The Kargil War

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A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDO- PAK WARS

BY DIPTANU SHARMA M.A(HISTORY),B.ED

EDITED BY SAMIR BHATTACHARJEE (RETIRED P.G.T OF HISTORY)

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Contents

Preface ...... 4 The First Indo-Pakistani War ...... 6 Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 ...... 15 Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 ...... 26 The Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan ...... 36 The Kargil War ...... 40 References ...... 63

Preface

Since both India and Pakistan were granted independence by Britain in 1947, the two neighboring nations have engaged in four wars. The first conflict took place soon after independence and is sometimes known as the First Kashmir War. This war was fought between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir from October 21, 1947, to December 31, 1948. The second war, in 1965, also concerned the disputed territory of Kashmir. Their third war, in 1971, occurred when India intervened to end the Bangladesh War of Independence, defeating Pakistan. The fourth confrontation, the Kargil conflict of 1999, was again in Kashmir.

Tension between the two nations remains high and both possess nuclear capability, India since 1974 and Pakistan since 1998. The Kashmir issue remains unresolved. Pakistan had been carved from out of India as a homeland for the Sub- Continent's Muslim population, whose leaders claimed that they would be discriminated against if they remained in the Hindu-majority independent India. The "two nation" theory said that Muslims and Hindus represented two distinct and different people who could not live peacefully together.

The almost constant hostility between the two countries might indicate the truthfulness of this

4 claim. Since 1948, part of Kashimr (Azad Kasmir) has been under Pakistani control, while the rest is a state within India. However, a large military presence has been maintained, which many regard as an occupation force. Various militant groups engage in violence and the Hindu population of the state has actually decreased. Accusations of brutality have been made against the Indian forces, usually by Muslims, and against Muslim militia, usually by Hindus. Many United Nations resolutions have addressed the conflict, several calling for a referendum by the people of Kashmir to determine their own future. Meanwhile, the conflict seems to be unending and is one of the longest lasting international disputes yet to be resolved . The Line of Control, dividing Indian from Pakistani Kashmir as agreed at Simla in 1971.

The First Indo-Pakistani War

Cause Prior to 1815, the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and six Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by the Amir (King) of Afghanistan, combined with those of local small rulers. These were collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput kings, were variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from Kangra state in the Himachal area. Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and invasions of Gorkhas, the hill states fell successively under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. The First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–46) was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over Kashmir, and the East India Company. In the Treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were made to surrender the valuable region (the Jullundur Doab) between the Beas River and the Sutlej River and required to pay an indemnity of 1.2 million rupees. Because they could not readily raise this sum, the East India Company allowed the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh to acquire Kashmir from the Sikh kingdom in exchange for making a payment of 750,000 rupees to the Company. Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of the newly formed princely state of Jammu and

Kashmir, founding a dynasty, that was to rule the state, the second-largest principality during the British Raj until India gained its independence in 1947.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir was one of a number of Indian states that recognized British paramountcy. Prior to the withdrawal of the British from India, the state came under pressure from both India and Pakistan to join them. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh wanted to remain independent and tried to delay the issue. However at the time of British withdrawal the state was invaded by a concentrated force of Pro-Pakistan Tribes from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and regular Pakistani soldiers. This forced him to accede Kashmir to India, who promptly rushed into Kashmir and thus started the war. The accession is still questioned by the Pakistanis. The Pakistani claim was that since the majority of the Kashmiri population is Muslim, the princely state should have been given to Pakistan. The Indian claim arises from both Maharaja Hari Singh's accession, as had happened with all of the other Indian states, and also that 48 percent of Kashmir was Sikh, Buddhist, and Hindu.

Stages of the War The 1st Kashmir war between India and Pakistan started in October 1947 was consisted of 10 phases as discussed bellow.

Initial invasion October 22, 1947–October 26, 1947 (Op Gulmarg)

By 22nd October a large invasion of the Kashmir valley was mounted by the irregular forces, aimed at Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The state forces were defeated and the way to the capital, (Srinagar), was open. There was also a mutiny by state forces in favor of the AZK in Domel. In desperation, Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir asked the Indian Government for Indian troops to stop the uprising. The Indians told him that if Singh signed an Instrument of Accession, allowing Kashmir to join the Indian Union, only then would India rush in troops for the protection of one of its territories. This, the Maharaja promptly did. Following this accession, by the 26th October Indian troops arrived and quickly blocked the advance of the invaders, preventing the imminent sacking of Srinagar. Moreover, many of the irregular forces went home with their loot after plundering local towns and thus failed to press the attack home. In the Punch valley, the Jammu and Kashmir state forces retreated into towns and were besieged.

Indian defense of the Kashmir Valley October 27, 1947–November 17, 1947

Indian forces, rapidly airlifted to Srinagar managed to defeat the irregular forces on the outskirts of

8 the town. This was partially due to an outflanking maneuver by armored cars. Shattered, the AZK were pursued as far as Baramula and Uri and these towns were recaptured. In the Punch valley the sieges of the loyal Jammu and Kashmir state forces continued. Meanwhile, the troops in Gilgit (the Gilgit Scouts) mutinied and this yielded most of the far north of the state to the AZK. They were joined by the Forces of Chitral State, the Mehtar of Chitral had acceded to Pakistan and he sent his forces to fight alongside the Gilgitis because of the close cultural and historical ties between Chitral and Gilgit.

Attempted link-up at Punch November 18, 1947– November 26, 1947

The Indian forces ceased their pursuit of the shattered AZK forces and swung south in an attempt to relieve Punch. This was less successful than hoped, because inadequate reconnaissance had underestimated the difficulty of the roads. Although the relief column eventually reached Punch, the siege could not be lifted. A second relief column reached only Kotli and was forced to evacuate its garrison. Mirpur was captured by the AZK and its inhabitants, particularly the Hindus, were slaughtered.

