Cities 52 (2016) 132–139

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Cities

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/cities

Urban neoliberalism vs. ethno-national division: The case of West 's shopping malls

Marik Shtern

The department for Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, article info abstract

Article history: Most research on ethnically and nationally contested cities posits that urban spatial segregation trends will re- Received 6 July 2015 main decisive so long as the macro level national conflict persists, and assumes that the neoliberalization of Received in revised form 18 November 2015 urban space would only strengthen such trends. Over the last decade however, and despite the ever deepening Accepted 22 November 2015 national conflict, Jerusalem has seen the emergence of neoliberal spaces of consumption that serve as resilient Available online xxxx spaces of intergroup encounter between Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab populations. In this article I will ex- Keywords: amine and compare two such neoliberal spaces in Jerusalem, and show how under certain conditions, privatized Divided cities urban spaces can undermine processes of ethno-national segregation. I argue that interactions between members Urban neoliberalism of the two rival groups are challenged and reshaped by neoliberal spaces and that the relocation of the ethno- Segregation national intergroup encounters to privatized spaces of consumption could represent a temporal shift to a class Jerusalem based encounters. Israel–Palestine conflict © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Consumerism

1. Introduction operation in Gaza. In Jerusalem, these events reverberated in a series of violent incidents, police oppression and a wave of fear and mistrust. Jerusalem is commonly described in the literature as a deeply segre- One of the results of the violence was a mass Palestinian boycott of gated city, with a clear geographical boundary separating Jewish-Israeli retail areas, which was almost absolute throughout from Arab-Palestinian areas. Yet over the past decade it has seen a July and August but gradually tapered off in the latter months of 2014 growing trend of daily encounters between Israelis and Palestinians tak- (Nasrallah, 2014). However, not all of West Jerusalem's commercial ing place primarily in the city's new neoliberal privatized spaces of con- areas suffered to the same extent from the absence of Palestinian cos- sumption. Between 2005 and 2014, the number of Palestinians from tumers. While the largest mall in Jerusalem – Mall – suffered crossing into West Jerusalem increased significantly. from a near total decline in the number of Palestinian shoppers Their growing presence in West Jerusalem has created new spaces of (Pundaminsky, 2014), in Mall any visitor would have been encounter not only in commercial centers (Shtern, 2010), but also in none the wiser. Even at the peak of the urban violence, Palestinian the public transport system (Greenberg Raanan & Shoval, 2014; Nolte and Israeli Jerusalemites still came to shop side-by-side in this Israeli & Yacobi, 2015), parks and even in residential areas (Yacobi & Pullan, luxurious open strip mall. Despite the fact that prior to the events of 2014). These spatial desegregation trends are a far cry from any kind the summer of 2014 both malls were highly popular among Jerusalem- of “urban coexistence”. In many ways they are forced on the ite Palestinian customers, only showed a high degree of Palestinians, driven as they are by long-term structural inequality and resilience as a site of intergroup encounter throughout this extremely the severing of East Jerusalem from the West Bank following the con- violent period. struction of the separation barrier (Cohen, 2013). Yet, they have had a This example illustrates the role of commercial centers as spaces of significant impact on increasing daily encounters between Palestinians encounter in the context of a violent ethno-national conflict. It shows and Israelis in West Jerusalem. how neoliberlism through processes of privatization and consumerism The summer of 2014 marked a new phase in Jerusalem's urban con- can influence intergroup spatial dynamics in various and particular flict. The latest round of violence began with the abduction and killing of ways. This paper will analyze the role of neoliberlism in the daily life three Israeli settler youth and a Palestinian teenager from East Jerusa- of a contested Jerusalem and the way it manifests in privatized spaces lem and concluded with Operation Protective Edge, Israel's most recent of encounter. I will also try to explain how different patterns of interac- tions and ethnic inclusivity have been created in each of the malls. To this end I offer an in-depth examination of the patterns of interaction in the two shopping centers, the and the Mamilla Mall, in E-mail address: [email protected]. the years 2008–2014.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.11.019 0264-2751/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 133

Between 2007 and 2014, Palestinian Jerusalemites constituted on (Chiodelli, 2012; Braier, 2013). As a result, the percentage of poor fam- average 25% of the visitors to the Mamilla and Malha malls.1 Based on ilies in East Jerusalem grew from 64% in 2006 to 84% in 2011 (Alyan, the research, I argue that market forces, consumerism and processes Sela, & Pomerantz, 2012). of globalization relocated the intergroup interactions from national The Second Intifada from September 2000 to the end of 2004 left the spaces to the privatized commercial sphere. These new spaces of en- city in a state of trauma and fear. In West Jerusalem, the 26 suicide at- counter challenge the spatial sectarian logic of the nationally contested tacks resulting in 173 deaths (ISA, 2009) led to a rise in Jewish emigra- city. In comparing the two malls, I will show how differences in location tion from the city and caused many Jewish residents to cease contact and security policies create different patterns of intergroup interactions. with East Jerusalem Arabs. In East Jerusalem, Israeli military action left In what follows, I will first review the political–geographical pat- 64 people dead (PCBS, 2006). The Israeli authorities systematically terns of spatial segregation and the conditions under which interactions closed down all Palestinian political institutions, arresting or deporting take place in contested Jerusalem. I will then provide an analytical most of its local leadership (Cohen, 2011). framework to demonstrate how the literature on divided cities and Another dramatic step was the construction of the separation barri- the study of the neoliberal urbanism can be used to understand the na- er, officially called the “Defense Barrier”. Completed in 2005, it was built ture of intergroup encounters in colonial contexts. My contribution to to stop the infiltration of terrorists from the West Bank into Israel. One the research on divided cities will be to demonstrate how a pattern of of the key results of the wall was a brutal physical severing of East Jeru- desegregation can emerge in a nationally contested city even under salem from the rest of the West Bank. It had a crucial impact on the func- conditions of deepening conflict, national resistance and with no politi- tional and economic viability of East Jerusalem as a regional cal resolution in sight. My second conceptual contribution will be metropolitan center. The wall left approximately 80,000 Palestinian res- achieved through juxtaposing the post-colonial discourse on mixed cit- idents of Jerusalem in neighborhoods which are trapped outside the ies in Israel/Palestine with ideas related to neoliberalism and the city. I wall but within the municipal border (Chiodelli, 2013; Shlay & Rosen, will show how even the most persistent ethno-national divisions can 2010; Kimchi, 2006). Overall, the aftermath of the Second Intifada left be temporarily undermined by privatization and the growth of com- Palestinian society in Jerusalem “divided, weak and confused, with a hy- mercialism which give rise to a new mode of daily encounters. Based brid political identity and a question mark hanging over its political fu- on combined quantitative and qualitative detailed field research, two ture,” (Cohen, 2011, 129). This is the context for the current case studies will follow in which I will discuss how the particular char- phenomenon whereby large numbers of Palestinians are crossing the acteristics of the two sites shape the nature of the encounter. I will con- invisible border into West Jerusalem on a daily basis and co-habiting clude with theoretical understandings about the economic and geo- spaces with local Jews. The unequal civic status and vast disparity in ma- political dynamics that are involved in creating spaces of encounter in terial conditions are two of the basic themes underlying intergroup spa- the malls of western Jerusalem, and how these transform the ethno- tial dynamics between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem. The presence national logic of space into the capital logic of class-based divisions. of Palestinians in the parks or malls of West Jerusalem is not a sign of voluntary social mixing because it is primarily driven by the lack of de- 2. The terms of engagement: occupation, inequality and violence cent recreation and consumption facilities in East Jerusalem (Nasrallah, in Jerusalem R., personal interview, May 18, 2009).

