2 FOREWORD
Lennox Napier commanded HMS RORQUAL during the most critical and challenging period of the Mediterranean Campaign during the Second World War. History records his achievements and distinguished war record, which earned him a DSO and DSC; this book does much more than that. His son, Christopher, himself a submariner, has been able to bring together a number of sources including Napier’s own voice from BBC transcripts to provide an in-depth study of the man himself. 2017 is the 100th anniversary of the Submarine Command Course and, as I read Christopher Napier’s words, it is clear to me that his father’s deep professionalism, detailed planning and calm and unemotional leadership were traits demanded by the course then as they are now. Submarines today still undertake arduous and sometimes dangerous patrols; they engage the enemy with torpedoes as during the Falklands War or Tomahawk missiles as during the Kosovo Campaign. They are called to patrol around the world monitoring trouble spots and in all this Lennox Napier would have felt at home. His story is well worth reading, not only by historians, but by all submariners - especially those preparing themselves for command. As Lennox answered when asked to what he would attribute his success:
"A combination of experience and caution. What successes we had, which were not as great as some others, were I think largely due to some degree of caution, not trying to do more than the available ship and force was capable of, and surviving long enough to gather experience. If you have experience your chances of surviving and carrying out successful operations increases, of course, enormously with time.”
This is excellent advice today and I commend this book to you.
Vice Admiral Sir Tim McClement KCB OBE
Patron of the Friends of the Submarine Museum
26th June 2017
3 CONTENTS
FOREWORD ...... 3 CONTENTS ...... 4 MAPS ...... 6 Map 1 - Mediterranean Sea Eastern Part - Area of Opera ons ...... 6 Map 2 - Loca ons Within the Aegean Sea ...... 7 INTRODUCTION ...... 8 1 – RORQUAL, CHARACTERISTICS AND DESCRIPTION ...... 12 HMS RORQUAL (N74) ...... 12 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS ...... 13 DESCRIPTION OF HMS RORQUAL ...... 14 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 14 ...... 2 - A TIMELINE OF EVENTS ...... 17 JUNE 1941 - DECEMBER 1943 ...... 17 3 - CONDITIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ...... 34 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 34 ...... 4 - SUBMARINE COMMAND ...... 36 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 36 ...... 5 - A MAGIC CARPET TO MALTA ...... 42 JUNE-JULY 1941 ...... 42 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 42 ...... FROM RED DUSTER, WHITE ENSIGN BY IAN CAMERON 43 ...... “Rorqual to Alexandria for special duty” ...... 43 6 - A DIFFICULT FIRST ATTACK ...... 46 28 AUGUST 1941 ...... 46 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 46 ...... 7 - ENCOUNTER WITH U109 ...... 48 17 NOVEMBER 1941 ...... 48 FROM THE SECRET DIARY OF A U-BOAT BY WOLFGANG HIRSCHFELD AS TOLD TO GEOFFREY BROOKES 48 ...... WAS IT RORQUAL? VIEW OF LWN ...... 50 8 - AN ACOUSTIC TORPEDO ...... 51 6 OCTOBER 1942 ...... 51 LWN POST WAR ACCOUNT 51 ...... FROM THE FIGHTING TENTH BY JOHN WINGATE, FORMER FIRST LIEUTENANT OF P44 (HMS UNITED) ...... 52 9 - 'FOUR TORPEDOES HAVE JUST PASSED UNDER ME' ...... 53 12 DECEMBER 1942 ...... 53 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 53 ...... FROM PERISCOPE VIEW BY GEORGE SIMPSON, CAPTAIN SM10 AT MALTA ...... 53
4 10 - THE LAST TIGERS FOR ROMMEL ...... 54 18 JANUARY 1943 ...... 54 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 54 ...... FROM PERISCOPE VIEW BY GEORGE SIMPSON, CAPTAIN SM10 AT MALTA ...... 55 FROM SEA WOLVES, THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF BRITAIN'S WORLD WAR2 SUBMARINES BY TIM CLAYTON, NAVAL HISTORIAN 56 ...... FROM ULTRA GOES TO WAR -THE SECRET STORY BY RONALD LEWIN 57 ...... 11 - 'HITLER WENT RED IN THE FACE' ...... 58 7 JULY 1943 ...... 58 LWN POST WAR ACCOUNT 58 ...... FROM THE MEMOIRS OF KARL DOENITZ 61 ...... 12 – CARRYING GUNS TO SAVE LEROS ...... 62 20-27 OCTOBER 1943 ...... 62 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 62 ...... APPENDIX A - NAVAL CAREER OF ...... 64 LENNOX WILLIAM NAPIER ...... 64 APPENDIX B -MINEFIELDS LAID BY RORQUAL UNDER LWN COMMAND ...... 66 APPENDIX C - DESCRIPTION OF A SUBMARINE ATTACK ...... 67 FROM TRANSCRIPT OF BBC INTERVIEW 67 ...... APPENDIX D - LETTERS TO CHRISTIAN LAMB ...... 70 LETTER 1 - FROM PLYMOUTH, ABOUT JULY 1942 ...... 71 LETTER 2 - FROM BEIRUT, 22 SEPTEMBER 1942 (RE-SENT APRIL 1943) ...... 72 LETTER 3 - FROM MALTA, 10 FEBRUARY 1943 ...... 74 LETTER 4 - FROM ALGIERS, 29 MARCH 1943 ...... 75 LETTER 5 - FROM MALTA, 28 APRIL 1943 ...... 76
5 MAPS
Map 1 - Mediterranean Sea Eastern Part - Area of Operations • • BEIRUT HAIFA BITTER LAKES CYPRUS • • PORT SAID MAP 1 TURKEY ALEXANDRIA • • EGYPT EL ALAMEIN SEA CRETE AEGEAN SEE MAP 2 CYRENAICA GREECE LIBYA SEA IONIAN MEDITERRANEAN SEA MALTA NAPLES • • SICILY • ISCHIA Is. TRAPANI ITALY • TRIPOLI SEA •
SICILIAN CHANNEL TYRRHENIAN MARETTIMO Is. TUNIS • • CAVOLI Is. • CAGLIARI BIZERTA • TUNISIA SARDINIA
6 Map 2 - Locations Within the Aegean Sea
MAP 2 INSTANBUL •
BLACK SEA
THESSALONIKA STRATONI • •
GULF GREECE OF • LEMNOS Is. • BOZCAADA Is. SALONIKA • KHROUSO
VOLOS • TURKEY SKIATHOS Is. AEGEAN • PAXOS Is. • SEA
ATHENS •
ZANTE Is. • ST GEORGE’S Is. • LEROS Is. • IONIAN SEA
• SCHIZA Is. RHODES
CRETE
7 INTRODUCTION
HMS Rorqual, when under the command of Lennox Napier, operated in the Mediterranean for a total of twenty months between 1941-43. The Mediterranean Campaign was the most important Royal Naval submarine campaign in World War II and made a signi icant contribution to the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa and the Allied invasions of Sicily and Italy.
During most of this period the Axis powers had full command of the air and surface in the submarine operating areas. This forced submarines to submerge in daylight and surface only at night to charge batteries or make passage. The operating areas were also beset with enemy mine ields. As a result of those adverse conditions, the success of the Campaign came at a heavy cost. In those twenty months of operations no less than twenty- ive Royal Navy submarines were lost to surface, submarine or air attack, mines, or destruction by bombs in Malta harbour.
The exploits of Rorqual during his command are well recorded in of icial and unof icial histories, as are those of other submarines involved in the Campaign. Books have been written, several by those with irst-hand experience as commanding of icers, or other members of the crew, describing the successes, the hardships and the leadership of those in command. As a former submarine of icer of the Cold War period, I have read many of those excellent accounts with appreciation of the extraordinary courage and endurance needed to achieve success. So why, so long after those events, is there a place for this account of Rorqual and Lennox Napier? One reason is that those books tend to focus on exploits of the attack submarines, mainly those operating out of Malta. There is little irst-hand material on the activities of the mine-laying submarines in the Mediterranean, which might be seen by some as less glamorous or less dangerous. Yet neither of these perceptions is true as I think is well shown when reading of the sinking of the German heavy lift ship Ankara, which was the last ship able to carry Tiger tanks to the Afrika Corps in North Africa. Or again, on reading of the sinking of the German tanker Wilhelmsberg in the approaches to the Dardanelles. Of that crucial event, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz's personal report made Hitler 'go red in the face' with anger. That very satisfactory reaction was regarded by Napier as a lifetime achievement. A further reason is that I have the transcript of a long interview he gave to the BBC. His part was as a contributor to the television documentary Nautilus, which featured Rorqual. I also have my father's accounts of events written over the years before his death in 2001. Being his own words, these lesh out the factual record in the histories, and well
8 demonstrate Lennox's attitude to command, to the war, and to life in an operational submarine during that era. His own words also reveal the secret of his success, and of his survival along with that of Rorqual at a time when so many others submarines were lost on patrol. Extracts from these sources form part of this account, with relevant passages from the writings of; Captain 'Shrimp' Simpson, Captain of the Tenth Submarine Flotilla in Malta; Admiral Doenitz and others. I have set them into context within a Timeline of Events, with commentary including summaries of the changing strategic situation in the Mediterranean and consequences for submarine operations. Even then this material might not add much to the existing material if Lennox had been 'out of the same box' as his contemporaries. He was not, and this brings additional interest. Although trained in the same way and to the same standards, his particular skills and approaches to command and wartime operations were unusual, in my view. As it happened these attributes were particularly suited to the submarine minelaying task. Lennox William Napier was born on 2 May 1912 into a family which for generations had been associated with service in the Royal Navy and produced several Admirals. Perhaps that was why, as a young boy with two Admiral uncles, he informed his parents that he was going to be a naval of icer. He might have changed his mind in time, but in those days the Navy pre-empted second thoughts as Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, then operated as a public school. This required the education of budding naval of icers take place there from the age of thirteen. Lennox's view was that it gave him a good general education along with naval training. As a cadet and midshipman, Lennox's time was served in the battleship HMS Nelson, then lagship of the Home Fleet. But the ceremonial, pomp and shipboard politics surrounding the Admiral was not at all to his liking. And so those factors propelled him out of that type of naval life and into volunteering for submarines, where life was less formal.
His career leading to submarine command was conventional. First as a junior of icer in HMS Porpoise (sister to Rorqual), then HMS L27 in Aden, followed by First Lieutenant of HMS Olympus on the China Station as the war broke out. Unusually, however, in 1936 he spent a year at Freiberg University, on a German Interpreter's course, and there obtained a clear understanding of the iniquities of the Nazi regime.
From Olympus he returned to UK to take the Submarine Commanding Of icers Qualifying Course, the 'Perisher'. Always somewhat self-deprecatory about passing this very demanding course, he'd say 'they were not so particular' in those wartime days regarding whom they allowed through. On qualifying he commanded HMS H34, an obsolete submarine employed on anti-submarine training, and the usual appointment for newly quali ied commanding of icers, allowing them to ind their feet.
In spring 1941, at a time when the battle for Crete was raging, he took passage to Alexandria in a convoy which came under regular air attack and turned out to be the last to traverse the Mediterranean until the end of 1943. On arrival, and in the rank of Lieutenant, he joined the First Submarine Flotilla, based on the submarine depot ship HMS Medway, as spare Commanding Of icer. Later, in June 1941, he was appointed in command of Rorqual to relieve Commander R.H. Dewhurst DSO. It is at that point that this story starts. Rorqual already had an established reputation, which must have made this appointment more daunting - but as he would say, that's what he was trained for.
9 Many successful submarine commanding of icers were good sportsmen, with an eye for the ball or for bringing down a bird in light, which is a good foundation for developing a 'periscope eye'. Lennox Napier was no exception, with his lifelong passion for cricket - playing for the Navy when young through to his last innings for the village cricket team in his mid eighties.
A man of considerable and lively intellect, he was an independent thinker and inveterate reader. His eager curiosity, his passionate and enduring interest in many subjects included languages, current affairs, ancient history and mathematics. So it was typical of him to think it a good opportunity to improve his Latin when on patrol! Then in later years, to ind in the cloakroom a book on advanced mathematics. Except for him it was in the German language and read for the sheer pleasure of it too! And his tangible legacy of painting; there always had been painting since childhood. In 1939 and on the point of telling his parents he planned to leave the Navy to paint, the war intervened. And he was more than a gifted amateur, he was accomplished, painting whenever opportunity arose while in the Navy and, as if to compensate for his lost chance to be a professional, making painting his main occupation on retirement. The drawings in his letters to Christian Lamb give an inkling of his talent. That range of interests and pursuits, academic and otherwise is what set him somewhat apart, I think. His interest in mathematics shows an analytical and logical approach to problem-solving, which would have served him well in Rorqual, underpinning his success in minelaying operations where careful analysis, prediction of enemy movements and precise navigation is required if a mine ield is to cause any damage to enemy shipping. 'Lennox could be guaranteed to have well-formed views on most subjects, which he was always willing to pass on to anyone who would listen.' says his daughter, Lucilla. 'Yet he was so strongly himself and so broad in his interests and talents that you could not help being enriched by it. His tremendous memory and his feeling for the humorous twist in a tale made him an entertaining raconteur.’ But on the other hand he wasn't always the easiest of people to live with, and he didn't ind it easy to draw people out. And this is evident in the BBC transcript where he is quite open on being more emotionally detached than others. Yet perhaps even without the common touch, natural empathy or evident lair shown by some of the better known submarine commanding of icers, Lennox had a devoted following from his crew. This had much to do with success, admiration of his attributes, un lappability and professional skill, but also the important fact that he kept them safe and always got them home. That their survival was due to in very large part to his abilities is undoubted. But also to the fact that Rorqual seemed to lead a charmed life; missed by U-boats on no less than three occasions, she had her periscopes destroyed by collision with a surface vessel, and only by a very close margin avoided being sunk in harbour by aircraft when unloading essential stores for our beleaguered troops ashore. His success he ascribed to 'a combination of experience and caution.' Experience certainly was an important factor, but that only came with time in command and did not save other very experienced and successful commanders on either side. As to 'caution', that certainly did not mean any lack of courage or lack of willingness to take on dif icult and dangerous tasks. Reading his own words and putting them together with his character does, to my mind, mean deep thought and analytical planning. Making best use of his innate intelligence, academic ability and experience as it developed, and with a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of his submarine and crew. Also a
10 careful assessment of risks and dangers in each mission and avoidance of those unnecessary to take to achieve the task. In short, Lennox made the very best of his opportunities, and his approach was appropriately well summed up in Rorqual's motto, Nec Temere Nec Timide, that is; neither rashly nor timidly. The bald statistics are that under Lennox Napier's command Rorqual was the leading minelaying submarine, laying more mines than any other submarine during the war. Seven merchant ships were sunk by torpedo or mine, totalling 22,460 GRT, with damage to a further two, totalling 5016 GRT. She sank one destroyer and 3 escort vessels, and carried out nine store-carrying trips, exceeding any other submarine.
But, it is my hope that reading this account will give some deeper insight into the challenges faced by Rorqual under Napier's command during this period of undoubted dif iculty and danger. Along with an understanding of the purpose of the varied operations she undertook, why she was successful and why she survived. Also to allow the reader to be present with Lennox as he describes the triumphs and narrow escapes, and gives his perspectives on the situation in the Mediterranean, wartime command, the quality of our submarines and the process of attack. A period which Lennox Napier saw as the best time of his life.
In putting together this compilation I wish to acknowledge the encouragement to complete the task given to me by contemporary submarine of icers of my era, along with assistance and support given by George Malcomson of the Submarine Museum and Tom Herman OBE of the Friends of the Submarine Museum. Also to Vice Admiral Sir Tim McClement KCB OBE for his kind words in the Foreword. In drawing up the Timeline of Events I have drawn much from British and Allied Submarine Operations in World War II by Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet and Uboat.net. Thanks also go to the BBC for allowing use of the transcript, to Christian Lamb for donating the letters Lennox wrote to her during the war, and especially to my wife Susan for her professional support and advice on layout and visual impact.
Christopher Napier OBE Peters ield June 2017
11 1 – RORQUAL, CHARACTERISTICS AND DESCRIPTION
!
RORQUAL IN PRE-WAR PAINT SCHEME
HMS RORQUAL (N74)
HMS Rorqual was one of a class of six minelaying submarines. Built by Vickers Armstrong, Barrow, laid down on 1 May 1935, launched on 27 July 1936 and commissioned on 10 February 1937. She started World War II on the China Station (Fourth Submarine Flotilla) but transferred to the Mediterranean (First Submarine Flotilla) in April 1940 in expectation of Italy entering the war. She then served under the command of Commander R.H. Dewhurst DSO RN until June 1941 when Napier took command.
