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Structure of Soviet Intelligence Unit Is Outlined COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE ORGANIZATION SOVIET UNION - CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE K.G.B. Secretariat: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS SECTION I STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE (K.G.B.) Yuri V. Andropov, Chairman I I 1st Chief Directorate 2nd Chief Directorate 3rd Directorate 7th Directorate 9th Directorate Foreign Intelligence Internal Security Armed Forces Surveillance Kremlin Guards Gen. A/eksandr M. Maj. Gen. 1. A. Fadeikin Maj. Gen. V. 1. Aladin Maj. Gen. Sakharovsky V, Y.Chekalov „Border troops 8th Directorate Administration Technical and Lie:Jt. Gen. Pavel Communications and Personnel Research Zyryanov Maj. Gen. Serafim N. Lyalin Deputy Chiefs, 1st Chief Directorate •111101143:341;611261011r3141311MORNIMICSMILZIGUar Maj. Gen. Yasily V. ill. Mozzhechkov g Maj. Gen. Mikhail S. GeOgra?hiC al arae4s "Dezinfcrmation" _easiness" Tsymbal Anatoly I. Maj. Gen. Ivan I. Kor2vii, Agayants The New York Times Organizational chart of the State Security Committee of the Soviet Union, which employs 600,000 to one million people. The First Chief Directorate for Foreign Intelligence, left, is comparable to the Central Intelligence Agency. Structure of Soviet Intelligence Unit Is Outlined Special to The New Tdrk Times WASHINGTON, Nov. 9—The The agency prints its own Soviet Union's State Security house organ, called Chekistsky Committee, which is the na- Sbornik. The magazine has a tion's principal intelligence select and limited circulation. agency, employs 600,000 to one The present name of the million people inside and out- State Security Committee, known in Russian as K. G. B. side the Soviet Union, accord- for Komitet Gosudarstvennoi ing to Western estimates. bezopasnosti, dates from 1954. Only one of its divisions, It is the successor organiza- the First Chief Directorate for tion to the security apparatus Foreign Intelligence, is com- started by Lenin as the Cheka, parable in function to the Cen- then reorganized periodically tral Intelligence Agency. This under different names, repre- division was the one in charge sented by the initials G.P.U. of Lieut. Col. Yevgeny Y. Runge, N.K.V.D., and M.V.D. an agent who recently defected Its officers still refer to them- to the United States. selves as Chekists, a term both Other functions handled by fearful and glamorous in the the Soviet State Security Com- Russian context., mittee have their equivalents At times in Soviet history the in the United States in the security police have played a Federal Bureau of Investiga- powerful role in the nation's tion, the National Security politics, notably in the era from Anatoly I. Lazarev . .Agency, the Secret Service, the Yuri V. Andropov '1938 to 1953 when Lavrenti P. Immigration and Naturaliza- Beria headed the apparatus and tion Service and, the Bureau of served as one of Stalin's closest Customs. associates. Thus the Soviet agency is Beria was executed within also concerned with internal months of Stalin's death, and security and subversive activ- the post-Stalin leaders have ity. When it finds it necessary, shown marked concern about it 'observes Soviet citizens and etting the security apparatus !foreign residents at their places ever play the dominant role in of work and in their private policy-making that it achieved activities. earlier. The agency cracks codes and communications used by other governments, provides body- guards for high political figures and manages technical labora- tories to devise new equipment for intelligence and other pur- poses. The 200,000 border guards also fall under the con- trol of the, security apparatus. 'A Museum in Moscow The organization has its own museum in Moscow, displaying mementoes of past security ex- ploits. The exhibits include the parachtite used by the Ameri- can U-2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960. The mu- seum is not open to the public. United States by the Secret Service. Western analysts, however, A separate division directs .consider the security agency at the border guards, commanded least as important as the mili- by Lieut. Gen. Pavel I. Zyrya- tary in the factional line-up of nov. Their closest equivalent I in the United States is the Iforces .in Soviet politics. No Naturalization and Immigration 'longer an instrument of brute Service. Like the United States terror, the agency, is still an Bureau of Customs, the border awesome and mysterious organ- troops also guard against the ization. importation of subversive litera- From defectors and other ture. sources, Western intelligence There is an administrative organizations have pieced to- and personnel division that gether, the. structure of the manages ,the agency's head- Soviet' agency -and identified quarters on Moscow's Dzerzhin- key personnel. sky Square. The headquarters Officially the ' agency is a includes Lubyanka prison, Government organization at where important prisoners are ministry level. Since the Soviet interrogated. Government is secondary at Finally, the agency main- every level• to the