AMIET/AL-NEAM MARKET - : BASELINE STUDY MINATINAA FI TAMASOKONA

STRENGTHENING NONVIOLENCE AS A STRATEGY FOR PEACEBUILDING AND PROMOTING SOCIAL COHESION IN THE ABYEI AREA FEBRUARY 2020

CONTACT:

Entisar Abdelsadig Rebecca Besant Country Director, Sudan Regional Director, East and Central Africa Search for Common Ground Search for Common Ground [email protected] [email protected] Baseline Study | February 2020 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 3

ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES 3

METHODOLOGY 4

Community Survey 4

Focus Group Discussions 4

Key Informant Interviews 4

Limitations 5

THE ABYEI CONTEXT 5

The View from Juba 5

The View from 6

The View from Abyei 8

Amiet/Al-Neam Market Case Study 11

FIELD RESEARCH FINDINGS 12

Conflict Dynamics 12

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Actors 13

Conflict Sensitivity of Peacebuilding Efforts 14

RECOMMENDATIONS 14

ANNEXES 16

Baseline Study | February 2020 3

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a decade after independence, Juba and Khartoum are no closer to a resolution on the disputed Abyei region. Political negotiations on Abyei have stalled and high level mechanisms and grassroots institutions that were created to address the dispute have proven ineffective. They have either stagnated or failed to disentangle local antagonisms over land and belonging from the machinations of authorities in Juba and Khartoum. As a result, the conflict in Abyei persists, while domestic challenges in Sudan and have taken priority. In looking back at the many clashes in Abyei over the past decade, the killing of the Ngok Dinka paramount chief in 2013 remains the watershed moment that ruptured relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities.

Juba and Khartoum’s future policies towards Abyei, however, are likely to be shaped not only by this history but also by the evolving political and economic landscape in both countries, as well as local dynamics. Sudan’s transition to democracy in 2019 and the gradual, albeit somewhat precarious, implementation of a peace agreement in South Sudan have created a rare window of opportunity to stabilize the region. Similarly, confidence-building measures at the grassroots level, such as the creation of the Amiet/Al-Neam shared market in 2016, have raised hopes for an improved environment. But both countries need to overcome major internal hurdles and community level trust issues in order to bring lasting peace to Abyei.

This rapid conflict assessment highlights the reality on the ground, as well as in the broader region. It takes stock of the major stakeholders in the Abyei conflict, considering their interests and their abilities to foster peace. This assessment traces the origins of the Abyei conflict and provides insight into current dynamics.

Assessment Objectives Search for Common Ground (Search), in partnership with Badya Centre for Integrated Development Services (Badya), is implementing the project “Minatinaa fi Tamasokona (Strong in Our Social Cohesion): Strengthening Nonviolence as a Strategy for Peacebuilding and Promoting Social Cohesion in the Abyei Area” with generous support from the US Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs. This is an 18-month project with the overall goal to advance inclusive collaboration on conflict transformation, human security issues, and socioeconomic development between Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities in Abyei.

To support the overall objective of the project and deepen our understanding of conflict drivers in Abyei, Search contracted an external consultant to conduct an assessment with the following objectives:

~~ Collect baseline values for the project indicators in the targeted locations ~~ Build on understanding of key conflict trends in the area, while mapping existing conflict dispute mechanisms ~~ Identify potential connectors and dividers supporting and undermining peace among the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka ~~ Assess the capacity of the program to ensure “Do No Harm” Baseline Study | February 2020 4

METHODOLOGY

The assessment team used a combination of open source materials, key informant interviews, qualitative focus group discussions, and a community survey of 401 individuals of different ages and ethnicities in order to capture a comprehensive, diverse set of opinions and perspectives. Field research was carried out in Juba, , Khartoum, Dair Junubi, Amiet/Al-Neam, Diffra, Fif, Quli, Misiri, and Makinis, among other locations in Sudan, South Sudan, and Abyei.1

COLLECTION METHOD TARGET PARTICIPANTS SAMPLE SIZE

Community survey Community members 401 respondents

Focus group discussions Community members 100 people (19 groups)

Joint community peace committee Focus group discussions 22 (JCPC) representatives

Key informant interviews (field) Local authorities, JCPC representatives 18

Key informant interview (remote) INGO/IO representatives 10

Community Survey Survey data was collected in December 2019 and January 2020 in several high-traffic areas and markets. Overall, the research team surveyed 401 respondents in Abyei. Responses were collected in the Amiet/Al- Neam Market area (48%), Da’ir Junubi (24%), Makinis (13%), and a few other localities of southern Sudan (15%).

The sample skewed largely male (61%, 39% female), which is likely due to data collection needing to be done in busy, public areas which tend to be male dominated. The sample distribution also skewed young, with the bulk of the respondents under the age of 40. The majority (60%) of respondents worked in farming and petty trade. Most respondents were married (62%), while a minority were single (36%) or divorced (2%). The sample primarily consisted of people who identified as Ngok Dinka (47%) and Misseriya (44%). Respondents from other groups, such as Nuer and Zaghawa, constituted 10% of the total sample.

Focus Group Discussions Focus groups reached out to community members in order to gain a more detailed, nuanced understanding of the conflict in Abyei. Separate FGDs were conducted for the Joint Community Peace Committee (JCPC) members to collect indicator data and to build on the understanding of their roles in the region.