12 Interrupted by a re it in the United Kingdom she played an essential part in the important submarine campaign in the Mediterranean until November 1943, when she returned to the United Kingdom for a further re it before going out to the Far East under command of Lieutenant JHP Oakley DSC RN. She was the most successful of the submarine minelayers and was the only one of her class of six to survive the war. She was sold for scrap on 19 November 1945 and broken up on 17 March 1946.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Dimensions 293ft x 25.5ft x 18ft Displacement 1810 tons surfaced, 2157 tons submerged Armament 6 x 21in bow torpedo tubes 12 x 21in Mark VIII torpedoes 50 Mark XVI moored contact mines in the casing 1 x 4in Quick Firing Mark III gun with 120 rounds 2 x Lewis guns and 5 ri les Propulsion 2 x diesel engines - 3300HP 2 x electric motors - 1630HP 336 cell battery Maximum Speed 16 knots surfaced 8.7 knots submerged, for 1.2 hours Endurance 3480 miles at maximum speed 10000 miles at economical speed Hull Double hull type 2 x 40 ft periscopes Designed diving depth 300 feet, but restricted to 150/200 feet during most of the war
Complement 5 of icers and 54 crew
13 !
DESCRIPTION OF HMS RORQUAL From transcript of BBC interview
Q: Rorqual, and the Porpoise class of submarines, is very characteristic. I wonder if you could give a description of it? LWN: Well, the Porpoise class submarines were, in appearance, quite different from the other submarines that we operated at this time. And this was because they carried 50 moored mines. These were carried outside the pressure hull in a casing which ran practically the full length of the ship and this gave the submarine a very distinctive silhouette. It was long and lat with the bridge structure rising in the middle. This class, they carried torpedoes - six bow torpedoes, that's the same as most other submarines - and once the mines had been laid the submarine was not really very different to any other one. And we were employed, generally speaking when we went on patrol, irst, to lay mines in some locality within the orders, and then to patrol an area, just as any other submarine might have been ordered to do. The chief disadvantage regarding the submarine as an ordinary patrol submarine was the matter of silhouette: this long casing considerably higher above the water than in any other class of submarine meant that it was more easily seen on the surface at night.
14 Q: How long would it take you to do an emergency dive? LWN: Despite this difference of shape, this didn't in itself really much affect diving time. We did have certain dif iculties about diving. There were restrictions on the depth to which we could go. This was because, in order to it the hull to carrying this train of mines, the after-part of the pressure hull was lattened. This lattened part tended to distort at even normal operational depths. And during the whole of our second period in the Mediterranean we were very considerably restricted to the depths at which we were supposed to go. One would have gone below these depths in an emergency probably, with perfect safety, but if it could be avoided we tended to remain at a shallower depth.
Q: Another design aspect of British submarines, unique design aspect, is the way in which the designers decided to place the captain in the control room rather than in the conning-tower - I wonder if you could say something about that and also about how that affected your relationship to the men around you. LWN: One difference between all British submarines and those of several other nationalities was that the captain conducted the attack from the control room itself. In other countries the captain frequently had a small control compartment in the conning- tower above the level of the control room. This had certain advantages, because it gave the submarine greater periscope depth. On the other hand, it was always felt in the Royal Navy that there was an advantage in the captain, particularly under the fairly stressful circumstances of carrying out an attack, that he should be seen by as many people as possible, that’s to say the control room crew, and that con idence was probably increased by his being there and, we hope, being seen to be conducting affairs in an unhurried manner such as would give con idence to those who could see it going on, rather than being in another compartment where he couldn’t be seen, or perhaps even heard.
15 !
THE CONTROL ROOM PANEL
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A RORQUAL MESS DECK
16 2 - A TIMELINE OF EVENTS JUNE 1941 - DECEMBER 1943
LENNOX WILLIAM NAPIER IN COMMAND
The Mediterranean campaign was the most important Royal Naval submarine campaign of World War II. It made a signi icant contribution to the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa and the Allied invasions of Sicily and Italy. In the operating areas the Axis powers had full command of the air and surface, forcing submarines to submerge in daylight and surface only at night to charge batteries or make passage. The operating areas were also beset with enemy mine ields. As a result of the adverse conditions, the success of the campaign came at a heavy cost. During the two periods of Rorqual's operations in the Mediterranean under Lennox Napier's command, totalling 20 months, 25 Royal Navy submarines were lost to surface, submarine or air attack, mines, or were destroyed by bombs in Malta harbour. For a description see Conditions in the Mediterranean and Submarine Command.
17 HMS MEDWAY AND HER FLOTILLA
In June 1941 the strategic situation for the Allies in the Mediterranean had greatly deteriorated since Italy entered the war in June 1940, with the loss to the Italians of Greece, Crete and Cyrenaica in North Africa. The Mediterranean Fleet was pinned in the eastern basin, dependent on the coasts of Egypt and Palestine. The Ionian and Aegean Seas were controlled by the Axis. Submarine operations were directed at interference with enemy traf ic carrying supplies and troops from Italy and Greece to North Africa to resupply the Afrika Corps (commanded by General Erwin Rommel).
Malta was a vital base for attacking supply lines to North Africa, but was now virtually cut off from east and west, being supplied by dedicated convoys from Gibraltar requiring heavy escort, and by submarines in an operation known as "Magic Carpet". Minelaying submarines were the most useful for this as they could carry cargo in the mine casing in place of mines. Internally, every nook and cranny would be taken up with foodstuffs and other vital supplies including ammunition for the aircraft defending Malta and anti-aircraft guns. The maximum diving depth when carrying stores was only 70 feet, at which depth in the clear waters of the Mediterranean submarines were visible from the air. Time alongside in Malta disembarking stores would be kept to a minimum so as to reduce the chance of damage to the submarine in an air raid. These operations were far from risk free, as demonstrated by the loss while carrying out Magic Carpet runs of HMS Cachalot (a sister ship to Rorqual) sunk by torpedo boat, HMS Pandora, HMS P36 and HMS P39 sunk or destroyed by bombs in harbour in Malta, and HMS Olympus sunk by mine off Malta. The irst three Magic Carpet runs were made by Rorqual from Beirut, with more later on. Without speci ic instructions, attacks on shipping were not permitted while loaded with cargo.
18 1 June 1941: Lennox Napier takes over command of Rorqual in Alexandria (1st Submarine Flotilla, HMS Medway) from Commander R. H. Dewhurst DSO RN. June - July 1941: Magic Carpet runs from Alexandria to Malta 3 June 1941: Left Alexandria with stores for Malta including 62 tons of aviation spirit for the RAFs Hurricanes. This was carried in 4 gallon petrol cans inside the mine casing with the mine casing doors removed. They were kept in place with wooden battens, and when on the surface at night there was often a considerable smell of petrol from cans which had sprung leaks. The carriage of 25 passengers, the maximum possible, caused considerable discomfort onboard. Arrived Malta on 12 June. On the return trip stores included gun ammunition and shrapnel shell for the 1st Submarine Squadron, as well as 17 passengers. Sailed from Malta on 14 June and arrived back in Alexandria on 21 June. 25 June 1941: Further Magic Carpet run to Malta with 21 passengers and stores including 64 tons of aviation spirit and 47 tons of kerosene - now in tanks in the mine casing. Arrived Malta 2 July. After docking, sailed from Malta 12 July, patrolling along the Libyan coast en route, and arrived back in Alexandria on 19 July. 31 July 1941: Further Magic Carpet run to Malta with 1500 cases aviation spirit, 4680 gallons aviation spirit in bulk, 16275 gallons of kerosene in bulk and 20 passengers. Many of the fuel cans stowed in the casing developed leaks in the heavy weather encountered, which resulted in the submarine diving at daybreak as much as 7 tons light. When submerged, they would slowly ill up with water, returning the boat to normal trim. Arrived Malta on 12 August, after a patrol for 3 days off Malta to intercept expected enemy tanker which did not materialise. Reverted to mine-laying duties. For an account of storing runs to Malta see A Magic Carpet to Malta.
SUBMARINES ALONGSIDE AT MANOEL ISLAND, MALTA
19 25 August 1941: After leaving Malta on 22 August, laid mine ield of 50 mines off Cape Skinari, at northern end of Zykanthos (Zante) Island, Ionian Sea, which resulted in the sinking of small Italian steamer. This mine ield would have been designed to disrupt Axis supply traf ic passing to and from the port of Patras and the Corinth Canal.
Mines were loaded at Malta or the Bitter Lakes in the Suez Canal, Port Said or Haifa (where there was a supply of mines transferred from the Far East before Japan entered the war). The area where mines were to be laid by Rorqual would be decided by the Operations Staff, but the exact position of each mine would be decided by LWN. To ensure the mines were laid where they had the greatest chance of success, minelaying required a high degree of navigational accuracy. This depended on visual ixing in daylight using the periscope, operating close to enemy harbours and shores where a raised periscope might well be spotted. Yet it was essential to remain undetected as, even if this did not lead to anti- submarine counter-measures, the location of the mine ield would be disclosed and enemy ships diverted to avoid it. Generally, in order to prevent disclosure of the location of the ield, attacks on shipping were not permitted before laying mines.
28 August 1941: Torpedoed and sank Italian merchant ship, Cilicia, (2727GRT) about 40 nautical miles south west of Schiza Island, off the Peloponnese. A second ship in the convoy, Alfredo Oriani, avoiding a further salvo of torpedoes, turned towards Rorqual, ramming and causing serious damage to both periscopes. Rorqual had to return to Alexandria for repairs, arriving on 2 September. For an account of this attack see A Dif icult First Attack
3 October 1941: After repairs and loading mines in the Bitter Lakes, left Port Said to return to United Kingdom for re it, via Malta and Gibraltar.
8 October 1941: En route to Malta, laid mine ield of 50 mines to the north west of the island off St Giorgios at the entrance to the Gulf of Athens, Aegean Sea, resulting in the sinking on 19 and 20 October respectively of the Italian torpedo boats, Altair and, Aldebaran, (both 647 tons). A convoy was sighted but not attacked as it passed within a mile of where the mine ield was to be laid. Arrived Malta on 12 October. This mine ield would have been designed to disrupt the Axis traf ic passing from the Dardanelles to Benghazi via the Ka iros and Kea Straights.
21 October 1941: Departing Malta on 17 October, and en route from Malta to Gibraltar, laid mine ield of 40 mines off Cape Ferrato and 10 mines off Cavoli Island on the south east of Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea, resulting in the sinking of the Italian merchant ship, Salpi (2715 GRT) on 9 February 1942. A convoy was sighted but not attacked as it was near where the mine ield was to be laid. Arrived Gibraltar on 26 October and departed for the United Kingdom on 28 October. This mine ield would have been designed to disrupt the Axis traf ic passing from northern Italy, via the eastern coast of Corsica and Sardinia, to Tripoli or the port of Cagliari in Sicily.
20 10 October 1941:
CONDUCT REPORT BY CAPTAIN SYDNEY RAW, CAPTAIN 1ST SUBMARINE FLOTILLA, HMS MEDWAY, ALEXANDRIA
Passage from Malta to the Tyrrenhaen Sea would have involved passing through the barrage of 3271 Axis mines laid across Sicilian Channel between Sicily and Tunisia, of which some 640 were set to catch submarines at periscope depth. This necessitated using a route close into the Sicilian coast, taking a good visual ix from Cape San Marcos and then proceeding to a depth of 150 feet and staying on a set course for some 50 nautical miles which, at submerged speeds, would take 14 or more hours. During this time there would be no way of checking whether the submarine was straying off course into the mine barrage or towards the Sicilian coast.
21
LWN IN WARDROOM OF RORQUAL WITH ENGINEER OFFICER, LIEUTENANT ST JOHN
As Rorqual departed for UK the British submarine campaign in the Mediterranean was at a high point. Supplies and troops to North Africa had been severely disrupted by submarines and RAF activity, and the Italian Navy was overstretched trying to defend the supply routes. Rommel was declaring that he could not contemplate any further advance, or relief of Tobruk, without an improvement in the supply situation. Much of the success against shipping was due to good use of signal intelligence (ULTRA) and co-operation between aircraft and submarines. Malta was being kept suf iciently supplied by dedicated convoys from Gibraltar, albeit requiring heavy escort, and Magic Carpet runs by submarines when required.
4 November 1941: Arrived Holy Loch. Devonport Dockyard was not ready to start the re it and so Rorqual was ordered to ill in time by laying a mine ield off La Rochelle, Bay of Biscay, departing 14 November
16 November 1941: On passage from Holy Loch to La Rochelle, and while on the surface, was very likely the subject of set up to attack by U109, also on the surface, within the Green Channel leading to the German naval base at La Rochelle. The attack was terminated by Commanding Of icer of U109 for fear of sinking an Italian submarine. This incident did not come to light until after the war. For an Account of this incident see Encounter with U109.
22 18 & 19 November 1941: Laid two mine ield of total 50 mines to the west of La Rochelle in the Bay of Biscay, resulting in the sinking of the French ishing vessel, Coligny, (600 GRT) the same day. This ield may also have sunk a U-boat. This mine ield would have been laid as part of an objective in Home Waters to prevent sorties by German warships and submarines from ports in the Bay of Biscay in German occupied France. La Pallice, the main port of La Rochelle, was an important German submarine base, containing reinforced pens for 10 U-boats.
December 1941- June 1942: Re it in Devonport Dockyard.
Between 1 February and 18 February 1942 LWN commanded Tigris for one war patrol off Fro Havet, north of Trondheim, Norway. The purpose of this patrol was to ill one of two patrol positions designed to intercept Tirpitz if she were to sail from Trondheim to intercept the convoys to north Russia or try to break out into the Atlantic. The patrol was uneventful.
July 1942: Workup from Holy Loch, Scotland, as part of 3rd Submarine Flotilla, returning to Devonport on 23 July. Sailed on 27 July for return passage to the Mediterranean. See Appendix D Letter 1. 5 August 1942: Arrived Gibraltar, departing 14 August carrying stores to Malta.
HMS RORQUAL AT MALTA
23 On arrival back in the Mediterranean submarine operations were staging a rapid recovery after serious setbacks. In the irst half of 1942 Malta had been under constant attack from the air, neutralising the air and surface forces which had been successful in attacking convoys to supply the Afrika Corps. Submarine operations had had continued success against these supply routes, but it had become increasingly dif icult to maintain submarine maintenance facilities in Malta (10th Submarine Flotilla) in the face of the air assault, which was also causing submarine losses in harbour.
So, in late April 1941 the decision had been taken to withdraw the 10th Submarine Flotilla to Alexandria. Attacks on the Axis supply routes to North Africa then reached a low ebb. In June, invigorated by more supplies, Rommel had advanced to beyond the Egyptian border and it had been decided to withdraw the submarine depot ship Medway and the submarine lotillas from Alexandria. En route to Haifa, Medway was lost to U-boat attack despite anti- submarine escort. This was a serious blow to the submarine service in the Mediterranean, along with the absence of Malta as a base, and loss earlier in the year of two submarine "aces" (Lt Cdr MD Wanklyn VC, DSO** of Upholder and Lt Cdr EP Tomkinson DSO** of Urge).
Matters had improved when Fliegerkorps II, responsible for the main part of the air assault on Malta, was ordered to Russia and the number of air raids on Malta decreased. Although still beleaguered in terms of supply by sea, the 10th Submarine Flotilla was in August 1942 in the process of moving back to Malta. At the same time the 1st Submarine Flotilla, now without Medway, was in course of setting up in a custom built French submarine base at Beirut in the Lebanon. The Italian Navy was short of fuel for surface operations but, on the other hand, escorts were now itted with German sonar for detecting dived submarines. Good signal intelligence (ULTRA) continued to be available but, to avoid giving away the decryption facility, signal traf ic always required corroborative intelligence before it could be used, such as from the air. Rommel was at El Alamein without suf icient supplies, especially fuel, to move forward at a time when the 8th Army was receiving strong reinforcement
30 August 1942: After leaving Malta 26 August, laid a mine ield of 15 mines off Paxos and Anti-Paxos, to the south of Corfu in the Ionian Sea. As the lay inished a loud noise was heard, and shuddering and a heavy strain was felt on the minelaying release gear. On coming to periscope depth it was realised that the remainder of the out it of mines were held up in the mine casing, despite indicators showing they had been laid. This was con irmed on surfacing after dark. The decision was taken to continue to Beirut where it was found that the failure had been due to excessive wear in the mine rails, coupled with faults in the sinkers. This mine ield would have been designed to disrupt the Axis traf ic passing from Italy to Libya down the west coast of Greece, which was still one of the main Axis routes to North Africa.
