research Motives:
Canada is a country that benefits from having a respectable and peaceful reputation. Like other countries, that reputation can hide a darker and mysterious past. Canada’s place in Asia has indeed quite the history. Since the end of World War II, interdependence among nation-states, particularly in economic and political affairs has become predominant characteristics of the
1 international system. National interests such as security and political ties are still important and still key factors in world politics. Why certain countries choose to align themselves with others and over who is something that has always been of interest to me. When it comes to writing on international relations, regardless of the country, one can find any alignment, with any country. However, very few scholars have tackled a comparative approach to alliances between countries, especially concerning Canada and China. This lack of writing is what has pushed me to explore Canada’s role in China’s rapprochement to the rest of the world, how it impacted Canada and its other relations as well as how Canadian-Sino relations have developed.
Research Purpose:
This thesis is devoted to the study of Canada’s political alignment in Asia.
The goal is to explore the reasoning behind Canada’s choice in establishing political ties with China in 1970, and moving away from Japan as by doing so.
This paper will aim to examine the decision process as well as the establishment of the Canadian-Sino relationship. It will also explore the outcomes of this relation and ponder on what keeps Canada and China together today and what could potentially break them up.
Research Methods:
For the development of this thesis, I intend on using the content analysis and document analysis for my thesis. This is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic. Documents are analyzed externally (e.g. author,
2 timeframe, place where the document was produced, category in which the document falls, what is the intended audience of the document), as well as internally (e.g. content, credibility of the content).
Furthermore, I have the intension of using Canada’s public works. An example being “StatsCan,” which is available to anyone and has great information for everything statistics and number related. Canada has laws in place, which requires the government to publish everything it does, and wishes to do. These publications include, amongst other things, trades, investments as well as many other government related statistics.
Research Approach:
The approach to my thesis is very simple and very specific; I will use the specific area and academic approach. This qualitative approach aims to analyze official documents, scholarly publications, journals, newspapers and speeches.
It is also essential to point out that this thesis will have its focus on the
Canadian side, due to the lack of access to the important PRC archives, which remain closed to the public, as well as the linguistic challenge that is mandarin.
Literature Review:
Discussions of Ottawa’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China in late 1970 has, more often than not, focused on the level of high politics and the ending of Communist China’s international isolation.
3
Some of the existing works places a particular importance on external demands in their analyses on Canadian-Sino relations and a number of experts suggest that Ottawa’s refusal of close relations with the PRC before 1970 was a
“Cold War problem” that the Canadian government had to “solve.”1
As Bruce Gilley states in his article “Reawakening Canada’s China Policy,”
“Virtually every scholarly work on the Canadian switch from non- recognition of
China during the period of Maoist terror to recognition in 1970 has portrayed the former as an aberrant policy driven by some combination of Washington
Cold War sentiments and hopelessly ignorant misunderstandings of China.”2
In short, for political historians, the “1970 handshake” is essential in the study of the history of Canada-China relations because it marked the end of one era and the beginning of a new, independent Canada. In a broader context, the establishment of diplomatic relation could be used to look at the two countries’ relationships with the world community at the time. It’s only after establishing ties with Canada that the People’s Republic of China was allowed to take a seat at the United Nations. Prime Minister Trudeau’s foreign policy, including his government’s recognition of Maoist China, had a direct impact upon American attitudes and policies. It also allowed Canada to solidify its image as a strong willed country who looked at the needs of many over that of the few.
Literature on Sino-Canadian relations tends to focus on three points:
1 F.Q. Quo and Akira Ichikawa (1972), Paul Evans (1991), John M. Robson (1968), Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1968) & Henry F. Angus (1953). 2 Bruce Gilley, “Reawakening Canada’s China Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy. March 2008: 122. 4
! Canada’s identity on the international scene has a role in how the country
interacts with others as well as an impact on how they perceive the
country.
! Chinese immigration to Canada is an essential part of the country’s
growth. It also creates a closer relationship to China that connects the two
in a deeper way.
! China now represents a threat to Canada as it is becoming more and more
involved in Canadian issues, this developing a Canadian dependency for
China.
The first point deals with Canada’s image on the international scene. The
focus seems to be that post-cold war Canadian foreign policy is implicated
not only in the governance of others, but also in the subjectification and
governance of Canadians. Canada has been idealized within foreign policy as
having just and virtuous values that are deemed to be lacking among foreign
subjects, including tolerance, humanitarianism, orderliness, and
peacefulness. This glorified image is now seen as a standard and Canadians
as well as other nations citizen expect the Canadian government to live up to
that standard.
The second subject of focus in Canadian-Sino relations is the issue of
Immigration. Scholars like Peter Li3 have dedicated careers in analyzing
immigration policies, trends and patterns. While it’s agreed that Canada
3 Peter Li, “Immigrants from China to Canada: Issues of Supply and Demand of Human,” Canadian International Council: Canada China papers, No. 9, 2010. 5
needs immigration in order to sustain itself, an ongoing debate exists on the
amount necessary and the source immigrants.
Lastly, the question of whether or not China represents a threat to Canada
has risen in popularity over the last decade. Author in the likes of Vivienne
Poy, Huhua Coy and Fred Bill4 to mention a few, try to asses the risks of
increased relations with China. The main issues being the growing
dependence of Canada on China, a dangerously high level of immigration and
modern day espionage fuel the ongoing debates.
Structure of Thesis:
This thesis will be divided into three chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one will focus on the build up to the establishment of diplomatic relation between Canada and China. It will also recall the distancing of Canada and Japan.
Finally an analysis of Canada’s take on the “One China” policy will be made.
The second chapter will tackle the impacts both political and economic that Canada faced after aligning with the People’s Republic of China. First the chapter will explore the evolution of Canadian-Sino relation post diplomatic ties.
Secondly, the slow distancing relation between Canada and Japan will be examined. In addition, after years of dependence, how did the United States and
Canada cope after clearly separating themselves on international interests?
4 Fred Bild, “Canada’s Staying Power: A Diplomatic ViewCao & Vivian Poy (eds), The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa: 2011). 6
The third chapter will look into what keeps China and Canada together. Is
Canada still valuable now that China is fully intergraded in the international scene? In addition, this chapter will cover the issue of a shift form a Liberal
Canadian government to a conservative government and how this change could jeopardize the relation. Lastly, a look into the Kosovo independence case, an international in which Canada involved itself and a case that could potential serve as a precedent and haunt Canada.
7
Chapter 1: Canada and Asia
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China in
1970 was a highly controversial political decision for Canada in the context of the time.5 Indeed, at the time, along with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was seen in a less favorable way by the “western world” due to its communist ties. However, China has now become Canada’s second trade partner, after the United States and is more important for Canada then ever.6
In this Chapter, I will first cover the history of Sino-Canadian relations post World War Two as well as Japanese-Canadian relations as they played an important role in Canada’s place in Asia. In the second part of this chapter I will explain Canada’s Policy changes in Asia, Trudeau’s role and his Liberal Party as well as it take on the “One China Policy”.
The History of Canada and China:
Canada’s place in Asia goes as far back as Canada’s creation. In 1905, when the last province joined the Canadian federation and formed what we now know as Canada (Nunavut excluded as it separated from the North-West
Territories later) international relations became an important factor for the country.
