Elite Bias, Not Voter Bias: Gender Quotas and Candidate Performance in France Paper to be presented at the first European Conference on Politics and Gender Belfast, 21-23 January 2009 Section 2a, panel 5 : parité Please do not cite without permission: please contact the corresponding author (Rainbow Murray) for the most recent version of the paper and updated citation details Rainbow Murray Department of Politics Queen Mary, University of London Mile End Road London E1 4NS United Kingdom
[email protected] Mona Lena Krook Department of Political Science Washington University in St. Louis Campus Box 1063 One Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130
[email protected] Katherine A. R. Opello Department of History, Philosophy, and Political Science The City University of New York – Kingsborough Community College 2001 Oriental Boulevard Brooklyn, NY 11235
[email protected] Elite Bias, Not Voter Bias: Gender Quotas and Candidate Performance in France Abstract Gender quotas have diffused rapidly around the world in response to concerns about the under-representation of women in political life. In France, the constitution was amended in 1999 and the electoral law revised in 2000 to require the nomination of equal numbers of male and female candidates. While the spread of quotas implies the emergence of new norms to facilitate women’s access to elected office, the need to displace men as candidates and office-holders raises questions as to why the same elites who may lose their seats would pass quota policies. One answer put forward recently relates to incumbents’ interests and voter bias. In this article, we critique this account by drawing on qualitative and quantitative evidence revealing (1) a combination of principled and pragmatic motivations for quota reform and (2) the role of elite actions, not voter bias, as the main explanation for women’s electoral performance.