30 August 1942: South of Corfu Island attacked the rear ship of a convoy of 4 merchant ships which appeared to have only air escort, hitting with 2 torpedoes the Italian merchant Monstella (5311 GRT) from 3500 yards. Counter-attacked by an undetected Italian torpedo boat, Brioni, avoiding 16 depth charges. Monstella, well down by the stern, with the poop deck awash, was escorted by Brioni under tow of three tugs and beached on Corfu, but was a constructive total loss.
24 7 September 1942: Arrived Beirut to rejoin 1st Submarine Flotilla. Maintenance and recreation period. See Appendix D Letter 2.
24 September 1942: Magic Carpet run from Beirut to Malta with aviation spirit, torpedoes and dehydrated vegetables, arriving at Malta on 2 October.
6 October 1942: After departing Malta on 4 October for return to Beirut, and while surfaced at night, attacked by Italian U-boat Sciesa with an acoustic torpedo which detonated some distance astern. Arrived Beirut on 12 October. The Italian’s commanding of icer was convinced he had sunk Rorqual and the U-boat was presented with a commemorative plaque by Mussolini. For an Account of this incident see An Acoustic Torpedo.
On 3 October 1942 the 8th Army opened its attack on Rommel's forces at El Alamein. The contribution of submarines to the success at Alamein was substantial, due to the disruption of supply lines to Axis forces in North Africa. In October 1941 44% of the total shipped was lost to submarines and aircraft.
22 October 1942: After returning to Beirut on 12 October, a further Magic Carpet run from Beirut to Malta carrying aviation spirit, fuel oil, torpedoes, and dehydrated vegetables. En route carried out carrier pigeon trials, releasing two birds while on the surface. One bird lew off successfully and arrived at destination. The other kept returning and was landed on arrival at Malta, with two others.
27 October 1942: When dived heard HE (Hydrophone Effect) similar to U-boat main motors at approximately 3000 yards. Followed in hope of an attack at dusk if the U-boat were then to surface, but contact was lost without any sighting.
30 October 1942: Disembarked stores in Malta overnight, followed by passage to Port Said to load mines. Left torpedo out it at Malta where there was a shortage of torpedoes. Arrived Port Said 8 November.
24 November 1942: After calling at Beirut, then left for Malta as a relief for submarines deployed to protect the landings in French North Africa (Operation Torch), arriving 2 December. Lent to 10th Submarine Flotilla based in Malta.
The occupation by Axis troops of Tunisia to prevent it falling into Allied hands made the cutting of Axis communications from Naples across the Tyrrhenian Sea into Tunisian ports of great importance. The routes through the Ionian Sea to Cyrenaica ceased as the Axis forces fell back to the west in face of the advance of the 8th Army along the coast of North Africa. An area of 100 miles by 20 miles between the west end of Sicily and the north coast of Tunisia, leading into the ports of Tunis and Bizerta, became one of intensive operations amongst enemy mine ields and strong Italian air and surface anti-submarine forces. Due to the changed situation in North Africa a convoy from the east reached Malta in November, followed by a number of other ships. The siege of Malta was over and surface forces were re-established there.
25 8 December 1942: Laid mine ield of 36 mines off Cani Rocks, north east of the port of Bizerta, Tunisia, resulting in the sinking of M/V Graz (1870 GRT). 14 mines were found to have come off the conveyor chain in the prevailing rough weather, and 3 were missing. During the night of 11 December, the First Lieutenant and crew members entered the mine casing in rough weather to secure the mines back in position. In rough seas this took 40 minutes, with the risk of being trapped outside the submarine if it was to be forced to dive through enemy action.
A dedicated Petty Of icer was carried to care for the mines and minelaying gear, but the system was quite primitive and could be temperamental. An endless chain, operated by a shaft from inside the internal mining compartment, hooked up under each mine and carried it along the rails until it dropped off the stern. The distance apart of the mines could be varied by altering the speed of the THE MINE RELEASE GEAR chain or the speed of the submarine. The laying of each mine would leave the submarine some 20 gallons lighter, needing compensation by internal ballasting.
Once at sea there was no opportunity to carry out checks or maintenance without sending crew into the mine casing at considerable danger to themselves if the submarine was forced to dive. So great care had to be taken to ensure all was correct before leaving harbour, including the correct depth setting on each mine. Although there was a mine counter designed to count the mines leaving the mine doors, it was not reliable enough to be quite sure how many mines had actually left the submarine until later surfacing. The critical thing was to ensure every mine settled at the correct depth and did not rise to the surface and give away the whole ield - as well as attract attention to the presence of the submarine. All in all there was a lot that could go wrong.
12 December 1942: Attack by U-boat on Rorqual while surfaced on a starlit night during urgent passage towards Naples. Four torpedoes passed were observed to pass under the submarine, having been mistaken for an aircraft carrier. For Account of this incident see Four torpedoes have just passed underneath me.
14 December 1942: Attacked an Axis merchant ship off Imperatore Point, Ischia Island, Gulf of Gaeta with three torpedoes itted with new Duplex non-contact pistols. Two exploded prematurely and the other one exploded on hitting the shore.
17 December 1942: The remaining mines from the 8 December lay were laid in a mine ield off Ischia Island. Torpedoed and seriously damaged Italian auxiliary vessel, Piero Foscari, (3423GRT) to north east of Ischia Island. The attack took place by moonlight, and in the presence of two E-boats. The Piero Foscari was towed into Gaeta. To Malta on 23 December
26
CONDUCT REPORT BY CAPTAIN PHILIP RUCK KEENE, CAPTAIN 1ST SUBMARINE FLOTILLA, HMS MEDWAY 11, BEIRUT January 1943: Docked in Malta for repairs to a partially collapsed area of the pressure hull which might have been the result of anti-submarine attack some time in the past. The situation at the beginning of 1943 was that the Afrika Corps was some 200 miles east of Tripoli in contact with the Eighth Army, which was building up supplies in preparation to advance. Rommel was very short of ammunition and had only enough fuel to retire to Tunisia. In Tunisia the First Army was building up strength prior to advancing eastwards. Everything therefore depended on rapid build up of supplies , and continued disruption of supplies to Axis forces. Practically all Axis convoys were being sent to Tunis or Bizerta, having been loaded at Naples and Palermo, or smaller ships loaded at Trapani. The convoys crossed to Africa in a corridor protected on each side by mine ields. Some submarines went into the protected corridor, as with Rorqual on 17/18 January, but it was dif icult to operate amongst mine ields and the corridor was largely given over to unrestricted attacks by Allied air forces, who came to dominate the area from air ields captured in the advance of the Eighth Army. Accordingly, submarine operations were directed at Axis shipping across the wider Mediterranean, with substantial success. By mid April, Axis armies were starved and their ighting power emasculated for want of supplies. 17-18 January 1943: After leaving Malta on 14 January, laid mine ield of 50 mines at night, within the protected corridor, 3 miles off Cani Rocks, 15 miles north east of Bizerta. This ield resulted in the sinking of the valuable German heavy lift ship Ankara (4768 GRT) on passage from Palermo to Bizerta with a cargo of tanks for the Afrika Corps. Ankara was the last ship in the Mediterranean capable of carrying Tiger tanks, and kept running regularly between Italy and Tunisia despite being attacked by British submarines on several occasions. She was reputed to be known to the Germans as "the ghost ship" on account of her repeated escapes from torpedoes and bombs. Her loss was a signi icant blow to Axis Forces. This mine ield also claimed the corvette Procellaria on 31 January 1943, and the destroyer Saetta on 3 February 1943. For an account of this event see The Last Tigers for Rommel.
27 24 January 1943: Off Cape Stilo, Calabrian coast, ired 4 torpedoes from 5000 yards at Italian (ex German) tanker Thorsheimer (9555 GRT), escorted by 2 destroyers and aircraft, without success. In glassy calm conditions, this convoy was hugging the cost very closely. Probably the speed of the convoy was underestimated. 29 January 1943: Off Cape Spartivento attacked a convoy of two ships on passage to Taranto. Four torpedoes ired from 2700 yards at German merchantman Gerda Toft, missing ahead, although one torpedo may have hit but not detonated, and then a further two torpedoes at 4000 yards but without success as the torpedo wakes were seen by the target or escorting aircraft. 30 January 1943: Gun bombardment of railway bridge over the Amendola River in the Gulf of Squillace, Calabria, scoring hits but, while diving, suffered a hit from shore batteries which removed the top of the forward periscope, necessitating return to Malta. Arrived 2 February for repairs and maintenance. The point of bombarding railway lines was that for a small effort the Italians were forced to provide troops to guard some 800 miles of coastal track. See Annex D Letter 3.
24-25 February 1943: After departing Malta on 22 February, laid a mine ield of 50 mines to the south of Marettimo Island, off the west coast of Sicily and in the approaches to the port of Trapani, resulting in damage to the new Italian merchant Carbonello A (1593 GRT) on 4 April 1943. Followed by passage to Haifa to load mines and torpedoes, arriving 5 March and departing on 9 March.
Rorqual could lay mines faster than they could be prepared for her in Malta. Thus she was on this occasion sent to Haifa to reload, but a long passage was necessary and this was not repeated.
22-23 March 1943: After visiting Malta 16-19 March, laid at night a mine ield of 50 mines in the approaches to Trapani on the west coast of Sicily. This mine ield resulted in sinking of the auxiliary minesweeper Giorgio. Then made passage to Algiers (to which HMS Maidstone and Eighth Submarine Flotilla had moved from Gibraltar) transporting a load of torpedoes, then in short supply at Algiers, arriving 26 March. Left for Malta with 31 torpedoes and 10 tons of stores on 9 April, arriving 15 April. See Appendix D Letter 4. 22 April 1943: Departing Malta on 18 April, laid mine ield of 50 mines off Favignama Island in the approaches to Trapani on the west coast of Sicily. Returned to Malta to reload on 24 April, sailing again on 27 April. See Apendix D Letter 5. 30 April 1943: Laid another mine ield of 50 mines off Favignama Island. These mines were laid in daylight in the wake of enemy minesweepers engaged on routine minesweeping, and may have caused the loss of the Italian schooner Sempre Avanti. Returned to Malta on 2 May. These last two ields brought little results as Axis traf ic had virtually ceased, other than small shallow draft vessels.
28 Final surrender of Axis forces in North Africa came on 13 May 1943. With the whole North African coast and air ields in Allied hands, Allied convoys could pass through the Mediterranean to India and the Far East. The campaign of attrition against Axis supplies to North Africa was over. Submarines were re-tasked to support the invasion of Sicily, scheduled for early July. This involved cutting Sicily off by sea from the Italian mainland and preventing its reinforcement by Axis forces. However, to prevent the enemy drawing conclusions as to where the next blow would fall, and to disperse Axis anti-submarine forces, submarines continued to operate throughout the Mediterranean as before. 15 May 1943: After departing Malta on 12 May, laid a mine ield of 50 mines off Cape Stilo, Calabria, southern Italy. This included the 1000th mine laid by Rorqual during the war. Then via Malta to Port Said for a brief re it, arriving 30 May, where she was docked until 15 June. Departed 23 June for passage to Haifa to load mines. 29 June 1943: LWN awarded Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for "Bravery and skill in command of His Majesty's Submarine Rorqual on war patrols in the Mediterranean, and in carrying vital supplies to beleaguered Malta, in the face of may hazards"
DSO INVESTITURE WITH FIRST LIEUTENANT IAN STOOP (LEFT) AND LIEUTENANT SAUNDERS
The First Submarine Flotilla was now allocated an area of operations covering the Aegean Sea, west coast of Greece and the eastern Mediterranean basin. While enemy shipping to
29 North Africa had ceased there was still considerable traf ic around the Aegean supplying occupied Greece, including from the Black Sea and the Rumanian oil ields though the Dardanelles. 2 July 1943: After departing Haifa on 25 June, laid a mine ield of 29 mines in the north of the Aegean Sea off Kassandra Point, Kassandra Peninsular, in the gulf of Salonika, leading towards Thessalonica, resulting in the sinking of auxiliary minesweeper GM53, which had been sent with others to clear it. 3 July 1943: The remaining 21 mines laid off Cape Sepias on the north of Skiathos Island in the approaches to Volos. This ield resulted in destruction of French merchant (in German service) Perigord/PLM 24 (5391 GRT) on 7 September. The wreck of PLM 24 drifted ashore on the mainland coast where her gun, ammunition and other equipment were looted, almost certainly by Greek partisans. Another vessel was observed by Rorqual on 10 September beached in the area, probably as a result of entering this mine ield. These mine ields were laid to disrupt the shipping route running along the western side of the Gulf of Salonika.
7 July 1943: Based on ULTRA intelligence Rorqual was directed to the approaches to the Dardanelles where, about 5 miles west of the island of Bozcaada, Turkey, she torpedoed and sank with 2 hits the large German tanker Wilhelmsberg (7020 GRT), former Greek vessel Petrakis Nimikou, carrying much needed oil from the Rumanian oil ields to Piraeus for German forces in Greece. The sea was glassy calm and the Wilhelmsberg was escorted by Italian destroyers Turbine and Monzanbano, German auxiliary submarine chasers UJ-2102 and UJ-2014, and fast patrol boats, all with aircraft cover. Rorqual was counter-attacked by escorts with 16 depth charges and forced to go deep, exceeding her maximum diving depth of 200 feet permitted since the repair in Malta, and causing distortion to the pillar itted to support the earlier damage. For an account of this event see Hitler went red in the face. 8 July 1943: Gun bombardment of ironworks at Stratoni, Ierissos Bay, to the north of Athos Peninsular, north Aegean Sea. Followed by passage to Beirut, arriving 14 July. On 10th July the Allies landed in Sicily, and by 22 July has overrun the western part of the island and Palermo, forcing Axis forces to retreat to the north east corner. 5 August 1943: After reloading mines at Haifa and sailing on 29 July, laid a mine ield of 29 mines to south west of Smila Point in the Gulf of Salonika. 6 August 1943: Laid a mine ield of the remaining 21 mines to the southeast of Lemnos Island in the approaches to the Dardanelles 7 August 1943: Off the Dardanelles, torpedoed and sank French merchant (in German service) Nantaise (1798 GRT) on passage form Varna to Piraeus in company with Thisbe (1782 GRT) and escorted by nine submarine chasers and aircraft. Counter-attacked with 6 depth charges but none was near.
30
CONDUCT REPORT BY CAPTAIN PHILIP RUCK KEENE, CAPTAIN 1ST SUBMARINE FLOTILLA, HMS MEDWAY 11, BEIRUT
8 August 1943: Gun bombardment of resin factory at Khrouso in the Gulf of Kassandra, Greece, leaving it in lames after iring 82 rounds. Returned to Beirut on 16 September and then to Haifa to reload mines. Distortion found in the pressure hull and Rorqual was thereafter limited to a maximum diving depth of 150 feet. On 3rd September the Eighth Army invaded Italy across the straights of Messina. Armistice with Italy was signed on 8 September. However, the Aegean Sea was still surrounded by occupied Greece, Greek Islands and Crete, with strong shore based air forces covering the Aegean. Only submarines could operate without ighter protection. 9-10 September 1943: After leaving Haifa on 2 September, laid mine ields totalling 30 mines in the Trikeri Channel, south of Skiathos Island in the approaches to Volos, and in the Straight of Skiathos to the north of the island. 11 - 12 September 1943: Laid the remaining 20 mines off Cape Irene, Lemnos Island, in the approaches to the Dardanelles. Further bombardment of Stratoni iron works with 91 rounds. Also ired a torpedo at the loading dock at long rang, narrowly missing it. 13 September 1943: Attacked Port Kastro on Lemnos Island, Greece, by gun ire. Surfaced much closer to the rocks than intended, underneath a shore battery which opened ire at close range, forcing Rorqual to dive pointing at the shore "with a rather ugly looking jagged rock just ahead of her". Then, after patrolling between the island of Leros and Nikaria to disrupt a German attempt to reoccupy Leros, returned to Beirut on 20 September.
