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University M icrofilm s Internationai 300 N. Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
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Yamamoto, Vasumasa
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN CRISES: A STUDY OF DISASTERS IN JAPAN
The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1985
University Microfilms internetionei300 N. zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106
Copyright 1985 by Yamamoto, Vasumasa Aii Rights Reserved
INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN CRISES
A STUDY OF DISASTERS IN JAPAN
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By Vasumasa Yamamoto, B.A., M.A.
*****
The Ohio State University
1985
Reading Committee: Approved By
Professor Enrico L. Quarantelli
Professor Ronald G. Corwin ^ Adviser Professor John Seidler Department of Sociology Copyright by Yasumasa Yamamoto 1985 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation would have never come out without several financial supports. The research at Nagasaki was undertaken with the grant from Ministry of Education, Japan, which was administered through Disaster Study Group led by
Professor Keizo Okabe at the University of Tokyo where I have been a member for three years, and the grant from Japan
Economic Research Center. The research at Umegashima and
Misugi was carried out with the grant from Ministry of
Education, which was administered through a temporary group
led by Professor Hiroshi Takahashi at the University of
Tokyo, and the grant from Japan Economic Research Center.
The opportunity to carry out the studies of the Izu Ohshima
Kinkai Earthquake and the Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake was
furnished by Institute for Future Technology. Both Institute
for Future Technology and the University of Tokyo not only
provided me with the opportunity, but also induced me to
continue studying disasters in Japan, for which I am most
grateful.
To Dr. E.L.Quarantelli, I shall remain foreever
appreciative. As a person and as a scholar, he has given me
great and deep influences throughout my graduate career at
ii the Ohio State University. I learned much from him not only about sociology or disaster but also about a sincere attitude toward research and life. Without him, my success at the Ohio State University would have never been attained.
Drs. Ronald Corwin and John Seidler served on my committee and gave valuable advices and suggestions for this dissertation as well as for my graduate studies. The late
Dr.Margaret L. Helfrich also made many and unique contributions to my graduate experiences at the Ohio State
University.
I am indebted to a large number of persons. Among them
two should be singled out. Professor Tsutomu Shiobara, of
Osaka University, first introduced me to the discipline of
sociology. Professor Susumu Kurasawa, of Tokyo Metropolitan
University, introduced me to sociological research and
taught me the importance of practical contribution of
sociological research to a society as well as theoretical
one to the field.
I could have never continued my studies of sociology
without the emotional and economic supports my wife, Kazuko
Yamamoto, provided. For eleven years since I resigned Tour
Conductor at Kinki Nippon Tourist Co Ltd., she has accepted
many sacrifices and endured any kind of trials, for which I
will remain foreever grateful.
ill VITA
February 25, 1944...... Born - Yamaguchi, Japan
1968 ...... B.A., Chiba University, Chiba, Japan
1968-1973...... Tout Conductor, Kinki Nippon Tourist Co.Ltd.
1974 ...... Graduated from Thé Non Degree Post Undergraduate Program,Chiba University, Chiba, Japan
1977 ...... M.A., Tokyo Metropolitan University, Tokyo, Japan
1979-1981 ...... Graduate Research Associate, Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1982-1984 ...... Senior Lecturer, Tokyo Zokei University
1984-Present ...... Associate Professor, Tokyo Zokei University
PUBLICATIONS
"A Conceptual Framework for Analysis of Organizational Responses to Earthquake” (in Japanese) Institute for Future Technology ed.. Reliability and Effectiveness of Actions for Earthquake Disaster Prevention (Tokyo :Institute for Future Technology, 1979) pp.10-16
"Disaster and Organizations" (in Japanese) Hirotada
iv Hirose éd., Social Scientific Approach to Disaster (Tokyo; Shinyosha, 1981) pp.49-81 .
"Disaster Studies in the United States in the Late 1970s" (in Japanese) Japanese Sociological Review Vol.31, No.4 1981
"Interorganizationa1 Coordination in the Recovery Period" (in Japanese) Institute of Journalism and Communication ed. Disaster and Human Behavior (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1982) pp.170-193
"Responses to the False Warning in Hiratsuka City" (in Japanese) Institute of Journalism and Communication ed.. The False Warning and the Citizens in Hiratsuka (Tokyol Institute of Journalism and Communication, the University of Tokyo, 1982) pp.109-134
"Organizational Responses to Nagasaki Flood Disaster" (in Japanese) Institute of Journalism and Communication ed.. Organizational Responses to the 1982 Nagasaki Disaster (Tokyo: Institute oT Journalism and Communication, the University of Tokyo, 1983) pp.80-98, pp.112-120
"A Typhoon Disaster and An Isolated Community" (in Japanese) Hiroshi Takahashi ed.. Flood Disasters Caused by the Typhoon 8210 and their Impacts on the Socio-Economic Activities (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo, 1983) pp.74-82
"Disaster and Social Change" (in Japanese) Comprehensive Urban Studies No.17, December 1982, pp.117-129
"Evacuation Behavior in Okuyama Area" (in Japanese) In stitu te of Journalism and Communication ed.. People's Responses to the 1982 Nagasaki Disaster (Tokyo: In stitu te of Journalism and Communication, the University of Tokyo, 1984) pp.Ill-- 136
"Japan and America - Some Comparisons between Chonaikai and Community" (in Japanese) News Letter of English and American Literature Society. Chiba University No.4, October 1983, pp2-3
"Interorganizational Analysis of An Emergency Social System" (in Japanese) Ritsuo Akimoto ed.. Disaster and Social System (Tokyo: Institute of Social Sciences, Waseda University Press, 1984) pp.77-113 "The Present State of Jishubo and a Means of Its Activation" (in Japanese) Gekkan Shobo Vol.6, No.9, September 1984, pp.34-38
"Disaster and Stress" (in Japanese) Waro Yamamoto ed., Living Environment and Stress (Tokyo: Kakiuchi Shuppan, in print)
"A Multi-Regression Analysis of Jishubo" (in Japanese) Institute of Journalism and Communication ed., Disaster and Communication (a p ro v isio n a l t i t l e ) (Tokyo: Institute of Journalism and Communication, The University of Tokyo, in print)
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Sociology
Studies in Social Organization. Professor Ronald G. Corwin
Studies in Collective Behavior. Professor Enrico L. Quarantelli
Studies in Industrial Sociology. Professor Margaret L. Helfrich
V i TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...... ii
VITA...... iv
LIST OF TABLES...... ix
LIST OF FIGURES...... xiv
CHAPTER
I. INTRODUCTION...... 1
1. What is a Disaster ? ...... 1 2. Why is Interorganizational Coordination in the Energency and Restoration Periods Focused on ?...... 5 3. Why is Our Focus on Coordination?...... 11 A. Why is a Typology Constructed ? ...... 12 5. Statement of the Problem and the Purpose of the Study ...... 14 6. Some Additional Notes ...... 16 7. Notes...... 23
II. STUDIES ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND COORDINATION...... 29
1. Studies on Interorganizational Relations...... 29 2. Studies onCoordination ...... 53 3. Notes...... 67
III. A THEORY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION...... 77
1. The Basic Framework...... 77 2. Centralization and Concentration ...... 83 3. Patterns of Interorganizational Coordination ...... 89 4. Derived Hypotheses...... 98 5. Notes...... 116 vii IV. METHODOLOGY...... 121
1. Methods for Data Collection ...... 121 2. Data Processing ...... 124 3. Measurements...... 125 4. Notes...... 130
V. A STUDY ON TWO HISTORICAL CASES...... 131
1. The 1964 Niigata Earthquake ...... 131 2. The 1968 Tokachi Oki Earthquake ...... 144 3. Analysis and Findings ...... 157 4 . Notes...... 176
VI. A STUDY ON TWO EARTHQUAKE DISASTERS...... 178
1. The 1978 Izu Oshima Kinkai Earthquake ...... 178 2. The 1978 Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake ...... 190 3. Analysis and Findings ...... 202
Vll. A STUDY ON THREE TYPHOON AND FLOOD DISASTERS...... 223
1. The Nagasaki Disaster by Torrential Rain...... 223 2. The Disaster Caused by the Typhoon No.10 in 1982 ...... 246 3. Analysis and Findings ...... 268
Vlll. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION...... 287
1. Summary of Findings...... 287 2. Discussion and Contributions...... 300 3. For Further Research ...... 305 4. Notes...... 321
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 325
V l l l LIST OF TABLES
Table
1. Disaster Process and the Units of Analysis...... 9
2. Financial Aids by the National Government...... 18
3. A Typical Schedule of Recovery Activities...... 19 4. Disaster-Relevant Organizations in Japan ...... 26
5. Characteristics of Environmental State ...... 34
6. Four Types of Intergroup Situation...... 51
7. Types of Interorganizational Field ...... 91
8. Patterns of Interorganizational Coordination ...... 92
9. Derived Hypotheses ...... 114
10. Damages and Casualties by the 1964 Niigata Earthquake...... 133
11. Recovery Activities and Major Events on the Day of Occurrence of the Niigata Earthquake...... '...... 140
12. Damages and Casualties by the Tokachi Oki Earthquake...... 146
13. Damages and Casualties in Aomori Prefecture...... 147
14. The Organization of the Prefectural Headquarter of Police EOC...... 153
Ix 15. Recovery Activities by Self Defense Force...... 156
16. The Stages of Recovery Process After the 1964 Niigata Earthquake ...... 158
17. The Stages of Recovery Process After the Tokachi Oki Earthquake...... 161
18. The Size of Member Organizations ...... 167
19. The Degree of Damages and Casualties ...... 170
20. The Number of Establishments ...... 171
21. Community Properties...... 172
22. The Scope of Impact ...... 172
23. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination and Several Factors Which Influence I t ...... 174
24. Damages and Casualties by the 1974 Izu Hanto Oki Earthquake and the 1976 Kawazu Earthquake...... 179
25. Damages and Casualties by the 1978 Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake...... 181
26. Organizational Responses to the 1978 Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake...... 189
27. Damages and Casualties by the 1978 Miyagi-Ken Oki Earthquake...... 194
28. Activities by the Fire Department of Sendai ...... 197
29. The Stages of Recovery Process ...... 202
30. Calculation of Concentration Score for the Emergency Interorganizational Network After the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake...... 206
31. Calculation of Concentration Score for the Emergency Interorganizational
X Network After the Miyagi-Ken Oki Earthquake...... 208
32. The Number of Mediation Units and the Concentration Score...... 211
33. Summary of the Four Patterns...... 213
34. The Size of Respective Organizations ...... 215
35. Degree of Damages and Casualties by the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake and the Miyagi-Ken Oki Earthquake ...... 217
36. The Number of Establishments ...... 218
37. Community Properties...... 219
38.' The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination and Several Factors Which Influence I t ...... 220
39. The Standards of Issuing the Warnings ...... 228
40. Damages and Casualties by the Torrential Rain in Nagasaki in July, 1982 ...... 228
41. Responses by the Police EOC in Nagasaki...... 238
42. Recovery Process After the Nagasaki Disaster...... 241
43. Overall Damages and Casualties by Typhoon No.10 in 1982 ...... 247
44. Damages and Casualties by Three Disasters in the Past ...... 251
45. Damages and Casualties in Misugi-Mura by Typhoon No.10 in 1982 ...... 252
46. Damages and Losses in Umegashima by Typhoon No.10 in 1982 ...... 258
47. Stages of Disasters in Misugi and Umegashima ...... 266
XI 48. The Number of Mediation Units in the Emergency Period ...... ,...271
49. The Degree of Centralization and the Concentration Score in Three Disasters...... 276
50. The Organizations Involved in the Recovery A ctiv ities...... 278
51. The Size of Member Organizations ...... 279
52. The Degree of Damages and Casualties in Three Disasters ...... 280
53. The Number of Establishments ...... 281
54. Community Properties...... 281
55. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination and Several Factors Which Influence I t ...... 283
56. Summary of Findings ...... 290
57. Rank Scores of Areas...... 293
58. Relative Rank of Area...... 294
59., The Average Size of Member Organizations ...... 295
60. The Amount of Tasks...... 295
61. The Degree of Urbanization ...... 296
62. The Size of ION...... 296
63. The Scope of Impact ...... '...... 297
64. The Amount of Experiences and Knowledge ...... 297
65. The Degree of Task Complexity and the Variety of Necessary Resources. 298
66. A Classification of Interorganizational Network by Katagiri...... 309
X l l 67. A Comparison of Patterns of Interorganizational Coordination ...... 310
68. Calculation of the Cyclomatic Number...... 318
69. The Number of Mediation Units in Two Types of Network...... 318
X l l l LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1. Scope of Disaster Study...... 4
2. Studies on Disaster andSocial Change ...... 4
3. A Typical Interorganizational Network After a Disaster in Japan ...... 21
4. Six Dimensions of Concerted Decision Making by Warren...... 42
5. Emergency Social System in terms of Six Dimensions...... 44
6. The Types of Interorganizational Coordination ...... 61
7. Structure of an Actor...... 78
8. Structure of Interorganizational Network...... 81
9. Report Couplings ...... 82
10. Direction Couplings ...... 82
11. The Centralized Concentrated Type ...... 93
12. The Decentralized ConcentratedType ...... 93
13. The Centralized Diffused Type ...... 93
14. The Decentralized Diffused Type...... 94
15. Maximum Level Hierarchy...... 96
16. Maximum Span Hierarchy ...... 96
17. Wheel Type Network by Shaw ...... 103
18. Circle Type Network by Shaw ...... 103
xiv 19. Communication Networks by Leavitt...... 103
20. Factors Which Affect the Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination ...... 115
21. The Location of Niigata and Other Relevant Prefectures...... 132
22. The Organization Chart of the Municipal EOC of Niigata ...... 135
23. The Organization Chart of the Prefectural EOC of Niigata ...... 137
24. The Organization Chart of Police EOC ...... 139
25. Aomori Prefecture and Hachinohe City ...... 145
26. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Emergency Period After the Niigata Earthquake ...... 159
27. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Restoration Period After the Niigata Earthquake ...... 160
28. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination After the Tokachi Oki Earthquake...... 162
29. Izu Peninsula - Kawazu and Higashi Izu Town...... 182
30. Miyagi Prefecture and Sendai City ...... 191
31. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Emergency Period After the 1978 Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake...... '...... 204
32. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Emergency Period After the 1978 Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake...... 207
33. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Restoration Period After the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake...... 210
XV 34. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Restoration Period After the Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake...... 212
35. Nagasaki Prefecture...... 224
36. The Quantity of Precipitation in Nagasaki in July, 1982 ...... 227
37. Nagasaki City and Spots of Landslides ...... 230
38. Misugi and the Typhoon No.10 ...... 248
39. Misugi Mura...... 250
40. Precipitation in Umegashima Area ...... 257
41. Umegashima Area and Major Spots of Landslides ...... 259
42. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Emergency Period of the Nagasaki Torrential Rain Disaster.... 269
43. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Emergency Period of the Misugi Disaster ...... 270
44. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Restoration Period After the Nagasaki Disaster ...... 273
45. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Restoration Period in the Misugi Disaster ...... 274
46. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination in the Restoration Period in the Umegashima Disastrer ...... 275
47. Relations Among F a c to rs...... 299
48. Sample Network (A)...... 317
49. Sample Network (6) ...... 317
XVI CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Disaster studies inevitably put stress on making a great contribution to policy making so that we can effectively and efficiently respond to a disaster. However, from the beginning of the history of disaster studies, much attention has been paid to theoretical contributions to sociological fields. The object of this current research is - to construct a typology of interorganizational coordination in the emergency and restoration periods after a disaster so as to contribute to both facets of theory and policy making in disaster studies. Before starting our main discourse, we should discuss some essential points.
1. WHAT IS A DISASTER ?
A disaster will be broadly defined as an undesirable changein inputs of a social system.By this definition, however, the temporary break-down of social system caused by a general strike, the stress attributed to an economic depression, and the like are regarded as an disaster. To define a disaster in a more specific manner, we have to take physical impact into account. In other words, that physical impact becomes so cial impact w ill be e s s e n tia l for
1 2 distinguishing a disaster from other collective s t r e s s e s . (2) This means, first, that an earthquake in the midst of a desert is not a disaster, and second, that an earthquake usually results in various degrees of damages or casualties according to social characteristics of the stricken areas, even if other factors such as the distance from the seismic center, the quality of ground, and the like are held constant. A natural phenomenon with a certain degree of physical impact can be potentially a disaster only when it has something to do with a social world, and the degree of damages and casualties caused by a disaster varies with the qualities of stricken areas. Any physical impact is always natural in itself. Only the conditions by which the impact is produced may be created naturally or artificially. The distinction between a natural disaster and a man-made disaster is based on this fact.
There seem to be two main streams in defining a disaster. The first type is represented by Barton's definition^^) He defines a disaster as one type of co llectiv e stress, which occurs when most members of a certain social system perceive stress. This type of definition has a defect. That is to say, what proportion of the population in a certain social system should perceive stress in order for a situation to be regarded as a collective stress ? The other type of definition is 3 exemplified by Form and Nosow's.They define disaster as "a condition in which the established social life of a community or other type of social organization abruptly ceases to operate". Contrary to Barton's definition, they ignore individual stress in their definition.
At a first glance, there seems to be no significant difference between both types of definition. A close look, however, makes clear that the former enables us to study a
disaster in the context of general social change, while the
latter puts restrictions on studying a disaster in the same
context. According to Moore, a social system is continuously
managing social stress and strain, and this managing process
is social change.By including the concept of stress
in the definition as Barton did, a disaster is regarded as
one of the stressors, and changes induced by a disaster are
dealt in the same manner by which changes induced by
other factors are treated. However, according to the latter,
a disaster is simply a momentary crisis of a social system,
and the modifications induced by a disaster are treated as
the temporary and sudden alterations which are basically
regarded as minor separate from ordinary changes of social
system.
This also affects the scope of a disaster study. Many
disaster researchers have been much concerned with social
change since 1920 when one of the earliest sociological disaster studies was published by Prince.Studies on a disaster in the context of social change can be roughly divided into two types. One is the studies on social change
Pre-disaster Period Emergency Period Post-disaster Period
(a) (b) (c) a social system in an emergency a social system in a normal situation social system a normal situation
(time) (disaster)
SCOPE OF DISASTER STUDY FIGURE 1
One Type of Collective Social Change of Stress Caused by Long-Term Internal or External Perspective._____ Factors of a Social System.______^__
Definition Studies oil ofDisaster Social Change
A Condition in Which Temporary,Sudden Normal Functions of and Unfavorable a Social System Cease. Change of a Social System.
STUDIES OF DISASTER AND SOCIAL CHANGE FIGURE 2 5 of short duration induced by a disaster. The other is the studies of relatively long-term social change Most disaster studies in the past probably fall into the first type, and focused on a comparison between (a) and (b) or solely on an emergency social system in (b) in Figure 1. On the other hand, the second type tries to make a comparison between (a) and (c).
In terms of Barton's definition of a disaster, disaster studies involve both types of studies on social change,
because stresses caused by certain stressors equally,
though not necessarilly in quantity, exist in every stage of
Figure 1. The latter type of definition of disaster
represented by Form and Nosow's keeps us from studying a
disaster in the same context as the first type of studies on
social change, because no concept is available for
connecting (a) with (c) mediated by (b). Figure 2 provides a
rough summary of these discussions.
2. WHY IS INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE EMERGENCY AND RESTORATION PERIODS FOCUSED ON ?
There are many discussions as to making a distinction
among the time periods of disaster.Powell and Wallace
are pioneers in specifying stages of disaster.Barton
made a distinction among five phases of disaster process as follows.(10)
(1) the predisaster period. (2)the period of detection and communication of warning of specific threat. (3) the period of immediate, re la tiv e ly unorganized response. (A) the period of organized social response. (5) the post disaster equilibrium.
Limiting their perspective to the post-disaster period,
Kates=Pijawka distinguish four stages as follows.
(1) the emergency period ; the time in which the community copes with problems caused by the extent of the destruction and the number of dead, injured, homeless, and missing. Typical indicators of the end of the emergency are cessation of search and rescue, drastic reduction in emergency mass feeding andhousing, an clearance of debris from principal arteries.
(2) the restoration period ; the time which is characterized by the patching up of the u tility , housing, commercial and industrial structures capable of being resto red , and the return to relatively normal functioning of social and economic activities. Some sample indicators of the end of the restoration period are the functioning of the major urban services, utilities, and transport, the return of those refugees intending to return, and substantial clearance of the rubble.
(3) the replacement reconstruction period ; the time in which the c a p ita l stock is r e b u ilt to predisaster levels, and social and economic activities return to predisaster levels or greater. The indicators of the end of the period are the replacement of the population and of the functioning equivalent of their needs in homes, jobs, capital stock and urban activities.
(4)the commemorative, betterment and developmental reconstruction period ; the time which serves three different, but possibly interrelated functions: to memorize or commemorate the disaster; to mark the city's postdisaster betterment or improvement; or to serve its future growth and development.
Most stage-models are likely to be arbitrary in how to differentiate each stage or period from others. Kates and
Pijawka point out some major events by which each stage is differentaited from others, and therefore, their four-stage model can be highly evaluated.
Thompson=Hawks present the three-stage model focusing on an emergency social system.The fragmented phase is
the time in which normal relationships among families or organizations are disturbed and each family or
organization must autonomously operate. As a result, the
allocation or integration mechanism of resources within the
social system is broken down. The second stage is the
synthesized phase. In a disorganized situation, uncertainty
in resource allocations and the degree of
interdependence among components of a social system
drastically increase. In order to deal with this situation,
the social system and its components try to concentrate all
resources on a synthetic organization. The synthetic
organization functions as a decision-making center and as an
information center. It is a kind of supra-organization. The
restored phase is the time in which each organization tries
to withdraw resources from the synthetic organization, as 8 the situation is improved.
It is very natural that focal points of analysis vary with stages of disaster. Barton indicates four focal points in disaster studies; (1)psycho1ogica1 concerns on individual responses, (2)results of public behaviors, (3)organizational responses, and (4)community r e s p o n s e s . (^3) According to
Barton, three focal points except the first one can yield the following four levels; (l)the public responses, (2) the organizational responses, (3)the inter-organizational network, and (4)the relationships between organizations and the public. These four levels of analysis correspond to the stages of disaster as shown in Table 1.
In the emergency period, activities or responses are mainly performed by the unorganized public. So long as no warning is issued, organizations are s t i l l preparing for being in action.
However, from the later stage of the emergency period through the restoration period, activities by organizations become dominant. In the restoration period, every organization suffers uncertainty and incresed interdependency Thus, as Thompson and Hawkes indicated, organizations seek a synthetic organization.Most a c tiv itie s in this period are beyond the domain of a respective organization and depend upon an interorganizational network established around the synthetic organization.
As the situation proceeds to the reconstruction period, a respective component organization returns to the normal operation mechanism, restoring their autonomy. Thus, instead of interorganizational network in the restoration period, each organization becomes a leading actor in the reconstruction periods. In the reconstruction period, in
TABLE 1 DISASTER PROCESS AND UNITS OF ANALYSIS
STAGES AN EMERGENCY MAJOR UNITS OF SOCIAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS
Normal Period latent (1) the public (2) organizations (3) interorganizational network (4) relationships between the public and organizations
Warning Period manifest the same as above.
Emergency Period manifest (1) the public (Fragmented Phase) (2) relationships between the public and organizations
Restoration Period manifest (1) organizations (Synthesized Phase) (2) interorganizational network
Reconstruction latent (1) the public Period I (2) organizations (Restored Phase) (3) relationships between the public and organiz ation sReconstruction and organizationsReconstruction Period II (Restored Phase) 10 addition to organizational activities, relationships between
the public and organizations become important. Barton points
out three types of the relationships; (l)the public as
obstacles to organizational activities, (2)the public as
resources or sources of resources for organizations, (3)the
public as customers of o r g a n i z a t i o n s . ^ I n these senses,
relationships between the public and organizations are the
important unit of analysis in the emergency period through
the beginning of the restoration period. However, another
important type of the relationship should be noted. In the
reconstruction period, bargaining or confrontation between
the public and organizations is frequently observed. For
example, after the restoration period of the Nagasaki Flood,
the public is opposed to the reconstruction plans
proposed by the local governments.Or, after the
restoration period of the Miyagi-ken Oki Earthquake,
residents of a newly-developed and severely stricken area
established an organization in order to negotiate over
compensation with the developer.This kind of
relationships between the public and organizations becomes
prominent in the reconstruction period.