Key Informant Interviews Key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with local authorities and members of the JCPCs between December 2019 and January 2020. From July 2019 into the early stages of collecting field data, KIIs were

1 Additional details on the questionnaire and demographics may be found in Annex 2. Baseline Study | February 2020 5

conducted remotely with stakeholders from the international community, including INGOs and UNISFA, who shared their thoughts on the conflict and the challenges of working in Abyei. KIIs also involved representatives from the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities and experts working in the region.

Limitations This assessment has several methodological limitations. First, the onset of the rainy season, which limits transportation, and sporadic violent attacks in the target areas delayed field data collection. These delays created a gap between the initial open-source review and the collection of field data such as the KIIs, the community survey, and FGDs.

Therefore, these research findings should be considered in light of this dynamic context and a timeline that was punctuated by episodic violence. For instance, the community survey was conducted just after the killing of three Misseriya in the Amiet/Al-Neam Market area, but before an attack that killed over 15 Ngok Dinka in a nearby village.

THE ABYEI CONTEXT

The View from Juba South Sudan’s engagement in Abyei cuts two ways. On the one hand, any open conversation on Abyei could risk putting the spotlight back on South Sudan’s border challenges and may come as a distraction when its government is trying to convince the international community that it is on a path towards stability. On the other hand, Abyei also offers South Sudan the opportunity to leverage an international border dispute – using force and a militarized response – to strengthen their regional position at a time of economic distress.

Domestically, South Sudan is in the middle of a complex peace process, which only just resulted in a tentative peace deal, between an incumbent government led by President Salva Kiir and an opposition under ex-First Vice President . Following a ceasefire in 2018 and an extended pre-transitional phase under the framework of the Revised Agreement on Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the warring parties launched a security sector reform (SSR) process that would, in principle, lead to the creation of a national unified army. Successfully integrating forces that have historically aligned with Kiir and Machar would require a decrease in the overall number of armed forces in the country. There has been enormous pressure on both men to participate in an ongoing cantonment and training exercise that paves the way for the assembly, registration, and vetting of forces. Most armed groups and commanders who sided with Machar have returned to the country, from their bases across the border in Sudan, to join this process. Meanwhile, some reports suggest that the government has been recruiting in , a state that borders Abyei, in order to boost its ranks.2

Despite what appear to be positive yet slow steps towards peace, there are indications that the incumbent government in Juba has been stalling implementation of the peace process. Therefore, any future failure of the incipient peace deal would likely be due to the government’s reluctance, rather than the difficulty of implementing complex reforms. The looting of national resources, particularly crude oil, in order to prop up patronage networks is as alive today as it ever has been. A UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan reported

2 UN Panel of Experts Report for South Sudan, 22 November 2019. https://www.undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2019/897 Baseline Study | February 2020 6

that the government of South Sudan has pre-sold “almost all of its oil.” Other reports suggest that the government may have pre-financed close to $300 million of crude sales in the first half of 2019 alone.3 Per the 2019-20 budget figures, there are indications that at least some of this incurred debt has been used to bolster support for Kiir, particularly in Dinka-majority areas, such as the greater Bahr el Ghazal.

The continued pillage by a small cabal of senior political and military leaders has impacted the government’s ability to mend relations with communities within South Sudan, as well as with the Ngok Dinka of Abyei. A significant portion of South Sudan’s population remains outside the country as refugees, and data from late 2018 indicates that Abyei remains a major transit point for cross-border migration, with a net flow towards Sudan from South Sudan.4 Additionally, the Ngok Dinka’s historical sense of abandonment by the SPLM and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) still runs deep,5 driven partly by the government’s failure to deliver services and public benefits to their community in Abyei. Ngok Dinka are likely to continue feeling marginalized, since they are a minority Dinka group living on the fringes of the state.6

These domestic stresses notwithstanding, there are also indications that the incumbent Kiir administration believes it possesses a unique moment to assert itself both domestically and regionally. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni has been preoccupied with his country’s deteriorating relations with Rwanda, as well as his efforts to shore up support for his re-election.7 Meanwhile, with Omar Bashir removed from power in Khartoum, the two foreign actors that were most essential in realizing the 2018 peace deal are no longer involved in this round of negotiations. These shifting regional politics have provided President Kiir with additional leverage.

As Khartoum’s political transition slowly edges forward, Juba is poised to act opportunistically in its dealings with Sudan, including in Abyei. The GoSS has remained rigid in demanding that a solution to that dispute will require a political resolution. In July 2019, Deng Alor, a prominent Ngok Dinka official and veteran of CPA-era negotiations, was tasked with handling the Abyei file, which suggests that the GoSS is amenable to dialogue, albeit on its own terms. Deng Alor accompanied President Kiir to meet with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in Khartoum in August 2019, which demonstrated that the new arrangements between the two countries would now include Abyei. In September 2019, Omar El Degeir, the president of the Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) and a prominent figure in the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of civilian and opposition Sudanese groups, met with Deng Alor to understand the GoSS’s perspective on Abyei. At the time of writing, it is anticipated that a joint border commission will be formed to re-open bilateral consultations on Abyei. However, the Juba-based government has made it clear that it will not go back to the beginning, rather it will pursue Sudan’s acceptance of the October 2013 referendum vote.

The View from Khartoum Following the ouster of Omar Al-Bashir in April 2019, two political deals were struck. The first of which was within the TMC, which includes NISS Director Salah Gosh and FVP and Minister of Defense Awad Ibn Ouf.