31 At the time of the Italian armistice on 8 September, British forces were sent to reinforce Italian troops on the island of Leros in the Dodecanese in the south Aegean Sea. Leros has one of the inest harbours in the Mediterranean. In the face of German determination to occupy the Dodecanese, an ill-fated decision was taken to hold the island despite enemy air superiority. Submarines were required to run in supplies to the beleaguered garrison. Leros was lost to airborne and amphibious attack by German troops between 12 and 16 November. 21-22 October 1943: Having departed Beirut on 5 October for passage to UK for re it, and reaching Malta on 9 October, recalled to Beirut to act as carrier of equipment and stores to Leros for relief of the beleaguered garrison on the island. On 20 October departed for Leros carrying a 40mm Oerlikon battery of 6 guns, with a Jeep on the casing, and also 35 tons of ammunition and 15 tons of aviation spirit. Attacked by 3 Arado loat planes en route, which dropped bombs or depth charges on Rorqual submerged at 70 feet, but without serious damage. Unloaded took place overnight and the battery gave the next German stra ing attack a servere surprise. However, after unloading Rorqual was found to be aground alongside the jetty. The local tug had been abandoned by its crew who feared an air raid and was loating around the harbour. Fortunately, the crew was found and Rorqual cleared harbour just as the irst air raid of the day was starting. Returned to Beirut on 27 October, followed by docking in Haifa. For an account of this event see Carrying Guns to Leros. 21 November 1943: Left Beirut for re it in UK, via Malta and Gibraltar, with spare commanding of icer Lieutenant GSC Clarabut DSO in temporary command from Malta as LWN was ill with jaundice and carried as a passenger. LWN disembarked at Falmouth on 19 November. On the following day Rorqual proceeded to Portsmouth in company with the French ship Chasseur 5 which capsized in heavy weather of the Isle of Wight with heavy loss of life. 1 December 1943: Handed over command of Rorqual 29 February 1944: Awarded Distinguished Service Cross for minelaying and sinking 2 supply ships
32
CREW OF RORQUAL WITH JOLLY ROGER, LWN LOOKING OVER FLAG OVER LOOKING LWN ROGER, JOLLY WITH RORQUAL OF CREW
33 3 - CONDITIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
From transcript of BBC interview
Q: I wonder if you could give a description of the speci ic operational conditions you were working in under the Mediterranean? LWN: Well, conditions in the Mediterranean were rather different to submarine operations in other areas, because our operating areas were always so close to enemy air ields. This meant that we could practically never go on the surface in daylight, except for short periods when operations might require it. But generally speaking, by day we had to remain dived almost continuously and operate on the surface only at night. We have to take into account that the weather and sea conditions in the Mediterranean were very different from operational areas like the Atlantic. Visibility, on the whole, was good, weather was good. So we didn't have to compete, so often anyway, with the very great dif iculties which arose in other areas of heavy seas, bad visibility, bad weather. On the other hand, it was relatively easy for aircraft to be able to see us from the air, even when dived.
Q: Can you talk a little bit about how you turned day into night? LWN: Well, because in the circumstances we were almost never on the surface by day, and were on the surface by night, it was convenient to turn round day and night inside the submarine, that's to say we had breakfast in the evening, our mid-day meal at midnight and supper in the early morning. The advantages of this were that at night on the surface, when it was more likely that a sudden emergency might arise, most people were awake. People could smoke if they wanted to. Also this meant that there was no cooking in the ship when dived, and except for those like the of icers of the watch and the look-outs who would be on the bridge at night, there really is no particular difference in the living conditions between day and night for a large part of the ship's company. So it did have advantages. It was by no means universal but I found it convenient to do it.
Q: A characteristic of operations in the Mediterranean was the short length of patrols? LWN: Yes. Patrols were much shorter in the Mediterranean than, for instance, for the Germans operating out in the middle of the Atlantic, because the distances from base to patrol area were very much shorter. Against that, there was not much quiet time at sea. You were almost perpetually under the possibility of encountering either surface ships or aircraft, or targets; and for this reason, I think, and because the time to passage was short, the operating authorities didn't keep submarines out on patrol for such long periods as was essential in the Atlantic or the Paci ic, where distances to patrol area were very great.
34 There was no let up, you might say. Well there was at times, but you could never be sure that there was going to be a let up. It could be that nothing happened for days on end but, on the whole, there was the consciousness that you couldn’t really relax as you might have done on a long surface passage to a patrol area.
Q: I think an important question is to talk about the context for the early period in which you were in command? LWN: When I irst went out there and took over this was in 1941 at the time of the Battle of Crete. This was a time when the Germans were occupying practically the whole seaboard of the Mediterranean, except a small piece in Syria, Israel and Egypt - and they'd even moved up close to Egypt. During the whole time, both in the irst and second time that I was in the Mediterranean, conditions for the allied forces were very dif icult throughout. The shores of the Mediterranean were almost entirely occupied by Axis forces, most of North Africa, France, Italy, Greece, the Aegean islands - almost everything except Egypt and the Levant. In these circumstances the submarine's task was largely to prevent, as far as possible, the enemy making the best uses of the advantageous circumstances in which he found himself. That is to say to cut supplies to North Africa, where the German armies were active, and to attack shipping of all sorts round the coast and in the narrows, and off Greece and the Aegean, to reduce the enemy's potential to supply himself and his scattered forces by sea - which was very advantageous to him if he could do it, rather than have to use land communications which were already heavily overloaded by the necessity to maintain his armies in Russia and other places.
Q: So given that context you've just described, how much feeling was there that there was a possibility that Britain might lose the war? LWN: Speaking personally, I don't think I really took a global view of these things. One's mind was really on the local situation. For the rest we didn't know a lot more than civilians knew from reading the papers. Once the Americans were in the war, even though their abilities in the early stages were slight until they really got going, I, for one, always felt that the outcome of war was settled - inevitable. The long-term power of the allies, which then included both Russia and the United States, would be in the long-run overwhelming.
Q: What about before America came into the war? I mean, was there a feeling of your back being up against the wall in that period - especially in the Mediterranean ? LWN: I think I had a naive if you like, and blissful, belief that we always won in the end. And when we heard the news of Pearl Harbour I was sitting in the wardroom of the barracks in Devonport, where Rorqual was at that time re itting, and everybody round me was saying 'Oh Lord, this is a terrible thing, the whole American leet's sunk in Pearl Harbour,' and I remember saying 'What are you on about? We have won the war today.' Churchill said it after me actually, I think. But that was what came to my mind - people were not instantly prepared to accept this judgment, but I remember saying this.
35 4 - SUBMARINE COMMAND
From transcript of BBC interview
Q: What was it like being captain of a submarine?
LWN: Well, the captain of any warship is totally responsible for everything that happens. The difference between a submarine and other war vessels of all sizes really, is that during periods at sea the captain is living in much closer contact with his ship's company than in a surface ship. This has the good or, perhaps, bad effect that the ship's company know pretty well what sort of a captain they've got. They can judge his character and they all form opinions of the con idence which they have in him. On the whole, this is something which you have to live with, and stems from way you behave - perhaps not deliberately - but simply from the captain's character and personality. You have to build con idence and convince people that you're in charge of the situation, and you know what you're doing.
Q: What impression do you think the men got of you as a Captain?
LWN: I don't really know what the men thought of me because I didn't ask them and they didn't give me their opinion. But my personal attitude was that I maintained my distance. I didn't engage in any particular familiarity. I doubt if anybody did in those days, perhaps the distance between of icer and men was more naturally further apart than they would be in modern times. But I just went about my business in a manner which I hope looked alright to them, and in my dealings with them I tried to be in authority, but polite.
Q: And did you try and exude con idence?
LWN: I don't think I tried to exude con idence deliberately. I think I just went around being myself.
Q: Your cabin is right by, everyone walks past it, it's an open cabin, you are very much on display. Did that mean that you never had a chance to have any private moments?
LWN: Well, that's not quite true. One didn't shut the cabin door, but one had a curtain, and although access was immediate for anybody who wanted to come in, they didn't actually see what you were doing unless they had occasion to come in and talk to you, or get you out to the Control Room because you were wanted.
36 Q: What about the area of discipline - life on board submarines in the Second World War was very informal, closed, but informal, could you tell us about that - the informality and how that was balanced with the concerns to maintain authority.
LWN Well, indeed, it's the case that discipline was less formal, we didn't insist on the uniform being worn in the sense it would have been in a surface ship, nor did the of icers themselves, including me, wear strict uniform most of the time, except for entering and leaving harbour. I had over my whole period in command very few disciplinary problems. Occasionally, minor things cropped up. I did have one case where a man refused to put to sea with the ship and the rest of the ship's company when we were going on patrol. This arose from the fact that after we had returned from the Mediterranean the irst time, and were due to go into dockyard for re it, the dockyard wasn't ready to take us in hand and, therefore, we were ordered to ill in time by going and doing a lay of mines in the Bay of Biscay. Well, this was probably disappointing to everybody who thought that they'd inally got home safely, and one man refused to go on board and go to sea. Well, this was probably the most serious disciplinary matter I ever had to deal with at this time. But as we were just all ready, about to shove off and go to sea, I had to leave the man behind and leave the of icers of the depot ship to deal with this matter.
A perhaps slightly more amusing, though it might not have been, example of a failure of discipline arose when, at sea, one man was found to be under the in luence of alcohol. Rum was issued neat in submarines, unlike surface ships where it's issued diluted as grog. And when this occurred the irst lieutenant said, and was overheard to say - "I know what this means, they have all got their rum bottled" - as the phrase was - "and I am going to search the ship." Unfortunately, he didn't do it at the time he said it, but he did it a little later by which time everybody who had got rum stowed away in their lockers had disposed of it in the most obvious way - inside themselves. And, indeed, for a little time, before everybody sobered up, we were quite hard pushed to get a watch who were all sober to keep things going. Well, unfortunate, but I don't think I pursued anybody about this. I just regarded this as something which shouldn't have happened. But it was not a disciplinary matter which I took any further.
Q: When you were going out and back and there's not much activity happening. What do you do with your spare time?
LWN: I think in any activity in war, there is always a lot of sitting about and very little actual activity and contact with the enemy. In fact this could happen at any time, so we'd naturally have to remain alert, but there's always a lot of sitting about. I did a great deal of reading. I found that going around the Mediterranean and inding myself looking at many places which were famous in antiquity, I started to be interested in Roman history, and I even went so far as to rub up my school Latin in order to read some of the classical authors in the original. This was no great piece of scholarship really, it was all rather elementary. However, you have to do something.
Q: You sank a lot of boats, completed a lot of very dangerous operations. What would you attribute your success to?
37 LWN: A combination of experience and caution. What successes we had, which were not as great as some others, were I think largely due to some degree of caution, not trying to do more than the available ship and force was capable of, and surviving long enough to gather experience. If you have experience your chances of surviving and carrying out successful operations increases, of course, enormously with time.
Q: And that's your own experience or that of the crew as well? LWN I don't know what the crew thought about these things. I do think they appreciated a captain who had success, because it's important to everybody that success should occur. And the longer you go on and have success the more will they come to believe that success will go on because they think, probably, that you are the sort of captain who can be relied upon to have successes without leading them into situations of unnecessary danger.
Q: How would you compare your approach to that of Dewhurst before you? LWN Dewhurst was quite a different character to me, that's all I really can say. He had a certain sort of swashbuckling attitude to things, whereas I, perhaps, by nature was more cautious and more inclined to think over things before I got involved in them.
Q: I just wondered if you could, in terms of this relationship to this success, explain what the Jolly Roger is and your feelings about that as well. LWN It was the practice in all British submarines, when they returned to harbour from patrol, to ly what was known as the Jolly Roger. This was a black lag with a skull and crossbones on it, onto which was sewn symbols which represented successes of various kinds, whether torpedo sinkings or gun actions, and this was a practice with which I was never totally happy. I always felt that it was unfortunate that it had crept in, that this practice was attached to a piratical symbol. We didn't think of ourselves as pirates in any sense at all, and I always thought that had some other symbol on the lag been used it would have been much better. But, of course, the thing had grown up long before I had any chance of in luencing it. So I just went along with what was the general practice, without ever being wholly happy with it.
Q: Do you think that the Jolly Roger re lected the attitude towards submarines within the British Navy? LWN: It might have been in the very early days, but not in the Second World War. I don't think that in the Navy in general this was seen as a sign of piratical action or piratical attitude of mind by submariners. Perhaps in the very early days of submarines, in the First World War, they might have been seen as in some way piratical. They were leading a rough life, they were dirty and not quite the sort of gentlemen who might have been found in a lagship, and this may have led to feelings that when they were irst introduced into the Navy that this was an unfair, an ungentlemanly way of waging war. I think by our time in the Second World War, this idea had entirely evaporated.
38 Q: Absolutely entirely? There was no undercurrent, that although they were perceived as being useful, they were slightly underhand? LWN I never came across in my time an attitude on the part of other branches of the Navy that this was so. I have heard merchant captains say something of this sort. They were to be at the receiving end of the U-boat’s attentions. I do not think that it was in any way a general attitude among the surface leet. If so, I did not personally come across it.
Q: What about survivors of ships you sank? LWN Submarines could not accept on board any number of people as prisoners and, indeed, very rarely were we really aware of the fact that we were ighting people. We were ighting against ships. When we sank ships, it was not part of our duties to rescue survivors. They would be in a convoy with other ships whose business it clearly was to pick up survivors. We would have endangered ourselves beyond any reason if we had attempted to surface in broad daylight and pick up survivors, and anyway we could not accommodate them in any numbers. I think there's a point here that we saw ourselves - I did anyway - as ships ighting against ships. Through the entire war I personally never saw a dead person. I don't think I saw a wounded one. I was waging war against ships. Of course anyone could see that people were getting killed and hurt in the process, but this really was not my affair, it was the affair of the other side to see to their survivors. This, perhaps, led one to have a more impersonal view of this type of warfare than was possible in many other war-like situations
Q: How did you feel about the way the Admiralty utilised submarines during the war - do you have any reservations – do you think they fully utilised the capabilities of submarine force? LWN I think our submarines were, by and large, properly used in the strategic sense and used within their capabilities. They tended to be used for speci ic tasks, particularly interrupting traf ic in the Mediterranean, and rather similar use later in the Paci ic. They were largely kept out of the Atlantic to make sure that they couldn't be mistaken for U- boats. And they also played a considerable part in the early days of German operations in Norway, and the North Sea. I would say that this was in line with the kind of tactical training and thinking that we went to war with. Though it could be said that various additional usages of submarines were made which we had not in the same way practised, like landing agents on enemy shores, laying markers on beaches for invasion forces to land, and so on.
Q: If you compare the technical quality of submarines, Britain tended to be a much older submarine force than the Germans and the Americans had. Do you agree - or how do you feel about those things?
39 LWN I don't think that our losses in general arose from inadequacy of design or vulnerability of our submarines. We did have some older submarines it's true, built quite a way before the start of the war. And we had losses in the beginning of the war. This will always happen. People have to acquire experience, some of that experience is acquired the hard way by submarines being lost and people learning by one means or another why they were lost. You have at the beginning of a war not got irst hand actual experience to build on. In consequence people will at the start of any war be exposed to dangers which they perhaps do not wholly appreciate because they are the unlucky people who are acquiring the experience which others will use later. I don't think I ever heard of any complaint, in general, about the design of our submarines, about torpedoes - yes, but not about the submarines themselves. They were not, I think, seen as especially vulnerable in any way. In some design terms, we thought that they might have been better. They were slow on the whole. We didn't have the surface speed of either German or American submarines, largely because they had been built for different circumstances, but I don't think I have ever heard any real criticism on those grounds.
Q: Just to round things off, at the end of your period you got sick, so did some of the other of icers, can you tell us about that and how that prompted your return home and how you were going back for a re it and so on?
LWN Before we left Beirut in 1943 to go home and re it, for the second time, one of my junior of icers had got what we in those days called jaundice, it's now called hepatitis, and had to be left behind. After we left, both I and my First Lieutenant went down with it, and this was very unpleasant because this is a very disabling disease and it's dif icult to keep going, and you haven't got anybody to replace you with. When we arrived in Malta we were both taken off the submarine, but then she couldn't go on to the UK for one reason or another, which I can't remember, and after being in the sick bay for a week or so we were allowed to go home as passengers in our own ship. This in war time is not a terribly comfortable experience because, although the captain will have been put in is solid and competent and all that, you always feel that it isn't you.
Q: When you arrived back in Britain, it was just before Christmas, you had to separate.