For the quick recovery from a disastrous situation and
the prevention of further losses, mutual aid among the
public is essential. However, in most cases, activities for
recovery or prevention are beyond the abilities of the 11 public. Therefore, it can be said that the sooner organizational forces become available, the better activities for recovery and prevention are performed. This means that the shorter the emergency period, the better the recovery process. Furthermore, since a component organization cannot be fully in operation for itself in the emergency period, an interorganizational network should be e sta b lish e d as soon as possible. Thus, th is kind of interorganizational network which emerges in the early stage of the restoration period becomes important or an object of study.
3. WHY IS OUR FOCUS ON COORDINATION ?
In a normal situation, organizations always suffer an
essential dillemma in that they should simultaneously
maximize both degrees of specialization and coordination.
All organizations, on the one hand, need the advantage of
specialization. On the other hand, the existence of common
goals is a raison d'etre of organizations. Any common goal
cannot be brought about without coordination. However, the
more an organization is specialized, the harder the process
of coordination is, and vice versa. Pugh briefly mentions
this point.
This is the basic specialization/coordination dillemma of organizations.lt is a dillemma because we want both sides of the coin, specialist expertise and common goals, yet they pull in opposite directions.( 18) 12
However, in the restoration period, this is not the case. Specialization is possible without a certain extent of predictability in interactions with others. In addition, the advantages by specialization can be expected only by narrowing the scopes of tasks. Neither condition is secured in the restoration period. Thus, it is almost impossible to increase the degree of specialization. Division of labor in the restoration period is attained on the basis of that in the normal situation, and no drastic change in division of labor is brought about. On the contrary, organizations in the restoration period lose their autonomous position, as mentioned above. What they should do is re la tiv e ly clear.
Each organization seeks information and resources in order to undestand the situation and to effectively carry out their functions. These individual efforts by each organization should be coordinated lest scarce resources and energies are unevenly distributed or overlap. In most cases, success or failure in coordination has a great effect on effectiveness of recovery activities. This is a reason why coordination is focused on in this study.
4. WHY IS A TYPOLOGY CONSTRUCTED ?
All scientific efforts aim at explanation and prediction of social and natural phenomena. As Rudner said, we cannot predict any pnenomena before explaining it,(19) 13 though some well-established empirical generalizations often enable us to predict phenomena without explanation.(^O)
Scientific explanation attempts to make clear and understand the nature of phenomena in terms of regularity immanent in
them. According to Hempel, three types of explanation are available.(21) xhe first is a deductive or nomological
explanation. In th is type, a c ertain phenomenon is
deductively explained by law(s) under specific conditions.
The second type is a stochastic or statistical explanation.
This type is applicable to a certain phenomenon with
relatively high repeatability so that the stochastical
method can be employed. The third one is a typological
explanation. This type of explanation, by clarifying
specific properties or regularity of explanandum, makes
clear what it is. Both the second and the third types do
not explain why a certain phenomenon occurs, but indicate
specific patterns or tendencies. Therefore, in order to
explain a complicated and obscure phenomenon, the second or
the third type of explanation is suitable.
Durkheim cautioned against two kinds of failure in
analyzing social facts.(2%) On the one hand, social facts
are likely to be an object of philosophical • study which
emphasizes universality with abstraction. On the other
hand, social facts tend to be an object of historical study
which puts emphasis on uniqueness descriptively observed or ' 14 confirmed. According to Durkheim, we are able to avoid these failures in analyzing social facts by introducing an intervening concept of social type. He claimed that a fundamental field of sociology should specialize in constructing typologies of and classifying societies, and named it social morphology. In his usage, social morphology classifies societies in terms of population size, population density, geographical conditions, and the like. However, his claim that social morphology is indispensable implies how important a typology or classification is in analyzing social facts. In fact, he further mentions that to classify many divergent units into a certain limited number of types makes the scientific work simple and clear, and that it is a necessry step toward scientific and sociological explanations.
We know little about interorganizational coordination in the emergency and restoration periods. So far as we could ascertain, only two empirical studies exclusively dealt with it in the past, and nothing is available from
Japanese cases^^S) Given this state of affairs, we have to explore regularities or patterns of interorganizational coordination as soon as possible. Otherwise, the findings of laborious studies remain fragmented and future research, as in the past, will continue to ignore interorganizational
coordination. Thus, constructing a typology is not only the 15 first step of sociological work, but also provides a groundwork for accumulating knowledge.
5. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THE PURPOSES OF THE STUDY
In a highly differentiated society, interorganizational
coordination is crucial for successfully performing a
certain goal beyond the domain of a single organization.
However, efforts to accumulate the findings of the studies
on interorganizational coordination in crises are quite few.
Although immature analytical models and inappropriate
methods were partly responsible for the minimal efforts, the
fact that there are only a few attempts to develop a
typology of interorganizational coordination seems to have
more directly hindered us from accumulating findings.
Despite remarkable, if not sufficient, improvement, in
models and methods for interorganizational analysis, there
still exists a need to construct a typology of
interorganizational coordination applicable to the context
of disaster. Thus, as mentioned at the outset, the purposes
of this study are (l)to clear up the ambiguities of several
important sociological concepts, (2)to construct a heuristic
typology of interorganizational coordination, and (3)to
examine it in terms of some Japanese cases. 16
6. SOME ADDITIONAL NOTES
These stated purposes are carried out by focusing on seven disasters in Japan. Among them, two cases of earthquake disaster are studied using secondary data such as the official records or research reports. Another two cases of earthquake disaster and one case of flood disaster were investigated by the research groups of which the author is' or was a member. Research on two typhoon disasters was performed by the author himself. The major data sources of these studies are as follows.
The 1964 Niigata Earthquake: Historical data such asarchives, research report, and so on.
The 1968 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake; Historical data suchas archives, research report, and so on.
The 1978 Izu Oshima Kinkai Earthquake: Research by Disaster Study Group of Institute for Future Technology, funded by National Institute for Research Advancement from 1977 to 1978.
The 1978 Miyagi-ken Oki Earthquake: The same as above.
The 1982 Nagasaki Flood Disaster: Research by Disaster Study Group of Institute of Journalism and Communication, the University of Tokyo, funded by Ministry of Education from 1982 to 1983. Additional research individually performed, funded by Japan Economic Research Center in 1983.
J'he 1982 TyphoonNo.lO Disaster in Misugi: Research individually performed , funded by Japan Economic Research Center in 1983. 17
The 1982 TyphoonNo.lO Disaster in Umegashima: Research individually performed, funded by Japan Economic Research Center and Ministry of Education in 1983.
In Japan, the duration of search and rescue or recovery activities is subject to restriction by The Disaster Relief
Act. The law prescribes the financial aids by the national government to the local goverment for recovery activities as
follows. In principle, the costs of recovery activities should be borne by the prefectural government. However, under the conditions as shown in Table 2, the national
government bears the costs up to the lim it of ninety per
cent of them.
This regulation applies to all cases beyond a certain
size or scale of disaster. The application for aid must be
made by the municipal or town government and includes a
report of damages and casualties. If the degree of damages
and casualties is beyond the predetermined standards of
damages or casualties, then the prefectural governor, on
behalf of the national government, declares the application
of the Act. Generally speaking, this law accelerates
interorganizational cooperations and shortens the duration
ofrecoveryactivities, because,in order for the Act to be
applied, the prefectural and municipal governments have to
gather information on damages and casualties from other all
relevant organizations and finish their recovery activities
within the prescribed term. 18
TABLE 2. FINANCIAL AIDS BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Costs Maximum Duration* 1. Emergency Medical Services. 14 days
2. Supply of Water 7 days
3. Supply of Temporary They should start Dwellings construction within 20 days after a disaster, and close the dwellings within 2 years.
4. Search and Rescue 10 days
5. Clearance of Debris 10 days
6. Supply of Foods 7 days
7. Supply of Shelters 7 days
* The maximum duration means that the national government can bear the costs for the recovery activities within the lim its of the maximum duration, and, therefore, if the duration of recovery a c tiv itie s exceeds the maximum lim it, the prefectural and/or the municipal government have to bear the costs for a c tiv itie s during the excess days.
In order to meet the conditions prescribed in and to make use of the Act, the local governments define their recovery schedule in a local disaster prevention planning.
For instance, the disaster prevention planning of Kanagawa prefecture stipulates the schedule and activities as shown in Table 3.
Although the schedule and activities defined are simply 19
TABLE 3 A TYPICAL SCHEDULE OF RECOVERY ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITIES BY THE PREFECTURAL OR MUNICIPAL EOC
Within 2- 3 hours (1)Providing information for the after a disaster public. (2) Gathering information on damages and casualties. (3) Communication activities with other relevant organizations. (4) Search and rescue activities.
Within24hours (1) Request to the national after a disaster government. Self Defense Force, and other local governments, if necessary. (2) Supplying medical services and temporary care of the dead. (3) Setting up emergency medical centers. (4) Application for the Disaster Relief Act.
Within 2 - 3 days (1) Supplying water and food. after a disaster (2) Providing temporary housing. (3) Temporary repairs of roads. (4) Providing temporary housing. (5) Supplying medical services. (6) Temporary repairs of water supply and drainage systems. (7) Request for help to private organizations.
a goal to be met, Table 3 suggests that the emergency period continues for about 2 4 hours or so and the restoration period peaks about two or three days after a disaster event.
According to Kates and P i j a w k a , (^4) he climax of the restoration period after the 1964 Alaska Earthquake was approximately three weeks after the event, which is the 20 earliest among their five cases cited, while the restoration a c tiv itie s after the 1972 Managua Earthquake reached its peak about thirty weeks after the event. In comparison with
these examples, the duration of each period seems much
shorter in Japan owing to the Act. Although the duration of
each period is of course widely different from case to case,
it should be understood that in Japan the emergency period
generally ends about one day after the event and that the
restoration period reaches its climax about two or three
days after the event. This study pays attention to the
emergency and restoration periods as noted above. Another
important law concerning recovery activities is The Disaster
Reduction Act. This Act prescribes (l)the guidelines for the
disaster prevention plans at a local and national level, (2)
the organizations which should be responsible for recovery
activities. The prescription provides us as shown in Figure
3 with a picture of a typical inter-organizational network
after a disaster.
Self-evidently, the prefectural or municipal emergency
operation centers are expected to be a coordinating unit in
a recovery situation. Thus, this study deals with an
interorganizational network which consists of the
prefectural and municipal emergency operation centers, the
fire department, the police stations, the prefectural
police. Self Defense Force, the quasi-voluntary fire squads. 21
the national EOC the designated nation- the designated nation widepublicandprivate wide public administration organizations* ______organizations* ______
Self Defense Force
the prefectural EOC the designated local other prefectures public and private organizations* ______the designated local public administration the prefectural organizations* ______headquarter of police
the prefectural board of education______
[the municipal EOC
the municipal or town other cities or towns board of education
Chonaikai or Jishubo the fire department
thequasi-voluntary other private fire squads* ______organizations
the police stations and boxes * See Note (25) and (26).
A TYPICAL INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK AFTER A DISASTER IN JAPAN FIGURE 3
and the like. Other designated public-organizations are not
much focused on, because most of them are highly specialized
and rarely cooperate with other organizations to restore
their facilities or function. These specialized 22
organizations voluntarily keep contacts with the prefectural
or municipal EOC, and sometimes join these EOC. However,
these contacts or participations are simply for information
exchange, not for coordinating their efforts with others.
Thus, these organizations practically have no possibility
to be a coordinating unit in the network.
-AY" NOTES
1. Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1969) translated by Kitao Abe et . al., p.36
2. Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Disaster and Stress," in Waro Yamamoto ed., Seikatsu Kankyo to Stress (Living Environment and Stress) (Tokyo: Kakiuchi Shuppan Inc., in print)
3. Barton, Communities in Disaster,translated by Kitao Abe, pp.36-38
4. William H. Form and Sigmund Nosow, Community in Disaster (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958) p.11
5. Wilbert E. Moore, Social Change (Englewood C liffs: Prentice Hall, 1963) translated by Yozo Matsubara, Chapter I
6.SamuelH.Prince, Catastrophe and Social Change (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1920)
7. Yasumasa Yamamoto, "An Interorganizational Analysis of An Emergency Social System," in Ritsuo Akimoto ed.. Disaster and Social System (Tokyo: The University of Waseda Press, 1984) pp.78-79
8. Dwight W. Chapman, "A Brief Introduction to Contemporary Disaster Research," in G.W.Baker and D.W.Chapman eds., Man and Society in Disaster (New York: Basic Books, 1962) p.7
9.A.F.C. Wallace, Tornado in Worcester; An Exploratory Study of Individual and Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation (Disaster Study Number 3, Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1956) p.2
10. Barton, Communities in Disaster, translated by Kitao Abe et. al., p.47
11. Robert W. Kates and David Pijawka, "From Rubble To Monument: The Pace of Reconstruction," in J. Eugene Haas et. al. eds.. Reconstruction Fol lowing Disaster (Massachusetts; The MIT Press, 1977) pp.1-23
12. James D.Thompson and Robert W. Hawkes, "D isaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process," in
■ 23 24
G.W.Baker and D.W.Chapman ed., Maji and Society in Disaster (New York: Basic Books, 1962) pp.268-300
13. Allen H. Barton, "The Emergency Social System," in G.W. Baker and D.W.Chapman eds., Man and Society in Disaster (New York: Basic Books, 1962) pp.225-226
14. Thompson and Hawkes, "Disaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process," pp.274-287
15. Barton, "The Emergency Social System," pp.225-226
16. One of the famous sightseeing spot in Nagasaki was an old stone bridge built in 1634. The stone bridge, which was one of the National Important Cultural Properties, was carried away by the 1982 flood disaster. As to rebuilding the bridge and improving the river, the group of the citizens opposed a plan offered by the prefectural government. The movement against the overall reconstruction plan still continues.
17. Hisashi Yasuda and Yasuyuki Satoh, "Problems in the Process of Reconstructing Houses and Housing Lots After the 1978 Miyagi-ken Oki Earthquake," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu (The Study of Sociology) 38 (1979) : pp.121-174
18. Derek Pugh, "Effective Coordination in Organizations," Advanced Management Journal 44-1 (1979)
19. Richard S. Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966) translated by Tsutomu Shiobara, p.92
20. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (New York: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964) p.349
21. Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Englewood Cliffs; PrenticeHal 1,1965 ) translated by Genichiro Nagasaka, pp.5-83
22. Emile Durkheim, Les Regies de la Methode Sociologique, (Paris: Press Universitares De France, 1950) translated by Koken Sasaki, Chap 4, pp.108-122
23. J.E.Wright, "Interorganizational Relations As Structure and As Action" (Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper No.37, The Ohio State University, 1977) Thomas E.Drabek et.al.. Managing Multiorganizational Emergency Responses (Program on Technology, Environment 25
and Man Monograph No.33, Institute of Behavioral Science, The University of Colorado, 1981)
24. Robert W. Kates and David Pijawka, "From Rubble to Monument: The Pace of Reconstruction," 1977
25. Chonaikai is a neighborhood organization which exists only in a part of Asia. Almost all residential areas throughout Japan have Chonaikai for each street. Historically, it had its beginning in seventh century. The rulers at that time imported it from China in order to effectively control the public. Thus, its original function was to keep the public under mutual observations. This tradition was upheld until the end of the war in 1945. During the war, the government took full advantage of it as the smallest unit of public administration organizations. After the war, G.H.Q. ordered them to disband it because of their undemocratic nature. However, it was soon spontaneously reorganized by the public. Nowadays, it can be said that the merits and demerits of Chonaikai offset each other. The typical demerit is that it often becomes a coercive electorate. The greatest merit is that it enables the public to keep a higher degree of solidarity. A large volume of studies indicate several unique characteristics of Chonaikai. Among them, the follow ing three are important. (1)their members are not individuals but households, (2)all households in a certain area automatically or coercively become members, and (3) its functions are extremely comprehensive. Jishubo is a neighborhood anti-disaster organization. It enables the public to effectively respond to a disaster. Although the Disaster Reduction Act enacted in 1961 prescribed that municipal or town governments should promote the establishment of Jishubo, only a few Jishubo existed in Japan at that time. In the beginning of the 1970s, when the great Tohkai earthquake was predicted, the prefectural governments actively promoted the establishment of Jishubo. It is essentially a voluntary organization. However, most Jishubo at the present time are under the leaderships of local governments. The expected functions of Jishubo are (l)disaster education and drills, (2)maintaining minor equipments such as fire plugs, extinguishers, and the like, (3)initial fire fighting, (4)smoothing evacuation, (5) mutual aids for supplying water, food, and medical services, and (6)preVanting panic. In most cases, Jishubo is a division of Chonaikai. Thus, these functions are also regarded as the functions 26
of Chonaikai. In 1983, among 3,268 cities or towns in Japan, 1,359 cities and towns were covered with Jishubo. The quasi-voluntary fire squad is a complement of the formal fire defense system which is a division of a municipal or town government. Voluntary a c tiv itie s of fire prevention and fighting are necessary in the areas which have no formal fire defense system. Thus, residents in such an area voluntarily organize fire squads. The member of the fire squads are paid only a l i t t l e . Therefore, it is quasi-voluntary. Organizations of this kind in the area where the formal fire defense system is active usually engage in fire prevention activities such as disaster education for the public, demonstration of fire fighting activities, and so on. In this sense, the quasi-voluntary fire squads in the area where the formal fire defense system is sufficiently established are similar to Jishubo. However, it is different from Jishubo in that its members are selected. On the other hand, in the area with no formal fire defense system, it is the only organization specialized in fire fighting and local governments, hence, regard it as a quasi-formal fire defense system.
26. As indicated in Figure 3, some designated organizations are always involved in the interorganizational network after a disaster. Although the emergency operation centers at the national level, the prefectural level, and the municipal level are supposed to be the leading organizations, some other public and private organizations whose functions and purposes are related to the recovery activities cannot be ignored. Thus, the Disaster Reduction Act designated these organizations as the disaster relevant organizations. Those designated organizations are classified into four categories in terms of the law, and listed below. As to the local public administration organizations and the local public or private organizations, taking Nagasaki area as an example, we can list the following organizations.
(1) The nation-wide public (2) The local public administration administration organization: organizations:
Fire Defense Agency, Kyushu Regional Police National Public Safety Bureau, Commission, Nagasaki Local Finance National Police Agency, Office, Hokkaido Development Kyushu Regional Medical Agency, Affairs Bureau, 27
Defense Agency, Kumamoto Regional Forestry Scienceand Technology O ffice, Agency, Nagasaki Local Food Environment Agency, Agency Office, National Land Agency, Fukuoka Regional Bureau of Ministryof Education, International Trade and Agency for Cultural Industry, Affairs, Nagasaki Local Land Ministry of Health Transport Office, and Welfare, Kyushu District Maritime Ministry for Agriculture Bureau, and Forestry, Kyushu District Port Ministry of International Construction Bureau, Trade and Industry, Nagasaki Civil Aviation Minstry of Transport, Office, Maritime Safety Agency, Nagasaki Maritime Safety Meteorological Agency, Office, Ministry of Posts and Nagasaki Local Telecommunications, Meteorological Observatory, Ministry of Labor, Kyushu Regional Postal Ministry of Construction. Services Bureau, Kyushu Radio Regulatory (3) The nation-wide public Bureau, or private organization: Nagasaki Labor Standard Bureau. Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corp., (A) The local public or Japanese National private organizations: Railways, Nippon Telegraph and Nagasaki Office of Japan Telephone Public Corp., Tobacco and Salt Public the Bank of Japan, Cor p., the Japanese Red Cross Moji District Office of Society, Japanese National Japan Broadcasting Corp., Railways, Japan Highway Public Corp. , Nagasaki Radio Communication Water Resouces Development Department, Public Corp. Nagasaki Branch of the Bank Japan Atomic Energy of Japan, Research Institute, Nagasaki Office of Japan Electric Power Red Cross Society, Development Co., Nagasaki Station of Japan Nippon Express Co., Broadcasting Corp., Tokyo Electric Power Fukuoka District Office of Company. Japan HighwayPub 1 ic Corp., Nagasaki Medical Assoc., PrivateMassMedia Companies, Nagasaki Branch of Nippon Express Co., 28
Nagasaki Branch of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Nagasaki Branch of Saibu Gas Co., Private railways or ship companies, Nagasaki Assoc, of Bus Companies, Nagasaki Assoc, of Truck Companies. CHAPTER II
STUDIES ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND COORDINATION
In this chapter, we review several important contributions to the field of interorganization study. In addition, some major discussions on the concept of coordination are reviewed in the latter part of this chapter. These reviews not only provide us with insights for building a theoretical model described in the following chapter, but also make our stand in the field clear.
1. STUDIES ON INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS
Just as a man can be human only by being in a human society, so an organization can be social only in a social environment. That is, organizations cannot exist even for a short period without transactions with their environment. In our modern society, where science and technology are showing
rapid, vast, and startling progress, and where the structure
becomes more and more specialized increasing the degree of
interdependence among the components, the problem of how to
effectively respond to or transact with its environment is
essential for an organization. Furthermore, as the word "the
29 30 organization society" implied, our lives largely depend upon organizations. This shows that studies on relationships of organizations with their environment have a crucial importance in our modern society.
Almost twenty years ago, Blau made a threefold division of organization studies into (l)role analysis, (2)structura1 analysis, and (3) organizational analysis.According to him, most of organization studies had been devoted to (l)the analysis of individuals in a specific position or role, and to (2) the analysis of social relations among individuals in groups within an organization. In these analyses, however, environments had been ignored and an organization itself had been a given set of limiting conditions for human behaviors.
He claimed that most necessary were studies focusing on 'the system of interrelated elements that characterizes the organization as a whole.In otherwords, heinsisted
that an organization itself should be a unit of analysis.
This implies that an organization as a whole should be
analyzed by taking its environment into consideration, and
that it can be done on the basis of open system perspective.
Barnard proposed a theory of organization from the open
system perspective in 1 9 3 8 . He points out thatexternal
forces are essential for an organization. In those days, however, the human relations perspective was dominant in the
United States, so that his suggestion was not fully 31 followed. In 1959, Gouldner discussed a natural system model in comparison with a rational model.A natural system model regards an organization as an adaptive structure which changes itself in response to a continuously changing environment so as to maintain the equilibrium. This model was dominant in the 1940s and 1950s, as represented by the works of Parsons and Selznik.^^^ Their pioneering works directed researchers toward studies on organization environment relations. In 1960s, as Blau suggested, major studies in organization analysis focused on an organization as a whole.A fewexamples are studies by Burns and
Stalker, Lawrence= Lorsch, Hage=Aiken, Aston Group, Blau and
Schoenherr, and the like.(^) These studies necessarily focused on the relationships with environment.
When we focus on organization-environment relations, we have to decide how to conceptualize the environment. There are two fields of organizational environment as Lorsch=Morse distinguished.(8) One is aninternalenvironment such as organizational climate or organizational culture, and the other is an external environment. The question here is about the external environment, and it was the dominant
focus in 60's. Richard Hall distinguished the external
environment into the general environment and the specific
environment. (9) The former "contains those general
conditions that must be of concern to all organizations"^ 32 such as the economy, demographic change, and so on. The latter "contains specific environmental influences on the organization, such as other organizations with which it interacts or particular individuals who are crucial to it .-(11)
On the other hand. Steers distinguished three ways of conceptualizing the external environmental^) First, the external environment is treated as a left-over concept. The second type of conceptualization is the external environmnent as task environment, which refers to the portion of the total setting relevant for organizational goal-setting or goal-directed activities such as customers, suppliers, competitors, and the like. In other words, the task environment is equal to the specific environment with the exception of individuals. With the third approach, one views the external environment in terms of several dimensions. Many studies in this approach are likely to understand the external environment as the general environment. A few examples are as follows.
( 1 ) Emery=Trist distinguished four types of external environment. In the pi acid-randomized environment, goals and noxiants are re la tiv e ly stable and randomely distributed. In the placid-clustered, although goals and noxiants are not randomely distributed but clustered in certain ways. The disturbed-reactive type is a clustered environment in which two or more systems of the same kind are competitively playing a dynamic game. When the dynamic properties emerge not from the interaction of the component organizations but from the field itself, the environment is called turbulent field.(13) 33
(2)Thompson, owing much to Dill, identified two dimensions of the degrees of homogeneity and of stab ility . The dimension of degree of homogeneity is sim ilar to the concept of 'dynamic' in the disturbed-reactive environment. That is, it indicates whether or not the social entities in an environment were similar to one another. The degree of stability refers to degree of changes in such external conditions as technological development, population, market, and the like. It is to be noted that he discussed these dimensions in the context of task environment.(14)
(3)Lawrence and Lorsch devised an uncertaintyscore which indicates the degree of environmental uncertainty. They caluculate the scores of three factors in three environmental spheres. The factors of (1) degree of clarity of information, (2)degree of uncertainty of causal relationships, and (3)time span for feedback are obtained in the spheres of (l)general scientific environment, (2)market conditions, and (3)technical and economic conditions.(15)
(4)Child indicated three dimensions of the frequency of change, the degree of difference involved with each change, and the degree of irregularity inthe overall pattern of change.(16)
(5)Duncan, employing two dimensions of complexity and stability, presented the following four types of perceived environment, as shown in Table 5.(17)
The approaches of both by the task environment concept
and the dimension concept are not mutually exclusive.