5 Charles Burton, “The Canadian Policy Context of Canada’s China Policy since 1970”, in Huhua Cao & Vivian Poy (eds), The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa: 2011), p. 33. 6 Industry Canada, International Trade Canadian Economy (NAICS 11-91), (Ottawa: 2013)
Following the founding of the PRC in 1949, Canada and what is now China found themselves in different ideology camps. Along the Western Bloc, which consisted of nations that partook in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), Canada refused to recognize the PRC as the true government of China.
Canada aligned itself with the Republic of China (ROC), rivals of the PRC based in
Taiwan following a retreat during the Chinese Civil War.
In 1968, the government of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott
Trudeau started negotiations with the PRC that led to the establishment of diplomatic relations on October 13, 1970. In 1971, Canada and China proceeded in exchanging ambassadors, and Canadian Minister of Industry, Trade and
Commerce Jean-Luc Pepin visited China. In 1972, Canadian Foreign Minister
Mitchell Sharp led a Canadian trade delegation to China and met with Premier
Zhou Enlai.
In 1973, Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the first Canadian Prime Minister to pay an official visit to the PRC, and in 1984 Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Canada, becoming the first Communist leader to address Parliament.
Governor general of Canada Jeanne Sauvé also conducted a state visit to China during her tenure. In 1985 as part of a growing concern for relations with China and Japan the Canadian Parliament passed an Act to create the Asia Pacific
Foundation of Canada, a think-tank focusing on Canada-Asia relations.
The History of Canada and Japan:
Japanese-Canadian relations began in 1929 and where Canada’s third
9 official partnership outside the commonwealth, making it quite significant. At the time, Canada considered Japan an important transit way for diplomatic relations with the rest Asia, highlighting the important of the relation.
Diplomatic ties where severed with the start of the Pacific war, in 1941 due to Japan’s attack on Commonwealth countries. Following the war, Canada returned to Tokyo in 1946 after Japan’s unconditional surrender to Allied forces initiating a new wave of diplomatic negotiation. Japan also opened a diplomatic office in Ottawa in 1951 for the preparation of the future resumption of diplomatic relations. Full restoration of Japanese-Canadian relations accompanied the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Japan was nominated by, and had the backing of Canada when it joined the United Nations in 1956.
Why Canada leaned towards China:
Fred Bild, in his chapter titled “Canada’s Staying Power: A Diplomatic
View” states that Canada in post-war euphoria,7 when the country was at its strongest economically, played a big role in the reconstruction and democratization of Japan. It’s thanks to these efforts that Canada truly entered
Asia and started moving west towards China. In the 1950’s when the Korean
War exploded, Canada finally realized that neither the Commonwealth led by the
British nor the United States, we’re using approaches that suited the country.
The way Canada presented itself to the world started changing and morphed into its very own approach. Geoffrey Pearson notes that when the Taiwan Strait
7 Fred Bild, “Canada’s Staying Power: A Diplomatic View, Cao & Vivian Poy (eds), The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2011), pp. 12-30. 10
Crisis emerged, Canada sided with the PRC in the case of the Quemoy and Matsu
Islands.8
As seen in the historical section above, Canada’s diplomatic relations with
Japan where not only important for the country but are still to this date quite strong. However, Canada’s focus in Asia changed from a Japan first to China first approach in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. With a Parliament leadership change, Canada sought to create its own image and place in the international community. It’s this desire to push away from the United States as well as the need to forge Canada’s very own approach to foreign policies that pushed the country’s view on China to change. When Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau took power along side his Liberals he had a clear goal in mind.
On the southern side of the border, American president Dwight
Eisenhower, in 1954, clearly expressed concerns when Canada made its first push to introduce China to the United Nations. At the time the United States made it very clear that they strongly opposed Canada and Jaime Glavoz described the dialogue between both countries leaders as tension filled. He states that Eisenhower firmly stated that should China gain a seat, the United
States would leave and the United Nations would also need to leave the United
States.9 Furthermore, according to Canadian Diplomat Chester Ronning, Ottawa took the United States’ threats and strong reactions quite seriously. 10 For
Canada, a country trying to establish itself as a mid power, threats of this level
8 Geoffrey Pearson, Seize the day : Lester B. Pearson and crisis diplomacy (Ottawa, 1993), p.132. 9 Jamie Glazov, Canadian Policy toward Khrushchev’s Soviet Union (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p. 73. 10 Chester Ronning, A Memoir of China in Revolution (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), p.182. 11 forced the country to question its own foreign policy agenda. At the time,
Canada’s foreign policies were mainly determined by American policy. John
Holmes goes even further and states that it isn’t American pressure that determined Canada’s policies, but American policies themselves.11 Differences in political agenda in regards to relations with China definitely stirred some
Canadian officials’ antipathy towards their southern friend in the 1950’s.
Political dynamics over relations with China unsurprisingly enthused some Canadian officials’ bitterness toward the United States during the 1950’s.
As a matter of fact, Prime Minister Pearson and his administration had established that having friendly relations with the United States was more important then establishing formal relations with Communist China. When
Pierre Elliott-Trudeau took Canada’s leadership and paved the way to diplomatic ties in 1968, his southern neighbors did not approve and criticized him for it.
This new government and its new approach to diplomacy created tension between Canada and the United States, but it’s important to mention that the relation between the two countries was never bad, it always remained cordial and composed.
There’s no way of sugarcoating Canada’s reasons to shift its primary Asia hub to China. Being labeled an “American Satellite” was something Trudeau and his government wanted to shed. The focus changed to from Tokyo, Canada’s long time Asian ally, to Beijing. While politically Ottawa and Tokyo didn’t change,
11 John W. Holmes, The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1970), p. 215. 12 economically recognizing and opening markets to China hurt Canada’s image in
Japan. This topic will be further explored in the second chapter.
Trudeau’s Role:
Being elected for a second term, Pierre Elliott Trudeau decided that he no longer wanted his government to be portrayed as a puppet of the United States and their ways of doing things. In order to distance himself and Canada from the
United States, he outlined a plan to shift his foreign policies to a new and independent. He felt that the public would tend to more comfortable with his
Liberals after they’d politically distance themselves from their southern neighbors.12 Not only did this shift in ideology demonstrate a new independent way of thinking, but it also highlighted what importance Washington had on
Trudeau and his government, and how heavy the United States weighed in on
Canadian politics.
By simply stating that Trudeau’s role in Canada was significant would truly diminish his actions. Prime Minister Trudeau has shaped what we now consider Canada and all that it implies. He first took in 1968 as Canada’s 15th
Prime Minister and once again in 1980 after a year of political changes in the country. As Jeremy Kinsman puts it, “ Believing the Department of External
Affairs was over-influenced by static, often Eurocentric, cold war thinking, he challenged officials to mark in foreign policy review those places in which
12 Peter Dobell, “Reducing Vulerability: The Third Option,” in Don Munton and John Kirton, eds., Canadian Foreign Policy: Selected Cases (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1992), p. 249. 13
Canada’s interest stood out.”13 The fact that the aging anti-communist in Taiwan spoke and represented the billion in what is “mainland” China was, for Trudeau, wrong.14
One year after Trudeau took office, Canada started secret negotiations with China in Stockholm, in 1969. Fast-forward another year and the negotiations where done, in the spring of 1970 Canada and China had diplomatic ties. Furthermore, Canada and China where seated next to each other at the
United Nations for a few years due to alphabetical placing. Jeremy Kinsman, who serves as Canada’s Ambassador to the European Union adds that Canada’s role might not of pushed the United States towards China, as they would of probably connected regardless, but the fact that a North American relation was already established made it easier.15
Prime Minister Trudeau’s priorities in China were always realistic and pragmatic. In his eyes, a friendly China could provide an avenue for business and open new doors for the Canadian market. He believed that his country shouldn’t neglect a populous Asian power like the People’s Republic of China and unlike his predecessors, Trudeau more then once expressed his concern over the PRC’s isolation on the international scene. Like anything or anyone else, Trudeau didn’t go without criticism. He was called on his decision to accept Beijing’s demands, particularly on the Taiwan and One China issue to quickly and giving to much away to China’s leader Mao.