Power relations between Palestinians and Jews in Jerusalem are un- 3. Conceptual background even on many levels. On a basic level, the inequality between the two populations stems from their different civic status. Soon after the 1967 Research on nationally contested cities has shown how intergroup war, the Israeli government granted every Palestinian Arab that lived encounters are charged with symbolic meaning and are dictated by fl in Jerusalem permanent residency. This quasi-citizenship status created the sectarian logic of the macro level national con ict, thus deepening a two-tiered citizenship system within Jerusalem. While Israelis are full spatial segregation (Bairner & Shirlow, 2003; Boal, 1996, 1999; citizens whose status and residency cannot be revoked, Palestinians are Romann & Weingrod, 1991; Peach, 2000; Shirlow, 2001; Shirlow & only eligible for social benefits and their permanent resident status is Murtagh, 2006). In many divided cities and societies, the political hege- contingent upon proving continuous physical presence in the city. In mony of the dominant group results in policies of forced spatial segrega- practice, Palestinian permanent residencies are frequently revoked tion, which are unfavorable towards the subordinated rival group. (Lapidoth, 2011). Driven by nationalistic or racist motives, these policies are manifested The official Israeli national and municipal planning and development in structural discrimination at the local and national government levels policies for East Jerusalem and its Palestinian residents further reflect (Lemon, 1991). The dominant group, seeking to minimize intergroup “ fi ” and drive this inequality. Two principles underline these policies: main- encounters in order to create puri ed spaces (Sibley, 1988), erects so- “ ” taining a Jewish majority and preempting any likelihood that the city cial, cultural and physical barriers to exclude unwanted elements. On could be divided (Amirav, 2007). Bollens (1998, 2000) termed these a broader level, the lack of secure and diverse transnational topogra- policies “partisan planning”,whileYiftachel and Yacobi (2003) describe phies in contested cities (Pullan & Baillie, 2013) limits the possibilities fl them as those of an urban ethnocracy. of reaching con ict resolution by sustaining and emphasizing inter- The result is acute inequality between the two populations in almost group cultural differences, promoting separate social networks, elevat- all spheres of life, but particularly in physical infrastructure, housing and ing mutual prejudice, and reducing the likelihood of positive education (Rom, Tatarsky, & Maimon, 2014; UNCTAD, 2013). Basic in- encounters (Peach, 2000). It also damages urban vitality and sustain- frastructure in Palestinian East Jerusalem neighborhoods such as ability by maintaining dual urban community facilities and reducing roads, sewage systems, schools and water systems suffer from tremen- the size of the local employment market (Boal, 1999). dous neglect. Discriminatory zoning policies have made it almost im- In Israel, structural segregation is manifested in government housing possible for Palestinians to acquire building permits, thereby creating policies that give rise to separate Jewish and Arab neighborhoods, cities a severe housing crisis and leading to the widespread phenomenon of and settlements and limit Arab urban development in mixed cities unregulated construction. This, in turn, has given rise to the widespread (Yiftachel, 1992, 1994; Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). As Yiftachel and “ practice by the Israeli authorities of demolishing Palestinian homes Yacobi write, the production of urban space in Israeli mixed cities stems from the exclusionary Israeli-Jewish national identity, which works to essentialize and segregate Arabs and Jews,” (Yiftachel & 1 The numbers are based on estimations and market polls done by the management of fl both malls: O. Bar Zvi, CEO Mamilla Avenue (2009), S. Ben Shmuel, CEO Mamilla Avenue Yacobi, 2003, 673). In Jerusalem, this approach was re ected in the (2014) and G. Avrahami, CEO Malha Mall, (2008 & 2014). local outline plan by the City Planning Department, titled “Jerusalem 134 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139