3 Africa Confidential, 30 August 2019 “Juba’s payday loan habit”https://www.africa-confidential.com/index.aspx?pageid=7&arti - cleid=12732 4 IOM DTM, 27 February 2019 “Flow Monitoring: South Sudan / Sudan through Abyei. 1 July – 31 December 2018” https://www.iom.int/ south-sudan-flow-monitoring-south-sudan-sudan-through-abyei-1-july-31-december-2019 5 Joshua Craze, June 2011, “Creating Facts on the Ground: Conflict Dynamics in Abyei” page 60, Small Arms Survey.h ttp://www. smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-26-Conflict-Dynamics-in-Abyei.pdf 6 Interview with prominent Ngok Dinka community representative, September 2019. 7 Africa Confidential, 14 September 2018 “Wave of protests rattle Museveni”https://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/12425 / Wave_of_protests_rattles_Museveni Africa Confidential, 22 March 2019 “Sibling rivalry turns ugly”https://www.africa-confidential.com/ article/id/12591/Sibling_rivalry_turns_ugly Baseline Study | February 2020 7

The second deal was between the TMC and the FFC. Yet, each deal has been fraught with disagreements, as their signatories have failed to compromise on the extent to which power should be handed over to a civilian-led government. The re-emergence of the Islamist Counter-Revolutionaries, a religious group with deep ties to the Popular Defense Force, the Popular Police Force, and the Popular Security Force (parallel security agencies to those of the government), has made political negotiations a three-way tussle.8 Collectively, these developments have ramifications both for Khartoum and the future of Abyei.

The absence of a clear break from the past means that key influencers from Khartoum may continue to impact the situation, as might the former Bashir regime’s Abyei policies. Mohamed “Hemeti” Hamdan, the current deputy head of the TMC, commands the (RSF), a paramilitary force that has been implicated in human rights violations in Darfur, Yemen, and Khartoum.9Hemeti descends from the northern Rezeigat, which is an ethnic group that shares a long, convoluted history of co-existence with the Misseriya. The two sides have similar languages, identities, and roots and are typically thought of as Arabs who sympathize with Khartoum. Misseriya who migrate to Abyei are said to consider Hemeti a potential ally in future negotiations with the Ngok Dinka.10 However, Hemeti’s personal ideas on Abyei remain unclear.11 While he has said that Abyei would unequivocally be considered Sudanese territory, it remains to be seen if the new political dispensation in Khartoum forces him to behave differently.12

Under Bashir, Sudan’s interests in Abyei centered on oil in Diffra and recruiting the Misseriya and Rezeigat to serve as Khartoum’s proxies in internal and external wars. These are considerations that may feature as part of Khartoum’s future calculation on Abyei. As Abyei’s oil reserves are believed to be past peak production, Khartoum may encourage more rapid exploitation of the remaining reserves. Additionally, its pipeline infrastructure could be used to service South Sudan’s Tharjath oil field if it were to be revived. That would allow the north to continue to collect pipeline fees well past the depletion date of its Abyei fields.13

Additionally, Misseriya lands span areas of Darfur and , and in exchange for foot soldiers, Sudan has historically supported their land claims in Abyei. Some Misseriya chiefs have been prominent National Congress Party (NCP) members, and there are some reports that Khartoum officials are continuing to maintain strong trade and business ties to the Misseriya, which could impact Khartoum’s engagement with Juba on Abyei.14

However, Khartoum and the Misseriya also share a long, complicated relationship. In the past, Misseriya chiefs were exploited by the NCP to undermine the authority of their senior leaders. Subsequent resentment and distrust festered between some in the Misseriya command and in Khartoum, with many Misseriya seeing Khartoum’s officials as unreliable and uncommitted to their interests in Abyei.15 It remains to be seen whether the new government in Khartoum can overcome this distrust by pursuing a newly defined Abyei agenda.

8 Pax Sudan Alert No. 1, 10 May 2019, https://www.paxforpeace.nl/publications/all-publications/sudan-alert-no-1 9 HRW, 9 September 2015, “Men with no Mercy” https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-at- tacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan Nicholas Heras, 27 October 2017, “Sudan’s controversial Rapid Support Forces bolster Saudi efforts in Yemen” Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/sudans-controversial-rapid-support-forces-bolsters-saudi-ef- forts-yemen/ 10 Interview with senior government official in South Sudan, September 2019. 11 Al Jazeera, 6 June 2019, “Who are Sudan’s RSF and their commander Hemeti?” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/su- dan-rsf-commander-hemeti-190605223433929.html 12 https://www.nyamile.com/2019/08/24/abyei-is-indisputably-a-sudanese-territory-general-hemeti/ 13 International Crisis Group, 12 October 2007, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock”. 14 Interviews with senior government officials in South Sudan, September 2019. 15 Joshua Craze, June 2011, “Creating Facts on the Ground: Conflict Dynamics in Abyei” pg 38, Small Arms Survey. Baseline Study | February 2020 8