A 1drich = Mind1 in discussed two perspectives in studies on
organization-environment r e l a t i o n .(^8) in theinformation
perspective, the external environment is regarded as a
source of information. As represented by Lawrence=Lorsch's
s t u d y , (19) this perspective pays much attention to the
concept of uncertainty as a dimension of the external
environment. The other is the resource perspective. This 34
TABLE 5* CHARACTERISTICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATE
simple complex
Cell 1 Cell 2 static Low Perceived Moderately Low Uncertainty Perceived Uncertainty 1.Small number of 1.Large number of factors & components factors & components in the environment. in the environment.
2.Factors & components 2.Factors & components are somewhat similar are not similar to one to one another. another. 3.Factors & components 3.Factors & components remain basically the remain basically the same and are not same. changing.
Cell 3 Cell 4 dynamic Moderately High High Perceived Perceived Uncertainty Uncertainty 1. Small number of 1.Large number of factors & components factors & components in the environment, in the environment. 2.Factors & components 2.Factors & components are somewhat similar are not similar to to one another. one another. 3.Factors & components 3.Factors & components of the environment are of the environment are in noncontinual in a continual process process of change. of change. ______
* Source: R.B.Duncan, "The Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty, 1972 p.320
perspective views the external environment as a source of
scarce resources. Since competitions among organizations for
scarce resources greatly affect the degree of dependencies
of those organizations, this perspective lays stress on the 35 degree of dependency as a crucial dimension of environment.
Although their interests were limited to studies with the dimension approach, either perspective can be employed in either approach. Both approaches are reciprocal or
complementary. As Steers briefly indicated, the dimension
approach is "useful for comparing one organization's
environment to another's on a more general level.
However, the task environment concept is not less useful
than the dimension concept. It enables us to clearly
identify the important aspects of environment and to provide
a greater precision in discussions on environmental
relations. Both the dimension concept and the task
environment approaches, being combined with each other,
contributed a great deal to studies of interorganizationa1
relations. On the one hand, the task environment concept
made researchers find out the existence of other
organizations in environments, because important aspects of
task environments such as suppliers, competitors, and the
like are practically composed of other organizations.
Thus, increased interests in the task environment motivated
studies of inter-organizational relations. On the other
hand, the dimension concept provided good examples on how to
deal with inter-organizational relations.
Thus, in the 1960s, studies on interorganizationa1
relations gradually evolved out of organization-environment 36 studies. However, it does not mean that there is no studies on interorganizationa1 relations before the 1960s. For example, we have some important studies such as Hunter's, Dahl's, and the like/^l)
As Laumann and his colleagues indicate, the studies on interorganizational relations have changed their level of analysis from dyadic relations in its early stage to the total network of interorganizational transaction, as Laumann and his colleagues i n d i c a t e d . (^2) The early studies inevitably tried to analyze one focal organization in relation with other organizations, because their concerns were persistently with organization environment relationships, and, therefore, the levels of analysis were kept at an organization as a whole. Laumann and his colleagues call this type as "egocentric network/^^3)
That is, what was focused on was each dyadic relation of an
organization with another organization. The typical example
is an organization-set model as developed by Evan.^^^^An
organization set model consists of four basic components;
e.g., focal organization, input organization set, output
organization set, and feedback effect. In this model, a
focal organization occupies "a central position" and
relationships of the focal organization with input and
output organization sets are the object of analysis. This
model is not a tool for the analysis of interorganizational 37 relations in the strict sense, because interorganizational relations involved in this model are limited to those which have some direct effects on a focal organization. However,
Evan's discussion on three dimensions that have a significant effect on the focal organization is very suggestive for analyses of inter-organizational relations.
He singled out (1) the size of input and output organization sets, (2)the diversity of input and output organization sets, and (3)the network configuration. Each dimension is defined as follows.
Size of set refers to the sheer number of input and output organizations with which the focal organization interacts; by diversity of the input and output organization-sets is meant the number of organizations in the input- and output-sets differing in gross, manifest functions such as industrial organizations, courts,legislatures, community organizations, prisons, professional associations, hospitals, etc. The network configuration refers to the formal properties of interaction among the members of the input and output organization-sets.(25)
Especially useful for our purpose is his discussion on
the network configuration He indicated, based on findings of
group communication network experiments, four types of
configurations Those are (l)a dyad, (2)a wheel network,
(3)an all-channel network, and (4) a chain network. This
shows us that experimental studies on small groups are
helpful in analyzing inter-organziationa1 relations.
One of the earliest studies which grappled directly 38 with the problem of interorganizational relations was done by Levine and White.They paid much attention to inter-organizational exchanges of social welfare organizations. Every organization has to engage in exchanges with other organization in order to get necessary resources, which are scarce, but indispensable for achieving an organization goal. They state that these exchanges are determined by (1) "the accessibility of each organization to necessaryelementsfromsources"(^7) outside the relevant system, (2) "the objectives of the organization and
particular functions to which it allocates the elements it
controls",(28) and (3) "the degree to which domain
consensus exists among the various organizations".(2^)
Among others, the concept of domain consensus seems highly
important. The domain of organization refers to the goals
and the functions of the organization. The domain consensus
exists when the goals and the functions of an organization
are accepted by other organizations as appropriate to the
organization.
Litwak and H ylton are a ls o among the e a rly
contributors to the field. (^^) Their study has much
importance for the analyses of inter-organizational
relations in that they tried to make clear distinction
between intra-organizational and inter-organizational
analyses, and in that they specified three determinant 39 factors of interorganizational coordination as mentioned later.
From the late 1960s, many studies or models were provided, and a total network of interorganizational transactions became a unit of analysis, as Lauman and his col leagues indicated. (^ ^) Some major models are briefly discussed in the following section.
Warren contributed to the field in two aspects. On the one hand, he made a threefold distinction of the levels of
o rg an izatio n al phenomena that transcend the purely
intraorganizational.
(1)Organizational position - concerns the relationship of the organization to its environment, including its input, output, and generalized position in the interorganizational field.
(2)Specific organizational interaction - concerns interactional episodes where a focal organization interacts with one or more others in a specific interactional framework.
(3)Interorganizational field - concerns the properties of an aggregate of interacting organizations as distinguished from the properties of the individual organizayions themselves.(32)
In the discussion of these levels, he made clear that
the interorganizational field is an extension of the line of
studies on organization-environment relationships, and that
it should be the unit of analysis when a community-wide
issue is the problem to be studied. 40
Warren offerred the concept of "concerted decision making". The concept of "concerted decision making" means the joint decision making process in the aggregate of organizations in a community. He defines it as follows.
Concerted decision making is a process in which the individual decisions of two or more units are made on a more inclusive systemic level which includes these units. The rationale underlying the concerted decision making is that the process w ill produce a more satisfactory outcome if concerted than if the units are left to make their own decisions independently.(33)
In this process, the individual enterprises continue as profit enterprises or voluntary or public agencies, but certain aspects of decision making are pooled. What earlier were individual enterprise decisions now become inclusive decisions. And a certain part of action that formerly was carried out in relation to goals of the individual enterprise is now carried out in relation to goals established for the aggregate of enterprises, whether at city hall, or in the chamber of commerce, or in the welfare council, or within some ad hoc coalition designed to implement a federally sponsored program.(34)
He tries to analyze an interorganizational field by
this concept. Six dimensions of an interorganizational field
as a concerted decision making unit are differentiated.
These six dimensions determine the degree of concerted
decision making. The firs t dimension is "organizational
domain". A respective organization is likely to preserve or
expand its domain. The second is "the dimension of
voluntarism/coercion." This has to do with how a respective
organization comes into a concerted decision making
situation. He points out that "concerted decision making can 41 take place where there is no coercive power, but it will take place only among those organizations which see no threat to their respective domains and only on those issues in which the organizations find this to be the case."(^^)
The third dimension is "decision making context". Four contexts of decision making are distinguished. In the context of "social choice", individual organizations cannot enter concerted decision making without a mediation of the third party. On the contrary, individual organizations lose their autonomy and become a part of a hierarchical structure of an inter-organizational field in the context of "unitary." In the contexts of "coalitional" and
"federative," concerted decision making is carried out in an
appropriate manner. The fourth is the dimension of "issue
outcome interest." If two or more organizations have the
same issue-outcome interest, their concerted decision making
will be characterized by cooperative process. If their
interests diverge, their concerted decision making will be
characterized by contest process. The fifth dimension is
"salience". This dimension has to do with the subjective
evaluation of results or merits attributed to their
participation in concerted decision making. The last
dimension is "inclusiveness of organizational involvement".
This dimension refers to the degree to which an individual
organization is involved in concerted decision making. His 42 discussion on these six dimensions can be summarized as
Figure 4.
Dimension
Organization H i ^ f- ow Domain
Voluntarism/ HighI4 Low I Coercion I ______V ______Decision Social £^C o a 1 i t i olTjf-) Federation (f|U nitar y Making Choice Context
Organization |Low| 4- »|High Involvement I
Salience Positive > Negative ^ Interest |Same|4- ^ [Divergent
* Source : Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Interorganizational Analysis of an Emergency Social System", 1984 p.98
SIX DIMENSIONS OF CONCERTED DECISION MAKING BY WARREN FIGURE 4
An interorganization field after a disaster consists of
four types of organization. Quarante11i =Dynes proposed a
typology of organizations which engage in recovery
activities. An established organization, which
maintains its normal structure and functions, tends to
preserve it organizational domain. An expanding organization
changes its structure during the recovery period, though its 43 functions are the same as usual. An extending organization extends their functional area maintaining its normal structure. Both of these types can be seen asorganizations that tend to extend either their structural or functional domain.
On the dimension of voluntarism/coercion, individual organizations are likely to enter in relationships with
other organizations in order to maintain or extend their
domain in the highly uncertain and interdependent situation,
though relations among organizations are partially mandated.
Since the emergency consensus is that the first priority
should be put on recovery activities in a disastrous
situation, and since most organizations in a disastrous
situation temporarily stop their usual functions, they enter
the interorganizational scene with most of their resources.
This means that the degree of organizational involvement is
high. On the dimension of salience, since each organization
temporarily ignores the rationality of economy in most
cases, and since performances in recovery activities affect
its prestige after the recovery period, it is obliged
to participate in interorganizational relations. Thus, an
emergency social system as interorganizational relations can
be characterized in terms of Warren's six dimensions, as
shown in Figure 5.
Van de Ven proposes a social action system model. 44
Organization Domain high
Voluntarism/ Coercion high
Decision Making Social Coalition Federation Unitary Context .Choice
Organization Involvement high
Salience positive negative
Interest convergent
* Source: Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Interorganizationa1 Analysis of an Emergency Social System", 1984 p.99
EMERGENCY SOCIAL SYSTEM IN TERMS OF SIX DIMENSIONS FIGURE 5
He regards an interorganizational relationship as a social action system which has one or more collectiv e goal(s), a high degree of interdependence among its components, and unique identity as a unit. His premise is that the social action system as interorganizational relationship must
"exhibit the basic elem ents of any organized form of
collective behaviorThus, the social action system
can be analyzed in terms of organizational variables such as
formalization, centralization, and complexity. In addition 45 to these structural dimensions, he indicates other factors which influence formation and maintenance of inter-organizational relation. Those are (1) situational factors such as resource dependence, consensus, domain similarity, and the like, (2) process dimensions such as
intensity of resource flows and information flows, and (3)
outcome dimension, e.g., perceived effectiveness.^^^)
His arguement on a social action system is useful in
that it gives a support for using organizations 1 variables
in analyses of interorganizational relations, and therefore,
for applying the findings in organizational studies to
interorganizational analyses. Another contribution to our
study is made through his definition of the concept of
centralization. He defines centralization as "the degree of
inclusive or concerted decision making by member agency
representatives". As discussed in the following
chapter, it is a matter of how many decision making units
exist in an interorganizational field.
Above a l l , that Van de Ven trie d to combine two
approaches distinguished by Aldrich=Mindlin should be highly
evaluated.As mentioned above, he indicates two
factors in process dimensions, e.g., resource flows and
information flows. This shows that two approaches are
complementary and reciprocal to each other, and that an
analysis becomes more complete by combining two together. 46
Aldrich presents the population ecology model.
The model, which is analogous to the natural selction model in biological evolution, premises that environmental factors select the organizational characteristics that are best fit to the environment. The premise is similar to that of the structural contingency theory. However, this model does not aim to find the best adapted form of organization to a certain environment as the structural contingency theory does, but attempts to explain the process underlying organizational change. He mentions as follows.
The three stages of variation, selection, and retention constitute a general model of organizational change, which explains how organizational forms are created, survive or fail, and are diffused throughout a population.(45)
First, variations between organizations within a
certain organizational population occurs for "whatever
reason; planned, unplanned, haphazard, systematic, random,
predictable, or heterogeneous variations in some activity,
behavior, or structure.Then, selection criteria
are operated so as to differentially select some variations
over others. The third stage is the operation of a
retention mechanism. This mechanism refers to the
stabilization of organizational structures or activities.
Although the population ecology model can explain
organizational population, it seems inappropriate for our 47 purpose because of its long-run perspective. Aldrich clearly points out it.
The model is not intended to account for short-run changes, which are temporary responses to local conditions, but rather for long-run transformations in the form of social organization.(47)
One of the widely accepted model is the resource dependence model proposed by P f e f f e r = S a la n c ik .T h e model is based on two premises. First, an organization has to obtain resources from i t s environment in order to survive. In this sense, every organization depends upon other organizations that have necessary resources, as
Levine=White indicate.Second, an organization tends
to preserve its autonomy and to avoid its dependence upon
other organizations. Cook speculates that organizations are
likely to have relationships with the organizations which
have the almost equal amount of power, because the cost for
exchanging resources is 1 ow.(^^) Furthermore, as Warren
indicated, an organization usually tries to preserve or
extend its domain in normal situations.^^ The expansion
of i t s domain means the increase of a v a i l a b i l i t y of
alternative sources of resources. As Levine=White and Cook
hypothesized,the more alternative sources an
organization has, the less the degree of its dependence upon
other organizations and the more bargaining power the
organization has. 48
If an organization has to obtain resources from its environment and tries to avoid its dependence upon other organizations, then what kind of strategies can be taken ?
This is a main theme of the model. Pfeffer and Salancik argue three strategies for managing the interdependence.
The first is to control the organization itself. This will
be carried out by (l)extending its own control into the
vital exchanges, or (2) decreasing its reliance on single
c ritic a l exchanges. The typical manifestation of these
strategies is merger or growth. This is why an organization
tries to extend its domain. The thixd strategy is to
establish the negotiated environment. The negotiated
environment means that interorganizational linkages are
stabilized not by hierarchical mandate but by agreements.
Pfeffer=Salancik specified as follows.
When situations of exchange and competition are uncertain and problematic, organizations attempt to establish linkages with elements in their environment and use these linkages to access resources, to stabilize outcomes, and to avert environmental control, (an omission) Organizations coordinate in many ways - cooptation, trade associations, cartels, reciprocal trade agreements, coordinating councils, advisory boards, boards of directors, joint ventures, and social norms, (an omission) Such s tra te g ie s are much more common than to ta l absorption , as in merger, and are particularly useful when coordination is needed only occasionally.(54)
The resource dependence model sees organizations as the
active units capable of changing their environment, whereas 49 the population ecology model seems to stand on the environmental determinism like the structural contingency
theory does. However, the resource dependence model regards
an environment as the aggregation of resources. If it is
better that the information- and resource-perspectives
should be combined, then the concept of "resources" should
includes information and relational resources.
As mentioned above, the type of interorganizational
studies shifted from analyses of an egocentric network to
those of a total network. The unit of analysis in our study
is a total network of interorganizational relations, which
is called "interorganizational network (ION)" here.
An interorganizational network in the emergency or
restoration periods refers to an action set which is
temporarily developed by several organizations for the
common goal of speedy and successful recovery from a
disaster.
An ION is characterized by (l)the weakness of formal
authorty structure and (2)the representativeness authorized
by contracts or mutual agreements. Litwak and Hylton
designated (l)the existence of partial conflicts and (2)the
lack of formal authority structure as the differentiating
fact or of an IONfrom an organization. (^7) But since the
existence of conflicts is the raison d’etre of an
organization as well, whether they be total or partial, it 50 is not necessarily a unique characteristic of an ION.
Furthermore, the lack of formal authority structure, although it is a matter of degree , is slightly inaccurate when we take into account the administration levels such as
federal, prefectura1, municipal and town levels discussed by
Klonglan and others.Therefore, it is better to say
that the formal authority structure of an ION is weak rather
than that it is totally lacking. This means no more than
that an ION has no rigid authority structure as observed in
an organization.
Turk indicates that group representativeness is the
base of interorganizational relationships, while
relationships in an organization are based on
authority.(^^) However, representativeness is also an
essential process for an organization, because
representativeness is the process of organizing several
differentiated parts into a unity, as Shiobara defined.
The process of representativeness is a general and direct
measure for resolving tensions due to conflicting principles
of an organization. In the definition above, the process of
representativeness is almost the same as the process of
coordination discussed later, and, therefore, it is
essential for an organization as well. However,
intraorganizational representativeness is realized as a
relatively rigid hierarchical structure based on formal 51 authority, while interorganizational representativeness is externalized in various patterns. Turk and Lefcowitz classified, as shown in Table 6, four extreme types of inter group situation in terms of two dimensions; "the equality or inequality of power between the two groups" and
"the degree to which both groups share standards about the intergroup situation, in short, whether the inter group situation is legitimated or not by their respective normative systems/^^^)
TABLE 6 FOUR TYPES OF INTERGROUP SITUATION
inequality equality
legitimate (l)the legitimated (2)the legitimated inequality . equality.
non (3)the non- (A)the non legitimate legitimated legitimated inequality. equality.
They further discussed that four types of interaction
among representatives correspond to these types of
inter-group situations. In the legitimated inequality
situation, "the interaction among representatives would be
one of indulgence-deference."(^^) In the legitimated
equality situation, it would be one which is characterized
by mutual deference and mutual indulgence. However, the
relationship between representatives is one of 52 dominance-subjugation," while, in the non-legitimated equality situation, "representative interaction may take two major forms. The first is mutual assertion-divisive for intergroup coordination but promoting solidarity within both groups. The second is mutual accommodation, the typical bargaining situation in industry, which is functional for intergroup coordiantion, but is dysfunctional to solidarity within the participating groups, since changed expectations are required of both."^^^) In terms of their discussion, both the 1egitimated-inequa1ity and the legitimated equality situations can be observed in an ordinary organization. That is, this implies that the pattern of intraorganizational representativeness is only one or two patterns among several possible types of interaction between representatives, while, all types discussed by Turk and Lefcowitz can be possible in an ION.
Interorganizational representativeness may take various
types given that the base of representativeness in an -ION is
contract or agreement. Pfeffer and Salancik, as to this
point, described the possibilities as follows.
There are many informal mechanisms and semi-formal interorganizational linkages that can be employed to coordinate the respective interests of various social actors. Social coordination of interdependent actors is possible as a means for managing mutual interdepen dence. Behavior, in this instance, is not determined by hierarchical mandate but by agreements to behave in certain ways.(64) 53
A type of representativeness in an interorganizational network would be determined by the nature of contract or agreement for delegation of decision making power. In terms of whether the contract/agreement for power delegation be temporary or of long duration, and in terms of whether the contract/agreement be comprehensive or partial, various types of interorganizational representativeness such as merger, cartel, or joint venture can be differentiated from each other.
Thus, it can be said that the difference between the intra- and inter-organizational representativeness is solely
due to its basis . That is, the representativeness in an
interorganizational network is contractual, while
representativeness in an organization is based on formal
authority.
2. STUDIES ON COORDINATION
Coordination is an essential process for an
organization as mentioned in Chapter I. However, the concept
has been used in a broad sense, and both connotations and
denotations of the concept are often obscure. Two reasons
seem to be responsible for the ambiguity. First, it has
been caused by the fact that the concept has been used at
various levels in various contexts. For example. Petit uses
the concept in such a very broad sense that it includes 54 processes of decision making, planning, organizing, leadership, and control, while Corwin deals with it simply as a concept subordinate to control.
Furthermore, Haas and Drabek use the concept as a process which makes up the performance structure together with control, decision making, communication, and so on.(^^)
We usually have to learn the meaning or nature of the concept from the context in which it appears. The second reason for the ambiguity is due to the fact that the substantial nature of coordination has been left unclear.
March=Simon classified the type of coordination into
(1) coordination by plan and (2) coordination by
feedback. ( The former type is coordination which is
carried out by a certain pre-established program, and is
effective in a stable environment. On the other hand, the
pre-established program of actions is often inappropriate in
a flexible environment, so that an organization has to
coordinate its specialized activities on the basis of
feedback information. This is the feedback coordination.
Thompson also discussed three types of coordination.
Coordination by standardization "involves the establishment
of routines or rules which constrain action of each unit or
position into paths consistent with those taken by others in
the interdependent relationship."Coordinationby
plan involves the establishment of schedules for the 55 interdependent units by which their actions may then be governed."(^1) A third type of coordination is one by mutual adjustment which involves "the transmission of new information during the process of action.He indicated that the more uncertain the situation, the greater dependence upon the third type of coordination, and that these three types of coordination impose increasingly heavy burdens on communication and decision making in the order introduced above. Pugh distinguished between two types of coordination, summarizing four traditional ways of achieving coordination. According to him, coordination has been traditionally achieved by (l)direct hierarchical control,
(2)control by paperwork system, (3)a committee which is "a mechanism that attempts to achieve coordination directly without resources to hierarchical or procedural control, and
thus without disturbing the power and status balance of the
departments r e p r e s e n te d " ^ a n d (4) a liaison officer who
is expected to exclusively cope with coordination problems.
The first two types of coordination are basically achieved
by indirect measures, while the latter two by a direct
means. He singles out four signs that effective coordination
is not achieved; (l)regular frictions between department on
a variety of issues, (2)work overload on top management and
the chief executive, (3)the red-tape syndrome, which means
that managers give up trying to follow paperwork procedures. 56 regarding them as red tape to be filled in as a ritual,
(4)hiding in a proliferation of committee, which means that committee members do not challenge the power balance of departments represented by themselves, so that they compromise on or hide coordination issues, and (5)the coordinator's empire, which means that liaison officers oppose direct attempts at coordination for infringing on their domain.
Litterer introduced the similar distinction of coordination type.(^^) He discussed three types of coordination. Voluntary coordination is when the groups or individual finds a need and a program, and applies it.
"Directive coordination is when people are told what to do andwhen/^75) However, in a highly uncertain andflexible
situation, to facilitate interaction between relevant
parties is necessary. Facilitated coordination is achieved
by establishing liaison positions which may be occupied by a
group or an individual. It should be noted that he defined
coordination as "the task of facilitating linked
activities"^and singled out two fundamental elements
of coordination: "( 1 )determination of adequate programs for
these a c tiv itie s and (2)communications to signal what
program is to be used or the conditions for which a program
is necessary and when action is needed.
We have only a few studies on interorganizational 57 coordination. Klonglan and others, influenced by studies of
Thompson=McEwan, Litwak=Hy1 ton, and Finley, tried to analyze an interorganizational network at three levels of federal, state, and county in terms of the following eight variables.
(1)director awareness of the existence of another organizations, (2)director acquaintance between organizations, (3)director interaction between organizations, (4)information exchange of newsletters, reports, and other releases, (5)resource exchange -bargaining- of funds, materials, or personnels, (6)over lapping board membership -cooptation- of staff or members, (7)joint programs - coalition - to plan andimplement activities, (S)written agreements to share activities between organizations.(78)
The degree of interorganizational connection becomes closer in the order introduced above, and these eight variables can describe eight patterns of interorganizational coordination as well. Weller and Kreps pointed out four structural consequences of interorganizational relations.