2000”. Using multicultural terminology, the plan gave de jure justifica- reconstructed by public–private partnerships (Harvey, 2005, 2012). tion for ethno-national segregation within an Israeli controlled The erosion, undermining and even the elimination of social policies Jerusalem: of welfare societies are creating old-new class divisions which are man- ifested in the transformation of urban public domains. This process has “Within the boundaries of the city of Jerusalem a process of spatial led some scholars to eulogize city life and even to mourn the “erosion of segregation between the various populations inhabiting the city public space” (Zukin, 1996) characterized by the rise of private urban has occurred, and continues to occur. In a multicultural city such as shopping centers at the expense of civic public spaces: “shopping cen- Jerusalem, spatial segregation of the various population groups in ters have replaced political meetings and civic gatherings as arenas of the city is a real advantage. Every group has its own cultural space public life. In that respect, shopping has become not only a practical eco- and can live its lifestyle. The segregation limits the potential sources nomical behavior but also a cultural activity,” (Zukin, 2004,7). of conflict between and among the various populations. It is appro- As in most of the urban centers in the developed world, some attri- priate, therefore, to direct a planning policy that encourages the con- butes of urban neoliberalism have taken hold in West Jerusalem. The tinuation of spatial segregation with a substantial amount of city has seen an unprecedented growth in private and public–private tolerance and consideration.” urban projects over the last fifteen years: in transportation (Nolte & (Jerusalem Municipality, 2004, chapter 7.2.2). Yacobi, 2015), education (Leshem & Paz-Fuchs, 2012) and sanitation The outline plan represents the Israeli municipal policy towards eth- (Osherov & Meniv, 2011). In some cases, the manifestations of nic spatial mixing following the violent clashes of the Second Intifada neoliberlism are shaped by Jerusalem's particular geo-political context. fl (2000–2005). This type of strategy, which aims to diminish potential se- The establishment of a series of malls during the 1990s was in uenced curity risks, has in fact encouraged the reduction of intergroup interac- by global trends but fostered by the terror attacks in western tions in Jerusalem. Boal (2002) suggests that these types of segregative Jerusalem's city business district (CBD). Many of West Jerusalem's retail patterns, once in place, tend to self-reproduce: “the force that is mainly shops and restaurants relocated from the central CBD to new industrial responsible for sustaining the residential pattern is simply inertia. What areas and 12 newly built malls around the city. This process has led to a are meant by inertia are those processes, often self-generated, which sharp decline in business activities in the old CBD. Despite the immense tend to keep people within a restricted life space” (ibid, 595). renovation projects carried out in the old CBD, most Jerusalemites re- In this paper, I use the term “space of encounter” to describe inter- frain from shopping or seeking recreation there, preferring one of the group space-sharing. This term is predominantly used to describe ev- local malls (Yalink, 2011). fl eryday interactions between majority and minority groups in Neoliberalism in Jerusalem is not only in uenced by the city's con- fl multicultural cities (Valentine, 2008, 2010; Wilson, 2011), which tend ictual nature but also by consistent governmental intervention in the to be socially or culturally divided but not nationally contested city's management. Alfasi and Fenster (2005) have pointed out that Je- (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). Public spaces in contested cities can func- rusalem is branded by the Israeli government as a city that belongs to tion as spaces of encounter and of risk, because unlike residential areas, the Jewish nation, as opposed to which Israel markets as a glob- “ “active and performative qualities of conflicts are located mostly in the al city belonging to the world. They argue that Jerusalem acts as the fi public sphere,” (Pullan & Baillie, 2013, 6). Therefore, in order to adapt capital of Israel, a city with religious, historical and national signi cance, the idea of “encounter” to the violent reality of a city such as Jerusalem, in which the State, via its different governmental ministries, interferes ” I will limit this concept to urban spaces in which personal intergroup in- in local matters, (ibid). While Jerusalem's real-estate economy relies teractions may be absent, yet still create conditions for mutual sight and on Jewish investment (Yacobi, 2012), the municipal budget relies on co-habitation. strong government support and subsidies which constituted around To conclude this section, spaces of encounter between rival groups 25% of its annual budget in 2011 (Choshen et al., 2014). would appear to challenge – from the point of view of research on divid- Tzfadia and Yacobi, post-colonial researchers, have argued that in ed cities – the prevailing ideology and collective tendencies that rein- Israel neoliberalism has gone hand in hand with segregationist policies. force sectarian separation through the purification of spaces (Sibley, They consider neoliberalism to be an institutional force, not 1988; Falah, 1996). Furthermore, a proliferation of spaces of encounter undermining state and government power but rather reinforcing the fi “… in divided cities could undermine the assumption that urban spatial ethno-national discourse of spatial control and puri cation: ethno- — segregation cannot be challenged until the macro-level national conflict nationalism is capable of adapting to myriad threats including global- is resolved (Doherty & Poole, 1997; Boal, 2002). ization, multiculturalism and neoliberalism, and to manipulate these threats for realizing territorial control,” (Tzfadia & Yacobi, 2011, 121). From this point-of-view, the privatized urban developments in Jerusa- 4. Neoliberalism in the Holy City lem represent “local ethno-security discourses and global neoliberal urban policies which do not contradict each other, but are, rather, com- Since the late 1980s, many scholars have examined the ways by plementary, ”(Yacobi, 2012, 1). In light of the research findings, which I which globalization and the spread of the free market economy have will present in the following section, I argue that the consequences of been changing the social and economic structure of urban centers. The neoliberalism are not necessarily in line with governmental segrega- shorthand for these social and economic changes is the term “neoliber- tionist policies. They can, rather, transform the nature of the division alism”. Scholars consider urban neoliberalism to be a key catalyst of new from one which is ethno-national to another which is based on class. class-based restrictions on access to public, residential and commercial spaces (Sassen, 1999, 2006; Smith, 2002). 4.1. Methodology The urban center is a strategically important arena for neoliberal re- forms (Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009). Neoliberal policies have “been In the following section, I will present the results of the urban- directly ‘interiorized’ into urban policy regimes as newly formed territo- geographical field research which I conducted in two shopping malls rial alliances attempt to rejuvenate local economies through a ‘shock in Jerusalem between March 2008–April 2009. The field research in- treatment’ of deregulation, privatization, liberalization and enhanced cluded a field survey which was validated by 19 in-depth interviews, fiscal austerity,” (ibid, 58). Throughout the developing world, urban news reports and ethnographic field observations. The two chosen neoliberalism is reshaping social and political spaces by privatizing mu- study areas for the survey were the Malha shopping mall in West Jeru- nicipal services, leading to social polarization, inequality, and a growing salem and the Mamilla Quarter Mall on the seam-line between East and exclusion of lower classes and minority groups from the ‘right to the West Jerusalem. Both commercial centers are characterized by a sub- city’ as more and more public spaces, especially in city centers, are stantial number of Palestinian customers. Both consist of conflicting M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 135 and competing layers of identity: Jewish/Arab, Israeli/Palestinian, yet In 2014, the management of the mall estimated that around 10% of they differ in their degree of resilience to the polarization brought the customers on weekdays to 25% during Muslim or Christian holidays about by inter-ethnic violence. (approx. 