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Who Gets to Fish? the Allocation of Fishing Opportunities in Eu Member States

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Who Gets to Fish? the Allocation of Fishing Opportunities in Eu Member States WHO GETS TO FISH? THE ALLOCATION OF FISHING OPPORTUNITIES IN EU MEMBER STATES CONTENTS SUMMARY 06 1 INTRODUCTION 08 1.1 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 08 1.2 WHY DISTRIBUTION MATTERS 09 1.3 THE IMPLICATIONS OF ‘BREXIT’ 10 1.4 OUR APPROACH FOR THE REPORT 10 CHAPTER 2 – CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 14 2.1 INTRODUCTION 14 2.2 WHY MANAGE FISHERIES 14 2.3 MULTI-LEVEL FISHERIES REGULATION 16 2.4 TYPES OF FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 23 CHAPTER 3 – FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 34 INTRODUCTION 34 3.1 WHY USE OBJECTIVES? 34 3.2 FOUNDATIONAL OBJECTIVES, INDICATORS, AND MEASURES 35 3.3 WHAT CAN BE CONCLUDED FROM THESE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS? 50 CHAPTER 4 – KEY DEBATES IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 54 INTRODUCTION 54 4.1 RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT (RBM) 54 4.2 QUOTA MANAGEMENT (QM) 57 4.3 EFFORT MANAGEMENT (EM) 58 4.4 INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS (ITQS) 59 4.5 CO-MANAGEMENT 63 CHAPTER 5 - BELGIUM 70 5.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 70 5.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 72 5.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 76 5.4 ANALYSIS 79 5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 85 5.6 CONCLUSIONS 89 01 CHAPTER 6 - DENMARK 92 6.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 92 6.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 94 6.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 97 6.4 ANALYSIS 100 6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 108 6.6 CONCLUSIONS 111 CHAPTER 7 - FRANCE 116 7.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 116 7.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 118 7.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 120 7.4 ANALYSIS 125 7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 132 7.6 CONCLUSIONS 136 CHAPTER 8 - GERMANY 140 8.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 140 8.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 142 8.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 144 8.4 ANALYSIS 147 8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 152 8.6 CONCLUSIONS 156 CHAPTER 9 - IRELAND 160 9.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 160 9.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 162 9.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 165 9.4 ANALYSIS 169 9.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 176 9.6 CONCLUSIONS 180 CHAPTER 10 - ITALY 184 10.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 184 10.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 186 10.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 188 10.4 ANALYSIS 191 10.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 197 10.6 CONCLUSIONS 199 02 CHAPTER 11 - NETHERLANDS 202 11.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 202 11.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 205 11.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 207 11.4 ANALYSIS 210 11.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 215 11.6 CONCLUSIONS 219 CHAPTER 12 - POLAND 224 12.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 224 12.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 226 12.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 229 12.4 ANALYSIS 231 12.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 237 12.6 CONCLUSIONS 239 CHAPTER 13 - PORTUGAL 244 13.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 244 13.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 246 13.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 249 13.4 ANALYSIS 252 13.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 258 13.6 CONCLUSIONS 262 CHAPTER 14 - SPAIN 266 14.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 266 14.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 269 14.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 272 14.4 ANALYSIS 275 14.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 282 14.6 CONCLUSIONS 284 CHAPTER 15 - SWEDEN 288 15.1 I NTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 288 15.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 290 15.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 293 15.4 ANALYSIS 296 15.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 305 15.6 CONCLUSIONS 308 03 CHAPTER 16 - UNITED KINGDOM 312 16.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 312 16.2 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 314 16.3 OBJECTIVES AND METHOD 318 16.4 ANALYSIS 322 16.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 333 16.6 CONCLUSIONS 340 CHAPTER 17 – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 344 CHAPTER 18 – ANNEX 349 04 SUMMARY FISH STOCKS ARE OWNED BY NO ONE BUT DESIRED BY MANY. HOW, THEN, SHOULD ACCESS TO FISH STOCKS BE DETERMINED? IN THE EU, MEMBER STATES HAVE ANSWERED THIS QUESTION VERY DIFFERENTLY, WITH MANY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS IN USE. WE ANALYSE 12 COUNTRIES IN DETAIL, AND FIND THAT DESPITE DIFFERENT SYSTEM DESIGNS, NONE OF THEM ARE FULLY MANAGING THEIR FISHERIES IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. IN THIS REPORT, WE DESCRIBE THESE SYSTEMS OF FISHING OPPORTUNITIES, ASSESS THEIR PERFORMANCE AGAINST DEFINED OBJECTIVES, AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM. Much has been written on the topic of overfishing and the large gains – environmental, economical, social – of managing fish stocks at larger population levels to support sustained catches. But far less is known, and facts are far harder to come by, on the similarly vexed issue of who gets given the right to fish. This report examines how 12 EU