The following four consequences can be also regarded as four patterns of interorganizational coordination.
(1)Autonomy: Each o rg a n iz atio n al unit remains independent, (2)Contracting: The organizational units set the limits of the cooperation but remain otherwise independent. (3)Coalescing: Elements of the organizations merge to coordinate, facilitate, mediate, or a ll three. (4)Coopting:. An element or elements of one organization is/are absorbed by another organization.(79) 58
Turk provides us with the third discussion on interorganizational coordination/®*^^ He notesqualities of interorganizational linkages, and distinguished between
two types of interorganizational network. One is the type
in which one powerful organization imperatively controls
other organizations' activities. In this type, the
structures of interorganizational network are more likely to
have the higher degree of centralization, and the
possibility of implementing an order is positively related
to the amount of power of the dominant organization. The
other is the ION composed of linkages based on
associationalism. The linkage of associationa1 ism is defined
as "problem-specific, temporary, voluntary, and lateral
(rather than vertical) relationships among social units, no
one of which is sufficiently powerful to determine the
actions of the rest."(®^) As to this secondtype, Turk
discussed as follows.
Certain units may be granted temporary power on the basis of alleged expertise or uncontested interest, but it is specific power based on contracts with the remaining units, and it may be withdrawn at any time. That linkage rests upon specific agreements among units with more nearly equal power than is the case in imperative control means that the process of decision is one of social choice, that is, of the unanticipated resolution of the interplay of numerous interests and values promoted by various social units.(82)
Hall and others explore factors which develop
inter-organizational cooordination. Their assumption is that 59 the bases of interorganizational coordination are (l)the
frequency of interaction, (2)the perceptions of member
organizations about each other, and (3)patterns of partial conf1ictbetween theorganizations.^®^^ The frequency of interaction is dependent upon the mutual desire of organizations and/or the mandates. Whichever the basis may
be, interactions lead to higher levels of coordination. When
interacting organizations perceive each other as competent
and as performing their tasks well, higher levels of
coordination can be anticipated. Since conflicts intensify
the interactions and heighten the level of communications,
conflicts and coordination covary. Their empirical research
in the setting of human service delivery activities resulted
in the following conclusions.
( 1 ) Interorg anizationa 1 coordination is strongly associated with the importance of the interactions, theassessmentof good performance in other organizations, the perception of competence of the personnel, and the compatibility of managing or operating philosophies among organizations.
(2)Frequency of interaction, perception of good performance, high quality of communication are directly and strongly related to coordination, respectively.
(3)Conflict is an important contributor to the level of coordination among the organizations.(SA)
Their effort is highly evaluated in that they
empirically specified the relationship between conflicts and
coordination, and in that they made clear distinction 60 between the interactions based on mutual desires and/or mandates. However, the concept of coordination is le ft unclear. They suggest, citing Yep's argument, that coordination can take place for the purpose of mutual goal attainment or adaptation to environmental pressures. The degree of coordination was measured by subjective evaluation of respondents, entrusting the definition of the concept to respondents.
Wright explored the relationships of two types of inter-organizational coordination with several factors.
He made a twofold division of interorganizational coordination pattern into system coordination and network coordination. The former is coordination by centralized
control, and the latter is one by self-control among member
organizations.
On the basis of discussions by Mott and Reid, we
distinguish between two basic patterns of
interorganizational coordination^^?) Those are( 1 )mediated
coordination, which means that coordination is achieved by
liaison positions, and ( 2)unmediated coordination. The
second pattern is further divided into (l)unmanaged
coordination and (2)managed coordination, in terms of
whether or not a coordinating agency has formal authority
and resources for effective control. The types of
interorganizational coordination introduced here can be 61 summarized as shown in Figure 6, including Wright's distinction. (^8)
t— unmediated network coordination (associationalism) Types of Coordination —[unmanaged(associationalism)
— mediated!—
—{managed^ system coordination (imperative control)
^Source: Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Disaster and Organizations", 1981
THE TYPES OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION FIGURE 6
Warren c la r if ie d that the concept of
inter-organizational coordination had been used in the past
with one of the following four meanings.
(1)A mutual checking out of plans so that two or more organizations may act in fu ll knowledge of each other's intentions. (2)Formal or informal agreements to avoid duplication of services. (3)Joint planning of new programs that go beyond the domain of any single organization. (4)Setting up mechanisms, formal or informal, for settling differences on issues when the interests of the organizations conflict with each other.(89)
Warren presented two additional meanings of
inter-organizational coordination. One is allocative 62 coordination, which means that two or more organizations are coordinated from "the community standpoint when the benefit from expenditures for their respective programs yields equal to the community, in terms of the value it places on their respective goals."( The other is "adaptive coordination", in terms of which "two or more organizations are coordinated to the extent that the behavior of one is modified in accordance with the behavior of the other(s)."(91)
All of these reviews on both intra- and
inter-organizational coordination show us that, although means, results and purposes of coordination have been
frequently discussed, substantial activities or process of
coordination are s t i l l vague, with the exception of
L itterer's discussion as noted above. As suggested by
L i t t e r e r , (92) we should take into account decision making
and communication in making clear the substantial meaning of
coordination. Simon indicated three steps of coordination:
(l)planning a comprehensive course of actions, (2)
communicating it to the members, and (3)being accepted by
themember. (93) Planning a comprehensive course of action
is decision making its e lf, and communicating and being
accepted by the members are self-evidently a matter of
communication. Thus, following Simon's discussion, we
consider that the substantial activities of coordination 63 are (l)to make overall decision and (2)to communicate it to the members.
At the organizational level, an overall decision is usually made by persons at the higher echelon of a formal authority structure. The legitimacy of decision role is
ensured by authority. However, at interorganizational level,
decision roles obtain its legitimacy from contracts or
agreements concerning delegating of decision-making rights,
whichever it may be formal or informal. In other words,
decision-making in an interorganizational network is
representative decision making. Decision making is,
needless to say, a process of data processing. It includes
four steps, as pointed out by Webber.First, one
has to identify the problem in achieving a specific goal(s).
This is to clarify the gap between the goal(s) and their
actual environmental conditions, and therefore,is called
"detection". Second, one has to define the problem and find
alternative solutions. This is called "cognition". Third,
one has to evaluate these alternatives as to advantages and
disadvantages, and to select the alternative to be followed.
This is the step of "evaluation". The selected alternative
has to be changed into an explicit form of directions. This
last step is called "direction".
Communication, another substantial activity of
coordination, relies heavily on authority in an 64 organization. As indicated by Barnard, in order for communication activity to be effective, information should come from an authorized person or position and be acceptable by the members who receive it. In other words, authority of communication is ensured (l)when a sender of information has legitimate authority attached to his position in formal hierarchical structure and (2)when the content of information is consistent with organizational goal(s). However, in an ION, the effectiveness of communication activity is, because of the weakness of formal authority structure, largely determined by the quality of the communication process, such as the speed or the accuracy of communication. This does not mean that communication in an ION needs no authority. Rather, authority is also indispensable in the case of an ION. It is simply said that communicating to other members is re la tiv e ly easier in a single organization than in an ION, so that authority becomes a determinant factor in an organization. On the contrary, an ION is likely to face serious problems attributable to different languages or various communication
formats used in member organizations. Consequently, it will
be an important matter for an ION how information can be
safely transmitted, rather than how it can be accepted.
As shown in Figure 6, the classifications by Reid,
Mott, and Wright include the type of coordination lacking a 65 coordinating unit. According to Litwak and Hylton, a coordinating unit emerges when the number of member organizations, the degree of standardization and the degree of interdependence are respectively in a medium range.
Organizational merger will be a result of high interdependence, and "where no interdependence exists there
is littl e concern for co-ordinating mechanism.Their
discussion also assumes that no coordinating unit emerges
in some cases. However, two characteristics of an ION, the weakness of formal authority structure and the contractual
representativeness, imply the existence of the coordinating
unit(s). Because of the weakness of formal authority
structure, an ION cannot be coordinated in the indirect
fashion as in a single organization, but must be done
through mediation of coordinating unit(s). The contractual
representativeness presupposes the existence of the other
party who is mandated or given the rig h t of making
decisions. Either the unmediated coordination or the network
coordination means that each member organization can be a
coordinating unit in an ION, so that there are as many
coordinating units as the number of member organizations in
an extreme case. In other words, the respective organization
autonomously coordinates their intraorganizational
activ itie s. As Thompson and Hawkes indicate, planned or
unplanned coordinating unit(s) necessarily follow(s) a 66 disaster.Thus, in considering inter-organizational coordination, we ignore the type of interorganizational network which lacks the coordinating unit(s). 67 NOTES
1. Peter M. Blau, "The Comparative Study of Organizations" i n Industrial and Labor Relations Review 18 (1965) pp.201-218
2. Peter M. Blau, "The Comparative Study of Organizations," 1965 pp.201-218
3. Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge Mass; Harvard U niversity Press, 1938)
4. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis" in Robert K. Merton et. al. eds.. Sociology Today (New York: Basic Book, 1959)
5. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1951)
Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organization" in Administrati ve Science Quarterly 1 (1956) pp.63-85
Philip Selznick, "Foundations for the Theory of Organizations"in American Sociological Review 13 (1948) pp.23-35
Philip Selznick, TVA and Grass Roots : A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966
6. W. Richard Scott, "Organizational Structure" in Annual Review of Sociology 1 (1975) pp.1-20
7. Tom Burns and G.M.Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London: Tavistock Publications, 1961)
Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (Boston : Harvard University, 1967) translated by Hiroshi Yoshida (Tokyo : Sangyo Noritsu Daigaku Press, 1977)
Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, Social Change in Complex Organizations (New York : Random House, 1970), and other articles.
Derek Pugh, D.J.Hickson, C.R.Hinings, and C.Turner, "Dimensions of Organization Structure" in Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968) pp.65-105 68
Derek Pugh, D.J.Hickson, C.R.Hinings, and C.Turner, "The Context of Organization Structures" in Administrative Science Quarterly 14 (1969) pp.91-114, and other articles.
Peter M. Blau and Richard A. Schoenherr, The Structure of Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1971)
8. Jay W. Lorsch and J. J. Morse, Organizations and Their Members: A Contingency Approach (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) pp.5-15
9. Richard H. Hall, Organizations : Structure and Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972) pp.297-324
10. Richard H. Hall, Organizations : Structure and Process, p.298
11. Richard H. Hall, Organizations : Structure and Process, p.298
12. Richard M. Steers, Organizational Effectiveness : A Behavioral View (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing, 1977) pp.84-99
13. F. E. Emery and E. L.Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments" in Human Relations 18 (1965) pp.21-32
14. James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action (New York: McGraw-hill Book, 1967) pp.67-70
15. Paul R.Lawrence and J.W.Lorsch, Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration, Chapter 4
16. John Child, "Organizational Structure, Environment, and Performance : The Role of Strategic Choice." in Sociology 6 (1972) pp.1-22
17. R. B. Duncan, "The Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty" in Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972) pp.313-327
18. Howard E. Aldrich and Sergio Mind 1 in, "Uncertainty and Dependence : Two Perspectiyes on Environment" in Lucien Karpik ed. Organization and Environment (Beverly H ills: Sage Publications, 1978) pp.149-170
19. Paul R. Lawrence and J. W. Lorsch, Organization and 69
Environment : Managina Differentiation and Integration, 1967
20. Richard M. Steers, Organizational Effectiveness ; A Behavioral View, 1977 p.77
21. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure; A Study of Decision Makers (University of North Carolina Press, 1953) translated by Naomichi Matsumura Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs _? (Yale University Press, 1961)
22. Edward 0. Laumann, Joseph Galaskiewicz, and Peter V. Marsden, "Community Structure as Interorganizational Linkages" in Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978) pp.455- 484
23. Edward 0. Laumann, Joseph Galaskiewicz, and Peter V. Marsden, "Community Structure as Interorganizational Linkages" 1978
24. William M. Evan, "The Organization-Set : Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations" in J.D.Thompson e d., Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966) pp.175-191 Wiiliam M. Evan, "An O rganization-Set Model of Interorganizational Relations" in M.F. Tuite, R.K. Chisholm and M. Radnor, eds., Interorganizational Decision Making (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1972) pp.181-200
25. William M. Evan, "An Organization-Set Model of Interorganizational Relations" p.185
26. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation ships" in Administrati v e Science Quarterly 5 (1961) pp.583-601
27. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation ships" p.588
28. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation ships" p.588
29. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation ships" p.588 70
30. Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis ; A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies" in Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (1962) pp.395-420
31. Edward 0. Laumann, Joseph Galaskiewicz, and P.V. Marsden, "Community Structure as Interorganizational Linkages" 1978 p.457
32. Roland L. Warren, A.F. Burgunder, J.W. Newton, and S.M. Rose, "The Interaction of Community Decision Organizations: Some Conceptual Considerations and Empirical Findings" in Anant R. Negandhi ed.. Modern Organizational Theory: Contextual, Environmental, and Socio-Cultural Variables (Kent State University Press 1973) p.146
33. Roland L. Warren, "The Concerting of Decisions as a Variable in Organizational Interaction" in Matthew Tuite, R. Chisholm, and M. Radnor eds., Interorganizational Decision Making (Chicago : Aldine Publishing Company, 1972) p.21
34. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change (Chicago : Rand McNally, 1971) p.155
35. Roland L. Warren, "The Concerting of Decisions as a Variable in Organizational Interaction", 1972 p.23
36. Enrico L. Quarante 11i , "Organization Under Stress" in Robert C. Brictson ed.. Symposium o_n Emer egncy 0££ r_£^^£££ (Santa Monica: System Development Corporation, 1966)
Enrico L. Quarante 11i and Russell R. Dynes, "Group Behavior Under Stress" in Sociology and Social Research 52 (1968)
Enrico L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes, "Operational Problems of Organizations in Disasters" in 1967 Emergency Operations Symposium (Santa Monica : System Development Corporation, 1967) pp.151-175
Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavion in Disaster (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1974)
37. Charles Per row, "Organizational Prestige : Some Functions and Dysfunctions" in American Journal of Sociology 66 (1961) pp.335-341 71
J. E. Wright, "Organizational Prestige and Task Saliency in Disaster" in E. L. Quarante 11i ed., Disasters : Theory and Research (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978)
38. Yasumasa Yamamoto, "An Interorganizational Analysis of An Emergency Social System" in Ritsuo Akimoto ed.. Disaster and Social System (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1984) p.99
39. Andrew H. Van de Ven, "On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations" in The Academy of Management Review 1 (1976) pp.24-36
40. Andrew H. Van de Ven, "On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations" 1976 p.25
41. Andrew H. Van de Ven, "On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations" 1976 p.29
42. Andrew H. Van de Ven, "On the Nature, Formation, and Maintenance of Relations Among Organizations" 1976 p.26
43. Howard E. Aldrich and Sergio Mindlin, "Uncertainty and Dependence : Two Perspectives on Environment" 1978
44. Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1979)
45. Howard H. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments, 1979 p.28
46.Howard H. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments, 1979 p.34
47.Howard H. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments, 1979 p.27
48. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Contro1 of Organizations : A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978)
49. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation ships" 1961
50. Karen S. Cook, "Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations" in J. Kenneth Benson ed., Organizational Analysis : Critique and Innovation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977) p.69 72
51. Roland L. Warren, "The Concerting of Decisions as a Variable in Organizational Interaction" 1972 p.22
52. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relation ships" 1961 Karen S. Cook, "Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations" 1977
53. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R.Salancik, The External Control of Organizations ; A Resource Dependence Perspective, 1978 Chapter Six and Chapter Seven
54. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations : A Resource Dependence Perspective, 1978 p.144 ,
55. "Relational resources" means here certain patterned social relationships which ensure the ownership or the right of control for physical and human resources and information. The patterned social relationships serve for maintaining social order in a normal situation. However, in a disastrous situation, they are forced to change as Thompson=Hawkes indicated.
Yasumasa Yamamoto, "D isaster and Organizations" in Hirotada Hirose ed.. Social Scientific Approach to Disaster (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1981) p.63
< <•*» J. D. Thompson and Robert W. Hawkes, "D isaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process" in G. W. Baker and D. W. Chapman eds., Man and Society i n Disaster (New York : Basic Books, 1962) pp. 272-273
56. Aldrich distinguished among three types of inter organizational relations at the population level. According to him, an interorganizational network consists of "all organizations linked by a specified type of relation, and is constructed by finding the ties between all organizations in a population." It is not a corporate body and thus cannot act as an organization. However, in this study, the concept of interorganziationa 1 network is used in the almost same meaning of "inter organizational field" by Warren.
Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Disaster and Organizations" in Hirotada Hirose ed.. Social Scientific Approach to Disaster, 1981 p.71 73 Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments. 1979 pp.279-284
Roland L. Warren, "The Interorganizational Field as a Focus for Investigation" in Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1967) pp.397-399
Roland L. Warren, A.F.Burgunder, J.W.Newton, and S.M.Rose, "The In te ra c tio n of Community Decision Organizations : Some Conceptual Considerations and Empirical Findings" 1973 pp.146-149
57. Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational AnalysisiA Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies" 1962 pp.562-564
58. Gerald E. Klonglan, R. D. Warren, J. M. Winkelpleck, and S. K. Paulson, "Interorganizational Measurement in the Social Service Sector: Difference by Hierarchical Level" in Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976) pp.675-687
59. Herman Turk, Organizations in Modern Life (San Francisco: Josey Bass, 1977) p.6
60. Tsutomu Shiobara, Soshiki to Unodo no Riron (A Theory of Organization and Social Movement) (Tokyo : Shinyosha, 1976) pp.16-20
61. Herman Turk and Myron J. Lefcowitz, "Towards a Theory of Representation Be'tween Groups" in Social Forces 40 (1962) pp.338
62. Herman Turk and Myron J. Lefcowitz, "Towards a Theory of Representation Between Groups" 1962 p.339
63. Herman Turk and Myron J.Lefcowitz, "Towards a Theory of Representation Between Groups" 1962 p.340
64. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R.Salancik, The External Control of Organizations : A Resource Dependence Perspective , 1978 pp.143-144
65. T.A. Petit, Fundamentals of Management Coordination (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975)
66. Ronald G. Corwin,"Patterns of Organizational Control and Teacher Militancy" in Research in Sociology of Education and Socialization 2 (1981)
67. J.EugeneHaas and Thomas E. Drabek, Complex 74
Organizations : A SocloloRical Perspective (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973)
68. James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Willey & Sons, 1958) translated by Moriaki Tsuchiya (Tokyo : Diamond-sha, 1977) P- 245 69. James D. Thompson,Organizations in Action, 1967
70. James D. Thompson,Organizations in Action, 1967 p.56
71. James D. Thompson,Organizations in Action, 1967 p.56
72. James D. Thompson,Organizations in Action, 1967 p.56
73. Derek Pugh, "Effective Coordination in Organizations inAdvanced Management Journal 44 (1979)
74. Joseph A. Litterer, The Ana lysis of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965)
75. Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations, 1965 p. 455 76. Joseph A. Litterer, The Ana lysis of Organizations, 1965 p. 472 77. Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations, 1965 PP.472-473 78. Gerald E. Klonglan, R.D. Warren, J.M. Winkelpleck, S.K. Paulson, "Interorganizational Measurement in the Social Services Sector:Differences by Hierarchical Level", 1976 p. 676
79. Jack M. Weller and Gary A. Kreps, "A Model of Community Coordination in Response to Disasters" Working Paper No.29, Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University 1970 p.9
80. Herman Turk, Interorganizational Activation in Urban Communities (Washington D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1973)
81. Herman Turk, Interorganizational Activation in Urban Communities, 1973 p.8
82. Herman Turk, Interorganizational Activation in Urban Communities, 1973 p.8 75
83. Richard Hall, John P. Clark, Peggy C. Giordano, Paul V. Johnson, and Martha Van Roekel, "Interorganizational Coordination in the Delivery of Human Services" in Lucien Karpik ed.. Organization and Environment; Theory, Issues and Rea 1 it y (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978)
84. Richard Hall, John P. Clark, Peggy C. Giordano, Paul V. Johnson, and Martha Van Roekel, "Interorganizational Coordination in the Delivery of Human Services", 1978 pp.295-297
85. Richard Hall, John P. Clark, Peggy C. Giordano, Paul V. Johnson, and Martha Van Roekel, "Interorganizational Coordination in the Delivery of Human Services", 1978 pp.304-308
86. Joseph E. Wright, "Interorganizational Relations as Structure and as Action: The Case for Emergency Medical Services in Disaster" Preliminary Paper No.37, Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University 1977
87. B. J. F. Mott, "Coordination and Interorganizational Relations in Health" in P.E.White and G.J.Vlasak eds., Interorganizational Research in Health: Conference Proceedings (Washington, D.C.: Johns Hopkins University, 1970)
W. J. Reid, "Interagency Coordination in Delinquency Prevention and Control" in Social Service Review 38 (1964)
W. J. Reid, "Interorganizational Coordination in Social Welfare: A Theoretical Approach to Analysis and Intervention" in R.M.Kramer and H.Specht eds., Readings in Community Organization Practice (Englewood C liffs: Prentice Hall, 1969)
88. Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Disaster and Organizations" 1981 P.73
89. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Lo ve, and Social Change, 1971 p.213
90. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Lo ve, and Social Change, 1971 p.214
91. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change, 1971 p.214 76
92. Joseph A. Litterer, The Analysis of Organizations, 1965 pp.472-473
93. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior; A Study of Decision Making Process in Administrative Organization (New York: Macmillan, 1945) translated by Takehiko Matsuda et.al., (Tokyo: Diamondsha, 1973) pp.136-138
94. Ross A. Webber, Manaaement: Basic Elements of Managing Organizations (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1975) p.24
95. Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, pp.172-176 He indicated that a superior does not necessarily have authority. Authority of communication is determined by potentiality of receivers to consent. The potentiality is ensured when communication is formal. Thus, communication from the source of organizational information, e.g., communication center, is likely to have more authority than from individual and informal sources.
96. Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis: A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies", 1962 p.415 Table 2
97. James D. Thompson and Robert W. Hawkes, "Disaster, Community Organization, and Administrative Process", 1962 pp.274-278 77
CHAPTER III
A THEORY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION
This chapter is devoted to depict our theoretical model. The firs t part provides the basic framework for understanding a structure of interorganizational system.
Discussions on two dimensions for constructing a typology of interorganizational coordination follow it. In the third section, we obtain four types of interorganizational coordination, which is one of purposes of our study. The
final part of this chapter provides us with possible
determinant factors of the types of interorganizational
coordination, and with eighteen hypotheses which are
examined in the following chapters.
1. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
A social system is an entity of actors coupled with
each othei’. An actor, whether it may be an individual or a
social collectivity such as a group, a family, an
organization, and so on, is a decision maker.The
structure of an actor is fundamentally composed of four
steps of (1) detection, (2) cognition, (3) evaluation,
(A)direction, as mentioned in Chapter II. It can be 78 described as Figure 7.
^input) ^ detection > cognition^ frame of cognition
V utp u — [direction 4------evaluation!^ —[frame of evaluation
-^An Actor^
STRUCTURE OF AN ACTOR FIGURE 7
Environmental information enters into cognition through detection, so that the actor can understand the information and clarify the situation and the problems in terms of the frame of reference. This subjectively understood or modified information is then transferred to evaluation, where the choice of the possible means or response is made by individual judgement concerning its resulting utility. The actor compares possible alternatives as to their resulting u tilities in terms of the frame of evaluation. The frame of evaluation consists of values, norms, beliefs, and the like, internalized by socialization process, and provides the
value-ordering of possible means or responses so as to enable the actor to choose the subjectively best possible means or response under several restrictions. The chosen means or response is modified in the form of operational
information in the step of direction. 79
The couplings of actors in a system are set up by information flow. The degree of interdependence of an organization in an ION is determined by the extent to which the organization has sufficient resources necessary for achieving their goal(s). Information can be seen one of four
important resources, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the
degree of interdependence is partly determined by the amount
and quality of information. Resources which an organization
needs are classified into the following four types.
(1)Human resources. (2)Physical resources. ( 3)Relationa1 resources. (4)Information.
These resources can be exchanged when a certain
established or establishing communication channel exists
between organizations involved, otherwise they do not know
what kind of resources they respectively have. Even when one
organization (A) knows that another organization (B) has the
resource necessary for them prior to any contact between two
organizations, the organization (A), first, has to send some
information asking about the possibility of resource
exchange. Thus, information exchange is a condition
prerequisite to resource exchange. Therefore, information
flow, rather than resource flow, describes the couplings in
a system.