The View from Abyei On the ground, the root causes of the Abyei dispute between the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka communities can be traced back to four primary issues: (i) the marginalization of the Ngok Dinka within local government since the 1950s; (ii) the progressive annexation of their territory by the Misseriya, with the support of successive Khartoum regimes, dating back to the 1970s; (iii) the abrogation by Khartoum of the referendum promised in the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 that would have allowed Abyei to choose to remain with the north or join South Sudan; and (iv) the mobilization of Misseriya militias in the civil war in the 1980s and 1990s as a continuation of the policy of annexation.16 These historical legacies have led to increased contestation between communities over land that had historically been shared for grazing and/or farming. As polarization deepened over the years, some communities tried to convert what had been “shared secondary” rights over access to and use of communal land into exclusionary ownership of land. This move resulted in many north-south borderlands, like Abyei, becoming the flashpoints they are today.17

Abyei is one component of a larger dialogue between Sudan and South Sudan and the countries continue to maintain a small military presence there. Given that these forces are far from the centre and are often badly provisioned (especially on the South Sudan side), there is poor command, providing forces the opportunity to engage in criminal acts. Such events can sometimes reach locals, as was the case in July 2019, when an attack against cattle raiders near Amiet/Al-Neam Market resulted in several civilian casualties and the death of at least one UNISFA peacekeeper. Those involved in the fighting were reported to be members of the SSPDF.18

The following conflict typology highlights the major stakeholders, causes, and conflict resolution actors at the grassroots level in Abyei today.19

CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT TYPE MAIN CONFLICT ACTORS CONFLICT CAUSES ACTORS

(Non-oil) resource competition largely Changing livestock Ngok Dinka, Misseriya JCPC, Market authorities in the form of ownership cattle rustling

Non-representative Sudan, South Sudan, political system AJOC, UNISFA, the Referendum dispute Ngok Dinka, Misseriya two governments Voter rights and eligibility

16 Douglas H. Johnson, 14 January 2011, “The road back from Abyei”, page 2. http://riftvalley.net/publication/road-back-abyei#.XX- UQMGaLnIU 17 Douglas H. Johnson, 2010, “When Boundaries become Borders: The impact of boundary-making in Southern Sudan’s frontier zones” pages 24-26, Rift Valley Institute. http://riftvalley.net/publication/when-boundaries-become-borders 18 Interview with UNISFA officials, September 2019 19 The typology has been adopted and modified from the original, which was published in Rift Valley Institute’s (2006) “Local peace processes in Sudan”, page 22. http://riftvalley.net/publication/local-peace-processes-sudan Baseline Study | February 2020 9

Absence of law and order

Presence of major economic hub, such Market leaders, prisons/police Criminality (unidentified) Criminal groups as Amiet/Al-Neam guards, joint local authorities

Lack of jobs and unemployed youth

The following tables presents the Abyei peace process: the participants, their interests, and their influence or authority.20

STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS IN ABYEI STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE

Ngok Dinka – nine ~~ Maintaining movement of people ~~ Weak presence in Amiet/Al-Neam chiefdoms largely and goods across the Kiir/Bahr Market – unequal trading ability in southern Abyei el-Arab river, which is important with the Misseriya. Numerically for economic well-being of larger in southern Abyei populations on both sides ~~ Most likely to self-regulate and ~~ Regain land access and benefit derive strength from political and from oil production military connections in Juba ~~ Reincorporation of Abyei into ~~ Although a UNSC Resolution (2445) Bahr el Ghazal (South Sudan) in 2018 empowers the Abyei Area through political agreement Administrative authorities, in the ~~ Dialogue with Misseriya absence of state services, Ngok to curb cattle raids Dinka traditional chiefs continue to appear to have the final word on day-to-day, local decisions

Misseriya – Presence ~~ Maintain freedom of movement, ~~ Traders dominate Amiet/ in northern Abyei access to grazing grounds, and Al-Neam Market with chiefs based in protection of cattle and trade ~~ Unclear how much continued El Mughlad, north of critical to their livelihoods influence they are likely to derive the Abyei box. Nomad from links in Khartoum. Some movement in the dry indications that the Misseriya may season (~December- be attempting to create a parallel April) to and from the administration in and around Diffra south in search of water and pasture

Government of Sudan ~~ Facilitation of continued oil ~~ Key partner in commitment exploration and production to peace in Abyei ~~ Release major military ~~ Force projection through the resources for use elsewhere presence of “Oil Police” in Abyei box ~~ Control over oil fields ~~ Extend territorial influence through tacit endorsement of incursions by proxy armed groups

20 The following table on stakeholders and interests has been adopted and modified from Rift Valley Institute’s (2006) “Local peace processes in Sudan”, page 81. http://riftvalley.net/publication/local-peace-processes-sudan Baseline Study | February 2020 10

Government of ~~ Maintaining gateway to ~~ Key partner in the commitment South Sudan south to encourage return of to peace in Abyei. Most likely to displaced South Sudanese leverage high level discussions ~~ Support Ngok Dinka land to their advantage claim over Abyei

UNISFA ~~ Strengthening local policing capacity ~~ Almost universally recognized ~~ Monitoring and verifying as being critical to maintaining redeployment of armed peace and stability between forces from Abyei area communities in Abyei ~ ~~ Facilitating delivery of aid and free ~ Presence permits operationalizing movement of humanitarian personnel the JCPC and other local conflict resolution mechanisms ~~ Participating in relevant ~ Abyei area bodies ~ Leading watchdog on local conflict dynamics ~~ Providing de-mining assistance ~~ Protecting civilians and when requested, providing security for oil infrastructure