3000 people a day) were Palestinians from East Jerusalem For the field survey, 125 adults (62 men and 63 women) aged 18 and (Avrahami, G., personal interviews, December 16, 2008, December 28, above were surveyed in the two study areas. The respondents were cho- 2014). sen from the crowd of visitors to both sites, while maintaining an equal Typically, the intergroup encounter at Malha Mall is peaceful. The composition of nationality and gender (Table 1). The questionnaires management has a strict policy regarding racist statements by workers were delivered by an Israeli/Palestinian team of research assistants; all and security personnel, and sees its role as providing security to all vis- questionnaires were included in the study. itors (Avrahami, G. personal interview, December 28, 2014). However, On the issue of space-sharing in commercial sites, the survey used in March 2012, this relatively peaceful co-habitation was breached open and closed questions aimed at assessing the sense of security for when 300 soccer fans of the team “Beitar” surged into the mall after a both populations and their position towards space-sharing with the match, verbally and physically attacking some of the Arab workers. rival community. Given the fact that both study areas are located in The police arrived and dispersed them only after 40 min of violent ram- West Jerusalem, the respondents were also asked about the way they paging (Rosenberg, 2012). This event, though it did not represent the identify the ethno-national territorial identity of the site. daily interactions at the mall, drew a lot of attention in the local and na- The in-depth interviews were conducted with 19 Israeli and Pales- tional media, and marked a new stage in the deterioration of physical tinian professionals and costumers, among them: 2 Palestinian and 1 safety for Palestinians in West Jerusalem (Tatarsky, 2013). Israeli urban planners, 2 Palestinian community leaders, 2 Israeli mall The Mamilla Mall opened almost 15 years later, in 2007. Local news- managers, 1 Israeli sales personnel. Twenty-six hours of ethnographic papers praised the mall as a “step up in the level of commercial net- field observations were undertaken at both sites, using the thick de- works and visual standards in Jerusalem,” (Berger, 2008). The strip scription method (Geertz, 1973). mall is the heart of the Mamilla Quarter: a straight 270 m narrow shop- ping alley with 200 shops that links the busy Agron/King Solomon streets of western Jerusalem's CBD to the plaza in front of 5. Palestinians at West Jerusalem's Shopping Malls: Two Case Studies (the main entrance to the which is in East Jerusalem). Mamilla's history has always been shaped by the fact that it is located on a border, The Malha Mall (officially called the Jerusalem Mall), was built in just outside the Old City. In its 150 years history, the quarter has served March 1993 in the Jewish neighborhood of Malha in southwest Jerusa- as a space for commercial exchange and social engagement, violent con- lem on the grounds of the pre-1948 Palestinian village al-Maliha. In testation, occupation, colonization and most recently, privatization. 1949 the Palestinian village was re-settled by poor Jewish immigrants Since its construction in the mid-19th century and until the war of and until 1967 it remained in a state of neglect, like many of the run- 1948, the Mamilla neighborhood developed organically as a nationally down frontier neighborhoods in Israeli Jerusalem. During the 1970s, mixed CBD outside the western entrance to the historic Old City of Jeru- the neighborhood (which was officially re-named “Manahat”) was gen- salem (1920–1947). During the 1948 war, the Mamilla Quarter was at trified and merged into a continuum of modern Israeli neighborhoods the heart of a war zone between Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian forces. (Gonen, 1995). The mall was built in that area, as part of a new urban Following the partition of the city between Israel and Jordan, it became district developed during the 1980s and 90s, with a high-tech small partly a no-man's land and partly a rundown Israeli border neighbor- business district, national soccer stadium, basketball and tennis courts hood. After 1967, the Israeli government expropriated the former no- and the Biblical Zoo. Today, even though as the crow flies the mall is sit- man's land territories in the Mamilla area. Soon afterwards, the author- uated just 400 m away from the southern , it is in the midst of ities relocated the Jewish residents of Mamilla, and after four decades of a main Western Jerusalem sub-CBD (Image 2). As I will show in the sur- bureaucratic and financial delays, it was rebuilt by a joint public-private vey results, it is also conceived by Palestinians and Israelis as Jewish- partnership – the ‘Karta’ company – which eventually sold it to a real es- Israeli territory. tate entrepreneur, Alfred Akirov, and his company Alrov. In place of the The mall was built and is currently managed by the , old neighborhood, a luxurious quarter arose in Mamilla, including two which as of 2015 owns 13 other major malls in Israel (Jerusalem. luxury hotels, an exclusive luxury residential neighborhood and an azrieli.com). It was planned by Avraham Yaski, a well-known main- open commercial boulevard — The Mamilla Quarter Avenue. stream Israeli architect. Its architectural style has been defined as local The new Mamilla compound was designed by an Israeli star archi- postmodernism (Kroyanker, 2008). The 3-story mall features glass tect, Moshe Safdi, who also designed prominent national institutions, domes, reminiscent of a basilica, and arches that imbue the consump- such as the Holocaust Museum (Yad Vashem) and Ben Gurion Airport. tion experience with religious motifs. The mall is surrounded by a free Like Malha Mall, the compound was designed in a neo-oriental style parking lot and major inner-city roads which isolate it from adjacent (Kroyanker, 2008) with stone domes and arches. Its narrow layout neighborhoods and other sites. The inner space resembles many other and design resembles the restored Jewish quarter, but also integrates malls in Israel and around the world, with a cluster of 200 shops over features characteristic of modern Middle Eastern Arabic architecture. 40,000 sqm, 2 escalators, and transparent elevators (Image 3). The avenue is a hybridization of a street and a mall. It is organically Malha Mall is the most popular shopping center in West Jerusalem, built into the urban realm of the western CBD, but apart from the am- and is also the most profitable mall in Israel. Each day, the mall draws phitheater there are no benches or resting spots along the avenue of an estimated 30,000 visitors, making it one of the most populated public shops and restaurants (Image 5). spaces in Jerusalem. Since its inauguration, the Malha Mall has been Within a few months after opening, Mamilla was drawing more than very popular among middle and upper-class Palestinians from Jerusa- 10,000 visitors per day. Its prime location between the Old City and the lem and even from neighboring Arab states, such as Jordan and Egypt. West Jerusalem CBD, its proximity to 15 hotels located in the city center and its huge underground parking lot made the avenue a popular pe- destrian route and a commercial success. Although Mamilla is clearly