There are four fundamental types of information. Those 80 are (1) reports flowing in upward communication channels,
(2) directives flowing in downward communication channels,
(3) instructions or suggestions in both vertical and horizontal communication channels, and (4) requests mainly in horizontal communication channels. The couplings in an organization are usually set up by report and directive flows of information. In a report and directive couplings, a certain specific part of an actor’s structure is made use of. That is, a certain actor(A) in a system exclusively detects environmental information for the system as a whole.
Another actor(B) receives the environmental information and exclusively recognizes it, the third actor(C) exclusively evaluates it, and the fourth actor(D) exclusively gives a direction. The couplings in an organization or in an ION are characterized by the partial use of functions of a unit. In most cases organizations, however, the actor C is identical with the actor D, and each actor slightly infringes on other’s functions. In other words, selection and direction process of decision making are usually monopolized by top echelons in an organizations, and each actor at several hierarchical level makes a partial decision as to, for example, whether or not certain information is to be sent to his superior. Figure 8 illustrates the couplings by report and direction information, where an actor (A) is coupled with an actor (B) through reporting activity, and an 81 actor (C) with an actor (D) through directing activity.
Illu strated in a different way, Figure 9 and 10 show the couplings through reporting and directing activities, respectively. Whereas these report- or direction-couplings presuppose a vertical or hierarchical structure of actors, the instruction- and request-couplings do not always imply the vertical relationship between the concerned parties, because the instruction- and request- informatinon are omnidirectional. Some of both couplings are predetermined by laws, and some others spontaneously emerge. Figure 9 shows the instruction- and request-coupling in detail. An ION consists of a ll of these four types of couplings.
( 2 ) idl ( 2 ) ( 1 ) ( 2 )
(3) d )
Unit (A) Unit (B) Unit (C) Unit (D)
(Interorganizational Network)----
(1);detection,(2): cognition, (3): evaluation, and (4): direction
STRUCTURE OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK FIGURE 8 82
OD
IA—Bfi r
REPORT COUPLINGS FIGURE 9
O C ]
DIRECTION COUPLINGS FIGURE 10 83
2. CENTRALIZATION AND CONCENTRATION
Centralization has been one of most frequently used variables in organizational analyses. It is usually defined as "the power given to organizational subunits that could be retained by the central organizational hierarchy at the same level as the subunits to which it is disturbed/^^) %n order to measure the degree of centralization, many indicators have been used. Hage and Aiken chose (l)"how much the occupants of various positions participate in decisions about the allocation of resources and the detemination of organizational policies" and (2)the degree of hierarchy of authority.(3) If all work decisions must be referred to the occupant of the position immediately superior in the chain of command, this is a great hierarchy of authority.
Hage and others, operationalized it as "the degree to which organizational members report participating in decisions about (1) the hiring personnel, (2)the promotion of personne 1,(3)the adoptin of new organizational policies, and
(A) the adoption of new program or service." Pugh and
others measured the degree of centralization by (l)autonomy,
(2)chief executive span of control, (3)worker/ su pervi sor y
ratio, and (A) the number of direct super visors.
Furthermore, Blau and Schoenherr employed four components of decentralization: e.g.,"(l)delegation of personnel authority
within the headquarters, (2)delegation of budget 84 responsibilities within the headquarters, (3)the influence
the heads of divisions at the headquarters exercise over major structural changes in their divisions , and
( 4)de1 egation of responsibilities to managers of local
offices.Negandhiand Reimann presented nine factors
to evaluate the degree of decentralization as folows.
(1)Layers of hierarchy,
(2)Locus of decision making with respect to major policies(e.g., mergers, major expansions or suspensions, major diversification decisions),
(3)Locus of decision making with respect to sales policies,
(4)Locus of decision making with respect to product mix,
(5)Locus of decision making with respect to standard-setting in production,
(6)Locus of decision making with respect to manpower policies,
(7)Locus of decision making with respect to selection of executives,
(8)The degree of participation in long-range planning,
(9)The degree of information-sharing.
In organizational analyses, there is a continuous de
bate on how to obtain data on specific variables. Pennings
makes a twofold division of research methods into (1) the
i n s t i t u t i o n a l approach which makes use of o f f ic ia l
informants or documents, as used in the studies by Pugh and
his collègues and by Negandhi and Reimann, and (2) the
questionnaire approach which makes use of questionnaires to 85 the members of organization, represented by Hage and his colleagues' studies. He compared two measure-sets used in these two approaches with each other. One of his finding was that "the most tentative conclusion which could be drawn is that centralization is a multifaceted concept, the dimensions of which have a s u b s ta n tia l amount of unrelatedness."In spite of his indication of multi-facetedness of the concept, the concept of
centralization is, without doubt, a measure for describing
decision-making or authority structure.
According to Turk, centralization means "that its
regulation and coordination are effected by one or a few
organizations that are closely tied to one another.
This definition shows us that one or a few organization(s)
operate(s) as a coordinating center in a centralized ION.
The concept of centralization in our study is used with the
almost same meaning as he defines. In report- and request-
couplings, when the information from various boundary units
always reaches the one same unit, the unit is called a
cognition center, and the system as a whole can be regarded
as centralized in cognition. In directive and instruction
couplings, when the information always comes from the one
same unit, the unit is called an evaluation center, and the
system as a whole can be regarded as c e n tra liz e d in
evaluation. Thus, an organization is defined as a system in 86 which the couplings are always centralized both in cognition and in evaluation, and a cognition and an evaluation centers in an organization are usually identical with each other, as mentioned earlier.
A coordinating unit is the center which serves as both a cognition center and an evaluation center. An ION is different from an organization in that the couplings in it are not always centralized and that the two centers are not always identical. Because of the weakness of formal authority structure, in an ION, a cognition center may sometimes be separated from an evaluation center. When two centers are separate, a cognition center cannot be regarded as a coordinating unit, while an evaluation center is. That is because the step of evaluation has a highest importance for decision making. Among four steps of decision making, the steps of detection and direction are the matter of communication in a sense. Although the step of cognition enables a decision maker to understand the situation and the problem, a decision maker is often forced to make decisions under the vague situation for less specified purpose.
This means that a decision maker has to or can make decisions without any cooperation of a cognition center, if one does not care about the process and results of the decisions.
The concept of concentration has been used for 87 describing an environmental property. Aldrich summarizes six dimensions of environment; e.g., (1)environmenta1 capacity,
(2)environmental homogeneity-heterogeneity,(3)environmental stability-instability, (A)domain consensus-dissensus, (5) environmental turbulence, and ( 6)environmenta 1 concentration-dispersion. He defines the environmental concentration-dispersion as "the degree to which resources,
including the population served and other elements, are evenly distributed over the range of the environment or
concentrated in particular 1ocations."^^^^ Pfeffer and
Salancik, introducing some definitions of economic
concentration, proposed their definiton of the concept.
According to them, concentration refers to "the extent to
which input or output transactions are made by a relatively
few, or only one, significant organizaions,"^^^^ or
reversely, to "the extent to which the focal organization
can substitute sources for the same resource."^ In
either case, the concept is expected to describe
environmental states of a certain social system. However, in
the field of experimental studies on groups, the concept of
centrality has been used as one indicating a property of
configurations of communication network. In our study, the
concept of concentration is defined as follows, slightly
different from but very close to the usage in the field.
As seen in Figure 9 and 10, there are two types of 88 communication channels in both report and direction couplings. One type of communication channel is basically composed of the sender and the receiver of information, and the other is a communication channel having an intermediate unit between the sender and the receiver. Some units between the sender and the receiver transmit the incoming information to other unit(s) without any modification. These units are not intermediate units, in its s tric t sense. The intermediate unit usually interprets and selects the incoming information and responds to it in a certain fashion prior to transmitting it. When there is no intermediate unit in a communication channel, the communication structure is regarded as completely concentrated. As the number of intermediate units increases in communication channels within a system, the communication structure of the system approaches a diffused state. In an organization, the
communication structure is usually diffused according to its
formal authority structure, while that of an ION varies with
cases according to contracts.
Thus, the degree of centralization is measured by the
number of coordinating unit(s) in an ION and represents its
decision making structure. The degree of concentration is
measured by the number of intermediate units in the
communication channels, and represents its communication
structure by indicating the communication distance between 89 the coordinating unit(s) and the member organizations in an
ION.
3. PATTERNS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION
Attempts to furnish a typology of ION by Klonglan and others or by Turk has already been discussed
Most of the eight indicators presented by Klonglan and others are not appropriate for analyzing an emergency social system, e.g., an ION in the emergency and restoration periods, because, in most cases in Japan, interorganizational relationships are generally mandated by
"Local Disaster Prevention Planning", and most of them are at "joint program" level in terms of their indicators. Of course, this does not mean that their indicators are totally inappropriate in ION analyses. Rather, these eight indicators w ill have the great u tility in that they are convenient means to observe the dyadic relations among organizations, and in that, by accumulating those dyadic
relations up to an ION, the sociometric approach can be
a p p l i e d , (17) go that the ION structure a sa whole can be
confirmed. The typology by Turk, although it shows two
extreme types of ION, is also inappropriate for analyzing
lONs in crises. The first type, the centralized pattern
based on imperative control, is not necessarily at an 90 opposite pole to the second type, e.g.,the pattern based on associationalism. What is at an opposite pole to the centralized pattern should be the type of completely decentralized pattern where each single organization is independently in operation for the same or opposed goal(s) as others. Especially in Japan, decision making in the emergency or restoration periods is performed by the emergency operation center(s) at the prefectural or the municipal level to which most of the organizations concerned send their representatives. If we recognize this emergency operation center(s) as a decision maker of the ION, then the
ION will be characterized by "imperative control". If we emphasize the fact that re p re se n ta tiv e s from the organizations concerned discuss and negotiate with each
other in the emergency operation center, then the ION can be
characterized by "social choice". That is, the emergency
social system in Japan can be either pattern , or can be
neither of them.
Warren provides another calssification of ION in a
normal situation. By crisscrossing two dimensions of
(l)the extent to which the respective goals or interests of
the member organizations agree, and (2) the degree of
interaction for coordinating their actions, he presented the
following four-cell table.
He assumes that "any movement in the direction of Box I 91 TABLE 7* TYPES OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL FIELD
issue-outcome
agree disagree
high I .Active II.Active Cooperation Contest interaction
low III.Potential IV.Potential Cooperation Contest
* Source: Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change, 1971 p.219
is desirable", and that "any movement away from Box II is desirable.An ION established after a natural disaster is a consensus type of event, as Quarantelli specified/'^O)
Therefore, the ION after a natural disaster can be either
Type I or Type III. However, the interests of issue-outcome can be further divided into agreement or disagreement on goals and agreement or disagreement on means. In terms of these two subdivisions, the ION after a natural disaster can be characterized by a high degree of agreement on goals and by the relatively low agreement on means, and this implies that the ION after a natural disaster can be Type II and IV, as well. In other words, we cannot clearly say whether the
ION after a natural disaster is the interest-agreement type
or the interest-disagreement type. 92
Throughthese discussion on some typologies of ION, we can see that the existing typologies are not completely appropriate for analyzing an emergency social system. If it is accepted that the emergency social system is an ION and that the focus of analysis should be on coordination, then the emergency ION should be classified by its focal process of coordination. As mentioned above, the substantial a c t i v i t i e s of coordination are decision making and communication. The structures of these a c tiv itie s are described by the concepts of centralization and concentration. These two concepts are measured by the number of decision making centers and by the distance between the sender(s) and the receiver(s) of information, respectively.
These two dimensions, by being crisscrossed, produce four types of ION, and at the same time, those are patterns of interorganizational coordination. Figure 11,12,13 and 14
TABLE 8 PATTERNS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION
Communication Decision Making Structure Structure Centralized Decentralized
Type I Type II Concentrated The Centralized The Decentralized Concentrated Type Concentrated Type
Type III Type IV Diffused The Centralized The Decentralized Diffused Type Diffused Type 93
N
Component Units:O Coordinating Units: #
THE CENTRALIZED CONCENTRATED TYPE FIGURE 11
C o ordina ting Units : #Component Units : O Coordinating Units : #Component #
THE DECENTRALIZED CONCENTRATED TYPE FIGURE 12
Component Units:O Coordinating Units : #
THE CENTRALIZED DIFFUSED TYPE FIGURE 13 94
Component Units:O Coordinating Units:#
THE DECENTRALIZED DIFFUSED TYPE FIGURE 14
illustrate the four types in Table 8.
The centralized-concentrated pattern of coordination is
good both for the speed and the accuracy of communication
because of its concentrated structure of communication,
and for making decisions from an overall point of view because of its centralized structure of decision making^^Z)
However, a highly centralized structure of decision making
tends to result in (l)stifling of initiative and creativity,
(2)organizational rigidity, and (3)ineffective
supervision.(23) Therefore, the centralized structure
will be inappropriate for performing non-routine or highly
technological tasks. Reid and Mott also designated the same
problems for a centralized structure. (2^) The experimental
studies of small groups show that a high concentration in
communcation structure often leads to the problem of 95 information overloads in communication flow.
The c e n t r a 1 i z e d - d i f f u s e d pattern of coordination enables decisions to be made comprehensiv1 y because of the centralized structure, and lessens the problem of communication overloads as a resu lt of diffusiveness.
However, high centralization leads to the problems indicated
above, and diffusiveness poses a problem of decreasing speed
and low quality of communication. The decentralized
concentrated pattern of coordination is good for the
speeding-up of decision making and communication. However,
because of its high decentralization, it is likely to suffer
such problems as the overlapping of activities, authority
conflicts between coordinating units, and focusing on
partial concerns instead of overall objectives. High
concentration also tends to lead to communication overloads.
As indicated through these discussions, the decentralized
diffused pattern of coordination is most problematic in
making a comprehensive decision and in communicating
effectively.
Mayhew specifies, based on the graph theory, two
extreme configuartions of hierarchical structure, as shown
in Figure 15 and 16.(^5)
Both of these two types are the centralized pattern.
However, two patterns are quite different if we take into
account the dimension of concentration/diffusiveness. That (a) a 0 96 Cb) i 3 (a) ^ CO I 4^
CO I 3 Ce) 4 o Cb) Cc) CO (e) 3 % f 0 Source:Bruce H. Mayhew, Source:Bruce H. Meyhew, "Hierarchical "Hierarchical Differentiation Differentiation in Imperatively in Imperatively Coordinated Coordinated Associations," Associations," 1983, p.166 1983, p.166
MAXIMUM LEVEL HIERARCHY MAXIMUM SPAN HIERARCHY FIGURE 15 FIGURE 16
is, the network in Figure 15 has three mediating units in its communication channel, while the network in Figure 16 has nothing. In other words, the network in Figure 15 shows the highest degree of diffusiveness, while the network in
Figure 16 shows the highest degree of concentration. This difference has an important implication in its effectiveness.
Let us put it in a mathematical form. Mayhew, citing
Harary=Ostrand, defines the "cutting number" of a unit(v), in a communication network as the number of pairs of points
(u,w) of the network such that u,w = v and all communication channels connecting (u) and (w) contains (v). (26) 97
According to this definition, in two types of network of
Figure 15 and 16, the cutting number of each unit is calculated as follows. In such types of hierarchical structure as in Figure 15 and 16, they call them the out-tree, the cutting number of end-position is always zero.
The Calculation of the Cutting Number.
For the network in Figure 15. The cutting number of the unit (b). 1. Connection between (a) and (c) (a)-(b)-(c) 2. Connection between (a) and (d), (a)-(b)-(d) 3. Connection between (a) and (e) (a)-(b)-(e) The cutting number of the unit (c). 1. Connection between (a) and (d) (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) 2. Connection between (a) and (e) (a)-(b)-(c)-(d)-(e) 3. Connection between (b) and (d) (b)-(c)-(d) 4. Connection between (b) and (e) (b)-(c)-(d)-(e) The cutting number of the unit (d). 1. Connection between (a) and (e) (a)-(b)-(c)-(d)-(e) 2. Connection between (b) and (e) (b)-(c)-(d)-(e) 3. Connection between (c) and (e) (c)-(d)-(e) The cutting numbers of other units are zero in each because they are at the end-position.
For the network in Figure 16. The cutting number of the unit (a). 1 . Connection between (b) and (c) (b)-(a)-(c) 2 . Connection between (b) and (d) (b)-(a)-(d) 3. Connection between (b) and (e) (b)-(a)-(e) 4. Connection between (c) and (d) (c)-(a)-(d) 5. Connection between (c) and (e) (c)-(a)-(e) 6. Connection between (d) and (e) ( d ) - ( a ) - ( e ) The cutting number of other units are zero
The numerals by each unit in Figure 15 and 16 show the
cutting number of each unit. Then, according to Mayhew, the
average cutting number of the positions in a certain network 98 is the measure of the magnitude of the hierarchy's disruption potential. If N is the sum of these cutting numbers of the positions in a communication network of size
S, the average cutting number, D, is given by D = N/S. The network in Figure 15 is given a value of D = 2.0, while the network in Figure 16 has a value of D = 1.2. Hence, the network in Figure 15, which is the most diffused type in our term, has the larger potential of disruptive communication than the network in Figure 16, the most concentrated type, does.
This mathematical consideration gives us an extremely useful insight on measuring the degree of concentration.
That is, it can be said that the larger the value D in a certain network, the more the network is diffused. A brief discussion on the graph theory will appear in the final chapter.
4. DERIVED HYPOTHESES
Wright empirically studied the relationships between his two types of interorganizational coordination; e.g., system- and network-coordination, in the recovery period. He took into account the four factors which determine the type of coordination; e.g.,(l)the amount of tasks, (2)the size of
ION, (3)the amount of experience and knowledge, and (4)the 99 variety of necessary resources.System coordination ultimately presupposes the existence of a single coordinating unit in an ION, while network coordination means the absence of coordinating unit in an ION. However, since an ION consists of organizations and each organization has at least one coordinating or decision-making unit in it, network coordination does not mean the absence of a coordinating unit, but a situation where there are as many coordinating units as the number of member organizations.
Therefore, Wright's distinction between system and network coordination corresponds to the distinction between the centralized and the decentralized coordinations in our discusson. Thus, according to Wright's findings, the following hypotheses can be built up.
HYPOTHESIS 1. The amount of tasks is positively related to the degree of decentralization.
HYP0THESIS2. The size of an ION is positively related to the degree of decentralization.
HYPOTHESIS 3. The degree of the variety of necessary resources is positively related to the degree of decentralization.
HYPOTHESISE. The amount of experience and knowledge is positively related to the degree of centralization.
Turk provides additional hypothesis. He defines
organizational complexity as "the number and variety of
relatively large organizations that comprise the macrosocial
unit." Then, he assumes that "the greater the organizational 100 complexity, the less the centralization."^^®^ His discussion on the external linkage, the organizational complexity, and the organizational representation of diffuse consensual solidarity presents another hypohtesis. The organizational representation of diffuse consensual solidarity means "the degree to which ceratin kinds of organizations signify the interests and standards that the macrosocial unit’s organizations sh a r e . "(^9) He postulates that: (l)"the greater the external linkage, the less the organizational representation of diffuse consensual solidarity, and (2)the greater the organizational complexity, the less the organizational representation of
diffuse consensual solidarity.The postulate implies
that organizational complexity and external linkage are
positively related to each other. Since organizational
complexity is negatively related to centralization, it can
be said that external linkage is also negatively related to
centralization. Furthermore, since both organizational
complexity and external linkage are negatively related to
both of organizational representation of diffuse consensual
solidarity, the organizational representation of diffuse
consensual solidarity is positively related to
centralization. As indicated above, Turk's definition of
centralization is similar to ours. Therefore, the following
hypotheses can be derived from his discussion: (1) The 101 degree of organizational complexity is negatively related to the degree of centralization, (2) the amount of the external linkage is negatively related to the degree of centralization, and (3)the degree of consensus on goals and means among member-organizations is positively related to the degree of centralization.
However, every organization, regardless of its size, its location, and the like, has more or less a certain amount of external linkages, especially in the case of public or quasi-public organizations. The organizations involved in the recovery activities after a disaster are usually public or quasi-public organizations. These organizations in Japan are generally the branches of the nation-wide organizations. Private organizations such as local construction companies or other provincial organizations participate in the recovery activities. Even those provincial private organizations have a certain amount of external linkages, for example, the linkages with customers, input- or output-organizations, or the guild which are located outside an ION. Even though these linkages were extremely weak in the normal situation, they would have been activated in a disastrous situation because of altruistic tendency frequently observed after a disaster.
Therefore, it is unprobable in the case of lONs after a disaster that the amount of external linkages causes a wide 102 variance in the configurations of the lONs.
As Quarante 11i = Dynes noted, the situation after a natural disaster, which we are going to examine, is essentially consensual. (^1) The major problems are how to mobilize necessary resources and how to allocate them.
Failures in mobilization or allocation of resources occur not due to the lack of consensus, but due to uncertainty.
Therefore, it is also improbable in the case of 10Ns after a disaster that the degree of consensus closely affects the shapes of the lONs. Thus, we employ only one hypothesis based on Turk's discussion.
HYPOTHESIS 5. The degree of organizational complexity is inversely related to the degree of centralization.
Since little theoretical and empirical research is
available on the dimension of concentrated and diffused
coordination, we are obliged to rely heavily on inferences.
They may be based on findings, if possible, from the
different fields or levels of analyses such as small group
studies or organizational studies.
Shaw indicated that when a task is simple, the
communication structure in a small group is likely to be
"centralized", and that when a task is complex, the
structure is likely to be "decentralized".^^^) In his usage,
"the centralized structure" means that most members cannot
communicate with others without the mediation of the member 103 Ca) (A)
Ce) Mo Ce)
6 Ce) Source: M.E.Shaw, urce: M.E.Shaw, "Communication "Communication Networks," 1964 Networks," 1964
WHEELTYPE NETWORK BY S'HAW CIRCLE TYPE NETWORIŒY SHAW FIGURE 17 FIGURE 18
Circle Chain
0
O Wheel
Source: H.J.Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Nets upon O rganization and Performance in Task Oriented Groups," 1950 p.548
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS BY LEAVITT FIGURE 19 104 at the central position of the group structure, while "the
decentr1ized structure" means that no member is located at a
central position, and that each member directly communicates
with each other.
Figure 17 and 18 respectively show "the centralized
structure" and "the decentralized structure". In Figure 17,
the member (a) cannot communicate with the member (b)
without the mediation of the member (e), while, in Figure
18, each member can have direct communications with others.
This means that communications among members always require
the intermediate position(s) in "the centralized structure",
and that no intermediate position exists in communication
channels among members in "the decentralized structure".
That is, his distinction of "the centralized and the
decentralized structure" respectively correspond to the
diffused and the concentrated structure in our terms.
Leavitt, presenting four types of communication network
as shown in Figure 19, pointed out that the circle type was
much better in overcoming an ambiguous problem than the
wheel type.(33) This finding also implies that, under the
rational norm of organizational behavior, they tends to be
the circle type of communication structure whose shape is
close to the diffused type in our term. Thus, the following
hypothesis is derived from their discussions.
HYPOTHESIS 6. The degree of task complexity is negatively related to the degree of concentration. 105
Hage=Aiken found that as the degree of s k ills and expertises of members increases, the degree of decentralization increases.The degree of s k ill and expertise is an indicator of organizational complexity.
Since organizational complexity in this sense is identical with task complexity, the following hypothesis may be advanced.
HYPOTHESIS 7. The dgree of task complexity is negatively associated with the degree of centralization.
Hypotheses (6) and (7) show that the high complexity of tasks implies the high necessity of trained and specialized knowledge in making decision and the highly specialized information in communication channels. The highly specialized knowledge or information stimulates member organizations to exclusively interact with the specific
others which are familiar with the knowledge or
information, so that those interacting organizations make up
a clique relatively independent of others. Thus, the
structure of an ION is likely to become decentralized,
including several factions each of which is exclusively
engaging in specialized decision-makings. Since it is hard
for intermediate unit(s) to understand information, most
intermediate units are more likely to be skipped or not to
be activated as an intermediate unit, the communication
structure of an ION tends to be diffuesed. 106
As Warheit=Quarantel1i or Warheit=Waxman indicated, the temporary increase in the amount of information is observed in an emergency organizatin after a disaster.This seems to mean that the increase in the amount of task leads to the increase in the amount of information. The temporary increase in the amount of information often results in the emergence of instant communication channels, as indicated by
Brouilette and Holsti,^^^) or in organizational devices to create a new role and to assign its members to it for coping with the increase in the amount of information, as indicated by Warheit=Quarante11i and Warheit=Waxman.(^^)
This seems to mean that the opportunity for intervening a c tiv itie s in communication flow is great. Thus, we obtain the eighth hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 8. The amount of tasks is positively related to the degree of diffusiveness.