13 Jeremy Kinsman, “Who is my Neighbour? Trudeau and Foreign Policy”, London Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 18, 2002/2003, p. 106. 14 Ibid. p. 107. 15 Ibid. p. 108. 14
Trudeau’s biggest role was that of a strong and capitalizing leader. He was able to exploit the change perception of the “American policy” that used to rule
Canadian diplomacy. He solidified his position and demonstrated that his newly elected party could stand strong and escape the southern political influence with its recognition of the PRC.
Canadian Perspective on the “One China Policy”:
The sovereignty conflict between the People’s Republic of China and the
Republic of China (ROC), also known as Taiwan, is a mostly hidden conflict. It does not appear regularly in the media, neither on the international front nor on the Canadian one. This may be due to the fact that the conflict, although ongoing, is somewhat dormant. Unlike other sovereignty conflicts, the one between
Taiwan and China has been rather quiet on the international level. The Canadian government’s position on the matter has been quite clear since the 1970’s.
During those times Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, sought to, through avant- gardism thoughts and actions, form a lasting bond between the Chinese government and his own as mentioned earlier. The year 1970 was a decisive one for China and Canada. 16 Trudeau openly declared his support of the government in China as the only true ruler of both the Mainland and the island of
Taiwan where the ROC claimed the same thing.
This decision took away international recognition from the Kuomintang leaders who would then fall under Chinese rule. The term “rapprochement” was
16 Canada’s World, 1960s, (Canada),
United States changed their official recognition from the Nationalist government to the Communist government. Official recognition and economic interdependence between China and North America became apparent as these decisions took place. This can be seen as Canada’s sole intervention in the sovereignty conflict between China and Taiwan. This Canadian intervention was unique in the sense that the federal government did not consider any other type of intervention for this conflict. Prime Minister Trudeau’s participation in the
“October Handshake” was considered a bold move.
During the previous decade, due to the events of the Cold War, the
Canadian economy was very dependant of the American economy. A general analysis of the Canadian economy would show that, historically, it has been dependant of American investments and contributions.17 However, the 1960s saw a surge of nationalism in the people of Canada, and even though their relation with the United States was important for their economy, Canadian independence from this trend was on the minds of the people. At this point in time, around the end of the 1960s, although other countries had begun to express potential support for the PRC instead of the KMT representatives, the
United States still refused economic ties with this communist government. The implication of China in supporting the USSR during the Cold War, through the
“signing of a mutual defence and assistance treaty” was still a hot topic for the
17 Stephen Azzi & J.L. Granatstein, Canada and the United States, (Canada, 2010)
United States. 18 There were notable instances during which the American government found ways to halt or intercept sales of goods from Canada to
China.19 Amidst this opposition by Canada’s top economic partner, the Trudeau government still found value in an economic and diplomatic relationship with the PRC.
The “October Handshake” represents Trudeau’s decision to create official diplomatic relations with China through recognition of the PRC as the only ruling party of China. He agreed to recognize that Taiwan was part of this China and that the economies of that territory and of Canada would prosper.
“Trudeau found the rigid categories of the Cold War suffocating
and he worked to blur the boundaries of Cold War divisions that
were radiating around the globe. One of his first acts as prime
minister was to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1970,
even before Henry Kissinger’s “ping-pong democracy” opened the
door for Richard Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972. It made
little sense to Trudeau that an emerging great power in Asia, with
the largest population in the world, should be excluded from
international institutions.”20
This being said, the road to recognizing the PRC was not an easy one for
Canada.
18 History, USSR and PRC sign mutual defense treaty, (United States, 2014),
“It is significant to note that Canada was prepared to recognize
Mao’s new government after the 1949 Communist victory.
However, this did not happen and the Canadian Consulate in
Shanghai was closed down in 1952, mainly because of the
pressure from the White House, which adopted an
increasingly hard-line attitude towards Chinese Communism.
Indeed for many years, the Canadian decision-makers treated
Sino- Canadian relations as a triangular form of diplomacy
involving Washington as well as Beijing and Ottawa. This is
reflected in the fact that the scholarly study of Canada-China
relations has been overshadowed by Sino-American
relations.”21
The decision to recognize China as a rising power and an economic equal was difficult for Canada, as the United States had expressed a desire to abandon their participation in the United Nations should they recognize the government of China and if normalization took place between the two institutions. They claimed that such an act would be considered as a United Nations abandonment of the United States and that they would not stand by such a decision. Canada’s fear of crossing such a line with the United States is expressed through a quote from Lester B. Pearson in 1965:
“I have always taken the view that if there is a division of
opinion in your own country on a particular item of foreign
policy, such as recognition of Red China... then it seems to me
21 Simon Ka Ho Li, The October Handshake, (Thesis, Department of History, Queens University, 2008), p. 23. 18
the reaction of the United States becomes even more important.
If you can’t make up your own minds... then you should be very
careful about not getting into trouble with your friends.”22
This declaration to a CBC reporter explains that keeping the Canadian relationship with the United States is more important than the other agenda of recognizing China. He also depicts the main debate taking place in Canada at the time.
The only type of intervention favoured by Canada was a political and economical one. There were no considerations of military interventions or even embargoes. Canada wished to intervene solely with the purpose of choosing a sovereign nation between both China and Taiwan to enhance its own economic position. Until the time where Trudeau decided to take action and recognize
China, Canadian governments had consciously made the decision to continue obeying American rules and policies. However, Trudeau seemed to have a knack for nation-building policies, even if they did not necessarily fall in line with
American policies or requests. He demonstrated his capacity to stand up to
American political pressure once again when he took a stand in 1976 by banning the Taiwanese athletes from competing in the Montreal Olympics. He showed the world that by defending his “one-China” policy and his respect for his allegiance that he would not break from the pressure applied both by the international community and by the American government. “When in 1976
Canada took on both the United States and the International Olympic Committee
22 Ibid. p. 28. 19 in order to bar Taiwanese athletes from the Montreal Olympics, Canada was heavily criticized, if not vilified in both the domestic and international media.
Trudeau’s strict application of Canada’s one-China policy reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to the 1970 recognition formula. The exclusion of the Taiwan athletes was condemned « for bringing politics into sports ». On the other hand,
Canada’s defiance of American pressure was popular and quietly praised.”23 This event took place after Nixon’s visit to China and the Shanghai Communiqué, which also brought normalization to China on an American level.
This shows Trudeau’s commitment to his arrangement; even though the
Americans had, themselves, agreed to recognize the PRC as the one and only
China, they still applied pressure to the Canadian government to reduce its dedication to China for the sake of the Olympics. Once again, Trudeau refused to crack under the American pressure. His rise to office as Canadian Prime Minister and his rock hard determination to endure under pressure from other institutions put an end to the debate that Pearson had described. The other side of the debate presented actors who wished for the Canadian government to wait for the American government to act and to follow in its footsteps.