Fall of Jhanger and attacks on Naoshera and Uri November 25, 1947- February 6, 1948

The Pakistani/AZK forces attacked and captured Jhanger. They then attacked Naoshera successfully. Other Pakistani/AZK forces made a series of unsuccessful attacks on Uri. In the south, a minor Indian attack secured Chamb. By this stage of the war, the front line began to stabilize as more Indian troops became available

Op Vijay: Counterattack to Jhanger Feb 7, 1948- May 1, 1948

The Indian forces launched a counterattack in the south, recapturing Jhanger and Rajauri. In the Kashmir Valley the Pakistani/AZK forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. In the north, Skardu was besieged by Pakistani/AZK forces.

Indian spring offensive May 1, 1948-May 19, 1948

The Indians held onto Jhanger despite numerous counterattacks from the AZK, who were increasingly supported by regular Pakistani Forces. In the Kashmir Valley, the Indians attacked, recapturing Tithwail. The AZK made good progress in the High Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring Leh under siege, capturing Kargil and defeating a relief column heading for Skardu.

Operations Gulab and Erase May 19, 1948-Aug 14, 1948

The Indians continued to attack in the Kashmir Valley sector, driving north to capture Keran and Gurais. They also repelled a counterattack aimed at Tithwail. The forces besieged in Punch broke out and temporarily linked up with the outside world again. The Kashmir State army was able to defend Skardu from the Gilgit Scouts and thus, they were not able to proceed down the Indus valley towards Leh. In August the Chitral Forces under Mata- ul-Mulk besieged Skardu and with the help of artillery were able to take the city. This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh

Operation Duck, August 15, 1948-November 1, 1948

During this time the front began to settle down with less activity on both sides The only major event was an unsuccessful attack by the Indians towards Dras (Operation Duck). The siege of Punch continued.

Operation Easy, November 1, 1948-November 26, 1948

The Indians began gaining the upper hand in all sectors. Punch was finally relieved after a siege of over a year. The Gilgit forces in the High Himalayas, who had initially made good progress, were finally defeated. The Indians pursued as far as

Kargil, before being forced to halt due to supply problems. The Zoji-La pass was forced by using tanks (which had not been thought possible at that altitude) and Dras was recaptured. The use of tanks was based on experience gained in Burma in 1945.

Moves up to cease-fire, November 27, 1948- December 31, 1948

Realizing that they were not going to make any further progress in any sector, the Pakistanis decided to end the war. A UN cease-fire was arranged for the December 31, 1948. A few days before the cease-fire, the Pakistanis launched a counter attack, which cut the road between Uri and Punch. After protracted negotiations, a cease-fire was agreed to by both countries, which came into effect, as laid out in the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948 were adopted by the UN on January 5, 1949. This required Pakistan to withdraw its forces, both regular and irregular, while allowing India to maintain minimum strength of its forces in the state to preserve law and order. On compliance of these conditions a plebiscite was to be held to determine the future of the territory. In all, 1,500 soldiers died on each side during the war and Pakistan was able to acquire roughly two- fifths of Kashmir while India acquired the majority, including the most populous and fertile regions.

Military insights gained from the war. On the use of armor The use of light tanks and armored cars was important during two stages of the war. Both of these Indian victories involved very small numbers of AFVs. These were:

• The defeat of the initial thrust at Srinagar, which was aided by the arrival of 2 armored cars in the rear of the irregular forces. •The forcing of the Zoji-La pass with 11 Stuart M5 light tanks. This may show that armor can have a significant psychological impact if it turns up at places thought of as impossible. It is also likely that the invaders did not deploy anti-tank weapons to counter these threats. Even the lightest weapons will significantly encumber leg infantry units, so they may well have been perceived as not worth the effort of carrying about, and left in rear areas. This would greatly enhance the psychological impact of the armor when it appeared. The successful use of armor in this campaign strongly influenced Indian tactics in the 1962 war, where great efforts were made to deploy armor to inhospitable regions (although with much less success in that case).

Progression of front lines

It is interesting to chart the progress of the front lines. After a certain troop density was reached, progress was very slow with victories being counted

13 in the capture of individual villages or peaks. Where troop density was lower (as it was in the High Himalayas sector and at the start of the war) rates of advance were very high.

Deployment of forces

• The Jammu and Kashmir state forces were spread out in small packets along the frontier to deal with militant incidents. This made them very vulnerable to a conventional attack. India used this tactic successfully against the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) in the 1971 war.

Indo-Pakistan War of 1965

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, also known as the Second Kashmir War, was the culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 1965 and September 1965, between India and Pakistan. The war was the second fought between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir. The war lasted five weeks, resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides and ended in a UN mandated ceasefire. It is generally accepted that the war began following the failure Pakistan's " Operation Gibraltar " which was designed to infiltrate and invade of Jammu and Kashmir .

Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in the region of Kashmir and along the International Border (IB) between India and Pakistan. The war also involved a limited participation from the countries' respective air forces. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001-2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan, during which over a million troops were placed in combat positions in the region. Many details of this war, like those of most Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear and riddled with media biases.

Pre-war escalation

Fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in an area known as the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. Initially involving the border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces, first on March 20 and again in April 1965. In June the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan gaining only 350 square miles (900 km²) of the Rann of Kutch out of its original claim of 3500 sq miles.

After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan is said to have believed that the Indian Army was unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed Operation Gibraltar. For its part, Pakistan claimed to have been concerned by the attempts of India to absorb Kashmir—a state that Pakistan claims as "disputed," into the Indian union by way of Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution allowing the President of India to

16 declare President's Rule in the disputed state. Pakistan was taken aback by the lack of military and moral support by the USA, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. The United States refused to come to Pakistan's aid and declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides.

The war

On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Pakistan administered Kashmir, marking an official beginning to the war. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to a tip the Indian forces received from Kashmiri civilians about Pakistani soldiers crossing the Line of Control (LoC) dressed as local Kashmiris. Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing, as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri, and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having

17 captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.

The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to withdraw to its starting point. On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army," launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated under the defenses of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (Real Answer). The area became known as Patton Nagar (Patton Town) as Pakistan lost/abandoned nearly 100 tanks, mostly Patton tanks obtained from the United States.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered

3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (545 km²) of Indian territory, mostly in Chumb, in the northern sector.