Blau and Blau=Schoenherr insist that the greater the size of an organization, the more vertically differentiated the organization should be.(^8) The possible corollary from their principle will be that the greater the size of an ION, the more vertically differentiated the ION will be. The size of an ION, needless to say, refers to the number of member organization in the ION. The higher degree of vertical differentiation means that many echelons exist between the top and the lowest in an organizational hierarchy. Thus, the 107 corollary is that (l)the greater the size of an ION, the more vertically differentiated the ION will be, (2)the more vertically differentiated, the more the number of levels or units in the communication channels within the ION. This provide the ninth hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 9. The size of an ION is positively associated with the degree of diffusiveness.
The great storage of experience and knowledge implies that intermediate units in communication flows are fairly fam iliar with interpreting and selecting the incoming information. If a certain unit cannot interpréta or select the incoming information so that it functions simply as a tunnel, then the unit cannot be regarded as an intermediate unit. Therefore, that a certain unit can interpréta and select the incoming information means that the unit is an intermediate unit. Thus, the greater the storage of experiences and knowledge, the greater the possibility of intervention or mediation by intermediate units and the more
likely the ION is to be diffused.
HYPOTHESIS 10. The degree of experience and knowledge is negatively related to the degree of concentration.
If the variety of necessary resources is great, an ION
is likely to expand its size. The great variety of necessary
resources creates the situation in which the existing
resources of member-organizations are not sufficiently 108 varied to meet the necessity. In order to meet the necessity, the ION must involve more organizations in it in order to mobilize the necessary resources. Since the size of an ION is positively related to the degree of diffusiveness, the degree of the variety of necessary resources is also positively associated with diffusiveness.
Thus, the eleventh hypothesis is as follows.
HYPOTHESIS 11. The degree of the variety of necessary resources is positively related to the degree of diffusiveness.
The more there is relatively large-scale organizations, the higher the organizational complexity, as defined by
Turk.The large-scale organizations themselves are
likely to be differentiated more, as Blau and
B1au = Schoenherr i n d i c a t e d . (^0) The highly differentiated organization has more hierarchical levels in it, and,
therefore, the communication structure in it is more likely
to be diffused. Thus, if an interorganizational network has
several large-scale organizations as the members, then the
communication structure is forced to be diffused. The
twelfth hypothesis is derived from this.
In addition, large scale organizations are more likely
to be dominant in an interorganizational network. Therefore,
the average size of member-organizations should affect the
pattern of interorganizational network. When the average 109 size, e.g., the proportion of large-scale organizations, is large, the possibility of multiple decision making is high, because those large-scale organizations are more likely to be autonomous and to respectively become a decision making center. The same is said of communication activ ities.
Hereby, the thirteenth and the fourteenth hypotheses are derived.
HYPOHTESISl2. The degree of organizational complexity is positively related to the degree of diffusiveness.
HYPOTHESIS 13. The average size of member organizations is positively associated with the degree of decentralization.
HYPOTHESIS 14. The average size of member organizations is positively related to the degree of diffusiveness.
The characteristics of disaster agent probably have much influence on the pattern of interorganizational coordination, as Kilijanek or Dynes indicated.Dynes specifies several characteristics of disaster agent, remarking that "some characteristics of disaster agents not only influence the types of community tasks that are created but relate to the a b ility of the community to handle them."(42) Those are (1) frequency, (2) predictability, (3) cause, (4) speed of onset, (5) control lability, (6) duration, (7) scope of impact, and (8) destructive potential. "Frequency" obviously affects the disaster 110 subculture of a community or the degree of knowledge or experience. "Predictability" and "speed of onset" enable them to prepare against a disaster, so that the relative amount of recovery tasks decreases. The recovery tasks in a chemical hazard is highly complex in that professional knowledge and skill are required, while those in a landslide disaster are relatively simple because major tasks are simply to remove earth and sand at the spots. Hence "cause" also influences the degree of task complexity. The degree of
"controllability" of flood is relatively high, whereas that of earthquake is s till low. The great controllability means that we have much knowledge on the disaster agent and the degree of complexity of recovery task is relatively low.
Needless to say, the disaster of prolonged "duration" and of wide scope of impact is likely to pose the larger amount of recovery tasks. Since disaster agents differ in terms of their "destructive potential", we should accurately understand the degree and the type of damages and casualties
caused by a certain disaster. Otherwise, recovery activities
themselves create further problems.
The characteristics of disaster agent, together with
the community properties, determine the degree or the shape
of a disaster, and the task properties henceforth are
determined. As indicated above, the structural properties
such as the size of an interorganizational network, the I ll average size of member organizations, and the amount of experience or knowledge are largely the function of the degree of urbanization or the product of the community properties. The characteristics of disaster agent also have something to do with an interorganizational network in that these characteristics determine the relative utility of each structural property. Among Dynes ' eight characteristics of disaster agent, we take into account three of them, because the others seem to have less significance for our cases.
The speed of onset and the predictability indirectly influence the amount of recovery tasks. By the term
"indirectly" is meant that the higher degree of suddenness does not increase the absolute amount of tasks, but the relative amount of tasks because of relative shortening of time. The scope of a disaster seems to be another important characteristic. When a disaster affects a broader area, the amount of tasks necessarily increases. The same can be said of the size of an interorganizational network. We obtain the fifteenth hypothesis as to the characteristics of disaster agent.
HYPOTHESIS 15,16,17. The speed of onset, predictability, and the scope of a disaster are positively related to the degree of decentralization and to the degree of diffusiveness.
Corollary 1. The speedier the onset, the greater the amount of tasks. Corollary 2. The higher the degree of predictability, the greater the amount of tasks. 112
Corollary 3. The wider the scope of a disaster, the greater the amount of tasks. Corollary 4. The wider the scope of a disaster, the larger the size of an network of organizations.
The concept of organizational complexity introduced by
Turk is used as one of the indices to measure the degree of urbanization. Population size, distribution ratio of labor
forces among the types of industries, the degree of social mobility, and the like are often used as the indices of
urbanization. In addition to these, in disaster studies, we
should take into account those factors such as life style,
the degree of community solidarity, the degree of political
and economic importance of the community in an area, and so
on. In an urbanized area, the size of an interorganizational
network established in the recovery period and the average
size of member organizations are likely to be larger than in
a non-urban area. In addition, the large scale and densely
concentrated populations, facilities, and functions of life
lines which are peculiar to an urban area, lead to the large
scale damages and casualties, and hence to the greater
amount of revovery tasks. The modern facilities or systems
built on the basis of highly advanced technology also induce
the higher degree of task complexity or resource variety.
Furthermore, since the higher degree of social mobility in
an urban area implies that the probability of transmitting
disaster subculture decreases, an urban area is less likely 113 to preserve lessons from the past disaster or knowledge as to a disaster or responses which is useful and peculiar to a certain local area. These considerations lead us to the final hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 18. The degree of urbanization is positively related to the degree of decentralization, and to the degree of diffusiveness.
Corollary 5. The more urbanized, the more the recovery tasks. Corollary 6. The more urbanized, the higher the degree of the variety of necessary resources. Corollary 7. The more urbanized, the higher the degree of task complexity. Corollary 8. The more urbanized, the less preserved the experiences and knowledge. Corollary 9. The more urbanized, the larger the size of an inter-organizationalnetworkinthe recovery period. Corollary 10. The more urbanized, the larger the average size of member organizations.
Thus, we derived the sixteen hypotheses from past research and plausible discussion. In addition, we come to a systematic model of the pattern of interorganizational coordination. The factors discussed above are categorized under four dimensions of (l)task property, (2)stuctural property, (3)community property, and (4)disaster-agent characteristic. The systematic model, as shown in Figure
20, enables us to pigeonhole the eighteen hypotheses in a different and more standardized fashion, as shown in
Table 9. 114
TABLE 9 DERIVED HYPOTHESES
(1)The greater the amount of tasks, the higher the degree of decentralization. (2)The greater the size of an ION, the higher the degree of decentralization. (3)The greater the variety of necessary resources, the higher the degree of decentralization. (4)The greater the amount of experinces or knowledge, the lower the degree of decentralization. (5)The higher the degree of organizational complexity, the higher the degree of decentralization. (6)The higher the degree of task complexity, the higher the degree of decentralization. (7)The larger the average size of member organizations, the higher the degree of decentralization. (8)The greater the amount of tasks, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (9)The greater the size of an ION, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (10)The greater the variety of necessary resources, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (11)The greater the amount of experiences or knowledge, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (12)The higher the degree of organizational complexity, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (13)The higher the degree of task complexity, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (14)The larger the average size of member organizations, the higher the degree of diffusiveness. (15)The speedier the onset, the higher the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness. (16)The higher the degree of predictability, the higher the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness. (17)The wider the scope of a disaster, the higher the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness. (18)The more urbanized, the higher the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness. 115
Dimension : Factors ;
Disaster Agent Speed of Onset. Predictability . Scope.
Community Degree of Property Urbanization
Degree of Damages & Casualties
Task Property Amount of Variety of Complexity Tasks Resources of Tasks
Structural /V Property -4 Size of ION
Average Size of Member
Experience & * Knowledge
Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination
FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION FIGURE 20 116 NOTES
1. Tairyo Murakami, Hisao Kumagai, and Shunpei Kumon, Keizai Taisei (Economic System) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973)
2. Richard Hall, Organizations: Structure and Process (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1972) p.228
3.Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, "Relationship of Centralization to Other Structural Properties" in Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (1967)
4. Jerald Hage, Michael Aiken and C. Bagley Marrett, "Organization Structure and Communications" in American Sociological Review 36 (1971) pp.860-871
5. Derek Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C.R.Hinings, and C. Turner, "Dimensions of Organizational Structure" in Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (1968) pp.65-105
6. Peter M. Blau and R. A. Schoenherr, The Structure of Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1971) p.113
7. Anant R. Negandhi and B. C. Reimann, "Task Environment, Decentralization, and Organizational Effectiveness" in Anant R. Negandhi ed.. Interorganization Theory (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1980) pp.145-146
8. Johannes M. Pennings, "Measures of Organizational Structure: A Methodological Note" American Journal of Sociology 79 (1973) pp.686-704
9. Herman Turk, Organizations in Modern Life (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1977) p.97
10. In respect of limited rationality, see Chapter 5 in H.A.Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Process in Administrative Organization (New York: Macmillan, 1945)
11. Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1979) p.68
12.Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: _____ A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) p.66
13. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External 117
Control of Organizations; A Resource Dependence Perspective. 1978 p.50
14. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: _____ A Resource Dependence Perspective , 1978 p.50
15. Gerald E. Klonglan, R.D.Warren, J.M.Winkelpleck, and S.K.Paulson, "Interorganizational Measurement in the Social Service Sector: Differences by Hierarchical Level" in Administrative Science Quarterly 21 (1976) pp.675- 687
16. Herman Turk, Interorganizational Activation in Urban Communities (Washington D.C.: American Sociological Association, 1973)
17. Anderson alredy applied the method of sociometry to a study of interorganizational relationships. See Robert C. Anderson, "A Sociometric Approach to the Analysis o f Interorganizational Relationships" in William M. Evan ed., Interorganizational Relations (The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) pp.307-324
18. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971) p.219
19. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change. 1971 p.219
20. E. L. Quarantelli and R. R. Dynes, "Response to Social Crisis and Disaster" in Annual Review of Sociol ogy 3 (1977) p.23
21. Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups" in D. Cartwright and A. Zander eds.. Group Dynamics (New York: Harper & Row, 1960) pp.660-683
Harold Guetzkow and H. A. Simon, "The Impact of Certain Communication Nets upon Organization and Performance in Task Oriented Groups" in Management Science 1 (1955) pp. 233-250
Harold J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance" in E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley eds., Read ings in Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1958) pp.546-564
M. E. Shaw, "Communication Networks" in L. Berkowitz 118
éd., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Academic Press, 1964) pp.111-147
22. Allen H. Barton, Communities in Disaster: A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations (New York: Doubleday, 1969) translated by Kitao Abe et. al. pp.148-155 Thomas E. Drabek, Disaster in Aisle 13 (Columbus: College of Administrative Science, The Ohio State University, 1968)
23. Marvin E. Olsen, The Process of Social Organization: Power in Social Systems (New York: Holt Rinehart, 1978) P • 247 24. Basil J. Mott, "Coordination and Interorganizational Relations in Health" in Paul E. White and George J. Vlasak eds., Interorganizational Research in Health: Conference Proceedings (The Johns Hopkins University, 1970) p.67
William J. Reid, "Interorganizational Coordination in Social Welfare: A Theoretical Approach to Analysis and Intervention" in Ralph M. Kramer and Harry Specht eds.. Readings in Community Organization Practice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1969) pp.176-188
William J. Reid, "Interorganizational Cooperation: A Review and Critique of Current Theory" in Paul E. White and George J. Vlasak eds., Interorganizational Research in Health: ____ Conference Proceedings (The Johns Hopkins University, 1970) pp.84-101
25. Bruce Mayhew, "Hierarchical Differentiation in Imperatively Coordinated Associations" in Samuel B. Bacharach ed.. Research in the Sociology of Organizations Volume 2 (Greenwich; JAI Press, 1983) pp.153-217
26. Bruce Mayhew, "Hierarchical Differentiation in Imperatively Coordinated Associations", 1983 p.164
27. Joseph Wright, "Interorganizational Relations as S tructure and as Action" Prelim inary Paper No.37, Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University 1977
28. Herman Turk, Organizations in Modern Life, 1977 p.98
29. Herman Turk, Organizations in Modern Life, 1977 p.65
30. Herman Turk, Organizations in Modern Life, 1977 p.66 119
31. E. L. Quarantelli and R. R. Dynes, "Response to Social Crisis and Disaster", 1977 p.23
32. M. E. Shaw, "Communication Networks", 1964 pp.111-147
33. Harold J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on Group Performance", 1958 pp.546-564
34. Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, "Relationship of Centralization to Other Structural Properties", 1967 pp.72-92
35. George Warheit and Jerry Waxman, "Operational and Organizational Adaptations of Fire Departments to Civil Disturbances" in American Behavioral Scientist 16 (1973) pp.343-355
George Warheit and E. L. Quarantelli, An Analysis of the Los Angels Fire Department Operations During Watts Book and Monograph Series No.7, Disaster- Research Center, The Ohio State University (1969)
36. John R. Brouillette, "The Department of Public Works: A Community Emergency Organization" Disaaster Research Center Report Series No.3, Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University (1968)
Ole R. Holsti, "Crisis, Stress, and Decision Making" in International Social Science Journal 22 (1970) pp.53-66
37. George Warheit and E. L. Q uarantelli, An Analysis of the Los Angels Fire Department Operations During Watts, 1969
George Warheit and Jerry Waxman,"Operational and Organizational Adaptations of Fire Departments to Civil Disturbances," 1973 pp.343-355
38. Peter M. Blau, "A Formal Theory of D ifferentiation in Organization" in American Sociological Review 35 (1970) pp.201-218
Peter M. Blau and R. A. Schoenherr, The Structure of Organizations, 1971
39. Herman Turk, Organizations in Modern Life, 1977
40. Peter M. Blau, "A Formal Theory of D ifferentiation in Organization," 1970 120
Peter M. Blau and R. A. Schoenherr, The Structure of Organizations, 1971
41. T. S. Kilijanek, "The Emergence of Interorganizational Communication Networks Following Natural D isaster" Technical Report No.8, SAR Research Project, University of Denver, 1980
Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in Disaster (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1974)
42. Russell R. Dynes, Organized Behavior in D isaster, 19 74 pp.51-52
43. Yasumasa Yamamoto, "A Typhoon Disaster and an Isolated Community" in Hiroshi Takahashi ed.. Flood Disasters Caused by the Typhoon 8210 and Their Impact on the Socio- Economic Activities (Tokyo: the University of Tokyo, 1983) p.81 CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
1. METHODS FOR DATA COLLECTION.
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, this research involved collecting data from seven different disasters. The data from the Niigata and the Tokachioki Earthquake were derived from secondary sources such as archives, research reports, and articles.
The data of the Izu Ohshima Kinkai and the Miyagi Ken
Oki Earthquake were obtained by non-structured interviews with officials who were in charge of recovery activities in eighteen or twenty organizations in each area. The
interviews were conducted by several members of the disaster
research group at Institute for Future Technology, of which
the author was a member, from January to August, 1978.
At that time, a theory as stated in the previous
chapter had not yet been developed. However, the research
was performed on the basis of the stress-strain perspective
which was developed by Haas=Drabek.(^) The perspective
indicates decision making, communication, control,
coordination, and the like as the essential processes of
performance structure of organization. Therefore, although
121 122 the conceptual framework was different from the present model, the data gathered for analyzing these processes were also useful for the present research.
As to the Nagasaki Disaster, we conducted interviews and obtained questionnaire data from September to December,
1982. For studying organizational responses, the data were obtained by semi-structured interviews with officials in eighteen organizations which were involved in recovery activities. The interviews were undertaken by several groups, each of which was composed of two or more researchers from the Disaster Study Group of the University of Tokyo. Some major questions we asked were as follows.
(1) What did your organization do in responding to the disaster?
(2) When and why did your organization do it?
(3) How did your organization make decisions for the activities?
(4) To where did your organization send the order (or instruction) as to the activities?
(5) How, when, and from where did your organization obtain information about damages and casualties?
(6) Did your organization send any request to other organizations? If yes, when, to where and what kind of request was done?
(7) Did your organization receive any request (or instruction) from other organizations? If yes, when, from where and what kind of request did your organization receive?
(8) Did your organization discuss possible measures against the disaster with other organizations? 123
If yes, when, how, with which organization, and what did your organization discuss?
These questions were asked, while we showed the interviwees the list of organizations involved in recovery activities and the chronological list of events. These lists were made by ourselves on the basis of preliminary field work in September, 1982.
The other two disaster studies at Misugi and Umegashima were undertaken by the author. The major source of data was also interviews with key personnels of relevant organizations. The procedures in obtaining interviews were the same as in the study of the Nagasaki Disaster.
Interviews at Umegashima were undertaken in September and
November, 1982 and in March, 1983, while, at Misugi, in
September and November, 1982 and in March and May, 1983.
The data about an organization collected by interviews with its members are sometimes accompanied by serious biases. For example, the data obtained may be questioned because of improper representativeness. When a certain member at a certain position answers the questions about his organization, it is probable that a subjective interpretation about the fact is involved. Or it is very natural that his answers would reflect his position.
However, we believe that, to a certain extent, we could minimize the biases usually attached to interview data in organizational research. One reason is that interviews we 124 carried out tended to be of a group nature. That is, although we made an appointment with a certain top official, he was usually accompanied at the time of the interview by his subordinates who were in charge of various specific tasks. When we asked a question, they discussed their possible answers. Then, the top o fficial answered our question.
2. DATA PROCESSING.
What we first did with the data collected by interviews or from documents was to identify the original sender and
the final receiver of certain information. For instance, we
asked each organization where or from what organization they
obtained the information, and where or to what organization
they sent the information. By tracing up to the sources or
the destinations, we depicted communication flows of the
information in an ION.
What we next did was to identify cognition centers and
evaluation centers. When a certain unit processed certain
incoming information, but did not make any decisions
responding to the information, then the unit was regarded as
a cognition center. On the contrary, when a certain unit
made some decisions about their emergency a c tiv itie s in
response to the information, then the unit was seen as an
evaluation center. When a certain unit functioned like a 125 tunnel in a certain communication flow, simply passing information to other units without any attempts to modify, understand and respond to the information, then the unit was regarded as a mediation unit in the communication flow.
3. MEASUREMENTS.
An interorganizational network is described by
focusing on such activities as information gathering, fire
fighting, search and rescue, supplying water, and
evacuation. A graph theory usually distinguishes between two
types of communication network.(^) One is called "the out-
tree", which describes a downward communication network
formed by direction-couplings as shown in Figure 10. The
other type is "the in-tree" which is an upward communication
network formed by report-couplings as shown in Figure 9.
The cognition center(s) can be identified by describing the
in-tree, and the evaluation center by illustrating the out
tree. In the following chapters, the in-tree which is
established for gathering information right after a disaster
and the out-tree which is made for sending directions on
search and rescue, evacuation, and the like are respectively
introduced for each case. These enable us to tell what
pattern the interorganizational coordination is.
The degree of centralization is measured by the number
of evaluation center(s) in the network. On the other hand. 126 the degree of concentration is decided through the following four steps. First of a ll, the number of the cutting points is counted. Secondly, since not a ll of the cutting points are the cognition centers, we discriminate the cognition centers from the cutting points in terms of reviewing communication flows in the recovery period. Thirdly, the number of the mediation point(s) is counted in each communication flow to the cognition center(s). Fourthly, the
total number of the mediation points is divided by the
number of the cognition center(s). The final value is the
average number of mediation points between the boundary
units and the cognition center(s). This average number shows
the degree of concentration, and is labeled as the
concentration score. That is to say, the greater the value
of the average number or the concentration score, the lower
the degree of concentration.
The factors, as discussed in the previous chapter, can
be measured by several indicators or by deliberate
judgement. Indicators or the ways to judge are as follows.
(l)Task property.
1. The Amount of Tasks.
Since the amount of tasks is directly associated
with the degree of damages and casualties, the
followings are combined into the amount of tasks.
(A) Proportional values. a. the number of killed / total population 127
b. the number of the injured / total population c. the number of households suffered / the total number of households d. the number of totally destroyed houses / the total number of households e. the number of partially destroyed houses / the total number of households f. the number of houses flooded above floor / the total number of households
(B) Real values. a. the number of fires b. the number of destroyed portion on roads c. the number of bridges destroyed
2. Task Complexity and The Variety of Necessary Resources.
The degree of task complexity is directly related
to the degree of necessity of specialized knowledge.
It w ill be judged in terms of the shape and
nature of a disaster.
(2) Structural Property
1. The Size of an Interorganizational Network.
The number of organizations involved in those
activities such as information gathering, search and
rescue, supplying water, and evacuation shows the
size of an interorganizational network.
2. The Average Size of Member Organizations.
The number of staffs in each of those official or
semi-official organizations that are involved in
such activities as above is taken into account.
3. The Amount of Experiences and Knowledge.
This will be judged from the historical review of 128
disaster experiences of the area and the degree of
preparedness.
(3) Community Property
In this study, each stricken community is
characterizedby the degree ofurbanization. The degree
of urbanization is mainly measured by three indicators,
as listed below.
,1. Organizational Complexity.
The indicators for measuring the degree of
organizational complexity are (l)the number of
major public organizations, (2)the number of
establishments, and (3)the ratio of the number of
big super markets to the total number of re ta il
trades.
2. Population.
3. Distribution Ratio of Labour Forces.
The distribution ratio of labour forces into the
primary, the secondary, and the tertiary industries.
The greater the ratio of labour forces in the
tertiary industry, the higher the degree of
urbanization.
Some other properties such as economic or
political characteristics, the number of banks, the
number of establishments, the number of large scale
retailers, and the like are supp1ementari1 y used for 129
describing a community.
(4) Characteristics of Disaster Agent
In this study, three dimensions of (l)speed of onset,
(2)predictability, and (3)the scope of disaster are taken
into consideration. Three different types of onset are
distinguished.Rapid onset is exemplified by
earthquake which suddenly s trik e s the populace.
Gradual onset "refers to a situation in which the effect
of the agent on the populace is very gradual but
ever-increasing in intensity until the emrgency is
reached." The example is flood. Repititive onset
means that a certain single type of disaster repetitively
strikes an area over a period of time. Predictability
is judged by whether or not a warning was possible or
issued.
Disaster agents are different in the range of
influence. When the relatively broad area suffered, the
disaster has a wide scope. The range of influence was
judged by the spread of damages and casualties recorded
in the official reports. 130
NOTES
J. Eugene Haas and Thomas E. Drabek, Organizations:A Sociological Perspective (New York: Macmillan Company, 1973)
. Bruce H. Meyhew, "Hierarchical Differentiation in Imperatively Coordinated Associations" in Samuel B. Bacharach ed., Research in the Sociology of Organizations (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1983) pp.153 - 229
R ussell R. Dynes, O rganized Behavior in Di sa s t e r (Columbus:Disaster Research Center, the Ohio State University, 1974) pp.51 - 55 CHAPTER V
A STUDY ON TWO HISTORICAL CASES
1. THE 1964 NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE.
(1) Backgrounds and the Disaster
Niigata is the prefectural capital and the largest city in the Hokuriku district. It contains about 450,000 population in 1981. In 1960, when the earthquake occurred, it was about 325,000. Niigata prefecture is famous as the home land of the ex-Prime Minister who is s till a mastermind and is called a producer of a Prime Minister. The prefecture contains 2,450,000 population in 1980, and it was slightly less than the 1980 population in 1965. The prefecture ranks thirteenth in its population among 47 prefectures.