Trudeau’s decision to award recognition to the Communist government of the People’s Republic of China was solely based on economic ties and a future economic growth. It did not take into consideration ideas such as the abandonment of a democratizing Taiwan, or even of the human rights of the
23 Micheal Frolic, Six Observations about Sino-Canadian Relations since Tiananmen, (XXX)
PRC’s own populations. The only main actor in this debate is the Canadian government. In all its influence over past governments through economic and political decisions, the American government is also technically an important actor in this conflict. However, from a Canadian perspective, the United States did not manage to put a stop to the Trudeau Government’s plans for Sino-
Canadian relations. The American implication in this conflict was essentially the same one as the Canadian implication. Although they resisted the incoming growth of the Chinese economy, they eventually took part in their own version of the Canadian October Handshake.
In 1972, Henry Kissinger and President Nixon met with Zhou Enlai, the
Chinese Premier, to deliver a joint communiqué expressing their new arrangements. “The communiqué pledged both countries to work for
"normalization" of relations, and to expand "people-to-people contacts" and trade opportunities.”24 The question of Taiwan came up as a thorn and was not smoothed out as easily as either side had hoped. The PRC still wished for a “one-
China” policy, while the United States had hoped to agree on a “two-China” policy. “In fact, the U.S. had been inching toward a "two Chinas" policy for years.
Only four months earlier, when the United Nations voted on whether to admit the People's Republic of China, the U.S. reversed its 20-year opposition to seating the PRC, but opposed any effort to expel Taiwan. Ultimately, the U.S. lost the fight for dual representation. The PRC gained admission to the UN, Taiwan was ousted
-- and the U.S. was left to juggle relations with two countries that both saw
24 American Experience, The Shanghai communque, (United States, 1999)
Chinese resolve the Taiwan question without the use of force.”25 Unlike Canada, who chose to recognize the PRC as the one true China without many requirements on the Taiwan front, the United States required that the Taiwan question be resolved through peace and other non-violent measures. As another actor in this conflict, their contribution was rather different from that of Canada.
The American government would have rather not had to choose between either claims to Chinese rule and would have preferred to recognize both countries as separate sovereign entities. However, lead by forthcoming actors such as
Canada, the United States was forced to recognize the PRC as the one true
Chinese ruling party and to abandon their claims that Taiwan was a sovereign country as well.
Afterthoughts:
Since the bold choices made by Trudeau both during his 1970 decisions and his 1976 refusal to budge under pressure, Canada has not addressed the
Taiwan-China sovereignty issue head on. It is clear that the question will not be revisited soon as Canada has made its decision and has declared its-self supportive of a “one-China” policy. The Canadian government has sided with the
25 Ibid. 22
PRC for economic reasons and will not be changing its decision considering
China’s economic growth these past decades. It’s main solution to the problem between both countries was to decide to side with the more economical promising actor and to discard the other despite potential human rights abuses by China.
23
Chapter 2: Political and Economic Impacts
Interdependence has become an important factor in international relations, especially following World War II. Many scholars argue that issues such as national defense, security and economic growth are dictating the future of international relations and that each state is expected to act strictly according to its own self-interest. As one can imagine, going against the tides, against your closest allies creates a certain degree of tension. Canada was no exception.
To some observers, Canada was nothing more than a junior partner in
North America, compared to its giant neighbor.26 Canada’s climb to middle power status did not mean much to them. This time, however, Canada was involved in a momentous diplomatic decision in which the United States was not an ally, something new for the northern country. The new policy approach toward China established that the Canadian government had decided to seek a more confident and independent role in world affairs.
How the relations with China evolved:
1968-1970 was a particular period, one of swift change, within Canadian society, while at the same time the trend of reforms was shared around the world. Surrounded by such environment, Ottawa’s China policy was also experiencing its remarkable changes in this context of political reform.
26 Abraham Rotstein and Gary Lax,Committee for an Independent Canada. (Canada, 2006),
Following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between
Canada and China, the two countries have enjoyed a friendly environment.
Firstly based on political reasons but slowly evolving to an economical relation.
It would be to much to state that Canada alone, or even as a major contributor, facilitated China in its diplomatic rapprochement towards the western world, but it would also be absurd to state that the Sino-Canadian relation didn’t help.
Scholars like Tong Zhang Chow believe that the significance of this relationship has evolved far beyond what was initially planned.27 The establishment of diplomatic relation in 1970, what is now known as the “October Handshake”, paved the way to the 1973 Trade Agreement between the Government of the
People’s Republic of China and the Canadian Government. 28 Furthermore,
Canada added China to its list of countries eligible for its General Preferable
Tariff (GPT) in 1979.29 The GPT list includes countries that Canada deems favorable to trade with.
The development of relations with the People’s Republic of China was a significant example of an independent Canadian foreign policy. This change in policy would be welcome across Canada at the time when anti-American sentiments were growing in popularity. Additionally, as Canada and China were both Pacific countries, it would only be natural for them to encourage closer political and economic relations. In the view of Trudeau’s new government, the
27 Tong Zhang Chow, Canada-China Government Relations: Political Differences Versus Economic Relations in Comparison With Japan-China Relations (Master Thesis, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, 1992), p.30. 28 Foreign Affairs Canada, Canada-China Economic Complementarities Study, (Canada, 2013),
Table 1: Percentage of Canadians Supporting Recognition of the PRC, 1950-1966
Should Not Year Should Recognize No Opinion Recognize 1950 38 39 23 1959 32 44 25 1964 51 34 16 1966 55 28 17 Source: Paul Evans, Canadian Public Opinion on Relations with China: An Analysis of the Existing Survey Research. (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1985): p.8.
The above table highlights the Canadian belief in recognizing the PRC.
During the first talks of establishing contact with China, early 1950s, the population was rather split through the middle, with a high percentage of
Canadians who had no opinion. The tides changed as China got more media coverage and the Trudeau era started. By 1955, more then half the population believed the People’s Republic of China should be recognized. This shows that
Trudeau had national support, all he needed to continue was someone who shared his belief in China.
While he was a firm believer in the Chinese Communist ideals on which the People’s Republic of China was founded, Zhou was often seen as the Chinese premier who restrained the excesses of Chairman Mao’s extreme policies within
30 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 201. 26 the limits of his authority.31 In order to help his country to efficiently build up essential knowledge and skills in the late 1960s and the 1970s, creating exchanges between Canada and the People’s Republic was for all intents and purposes part of Zhou’s national recovery strategies. Shortly after the opening of
Sino-Canadian relations, Jeanne Sauvé, federal Minister of State for Science and
Technology, headed an official Canadian scientific delegation to the People’s
Republic of China for a specific dialogue of common scientific exchanges between the two countries in September 1973.32 As a result, Beijing’s goals were to some extent accomplished in this sense. Throughout the same year, the
Canada-China Scholars’ Exchange Program (CCSEP) was started, which was an
“official exchange program between the two countries designed to enhance
Chinese scholars’ and professionals’ knowledge and understanding of Canada.”33
The program was without a doubt the result of a mission by Zhou Enlai and
Pierre Trudeau.
Nowadays, the Canadian-Sino relation has reached great heights. An example of this can be the signing of the Foreign Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement (FIPA) with China at the APEC Summit in Russia in
September 2012.34 Signing a trade agreement of this importance, above all before both the United States and the European Union, provided groundwork for
Ottawa to pursue more healthy relations with China, and dismiss criticism that
31 Unknown, “Mao and Zhou: Behind the Smiles,” The Straits Times, September 16, 2003. 32 Sylvia Duvernet, Canada-China Cultural Exchanges: Centered in the 1970’s but Beginning with Dr. Henry Norman Bethune, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p.98. 33 Canada, Canada-China Scholars’ Exchange Programme (CCSEP) pamphlet, (Canada, 2014 [updated]),
Canada had become less important in the Asia Pacific. The agreement, the government argued, had the potential to be one of Canada’s largest and most important trade agreements since the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). The FIPA outlines rules and mechanisms to ensure fair national treatment of each other’s investors as well as minimum standards of treatment.