Abyei Joint Oversight ~~ Interface between the ~~ Originally created as a temporary Committee (AJOC) north and south measure and weak by most ~~ Supervision and oversight of accounts. Remains largely de- the Abyei area and tasked activated despite membership with helping create joint and presence in the two capitals administration and policing ~~ AJOC not accepted by the local Ngok institutions among other things Dinka community because recognizing AJOC means de facto acceptance of joint administration for Abyei, which jeopardizes the Ngok Dinka claim that Abyei belongs to them ~~ As of writing, AJOC representatives in north of the field are being reshuffled, suggesting a possible change in direction by Khartoum

Joint Community ~~ Settlement of local disputes around ~~ Useful to address very localized Peace Committee blood compensation, cattle rustling disputes, but heavily dependent on (JCPC) – includes equal ~~ Offer means to communicate UNISFA for continued operations participation from the directly with communities ~~ Perceived as a civil society Ngok Dinka and the effort that has little bearing on Misseriya, who meet higher political discussions weekly in Todach

Community Protection ~~ Responsible for security in Amiet/Al- ~~ Presence of CPC stations in Abyei, Committees (CPC) also Neam Market and in southern towns Agok, and other locations serves as a referred to as Joint crime deterrent. But only organized Protection Committees in southern Abyei in Ngok Dinka – volunteer or areas. In northern Abyei, Sudan has insisted on a joint police, and absent community-based police that, has put 150 “oil police” in the supported by UNISFA Diffra Oil Complex, who are also in charge of local policing work Baseline Study | February 2020 11

“Ajaweed” – noble, ~~ Given high social stature, ~~ The Ajaweed’s ability to resolve knowledgeable people these individuals use “judia” or disputes – particularly around land, with expertise on customary forms of arbitration family affairs, murders, attacks of tribal traditions, who to both retain their stature and farmers/herders, tribe, sexual and often act as mediators mediate between parties physical violence, theft and commerce – was cited by survey respondents or facilitators as being critical to resolving grudges and settling conflicts “with psychological reconciliation”

Amiet/Al-Neam Market Case Study Peace markets, like Amiet/Al-Neam, have existed in the greater area since the 1990s, where they have served as both a rendezvous point for Ngok Dinka, Misseriya, and Rezeigat traders and as forums for interpersonal peace dialogues. The 2002 Abyei grassroots peace process followed the 1999 Wunliet Peace Conference in recognizing the migration rights and co-existence of some Misseriya sections and Ngok Dinka. Leading up to South Sudan’s independence in 2011, goods from Sudan began to flood markets along the border. Despite the economic volatility that ensued in South Sudan after 2011, relations between the countries improved and led to the formal establishment of the Amiet/Al-Neam Market in 2016. This was possible due to a number of factors, including but not limited to the need for a northern corridor linking Ngok Dinka to wage labor in the north, access to food and other goods, a place to sell livestock, and the ability to resettle in areas north of Abyei town.21

Although Amiet/Al-Neam was meant to serve as a “peace market,” reality has been far more complex. The market was intended to foster a sense of community, but it has also attracted violence and crime, which is partly a function of poor governance in Abyei. Disputes persist between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities over the location of the market and security-related challenges abound both within the market premises and beyond.22 In addition, Amiet/Al-Neam Market tends to draw three types of sellers – large scale merchants with large warehouses, local traders or peddlers, and farmers or herders or local craftsmen selling their own products. The market also entices big traders, whose interests do not always align with locals’.23

Another point of controversy has been the dominance of Misseriya traders in the market , which has allowed the Misseriya to manage the marketplace’s land allocation for shops. Collections made by the Misseriya within the market also make it easier for them to pay blood compensation and settle property compensation disputes than it is for the Ngok Dinka.24 However, while the Misseriya maintain the upper hand financially, the Ngok Dinka own the land beyond Amiet/Al-Neam and have strength in numbers. This dynamic leads to a complex, symbiotic relationship in which neither side can upset the status quo too radically without provoking a counter-reaction from the other. Stability thus remains a functional arrangement that largely works for both communities.

Outside the market, revenue collections are controlled by both communities. Armed individuals and militias in Abyei town and further south tax commodities heading to and from the market. Similarly, the movement of goods (and people, particularly South Sudanese) to or from the north is regulated. Local political or military elites, either from the Ngok Dinka community or the Misseriya community, profit from these collections.

21 Mark Bradbury, John Ryle, Michael Medley, Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, 2006, “Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study” pages 73-76. Rift Valley Institute. Oystein H. Rolandsen (2019) “Trade, peacebuilding and hybrid governance in the Sudan-South Sudan borderlands” Conflict, Security and Development, 19:1, 79-97, https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2019.1561628 22 Interview with Abyei based NGO and UNISFA representatives, September 2019 23 Rolandsen (2019). 24 Interview with Abyei based NGO and UNISFA representatives, September 2019 Baseline Study | February 2020 12

Road safety features are a key concern for buyers and sellers alike, yet they never seem to cross a locally acceptable threshold, allowing Amiet/Al-Neam Market to continue to be a draw. As a “site of interaction and negotiations,” Amiet/Al-Neam Market has evolved to accommodate local “security arrangements and arbitration mechanisms,” a dynamic that puts primacy on the need for access to resources over a desire to build peace.25 FIELD RESEARCH FINDINGS

Conflict Dynamics Survey respondents believed that relationships in their communities are worse than in the past26 and that cohesion between various societal factions is strained.27 Furthermore, 81% of respondents stated that there had been instances of violent conflict in their immediate communities within the last six months.28 A simple majority of survey respondents believed that violence is on an upward trend.29

FINDING 1: Residents of Abyei feel that trust and social cohesion are relatively low and that violence is on the rise in their communities.