LWN Well, irst of all, we went into Falmouth, where we had to wait 24 hours for an escort, because close round the coasts on the surface we always had to have a surface escort so that we could not be mistaken for a U-boat. So we had to wait. As I was doing nothing except sit there, I didn't see any great point in just staying there longer. So I went ashore in Falmouth and went straight up to Flag Of icer Submarines headquarters. So the submarine then made the last leg of the trip from Falmouth to Portsmouth without me. And for this, they were given a free-French frigate as an escort. Well, it was a very rough day and when they got about off the Isle of Wight the French frigate capsized and loated upside down. In fact, I think most of the French ship's company were lost, because either they were inside or they'd been washed off in very rough weather. So this made a rather unhappy homecoming, though I personally was not present when this happened.
40 Q: Did you get a chance to say goodbye to the men?
LWN Oh, yes I came back after I'd been to Flag Of icer Submarines. I went to Portsmouth to see them after they'd arrived, because the ship's company would have, at least in the main part, stayed with the ship until she was actually in dockyard hands when they would be reduced to a sort of skeleton crew.
Q: What was it like, I mean, you'd served on board her a very long time, how did you feel?
LWN Glad to be home, I suppose. Regarded myself as lucky as having done all that time and been able to return with all my people and ship intact, I should think. I don't really remember. I think that would be my irst reaction.
Q: I mean, you must have felt a sense of bonding with the men, after spending so much time with them, or maybe you didn't?
LWN Well, I think one did. But I don't remember exactly what I felt. Perhaps I am rather an unemotional character in this way. I tend to take everything as it comes, on the whole, and I perhaps don't have such acute feelings of this sort of situation as others might have. I think my feeling would have been relief and general pleasure that I'd got the whole out it back home again.
Q: It seems that you looked upon the whole thing in a very professional manner?
LWN Yes, I think so. I suppose that, on the whole, I looked on the whole thing as a job. It was something which I had been trained to do. Command had come to me at the sort of time of life that I had expected, and in the way that I had expected. And then I saw the thing as a job which had to be done to the best of my ability, without getting unduly frightened or emotional about it.
Q: When you look back now, with hindsight, at those years you were a young man, lots of adventure, lots of responsibility - how do you look back on those years?
LWN: It's the best time of my life, I suppose, taken by and large. People, perhaps others like me, of that same sort of age group, we had come to the war at the time when we had responsibility, particularly in submarines. We had the ability to operate on our own, largely outside of immediate superior control and, of course, the whole circumstances of the war meant that life was enormously interesting because you didn't know what was going to happen next, and the outcome of the war was always something which was continually in your mind.
41 5 - A MAGIC CARPET TO MALTA JUNE-JULY 1941
From transcript of BBC interview
LWN: Once the Italians had come into the war and the enemy occupied almost the whole of the coasts of the Mediterranean it became very dif icult indeed to run supplies into Malta. They were very liable to attack either by aircraft or surface ships operating from Italian ports, or by E boats in the narrows approaching Malta.
So therefore means had to be found of getting in the most vital supplies, and the most vital supplies were seen to be aviation fuel for the aircraft based in Malta. And so it was during this period, when it was hardly possible to run convoys from either end of the Mediterranean into Malta, that submarines were almost the only way in which supplies could be got in. The quantities which any one submarine could bring were very small indeed compared with the requirements, but by using several submarines from both ends of the Mediterranean a certain amount could be done.
So, the very irst duties which Rorqual was employed on after I took over was taking supplies to Malta. To begin with this was done in a very primitive fashion. We simply illed the mine casing with four gallon cans of petrol, and they were ixed in place with wooden battens. They would move about, and were likely to burst under sea pressure.
We also used to disembark a proportion of our fuel so that the fuel tanks could then be illed with aviation spirit. And so this was the irst thing we did, we went off with this petrol, a certain amount of dry stores which could be carried inside, and some passengers always. Because we could not go on the surface by day it took the best part of a week to get from Alexandria to Malta.
Q: Can you explain how dangerous that cargo was?
LWN: We were always conscious that we were carrying a dangerous cargo. Had we been depth charged with this petrol, nobody really knows what might have happened. It would certainly have leaked, and leaking petrol might easily have been visible on the surface. Apart from the fuel which we carried in the mine casing and in our own fuel tanks, we took a certain number of vital supplies, some were food. I remember one occasion when we had a whole deck - a whole interior deck built through the length of the submarine - made out of cases of dehydrated cabbage, and we had some amusement thinking what would happen to us inside the submarine if the water got in to the dehydrated cabbage, which I suppose might perhaps have swelled up to leave us no room to move around.
42 INSIDE THE MINE CASING HMS RORQUAL
From Red Duster, White Ensign by Ian Cameron
“Rorqual to Alexandria for special duty”
ADMIRALTY SIGNAL
Operations 'Harpoon' and 'Vigorous' in June 1942 cost the Royal and Merchant Navies eleven ships sunk and eleven damaged. They cost the Royal Air Force upward of forty planes. Yet they achieved only partial success. Malta was still desperately short of food, ammunition and all types of fuel.
The food situation was the worst. Rations, already down to starvation level, suffered a further cut in early July, and how close the island was to starvation can be seen from the following table:
Weekly rations for July 1942 per person per week
Bread 73.5 ozs Edible Oils Nil Sugar Nil Tomatoes 3 lbs Rice Nil Potatoes 1.5 lbs
43 Flour Nil Laundry Soap 0.25 lb Fats 3.5 ozs Toilet Soap Nil Cheese 1.57 ozs Matches 1 box Tea Nil Goat's Milk 3 pints Coffee 1.75 ozs Meat Nil Milk Nil Kerosene 0.5 gal
No people could exist for long on such a diet as this. As soon as the results of the June operations were known plans were immediately drawn up for another and larger convoy, to sail this time from Gibraltar. It would, however, be well over a month before the ships could even assemble and in the meantime Malta had somehow to be kept going.
The idea of using submarines as store carriers was not new. The French navy indeed had designed the gargantuan Surcouf expressly for such a purpose, and as early as 1941 a number of British submarines had been used to carry provisions to Malta.
Those early trips, with their experimenting, improvising and teething troubles were in a way more interesting than the later runs when things went more smoothly almost as a matter of course. And certainly Clyde could never, during the summer of 1942, have carried so much, so safely, so many times, if it hadn't been for the early experimental runs made by submarines Rorqual and Cachalot.
Rorqual and Cachalot were built for minelaying. They were big submarines, over 1500 tons and over 270 feet in length. They needed only a small amount of conversion to become store carriers capable of carrying up to 200 tons of supplies. The Admiralty was quick to see their possibilities.
Early in May 1941 Rorqual was taken off patrol 'for special duty'. She lay for 3 weeks in Alexandria while dockyard workmen swarmed through her passageway stripping out non- essential equipment. Then on 3 June she started to load a cargo re lecting Malta's most pressing needs. As well as 2 of icers and 21 ratings as passengers, she carried 1478 cans of aviation spirit, as well as 15 tons in bulk, 48 tons of kerosene, medical stores, wire and 147 bags of mail.
It took the better part of 48 hours to load these stores, the limiting factor being space rather than weight. The aviation spirit proved especially dif icult. It arrived in lightweight 4.5 gallon cans, hermetically sealed. These were itted, two at a time, into small wooden crates which had been especially designed to it exactly over the mine rails, and were then lashed to the mine casing. It was hard, laborious work, calling for much patience, strength and a lot of rope.
She left Alexandria on 3rd June 1941, a little after sunrise, and for the whole of her passage to Malta the weather was mercifully ine. This was lucky, for even in a calm sea her cargo shifted uneasily, and whenever she submerged the stench of petrol vapour all but suffocated her crew.
For the irst few days her progress was uneventful. Then, early on 9th June, a Junkers 52 with a single Messerschmitt 109 was spotted heading south for Cyrenaica. Her Commanding Of icer, Lieutenant Napier, dived and took Rorqual her down to 70 feet.
44 For an hour he waited anxiously, while in the overcrowded quarters his passengers and crew became hotter, shorter of air and increasingly sickened by the nauseating reek of aviation spirit. On returning to periscope depth the planes had gone.
Two days later Rorqual nosed into Grand Harbour, Malta. Her cargo was dif icult to unload as seven of the crates had shifted and water absorption had caused the wood to swell. Nevertheless she managed to achieve a quick turnover, discharging within 48 hours. She left Malta on 14 June and 7 days later was back in Alexandria.
Almost at once she started to load again. Only this time, acting on Napier’s recommendation, petrol spirit was stowed somewhat differently. In place of small wooden crates, the dockyard carpenters were told to provide large wooden "tanks", 3 feet 6 inches wide 14 feet long, to it exactly into the mine casing. Only four of these could be built in the few days before Rorqual was due to sail, but were enough to test the effectiveness of the idea.
Loading commenced on 22nd June 1941 and this time Rorqual carried 21 passengers, 11700 gallons of kerosene, 50 tons of aviation spirit in bulk and 14 tons in cans, 2 U class submarine propellers, 2 tons of army clothing, ire hoses, foamite re ills and 90 bags of mail.
She left Alexandria on 25th June 1941 and once again enjoyed good weather and a moderately uneventful passage. The new method of storing petrol proved an unquali ied success. Rorqual was able to dive to ninety feet and could proceed deep for several hours at a stretch without undue discomfort from petrol vapour.
On Rorqual's return to Alexandria it was agreed that in future every submarine making the run to Malta should be equipped with tanks for carrying petrol in bulk. This ensured quicker loading and unloading, safer transit, and less discomfort for the crew.
Rorqual's third storage run from Alexandria to Malta commenced on 31 July 1941 carrying 20 passengers, 17285 gallons of kerosene and 4680 gallons of aviation spirit in bulk, 1500 cases of aviation spirit, 6 tons of other stores and 2 tons of mail.
It was largely due to the pioneer work of Rorqual that a year later the submarine Clyde was able to carry some 1200 tons of vitally needed kerosene from Gibraltar to Malta within the space of a couple of months.
In September 1942 Rorqual carried out a fourth storing run, from Beirut to Malta, carrying 45 tons of aviation spirit, 11 submarine and 7 aircraft torpedoes, 5 tons of dehydrated vegetables, other provisions, RAF stores and mail.
A inal storing trip, from Beirut to Malta, was made in October 1942 carrying 50 tons of aviation spirit, 20 tons of fuel oil, 12 submarine and 8 aircraft torpedoes, 10 tons of dehydrated vegetables, RAF and other stores.
45 6 - A DIFFICULT FIRST ATTACK 28 AUGUST 1941
From transcript of BBC interview
LWN: I think I'm right in saying that it was while we were returning from Malta to Alexandria we were diverted to intercept some enemy shipping heading for North Africa. This in fact, led to the irst ever real life attack which I made on an enemy target. Well, there were two merchant ships which were not escorted, and it was, as things go, a fairly simple operation for a beginner. I ired at the irst of them, three torpedoes, and I knew that I'd got a hit. I stayed at periscope depth, which one would not have done had there been an escort, in the hope of getting a shot at the second ship which was just coming into a iring position. I took no avoiding action but stayed put and ired 3 more torpedoes at the second ship at short range. However, she must have seen the tracks of the earlier torpedoes, and probably seen the torpedoes hit the irst ship, and turned hard at us. He had his helm over heading straight for us, and I had to go deep quickly to get underneath him before being rammed. In fact, he was very close. I didn't allow enough time, and he scraped the top of the periscope standards, snapping them clean off. I was, in fact, slightly confused during this attack. We had been told that there were two ships underway from Syria to France - repatriating French soldiers who had been left in Syria after we had occupied their country, and that these had a safe passage. At the very last moment, as this second ship was heading for me, I could see her lag which was dirty, and it was in the evening light, and for a moment I thought this was not an Italian ensign but a French lag, and I had a terrible moment of thinking that I had torpedoed the French under safe conduct. The combination of panic, horror and inexperience made me delay going deep for a few crucial seconds, which caused the ramming to occur. When we got onto the bridge that night we found an absolute mess, with wireless aerials and periscopes standards all over the place. Thereafter we had to go back to Alexandria without the periscopes. This simply meant we had to dive by day, stay deep, because we were unable to see anything at periscope depth. They were repaired in Alexandria fairly rapidly, but the attack periscope was never as good as new, and thereafter for the fairly short remaining time in the Mediterranean, before we went home to re it, the periscope leaked when one was using it. This was a nuisance rather than anything else, but it could be quite a nuisance when you were trying to concentrate on the job.
46
DAMAGED PERISCOPE STANDARDS BEING REMOVED
47 7 - ENCOUNTER WITH U109 17 NOVEMBER 1941
From the Secret Diary of a U-boat by Wolfgang Hirschfeld as told to Geoffrey Brookes
Just after midnight on 17 November U-boat Command acknowledged our request for an escort at the Ile de Croix at 0600 the next morning. Because a German anti-submarine group was operating between Biarritz and Lorient we had to sail a diversionary course which took us out into the Bay again in order to proceed to Lorient by Route Green, the approved U-boat approach alley to the port.
Already there was a relaxed atmosphere in the boat as we prepared for putting in. Jarschel had shared out the remaining provisions among the crew. 'It would be a shame to hand it in so that the Flotilla studs can get fat on it,' he explained. I merely shut my eyes to these goings-on.
At 2000 that evening, when Lt Keller and his three lookouts trooped up to the bridge, there was no more than a light swell. In the darkness we had nothing to fear from patrolling aircraft here in Biscay but Keller had not been up there very long before he cried out, 'Battle stations!'
I went cold. The Commander [Heinrich Bleichrodt] jumped up from his bunk and grabbed his leather jacket. 'That Keller must have inally lipped,' he said to me as he went off to the bridge. The whole boat was in uproar as the hands went to their duty stations.
I followed the Captain through into the Control Room where the Chief asked me what was up. 'I'm just going to see,' I told him from the ladder. I could hear every word above me.
'Let me ire, Captain,' Keller shouted. 'He's dead ahead!' 'No! I can't see anything yet,' Bleichrodt roared back. It was very black in the open and the Commander's eyes were still night-blind and had not yet become accustomed to the darkness. 'Captain, I can see him very clearly. Range 800 yards!' I heard Keller tell him. 'We must either shoot now or turn away.'
For a few moments it fell silent. Then Bleichrodt said, 'bear away to port. Full ahead both, zig-zag course!' Maureschat was at the attack computer in the tower; he had been there all the time, but I had only just noticed him. 'What's going on, Ede?' I asked.
48 'A big submarine ahead. It just surfaced. Keller says it's a Tommy.' 'Why don't we ire then?' . 'No idea. The Old Man won't do it. You heard that yourself.' 'Well that's a ine thing,' I murmured. 'You can say that again,' Maureschat answered.
U-I09 hammered through the calm black sea as if whipped by the Furies. The crew had remained at battle stations; in the control room I explained to the Chief what had happened. The men listened and then looked away in exasperation.
After a couple of hours the boat came round to the east on Route Green and we stood down from the alert. When the Captain came down into the control room he couldn't help noticing all the dark looks, sensing the simmering resentment and perhaps hearing some of the murmurings of discontent. After hanging up his reefer jacket he came to the radio room.
'What's the matter with them all?' Bleichrodt said. After some thought I replied, 'They're all moaning because you didn't sink that submarine. '
The Captain stroked his beard. 'The blockheads, what do they know about it?' Then with a smile he said, 'Give me the microphone and plug me through to all rooms.' I did this at once and he announced, 'this is the Commander. Listen men. There is a Standing Order for Commanders that we must not shoot at any submarine in this grid square because it might be an Italian. You will understand why I did not wish to take a gamble. That's all.' The loudspeakers clicked off. We hadn't thought of that, of course: the Italians had very large submarines and it was easy to confuse the outline of British and Italian boats in the darkness.
Footnote: This was probably the large British minelaying submarine HM S/M Rorqual (Lt Napier) which laid mines off La Rochelle on the morning of 19 November, 1941, the day following the sighting of a British submarine by Lt Keller Editor: U-109 was a Type IXB U-boat of the Kriegsmarine. She conducted nine war-patrols, sinking 12 ships and damaging one. All but one of these successes were during the six patrols she carried out under the command of the U-boat ace, Heinrich Bleichrodt. On 4 May 1943, she was sunk with all hands by a B-24 Liberator, operated by 86 Squadron RAF.