Among the disasters which occurred in the prefecture,
Niigata Earthquake is most famous. Niigata Earthquake occurred with a magnitude of 7.5 at 1:01 pm on the 16th of
June in 1964. Broad areas including fifteen prefectures in the northern part of Japan were affected by the earthquake in the various degrees and the tsunami induced by the earthquake. Figure 21 shows the areas where "Shindo" 4 ^ ^ ^ or more was observed. The most severely devastated area was, as shown by the name of the earthquake, Niigata Prefecture
131 132 which is the meshed area in the Figure 21. The damages and casualties in Niigata Prefecture are listed in Table 10.
Yamagata . Prefecture
Niigata Prefecture
oNagaoka
ure Toyama
* Roman numerals show "Shindo", and the symbol "X" shows the seismic center.
THE LOCATION OF NIIGATA AND OTHER RELEVANT PREFECTURES FIGURE 21 133
TABLE 10 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THE 1964 NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE
Casualties :
the killed...... 11 the fatally injured ...... 16 the injured ...... 104
Damages :
the totally destroyed houses ...... 2,338 the partially destroyed houses ...... 7,595 the slightly destroyed houses ...... 10,703 the houses flooded above floor ...... 10,283
* The figures show the damages and casualties only in Niigata city.
This earthquake was epoch-making in Japanese earthquake history in that it was the first earthquake which occurred in a modernized and urbanized area in the Showa era,(2) and also because the national government established an on-the-spot emergency operation center during the recovery period. Tokyo was struck by the Great Kan to
Earthquake in 1923. However, people’s memories of the earthquake had already sunk in oblivion. In addition, in the earlier decades of this century, Tokyo was s t i l l on the way to modernization and urbanization, and the life style or social system itself was quite different from those in the
later decades of this century. Thus, the Niigata earthquake
provides us with many lessons because the life style and the
social system are similar to those in the present time. 134
The national government rarely establishes an on the spot emergency operation center (EOC) where a high governmental official is active in controlling other national and local organizations. The fact that the national government set up an on-the-spot EOC in Niigata city shows that this earthquake was regarded not only as one with severe damages and casualties, but also as a politically, economically and socially important event.
(2) Organizational Responses.
On the day of the earthquake, the mayor of Niigata city, who was supposed to be the head of the municipal emergency operation center, was absent. The deputy mayor, just after the earthquake, called an emergency conferences of directors in order to discuss possible and necessary measures against the earthquake. Based on the decision in the conference, at 1:20 pm, 19 minutes after the earthquake,
Niigata city set up the emergency operation center(the municipal EOC) and a deputy mayor executed responsibilities
for a mayor who was temporarily absent.
The organization of the municipal EOC, which was based
on the Emergency Planning of Niigata City set up three
months before the earthquake, is as shown in Figure 22.
At the outset, the major efforts were devoted to (1)
exchanging information with the prefectural emergency 135
Dept, of General Affairs (Collection of information, the public relations, and others. )______
Dept, of Mobilization (Resource mobilization for recovery activities.)_____
Dept, of Agriculture and Forestry (Collection of information on losses in and recovery measures for the primary industry.)______
Dept, of Civil Engineering Headquarter (Collection of information (the Chief : Mayor on losses in and recovery the Deputy Chief: measures for the public Deputy Mayor) facilities. )______
Dept, of Construction (Collection of information on losses in and recovery measures for the public constructions. )______
Dept, of Public Health (Garbage collection and prevention of epidemics.)
Dept, of Public Welfare (Economic aids for the sufferers.)______
Dept, of Education (Collection of information on losses in and recovery measures for educational facilities.)______
Fire Dept. Dept, of Water Supply (Fire fighting and (Information gathering and flood control.) repairs, and emergency supply of water.)
THE ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE MUNICIPAL EOC OF NIIGATA FIGURE 22 136 operation center, (2) disseminating the evacuation order from the expected tsunami for the public,(3) preparing emergency supplies of meals for the sufferers, and (4) opening temporary shelters at schools which looked to be safe from fires and tsunami. Major a c tiv itie s done by and events related to the municipal EOC are chronologically
listed in Table 11.
The govenor of Niigata prefecture was also absent on
the day of the earthquake. In addition, the deputy governor who had responsibility for recovery activities was on an
airplane for Osaka. Just after the earthquake, the other
deputy governor, consulting with the director of Department
of Disaster Prevention, called an emergency conference of
directors, and decided to establish the prefectural
emergency operation center (the prefectural EOC) at 1:30 pm,
29 minutes after the earthquake. The organization chart of
the prefectural EOC is as shown in Figure 23. Beginning with
such activities as information gathering and getting in
touch with the governor and the deputy governor in charge of
recovery activities, the prefectural EOC made several
important decisions including (1) a request to the national
government for sending-out the self defense force, (2) a
request to other municipal and town offices surrounding
Niigata city for sending out their fire squads, and (3)
mobilizing necessary equipments for providing the public 137
Dept, of General Affairs (Information gathering, the public relations, the application of the Disaster Relief Act, the request to Self Defense Force, and transportation .)______
Dept, of Accommodation (Providing Self Defense Force with Accommodation.
Dept, of Public Welfare (Financial aids and distribution of goods.)
Dept, of Public Health (Medical services and emergency water supply.)
Dept, of Industries (Control of construction materials and goods for Headquarter daily use.)______(the Chief : Governor, the Deputy Chief: Dept, of Agriculture and Deputy Governor) Forestry (Control of foods and timbers. )______
Dept, of Agricultural Land (Recovery measures for agricultural land.)
Dept, of Civil Engineering (Recovery measures for public facilities.)
Dept, of Public Peace Dept, of Education (The Prefectural (Recovery measures for headquarter of educational facilities.) police.)______
THE ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE PREFECTURAL EOC OF NIIGATA FIGURE 23 138 with drinking water.
The Niigata prefectural headquarter of police independently operated. On the day of the earthquake, the chief of the prefectural headquarter of police was also absent. A director in charge of recovery activities called an emergency conference of directors and decided to open the police emergency operation center (the police EOC) at 1:30 pm. The police EOC, at the outset, consisted of 87 policemen grouped into seven sections. These sections were respectively in charge of ( 1 ) information control,(2)survey of damages and casualties, (3)public relations, (4)gathering
information concerning the disaster agent itself and its
secondary effects, (5)mobilization, (6)prevention of crimes
and lootings, and (7)general activities for protecting the
public. However, as the situation changed, the organization
was shifted as shown in Figure 24.
The national government had an emergency meeting of
representatives from the relevant Ministries and Agencies at
3:00 pm on the 16th of June and decided to send the Minister
of Internal Affairs to Niigata city to inquire into the
situations and to establish the emergent operation center
(the national EOC) at the Prime Minister’s Office. The
national EOC was established at 5:00 pm and headed by the
Minister of Construction. Although the national EOC was
expected to cover three prefectures of Niigata, Akita and 139
Dept, of Public Relations (Contacts with the prefectural EOC and public relations.)
Dept, of Mobilization (Mobilizing resources and equipments . )______
Dept, of Accommodation (Mobilizing foods, supplying medical services and accommodation for police.)
Headquarter Dept, of Information (the Chief of the (Gathering information on prefectural the disaster itself and headquarter on damages and casualties.) of poli ce.) ______Dept, of Public Safety (Prevention of lootings, and panic.) ______
Dept, of Traffics (Emergency traffic control.)
Dept, of Communication (Maintaining communication devices. )______
THE ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE POLICE EOC FIGURE 24
Yamagata, it set up the on-the-spot EOC in Niigata city headed by the chief of the Fire Defense Agency at 3:30 pm on the 17th of June. At the night of the 16th of June, the national EOC decided that (l)the necesarry measures to cope with the situation should be actively taken even if no request from the stricken areas arrived, (2)all of the 140 necessary measures should be worked out up to the 18th of
June at the latest, and (3)the necessary substances and persons should be in excess of the needs in terms of quantity and quality. The on-the-spot national EOC essentially functioned as a communication bridge between the prefectural and the national EOCs.
The major activities taken by these EOCs are listed with important events as shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11 RECOVERY ACTIVITIES AND MAJOR EVENTS ON THE DAY OF OCCURRENCE OF THE NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE
Organizational Responses Major Events
June 16 13:01 The occurrence of the earthquake 13:02 Break-out of Oil Tank Fire 13:15 The Tsunami Warning issued by Meteorological Agency 13:20 Tsunami 13:30 The prefectural and the municipal EOCs 14:15 The prefectural EOC TV networks received the Tsunami started to give Warning and sent a disaster messenger to the information. municipal EOC. 14:30 The municipal EOC issued the evacuation order. 15:00 The national government had an emergency meeting. 15:23 The open of radio station at the prefectural EOC 15:30 The prefectural EOC sent a request to Self Defense Force. 141
Table 11 (Continued)
16:30 The prefectural EOC sent a The prefectural request to the fire dept, EOC succeeded in of other cities and towns. getting contact with their Tokyo The municipal EOC began Office. emergency supply of water. 17:00 The national EOC was set up 17:10 Self Defense Force units arrived at spots. 18:00 The prefectural EOC decided to apply the Disaster Relief Act to Niigata city 19:00 The municipal EOC decided to temporarily close schools in the city. 21:30 The national EOC had its first meeting.
(3) Communication Activities.
In Niigata city, an ordinary telephone system was disrupted just after the earthquake, and approximately ninety one per cent of the telephones became unusable. All exclusive lines between specific organizations also became unusable except one between the Niigata Local Meteorological
Observatory and the Niigata branch of NHK (Japan
Broadcasting Corporation). However, even this exclusive line which survived the disaster also stopped functioning a few minutes later. Thus, every organization was obliged to depend on messengers at the outset.
All radio units also ceased their functions because of a power stoppage, though some units were quickly 142 rehabilitated. However, these functioning radio units were monopolized by the organizations which owned them, because they had been exclusively used, for example, as a police radio system or as a fire radio system during normal time.
Thus, the prefectural EOC was obliged to depend on the
police radio system, and the municipal EOC was forced to
depend on the fire radio system. The amateur radio operators
voluntarily extended assistances to the municipal EOC.
Immediately after the establishment of the prefectural EOC,
they sent messengers to such places as the fire department
of Niigata city, the Niigata Central police station, the
Niigata Higashi police station, Hokuriku Regional
Construction Bureau, and Niigata Meteorological Observatory.
At approximately 2:15 pm, an official of the Niigata
Meteorological Observatory came into the prefectural EOC
with a portable radio unit and informed them about the
tsunami warning which had been issued by Meteorological
Agency in Tokyo at 1:33 pm. Fragmentary information on
damages and c a s u a ltie s had already been gathered by
messengers and through the police radio system. In addition,
an aerial report based on observations from a helicopter was
also brought into the prefectural EOC by an official of Air
Self Defense Force. At 3:23 pm, the prefectural EOC opened
an information center with a radio unit borrowed from the
police EOC, and ordered the local offices of the prefecture 143 to send information on damages and casualties in their jurisdictional areas.
By combining these reports with information obtained from the police department, the prefectural EOC gradually clarified the situation. By the evening of the day, it was clear that Niigata city was the most severely devastated area in the prefecture. 144
2. THE 1968 TOKACHI OKI EARTHQUAKE
(1) Backgrounds and the Disaster.
The northern end of Honshu Island is Aomori Prefecture.
The prefecture contains about 1,500,000 population, which is ranked 27th among the 47 prefectures in Japan. About one fourth of the total number of workers is farmers. Figure 25 shows the location of Aomori prefecture and Hachinohe city.
In the past, several large-scale disasters caused by earthquake and tsunami had struck this prefecture. However, the followings are the major disasters in terms of scale and amount of damages and casualties occasioned.
On the 15th of June, 1896: The Sanriku Oki Earthquake of 8.5 magnitude followed bya large-scale tsunami killed 27,122 people and totally destroyed 10,617 houses.
On the 12th of May, 1900: The Miyagi Ken Hokubu Earthquake of 7.0 magnitude struck the areaand killed 17 persons.
On the 9th of August, 1901: The Aomori Toho Oki Earthquake struck the area with a m agnitude of 7.2 on Richter scale, was followed by tsunami, and k illed 18 persons.
On the 3rd of March, 1933: The Sanriku Oki Earthquake of 8.1 magnitude, followed by a large scale tsunami, struck Aomori, killed 3,008 people and totally destroyed 7,512 houses . 145
komori Aomori Prefecture
Hirosaki Misawa O
AOMORI PREFECTURE AND HACHINOHE CITY FIGURE 25 146
On the 4th of March,1952: The Tokachi Oki Earthquake of 8.2 magnitude, followed by a large-scale tsunami, killed 33 persons and totally destroyed 906 houses.
As shown in the above lis t, Aomori Prefecture has experienced many earthquake- and tsunami-disasters. Through these experiences, they are more likely to be sensitive to tsunami, because most damages and casualties in the past were due to tsunami.
The earthquake of 7.8 Richter magnitude struck the northern part of Japan at 9:49 am on the 16th of May in
1968. Although the earthquake affected a broad area
TABLE 12 DAMAGESANDCASUALTIES BY THE TOKACHIOKI EARTHQUAKE*
Killed Injured Destroyed** Flooded Prefecture above floor Aomori 47 188 3,557 100 Iwate 2 4 36 109 Miyagi 1 1 1 1 Akita. 0 2 3 0 Saitama 0 2 0 0 Hokkaido 2 132 66 11
Total 52 329 3,670 221
* Source: Table 1-2-4 in Aomori Prefectural Government ed.. The Official Record of Aomori Earthquake Disaster - The 1968 Tokachi Oki Earthquake (1969). ** "Destroyed houses"here includes both of the numbers of totally destroyed and partially destroyed houses. 147 including six prefectures, it caused the most severe damages and casualties in Aomori Prefecture, as shown in Table 12.
In Aomori Prefecture, major damages and casualties due to landslides occurred around Hachinohe and its suburbs.
Since it was low tide when the earthquake occurred, the damages and casualties by tsunami were minor. When we divide the prefecture into three area, we have the damages and casualties in each area as summarized as shown in Table 13.
This shows that eighty per cent of casualties and seventy
per cent of damages were recorded in the Hachinohe area.
Therefore, the next section describes the organizational
responses in Hachinohe area.
TABLE 13 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES IN AOMORI PREFECTURE*
Area Killed Injured** Destroyed Flooded Houses** * above floor
Shimokita area 7 30 1,311 63 Hirosaki area 0 0 0 0 Hachinohe area 42 93 3,007 64
* Source: Table 1-3-2 and Table 1-3-3 in Aomori Prefectural Government ed.. The Official Record of Aomori Earthquake Disaster -The 1968 Tokachi Oki Earthquake (1968). ** ‘'Injured" means here the number of the fa ta lly injured. *** "Destroyed Houses" means here the number of totally or partially destroyed houses. 148
(2) Organizational Responses.
Since it had been raining before the earthquake, many landslides were induced by the earthquake in the southern part of the prefecture, e.g., in the Hachinohe area. In fact, thirty three persons were killed by the landslides in
Hachinohe area, which is about seventy nine per cent of the total number of the k illed in the area. In Hachinohe city, twelve persons were killed by landslides. Fires broke out at seven spots in the city, though nobody was killed. In addition, seventeen minutes after the earthquake, the tsunami warning was issued by the Hachinohe local meteorological station. Upon hearing the warning, the citizens vied with others in evacuating to high grounds.
The post-disaster survey undertaken by the prefectural government showed that ninety five per cent of the citizens evacuated.(3) This introduced further confusion in the situation.
In Hachinohe, the city hall itself was severely damaged by the earthquake. One person was k illed when the ceiling f e ll in the city hall. The city government set up the municipal emergency operation center at 10:05 am on the 16th of May, sixteen minutes after the earthquake. However, the
shift into an emergency operation system was automatically made on the basis of the disaster prevention planning, and what officials could do at the outset was only to deal with 149 the dead and the injured around them. It was very natural that they concentrated their efforts on gathering inform ation on damages and c a s u a ltie s . In gathering information, they were obliged to almost totally depend upon
the police station and the fire department. Since the
police station and the fire department were independently
responding to the warning, the landslide, and the fires, the
municipal EOC could not be involved in the overall decision
makings on possible measures against the disaster. The only
positive action by the municipal EOC was setting-up of a
counseling counter at the city office. The counseling
counter was set up in the afternoon on the 16th of May and
dealt with 404 cases up to the 15th of June. Those cases
mainly had to do with emergency loans and deferring tax
payments.
Right after the earthquake, the fire department set up
an emergency operation center. They engaged in four kinds of
activities. First, they obtained and responded to inquiries
made through the emergency c a ll "number 119." They learned
of landslide disasters in the suburbs of the city through
"number 119", and sent this information to the municipal
EOC. Second, responding to the information on landslide
disasters, they sent their search-and-rescue groups to each
spot in order to cooperate with the quasi-voluntary fire
squads. Third, needless to say, they engaged in fire 150 fighting activities. At 9:52 am, three minutes after the earthquake, the fir s t fire broke out in the city. With this as the start, seven fires broke out up to 10:16 pm of the day. Most of them started within six minutes between 9:52 am and 9:58 am. Fourth, upon receiving the tsunami warning, they cooperated with the police station and the quasi voluntary fire squads for disseminating the warning and providing citizens with help.
The Hachinohe police station also received a large number of emergency telephone calls through "number 110". In addition, the twenty eight police boxes in the city also provided reports on the situation. This allowed the police station to independently and positively take actions.
Following the order from the prefectural police EOC issued at 9:55 am on the 16th of May, the Hachinohe police station set up the emergency operation center (the police EOC). The chief of the Hachinohe police station divided his personnels into two groups. One group was for search and rescue activities at the spots of landslide, and the other group dealt with the tsunami situation. The police EOC sent several groups each of which was composed of five members, to the landslide spots, and also sent the requests for help to the Self Defense Force. After receiving the tsunami warning, they sent a group of twenty four members to watch the sea level and disseminate the warning. These groups at 151 the coast line found a sign of a tsunami at about 10:20 am, sent this information to the municipal EOC, and urged residents to evacuate.
When the earthquake occurred, both the prefectural governor and the deputy governor were absent. The chief treasurer of the prefectural office took over their tasks At the outset, he tried to gather information on damages and
casualties in the prefecture. However, because of
communication disruption in the prefectural and their local
offices, he was obliged to get information from the
prefectural headquarter of police or the Self Defense Force.
It was at about 10:30 am on the 16th of May that the
situation in the prefecture became vaguely understood, and
a prefectural EOC was established.
At about 3:30 pm on the 16th of May, the governor and
the deputy governor flew back from Tokyo to Misawa in
Hachinohe area. After inspecting the situation in Hachinohe
area, they arrived at the prefectural EOC in Aomori city in
the late evening. Upon their arrival, the first meeting with
the governor in the chair took place at the prefectural EOC.
The meeting, however, involved only the prefectural
departments and bureaus. That is, other relevant
organizations such as the municipal EOC, the prefectural
police EOC, the fire department. Self Defense Force, and the
like were not involved in the meeting. The main purpose of 152 this meeting was to exchange and integrate the various information from several organizations and the prefectural departments or bureaus. At about 9:00 pm, the prefectural
EOC declared that the Disaster Relief Act was applicable in the Hachinohe area.
On the next day, information gathering activities were s till continued. The prefectural EOC made frantic efforts to gather information and made almost no decisions as to recovery activities except the decision of applying for the
Disaster Relief Act. The requests for help to Self Defense
Force and other organizations were informally sent by the municipal EOC or from the Hachinohe police station. Since the prefectural EOC failed to quickly gather information at the outset, they became highly involved in information gathering. However, since they were preoccupied with gathering information, they could not keep up with the situation which was continuously changing because of serial participations of several organizations at the scene. Later on, the prefectural EOC could estimate the scale or degree of damages and casualties in the prefecture, but they were outside the substantial recovery activities.
The prefectural headquarter of police established its
EOC at 9:55 am on the 16th of May, six minutes after the earthquake. The organization of the EOC of the prefectural headquarter of police (the prefectural police EOC) was as 153
TABLE 14 THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PREFECTURAL HEADQUARTER OF POLICE EOC*
Emergency The Number Activities Functions of Staffs* *
Evaluation 6 Evaluating damages and casualtiesinthe prefecture andmaking decisions as to allocationsof resources.
Traffic 3 Gathering traffic information and making decisions as to traffic controls.
Information 2 Engaging in communication activities with other organizations.
Logistics 3 Mobilizing equipments, foods, and transportation.
Investigation 2 Controling prisoners and conducting criminal investigation.
Identification 2 Engaging in criminal identificationand identify the dead.
Security Guard 2 Preventing lootings.
General Affairs 2 Financial activities.
Public 2 Public relations Relations
Maintenance 4 Maintaining communication devices.
* Source: Table 2-2-1 in Aomori Prefectural Government ed., The Official Record of Aomori Great Earthquake- The 1968 Tokachi Oki Earthquake (1969). * » The figures show the number of staffs who were only in the prefectural police EOC. 154 shown in Table 14.
Right after the earthquake, the chief director of the department of the security guard ordered his fifteen staff members to communicate with all of the local police stations. What they ordered the police stations to do was
(1) to set up EOCs in each respective police station, (2) to inspect the respective jurisdiction, (3) to provide aids for helping people to evacuate, (4) to engage in search and rescue activities, where necessary, and (5) to prevent looting activities.
Their radio network was s t i l l available after the earthquake. Except for the communication devices of the Self
Defense Force, their radio network was the only communication devices in Aomori Prefecture s t i l l functioning at that time. Thus, the prefectural police EOC spontaneously became an information center and supplied information to the prefectural EOC. They obtained much information from the southern part of the prefecture, especially from the area of
Hachinohe. Using that information, the prefectural police
EOC issued an order to the riot squad at 10:00 am to go into the Hachinohe area. However, the riot squad had already engaged in search and rescue a c tiv itie s in Aomori city in response to the request from the Aomori police station.
Thus, it was at about 10:30 am that the riot squad left
Aomori for Hachinohe. 155
The prefectural police EOC sent their staffs to act as messengers to the prefectural EOC and the local
meteorological station. At 10:06 am on the 16th of May, the
Hachinohe local meteorological station issued the tsunami
warning, and this was transmitted to the prefectural police
EOC by the messengers at the meteoro 1 o-gica1 station. The
staff members at the prefectural EOC brought a portable
radio with them and acted as intermediaries between the
prefectural and the prefectural police EOCs.
The ninth Division of the Ground Self Defense Force
consists of four regiments under the command of the
headquarter. The headquarter and one of four regiments were
located at Aomori city. The other three regiments were
respectively stationed at Hachinohe city, Hirosaki city,
and Takizawa mura. Upon the occurrence of the earthquake,
the Division headquarter sent a staff officer to the
prefectural office in order to gather information. However,
since the prefectural EOC was in chaos and had l i t t l e
information at that moment, they had to gather information
on their own. Their wireless telephones connecting the
regiments were s t i l l available. The information gathering
a c tiv itie s were quickly performed with these wireless
telephones.
In the afternoon on the 16th of May, the Division
headquarter received a request from Aomori city and sent 156 troops in with an emergency supply of water. Prior to this, the regiment at Hachinohe had already been in the field, in responses to the request from the Hachinohe municipal EOC and the Hachinohe police EOC, undertaking search and rescue of the victims of the landslides. In spite of the severe damage to their own barracks and other facilities, the regiment was able to supply emergency foods and water, blankets, and temporary te n t-v illag e s for victims. Their recovery activities and the number of soldiers who engaged in them are as shown in Table 15.
TABLE 15 RECOVERY ACTIVITIES BY SELF DEFENSE FORCE
Activities Term The Number Area of Soldiers
Aomori Waterworks May, 17-20 318
May,16-19 130
Misawa Supplying May,18-21 132 water Hachinohe May,16-17 85
May,16-19 350
Fukuchi Search and May,31-June , 4 756 Rescue Totsu May,31-June , 8 1,100
Gonohe May,16-June,8 2,256
Prevention of epidemics June,7-8 16
Others May,16-24 26 157
3. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
(1) Interorganizational Networks.