However, despite the fact that north-south migration across the border region tends to be the most violent period, respondents felt that this most recent season had been more peaceful than last year.30 These sentiments were expressed by respondents from different tribes and ages, although older Misseriya respondents shared more pessimistic views of the recent migration season. The dichotomy between perceptions of peaceful migration and deterioration in community relations should be noted. Residents feel that trust is relatively low and violence is on the rise, but they also feel that migration-related resource conflicts have been handled more peacefully than in previous years.

This indicates that migration-related resource issues, like water and land use, still underlie many conflicts in Abyei, yet violent conflicts also go beyond those resource disputes. Water scarcity and access were a primary theme during focus groups, as participants detailed the extent to which resource conflicts crossed all segments of their communities, regardless of tribal divisions. Moreover, the JCPCs, UNISFA, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been utilized to prevent conflicts over resources from escalating into armed violence. The escalation from conflict to violence occurs at the nexus of resource disputes (land and water), negative tribalism, and the Sudan-South Sudan political divide.

25 Rolandsen (2019). 26 71% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “when compared to the past, relationships within my community are not good.” (Question 1.1) 27 67% of respondents strongly agree/ agree with the statement “cohesion among different elements of society is not good.” (Question 1.2) 28 81% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “there have been instances of violent conflict in my community within the last six months.” 29 54% of respondents said “yes” to the question “has violence been increasing recently?” 30 71% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “compared to last year, migration and movement between the north and south was more peaceful.” Baseline Study | February 2020 13

Dinka-Missireya Communication FINDING 2: While available "Communication in the past 6 months was good." mechanisms have mitigated re- source disputes, tribal identities and historical grievances are OTHER both key drivers of armed vio- lence and barriers to improving social cohesion. NO 32% YES 68%

DINKA This finding was corroborated by our survey in which NO 38% YES 62% respondents cited tribal identity as a primary cleavage around MISSERIYA which conflict is centered.31 FGD participants added that NO 64% YES 36% the long history of Ngok Dinka viewing Misseriya as usurpers of land and Misseriya viewing Ngok Dinka as inferior humans remains ever-present. Furthermore, these stereotypes are often fueled by politics in Juba and Khartoum. However, in contrast, most respondents believed that people in their immediate communities generally speak about other tribes using positive terms.32 Coupled with focus group and interview data, this might be another example of “othering,” whereby one group sees itself as inherently good and another group as bad, or even malicious.

Underscoring this lack of social cohesion, 54% of survey respondents stated that they did not find it important or necessary to engage with people from the other tribe. 33 The survey results suggest that those who did not think it was important for them to interact with the other tribe also thought that inter-tribal relations had improved. Conversely, those who found it important to interact with others were in fact more worried about the state of relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya.

Despite these historical dynamics, community members noted the perception of improved relations between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in the past six months.34 This perception was shared evenly across Ngok Dinka, Misseriya, and other tribal backgrounds.

However, when asked about communication between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in the past six months, varied perceptions emerged. 64% of Misseriya respondents found that communication between the two groups was not good over the previous 6 months, while 62% of Ngok Dinka respondents believed that communication was good. A Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit test confirms that this disparity is statistically significant (p < 0.01). Overall, the Misseriya appeared to have more pessimistic views about inter-communal contact.35

31 71% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “most conflicts in our communities are a result of tribal and ethnic differences.” (Question 1.7) 32 69% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “The portion of the population who speaks about other tribes in posi- tive terms is high” (Question 1.10) 33 54% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “It is not necessary/important for me to engage with people from another tribe.” (Question 1.21) 34 63% of respondents strongly agree /agree with the statement “relationships between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya have improved in the past six months.” (Question 1.6) 35 It should be noted again that this survey was conducted just after the slaying of three Misseriya allegedly by Ngok Dinka. Baseline Study | February 2020 14

FINDING 3: There is a drastic disparity in how Ngok Dinka and Misseriya respondents perceive the quality of inter-tribal communication.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Actors Awareness of conflict mediation and intervention techniques is widespread among community members. When asked to identify the best conflict resolution mechanisms and intervention approaches, respondents most frequently cited the JCPC, Judia, and civil courts. Judia is a traditional mechanism used for arbitration and mediation. When asked about the types of persons or entities who are best suited for conflict intervention, respondents identified JCPC members, civil administration officials, and youth committee members.

FINDING 4: Residents of Abyei perceive the JCPC and Judia as being the most effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution.

Members of the JCPC have a proven track record engaging in conflict resolution in their communities. As JCPC members discussed during focus groups, they have enjoyed some success, despite the difficult, ever-changing context and various setbacks. According to JCPC members, their success includes a host of initiatives, such as: establishing peace markets, creating a civil court and prison, coordinating with UNISFA peacekeepers, strengthening justice systems against corruption, contributing to an effective system for distributing blood money and for compensation for crimes, and coordinating dispute resolution mechanisms between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya.