49 Was it Rorqual? View of LWN
'I have had much interest, entertainment and nostalgia out of attempting to reconstruct the alleged encounter of Rorqual with U109 on the night of 17 November 1941 and I thought you [Christopher Napier] might be amused to see how it turns out. It must have happened, I think, despite the dif iculties in making the facts it. It is quite surprising how much incident there was in what was supposed to be no more than illing in an odd week until Devonport Dockyard were ready to take us in hand.' See Chart below
50 8 - AN ACOUSTIC TORPEDO 6 OCTOBER 1942
LWN post war account
'We were on passage from Malta to Beirut proceeding, as usual, on the surface at night, which was overcast and very dark with no moon. I was in the Control Room when I was called to the bridge. The Of icer of the Watch told me a lashing light had been sighted and he had, quite correctly, turned stern on. Since lashing lights in the open sea were something very unusual, my mind hit on the idea that this could possibly be HMS Parthian, known to be at sea in the locality. It must be admitted that this was a very unlikely eventuality- she should have been a long way distant. However, I ordered the challenge for the night to be made by light. This was a 3 letter group, the reply to which was another 3 letter group. To add to the confusion the unknown vessel answered with the irst letter of the correct reply. At about this time a shadowy object appeared and almost immediately a single explosion occurred. My dim view was of a vessel bows on to us which I registered as a destroyer, or at least a destroyer type patrol vessel, and I thus automatically thought the explosion to be a depth charge. Nothing further happened until we arrived in Beirut. It was Ruck-Keene's [Captain SM1] practice when submarines returned from patrol to go on board to welcome them and then walk through the boat and exchange a few words with the ships company. On this occasion, as soon as he came on board, he said words to the effect, "we are very relieved to see you. We had an intercept from an Italian U-boat reporting having sunk an enemy submarine in just about the position we reckoned you would have been." I was sceptical, so sure was I that what I had seen was a surface ship but, when I went to the staff of ice to talk things over, all there seemed convinced I had encountered a U-boat. I remember that, in an attempt to convince the SOO [Staff Operations Of icer], I drew a picture of what I had seen in the night with a soft lead pencil. He said "Well I think what you have drawn could just as well be a U-boat (end on, of course) much closer than you thought instead of a destroyer further away. Of course it was in fact a U-boat, as the staff very well knew, and only my conviction led me to interpret the single explosion as a depth charge, never very likely really.
51 From The Fighting Tenth by John Wingate, former First Lieutenant of P44 (HMS United)
According to Lieutenant Ian Stoop, irst Rorqual's third hand, later her Number One, Rorqual led a charmed life. One dramatic incident that he cites occurred when she was leaving Malta one night and was challenged by an enemy submarine. Rorqual dived immediately, when an enormous explosion was heard astern. The Italian U-boat had ired an acoustic torpedo, and evidently reported that she had sunk Rorqual. Ian Stoop explains:
'When the Italians inally capitulated, Rorqual was in Malta and we were able to visit an Italian submarine: On her wardroom bulkhead was a plaque presented by Mussolini "for the sinking of HMS Rorqual"! We had the pleasure of showing her Captain the real Rorqual safely alongside in Lazaretto Creek.'
52 9 - 'FOUR TORPEDOES HAVE JUST PASSED UNDER ME' 12 DECEMBER 1942
From transcript of BBC interview
LWN: One incident took place when we were on the surface at night, in fact, going from Tunis where we had laid half our mines, up to Naples where we were to lay the other half. In the middle of the night I was in the Control Room. I heard the of icer of the watch say 'Port 30, Captain on the bridge.' So I rushed up and he said we've just been missed by a torpedo and, 'God' he said, 'there's another one.' And this great white streak went more or less straight under our feet. It came to be known from German records after the war that these torpedoes had been ired by a U-boat who had mistaken this bulky silhouette, which was of Rorqual, at quite short range, for an aircraft carrier at a much greater range. And although this may sound curious, this is quite an understandable mistake. He would then have set his torpedoes to run at a much greater depth, with the intention of hitting an aircraft carrier, than he would attacking a submarine, which was fortunate for us, because his torpedoes passed underneath us.
From Periscope View by George Simpson, Captain SM10 at Malta
'Shortly after this a German U-boat captain made a comparable mistake over a "sitting shot." The minelayer submarine Rorqual (Lieutenant-Commander L W Napier) was south-east of Sardinia, and I needed to reinforce to the south of Naples urgently. The worst feature of these otherwise excellent submarines was the size of the silhouette due to the high casing to store ifty mines. I told Napier of the urgency but left the rest to him. He could get to the position by dawn if he went full speed without zigzagging. It was a starlit but moonless night and he decided to risk it. The risk was certainly slight. About 0200 I got a signal from him. "Four torpedoes have just passed under me between forehatch and stern. Am proceeding." After the war it was found that a German U-boat on patrol heard Rorqual and then saw her through binoculars in the dim night glow. Seeing the long lat deck the captain passed the order to change the torpedo depth setting from 4 metres to 8 metres since the target was an aircraft carrier'
53 10 - THE LAST TIGERS FOR ROMMEL 18 JANUARY 1943
From transcript of BBC interview
Q: Let's discuss minelaying operations. I wonder if you could explain - perhaps take in one which might be familiar - one which is strong in your mind. Take us through what that would involve, brie ly. LWN: Well, the most striking minelaying operation which we did was from Malta in the last days of the German defence of Tunis. By that time the only port left in use to them was Tunis, and that itself was bombed, and so therefore any heavy material, like tanks, that they wanted to get in and ashore was dependent on such ships that could carry heavy loads and embark and disembark them themselves with their own derricks. So we were sent from Malta to go and do a lay of mines close inshore on the routes which the enemy supply ships were using to get into Tunis. We knew pretty well what these routes were because it was in such restricted waters that there wasn't very much opportunity to divert from them. Well, we were sailed one night from Malta, and there was unusually quite bad weather, so that although it would have been a run up from Malta to the Tunis neighbourhood quite easily done in one night, I didn't get there by dawn. So, I then withdrew from the area, spent the night off the island of Pantelleria to have a good ix for the next day, ran in under cover of darkness with the intention of laying the mines from dived during the next day. It's better always to lay the mines by day because you can get better ixes from the land features and be sure where you have put them. In this case we got alright into the position which I had selected for the lay. We laid I think two or three mines and the laying gear jammed. Well, there we were dived in daylight in very restricted and heavily patrolled waters, so there was nothing we could about it in daylight. So during the next night I withdrew to the neighbourhood of Zembra Island, a mountainous island which comes up very vertically at quite a considerable height out of the sea. There was plenty of water so I went very close inshore so that on a moonlight night, as it was, I wouldn't be likely to be seen up against the background of the island. We did not know if the island was occupied by the Germans. Well, then three people, the irst lieutenant, the engineer of icer, and the torpedo gunner's mate who was in charge of mines, went down into the casing. They found what the fault was, cleared it, and by good fortune were able to get back inside again without us having been observed. Although during the time that we were doing this a convoy of small ships had passed us on their way into Tunis. They didn't see us, and we weren't going to interfere with them in these circumstances. So the mines having been cleared we went back in the next day. Everything worked, I laid the mines, not in exactly the same position but close to where I'd originally intended, and then
54 we pulled out of the area as soon as we could, because it was not a pleasant place to be hanging about. We heard afterwards that this had had an exceptionally good success because a ship called Ankara, which was possibly the last merchant ship with heavy loading gear available to the enemy for getting heavy stores such as tanks ashore in North Africa, went on the mines and sank. So any success with mines depends on a bit of luck. This was an exceptionally successful operation of its kind.
From Periscope View By George Simpson, Captain SM10 at Malta
'It was now mid-January 1943 and the need continued to make every effort to attack the Palermo-Bizerta supply route which had cost us so dear in December. As I have explained I had grown to fear this narrow funnel of seaway, heavily mined except at its extremities and giving submarines no sea room for retirement, but the fact remained that the ghost ship Ankara was still ferrying Tiger tanks to the Panzer army with clockwork regularity, and since this Axis supply route could not yet be assaulted in force from the air, the submarine effort had to continue.
Rorqual (Lieutenant-Commander L. W. Napier) came to Malta to load up with mines and ‘have a go.’ Napier had been a midshipman in Nelson when I served there in 1930-1 and subsequently my ef icient navigator in L27 at Aden. He was a widely read man with a full appreciation of the humanities. He found in 1935 that he disliked the naval life in general and submarines in particular so much that he came to me asking that I should forward his resignation. Using every argument I persuaded him to accept the life in view of the country's plight, for surely he was needed in this work which he carried out so well. He was a sub- lieutenant then and perhaps my assurance of his ability and value carried weight, for he agreed to forget his personal inclination for my call to service.
I had seen Napier brie ly eight weeks earlier when he came to join for the Torch operation, and to lay mines off Cagliari. He had seemed gay and con ident, but I had on that occasion told him to dash to Naples without zigzagging and he had watched four torpedoes pass under him that night. I wondered what he thought of my judgment now.
Having loaded mines on 15 January, he came to see me and I showed him the chart and the problem and suggested that he lay ifty mines about ifteen miles north-east of Bizerta, in sight of the Cani Rocks so as to get an accurate ix and place them with precision across the centre of the swept channel in almost daily use by Axis convoys. ‘What I particularly dislike,’ I added, ‘is that I am asking you to do this right away at a time of full moon which means you will have great dif iculty in charging your batteries without detection, but you will have to surface somewhere near enemy territory to do this.’
Napier had a good look at the chart and the enemy mine ields which were supposed to be accurate and then said, "full moon will suit me admirably and battery charging won't worry me at all. Enemy patrols won't expect anything to come through on the surface at full moon, so I will do the whole run in on the surface with accurate navigation and then dive at right angles through this south-western end of the enemy mine ield and lay my mines right across the channel and surface and get out of it to the west. Actually, sir, it suits me very well, it
55 seems to me a good idea."
If con idence was the arbiter of fate then he was all right I thought, but I had lost P48 just there on Christmas Day. Rorqual sailed and apparently everything went forward on the night of 17-18 January as Napier had con idently predicted. The following afternoon an Axis convoy was approaching the southern end of their swept channel when it ran into Rorqual's mine ield and at 1422 Ankara struck a mine and sank, together with her load of Tiger tanks.
At last the ghost was laid. Nor apparently was that all, since it is stated in the of icial history of submarine operations that on the 31 January the corvette Procellaria and, on 3 February the destroyer Saelte, 1200 tons, were both sunk by the same line of mines.
Rorqual inished the patrol on the north Sicilian coast and, having failed to torpedo two distant targets, a bridge was bombarded and shore batteries responded with such effect that as Rorqual dived the top of one periscope was shot off.
I was unable to congratulate Napier on Rorqual's return to Malta in early February for I had left, but he survived the war with a distinguished record.'
From Sea Wolves, The Extraordinary Story Of Britain's World War2 Submarines by Tim Clayton, Naval Historian
'The short Palermo-Tunis route was exceptionally dangerous, constantly patrolled and protected by new mine ields. [Captain SM10] Simpson found himself drained by 'the gnawing anxiety every hour of every day and night over how my men were standing up to the strain of operating within a narrow channel with barely sea room to manoeuvre, ceaseless enemy patrols overhead and convoys to attack which contained invariably twice the escorts than there were targets'. On 25 November the charming Basher Coombe was killed when the veteran Utmost was sunk by Groppo. On 12 December Alexander 'Black' Mackenzie's P222 was sunk by Fortunale and on Christmas Day near Zembra Island Jack Howard's P48 was sunk while attacking a Tunis-bound convoy by Ardente and Ardito.
The best intelligence did not always produce results. One ship in particular, the German Ankara led a charmed life. Ankara became the only merchant ship capable of embarking the huge Tiger tanks that were Rommel's most potent weapon in the later stages of the desert war. She was missed for the irst time by Tony Collett in February 1941. In August she was one of the missed targets that caused Simpson to sack Joe Cowell from Thrasher. In December Unbeaten was lying in ambush for her thanks to information from Ultra, but the aircraft that gave him his excuse to attack caused the Italians to change the convoy's route. In July 1942 Tubby Linton missed her. In August Hugh Mackenzie was about to ire when an escort forced him deep.
Ankara now began to make regular runs with tanks for Rommel and became a prime target. In December she was one of several ships missed by Michael Faber in P48. By now she was known as the 'ghost ship'. On 18 December Simpson directed Ian McGeoch into her path. She was escorted by four aircraft and two destroyers. When he ired six torpedoes McGeoch had the merchant and a destroyer in a continuous line and was quite certain that he had hit both.
56 He sank the Aviere but Ankara saw his torpedoes and avoided them, capping this by avoiding Mike Lumby's shortly afterwards.
Finally, warned by Ultra that she was approaching Cani Rocks, Simpson sent Lennox Napier in Rorqual to lay mines in her path. Next day Ankara hit one and inally sank, together with her load of tanks."
From Ultra Goes To War -The Secret Story by Ronald Lewin
'It was on 19 December 1941 that Ultra entered the Crusader story in the most striking and, as it turned out, unfortunate fashion. The Axis convoy No 52, carrying tank replacements [for Rommel] had been crossing the Mediterranean - two of its ships, with forty ive tanks, were sunk on 13 December. As it approached the North African coast the convoy split, its main body making for Tripoli where on 19 December Monginevro landed twenty three tanks. On the same day, however, the breakaway part of the convoy - the 4700 ton Ankara - reached Benghazi, successfully landing its cargo of twenty two tanks which were off loaded with great expedition (for the 8th Army was drawing near) and handed over within a few days to 15 Panzer Division of the Afrika Corps. [This important reinforcement lead to a heavy defeat for 22 Armoured Brigade in a surprise attack by Rommel, and due course the 8th Army being expelled from the Cyrenaican bulge, falling back to the Gazala line west of Tobruk].
Ankara was a ship evidentially blessed at her launching. Built in Hamburg for the German Levant line, fast and well-equipped, with holds particularly suited for the transport of tanks, Ankara bore a charmed life during which her name cropped up constantly in Ultra messages as she sped back and forth across the Mediterranean. 'The Captain got quite a swollen head about his luck and would harangue the dock workers in Naples and Tripoli'. So, Sir David Hunt, who as intelligence staff of icer [to the 8th Army] was haunted by this phantom, as were his colleagues and everyone in the Navy and RAF who was concerned with cutting Rommel's supply lines. Constantly hunted, Ankara nevertheless survived until the end of 1942 when, in spite of so many evasions, she succumbed at last to a mine laid by the submarine Rorqual.'
57 11 - 'HITLER WENT RED IN THE FACE' 7 JULY 1943
LWN post war account
In July, 1943, Rorqual was in the north west Aegean and had just inished laying mines in the approaches to Thessaloniki when a signal [based on ULTRA intelligence] was received from base at Beirut ordering us to remain within 24 hours steaming of the Dardanelles until further orders.
Twenty-four hours steaming for the submarines of those days in those waters in summer would have been no more than 150 miles. This may not sound much but it must be remembered that it was very risky to be on the surface in daylight, owing to the proximity of enemy air ields and, even when surfaced after dark, speed was usually reduced for a time by the necessity to devote one engine to re-charging the battery. Even so 150 miles from the Dardanelles covers most of the north Aegean.
There was nothing to tell us what to expect but it was clear that a target of some importance was likely to emerge from the Bosphorus shortly. It was also clear that I should not risk giving the game away by being sighted close to the Dardanelles too soon. So I took up a waiting position some 100 miles to the west.
While in this position we sighted a quite large three-masted schooner, an unusual vessel, considerably larger than the average Greek caique, stopped and accompanied by at least two small power boats. To this day, I have no idea what they might have been doing. It would have been an easy target for the gun but I decided that there were bigger things in the wind and that we should not reveal ourselves yet.
Sure enough, after surfacing that night, we got a signal from base telling us to be off the Dardanelles by irst light on the next day but one. There was, therefore, some time to be illed in and I decided that we would be best employed by moving up and using the day before the expected encounter for a reconnaissance of the area.
So daylight on the next morning found us dived just east of the island of Lemnos, some 25 miles from the Dardanelles, and this proved interesting. Soon after breakfast, three patrol vessels emerged from Mudros, Lemnos, a British base in the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. They formed in line abreast, widely spread and headed east. I went deep and they passed over us without making any contact. I hung around in the same general area all day and, as dusk was falling, they returned in the same formation to Mudros.
58 It looked as though an anti-submarine sweep had been carried out in preparation for the next day. Some thing was indeed afoot. I now chose a spot which I would hope to occupy by irst light the next morning, while still trying to make sure that I should not be picked before I got there. And it must be supposed that the three patrol vessels might well make a night search through the same area. I therefore closed to the Turkish coast. There were two possible advantages in this tactic. One that, Turkey being neutral, her territorial waters could be used as fairly safe haven; secondly, for the same reason, all navigational lights were showing, so an accurate start could be made for the following day.
