Attachment # 1 Nazrallah Comments Made Today (Transcript from ESCWA

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Attachment # 1 Nazrallah Comments Made Today (Transcript from ESCWA Attachment # 1 Nazrallah comments made today (transcript from ESCWA) >* In extensive comments on the developments taking place in the field battles, Nasrallah hailed the heroic confrontations and resistance that the Hezbollah resistance fighters were putting up against the Israeli battalions and attacks. He said the ground battles had begun since the first day of Israel's aggression on Lebanon but were now becoming more fierce and comprehensive. According to Nasrallah, the ground battles of the past two to three days took on a shape where tens of thousands of Israeli troops and tanks were involved and were faced with heroic resistance fighters. He said the battles were still taking place on the front lines and positions. According to Nasrallah, there have been two major elements on the ground level: 1- The human elements, where the Israeli army did not expect to be faced with the men of such a level of courage and steadfastness. The Israelis expected to besiege towns and villages while leaving a back route for the resistance fighters to flee but were surprised when the fighters continued to fight, even if until the very last breath. He said the fighters were putting up almost miraculous performances against entire Israeli battalions and tanks. 2- The ability of the resistance — in quality and quantity — to destroy enemy tanks and vehicles even though they were very advanced and modern technologically. Nasrallah said the numbers of Israeli tanks and vehicles destroyed are very high. He said even Merkava tanks were being destroying by human elements, in reference to the resistance fighters. According to Nasrallah, these two factors surprised the Israelis. Nasrallah made two pointers regarding the ongoing ground battles: 1- The Israeli enemy is counting on many lies, which is either consistent with its regular behaviour or part of the psychological war it has been waging, he said. He gave the example of the battle over Maroun EL-Rass, where the battles were ongoing for days but Israel falsely contended it had taken over that area from the very first day. A similar case was that of the battles of Bint Jbeil, he said. According to Nasrallah, Israel is now saying that it controls large areas of South Lebanon but many of those claims are lies and part of its psychological warfare, he said. 2- Asserting that the resistance does not fight like a regular army but rather like gangs, Nasrallah said the resistance is not interested in holding on to specific positions or areas as much as it is interested in inflicting as many losses on the enemy as possible. It is sometimes advantageous to let them take over some areas in order to later inflict more losses on them while regaining them back, he asserted. Concerning the sea battles, Nasrallah confirmed that the earlier Hezbollah assertion that the resistance had targeted and directly hit an Israeli warship off the coast of Tyre. But like the earlier case when the resistance hit the warship off the coast of Beirut, Israel denied, he said. While in Beirut, the resistance could prove its claims because it had taken photos of the sinking warship which was close to the coast, in Tyre it could not take similar footage because of the foggy weather conditions and the distance of the warship from the shore. Concerning Hizbullah's rocket attacks, Nasrallah said hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel and beyond Haifa were continuing at a higher rate, despite Israeli claims. He decried as an Israeli mistake and stupidity assertions that the resistance had been defeated when it halted its rocket attacks on Israel during Israel's declared 48-hour truce in air raids. Nasrallah said Olmert made the stupid mistake of saying that Israel had destroyed Hezbollah's military infrastructure, a stupidity repeated by his deputy Peres, merely because the resitance had halted its attacks for two days. Acccording to Nasrallah, the resistance merely stopped its attcks for 48 hours to allow the people some reprieve, to allow for the movement of the injured, and the removal of bodies from under the rubble. To prove it, once Israel's 48-hours were up and Israel resumed its attacks, the Hezbollah resistance launched more than 300 rockets in the same day against Israeli settlements, he said. Asserting that the resistance remained in full control of all fronts and over all its rockets, Nasrallah said Hezbollah could still launch the number of rockets that it wants, as deep in Israel as it wants and whenever it wants. This disappointed Israel and the scandal prompted Israel's Chief of Staff to increase his threats against Lebanon, threatening to attacking deep inside Lebanon and even Beirut. According to Nasrallah, this is part of the psychological war, saying all Lebanese areas, with the exception of Beirut, were being attacked every day without any new decision being taken in Israel. However, Nasrallah warned that if Israel does carry out its threat to attack Beirut, which is the Lebanese capital, then the resistance would attack the capital of the enemy, Tel Aviv, and can attack Tel Aviv. Addressing the Israelis, Nasrallah said all your attacks and invasions will not stop our rocket attacks. The Israeli government, military and leaders are all beginning to admit that truth, he contended. Saying the attacks on the Israeli settlements and cities were not an action but a reaction, Nasrallah said Hezbollah was reacting to Israel's attacks on Lebanese villages, people and civilians. He said when Israel stops its attacks on Lebanese civilians and infrastructure, Hezbollah would stop its attacks on the settlements. Scoffing at the Israelis, Nasrallah said Israel had made two great military achievements during this war: 1- The Qana massacre and the killing of women and children. They tried to justify that by saying the resistance had launched rockets from behind that building and then by saying that there were Hezbollah members inside the building, which turned out to be false information. However, Nasrallah said he did not believe that attack was a mistake but rather a deliberate attack. 2- The Israeli commando descent on Baalbeck. According to Nasrallah, Israel made two descents, one on the hospital of Hikmeh on the outskirts of Baalbeck and the other on a street that is not inside Baalbeck. He said the Israelis had used tens of warplanes and helicopters to descend on a hospital, and not even on a military position. According to Nasrallah, that operation was based on military and information mistakes because there were no Hezbollah leaders in that hospital and they merely kidnapped injured people (supporters of the resistance). Regarding the second Israeli descent on a street near Baalbeck, Nasrallah said the idea was to target the house of a man because of his name. He was a civilian whose name happened to be Hassan Nasrallah and who was later kidnapped. According to Nasrallah, the five individuals captured by Israel from Baalbeck were civilians and should be considered as hostages and not as POWs. Addressing the Israeli leaders and people, Nasrallah said they have been the victims of Olmert's insecurity complex and his need to prove he is a great leader like his predecessors Sharon, Rabin and othrs. According to Nasrallah, Olmert succeeded in being like Sharon and other Israeli leaders by committing massacres but at the level of political and military leadership, Olmert proved to be the stupidest and the biggest failure of an Israeli leader, Nasrallah added. He said this war on Lebanon has not and will not lead to the handover of the two captured Israeli soldiers, it has not made the Israeli settlements safer and did not improve the Israeli government's image. Defiantly, Nasrallah addressed the entire world, saying Hezbollah and the resistance could not be defeated because the resistance is not a regular organized army or state, but is a valiant, steadfast, strong people. He said they cannot end the war with the resistance because it is renewed with every generation and with killing and bloodshed. At the political level, Nasrallah blamed US President Bush and his US Administration for all the killing and massacres that have taken place since the first day of the war on Lebanon, saying Olmert and his government were merely tools of implementation. He said Bush, Rice and the US administration had obstructed any cease- fire and were responsible for all the death and killing taking place. Refuting the claims that the US is a friend to Lebanon and a supporter of democracy, Nasrallah said Lebanon would never become a position in Bush's and Rice's new Middle East. Addressing Arab countries and all other countries "who love Lebanon", Nasrallah asked them not to treat Lebanon as an ailing patient but to help it but to use their influence to stop the aggression on Lebanon. He reminded them that the destruction and damage incurred on Lebanon was not the result of an earthquake or a natural disaster, but rather was caused by Israeli aggression through US decisions and weapons..
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