FINDING 5: Most JCPC members feel confident in their ability to maintain committee efforts beyond the UNISFA mandate. However, UNISFA provides critical support and it is unclear how resource gaps will be filled upon its completion.

77% of JCPC members responded feeling confident in their ability to maintain peace after the UNISFA mandate ends (currently slated for May 2020). However, UNISFA provides the JCPC with significant material and logistical support, including neutral spaces to hold mediations and meetings. It also enables armed police to seize criminals. The research team discovered no clear plan to fill this critical gap at the end of the UNISFA mandate. Additionally, JCPC members fear that the end of the UNISFA mandate will bring a new wave of political manipulations and interventions from Sudan and South Sudan, as they reposition themselves around an Abyei without a UNISFA presence.

Conflict Sensitivity of Peacebuilding Efforts Interviewees expressed that it is important for peacebuilding efforts, and INGOs generally, to understand the long history of conflict and hatred between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. While the two sides’ narratives are in opposition to each other, efforts that can respect the other side without confirming one group’s bias will be critical to maintaining a conflict sensitive approach. JCPC members asserted that it is important for actors from the local context to continue to transform relationships in new ways, such as through peace markets. But field research has also shown that traditional mechanisms, like Judia, are well known and perceived to be effective. Baseline Study | February 2020 15

FINDING 6: Conflict sensitive approaches to peacebuilding in Abyei will respect the complex and conflicting narratives of the population and will center on working with widely-accepted traditional mechanisms and locally led efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the finding that “residents of Abyei feel that trust and social cohesion are relatively low and that violence is on the rise in their communities,” the research team recommends that communities in Abyei should have increased knowledge and awareness of the larger trends in violence. These should be shared in ways that are conflict-sensitive, but that can also combat recall bias and provide a better picture of these trends over time.

Considering that “while available mechanisms have mitigated resource disputes, tribal identities and historical grievances are key drivers of armed violence and barriers to improving social cohesion,” the research team recommends that peacebuilding programs must go beyond strengthening local capacities to respond to and mediate conflict. Such efforts should aim to address and transform narratives that deepen tribal divides.

Noting that “there is a drastic disparity in how Ngok Dinka and Misseriya respondents perceive the quality of inter-tribal communication,” the research team recommends that peacebuilding efforts should support tribal authorities and JCPC members to improve inter-tribal communication channels and disseminate accurate information across ethnic lines.

Given that “residents of Abyei perceive the JCPC and Judia as being the most effective mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution” and that “most JCPC members feel confident in their ability to maintain their current efforts beyond the UNISFA mandate,” the research team recommends that support for local mechanisms be a core component of any peacebuilding strategy in the region. Moreover, given that it is unclear how resource gaps will be filled once UNISFA’s mission is completed, further efforts should be made at-once to identify supplementary support for the JCPC.

Finally, based on the finding that “conflict sensitive approaches to peacebuilding in Abyei will respect the complex and conflicting narratives of the population and center on working with widely-accepted traditional mechanisms and locally led efforts,” the research team emphasizes the aforementioned program recommendations that seek to transform tribalism and negative stereotypes and improve inter and intra- tribal communication, while supporting traditional mechanisms for conflict and dispute resolution. Baseline Study | February 2020 16

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: Abyei geopolitical timeline

1. 2002 Machakos Protocol excludes Abyei from its definition of southern Sudan. 2. Abyei was designated as a special administrative status in May 2004 under the Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, which was to be governed directly by the president. Abyei’s borders were investigated and defined by a panel of experts known as the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). A referendum commission was supposed to then determine voter eligibility for a referendum on the status of Abyei.36 3. In July 2005, the ABC issued a “final and binding” ruling on Abyei’s boundary but this was rejected by Khartoum. The disagreement and stalemate dragged on for three years. 4. Clashes first between the SPLM and northern-backed militias and then the Sudanese army in 2007. Abyei town razed to the ground in May 2008. 5. In June 2008, the NCP and SPLM signed the Abyei Roadmap Agreement to break the deadlock on implementing the Abyei Protocol.37 6. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) rendered a decision in July 2009, significantly reducing the territorial size of Abyei, doing away with the ABC zone of shared rights and placing contested oil fields, such as Bamboo and , in Kordofan rather than Abyei. That ruling was seen as favouring the North but because of its focus on Ngok Dinka permanent settlements in Abyei, it was rejected by Khartoum.38 7. Following the PCA ruling, SAF forces and militias prevented survey teams from working on border demarcation. 8. May 2011, Omar Bashir unilaterally dissolves the joint North-South Abyei Administration. SAF launch coordinated attack on South Sudanese military personnel in Abyei.39 9. Agreement formed in June 2011 between Sudan and South Sudan to defuse the crisis. Temporary security and administrative arrangements put in place. Sudanese forces withdraw from Abyei town in June 2012 although Sudanese “oil police” remain behind in northern Abyei. Ethiopian forces were deployed under the UNISFA banner.40 10. May 2013, then-paramount chief of the Ngok Dinka community in Abyei is assassinated. Consequently, the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee stops meeting. 11. October 2013, the Ngok Dinka community in Abyei hold a unilateral, informal, non-binding vote on the final status of Abyei, which leans heavily in favour of Abyei joining the south.41 12. November 2014, Presidents Bashir and Kiir meet in Khartoum and agree to resume the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee meetings. In March 2015, Abyei Joint Oversight Committee meet in Addis Ababa after a lapse of almost two years,42 but no subsequent meetings occur until May 2017. 13. In October 2015, Missierya and Ngok Dinka communities meet for the first face-to-face dialogue since the assassination of the Ngok Dinka paramount chief in May 2013.43 Unlike the stagnation at the higher level AJOC meetings, grassroots dialogues happen more regularly. 14. Amiet/Al-Neam common market re-opens in August 2016.44