All went according to plan and so at about 0400 I left my lurking place and proceeded without event to my chosen spot, dived shortly before daylight and went deep. This was standard practice since twilight was an awkward time for the submarine. On the surface one was increasingly vulnerable yet it would still be too dark to see much through the periscope.
We would then all have had breakfast and waited for full daylight while listening, of course, for screw noises. So, then, when visibility should be right, back to periscope depth to see what may be going on, and there was in fact not long to wait before two Italian destroyers came in sight, heading east. They were not close to us and there was no need to do anything but watch them until they disappeared over the eastern horizon, obvious precursors of something to come. The next thing to appear in the same direction towards which the destroyers had departed was an aircraft, sweeping to and fro ahead of what now must surely be the approaching target.
And indeed it was. What at irst seemed an armada of masts gradually resolved itself into one sizeable vessel, escorted by the two destroyers and three patrol vessels, probably yesterday's search group. One destroyer was disposed on each bow of the target with one patrol vessel right ahead and one on each beam of the target. As well there were two fast patrol boats, weaving at high speed between the other escorts; all in all astonishing protection for a single ship, now seen to be a tanker. The sun is shining, the sea just rippled by a light breeze and the full extent of the problem can now be estimated.
So far nobody but myself has seen all this, though I have passed some information to those in the Control Room, so I invited the First Lieutenant to take a quick look; an independent witness might come in handy. At the same time I passed through the ship a brief description of what was going on.
At this stage it should be noted that in this particular locality there is an unusual conjunction of circumstances. This is the fact that, because of the great Russian rivers which pour into the Black Sea and out through the Straits, there is a considerable expanse of sea where a layer of fresh water lies on of the salt water with which it has not yet mixed. The result of this is that the submarine must be trimmed in water of one density, in order to use the periscope, but must be made heavier in order to break through the density barrier and to be in trim at only slightly greater depth. This is quite important in what follows.
As the convoy approached, I could see that I was quite well placed for a shot. I was about the right distance off the target track, on the tanker's starboard bow and easily able to turn on to a iring course without using speed. The problem was the escorts. While the tanker seemed to be holding a steady course and speed, the escorts were weaving to and fro across the general line of advance. The patrol vessel right ahead of the target did not
59 worry me, since I felt I was outside the limit of their weave to starboard; more worrying was the patrol vessel on the tanker's starboard beam who was likely weave out close to my desired iring position.
In fact, he did just that. As the target was coming close to the bearing on which I must ire he turned straight towards me at very short range. Of course, he might have seen the periscope though, with hindsight he certainly had not. At this point I had not much choice but I judged I could a go little deeper, for the safety of my periscope standards, then come up to periscope depth astern of him and get off my salvo, perhaps with a slightly wider track angle.
So I ordered 50 feet depth and told the A/S of ice to stand by to ire by hydrophone bearing if necessary. As regards the depth change, absolutely nothing happened; we were undoubtedly sitting exactly on the top of the salt water layer. There was no point in hanging about, it was now or never for a shot. So up periscope, to ind myself frighteningly close to the patrol vessel, almost under the counter of her overhanging stern, where a sailor was standing. One does not often see people during a submarine attack and his presence, so seemingly close, was almost eerie. However, he was looking away and I was falling astern of the escort so the danger was, for the moment, past.
I had intended to ire all six tubes at a target so evidently important, spread over one and a half ship's lengths, aiming the irst just ahead of the target but, as a result of the proximity of the patrol vessel, the moment for that had been lost. So I cut the salvo to four torpedoes, aiming the irst at the tanker's bow and told the tube space to ire the remaining three by the previously calculated time interval.
As soon as the last torpedo was gone, I turned away from the convoy track and went deep, this time using full speed and looding Q tank, an emergency tank for quick depth changing, in order to get through the density layer which should now prove an effective concealment from asdic or hydrophone detection. At this point the Asdic Of ice reported two hits and the depth charging started. There were, as I recollect some 20 charges dropped, none very close. Once we were clear of the torpedo tracks, I doubt if they ever had any idea where we were.
After about 45 minutes without further enemy activity, I returned to periscope depth to see what, if anything, was going on. In the direction of the iring position, one patrol vessel lay stopped and a cloud of slowly dissipating black smoke hung over the area. There could be little doubt but that the target had been destroyed and this was con irmed on return to harbour.
The importance of this ship, the German Wilhelmsburg (7020 GRT), lay in the fact that, although the Germans were still exploiting the Romanian oil ields, it had become very dif icult to transport the oil to places where it was needed. Little could be moved by land because of the demands on rail traf ic for the Eastern Front and this ship was one of their last remaining tankers of any size which could carry it from the Black Sea ports to Greece or Italy.
There is an epilogue to this story. Long after the event, Admiral Doenitz recorded in his Memoirs that he was in conference with Hitler when a signal came in reporting the loss of this ship. The Fuhrer rounded on the Admiral, berating him for the uselessness of the German Navy and comparing them unfavourably with the Royal Navy. Doenitz replied that
60 it was all very easy for the British, who had ample resources, to protect their convoys. Hitler went red in the face but said nothing. Perhaps it was just as well for Doenitz that Hitler did not probe his answer further; the escort given for this one ship was more than we could have provided for a large Atlantic convoy during much of the war.
I have since regarded having made Hitler go red in the face as one of the more satisfying achievements in life.
From The Memoirs Of Karl Doenitz
Being Blunt with Hitler
'Thereafter I was always frank with him [Hitler], and I never concealed from him any of the mistakes made by the Navy, or any of our plans that ended in failure. I did not hesitate for instance to tell him in blunt terms of my anxieties with regard to the U-boat war: and when in May 1943 it collapsed, Hitler uttered no word of reproach.
I am going to describe one occasion when I crossed swords with Hitler because I believe that it had a considerable bearing on subsequent events. During a conference he received news that a large tanker, bound from the Black Sea for occupied Greece, had been intercepted and torpedoed by a British submarine, near the Dardanelles. "There you are!" he exclaimed angrily "The British, of course, can do it, but our boats off Gibraltar don't sink a thing!"
I was standing beside him in front of a map, and in the middle of the circle of about twenty people, among whom were senior of icers of the armed forces. "My Fuehrer" I retorted sharply "our U-boats are ighting against very great sea Powers. If, like the British off the Dardanelles, they had no anti-submarine forces to contend with, they would achieve equal success. Off Gibraltar I have stationed the most outstanding of my U-boat commanders and they, let me tell you, are a great deal better than the British!"
There was dead silence. Hitler went red in the face, but after a few moments he turned to General Jodl, who had been in the middle of submitting a report, and said quietly "carry on, please."'
61 12 – CARRYING GUNS TO SAVE LEROS 20-27 OCTOBER 1943
From transcript of BBC interview
LWN: One of the most unusual operations which we had to carry out was for the supply of the island of Leros in the Aegean. The task had to be carried out with the utmost urgency and imposed an intense strain on of icers and men. Indeed I found it the most trying of all our patrols. This arose because when the Italians surrendered there was a plan for our forces to occupy several of the islands in the Aegean. The success of this depended on the co-operation of Italian forces in the islands. This co-operation didn't occur, and in two of the islands our land forces became stranded out of range of our aircraft in an area we could not supply using surface transport, or even warships. One of these was the island of Leros. I was given the task of taking into Leros a battery of 40 millemetre Oerlikon guns on mobile mountings, and a Jeep to tow them. We did this by taking off the whole upper deck covers so that these guns, with their barrels removed, could be itted sideways into the mine casing. The Jeep, with its engine and gearbox taken out, was secured on the upper deck, and we had a large quantity of ammunition on board, making a false deck of ammunition boxes right through the submarine. Also aviation spirit.
RORQUAL LOADED WITH OERLIKON BATTERY
62 We loaded against time. While we were on our way to Leros, loaded with all the guns, ammunition, vehicles, food and petrol we could carry, we were attacked by three dive bombers. We dived at once and, although the bombs fell close enough to give us a thorough shake up, they did us no damage. Well, we got to Leros alright and got alongside with the help of an Italian tug. Due to air raids by day we had to unload during the hours of darkness. There was only one jetty, and one electric crane which made tremendous sparks which were not conducive to secrecy or to the peace of mind of those engaged in unloading petrol. We unloaded against time in order to get away by daylight, when the next German air raid was sure to come. We inished unloading just as the moon was rising but then found that we were hard and fast aground. The tug was needed again to get us off, but had been abandoned by the Greek crew when they heard an air raid warning during the night and had taken refuge in the shelters ashore. Eventually we rounded up the crew and inally the tug got us off at irst light. The entire ships company was worked to a standstill, and this meant that we had to put to sea in waters where the enemy might be encountered a cable or so outside the boom with lookouts and of icer of the watch who were all but falling asleep on their feet. Moreover, after unloading all that cargo our trim was of course largely incalculable, which would make the submarine very dif icult to control if we had to dive in a hurry. However all went well and our luck held. Just as we passed out through the boom the irst lares from enemy aircraft about to attack the harbour fell astern. We dived, found that our trim was not so bad after all, and got safely away. Years later I met the commander of the Royal Artillery units in the island who received the guns we landed and, by being able to conceal them until they were operational gave, so he said, the Germans pilots a very severe surprise when they next came in with a low level stra ing attack, as they had come to expect a total lack of opposition.
63 APPENDIX A - NAVAL CAREER OF LENNOX WILLIAM NAPIER
1926 January BRNC Dartmouth as Cadet, Hawke Term 1929 August Battleship NELSON as Cadet 1930 January Promoted to Midshipman 1932 September Promoted Sub Lieutenant 1932 September RN College Greenwich and Technical Courses 1934 DOLPHIN for Submarine Officers Training Course 1934 Submarine PORPOISE based at Portsmouth 1935 June Promoted Lieutenant 1935 June Submarine OBERON based at Devonport 1935 August Submarine L27 in Aden as Third Hand 1936 Submarine L23 as First Lieutenant 1936 September Freiburg University for Interpreter's Course 1937 Depot Ship MEDWAY on China Station 1938 February Submarine OLYMPUS as First Lieutenant, Hong Kong 1940 May Submarine Commanding Officers Qualifying Course 1940 July Submarine H34 in command 1941 January 6th Flotilla at Blythe as Spare Commanding Officer 1941 May Depot Ship MEDWAY at Alexandria 1941 June Submarine RORQUAL in command, Alexandria 1942 January Submarine TIGRIS in command, Plymouth 1942 March Submarine RORQUAL in command, Mediterranean 1942 June Promoted Lieutenant-Commander 1944 February COs Qualifying Course in command ("Teacher") 1944 June Promoted Commander
64 1945 January DOLPHIN on staff of Flag Officer Submarines 1945 June RN College Greenwich for Staff Course 1946 June Staff of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Melbourne, Australia 1947 April Staff of Commander-in-Chief Far East, Singapore 1948 Tactical School for Senior Officers Air Course 1949 Aircraft Carrier VENGEANCE as Executive Officer 1952 RN Barracks Devonport as Drafting Commander 1954 Promoted Captain 1954 7th Submarine Squadron at Rothesay, in command 1955 MOD as Deputy Direct of Plans, Joint Planning 1958 Imperial Defence College, London 1959 5th /1st Submarine Squadron, DOLPHIN, in command 1959 Deputy Flag Officer Submarines 1962 January Retired
65 APPENDIX B -MINEFIELDS LAID BY RORQUAL UNDER LWN COMMAND
26 August 1941 Cape Skinari, Zante Island, Ionian Sea 50 mines 8 October 1941 St Georges Island, approaches to Gulf of Athens 50 mines 19 October 1941 Cape Ferrato, South East Sardinia, Tyrrenhian Sea 50 mines 19 November 1941 La Rochelle, Bay of Biscay 50 mines 30 August 1941 Paxos and Anti-Paxos, Ionian Sea 15 mines 8 December 1942 Cani Rocks, approaches to Bizerta 36 mines 17 December 1942 Ischia Island, Gulf of Gaeta 14 mines 18 January 1943 Cani Rocks, approaches to Bizerta 50 mines 24-25 February 1943 Marettino Island, approaches to Trapani, Sicily 50 mines 22-23 March 1943 Approaches to Trapani, Sicily 50 mines 22 April 1943 Marettino Island, approaches to Trapani, Sicily 50 mines 30 April 1943 Favignama Island, approaches to Trapani, Sicily 50 mines 12 May 1943 Cape Stilo, approaches to Calabria, Sardinia 50 mines 2-3 July 1943 Kassandra Point, and Skiathos Island, Aegean Sea 50 mines 5 August 1943 Smila Point, Gulf of Salonika, Aegean Sea 29 mines 6 August 1943 Lemnos Island, Aegean Sea 21 mines 9/10 September 1943 Skiathos Island, Aegean Sea 30 mines 12 September 1943 Lemnos Island, Aegean Sea 20mines Total mines 715 Total mine ields 16
Editor: In British and Allied Submarine Operations in World War II (Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet) Volume 1, it is stated on page 367 that 800 mines were laid in 16 ields, but totalling the number of mines laid in each operation comes to a igure of 715 mines; and this igures matches the total shown on a handwritten document in the possession of LWN at his death and which was either prepared or agreed by LWN.
66 APPENDIX C - DESCRIPTION OF A SUBMARINE ATTACK
From transcript of BBC interview
LWN: The actual conduct of any particular attack, of course, depends tremendously on the circumstances. In daylight, in the Mediterranean, with good chance that there would be a fairly calm sea and good visibility, probably the irst notice you would have that there was some kind of target appearing would be seeing masts appearing over the horizon, quite possibly accompanied by an aircraft. When this happens we would normally go to diving stations, or what you might call action stations in a surface ship. Everybody would be closed up at their stations, and as soon as we can see that this is a likely target and is coming in our direction, the irst thing to do is to try and establish what the target is doing, that's to say what course is he steering, at what speed, whether zig-zagging, and how important a target this is in terms of how many torpedoes that you may be going to ire. Well, from that point onwards you have to keep a continuous plot on what the enemy is doing, so that you can accommodate your own movements to get into a good iring position. You start the whole thing off by making some kind of estimate of size of the ship. Only when you know this can you get a range with the kind of range inders available in the periscopes of those days. You've got to estimate the height of, perhaps, the funnel of that class of ship and use that as a basis for measuring the angle which that subtends, and so the range. So you try to get a range and also you make an estimate of the course. The estimate of the course was always made by estimating what was called the angle on the bow, that's the angle between the course which the target is steering and your line of sight to the target. And then you start a plot. You have one of the of icers working a plot in the centre of the control room, with another of icer working the rather primitive kind of computer of those days, which would give you the iring angles. Also, all around you there are the First Lieutenant who is keeping the trim, two plane operators who are working the hydroplanes, the helmsmen, somebody keeping a log of events, and somebody reading off the periscope bearings for the plot when you tell him that you are on the target, which you can't see yourself as you are looking through the periscope. So, to begin with, things probably are happening fairly slowly. We are trying to get a good idea of what the target is up to, and in most cases it's probably a merchant ship not going very fast, and you have quite a lot of time to think, in these circumstances of good visibility, of what is going to happen between the time of sighting and the time that the target gets in iring range. You bring your torpedo tubes to the ready, decide how many torpedoes you require to have a good probability of a hit, and whether this is a worthwhile expenditure of torpedoes against such a target. Well, as things get closer you get better ranges and better estimates of course and speed. Of course, the target may be zig-zagging, so every now and then it may be he alters course and
67 you have to reset all your plot and your instruments. Also, as the target gets closer, you have to consider if the target is escorted and, if so, what is the position of the escort relative to the target, and what they are doing, and what steps you have got to take to avoid them and get yourself into a position where you can get a shot without the escorts interfering Well, the moment comes when you get into this position, we hope, and then you have by this time warned the torpedo space that you are going to do one of two things. You may either ire the irst torpedo and order a iring interval to the torpedo compartment for them to ire the rest of the torpedoes - how many you've ordered at a timed interval - or you may, if you think it's safe, order individual tubes to be ired at individual points of aim on the target. When you have ired, certainly if there is any escort around, your irst consideration is to get away from the iring position because the torpedoes will have left a track and the irst thing that any escort in the vicinity will do will be to come down the tracks and put down his irst depth-charge attack on the point where the torpedoes were ired. The torpedoes and the control arrangements which we had in those days were fairly primitive. In almost all cases we sought to get into a position where we could ire a direct straight shot with the torpedo, with a rather simple kind of computer which could calculate the amount of angular aim off which we needed to hit a ship in those conditions. It was possible to angle the torpedoes ninety degrees, but this was awkward to use in practice. I never used it myself and I doubt if very many others did. It made the inal closing stages of the attack more complicated, and wasn't in general thought of as very reliable. This was different to, particularly, the American set up where they had a far more elaborate computer and a torpedo which could be directed in a more sophisticated way than was possible for us.