The agreement also assigns dispute resolution to closed-door arbitration by an international mediator, which represents the root of much of the criticism levied against the FIPA.
The consequences of ignoring Japan:
Since establishing diplomatic relations with China, the relation between
Canada and Japan has changed. Although the impacts aren’t what one might consider big, they are significant. As more and more of Canada’s efforts shifted form Japan to China, the relation took its toll. Politically speaking, nothing has changed. The two nations still enjoy a strong link economically, however the relation has seen drastic declines. Canada’s businesses have slowly shifted towards the Chinese markets.
Canada’s business relationship with Japan has declined significantly in recent years. Over the past two decades, Japan has lost its place to China as
Canada’s second-largest trading partner, after the United States, and no longer attracts as much national attention as it once did. The partial media coverage in
Canada of Japan’s situation over the past twenty years has been overwhelmingly negative, focusing on the economic hold back and its outcome. Even Prime
28
Minister Paul Martin’s visit to Japan in January 2005 received next to no coverage in the Canadian media.35
Canadian trade with Japan has been determined largely by the Japanese needs. As Canada has the luxury of easy access to the United States, companies prefer to produce for that large market. This is partly due to lower costs of doing business with their southern neighbor and partly to stubbornness on the part of
Canadian firms. The result has been a declining market share in Japan. This ranges across sectors as diverse as forest products, educational services, tourism and investment. Canada’s shortcoming rests not so much on what it has done but rather on what it has not done.36
While Canada’s economic relation with Japan might be dwindling down, there exist options to reverse the effects. Prime Minister Martin signaled with his visit to Japan that he was interested in strengthening economic ties with the country, and agreed with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to establish a Canada-Japan Economic Framework to study ways to further promote the bilateral economic relationship.37
Canadian goods have seen ups and downs in the Japanese. In the past twenty years, as much as six percent of Canada’s total exports saw their way to
Japan. However, that number decreased to two percent by the end of the 1990s.
35 Carin Holroyd, The Costs of Falling Behind: Canada’s Economic Relationship with Japan (Canada, 2005)
Seeing as Japan has a natural resource deficiency and wood, coal, canola, pulp, fish, copper, meats, wheat and various other minerals consist of the main exports from Canada, no real changes have occurred within the Canadian-
Japanese trade. This almost exclusive trade of natural resources has placed
Canada in a difficult position. Increased competition emerging from globalization and the ever changing pricing of raw materials has left Canada on the loosing end.38
Table 2: Share of the Japanese Import Market, Selected Countries (%)
1995 2003 China 10.7 19.7 United States 22.6 15.6 Australia 4.3 3.9 Malaysia 3.1 3.3 Canada 3.2 2.0 Source: Karen Harold, Commentary, Canada Asia, Vol. 38, February 2005, p. 2.
As highlighted by the above table, Canada is now falling behind in Japan’s import market. China, the United States, Australia and Malaysia have all benefited from Canada’s shift towards China.
Canada has never been a powerhouse on the world scene. Often scene as a mediator, Canada has a reputation of staying away form complex or difficult situations and markets. Furthermore, a surprisingly high labor costs has transformed Canada into a natural resource exporter, lowering to full monetary potential of the country. When trade with Japan began to lower, over the past
38 Ibid. 30 two decades, the Canadian companies quickly changed or outsourced their product to China. The price paid is now a significant drop in Canadian-Japanese business, a country that lack natural resources and whom one would think fit
Canada’s export model.
As previously mentioned, relations with Japan never ceased; they also never mature into what would have been expected of Canada’s former Asian hub. With all the focus set on China, Japan has been left out and simply found ways to meet its needs elsewhere.
The creation of the Asia Pacific Foundation Act:
With the establishment of the diplomatic relation with China, Canada saw its presence in Asia grow at a steady pace over the years. In order to take full advantage of this, Canada created the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC).
Established by an Act of Parliament in 1984, the APFC is an independent, non- profit think-tank focusing on Canada’s relations with Asia. The foundation has its headquartered in Vancouver as well as an office in Toronto. They focus on bringing together both people and knowledge, to supply current and comprehensive research, analysis and information on Canada’s transpacific relations.39
The Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada has three mandates. The first consists of conducting research on contemporary issues in Canada-Asia relations. Their second is to raise knowledge and promote informed decision-
39 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada - An independent think- tank on Canada's relations with Asia, (Canada, 2014)
The Foundation promotes relations with Asian by taking on many projects. The APFC encourages foreign relations by organizing roundtables, workshops and panel discussions on contemporary Canada-Asia topics, which focus on foreign relations, trade and investment, business and public policy concerns. Furthermore, speakers and panelists are invited to share information and experiences at these events. The Foundation also organizes and coordinates what is known as “Track Two” events in Canada. These events consist of international forums as well as international conference either hosted by the
Asia Pacific Foundation Act or in collaboration with them. Recent examples include the annual Canada-Korea Forum and US-Canada-Japan Trilateral
Cooperation Conference. Lastly the foundation supports Canadian policy research on Asia through its many grants program. The competitive grants programs offers financial support to researchers and industries that are studying a subject of present-day policy, significant to the Canada-Asia relationship.41
Canada and the United States post Canadian-Sino relation:
Even though Canada and the United States were the closest trading and business partners in the world, the two countries were not equal economic
40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 32 partners. As the Prime Minister Trudeau dealt with the United States as well as
China to guide establishment of Canadian-Sino relations, management of this complex process was often a test of political management. According to Maxwell
Cohen’s article “A China Policy for Canada”, “it is clear that we must live easily with our neighbors and our great friends and if they feel so deeply about a third party, we cannot ignore that feeling except at the possible peril to the friendship itself.”42 This line of reasoning undoubtedly captured the mood of the time.
Canada, a country with only one neighbor, every now and then faced the limits of its political independence when it came to the formulation of its China policy.
As established, Canada has always been under the giant shadow that is the American economy. During the Cold War period, Canada’s economy was quite smaller then the American economy, this paved way to some different ideals on interests for both nations. An example could be the United-State’s disappointment over the “loss of China” to the communists in 1949. The
American showed stronger opinions as they were allied with the Nationalist who retreated to Taiwan after the civil war and felt frustrated where as Canada didn’t. 43 Different views on future interests consequently presented some problems. Prime Minister Diefenbaker, described the situation while he was in power; “Canada took the stand that while it would not sell strategic material to
42 Maxwell Cohen, “A China Policy for Canada,” Saturday Night, October 11, 1958. 43 Dorothy Borg & Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947- 1950, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 13. 33 communist countries, including Cuba, trade in non-strategic commodities should be encouraged. This was regarded as heresy in Washington in 1961.”44
Some have argued that Canada’s move towards China was due to economic downturn in the United States. Jiang argues that Canada’s near complete dependence on US markets may be associated with Trudeau’s desire to find a “Third Options”.45 With Canadian oil gaining popularity over the 1980s-
90s period as well as a booming forestry industry, Canada had a strong sales pitch and gain grounds with a China that was looking to diversify and assert itself on the international stage.