Member States make that decision – and the consequences that this can have. Whether it is the disappearance of fishing communities around the coast, the controversy over larger and larger factory trawlers, or the alarm over the privatisation of a public resource, many of the concerns about contemporary fisheries management are about how the resource is divided, not just the size. To explore this issue of allocating fishing opportunities, we analyse 12 EU Member States in detail: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The systems of fishing opportunities in use vary significantly. Whilst fishers in Belgium and the Netherlands fish many of the same species in the same waters, the government-rationed quotas of the former, and market for ownership rights in the latter, are worlds apart in management approach. To assess whether a system of fishing opportunities is successful, we have developed a framework of 12 objectives (Table 1). Whilst not specifying a precise blueprint for fisheries, a successful system should achieve these objectives to allow fishers to thrive and the public to benefit, all whilst ensuring a good process of decision-making. 05 OBJECTIVES DESCRIPTION Secure Fishing opportunities provide fishers with a sustained, long-term share of fish stock(s) SUMMARY Flexible Fishers can access new fishing opportunities or exchange existing ones Accessible New eligible fishers are granted fishing opportunities upon entry to the industry Viable Fishing operations are financially viable and employees are decently paid Equitable and fair Fishing opportunities are distributed fairly and unique needs are prioritised Publicly owned Fish stocks and fishing opportunities remain publicly owned Meets government objectives Governments use fishing opportunities to meet national and EU policy objectives Limited public expense The cost of managing the system of fishing opportunities is covered by the fishing industry Captures resource rent As a public resource, some of the resource rent is captured Transparent and accountable Decision making on the allocation of fishing opportunities is transparent and accountable Objective The allocation of fishing opportunities follows a systematic and fair process Right governance level Governance empowers local institutions and involves and representative inclusive stakeholder representation In assessing the systems in use based upon these objectives, there is a spectrum of performance across the Member States analysed; each system with some positive signs of performance, but all systems with serious challenges as well. In all Member States, fisheries management is shown to be costly to administer and generates little public revenue. Obtaining access to the fishing industry for new entrants is difficult, and the transparency of many systems of fishing opportunities is low. Our proposals for reform vary by Member State, responding to the contexts of each system including any national objectives for fisheries that have been established. Some of our proposals for Member States include: • a government statement clarifying public ownership of fishing rights • a quota reserve for new entrants • a peer-to-peer quota swapping system • a landing tax differentiated for domestic ports • a reallocation of quota using socio-economic and environmental criteria. Fisheries will continue to face questions over access. This framework presents a path towards fishing in the public interest. 06 07 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 FISHING OPPORTUNITIES 1 - INTRODUCTION Fishing opportunities are the access rights granted to companies, individual fishers and members of the public that allow them to fish. These opportunities come in many different forms, from a fishing licence to operate a 6 metre vessel to the quota held by a large-scale trawler to catch 50 tonnes of herring over the year. Their primary purpose is to prevent overfishing, reduce conflict between users, and ensure good practices are upheld in utilising the natural resource. As the oceans, and consequently fish stocks, are not owned by anyone, governments are responsible for managing these rights – deciding ‘who gets to fish’. In many cases, where stocks are not heavily fished, granting fishing opportunities is straightforward – fishers apply for a licence and they can fish relatively freely if they meet the requirements. However, for commercial fisheries, many fishers want to access the same stocks and there is a risk of overfishing. In these cases, it is common for authorities to distribute fishing rights (e.g. a quota limit on catches/landings) to limit access. Authorities then consider wider socio-economic and environmental implications in how they allocate these fishing opportunities. This process is complex and often political. Difficult questions arise such as on what basis should allocation decisions be made? And who wins and loses under different types of access management? It is these distributional issues related to fishing opportunities that are the focus of this report. Some of the same questions arise in debates about the distribution of fishing opportunities between Member States as well. This aspect of distribution (which has been fixed since the establishment of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy in 1983) is not the focus of the report. Here we look specifically at the fishing opportunities that Member States have available and how they manage them. Aquaculture, inland fisheries, and recreational fisheries are also not covered in this report. Lastly, the level that fishing opportunities are set at and the sustainability of fishing are, in many ways, distributional issues between generations and are also not covered here. Whilst we have written previous studies on the sustainability of fishing opportunities for commercial stocks (‘the size of the pie’),1 it is the means, method and effect of the distribution that concern this report (‘the sharing of the pie’).
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