Naval war

The navies of both India and Pakistan played no prominent role in the war of 1965. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a bombardment of the coastal Indian town and radar station of Dwarka under the name of Operation Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. There was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, the Indian fleet from Bombay sailed to Dwarka to patrol off that area to deter further bombardment.

According to Pakistani sources, one maiden submarine, PNS Ghazi kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.

Further south, towards Bombay, there were reports of underwater attacks by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American-supplied Pakistani submarines, but this was never confirmed

Covert operations

There were a couple of covert operations launched by the Pakistan Army to infiltrate Indian airbases and sabotage them. The SSG (Special Services Group) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory and, according to the then Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, more than 180 commandos penetrated the enemy territory for this purpose. Indian sources, however, claim as many as 800- Butt also being 900 commandos were airdropped, though that figure is probably for the duration of whole war. Given that most of the Indian targets (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur) were deep into enemy territory only 11-15 commandos made it back alive and the stealth operation proved ineffective. Of those remaining, 136 were taken prisoner and 22 were killed in encounters with the army, police, or civilians. The daring attempt proved to be a disaster with the commander of the operations, Major Khalid arrested. Ceasefire

On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre- August lines no later than February 25, 1966. The

20 war remained largely inconclusive despite Pakistan suffering relatively more losses, and saw a six year period of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971.

Intelligence failures

Indian miscalculations

Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained a stalemate. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result. The "Official History of the 1965 War," drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22, when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The general replied that most of India's front line ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank loss. It was found later that only 14 percent of India's front line ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did. By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to 80 percent of its ammunition. Air Chief

Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other.The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome," a patronizing attitude sometimes attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion and revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, and on the contrary, provided the Indian Army with enough information for them to learn of "Operation Gibraltar" and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars. The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam," which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnur, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable reason relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik of charge and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue," asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Many authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently viewed that Pakistan Army "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military … the 1965 war was a shock." As a result most of the blame was heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when Pakistan was comprehensively defeated and dismembered by India, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

Consequences of the war

The war created a tense state of affairs in its aftermath. Though the war was indecisive, Pakistan suffered much heavier material and personnel casualties than India. Many war historians believe that had the war continued, with growing losses and decreasing supplies, Pakistan would have been eventually defeated. India's decision to declare ceasefire with Pakistan caused some outrage among the Indian populace, who believed they had the upper hand. Both India and Pakistan increased their defense spending and Cold War politics had taken root in the subcontinent. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. India slowly started aligning with the Soviet Union both politically and militarily. This would be cemented formally years later, before the Bangladesh Liberation War. In light of the previous war against the Chinese, the performance in this war was viewed as a "politico- strategic" victory in India. Many Pakistanis, rated the performance of their military positively. September 6 is celebrated as Defense Day in Pakistan, commemorating the successful defense of Sailkot against the Indian army. The Pakistani Air Force's performance was seen in much better light compared to that of the Pakistani navy and army. However, the end game left a lot to desire, as Pakistan had lost more ground than gained and more importantly did not achieve the goal of occupying Kashmir, which has been viewed by many impartial sources as a defeat

24 for Pakistan.Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning during Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was further seen as a raw deal in Pakistan, though few citizens realized the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Under the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's then foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority—if not invincibility—of its armed forces.But Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war created a political liability for Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.And with the war creating a huge financial burden, Pakistan's economy, which had witnessed rapid progress in the early 60s, took a severe beating.

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan. Bengalileaders accused the government for not providing adequate security for East Pakistan, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was apprehensive of this situation and the need for greater autonomy for the east led to another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a major military conflict between India and Pakistan. The war is closely associated with the Bangladesh Liberation War (sometimes also referred to as Pakistani Civil War). There is an argument about exact dates of the war. However, the armed conflict on India's western front during the period between December 3, 1971 and December 16, 1971 is called the Indo-Pakistani War by both the Bangladeshi and Indian armies. The war ended in a crushing defeat for Pakistani military in just a fortnight. Background

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation War, a conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis. The war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan, thus securing a simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Pakistani parliament. Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented Six Points and claimed the right to form the government. After the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to give premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur, President Yahya Khan called in the military, which was made up largely of West Pakistanis.

Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several days of strikes and non-cooperation movements, Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of March 25, 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested and taken to West Pakistan.

On March 27, 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a rebellious major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of Mujibur. In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Boiddonathtola of Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, an elite paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. A guerrilla troop of civilians, the Mukti Bahini, was formed to help the Bangladesh Army.

India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War

On March 27, 1971, the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, expressed full support of her government to the Bangladeshi struggle for freedom. The Bangladesh-India border was opened to allow the tortured and panic- stricken Bangladeshis safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya, and Tripura established refugee camps along the border. Exiled Bangladeshi army officers and voluntary workers from India immediately

27 started using these camps for the recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas.

As the massacres in East Pakistan escalated, an estimated 10 million refugees fled to India, causing financial hardship and instability in the country. The United States, a long and close ally of Pakistan, continued to ship arms and supplies to West Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi launched a diplomatic offensive in the early fall of 1971 touring Europe, and was successful in getting both the United Kingdom and France to break with the United States, and block any pro-Pakistan directives in the United

Nations security council. Gandhi's greatest coup was on August 9, when she signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, greatly shocking the United States, and providing India with insurance that the People's Republic of China would not be involved in the conflict. China, an ally of Pakistan, had been providing moral support, but little military aid, and did not advance troops to its border with India.

Operation of the Mukti Bahini caused severe casualties to the Pakistani Army, which was in control of all district headquarters. As the flow of refugees swelled to a tide, the economic costs for India began to escalate. India began providing

28 support, including weapons and training, for the Mukti Bahini, and began shelling military targets in East Pakistan.

India's official engagement with Pakistan

By November, war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border with East Pakistan had begun. The Indian military waited for winter, when the drier ground would make for easier operations and Himalayan passes would be closed by snow, preventing any Chinese intervention. On November 23, Yahya Khan declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told his people to prepare for war.