Politically speaking, Canada’s decision to establish diplomatic ties with
China was a gesture the United States did not appreciate. In 1970, the relation between Ottawa and Washington might not of been at its best, however, when the Americans did establish a relation of their own with China, it marked the return to normal for Canadian-American affairs.
44 John G. Diefenbaker, “Across the Border,” in John H. Redekop, (eds)., The Star-Spangled Beaver (Toronto: 1971), p. 44-45. 45 Wenran Jiang, “The Dragon Returns: Canada in China’s Quest for Energy Security.” Canadian International Council: China Papers, no. 19, 2010, p.25 34
Table 3: Foreign Investment in Canada
Foreign Investment in Canada U.S. Total U.K. Total U.S. FDI U.S. FDI Investment Investment Year All Foreign All Foreign All Foreign Total FDI Investment Investment Investment Percent 1926 53 44 23 79 1933 61 36 26 82 1939 60 36 27 82 1945 70 25 33 85 1950 76 20 40 86 1955 76 18 48 84 1960 75 15 48 82 1965 79 12 48 79 1970 79 9 48 81 1975 77 7 43 79 1980 69 7 38 79 1985 56 7 28 76 1987 48 8 26 73 Source: Alan Rugman, Multinationals and Canada-United States Free Trade (Colombia: University of South Caroline, 1990), p.19.
As this graphic shows, business with the United States did not suffer through this political ordeal. While there is a constant drop in foreign direct investment, Alan Rugman explains that its not due to the United States loosing faith in Canada, but globalization happening. He continues by saying that like most countries, the United States started investing in countries all around the world, and that the United States still represented Canada’s biggest supporter.46
Chapter 3: Contemporary Issues
46 Alan Rugman, Multinationals and Canada-United States Free Trade (Colombia: University of South Carolina, 1990), p.19. 35
As covered in the previous sections, Canada and China have quite the history. Nowadays the events that brought them together are overshadowed by what keeps them together as allies and what could potentially break them up.
This chapter will explore Chinese immigration to Canada and its impacts as well as the new face of Canada, Prime Minister Harper and his government. Finally
Canada’s decision to accept and support Kosovo’s independence claim could potentially complicate relations between China and Canada’s relations with the
Republic of China (Taiwan).
Chinese Immigration to Canada:
Chinese immigration to Canada plays a big part in the two countries relation. Kenny Zhang, in his article titled “Flows of People and the Canada-Sino
Relationship,” mentions that Canada is now the most Asia connected country in the world. He states that not only is China the top source of immigration to
Canada but that over 1.3 million Canadians are of Chinese origin. In addition ten percent of overseas Chinese population calls Canada their second home.47 These facts make Chinese immigration quite important for Canada. It not only allows the country, whose birth rate is amongst the lowest, to stay afloat population wise, but it also solidifies the need for good bilateral relations.48 Between 2001 and 2006, Canada’s population grew by 5.2 percent, largely due to international immigration.49
47 Kenny Zhang, “Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship,” Canada China Papers Canadian International Council: Canada China papers, No. 10. 2010, p.6. 48 United States Government (CIA), The World Factbook: Birthrates, (United States, 2014)
Immigration is historically linked to the creation and building of Canada.
Multiculturalism, a founding concept of Canadian culture, is due in major part to immigration. Nowadays the Canadian population is made up of 3.8 percent aboriginal peoples, 19.8 percent first-generation immigrants and 76.4 native- born Canadians who are decedents of immigrants.50
With China’s economy growing at an impressive rate, it can be expected that China will take a larger role in economical influence worldwide. The uninterrupted rise of financial and economic importance of China means that international organizations and countries, including Canada, interested in maintaining closer economic ties with China will be looking for professionals and experts who not only have the financial and technical knowledge but also the social capital to be able to operate in the China market. Highly educated PRC immigrants in Canada will make up the rich human resources that can greatly benefit Canada as it expands its trade and economic undertakings in China. In turn, they can also contribute to the future growth of China by taking advantage of their cultural capital, language skills, international contacts and professional expertise. 51
The high level of Chinese Immigration to Canada consistently helps solidify the relation. Overseas Chinese have developed strong ties to mainland, a linguistic, cultural and social presence in Canada that can be felt form the East to
50 Statistics Canada, The Daily, December 4, 2007, (Canada, 2008)
West coast. Since 1990, China has reach the top of the list as an immigrant
sending country.
Table 4: Flows of People from China to Canada at the Turn of the 21st Century
Flows of People from China to Canada at the Turn of the 21st Century Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Immigrants Arrival 19790 29147 36750 40365 33307 36252 36429 42292 33079 27013 29336 Share (%) 11.4 15.3 16.2 16.1 14.5 16.4 15.5 16.1 13.1 11.4 11.9 Rank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Tourists Visit (1,000) n.a. n.a. 74 82 95 77 95 113 139 151 159 Share of top n.a. n.a. 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 15 origins (%) Rank n.a. n.a. 14 14 13 12 12 10 9 9 9 International Students Annual Entry 1985 4339 6687 11446 11814 10140 7462 7434 8988 10032 13668 Share (%) 4.7 7.4 9.7 14.1 15.3 14.5 11.3 11.0 12.5 13.5 17.2 Rank 6 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Stock 3505 6465 11055 20415 29807 36611 39296 39592 39843 41087 42154 Share (%) 4.1 6.6 9.7 14.9 19.8 22.9 23.8 23.7 23.4 23.3 23.7 Rank 7 4 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Foreign Workers Annual Entry 933 1182 1166 1196 1313 1127 1288 1407 1696 2655 2321 Share (%) 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.2 Rank 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 14 12 15 Stock 841 1213 1338 1588 1824 1950 2427 3080 4206 6632 8534 Share (%) 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.6 3.3 3.4 Rank n.a. 14 14 14 13 13 13 13 13 13 9 Source: Kenny Zhang, “Flows of People and the Canada-China Relationship,” China Papers, No. 10, May 2010, p. 12.
Peter Li explains that in the near future, highly-qualified immigrants will
have options to where they can reach the best quality of life.52 When we look at
the immigration table above, we can see that China has consistently ranked first
in sheer numbers of immigration to Canada. China not only ranks on top for
immigration but also for international students, further solidifying Canada’s
reputation as a welcoming destination. Chinese tourism has also seen a constant
rise. This boost in Asian visitors provides Canada with extra revenue, an added
52 Ibid, p.11 38 inventive to facilitate Chinese entrance to the country. As seen earlier, more and more skilled Chinese immigrants are looking for new homes. Canada, a country dependent on immigration, will need to do everything in its power to secure these qualified immigrants. In order to win out on the other competing countries, the likes of Australia and the Unites-States, Canada need to capitalize on its close ties with China and facilitate their access. Its also this dependency towards immigration that assure Canada will do everything in its power to keep relations with China, therefore immigration can be seen as a positive factor in
Canadian-Sino relations.
Possible causes for rupture:
When Pierre Elliott-Trudeau expressed his concern towards China’s international isolation, it seemed like a risky move due in large part to the opposition rendered by Americans. Today, not only is China on the main front of the international scene, they’ve successfully hosted the Olympic, welcoming the whole world by doing so, as well as shed its oppressed reputation internationally. Tensions have now developed between Canada and China. In
2006, the Chinese government ignored Prime Minister Steven Harper after it rejected a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Recent disagreements between the two countries were blamed, including many critics on China’s human rights record made by many Canadian organizations.53 While some
Canadian scholars like Bruce Gilley54 argue that relations between the two
53 Brian Laghi, “China Snubs Harper,” The Globe and Mail, November 15, 2006: 1. 54 Bruce Gilley. “Reawakening Canada’s China Policy,” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 2, No. 14, 207, p. 121. 39 countries aren’t in the best of state, other like Paul Evans55 take a more optimistic stance and argue that the relationship is still developing.