36 Abyei Protocol: https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-protocol-resolution-abyei-conflict 37 Abyei Roadmap Agreement: http://www.sudantribune.com/TEXT-Abyei-Roadmap-Agreement,27519 38 http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXX/145-416.pdf 39 James Copnall, “Sudan: why Abyei is crucial to north and south” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13502845 40 Amanda Hsiao, June 2012 “Field Dispatch: Abyei in Flux” https://enoughproject.org/files/Abyei_Dispatch_06272012.pdf 41 https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-referendum-in-abyei-is-an-ongoing-challenge-for-the-african-union 42 UNSG Report on Abyei, 1 December 2014. https://undocs.org/S/2014/862; UNSG Report on Abyei, 30 January 2015. https://undocs. org/S/2015/77 43 UNSG Report on Abyei, 13 November 2015. https://undocs.org/S/2015/870 44 UNSG Report on Abyei, 12 October 2016. https://undocs.org/S/2016/864 Baseline Study | February 2020 17

ANNEX 2: Community Survey Additional Information

Data Summary Tables

LOCALITY OF COLLECTION Da’ir Junubi 24.4% Amiet/Al-Neam 48.1% Makinis 12.7% Other 14.7%

TRIBE Other Tribes 10%

Ngok Dinka 47% Misseriya 44%

WORK TYPE Freelance 17% Business 15% Farming 30% Petty Trade 31% Shepherding / Grazing 8%

Question 1.1: “When compared to the past, current relationships in the community are not good.”

Strongly Agree / Agree 72% Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 27% Neutral/ NA 1%

Question 1.2: “Cohesion among elements within society is not good.”

Strongly Agree / Agree 67% Strongly Disagree / Disagree 32%

Neutral/NA 1% Baseline Study | February 2020 18

Question 1.3: “During the past six months, there have been incidents of violence between different types of groups in the area.”

Strongly Agree/ Agree 81% Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 17% Neutral/NA 2%

Question 1.4: “Compared to last year, migration and movement between the south and the north was more peaceful.”

Strongly Agree/ Agree 71% Strongly Disagree/ Disagree 27% NA 2%

Question 1.5: “There are systems for mediation, early warning, and intervention in the event of conflict in the area.”

Strongly Agree / Agree 83% Neutral/NA 1% Strongly Disagree/Disagree 16% Question 1.6: “Relationships between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya have improved in past six months”

Strongly Agree 41% Agree 22% Neutral 3% Disagree 13% Strongly Disagree 21%

Question 1.7: “Most conflicts in our communities are a result of tribal and ethnic differences.”

Strongly Agree 38% Agree 33% Neutral 2% Disagree 8% Strongly Disagree 20% Baseline Study | February 2020 19

Question 1.8: “What are the best ways to resolve conflict in the area?”

Peace Committees 74% Judia 65% Civil Courts 56% Tribal Mediation 53% Police 45% Other 8%

Question 1.9: “What are the best ways to intervene…?”

Community Peace Committees 84% Civil Courts 44% Civil Administration 74% Notable People 39% Youth Committees 56% Other Means 4%

Question 1.10: “The proportion of the population who speaks about other tribes in positive terms is high.”

Strongly Agree 38% Agree 31% Neutral 1% Disagree 30%

Question 1.11: “Violence has increased recently.”

No 46% Yes 54%

Question 1.12: “In the past six months, communication between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya was good.”

No 49% Yes 51% Baseline Study | February 2020 20

Question 1.21 “What are the primary causes of conflict in your area?”

Tribal / Ethnic biases 48% Competition over water 45% Competition over land rights/use 64% Pasture 32% Negative behaviour toward other tribes 9% Ignorance 39% Theft and Raids 44%

Question 1.22: “It is not necessary/important for me to interact with people from different tribes.”

Strongly Agree 35% Agree 19% Neutral 0% Disagree 17% Strongly Disagree 29% Baseline Study | February 2020 21

ANNEX 3: Log Frame Baseline Values

INDICATOR BASELINE VALUE

% of target community members interviewed who report 45% (Q1.22) trusting members of other communities

% of target community members interviewed who report that there have been abuses against their ethnic group in 81% (Q1.3) the previous 6 months

% of JCPC members who report feeling confident in their ability to sustain peace in AAA beyond the end of the 77% UNISFA mandate

% of JCPC members who can cite at least 1 example of engagement with community stakeholders around 95% peacebuilding efforts

% of target community members interviewed who report an improvement in peaceful migration as compared to the 71% (Q1.4) year before

% of community members able to cite the conflict monitors or ad-hoc mediation systems as mechanisms to report or 83% (Q1.5) address emerging conflicts

% of target community members who report trust between 63% (Q1.6) the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka has improved

% of community members who report that inter-community 27% (Q1.1) perceptions have been positively transformed

% of community members who believe that conflict is 71% (Q1.7) ethnically-driven

% of community members who use a positive terminology 69% (Q1.10) to refer to a member of another group