Communist tains technical laboratories and party structure, the true chan- research facilities at Pushkino, nel of authority is through the northeast of Moscow, to devise Administrative Organs section new techniques and devices of of the party's Central Commit- `-eurveillance, sabotage and tee secretariat, headed by the has been the head of the Sec- analysis. general secretary, Leonid I. lond Chief Directorate, though The First directorate is di- Brezhnev. recent reports indicate he may rectly involved with foreign The present chairman of the governments, for this is the Soviet agency is a close polit- have been replaced. division that dispatches agents ical ally of Mr. Brezhnev, Yuri The Third Directorate, head- abroad. V. Andropov, a professional ed by Maj. Gen. I. A. Fadeikin, Under General Sakharovsky also learned surveillance and party official. Mr. Andropov was known during World War are three deputy directors, counterstuveillance, secret writ- was named to this post last II as Smersh, an acronym for Maj. Gen. Vasily V. Mozzhech- ing, safe "drops" for niessages May in a shake-up that ob- Russian words meaning "death kov, who was publicly identi- and "brush" contacts. In such servers analyzed as a move to to spies." It is charged with fied last April while visiting contacts material is passed un- bring the agency more closely counterintelligence within the the United States under a pseu- obtrusively between two agents under Mr. Brezhnev's control. Soviet. armed forces. The State donym; Maj. Gen. Mikhail S. as they brush against each Structure Is Described Security. Committee is thus the Tsymbal, who is known to have other in a: public. place. Under the chairman are a senior partner, over the armed made periodic trips outside the From Moscow colonel. Runge series of chief directorates, forces' own military intelligent Soviet Union under the name was sent to Leipzig and then to each headed by an intelligence agency, or G.R.U., since the Rogov, and Maj. Gen. Ivan I. Halle in East Germany before officer with the rank of major security agents keep the mili- Agayants, newly promoted to moving on to Munich and Frank- general or lieutenant general. Itary intelligence itself under sur- the post of deputy director. furt in West Germany for ad- The First Chief Directorate, veillance. Counterintelligence in vanced training. Unlike most, il- General Mozzhechkov is be- legal agents he was trained .on headed by Lieut. Gen. Aleksandr the United States armed serv- lieved to be in charge of per- M. Sakharovsky, employs about ices is a responsibility of the the job rather than in special sonnel and administration. Gen- schools in Moscow. 10,000 persons in the collec- services themselves. eral Tsymbal. was formerly tion and analysis of foreign The fourth, fifth and sixth Early in 1956 he married Wa- head of- the directorate's de-, lentina Rusch, an East German intelligence. directorates are not known to partment overseeing "illegals,' The Second Chief Director- exist now. Formerly they shared woman who had already been in the internal security respon- agents who live abroad under recruited into the Soviet intel- ate is concerned with political the deep cover with no appar- subversive activities, economic sibilities, dividing up political, ligence service. economic and other crimes ent link to the Soviet Union. With $1,200 advanced them espionage, sabotage and tree- The present head of the "illeg- !son, embezzlement and thefts that have now been grouped by the intelligence agency, Mr. under the Second directorate. als" department Is A.natoly I. and Mrs. "Gast" settled in Co- of government property. Some Lazarev. of its functions therefore cor- Thee Seventh Chief Direct- logne and sought to open respond to those of the Federal orate is the division that car- General Agayants , was for a dry-cleaning establishment. Bureau of Investigation, local ries out actual surveillance, the many years the head of the However the money proved in- police forces and regulatory shadowing of suspicious per- "disinformation" department of adequate and they were forced agencies such as the Food and sons, the clandestine penetra- the First directorate, the ap- to borrow. In time Colonel Drug Administration or the tion of offices and the recruit- paratus charged with dissem- Runge, switched to the vending- Narcotics Bureau. More than ment of potential agents among inating false or misleading in- machine business. 100,000 agents are believed to foreigners. This division , is formation with an intent to de- His monthly pay as an agent report through this division. known to employ 3,000 per- eive foreign countries. The was 380 rubles (about $420), Lieut. Gen. Oleg M. Gribanov sons in' 'Moscow alone. Guards department is reports to have which was deposited to a bank at embassies and buildings a' -staff of 40 or 50 writers account in his name in Moscow. where foreigners live in the and editors in Moscow. He supported himself and his Soviet capital report to the The work of the First direc- family entirely on the proceeds Seventh directorate, headed by torate is known to be divided of his West German business.
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