Furthermore, past political issues could arise and haunt Canada’s past. The case of Kosovo’s independence, one in which Canada took place, could potentially break Canada’s take on the “One China” policy.
The Conservative Harper government:
Following Canada’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China in
October 1970, up till 2006 the objective was to increase engagements between
Canada and China. With a focus on the governmental level, by intensifying high level visits, the only disruption happening after the Tiananmen massacre on June
4, 1989. After a shift that saw the Liberal government of Trudeau fall to the
Conservative party of Joe Clark and himself loosing to Jean Chretien and his
Liberals years later, Canada encouraged strong economic relations with China.
For just a little over a decade, massive trade missions between Canada and China titled “Team Canada missions”.56 The prominence of China was continued by
Chretien’s successor, Paul Martin, Jr., who took over in December 2003. Martin was convinced of the importance of China, and keenly accepted a “strategic partnership” agreement offered by the People’s Republic of China.57
In 2006, when the Conservatives of Steven Harper took power, Canada’s international affairs changes and adopted a simplistic approach. After years of
55 Paul Evans. “Responding to Global China: Getting the Balance Right.” Canadian Foreign Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008, p. 131. 56 Tom Keating, “Passive Internationalist: Jean Chretien and Canadian Foreign Policy,” Review of Constitutional Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004, p. 125-126. 57 Wenran Jiang, “Seeking a Strategic Vision for Canada---China Relations,” International Journal, Vol. 64, No. 4, 2009, p. 892. 40 criticism: “Liberal foreign policy has compromised democratic principles to appease dictators, sometimes for the sake of narrow business interests.”58
Harper and his government finally had the opportunity to change things, and change they did. The new platform promised that a Conservative government would “articulate Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and free trade and compassion for the less fortunate on the international stage.”59
Some of the Harper government’s changes consisted of small slights: for example, in September 2006, seven months after the new Conservative government took office, Peter MacKay, the minister of foreign affairs, was still having difficulty finding time in his schedule to meet the People’s Republic of
China’s ambassador to Canada, Lu Shumin.60 The Conservative government took it even further by attacking the Chinese government when Peter Mackay, a high member of the party, answered a reported from CTV (a Canadian television chain) by saying the government was “very concern: about the scale of Chinese
“economic espionage” in Canada, claiming that there was “a fair bit of activities here”.61 Harper’s conservative government also past comments and took actions against China criticizing its human rights policy. Lu Decheng, one of three dissident jailed for splashing paint on the portrait of Mao Zedong in Tiananmen
58 Conservative Party of Canada, Stand Up For Canada: Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006, (Canada, 2006) p. 44,
Square, was granted asylum after he escaped to Thailand. Once in Thailand, he was arrested and the Canadian government intervened, side tracked the Chinese effort to extradite him and brought him to North America.62 Canada also openly pressed the case of Huseyincan Celil, a Canadian citizen of Xinjiang Uyghur, who was imprisoned by China on charges of terrorism.63 Another example of Harper’s government acting in ways that could be considered insulting for the People’s
Republic of China is attacking their reputation. Other moves appeared to be designed to do nothing more than annoy the Chinese government. In November
2006, Harper claimed that he would not stop bringing up human rights issues on the Chinese government just because Beijing was threatening the economic relationship. “I think Canadians want us to promote our trade relations worldwide,” he said, “and we do that, but I don’t think Canadians want us to sell out important Canadian values. They don’t want us to sell that out to the almighty dollar”.64 More insulting was Harper’s refusal to join other world leaders in Beijing to celebrate China’s first Olympic Games in 2008. As Jiang
Wenran put it, “While the world is busy engaging China, for obvious reasons,
Harper’s handling of Canada’s China policy has been, by design or default, exactly the opposite”.65
62 Oziewicz , Estanislao, & Bill Curry, “Help Chinese Dissident, Ottawa is Urged,” The Glove and Mail, March 21, 2006, p. A16. 63 Omar El Akkad, “As Ottawa Fumbled, Canadian Languished in China’s Court System,” The Globe and Mail, February 13, 2012.
It comes at no surprise that Chinese Government did not respond kindly.
The night prior to Harper’s first Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in
Hanoi in November 2006, the Chinese government suddenly cancelled a planned meeting. While Harper and President Hu Jintao did meet, it was only for 15 minutes and only on the side during the summit.66 Furthermore, the Canadian
Government support to prisoner Celil was seen as support for the Xingjian separatist movement in China. During Canada’s attempts to extradite the prisoner, Beijing took pleasure in frustrating the efforts, either during the monitored trials or with efforts towards giving the prisoner consular assistance.67
While the Conservative Government took some backward steps when it comes to the Canadian-Sino relation, they change their focus and increased
Canada’s official presence in China. Six new trade offices where opened in April
2006 along with the already established missions in Beijing, Shanghai,
Chongqing, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, raising the total to eleven. The reasoning behind the new missions was a desire by the Conservatives in increasing economic linkages.68 The Chinese government noticed this change of approach and after years of uncertainty high level visits were share. Prime Minister Harper went to China in December 2009 and President Hu Jintao visited Canada in June
66 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Won’t ‘Sell Out’ on Rights despite China Snub: PM, (Canada, 2006)
2010. The Canadian Leader took the opportunity to hint a significant change in
Canadian policy.69
Relations bloomed enough for China to bestow a “approved destination status” to Canada, which allows its travel agencies to promote Canada as a destination for Chinese tourism. Tourism from China has seen a significant increase and an estimate showed that the special status that Canada enjoys boosted tourism revenues by 100 million dollars per year.70
Relations between the two countries seemed to be improving, however
Canada found itself sidelined for a series of important Asian initiatives. Those included several Association of South East Asian Nation related activities, the
Shangri-La dialogue and the Trans Pacific Partnership. Canada has expressed its resolve to engage with China on a level playing field by using its own approach to international affairs. This meant shedding the image of Canada as a middle power the Liberal government had adapted and focusing on the Harper way.
Canada is now chasing a more direct relation with China and committing to a tougher international mind set.71
While Trudeau’s wish of establishing relations and including China in the international scene have been realized, they’ve been replaced by Harper’s
69 Stephen Harper, “Canada and China: A Good and Frank Relationship to Build On,” speech to Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, December 4, 2009,
Conservative government calls “Canadian values” and separate itself form the once accepted middle power status could potentially jeopardize Canadian-Sino relations.
Canada, China and Taiwan, the case of Kosovo:
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Kosovo has been one of the most explosive zones in Europe. 72 The region is situated between Serbia,
Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia. While both Serbia and Albania have claimed the area as their own, a strong independence movement has always existed in the region. In the turmoil that was Yugoslavia in 1990, an unconstitutional Kosovo government declared itself as an independent country with Albania being the only country to recognize the gesture. The conflict progressed through the 1990s with the Kosovo-Albanians clamming independence against Serbia who insisted that the region belonged to them. By
1998, after years of growing tension, the conflict exploded into a war between the guerilla Kosovo Liberation Army and the Serbian Special Police Forces as well as the Serbian military.73
It’s on June 10th 1999, following a ceasefire that the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution 1244 which placed Kosovo under United
Nations administration and asked the Kosovo Force, a NATO led peacekeeping force, to help maintain peace in the region. This saw the end of the civil war that
72 Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship (New York: United Nations Press, 2000), p. 19. 73 Ibibd. p. 19. 45 had plagued the region for so long.74 Shortly following this time of peace the question of independence was once again raised. Almost a decade later, Kosovo declared Independence and this time it was supported by a large group of countries. In total 51 United Nations member states recognized the region as autonomous. Most of Europe, Australia and the United States are some of the more notable supporters of the Kosovo independence while Serbia, Russia,
China, Spain and New Zeeland composed the main opposition to the movement.