Table 1 an Israeli compound built on expropriated land, on the boundary be- Number of respondents by nationality and site. tween the two parts of the city, its territorial identity is continuously ne- gotiated and contested by the stream of Palestinian customers and Israeli respondents Palestinian respondents ∑ visitors. In 2008, the management of the mall estimated that the num- Mamilla 32 33 65 ber of Palestinian visitors in Mamilla was anywhere between 20% and Malha 30 30 60 25% of the total number of visitors. Like the Malha Mall, Mamilla 136 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139

Table 2 Table 3 Respondents' sense of security by location. Position of Israeli respondents towards space-sharing by location. ⁎ Israelis (m) n1 Palestinians (m) n2 pt Negative Neutral Positive nm p t

Mamilla 4.48 32 4.46 33 .92 .09 Mamilla 22% 22% 56% 32 3.63 .02 2.30 Malha 4.33 30 4.03 30 .12 1.57 Malha 35% 35% 30% 30 2.93

Note: scale: 1–5. Note: scale: 1–5. ⁎ All the T-tests in the paper are based on two-tailed solution. draws Palestinians from all socio-economical levels, but the presence of To further illustrate Malha Mall's conflicting terms of inclusiveness the upper-middle classes is particularly marked (Bar Zvi, O., personal in- towards Palestinians, the findings show that a substantial number of terview, July 20, 2008). The avenue is also a central employment center Palestinians attributed their feelings of exclusion to the security checks for young East Jerusalem Palestinians, which constitute 66% (approx. at the entrances to the mall which are operated by a private Israeli secu- 1500) of the quarter's total sales personnel (Ben Moshe, S., personal in- rity company. Many Palestinian interviewees mentioned that they felt terview, November 14, 2014). as though they were treated with a greater degree of harshness at these checkpoints compared to Israeli-Jewish visitors, and that they were singled out as a potential threat to public safety: 6. The particularities of the two spaces of encounter “When there's a Palestinian attack, let's say, [Palestinian] women Upon analyzing the findings of the field research, I discovered that tend to boycott the mall out of fear that they will search them, like the malls are different regarding their level of inclusivity towards Pales- they do at the airport. Once I took my wife to the mall. As soon as tinian customers. In Malha Mall, Palestinians' sense of security was the guard started asking me all kinds of strange things, I said to lower than in Mamilla, and Israeli shoppers' hostility towards him: ‘excuse me. Stop. Give my ID back. I'm going home. I don't want Palestinians was higher. In what follows, I use interview and survey ev- to spend my money here and be humiliated …” idence to illustrate this difference and point to possible reasons for its occurrence. (Ayub, A., personal interview, April 7, 2009). Broadly speaking, research findings show that during periods of calm in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict both compounds offer the neces- Apart from the understandable appeal for respect and equal treat- sary conditions for relatively peaceful intergroup encounters. In 2008– ment, in between the lines you can also hear Ayub's plea for anonymity. 2009, visitors to both sites indicated a high sense of security (Table 2). Ayub wishes to be treated as just another costumer in the mall without However, the research shows that the respondents' attitude towards the burden of the ethno-national label. He feels that the disrespectful space-sharing underlies substantial differences in the level of mutual and at times aggressive attitude towards him (and his wife) at Malha tolerance at each site. At the Malha Mall, the presence of Palestinians transforms his shopping experience from a neutral consumerist experi- was received much less favorably by Israeli shoppers, when compared ence into a controversial political act. to the latter's attitudes towards Palestinians at Mamilla Mall (Table 3). By contrast, Mamilla Mall has no security checks at the entrance to Palestinian shoppers' attitudes, on the other hand, were overwhelming- the compound which has a positive effect on Palestinians' sense of in- ly positive towards the presence of Israeli shoppers at both sites clusion at the site. Instead, security guards freely patrol the open-air (Table 4). mall. The absence of a security check is also a clear cause of the much The difference between the reactions of the Israeli costumers to the higher degree of security felt by Palestinians there when compared presence of Palestinians can be explained by three particular factors: with Malha. However, Palestinians did not object to the presence of se- geo-political location, security policy and class affiliation. In most curity guards in principle, and explained that security measures that do people's minds, Malha Mall has an indisputable ‘West Jerusalem’ identi- not include checkpoints increase their sense of security in the same way ty. Although it is located not far from the former southern border that they do for Israelis. A Palestinian design student said “the security (‘green line’), today it is an integral part of West Jerusalem, far from guards don't bother me, they are just there,” (interview, 2009). A textile the large East Jerusalem Palestinian centers. When the respondents merchant in the Old City said that the absence of checkpoints is what were asked what in their opinion is the national territorial identity of makes the Mamilla Mall into “…the best mall for Palestinians in Jerusa- the Malha Mall, the vast majority of both populations identified it as a lem,” (interview, 2009). Palestinian respondents' focus on security pol- Jewish territory (Tables 5 and 6). This can explain the objection by icy issues in both Malha and Mamilla attest to the centrality of this issue many of the Jewish costumers to the presence of Palestinians at the in Israeli–Palestinian intergroup encounter patterns. mall. As one of the interviewees in Malha said: “I'd prefer it if they Another key reason for the greater sense of inclusiveness felt by stayed in . We can't go there, so why should they come Palestinians in Mamilla is the overwhelming presence of both Palestin- here?” (interview, 2008). ian visitors as well as Palestinian sales personnel. Many Palestinian re- Even Israeli visitors who expressed a positive attitude towards the spondents stated that they “came to visit a friend who works here.” presence of Palestinians at Malha Mall did not base it on a desire for co- The large numbers of Palestinian visitors and salespeople creates a ‘crit- existence, but rather on a respect for the “the constraints of democracy”. ical mass’ which itself becomes an attraction for Palestinian visitors. The For example, an Israeli university lecturer said that “as long as they all ob- most popular argument in favor of Mamilla among Palestinian respon- serve the law, its fine. Everybody needs to shop…” (interview, 2008). An- dents, however, was the compound's proximity to East Jerusalem, the other Israeli teacher said “the Palestinians that come here don't bother anyone. They're human beings just like us. The ‘Arsim’2 bother us more,” (interview, 2008). Both quotes demonstrate the terms under Table 4 which Palestinians can be granted legitimacy by some of the Jews at Position of Palestinian respondents towards space-sharing by location. the Israeli mall: as shoppers or as members of the “decent” middle class that “play by the rules”. Negative Neutral Positive nm p t Mamilla 0% 18% 82% 33 3.93 .002 3.17 Malha 353 7% 90% 30 4.47 2 “Ars” is derogatory Hebrew slang for the Israeli stereotype of a lower class young man, usually dark-skinned and speaking in Arabic-inflected Hebrew. Note: scale: 1–5. M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 137