On the evening of Sunday, December 3, the Pakistani air force launched sorties on eight airfields in north-western India. This attack was inspired by the Arab- Israeli Six Day War and the success of the Israeli preemptive strike. However, the Indians had anticipated such a move and the raid was not successful. The Indian Air Force launched a counter-attack and quickly achieved air superiority. On the Eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini (Allied Forces); the next day, Indian forces responded with a massive coordinated air, sea, and land assault on East Pakistan.

Yahya Khan counter-attacked India in the West, in an attempt to capture land which might have been used to bargain for territory they expected to

29 lose in the east. The land battle in the West was crucial for any hope of preserving a united Pakistan. The Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the west and made some initial gains, including capturing around 5,500 sq miles of Pakistan territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir and the Pakistani Punjab sector were later ceded in the Shimla Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill). The Indian Army described its activities in East Pakistan as:

The Indian Army merely provided the coup de grace to what the people of Bangladesh had commenced—active resistance to the Pakistani Government and its Armed Forces on their soil.

At sea, the Indian Navy proved its superiority by the success of Operation Trident, the name given to the attack on Karachi's port. It also resulted in the destruction of two destroyers and one minesweeper, and was followed by the successful Operation Python. The waters in the east were also secured by the Indian Navy. The Indian Air Force conducted 4,000 sorties in the west while its counterpart, the PAF put up little retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses, as it had already incurred huge casualties in the conflict. In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed achieving air superiority in the east. Faced with

30 insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in just under a fortnight. On December 16, the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered. The next day India announced a unilateral ceasefire, to which Pakistan agreed.

American involvement

The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. President Richard Nixon denied getting involved in the situation, saying that it was an internal matter of Pakistan.

Several documents released from the Nixon Presidential Archives show the extent of the tilt that the Nixon Administration demonstrated in favor of Pakistan. Among them, the infamous Blood telegram from the U.S. embassy in Dacca, East Pakistan, stated the horrors of genocide taking place. Nixon, backed by Henry Kissinger, is alleged to have wanted to protect the interests of Pakistan, as he was apprehensive of India. Archer Blood was promptly transferred out of Dacca. As revealed in the newly declassified transcripts released by the State Department,President Nixon was using the Pakistanis to normalize relations with China. This would have three important effects: Opening rifts between the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam, opening the potentially huge Chinese market to American business and creating a foreign policy coup in time to win the 1972 Presidential Elections. Since Nixon believed the existence of Pakistan to be critical to the success of his term, he

31 went to great lengths to protect his ally. In direct violation of the Congress- imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan and routed them through Jordan and the Shah-ruled Iran.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations George H. W. Bush branded the Indian action as "aggression" at the time and took up the matter in the UN Security Council. The United States believed that should Pakistan's armed forces in the east collapse, India would transfer its forces from there to attack West Pakistan, which was an ally in the Central Treaty Organization. This was confirmed in official British secret transcripts declassified in 2003.Nixon also showed a bias towards Pakistan despite widespread condemnation of the dictatorship even amongst his administration, as Oval Office records show. Kissinger wanted China to attack India for this purpose.

When Pakistan's defeat seemed certain, Nixon sent the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal from the Gulf of Tonkin.Enterprisearrived on station on December11, 1971. Originally, the deployment of Enterprise was claimed to be for evacuating U.S. citizens and personnel from the area. Later, Nixon claimed that it was also as a gesture of goodwill towards Pakistan and China. Enterprise's presence was considered an intimidation, and hotly protested by India and

32 the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union called this U.S. move one of Gunboat

Diplomacy. On December 6, and December 13, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean from December 18 until January 7, 1972. Effects

The war led to the immediate surrender of Pakistani forces to the Indian Army. Bangladesh became an independent nation, and the third most populous Muslim country. Loss of East Pakistan demoralized the Pakistani military and Yahya Khan resigned, to be replaced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Mujibur Rahman was released from West Pakistani prison and returned to Dhaka on January 10, 1972.

The exact cost of the violence on the people of East Pakistan is not known. R.J. Rummel cites estimates ranging from one to three million people killed.Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000.

On the brink of defeat around December 14, the Pakistani Army and its local collaborators systematically killed a large number of Bengali doctors, teachers, and intellectuals, part of atrocities against the Hindu minorities who constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals. Young men, who were seen as

33 possible rebels, were also targeted, especially students.

The cost of the war for Pakistan in monetary and human resources was high. India took 93,000 prisoners of war that included Pakistani soldiers as well as some of their East Pakistani collaborators. It was one of the largest surrenders since World War II. India originally wished to try them for war crimes for the brutality in East Pakistan, but eventually acceded to releasing them as a gesture of reconciliation. The Simla Agreement, created the following year, also saw most of Pakistani territory (more than 13,000 km²) being given back to Pakistan to create "lasting peace" between the two nations.

Important dates

• March 7, 1971: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declares that, "The current struggle is a struggle for independence," in a public meeting attended by almost a million people in Dhaka. • March 25, 1971: Pakistani forces start Operation Searchlight, a systematic plan to eliminate any resistance. Thousands of people are killed in student dormitories and police barracks in Dhaka. • March 26, 1971: Major Ziaur Rahman declares independence from Kalurghat Radio Station, Chittagong. The message is relayed to the world by Indian radio stations.

• April 17, 1971: Exiled leaders of Awami League form a provisional government. •December 3, 1971: War between India and Pakistan officially begins when West Pakistan launches a series of preemptive airstrikes on Indian airfields. • December 14, 1971: Systematic elimination of Bengali intellectuals is started by Pakistani Army and local collaborators. •December 16, 1971: Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi, supreme commander of Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, surrender to the Allied Forces (Mitro Bahini) represented by Lieutenant General Aurora of the Indian Army at the surrender. Bangladesh gains independence.

The Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

After the end of the first Indo-Pak War of 1947-48, a cease Fire Line (CFL) was established from Manawar in Jammu to Khor (NJ9842) in Ladakh just short of the Karakoram glaciers. No precise line was extended beyond this. Under the Shimla Agreement the CFL was redefined and named the Line of Control (LoC). In the late 1970s the Pakistanis started to show the area as belonging to them. Both sides responded by creeping in to establish posts. In 1984 the Pakistanis started sponsoring mountaineering expedition from this area and their maps started showing the Siachen area as their territory. In 1987 the Pakistanis intruded and established a feature, naming it Qaid Post, at 6452 meters on the Saltoro ridge overlooking the defences on the Bilafond Pass. From this post they would snipe at our helicopters and defences. The posts at Amar and Sona, which were maintained by air, became untenable. The decision was made to retake Qaid Post.