Canada stance on the issue took a little internal debating but 30 days later announced it recognized Kosovo as an independent nation-state.75
Christopher Borgen argues that Kosovo is different from other independence claims because it was under international community administration due to the situation being too volatile. He continues and claims that resolution 1244 internationalized the problem, taking away the usual domestic laws that affect other cases of independence. He states two reasons for
Kosovo’s uniqueness. The first, as he mentioned before is that Kosovo was under international administration for almost a decade. The second in his opinion is that the Kosovar Albanians are an ethnically homogenous enclave, physically separate and ethnically different from the Serbs.76
74 Mark Biondich, The Status of Kosovo: Political and Security Implications for the Balkans and Europe, (Canada: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 2005), p. 1. 75 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Canada Recognizes Kosovo, Serbia Pulls Ambassador, (Canada, 2008).
Borgens then proceeds to warn the international community that by accepting Kosovo’s independence on these terms could create a precedent, which could in turn be used by other groups and regions.77 In spite of the declarations and best intentions of other independents movements, simply stating that something is "unique" may not be enough. States and commentators will need to ask why one claim of independence is allegedly unique and then consider its political as well as legal effects.
The case of Kosovo’s independence could potentially jeopardize
Canadian-Sino relations due to the precedent possibility mentioned above. As
Canada took part in Kosovo’s development into the nation state it is today,
Taiwan could turn towards the western world and claim independence the same way Kosovo did. In 2005, the United Nations accepted a mandate titles
“Responsibility to Protect”, which mentions that the world should not stand by and watch military actions crush a vibrant, successful democracy.78 Canada, who accepted China’s terms on the “One China” policy could suddenly by in hot water in if it was called in to support Taiwan’s independence. Furthermore, the
Montevideo Convention treaty could support Taiwan’s case. The December 1933 treaty discusses the definition and rights of statehood. The treaty highlights four key components to achieve statehood. The first is a permanent population. The second is a defined territory. The third is a government and lastly, the capacity to
77 Ibid. 78 United Nations, The responsibility to Protect, (New York, 2014)
Be it Russians, Abkhazia, Krajina Serbs or Taiwan, the case of Kosovo’s independent clearly gave these groups a stronger claim to establish their own independence. If the Kosovo claim isn’t carefully construed and analyzed these groups could have a legitimate argument to gain international approval should they ask for it. More importantly, regardless of further development in the
Kosovo case, the fact that Canada recognized its independence showed that under the right conditions and circumstances, the Canadian government with recognizes declarations.
Conclusion:
From both the Chinese and Canadian perspectives, the development of
Sino-Canadian relations during the late 1960s depended heavily on Trudeau, as he believed that the PRC should be brought into the mainstream of international
79 Council on Foreign Relations, Montevideo Convention on the Righs and Duties of States, (Montevideo, 1933)
According to Frolic, from the Chinese perspective, Pierre Elliott-Trudeau was the catalyst.80
In China, Trudeau was viewed as being more international and open in his worldview than his antecedents. The Liberal Party’s official position on recognizing China resulted from Trudeau’s attitude as “a citizen of the world” as well as the leader’s personal sympathy for those countries that were still not part of the international community.
The fact that world powers did not necessarily determine the direction of
Canadian-Sino relations highlights the importance of the events Individual leaders played significant roles. This approach has led to exploration of how
Trudeau’s personal association with China and Mao’s long-standing rivalry with
Chiang Kai-shek influenced their critical decisions about the normalization of relations.
The first chapter covers Canada and China’s history. With is Asian debut in Japan; Canada slowly shifted its interest to Beijing. Pierre Elliott-Trudeau, one of Canada’s greatest Prime Minister, believed that the billions in China should be represented by their governing party, communists or not, and not by the retreated Kuomintang who resided in Taiwan. He spearheaded the campaign
80 Michael Frolic, “Canada and the People’s Republic of China: Twenty Years of a Bilateral Relationship, 1970-1990,” in Frank Langdon (ed.,) Canada and the Growing Presence of Asia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1990). P.45 49 and kept going even with American threats. Canada also adopted a strict one
China policy in order to officially establish relations with China.
The second chapter covered the political and economical impacts of the
Canadian. Following the establishment of political ties, Canada assisted China in its entrance to the international scene. Canada also spear headed the campaign to allow the PRC to replace the ROC at the United Nations. While relations with
Japan never reached an impasse, the constant focus on Beijing did hinder the relation. Japan, who was once the Asian hub of Canada, slowly slipped behind
China and took less and less importance. Dealing with Asia pushed Canada to create the Asia Pacific Foundation Act. With its goals of promoting Asian relations by offering projects, scholarships and workshops, the APFC has help
Canada pave its way across Asia for nearly thirty years. While initially
Washington wasn’t pleased with Canada’s decision to establish relations with
China, North American relations only suffered a slight drop in economic trade.
The last chapter, in its first section, covered the importance of Chinese immigration to Canada. Canada, who’s birth rate ranks amongst the lowest, is completely dependant on immigration and enjoys a steady stream from China.
The highly educated Chinese immigrants are of high interest for Canada and that fact assures that Canada will do everything in its power to keep a healthy relation with China as well as facilitate immigration for those who are wanted.
Secondly, the chapter covers two issues that could potentially hurt the Canadian-
Sino relation. The first is a change in Canadian government, form Liberals to
Conservatives, from Trudeau and Martin to Harper. Prime Minister Steven
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Harper whished to shed Canada’s image of a middle power by changing Canada’s stance on certain policies, specifically human rights and foreign affairs. He has, on multiple occasion criticized the Chinese government, who in turn shared a few choice words. Finally the case of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia could potentially force Canada to break its stand on the “One Chine” policy should the
Republic of China in Taiwan declare its own independence movement. Due to
Canada’s presence in the Kosovo case, as well as other major countries, and what is used to determine statehood internationally, Taiwan could have a legitimate case and call on those who helped Kosovo. Should this happen, there is the potential that Canadian-Sino relation could suffer.
In this thesis, four major topics where explored in a subtle way, they are leadership, the importance of the ruling party in Canada, international politics and the image of China in Canada’s eyes. As explored on multiple occasions, leadership has and still plays an important role in Canada, the preferences, background and motivation of the leaders shape the country. The ruling party also affects Canada’s relations in many ways. Political parties don’t share the same values and tend to focus their rule on different issues, meaning it influences the way Canada interacts with the world. Furthermore, Canada’s international relations have been highlighted many times in this thesis. With a focus on Canada’s approach to China, many issues have been tackled. Finally the image of China in Canada has shifted throughout the years. With the Trudeau government, a positive image was being cultivated. Backed by a newly established relationship, the formation of new programs and mutual help,
China’s image in Canada seemed to be rising constantly. However, with the
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Harper government, China’s image in Canada took a hit with many problems occurring and conflicting ideologies. The creation of new projects has shined its light on China, and a revamped relation could potentially boost its imagine in
Canada once again.
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