Q: What was the actual atmosphere like during an attack? Did you feel any sense of nerves? LWN: Well, when the target irst appears you don't know what is going to happen and, speaking for myself, there is a certain feeling of apprehension because you don't know what is coming. Quite soon you are too busy to worry about those things. The captain is too busy. Other people who have, perhaps, not very much to do except sit around the control room waiting to do what they are told, or just getting on with the business of operating the hydroplanes, may have quite a different attitude to this. They can't see what is happening. They are not busy in the same way as the captain and some of the other ire control of icers are occupied. I have never been in this position myself, but I would think there must inevitably be a great deal of tension and anxiety in their minds. All they know is that they are going into some possibly dangerous situation of which they know very little. One does, of course, try to tell them over the loudspeakers what is happening, but you can't do very much of this.
Q: But in the control room, you must have worked very intuitively? LWN Everybody has something to do. There's a relay of information going round between the captain and what we called the fruit machine operator - he's working this rather old fashioned computer - the plot of icer, the helmsman, and the man working the telegraph orders to the motors. These are the people you are in constant touch with. There are others who are really not doing very much, and even the people I have mentioned are standing about for a great deal of the time.
68 Q: And is it an atmosphere of concentration, of focus? LWN I am busy all the time, either observing or thinking or listening to what somebody else has got to tell me, or deciding what action I ought to be taking. Once you're into it, it is a very absorbing thing. You know you've got to get it right, and you've got to be all the time estimating the situation which is out there, and comparing it with the knowledge that you have, or appear to have, available to you.
69 APPENDIX D - LETTERS TO CHRISTIAN LAMB
Christian Lamb (née Oldham) describes in her book, I Only Joined for the Hat, her wartime experiences as a Wren Plotter and Third Of icer WRNS. In this she tells how in early 1942, when Rorqual was in re it in Devonport, there were many Saturday nights when she was invited to drinks aboard Rorqual, along with Wrens Eve Lindsay and Ruby Cortez, before going on with Lennox and others to Genonis, an Italian restaurant near Drakes Circus or to the Moreland Links Hotel near Yelverton where they ‘danced the night away’. Ruby Cortez is described as a ‘ball of ire’ who had been at one time secretary to the ilm magnate Alexander Korda. Eve and Christian were good friends. Christian transferred to Belfast, where she met and later married Lieutenant John Lamb DSC who was serving in the destroyer Oribi. In February 1944, after return of Rorqual from the Mediterranean, Eve and Lennox were married.
70 Letter 1 - From Plymouth, about July 1942
HMS Rorqual c/o GPO London [Late July 1942] My dear Christian
This is to wish you farewell - Empire or otherwise according to taste. "Ave atqe vale"1 as we say in our usual affected manner. (This has got in because I have been reading Tacitus - about that dear Caligula, such a nice man). You might hardly credit it but I went off yesterday evening, being Saturday, to a certain well known hotel with Steve, Eve, Ruby and others: this time was really the last though. It gives me particular pleasure to be able to announce that, on returning, Ruby in person was soundly censured by one of her angry messmates for making too much noise. Don't imagine however that we have been enjoying the leshpots ever since you left. We have been places meanwhile. One place we went was both unintentional and dramatic. We were steaming through a certain Narrows and Rocky Place with a local Pilot in charge. While passing the lighthouse so close that the lighthouse keeper not only could, but did, spit on to the upper deck, we suddenly began to go sharply uphill and inally came to rest with a grinding crunch. At this point the pilot, with the famous last words 'Oh xxxx it' in his lips passed clean away into the arms of the Sublieutenant, who, taken by surprise, fell backwards into the arms of the Signalman, thus most successfully, but unsportingly, leaving me with the onus of extricating the whole organisation from a predicament for which he was entirely responsible. This we managed. But the Pilot's bowler hat, which fell over the side in the general turmoil, was last seen being worn by a porpoise, disporting itself round the ship's bows. At least so a Leading Stoker declared, though the man in question is notoriously unreliable. The beast he said had exceptionally beautiful eyelashes. This morning I was paid a visit by the Old Guard, who were shown round the boat, so choc-a-bloc with boxes and stores, trunks, potatoes, and pistons that after an extended obstacle race, with all participants glowing freely at the end of it, I do not really think they had seen anything at all. Ruby said afterwards that she now understood why people found service in submarines so absorbing. So Heaven knows what idea she has got in her head or is now going to spread about in an unsuspecting world.
1 The last words, "Hail and Farewell" (in Latin, ave atque vale), are among Catullus' most famous; an alternative modern translation might be "I salute you...and goodbye".
71 I take it by this time, your two Commanders, if not the RAF, will have been set well on the road to being brought to heel. I cannot help hoping that they are that type of Commander you have been used to dealing with in these parts. This kind - if you catch my meaning. A man is practising the banjujele in the next room of this hotel. This is too much - I can't go on. Love Lennox
Letter 2 - From Beirut, 22 September 1942 (Re-sent April 1943)
HMS Rorqual 22 September [1942] My dear Christian We are now installed in our new home - and very nice it is, I must say. We live in a large and commodious house, once the property of Russian hermits. I must confess I had always imagined hermits to be austere, ascetic gentlemen, living in caves in the mountains. But not at all. Asceticism is strikingly absent from the home and the lesh is only seriously morti ied by the marked inadequacy of the bathing arrangements - a state of affairs which I strongly suspect did not mortify the Russians in the least. One other cross, indeed, we do have to bear and that is the immediate proximity of a large contingent of the so-called Fighting French. There appears to be only one all-important aspect of French Military Training and that is bugling. At 0500 it starts with one instructor playing ♪ then every recruit plays ♪, some a little sharp and some a little lat. Then the instructor plays ♫ and the recruits follow suit. All day long, with no pause , they stick at it, until about 1900 they have reached � � � � after which , thank God, they stop. And so to work again at 0500 the next morning. But what, after all, does that matter when we are living in a lovely country, where rationing is unheard of (by us), where I am supplied with a motor car and chauffeur at the public expense and where, in between patrols, I am sent to cool off 3000 feet up in the mountains. French is the language of our daily intercourse. This comes a tri le hard anyway after long years of disuse but what really upsets me is that I am informed, not only by one person or by two, but by all whom I meet, that I speak the language in the most perfect German accent. However since no one here has heard more than vague rumours of there being some kind of war, or at least some marked divergence of opinion, between the powers in the great world outside, this does not really matter. Truly the people, at least the village people, round about are almost embarrassingly friendly. As one goes for ones Saturday afternoon walk in the hills one is pressed on every side - to go into this cottage for a cup of coffee or to accept a great bunch of grapes from the vine growing over the door of that one. In short we live in a kind of Arcadia with Bugling. What, of course, makes it even for Arcadian for me at the moment is that on the second day in harbour my entire wardrobe was removed by an enterprising Burglar while the laundryman was engaged in enjoying his siesta. The simplicity of attire compelled by this disaster should perhaps be called Spartan
72 rather than Arcadian, and in any case is not altogether unsuited to the climate. (Pay no attention to these pictures I put in. They are only to keep up morale which is liable to become reduced to a particularly low level by the rigours of letter writing.) Naturally in this Eden there are nymphs and shepherdesses and what have you. The best we can do in this line at present is a small female cypher staff who live in our mess. This, I must tell you at once, does not really add all it might to the above idyllic scene, chie ly on account of the presence among them of the local General's wife - a charming lady no doubt but one whose continual presence in the wardroom ills me with the utmost alarm and despondency. Particularly is this so since there is no way of getting from my cabin to the bathroom except by going through the mess. The disadvantages of this layout are apparent, and as I scurry past furtively, on my way to my evening scrub, loofah in hand, and all too inadequately clad for communing with Generals’ wives, I get the iciest stare from the good lady who has a most unhappy predilection for a seat immediately outside my door. I am afraid that you may hardly believe me when I tell you that we have now, really, acquired a violin for our wardroom. (A present from a gentleman who could not take all his baggage home, which he insisted in pressing upon my Engineer Of icer in spite of the most vehement protestations that he had no use for the instrument.) The Bluebells of Scotland has so far been practised only (and that pizzicato owing to restrictions of space which make bowing dif icult) and it has been decided that actual performances of this classic are to be reserved for the occasions of one of our operational successes, when it will be rendered by myself, as a kind of paean on the ancient Greek model. As a matter of fact we have had a slight opening success but, by the time the depth charges had ceased pattering about our ears, it must be confessed that the Bluebells had come to be somehow overlooked. Next time, however, there shall be no mistake. I know you are in fact keeping my morale up as promised, and that it is simply ill fortune that all your letters get sunk or shot down en route (as a matter of fact, as I have not had a single letter since we left home, I am not really complaining at all). Wishing you, in conclusion, a Merry Michaelmas and a Happy Lord Mayor's Day Lots of love, Lennox P.S. After setting out on its travels about Sept 22nd this letter has circumnavigated Africa and reached me again circa April 15th in an envelope somewhat embarrassingly addressed - "Lennox" HMS Rorqual. As I am however incurably lazy I have no compunction whatever in sending it off once more in its way, thus relieving me of the necessity of thinking of anything new to say. Besides it still appears to me a ine piece of English Prose and you might as well know what we were up to in September. Suf ice to it say we are in no Arcadia now Love Lennox HMS Rorqual 17 April 1942
73 Letter 3 - From Malta, 10 February 1943
HMS Rorqual 10th February 1943 My dear Christian How nice to hear from you after all these months. I have just got a letter from you - dated 14th Sept! - nevertheless this leads me to hope there may be others, spread around in Space-Time, which will be rolling in slowly, but steadily, long after the outbreak of Peace. I wonder if my letters to you, of which I must ask you to believe there have been several, are also arriving after a similar interval, or at all, for they have all been addressed to Edinburgh where I suppose you have not been at all. Never mind, it is the Kind Thought which is really important, they say. We have long since left that Garden of Eden in which we started our career abroad and are now in a very sorry, though slowly improving, quarters. Such tri ling things as the rain coming through the roof and a total lack of hot water are such everyday matters that they are no longer noticed. I have however been provided with a new cabin. Into this, by a most ingenious arrangement, is blown a continuous shower of soot through an inaccessible ventilator which take its supply from a neighbouring chimney - life in fact is exactly like a continuous residence in a Railway Station in which there is only corned beef and dry bread in the Buffet and the conveniences are out of order. The austerity of our daily fare was well summed up the other day by a sailor whom I happened to overhear as he inished the tinned plums which had formed part of his lunch and, by means of the stones, endeavoured to ascertain what he was going to get for supper. As he pushed each stone to the side of his plate he was reciting "Corned Beef, Pressed Beef, Tinned Beef, Beef”. You might suppose that I am having a moan and that Morale is Bad. On the contrary it is very good. (Touching Wood) the war has not been going too badly lately - indeed you may even have seen some highly garbled accounts of our doings in the Press. Yesterday I had to do a lecture on Submarine Warfare to a large party of soldiers. On arriving on the platform the local military chieftain introduced me as Lieut-Colonel Napier which completely unnerved me and left the whole audience tittering. Later I told a grossly exaggerated funny story of one of our one-time soldier passengers, only to discover too late that he was MO of the regiment and actually in the audience. He now keeps coming to our Mess and asking for me - Oh dear! There is precious little room on these damn things, these bits of paper [Editor - aerogrammes] I mean. I will write you a better letter later. In the meantime Lots of love Lennox
74 Letter 4 - From Algiers, 29 March 1943
HMS Rorqual c/o GPO 29th March My dear Christian, How satisfactory that we have at last established communication. I should have a great deal to tell you about the last six months really but, alas, I can never do it, for fear that an earlier letter may turn up, with a totally different version of the same story. The deplorable habit of improving events for publication may in such cases ind me out. You may hardly believe it but since I last wrote to you I have had three days of the most glorious skiing. This in a country that I have already described to you at some length (vide my 17.10.42, now about at Cape Town) and which is an absolute Heaven in this troubled world. For not only can one go skiing but almost every other human pleasure is provided - you can stuff yourself to the epiglottis with everything that you have almost forgotten about I expect, from oranges to oysters, the shops are full and the country is one of the most beautiful places I have ever seen. Below the snow line the lowers were almost beyond belief, although spring had hardly begun - solid masses of poppies between the olive trees, gentians, anemones, wild cyclamen and cherry and God knows how many I have no idea of the name of. Now we are all back in the hard world again, after only four days of this, but at least every corner of the submarine is packed to capacity with chocolate, razor blades, ivory, apes and peacocks against the bad times to come. I cannot forbear to repeat one item of news. That is that we acquired a violin, a present from a leeing evacuee, and on Christmas Day I gave a stirring rendering of the "Bluebells" in the presence of my Petty Of icers, meanwhile my Gunlayer, a more competent iddler than myself, persisted in playing the "Road to the Isles" under the slightly alcoholic impression that he was accompanying me. Probably very bad for discipline, but I think no one had any very clear recollection of the events next day. This is perfectly true. There was no lurverly blonde present. Lots of love Lennox
Editor: Rorqual was de initely in Algiers on 29 March 1943, but the lowers listed do not sound like Algeria. On the other hand Lebanon is a lora hotspot. So, the description in the letter is likely to be of the mountains and countryside near Beirut, where Rorqual was at the time of the letter of 17 October 1942 referred to (not held). There has been skiing available in the Lebanon since the early 20th century, so maybe Lennox went up to Beirut for skiing when Rorqual was in Haifa from 5-9 March loading mines and torpedoes.
75 Letter 5 - From Malta, 28 April 1943
Usual address 28 April [1943] My dear Christian, How can you do such an absurd thing as apply for Foreign Service? All these places are a pretty fearful bore nowadays. I'm beginning to think of moving in the other direction. High Authority has already decreed the day of my return home and, although the same High Authority keeps shifting the date just a little further away, yet nevertheless I am, like a schoolboy, already at work on my calendar crossing off the days to the end of term and praying, like the most optimistic kind of schoolboy, that some miraculous intervention, as an earthquake for an example, may strike the school lat and cause the holidays to begin rather sooner than expected. It is not in my experience that this ever happened. We have been working quite hard lately so recountable news is scarce. The chief incident of our last patrol however, must not be overlooked. Which was that the rats successfully gnawed right through the Coxswain's braces while he was asleep. As we have now a kind of blood-sucking bug onboard to add to our old friends the rats, cockroaches, leas and woodlice, the struggle for Existence is becoming one of evergrowing intensity. I can hardly contain my pride today for I have just received a letter from one of my female admirers (married) asking me not only to be the Godfather of her projected infant but declaring her intention of naming it after me should it prove the right variety. Since when I keep inding myself preening myself in front of my mirror (which is only partially covered in soot) and, with a smile of smug complacency, adjusting my now threadbare, but irreplaceable, tie at a more exactly satisfactory angle. Which reminds me for some reason of a rather nice advertisement in the local paper the other day. Translated, it went roughly like this - "For Sale: - Comfortable well-upholstered sofa- divan or willing exchange for perambulator in good condition". My sister keeps sending me books - by every mail yet another volume of "War and Peace". I shall have to read them or be found out ultimately. I should have thought Ulster was foreign enough for anyone, it would be for me. Lot of love Lennox EDITOR: Lennox was being very optimistic. In fact Rorqual did not get home until late November 1943
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Christopher Napier joined Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth in 1962. After completing training he served in submarines Onslaught, Dreadnought as Navigating Of icer, and Oberon as First Lieutenant. Dreadnought became the irst Royal Navy submarine to reach the North Pole in 1971. Leaving the Navy in 1976, he quali ied as a Solicitor and became a partner of the international law irm of Clifford Chance, specialising in shipping and, later, environmental law and litigation. In more recent times his passion for the English countryside has found him as Vice Chairman of national Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), Chairman of CPRE Hampshire, President of the Peters ield Society, and much involved in the campaign to achieve the South Downs National Park. In 2016 he was appointed OBE for ‘services to the environment and rural communities in Southern England’.
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