THE BATTLE

The Siachen glacier is one of the worlds most inhospitable terrain. It is a frozen river of ice with temperatures from -35º Celsius in summer to -60º Celsius in winter. Add to it unseen crevasses, avalanches and howling winds and it has all the appearances of hell. Many a times the inclement weather would clamp down for days at end, leaving the Indian Air Force as the only lifeline to the outside world. On 18 April 1987 the Pakistanis from Quaid Post fired on our troops at Sonam. One JCO and one OR of 5 Bihar was killed. The eviction of the Pakistanis became essential. On May 29 a patrol of 8 JAK LI was asked to probe the approaches to Quaid Post. Led by 2nd Lt. Rajiv Pande they started through a difficult route, a sheer almost 90º wall of 500 meters at 1100 hours.

They were undetected till they were about 30 meters from the post. The first man over the ice wall was Lance Havildar Mulk Raj Sharma who equipped with only a pick axe established a number of footholds on the vertical ice wall. The patrol inched its way onwards the post. At the last moment they were sighted by the enemy who opened fire with a heavy machine gun. The heavy fire at close range instantaneously killed 2nd Lt. Pande, Lance Havildar Sharma and four others. Three men survived to tell the tale. However they did not die in vain, as they had laid a rope to the top. A pall of gloom descended on 8 JAK LI which gave way to

37 cold fury. A new plan to capture the post was launched. The task force was led by Major Varinder Singh. It consisted of 2 Officers, 3 JCOs and 50 ORs. Code-named Operation Rajiv in honor of 2nd Lt. Rajiv Pande VrC, it was launched on 23 June 1987.

Due to bad weather the force took nearly four hours to travel one km. It took some time to locate the rope causing the attack to be postponed. The evening of June 24th, the task force located the rope and climbed the ice wall. Having established a base, one team under Subedar Harnam Singh was sent to the attack. En route they came across the bodies of their fallen comrades. At 0330 hours on June 25th they were detected and fired upon. The base team could not provide covering fire as the extreme cold had jammed the weapons. The attack was aborted. It was now more than 48 hours and the limited food and water supply was running out. Cold and exhausted the troops sucked at ice to quench their thirst. On the night of June 25/26th, a second attack led by Subedar Sansar Chand was launched. Once again they were detected and repulsed.

Interesting Facts about cold in the Siachen Glacier; The soldiers in Siachen region are appointed at around 18,000 to 23,000 feet above the sea level. The temperature falls below up to minus 55 degrees celsius because there are approximately 22 Glaciers in this area.

The situation in Siachen Glacier is so severe that soldiers don’t get sufficient oxygen essential for their survival. Here the soldiers have to walk in the snow till the knees. A healthy soldier can also walks a few steps only due to extreme weather conditions. In Siachen Glacier; rifles are thawed frozen and machine guns primed with boiling water. Soldiers are bound to suffer from hypothermia, frostbite and chilblains. The soldier's own sweat can become his enemy as it converts into ice in his gloves and shoes and frostbite increases the severity of the soldiers. In the Siachen Glacier; the soldiers need to have food of more than 4000-5000 calories per day but they don’t get it. Inadequate food availability reduces the weight of the soldiers between 5 to 10 kg in 3 to 4 months. The special food of these soldiers is prepared by the scientists of the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). To get the drinking water the soldiers need to melt the ice on the stove but in the absence of adequate fuel the availability of the safe drinking water is also a challenge for them. One surprising fact is that the main reason behind the death of the soldiers is not the fight between the India and Pakistan but it is extreme weather conditions. According to an estimate, so far 2500 soldiers of both countries have lost their lives here without any gun battle

The Kargil War

After its crushing defeat by India in the 1971 war, Pakistan came to terms with the hard reality that it could not take away Kashmir by force. Kashmir was relatively quiet for about eighteen years in the absence of any Pakistani machination. However, Islamabad began to show its true colour once again in late 1980s.Since 1989 it took resort to the policy of low intensity conflict to bleed India indirectly through a strategy of "thousand cuts" and try to achieve its long-term objective of snatching Kashmir away from India. As part of this plan, Pakistan initiated cross- border terrorism against India by arming and training various groups of Kashmir militants, and providing them with political, economic and military support. These militants were to carryout subversive activities in Kashmir with the ultimate objective of the secession of the State from India. After a decade- long proxy war of this kind, Pakistan launched a limited scale-war against India in mid-1999 at Kargil sector of Kashmir.

Pakistani Lieutenant general Shahid Aziz, and then head of ISI analysis wing, has confirmed

40 there were no mujahideen but only regular Pakistan Army soldiers who took part in the Kargil War. There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian- controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire

The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilising forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing most of the territories held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after international pressure The 1999 Kargil War took place between May 8, when Pakistani forces and Kashmiri militants were detected atop the Kargil ridges and July 14 when both sides had essentially ceased their military operations. It is believed that the planning for the operation, by Pakistan, may have occurred about as early as the autumn of 1998.

The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan- backed armed forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to repel the intrusion left 527 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363 wounded, according to December 1 statistics by Defense Minister George Fernandes. Earlier Government figures stated that

696 Pakistani soldiers were killed. A senior Pakistani police official estimated that approximately40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani side of the line of control.

By 30 June 1999 Indian forces were prepared for a major high-altitude offensive against Pakistani posts along the border in the disputed Kashmir region. Over the previous six weeks India had moved five infantry divisions, five independent brigades and 44 battalions of paramilitary troops to Kashmir. The total Indian troop strength in the region had reached730,000. The build-up included the deployment of around 60 frontline aircraft.