Table 5 by both Israelis and Palestinians as a more “global” space. The fact that Territorial identity by Israeli respondents. Mamilla is not perceived to belong to any one national group makes Jewish Hybrid Arab Nm p t more tolerant, profit-oriented policies more likely. Malha, on the other hand, has been identified as a space that prioritizes one ethnicity, Mamilla 72% 25% 3% 32 1.22 .501 .67 Malha 90% 7% 3% 30 1.13 Jewish-Israeli, over the Palestinian rival group. These findings help explain why the latest wave of violence in the Note: scale = 1–3. summer of 2014 affected the two malls so differently. As intergroup vi- olence escalated dramatically culminating in “the Jerusalem Intifada”, Old City and the Arab central business district. Many Palestinians re- the number of Palestinian visitors to Malha declined to almost zero. spondents said that they perceive Mamilla as being on the edge of Pal- This was primarily due to a Palestinian political boycott of West Jerusa- estinian home territory. lem commercial areas in response to Israeli policies as well as to The Mamilla Mall's higher level of inclusiveness in comparison with Palestinians' fear of racially motivated attacks (Nasrallah, 2014). The de- Malha is also reflected in the higher degree of tolerance displayed by cline in the number of Palestinian visitors resulted in a sharp 15% de- Israeli shoppers towards Palestinian shoppers. Unlike Malha, which crease in general retail income (Pundaminsky, 2014). In the months Israelis perceived as Jewish-Israeli, Mamilla was perceived as a frontier following the Gaza ceasefire, the number of Palestinian visitors gradual- site with an international character and a diversity of visitors (Tables 4 ly rose again, but only up to a third of the previous figure (Avrahami, G., and 5). Its location on the main tourist circuit in and out of the Old personal interview, December 28, 2014). City serves to identify it as a tourist destination rather than Israeli The events of the summer of 2014 also had an impact on the revenue home territory, even for local Israeli Jerusalemites. Any tourist coming of businesses in Mamilla Mall. During the summer, some of the com- to Jerusalem will almost inevitably walk through the Mamilla Quarter mercial avenue's shops suffered a 30% decrease in daily income Mall on their way to the Old City through Jaffa Gate, which means that (Dovrat-Mezritz, 2014). However, in contrast with Malha Mall, the de- the number of foreign tourists sometimes exceeds the number of local cline in numbers of visitors was equal among both Israelis and Israeli and Palestinian customers at the compound. In these conditions, Palestinians (Bitton, K., personal interview, November 14, 2014). In ad- being Israeli or Palestinian becomes just another option in this temple of dition, Palestinians did not call for a boycott of Mamilla as they did with global consumption. Malha. The fact that Mamilla faired differently to Malha in the wake of This notion was articulated by both Israeli and Palestinian respon- the events of 2014 is a dramatic illustration of the link between com- dents. Ido, one of the managers of an Israeli coffee shop in Mamilla, mercial resilience and an inclusive geopolitical identity. Mamilla's par- said “the place is like a floating balloon, it's not connected to anything, ticular characteristics, in this regard, have created a more sustainable there are many tourists, and it feels like abroad...” (Halevy, I., personal and resilient space of intergroup encounter. interview, June 3, 2009). Two Palestinian high school students talked about the more inclusive feeling that Mamilla offers as a space of encounter: “the differences between people coming here are not that 7. Conclusion substantial. It brings us together, and almost eliminates the sense of oth- erness... You don't feel the difference and nobody harms us,” (interview, The existence of privatized spaces of encounter is a challenge to the 2009). The heterogeneous character of Mamilla and the gradual rise in ethno-national logic that has shaped segregationist policies and the the number of Palestinian customers has become part of the mall geo-political reality in Jerusalem since the Second Intifada. In both management's sales strategy. In a surprising admission, Shmuel Ben malls, but in Mamilla in particular, the profit interest partially super- Moshe, CEO of the Alrov Israel company which owns the Mamilla Quar- sedes the logic of ethno-national segregation. The malls' owners cater ter, disclosed his role in creating its current social composition: to Palestinians as customers in a bid to increase their profits, but they do so in a context where Palestinians and Israelis are contesting space “I have many Arab workers in the shops. It's intentional. It's because I and sovereignty. want the Arabs that come to the shops to feel at ease when one of In West Jerusalem, where the management of public space is domi- their own is serving them. It was tremendously successful, which nated by the Israeli Jewish collective, it is to be expected that the reloca- was reflected not only in sales, but also in the fact that there is no tion of daily intergroup encounters to newly privatized commercial vandalism or destruction of any kind, or anything like that. Because spaces would, under certain conditions, make those spaces less exclu- when rough (Arab) children see that in the store there's an Arab sively Israeli-Jewish. Thus, while the privatization of civic spaces dictat- manager or a salesperson, they won't damage it, they feel like it be- ed by neoliberal policies has been identified globally with increasing longs to them as well. They respect us and we respect them, and it's restrictions on lower classes and minority groups' rights to the city, it beautiful.” is precisely this process which has created relatively inclusive enclaves (Ben Moshe, S., personal interview, November 14, 2014). for ethnic mixing in western Jerusalem. But this type of temporary in- clusion is possible only for middle class Palestinians and Israelis who Ben Moshe's statement demonstrates that processes of privatization share global consumerist cultural preferences. In this respect, the trans- of public spaces in Jerusalem have given rise to marketing strategies and national nature of neoliberalism temporarily transforms the ethno- policies that are to some degree independent of segregative sectarian national division into a class-based encounter. motives, and in fact have the potential to actually foster intergroup en- In neoliberal spaces, such as Malha or Mamilla, Palestinians are de- counters. While both the Malha and Mamilla malls appeal to shoppers sired by retailers as customers. As a result, Palestinians wield power as on the basis of a global consumerist culture, Mamilla's different security consumers in these spaces, a power that they made full use of during policy and its proximity to the Old City means that it has been marked the summer of 2014. The Palestinian boycott of the Malha Mall in the summer of 2014, and the refusal of Palestinian newspapers to publish Malha Mall ads at this time, is one way in which Jerusalemite Table 6 Territorial identity by Palestinian respondents. Palestinians have been making use of their status as legitimate partici- pants in new neoliberal spaces of consumption and asserting their role Jewish Hybrid Arab Nm p t as urban actors. These developments suggest that although Palestinian Mamilla 18% 76% 6% 33 2.16 b.00001 6.75 participation in West Jerusalem's new commercial centers was initially Malha 77% 20% 3% 30 1.26 motivated by economic dependency and political oppression, the desta- Note: scale = 1–3. bilization of spatial segregation brought about by neoliberalism is, 138 M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 nonetheless, creating growing economic interdependence between Alyan, N., Sela, R., & Pomerantz, M. (2012). Policies of neglect in east Jerusalem: The pol- icies that created 78% poverty rates and a frail job market. The association for civil Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem. rights in Israel. This comparative study of Malha and Mamilla malls illustrates the Amirav, M. (2007). Jerusalem syndrome: The failure of Israeli policy to unite Jerusalem, way in which the particular location of Mamilla within Jerusalem's 1967–2007. Jerusalem: Carmel (in Hebrew). Bairner, A., & Shirlow, P. (2003). When leisure turns to fear: Fear, mobility, and ethno- urban geography, combined with its neoliberal consumerist character, sectarianism in Belfast. Leisure Studies, 22(3), 203–221. produces a hybrid frontier territory that has a somewhat global rather Berger, G. (2008, June 7). In (Ed.), The city which was connected to the mall (in than a national identity, and thus facilitates temporary spaces of nonvi- Hebrew). olent intergroup encounters. It also demonstrates the significant impact Boal, F.W. (1996). Integration and division: Sharing and segregating in Belfast. Planning Practice and Research, 11(2), 151–158. of ‘a sense of security’ and geographical context on minority inclusion. Boal, F.W. (1999). From undivided cities to undivided cities: Assimilation to ethnic cleans- Soft borders and hybrid political locations can have a positive, albeit ing. Housing Studies, 14(5), 585–600. fi Boal, F.W. (2002). Belfast: Walls within. Political Geography, 21(5), 687–694. temporary, effect on a sense of belonging. While Malha is rmly identi- fl fi Bollens, S.A. (1998). Urban planning amidst ethnic con ict. Jerusalem and Johannesburg, ed with Jewish West Jerusalem, Mamilla's location on the seam blurs 35 (4).