The Pakistani effort to take Kargil occurred after the February 1999 Lahore summit between then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpayee. This conference was believed to have de-escalated the tensions that had existed since May 1998. The major motive behind the operation was to help in internationalising the Kashmir issue, and for which global attention had been flagging for some time. The intrusion plan was the brainchild of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf and Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff. They obtained only an 'in principle' concurrence, without any specifics, from Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani Prime Minister.

LOCATION

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains.

The First Kashmir War (1947–48) concluded with the LOC bisecting the Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.

The town of Kargil is located 205 km from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to−48 °C (−54 °F).

An Indian national highway (NH 1) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh. The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 metres16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as5,485 meters (18,000 ft). Kargil was targeted partly because the terrain was conducive to the preemptive seizure of several unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well- prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender on the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures. Kargil is just 173 km (107 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants.

INFILTRATION BY PAKISTAN

During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC

44 and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. During February 1999, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some empty posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the Pakistani elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries . According to General VP Malik, the bulk of the infiltration occurred in April 1999.

INDIA’S RESPONSE

Two "shepherds' in the area of Banju in the Batalik sector first noticed the intrusions in the Kargil sector on 3 May 1999. That was reported to 3PUNJAB, the battalion responsible for the security of that area. 3 PUNJAB launched two Subsequently more patrol parties and troops were sent to assess the situation and contain the intrusion. The army's initial assessment in early May was that, about 200 to 3'00 Pakistani intruders had infiltrated across the LoC and were occupying certain remote and unmanned areas. By 17 May, there was increasing evidence

45 that armed intruders had occupied the heights in the gaps between the Indian defended areas in all sub-sectors of the Kargil sector in various strengths - Batalik(200-250); Kaksar (80-100); Dras (60-80); and Mashkoh (200-250). By the last week of May the Indian Army realized that the Pakistani intruders had occupied as may as 70 positions along the LoC. They also came to the belated realization that well over the initial estimate of 800 intruders were involved inthe operation. Worse still, the intruders had occupied a number of strategic positions directly above the road from Kargil to Leh and were in a position to cut off the northern portions of Kashmir from the rest of the State. Aerial surveillance revealed that the intruders were equipped with snow mobiles, artillery and substantial stock of supplies The initial aim of the Indian forces was to establish contact, assess the extent of intrusions, and contain the enemy. Consequently, a series of attacks were launched in the ensuing days on features held by the Pakistanis. In fact, the Indian Army had begun its offensive against the intruders on 8 May. But because of the lack of ground cover and the intruders' command of the heights, the advancing Indian troops became easy targets for Pakistani snipers and gunners.

After taking substantial casualties, India realized that the intruders were heavily armed and well entrenched and their eviction would require very

46 deliberate measures including greater firepower and use of airpower.

On 25 May 1999, the high-powered Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)met in New Delhi to take stock of the situation and undertake a comprehensive political- military analysis of the emergent problem. In the meeting it was realized that Kargil intrusions posed military as well as political and diplomatic challenges. The political directive given to the Indian armed forces was to evict the pockets of intrusion and restore the sanctity ofthe LoC.No time frame was given. CCS also approved the application of airpower against the entrenched intruders. However, it strictly stipulated thatLoC would not be crossed and if it became necessary to cross it, approval of the Cabinet had to be sought.

INDIAN ARMY OPERATION

The Indian Army detected the intrusions between May 3-12. From May 15 - 25, 1999, military operations were planned, troops moved to their attack locations, artillery and other equipment were moved in and the necessary equipment was purchased. Indian Army’s offensive named Operation Vijay was launched on May 26, 1999. Indian troops moved towards Pakistani occupied positions with air cover provided

47 by aircraft and helicopters. Operation Vijay in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir during the summer months of 1999was a joint Infantry- Artillery endeavor to evict regular Pakistani soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) who had intruded across the Line of Control (LoC) into Indian territory and had occupied un- held high-altitude mountain peaks and ridgelines. It soon became clear that only massive and sustained firepower could destroy the intruders’ sangars and systematically break their will to fight through a process of attrition and, in the process, enable the gallant infantry men to close in with and evict the intruders. Thus began a unique saga in the history of The employment of Artillery firepower in battle.The first major ridgeline to fall was Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999 which wascaptured after several weeks of bitter fighting. The attacks were preceded by sustained fireassaults from over one hundred Artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers firing in concert. Interfering with the assault. The 155 mm Bofors medium guns and 105 mm Indian field guns in the direct firing role destroyed all visible enemy sangars and forced the enemy to abandon several positions. Thousands of shells, bombs and rocket warheads wrecked havoc and prevented the enemy from the arcs of fire trailing behind the Bofors high explosive shells and the

Grad rockets provided an awesome sight and instilled fear into the minds of Pakistani soldiers. The capture of the Tololing complex paved the way for successive assaults to be launched on the Tiger Hill complex from several directions. Tiger Hill was re- captured on July 5, 1999 and Point4875, another dominating feature to the west of

Tiger Hill and jutting into Mashkoh Valley, was re-captured on July 7, 1999. Point 4875 has since been re-named "Gun Hill" in honour of the stupendous performance of the Gunners in the Drass and Mashkoh sub-sectors. Over 1,200 rounds of high explosive rained down on Tiger Hill and caused large-scale death anddevastation. Once again, the Gunners of the Indian Artillery fired their guns audaciously in thedirect firing role, under the very nose of Pakistani artillery observation posts (OPs), without regard for personal safety.

Even 122 mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs)were employed in the direct firing role. Hundreds of shells and rocket warheads impacted on the pinnacle of Tiger Hill in full view of TV cameras and the nation watched in rapt attention the might of the Regiment of Artillery. While the nation's attention was riveted on the fighting in the Drass sector, steady progress was. being made in the Batalik sector despite heavy casualties. In the Batalik sector, the terrain was much tougher and the enemy was far more strongly entrenched. The containment battle itself took almost a month. Artillery OPs were established on dominating heights and sustained Artillery fire was brought down on the enemy continuously by day and night allowing him no rest. Point 5203 was re-captured on June 21, 1999 and Khalubar was re-captured on July 6, 1999.

Within the next few days, further attacks were pressed home against the remaining Pakistani posts in the Batalik sub-sector and these fell quickly after being pulverised by Artillery fire.

Once again, Artillery firepower played an important part in softening the defenses and destroying the enemy's battalion headquarters and logistics infrastructure.

The Indian Artillery fired over 250,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately, 5,000 Artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars . Such high rates of fire over long periods had not been witnessed any where in the world since the second World War.

AIR OPERATIONS

From May 11 to May 25, ground troops supported by the Air Force tried to contain the threat, assessed the enemy dispositions and carried out various preparatory actions. Entry of the Air Force into combat action on May 26 represented a paradigm shift in the nature and prognosis of the conflict. In Operation Safed Sagar, the Air Force carried out nearly 5,000 sorties of all types over 50-odd days of operations. The Western Air Command conducted the three-week- long exercise Trishul three weeks before Kargil. During Trishul, the IAF flew 5,000 sorties with 300 aircraft using 35,000 personnel and engaged targets at high elevation in the Himalayas. The IAF claimed to have flown 550 sorties in Kargil, though just about 80 were on or close to the target. Operations in this terrain required special training and tactics. It was soon realised that greater skills and training were needed to attack the very small/miniature targets extant,

51 often not visible to the naked eye. The shoulder- fired missile threat was there . An IAF Canberra recce aircraft was damaged by a Pakistani Stinger fired possibly from across the LoC.

On the second and third day of the operations, still in the learning curve, the IAF lost one MiG-21 fighter and one Mi-17 helicopter to shoulder-fired missiles by the enemy. In addition, one MiG-27 was lost on the second day due to engine failure just after the pilot had carried out successful attacks on one of the enemy's main supply dumps. These events only went to reinforce the tactics of the IAF in carrying out attacks from outside the Stinger SAM envelope and avoiding the use of helicopters for attack purposes. Attack helicopters have a certain utility in operations under relatively benign conditions but are extremely vulnerable in an intense battlefield. The fact that the enemy fired more than 100 shoulder fired SAMs against IAF aircraft indicates not only the great intensity of the enemy air defenses in the area but also the success of IAF tactics, especially after the first three days of the war during which not a single aircraft received even a scratch.

The terrain in the Kargil area is 16,000 to 18,000 feet above sea level. The aircraft are, therefore, required to fly at about 20,000 feet. At these heights, the air density is 30% less than at sea level. This causes a reduction in weight that can be carried

52 and also reduces the ability to maneuver as the radius of a turn is more than what it is at lower levels. The larger radius of turn reduces maneuverability in the restricted width of the valley. The engine’s performance also deteriorates as for the same forward speed there is a lesser mass of air going into the jet engine of the fighter or helicopter. The non-standard air density also affects the trajectory of weapons. The firing, hence, may not be accurate. In the mountains, the targets are relatively small, spread- out and difficult to spot visually, particularly by pilots in high speed jets.

The MiG-23s and 27s are optimised for attacking targets on the ground. They can carry a load of 4 tones each. This could be a mix of weapons including cannon, rocket pods, free- fall and retarded bombs and smart weapons. It has a computerised bomb sight which enables accurate weapon delivery. These planes were, therefore, ideal for use in the mountainous terrain of Kargil.

However, on May 27, the MiG-27 flown by Flt Lt Nachiketa, while attacking a target in Batalik sector, developed an engine trouble and he had to bailout. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja, in a MiG-2l, went out of the way to locate the downed pilot and in the process was hit by a Pakistani surface to-air missile (SAM). He ejected safely but his body bearing gun- wounds was returned subsequently. The state-of-the-art Mirage-2000s were used for electronic warfare, reconnaissance and ground attack. This fighter delivers its weapons with pinpoint accuracy. In reconnaissance and ground attack. This fighter delivers its weapons with pinpoint accuracy. In addition to carrying free-fall bombs, it also fires the laser-guided bomb with deadly effects. Infect, it was this weapon that caused considerable devastation to Pakistani bunkers on the ridges atTiger Hill and MunthoDhalo. In the Mirage attack on MunthoDhalo, Pakistani troops suffered180 casualties. Because of the need to engage Pakistani targets in the valleys and on ridges, the slower helicopter gunship became an important requirement. The load-carrying Mi-17 was modified to carry 4 rocket pods with air-to-ground rockets. This helicopter proved effective in engaging Pakistani bunkers and troops. On May 28, while attacking Point 5140 in Tololing sector, one helicopter and its crew were lost to a Stinger heat- seeking missile. Thereafter, because of the number of SAMs being fired, helicopters resorted to evasive tactics but persisted with the attacks.

The operations restricted to Kargil area did not lend themselves to the use of air power. There was a constraint of not crossing the Line of Control (LoC) to the Pakistan side. The IAF was, therefore, not at liberty to destroy the Pakistani supply lines and smash the logistic bases across the LoC. However, such attacks were done on Pakistani facilities on the Indian side of the LoC. The targets were identified along with the Army and engaged by day and by night in precision attacks by Mirage 2000s and Jaguars. Supply lines, logistic bases and enemy strong points were destroyed. As a result, the Army was able to pursue To obviate the threat from SAMs, bombing was done accurately from 30,000 feet above sea level or about 10,000 feet above the terrain. In these high level attacks, the infantryman does not see his own fighters and, therefore, feels that air support is not there. It is estimated that in operation Vijay, about 700 intruders were killed by air action alone.

The IAF has intercepted a number of enemy wireless transmissions indicating the effectiveness of IAF attacks Pakistan Air Force fighters were picked up on the airborne radar of our fighters but the PAF planes did not cross to the Indian side of the LoC. Nevertheless, as a precaution, IAF , strike aircraft were accompanied byfighter escorts. After all, in the recent past no war has been won without

55 control of the air space in which operations are conducted.