(pp.729–750). its ethno-national affiliation, thus allowing the profit motive to trump Bollens, S.A. (2000). On narrow ground: Urban policy and ethnic conflict in Jerusalem and ethno-national segregation. The comparison also identifies security Belfast. Albany, NY: State university of New York Press. Braier, M. (2013). Zones of transformation? Informal construction and independent zon- checkpoints as markers of ethno-national dominance rather than ing plans in East Jerusalem. Environment and Planning A, 45(11), 2700–2716. mere security measures. These subtle features of geo-political location Chiodelli, F. (2012). Planning illegality: The roots of unauthorised housing in Arab East and security policy should be kept in mind when designing urban poli- Jerusalem. Cities, 29(2), 99–106. Chiodelli, F. (2013). Re-shaping Jerusalem: The transformation of Jerusalem's metropoli- cies to foster space-sharing in contested settings. tan area by the Israeli barrier. Cities, 31 ,417–424. In conclusion, while the postcolonial claim regarding the mutually Choshen, M., Shapira, Y.A., Korach, M., Shemer, D., Shahar, Y., & Kupererd, A. (Eds.). reinforcing relationship of ethnocracy and neoliberalism is often true, (2014). Statistical yearbook of Jerusalem, 2014. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem institute for Israel Studies (in Hebrew). this research shows that the logic of neoliberalism does not always go Cohen, H. (2011). The rise and fall of Arab Jerusalem: Palestinian politics and the city since hand-in-hand with the logic of ethno-national spatial segregation. 1967. London & New York: Routledge. Though we should not lose sight of the fact that Palestinian consumption Cohen, H. (2013). Joint Israeli–Palestinian challenges. In W. Pullan, & B. Baillie (Eds.), Lo- fl – at Israeli commercial centers is in many ways reinforcing the Israeli oc- cating urban on icts: Ethnicity, nationalism and the everyday (pp. 132 150). Palgrave Macmillan. cupation in terms of partial normalization of the economic relations be- Doherty, P., & Poole, M.A. (1997). Ethnic residential segregation in Belfast, Northern tween the populations, it is equally true that neoliberal commercial Ireland, 1971–1991. Geographical Review, 87(4), 520–536. spaces, especially ones like Mamilla Mall, undermine ethnocratic goals Dovrat-Mezritz, A. (2014, November 12). The security deterioration is damaging business in Jerusalem: “Ben Yehuda market is half empty”. The Marker (in Hebrew). in relation to the identity and composition of urban space. Neoliberal Falah, G. (1996). Living together apart: Residential segregation in mixed Arab–Jewish cit- and ethnocratic spatial logics, therefore, need not always be in align- ies in Israel. Urban Studies, 33(6), 823–857. ment, especially in situations where neoliberal economic efficiency de- Gaffikin, F., & Morrissey, M. (2011). Planning in divided cities. Wiley-Blackwell. Geertz, C. (1973). The interpretations of cultures: Selected essays. New York: Basic Books. mands intergroup mixing and transnational brand consumption. The Greenberg Raanan, M., & Shoval, N. (2014). Mental maps compared to actual spatial be- intertwining of ethnocratic with neoliberal logic, two contradicting sys- havior using GPS data: A new method for investigating segregation in cities. Cities, tems of logic, as a feature of Jerusalem's ‘national capitalism’ creates an 36,28–40. Gonen, A. (1995). Between the city and the suburb: urban and residential patterns and pro- ongoing process of negotiation between national and individual identi- cesses in Israel. Aldershot; Avebury. ties, between political loyalties and material needs. The intergroup en- Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: University Press. counters in these neoliberal spaces are shaped by particular historical Harvey, D. (2012). Rebel cities: From the right to the city to urban revolution. London & New York: Verso. and geopolitical conditions, and they are fragile. However, they also ISA (2009). Review of eminent terror attacks characteristics in the last decade. in Hebrew: comprise a growing tendency towards resilient economic interactions. Israeli Security Agency. Regardless of the long-term prognosis for these spaces of encounter, Jerusalem Municipality (August 2004). Local outline plan Jerusalem 2000. Report no. 4, examining those helps us to further understand trends of integration The proposed plan and the main planning policies. Kimchi, I. (Ed.). (2006). The security fence around Jerusalem: Implications for the city and its and patterns of interaction under conditions of violent urban conflict residents. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. in nationally divided cities. Urban neoliberalism in nationally contested Kroyanker, D. (2008). Revolution in presentation of Jerusalem. In O. Ahimeir, & Y. Bar settings poses a paradoxical challenge: it creates new opportunities for Siman-Tov (Eds.), 40 years in Jerusalem. Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies pp. 213 –185. (in Hebrew). intergroup encounters, but demands a radical reconstruction of the cit- Lapidoth,R.(2011).Jerusalem: Some legal issues. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel ies' economy, democracy and social life. The neoliberal terms for this Studies. kind of encounter set a socio-economical barrier for participation. Yet, Lemon, A. (1991). Homes apart: South Africa's segregated cities. London: Paul Chapman. Leshem, E., & Paz-Fuchs, A. (2012). Between the public and the private: Privatizations at the same time they enable non-violent space sharing and temporary and nationalizations in Israel. (Annual report 2011). Jerusalem: Van Leer (in Hebrew). same-status encounters between costumers, experiences that under- Nasrallah, R. (2014). Jerusalem the “fragile city”: interaction between east and west mine a status-quo of unequal power relations, political oppression, Jerusalem: Main talking points. Unpublished manuscript. Nolte, A., & Yacobi, H. (2015). Politics, infrastructure and representation: The case of hate, fear and mistrust. Jerusalem's light rail. Cities, 43,28–36. Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx. Osherov, E., & Meniv, O. (2011, March 23). Dirty business: This is how you cash out on the doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2015.11.019. sanitary workers in East Jerusalem. Zman Yerushalayim (in Hebrew). PCBS (2006). Jerusalem statically yearbook 2006. Ramallah: Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics. Acknowledgments Peach, C. (2000). The consequences of segregation. In F.W. Boal (Ed.), Ethnicity and hous- ing: accommodating difference (pp. 10–23). Aldershot: Ashgate. Funding for the initial fieldwork came from the Sapir scholarship for Peck, J., Theodore, N., & Brenner, N. (2009). Neoliberal urbanism: Models, moments, mu- tations.SAIS. Review of International Affairs, 29(1), 49–66. municipal studies. I would like to thank Prof. Shlomo Hasson from the Pullan, W., & Baillie, B. (2013). Locating nationalism and the everyday. Palgrave: Macmillan. Department of Geography at the Hebrew University for guiding me Pundaminsky, K. (2014, December 16). Arab newspapers: We won't publish Malha Mall's through the initial fieldwork for this study, and my mentor Prof. Haim campaigns. Yedioth Yerushalayim (in Hebrew). Rom, Y., Tatarsky, A., & Maimon, O. (2014). Shortage of classrooms in East Jerusalem: annual Yacobi, of the department of Politics and Government at Ben Gurion survey. Jerusalem: Ir-Amim. University, for providing the theoretical framework. Romann, M., & Weingrod, A. (1991). Living together separately: Arabs and Jews in contem- porary Jerusalem. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Rosenberg, O. (2012, March 23). Hundreds of Beitar Jerusalem fans beat up Arab workers in References mall; no arrests. Haaretz (in Hebrew). Sassen, S. (1999). Globalization and its discontents: Essays on the new mobility of people and Alfasi, N., & Fenster, T. (2005). A tale of two cities: Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in an age of money. New York: The New Press. globalization. Cities, 22(5), 351–363. Sassen, S. (2006). Cities in a world economy. Thousands Oaks: Pine Forge Press. M. Shtern / Cities 52 (2016) 132–139 139