NAVAL OPERATION

While the Army and the Air Force readied themselves for the battle on the heights of Kargil, Indian Navy began to draw out its plans. Unlike the earlier wars with Pakistan, this time the bringing in of the Navy at the early stages of the conflict served to hasten the end of the conflict in India's favor. In drawing up its strategy, the Navy was clear that a reply to the Pakistani misadventure had to be two-pronged. While ensuring safety and security of Indian maritime assets from a possible surprise attack by Pakistan, the Indian imperative was that all efforts must be made to deter Pakistan from escalating the conflict into a full scale war. Thus, the Indian Navy was put on a full alert from May 20 onwards, a few days prior to the launch of the Indian retaliatory offensive. Naval and Coast Guard aircraft were put on a continuous surveillance and the units readied up for meeting any challenge at sea. Time had now come to put pressure on Pakistan, to ensure that the right message went down to the masterminds in that country. Strike elements from the Eastern Fleet were sailed from Visakhapatnam on the East Coast to take part in a major naval exercise called 'SUMMEREX' in the North Arabian Sea.

This was envisaged as the largest ever amassing of naval ships in the region. The message had been driven home. Pakistan Navy, in a defensive mood, directed all its units to keep clear of Indian naval ships. As the exercise shifted closer to the Makaran Coast, Pakistan moved all its major combatants out of Karachi. It also shifted its focus to escorting its oil trade from the Gulf in anticipation of attacks by Indian ships.

As the retaliation from the Indian Army and the Air Force gathered momentum and a defeat to Pakistan seemed a close possibility, an outbreak of hostilities became imminent. Thus the naval focus now shifted to the Gulf of Oman. Rapid reaction missile carrying units and ships from the fleet were deployed in the North Arabian Sea for carrying out missile firing, anti- submarine and electronic warfare exercises. In the absence of the only aircraft carrier, Sea Harrier operations from merchant ships were proven. The Navy also readied itself for implementing a blockade of the Pakistani ports, should the need arise. In addition, Naval amphibious forces from the Andaman group of islands were moved to the western sea-board.

In a skilful use of naval power in the form of ‘Operation Talwar’, the ‘Eastern Fleet’ joined the ‘Western Naval Fleet’ and blocked the Arabian sea routes of Pakistan. Apart from a deterrent, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to sustain itself if a full fledged war broke out.

END OF THE WAR

Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in deescalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, who was then an aide to President Bill Clinton, reported that US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. Following the Washington accord of 4 July 1999, when Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on. The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last

58 week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on 26 July. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas(Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, Pakistan had to withdraw under international pressure and due to pressure from continued fighting at battle front and left India in control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July1972 as per the Simla Agreement.

TIME LINE OF THE EVENTS OF THE WAR

3 May Pakistani intrusion in Kargil reported by local shepherds. 5 May Indian Army patrol sent up; Five Indian soldiers captured and tortured to death. 9 May Heavy shelling by Pakistan Army damages ammunition dump in Kargil 10 May Infiltrations first noticed in Dras, Kaksar, and Mushkoh sectors Mid- May Indian Army moves in more troops from Kashmir Valley to Kargil Sector. 26 May IAF launches air strikes against infiltrators. 27 May IAF loses two fighters – MiG-21 and MiG- 27;. Flt Lt Nachiketa taken POW. 28 May IAF MI-17 shot down by Pakistan; four air crew dead.

1 June Pakistan steps up attacks; bombs NH 1A. 5 June Indian Army releases documents recovered from three Pakistani soldiers indicating Pakistan's involvement 6 June Indian Army launches major offensive in Kargil 9 June Indian Army re-captures two key positions in the Batalic sector 11 June India releases intercepts of conversation between Pakistani Army Chief Gen Pervez Musharraf, while on a visit to China and Chief of General Staff Lt Gen Aziz Khan in Rawalpindi, as proof of Pakistani Army's involvement 13 June Indian Army secures Tololing in Dras 15 June U.S. President Bill Clinton, in a telephonic conversation, asks Pakistani Prime MinisterNawaz Sharif to pull out from Kargil 29 June Indian Army captures two vital posts: Point 5060 and Point 5100 near Tiger Hill. 2 July Indian Army launches three-pronged attack in Kargil. 4 July Indian Army recaptures Tiger Hill after an 11-hour battle. 5 July Indian Army takes control of Dras. Sharif announces Pakistani army's withdrawal from Kargil following his meeting with Clinton 7 July India recaptures Jubar Heights in Batalik. 11 July Pakistan begins pullout; India captures key peaks in Batalik.

14 July Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee declares Operation Vijay a success. 26 July Kargil conflict officially comes to an end. Indian Army announces complete eviction of Pakistani intruders.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KARGIL WAR The Kargil crisis had several layers of significance for both Pakistan and India, and generally these were very different for the two countries. For Pakistan, Kargil was significant primarily for the following reasons: • While Pakistan appears to have concluded that Kargil-like1 operations are not legitimate in the current international environment, violence in the form of low intensity conflict (LIC) continues to be seen as a legitimate tool for attaining political objectives.i • Kargil was yet another example of the failure of Pakistan’s grand strategy. In Kargil, as in the 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan failed to comprehend that the international environment would not support its position and consequently did not anticipate or plan for the unanimous international opprobrium and isolation that ensued.

For India, Kargil was significant for very different reasons:

• India confirmed its belief that Pakistan is a reckless, adventuristic, risk- acceptant, untrustworthy state. Moreover, the Pakistani military came to be seen as a substantial cause of the problems in India-Pakistan relations, as it is understood to be the real power in Pakistan that also happens to be virulently anti-India. • Kargil motivated India to reconsider whether to engage Pakistan diplomatically on the Kashmir issue. Any Indian inclination to resolve the Kashmir problem with an acknowledgment of Pakistan’s equity, in the manner desired by Islamabad, has been vitiated. • Kargil strengthened the widespread perception that India’s intelligence infrastructure has endemic deficiencies. It has reinforced the Indian commitment to a more robust forward defense and to improving logistics and intelligence capabilities to prevent future Pakistani incursions. • India realized that international attention to Kashmir is not altogether undesirable, particularly when such attention focuses on Pakistani misadventures. India, however, will resist international involvement in the final disposition of Kashmir, particularly if such involvement is directed toward “new map-making” in the disputed state. • Kargil was India’s first televised war. India made use of the media to shape domestic and international response in its favor.

References

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