Shirlow, P. (2001). Fear and ethnic division. Peace Review, 13(1), 67–74. Yacobi,H.(2012).God, globalization, and geopolitics: On west Jerusalem's gated commu- Shirlow, P., & Murtagh, B. (2006). Belfast: Segregation, violence and the city. London: Pluto nities. Environment & Planning A, 44(11), 2705–2720. Press. Yacobi, H., & Pullan, W. (2014). The geopolitics of neighborhood: Jerusalem's colonial Shlay, A.B., & Rosen, G. (2010). Making place: The shifting green line and the development space revisited. Geopolitics , 19(3), 514–539. of greater metropolitan Jerusalem. City & Community, 9(4), 358–389. Yalink, A. (2011). City center — Situation report and the seeds of change. In A. Ramon, A. Shtern, M. (2010). In foreign fields: Patterns of interaction between Israelis and Palestinians Yalink, & A. Vitman (Eds.), Going downtown: Jerusalem city center — History, situation in mixed commercial zones in Jerusalem. Jerusalem: Floersheimer Studies (in Hebrew). report and the revitalization plan (pp. 106–161). Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Sibley, D. (1988). Survey 13: Purification of space. Environment and Planning D: Society Israel Studies (in Hebrew). and Space, 6(4), 409–421. Yiftachel, O. (1992). Planning a mixed region in Israel: The political geography of Arab–Jew- Smith, N. (2002). New globalism, new urbanism: gentrification as global urban strategy. ish relations in the Galilee. Aldershot: Avebury. Antipode, 34(3), 427–450. Yiftachel, O. (1994). The dark side of modernism: Planning as control of an ethnic minor- Tatarsky, A. (2013). Jewish nationalistic violence in Jerusalem: Review. Jerusalem: Ir-Amim ity. In S. Watson, & K. Gibson (Eds.), Postmodern cities and spaces (pp. 216–239). Ox- (in Hebrew). ford: Blackwell. Tzfadia, E., & Yacobi, H. (2011). Rethinking Israeli space: Periphery and identity. New York: Yiftachel, O., & Yacobi, H. (2003). Urban ethnocracy: Ethnicization and the production of Routledge. space in an Israeli ‘mixed city’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 21(6), UNCTAD (2013). The Palestinian economy in east Jerusalem: Enduring annexation, isolation 673–693. and disintegration. New York & Geneva: United Nations. Zukin, S. (1996). The cultures of cities. Cambridge: Blackwell. Valentine, G. (2008). Living with difference: Reflections on geographies of encounter. Zukin, S. (2004). Point of purchase: How shopping changed American culture. New York: Progress in Human Geography, 32(3), 323–337. Routledge. Valentine, G. (2010). Prejudice: Rethinking geographies of oppression. Social & Cultural Geography, 11(6), 519–537. Wilson, H.F. (2011). Passing propinquities in the multicultural city: The everyday encoun- ters of bus passengering. Environment & Planning A, 43(3), 634–649.