The emergency period after the 1964 Niigata Earthquake, as a matter of course began with the occurrence of the earthquake. The prefectural EOC declared the application of the Disaster Relief Act to Niigata city at 6:00 pm. This is the end of the emergency period, because this made clear the situation, although all information about the situation remained incomplete for full application of the Act. By the declaration, efforts basically turned to recovery activities from information gathering. The restoration period in practice began a l i t t l e earlier than the declaration, because fire squads and policemen had already been dispatched to the scene. However, the declaration was the formal beginning of the restoration period. It continued up to the 3rd of July. By the 19th of June, most life line functions were recovered. On the 19th of June, the fire at
the petrolium plant was brought under control, the electric
power company restored their system and was able to supply electric power for ninety eight per cent of households in
Niigata city. Twenty eight per cent of telephones was
restored, and eighty per cent of railway system was also
reopened. Therefore, we understand that the restoration
period entered the final phase on or about the 19th of 158
June. The decisive event indicating the end of the restoration period was the completion of the building the temporary houses on the 3rd of July. These stages of recovery process are shown in Table 16.
TABLE 16 THE STAGES OF RECOVERY PROCESS AFTER THE 1964 NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE
the emergency from 1:01 pm, the 16th of June period (the occurrence of the earth quake . ) to 6:00 pm, the 16th of June (the declaration of applying the Disaster Relief Act.)
the restoration from 6:00 pm, the 16th of June period to the 3rd of July (the completion of building the temporary houses.)
First of a ll, the interorganizational network in the
emergency period was established in order for several
organizations to gather inform ation on damages and
casualties. Some of the organizations already engaged in
decision-makings and issued some directions at this moment.
The configuration of the interorganizational network in the
emergency period can be illustrated as shown in Figure 26.
The national EOC established the on-the-spot EOC at the
prefectural office at 3:30 pm on the 17th of June. As the
chief of Fire Defense Agency said,(^) the on-the-spot
national EOC itself was not a coordinating unit at the 159 scene. It functioned as the reception center of requests from the prefectural or the municipal EOCs, However, the on-the-spot national EOC considerably changed the situation.
The newly emerged network can be illu stra te d as Figure 27.
This is the interorganizational network in the restoration period.
In both Figures 26 and 27, solid lines show the report
or direction couplings and dotted lines show the request or
instruction couplings. Furthermore, organizations with a
single circle (O ) are cognition centers and organizations
with a double circle ( ®) are cognition and evaluation
center.
( 2 )
(3) (4)1 (5) ( 6 ) (7)
( 8 )
( 11)
( 10) (9)
* (1): the prefectural EOC, (2); the prefectural police EOC, (3): other c itie s and towns, (4): the branch offices of the prefectural government, (5): the municipal EOC, (6): the four police stations in Niigata city, (7): other police stations, (8): the fire department, (9): the headquarter of quasi-voluntary fire squads, (10): the eleven fire stations, (11): the police boxes.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE EMERGENCY PERIOD AFTER THE NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 26 160
(1) (5) m XT) (4)
(6)1(7)
(8 ) (9) ( 12)
(13)
(14) (15)
* (1): the national EOC, (2): Fire Defense Agency, (3): National Police Agency, (4); Maritime Safety Agency, (5): Self Defense Force, (6): the prefectural EOC, (7): the national on-the-spot EOC, (8): the branch offices of the prefectural government, (9): other cities and towns, (10): the prefectural police EOC, (11): the four police stations, (12): the municipal EOC, (13): the fire department, (14): the headquarter of quasi-voluntary fire squads, (15): the eleven fire stations.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD AFTER THE NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 27
On the other hand, the emergency period after the 1968
Tokachi Ok i Earthquake was from the occurrence of the earthquake up to the declaration of applying the Disaster
Relief Act to Hachinohe area by the prefectural EOC which occurred at 9:00 pm on the 16th of May, about eleven hours after the earthquake. By the 17th of May, the gas supply system was almost completely recovered. The electric power and telephone systems were also mostly recovered by the 18th of May. On about these days, the restoration period entered 161 the final stage. On the 5th of June, the shelters were closed and the temporary houses were completely built. The troops of Self Defense Force withdrew from the scene on the 7th of June. These events show the end of the restoration period. Thus, Table 17 shows the stages of recovery process after the Tokachi Oki Earthquake.
TABLE 17 THE STAGES OF RECOVERY PROCESS AFTER THE TOKACHI OKI EARTHQUAKE
the emergency from 9:49 am, the 16th of May period (the occurrence of the earth quake . ) to 9:00 pm, the 16th of May (the declaration of applying the Disaster Relief Act.)
the restoration from 9:00 pm, the 16th of May period to the 5th of June (the close-down of shelters and the completion of building the temporary houses.)
There is no drastic change between two networks in the emergency and restoration periods. Therefore, the interorganizational networks are together illustrated as shown in Figure 28.
In the interorganizational network in the emergency period after the 1964 Niigata Earthquake, we can identify four cognition centers. The report and direction couplings in the restoration period are basically the same as in the report couplings in the emergency period. By the 162
( 2 ) ( 1 ) P)
(4) 1( 8 )
(9)
( 10)
[(13) ( 12)
(1): the prefectural EOC, (2): the prefectural police EOC, (3): Self Defense Force, (4): other police stations, (5); the Hachinohe police station, (6): the branch offices of the prefectural government, (7): other cities and towns, (8): the municipal EOC, (9): the fire department, (10): the headquarter of quasi-voluntary of fire squads, (11): the four fire stations, (12): the sixteen quasi-vo1 untaryfiresquads, (13) : the twenty eight police boxes. * * Solid lines show the report or direction couplings, while dotted lines show the request or instruction couplings. Organizationswitha single circle (o) are cognition centers and organizations with a double circle (®) are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION AFTER THE TOKACHI OKI EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 28
introduction of the on-the-spot national EOC, several organizations at the national level joined in the network As a result, we identify five cognition centers and five evaluation centers in the inter-organizational network in the restoration period. Neither a regiment nor a division of the Self Defense Force exists in Niigata city. Therefore, the Self Defense Force can be ignored in identifying the 163 cognition or evaluation centers in this case. The concentration score is calculated as follows.
THE DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE NIIGATA EARTHQUAKE.
(a)the number of mediation units from the boundary units for respective cognition- and evaluation-center.
(The emergency period)
as a cognition as an evaluation center center
the prefectural EOC 9 x the municipal EOC 3 0 the prefectural police EOC 4 4 the fire department 1 1
Total number of mediating units ...... 17 5
(The restoration period) as a cognition as an evaluation center center the national EOC...... 10 10 the prefectural EOC...... 9 9 the municipal EOC 3 3 the police EOC 4 4 the fire department ...... 2 2
Total number of mediating units ...... 28 28
(b)the concentration score = the total number of mediating units / the to tal number of a cognition and evaluation centers. (the emergency period) = (17 - 5) / (4 - 3) = 3.14
(the restoration period) = (28 - 28) / (5 - 5) = 5.6
In the interorganizational network after the 1968
Tokachi Oki Earthquake, we identify six cognition centers 164 and four evaluation cneters. The 38th regiment of Ground
Self Defense Force was stationed in Hachinohe. It sent a report to the Division headquarter at Aomori city in the emergency period and received d ire c tio n s from the headquarter in the restoration period. Thus, in this case, the Self Defense Force is taken into account. The Division headquarter of Self Defense Force had no mediation unit in their communication channels, both in report and direction couplings. The prefectural police EOC was a cognition center, but not an evaluation center. They issued no direction as to a c tiv itie s in Hachinohe area, while they gathered information from all police stations in the prefecture and received requests from them. As a cognition center, the prefectural police EOC had one mediation unit, e.g., the Hachinohe police station. The Hachinohe police station was an evaluation center as well as a cognition center. It had no mediation unit either as a cognition center or an evaluation center. Although the Hachinohe municipal EOC was also a cognition center as well as an evaluation center, it had two mediation units only as a cognition center. The fire department had one mediation unit both in their report and direction couplings. The prefectural EOC functioned only as a cognition center. In the report couplings, it had five mediation units. Since it was not an evaluation center, it had no direction coupling. 165
Thus, the concentration score for the interorganizational coordination after the Tokachi Oki Earthquake is obtained as follows.
THE DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE TOKACHI OKI EARTHQUAKE
(a)the number of mediation units from the boundary units for respective cognition - or evaluation -centers .
as a cognition as an evaluation center center
the police EOC 1 x the prefectural EOC...... 5 X the municipal EOC... 2 0 Self Defense Force.. 0 0 Hachinohe Police Station...... 0 0 the fire department. 1 1
Total number of mediation units 9 1
(b)the concentration score = the number of mediation units as a cognition and an evaluation centers / the number of a cognition and an evaluation centers. = (9 - 1) / (6 - 4) = 1.0
The comparison between these two interorganizational
networks leads us to the following conclusion. That is, the
interorganizational network after the 1964 Niigata
Earthquake has the lower degrees of concentration and
centralization than that after the 1968 Tokachi Oki
Earthquake. In so far as these two cases are concerned, the 166 pattern of interorganizational coordination after the
Niigata Earthquake is closer to the decentra1ized-diffused type, while the pattern after the Tokachi Oki Earthquake is closer to the decentra1ized-concentra ted type.
The other point which should be noted here is that the inter-organizational network in the emergency period after
the 1964 Niigata Earthquake exhibits a slightly higher
degree of concentration than that in the restoration period.
This implies that the pattern is likely to be more
concentrated in the emergency period than in the restoration
period. This is probably due to the fact that each unit is
likely to be in direct contact with headquarters or the
cognition center in the emergency period, skipping the
mediation units. In fact, Brouillette and Holsti indicate
that mediation units in normal situations are skipped and
the bypaths emerged in communication channels in the
emergency period.
(2) Factors Which Influence the Pattern.
As mentioned earlier, Hachinohe area was struck by
several large-scale disasters in the past, though most of
damages and casualties were caused by tsunami. On the
contrary, Niigata area had few disaster except snow damage.
It is difficult to provide a statistical treatment about the
difference, but this implies that there existed some 167 differences between their subcultures.
The number of organizations involved in the recovery activities after the Niigata Earthquake was almost as many as after the Tokachi Oki Earthquake. In both cases, several organizations at the national level joined the scene.
However, the only difference between these two cases was in the involvement of the national EOC. Thus, the size of the interorganizational network was not largely different from each other.
However, in contrast with each other, the size of respective member organizations was different. As shown in
Table 18, a ll component organizations in the network in
Niigata were larger than those in Hachinohe. Hence, among the structural variables, only the size of member organization has a significant difference between two cases.
TABLE 18 THE SIZE OF MEMBER ORGANIZATIONS
Name of Organization: Niigata Hachinohe
The municipal government 4,000 2,500 The prefectural government 2,800 2,000 The fire department 230 130 The quasi-voluntary fire squad 2,300 1,600 The prefectural police 3,200 2,035 The police station(s) 301 272 (The number of police station and police box in a city) 96 29 Self Defense Force* 19,390 435
*Thefigures for Self Defense Force is atotal man-days, 168
The degree of task complexity is relatively higher in the case of Niigata than in Hachinohe. About one minute after the earthquake, the large petrolium plant caught fire.
The fire spread to five oil tanks which respectively contained 30,000 and 45,000 kilo litters of oil. At 6:00 pm, the fire further spread to other two oil tanks at distance of about 330 yards from the place at which the first fire started. The roaring fire raged through the plant and its surrounding areas. Although the fire was weakened on about the 20th of June, it was at 5:00 am on the 1st of July before the fire was completely overcome. This 16-day fire was beyond the capacity of the normal system of fire fighting in this area. Fire Defense Agency tried to mobilize, across the nation, the professionals and equipments specialized in fighting against such a large scale oil fire. However, neither the skill nor the equipment appropriate to the case was available at that moment. Finally, Fire Defense Agency asked an American professional for help.
In contrast, there occurred no outstanding event such as this fire in the Hachinohe area. Although they also had
several fires, all of these were extinguished by their
normal fire fighting system. The recovery tasks in
Hacinohe area were mainly (l)to remove the earth and sand
and dig out victims, (2)to make the citizens safely evacuate 169
■S from the tsunami, and (3)to supply water. These tasks are ordinary emergency activities.
The situation also influenced the variety of resources available. In Niigata, in order to prevent the further spread of the fire, various resources were mobilized such as oil fences, chemical extinguishers, helicopters, and so on.
These resources were unnecessary in the Hachinohe area.
Thus, both degrees of task complexity and the variety of resources were a little higher in Niigata than in Hachinohe.
The amount of tasks is positively associated with the degree of damages and casualties. Table 19 comparatively shows the major damages and casualties in both areas.
As seen in the Table 19 c a s u a ltie s were more in
Hachinohe city than in Niigata city, while damages were much more in Niigata city. The sheer number of households which suffered losses was very similar in both cases. Thus, it is difficult to definitely say which city had the greater amount of the tasks to carry out.
Community properties can be summarized as shown in
Table 21. Niigata is the prefectural capital, and hence many headquarters of local organizations and branches of nation-wide organizations exist in the city. In Niigata city, there are the prefectural office, the prefectural
headquarter of police, and local offices of other national
organizations such as Ministry of Construction, Ministry of 170
TABLE 19 THE DEGREE OF DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES
The number of: Niigata city Hachinohe city the killed 11 19 the fa ta lly 16 (0.04 %)* 31 (0.15 %)* injured the injured 104 274 the totally destroyed houses 2,338 (1.7 %)** 148 (0.2 %)** the partially destroyed houses 7,595 (5.3 %)** 428 (0.6 %)** the houses flooded above floor 10,283 (7.2 %)** 64 (0.08 %)** the households suffered 32,970 (23.3 %)** 37,601 (52 %)** the population suffered 144,097 (46 %)* 162,312 (73 %)* fires 12 7 the broken points on the roads 74 427
the broken bridges 12 64
the spots where at least one life was lost 2 9
* The proportions are to the total polpulatlon in 1965. ** The proportion sare to the tota 1 number of households in 1965.
Home Affairs, Ministry of Transport, and the like.
Furthermore, several large scale factories and plants are
located in the city. On the other hand, in Hachinohe, which 171 is also a major city in the southern part of the prefecture, several branch-offices of the prefectural government exist.
However, there exist only a few local offices of the national governmnet and there are no large scale factories or plant in the city. In fact, the figures in Table 20 show the difference in the degree of organizational complexity between both cities.
TABLE 20 THE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS
The number of : Niigata Hachinohe
Establishments 25,834 12,556 Manufacturers 1,859 857 Retailers 6,912 3,567 Large-scale retailers 61 34 Banks 137 51
Including the other two indicators of the degree of urbanization. Table 21 provides us with a comparative view of two areas, and it leads us to a conclusion that Niigata city was much more urbanized than Hachinohe city.
As to the characteristics of disaster agent, the speed of onset and the degree of predictability, they can be regarded as equal to each other. However, the two disasters were different from each other in the scope of the disaster.
Although population and households which suffered a certain amount of loss were almost equal to each other, the number of cities and towns which suffered damages and casualties 172
TABLE 21 COMMUNITY PROPERTIES
Community property Niigata Hachinohe
Population 325,018 198,280
The Number of Households 71,700 44,346
Organizational Complexity high low
Political The prefectural The major city Characteristic capital. in the southern area of the prefecture.
Economic Manufacturing Manufacturing Characteristic basedon several based on middle large factories. & small factories. Distribution of labor forces into the Primary, the 5:25:70 9:27:64 Secondary and the Tertiary Industry.
was rather different in the two cases. Based on this fact, we conclude that the disaster in Niigata had a wider scope than that in Hachinohe.
TABLE 22 THE SCOPE OF IMPACT
The number of : Niigata Hachinohe
Cities & Towns suffered. 116 67 Households suffered. 68,479 70,957 Persons suffered. 332,061 313,111 173
From these analysis, we conclude the followings.
(1) Interorganizational coordination in the emergency period after the 1964 Niigata Earthquake was more concentrated than in the restoration period. This may be due to the fact that, as time passes on, more units returned to the formal network of communication.
(2) There was no significant difference in the amount of recovery tasks between two disasters, and therefore, nothing can be said as to the amount of tasks.
(3) Interorganizational coordination in Niigata, where both degrees of task complexity and resource variety are higher than in Hachinohe, was diffused, while it was concentrated in Hachinohe. This support our hypothesis.
However, since interorganizational coordination was decentralized both in Niigata and Hachinohe, nothing can be
said about the dimension of centralization/decentralization.
(4) Although the amount of experiences and knowledge was greater in Hachinohe, interorganizational coordination
in Hachinohe was concentrated. This is contrary to our
hypothesis. As to the dimension of centralization
decentralization, we found no difference between two cases.
(5) Both interorganizational networks were almost same
in their sizes. However, the network in Niigata was slightly
larger than in Hachinohe in that a few more organizations at
the national level were involved in the scene. Hence, if we 174
TABLE 23 THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION AND SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE IT
The Niigata The Tokachi Oki Earthquake Earthquake
Pattern of Inter The Decentralized The Decentralized organizational Diffused Type Concentrated Type Coordination
Experiences and Knowledge few elaborated Size of Inter organizational almost same Network
The Average Size of Member larger smaller Organizations
The Task Complexity higher lower
The Variety of Necessary higher lower Resources
The Amount of Tasks - —-
Organizational Complexity higher lower
Urbanization more urbanized less urbanized The Speed of Onset - -
Predictability - -
The Scope of Impact broader narrower take into account this slight difference, our hypothesis can be partially supported. 175
(6) The average size of member organizations was larger in Niigata, and interorganizational coordination was more diffused than in Hachinohe. So far as the dimension of concentration/diffusiveness is concerned, it appears that our hypothesis is supported. Nothing can be said as to the dimension of centralization/decentralization.
(7) The relationships between the scope of a disaster or the degree of urbanization and the pattern of interorganizational coordination were in accordance with our hypotheses, with the proviso that, although Hachinohe was less urbanized in comparison with Niigata, it seemed to be sufficiently urbanized when being compared with other areas.
(8) Niigata was more urbanized than Hachinohe, and the size of interorganizational network and the average size of member organization were larger in Niigata. Furthermore, the degrees of task complexity and resource variety were also higher in Niigata, though the amount of experiences and knowledge and the amount of tasks were smaller in Niigata.
Therefore, our Hypothesis 18 and Corollary 6, 7, 8, and 10
are respectively supported.
(9) We could not examine the importance of the speed of
onset and predictability, because the earthquakes suddenly
occurred without any warnings in both cases. 176
NOTES
1. In Japan, the degree of "Shindo" sometimes causes confusion among people. They confuse it with the Richter magnitude. While the Richter magnitude shows the scale of an earthquake itself, "Shindo" shows the degree of shock in a certain area. Therefore, an earthquake has several figures of "Shindo, "although it has only one figure of the Richter magnitude. "Shindo" varies with (l)the Richter magnitude, (2)the distance from the seismic center, and (3)the nature of land an each area. "Shindo" isdetermined by Meteorological Agency for each earthquake on the basis of the situation caused by it. Rough criteria for judging the situation are as follows. The minimumShindo is zero and the maximum is seven.
Shindo 0 ...... No one can feel the shock, but only a seismograph can catch it. Shindo 1 ...... Some people who are sensitive can feel the shock. Shindo 2..... M a n y people feel the shock and doors or windows slightly vibrate. ShindoS Houses shake, furniture makes noise, and water in a cup ripples. Shindo 4 .....Houses shake, vases or other unstable equipments fall. People who are walking can feel the shake and most people rush out the door. Shindo 5 ...... Tombstones of Japanese style or stone lanterns fall. Chimneys or stone walls are collapsed. Walls crack. Shindo 6 . Less than thirty per cent of houses collapse. People can not stand on the ground or floor. Landslides or cracks in the ground are caused. Shindo 7 More than thirty per cent of houses fall, a lot of landslides, cracks in the ground, and dislocations are caused.
2. The Showa era was inaugurated in 1925, and the year of 1984 corresponds to the 59th year of Showa. Historically, the Japanese name of an era is named after the emperor (Tenno) at that time. That is to say, a certain name of era is abolished when an emperor(Tenno) dies, and a new era is named after a new emperor(Tenno). 177
3. The Planning Department of Aomori prefectural government ed., The Official Record of Aomori Earthquake Disaster The 1968 Tokachi Oki Earthqualce (Aomori; Aomori Prefectural Government, 1969) p.250
4. Kiyoyuki Matsumura (the chief of Fire Defense Agency in 1964), To Niigata, in Gekkan Shobo (September, 1964) p.31
5. J. R. B rouillette, The Department of Public Works : A Community Emergencey Organization, Report Series No.3 (Columbus: Disaster Research Center, The Ohio State University, 1968)
0. R. Holsti, "Crisis, Stress, and Decision Making" in International Social Science Journal, Vol.22, 1970 CHAPTER VI
A STUDY ON TWO EARTHQUAKE DISASTERS
1. THE 1978 IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE
(1) Backgrounds and The Disaster.
Izu Peninsula has been regarded as one of the areas likely to be most severely damaged in the future Great Tokai
Earthquake. Since 1969, many researchers have informally indicated that there is a great possibility of an earthquake of a magnitude 7.0 or larger in the Tokai area. In 1976, one researcher made a presentation at the annual meeting of
Japan Seismologic Society concerning the possibility of the
Great Tokai Earthquake. This presentation , the content of which was disseminated by major TV networks and newspapers, seriously affected the national and local governments and the public. The national government set up a system for predicting the earthquake. Shizuoka prefecture, which is expected to be the most severely damaged area, carried out several policies such as activating Jishubo, clearing up hazardous factors and taking other necessary measures, and so on.
In May of 1974, the Izu Hanto Oki Earthquake of a magnitude 6.9 occurred in the south end of the peninsula.
178 179
Two years after the earthquake, another earthquake of a magnitude of 5.5 occurred in the area around Kawazu town, which was the most severely affected area by the Izu Ohshima
Kinkai Earthquake in 1978, The Izu Hanto Oki Earthquake in
19 74 caused large-scale landslides at 101 places, and resulted in such damages and casualties as listed in Table
24. On the other hand, the Kawazu Earthquake in 1976 was relatively minor in the damages and casualties it caused.
TABLE 24 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THE 1974 IZU HANTO OKI EARTHQUAKE AND THE 1976 KAWAZU EARTHQUAKE
Izu Hanto Oki Kawazu Earthquake Earthquake Casualties : the killed 30 0 the injured 102 0 Damages : the totally destroyed 134 2 houses the partially destroyed 240 30 houses
Both earthquakes provided some lessons as to
organizational responses. First, it took about three hours
to gather information and to grasp the situation in the case
of the Izu Hanto Oki Earthquake. Local governments realized
that the municipal or town government offices should be
equipped with radio sets, although, because of limited 180 budgets, not every government actually became equipped with radio sets. The prefectural headquarter of police distributed portable radiophones to their major police stations or boxes in Izu Peninsula. Second, in the recovery period, the municipal or town offices behaved with considerable confusion because of convergences of information and a lack of trained staffs. Some town offices hired new personnel to e x c lu s iv e ly manage d is a ste r prevention activities. Against this background, the Izu
Oshima Kinkai Earthquake occurred at 12:24 pm on Saturday, the 14th of January in 1978. The magnitude was 7.0, and
Shindo 5 or 6 was observed in Izu Peninsula. The damages and casualties are listed in Table 25. Unique features of this earthquake are as follows.
(1)Slight earthquake shock,which occurred more thanfourty times on the previous day, preceded the main shock of January 14. Meteoro1ogicalAgencyre1eased 'Information on the Continuous Earthquakes in Izu Peninsula' which included an informal warning. This was, in effect,the first earthquake prediction information released in Japan.
(2) No fire occurred after the earthquake in spite of the fact that it happened around noon in winter. This showed that the public was well educated about how to effectively respond to an earthquake. ^
(3) A panic-like confusion followed the earthquake. On the 1 71hofJanuary , the prefectural government released 'the after-shock information.' This information caused a lot of confusion among the public. In Kawazu town, some evacuated by cars, schools were temporarily closed, a few Chonaikai prepared an emergency kitchen, LP gas dealersturnedoff gas stopcockslocated at each consumer's house, and the like. 181
TABLE 25 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THE 1978 IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE
Casualties :
the killed ...... 25 the fatally injured ...... 34 the slightly injured ...... 171
Damages :
the totally destroyed houses ...... 96 the partially destroyed houses 4,786
Figure 29 provides a geographical description of Kawazu and Higashi Izu towns where the most damages and casualties were recorded.
(2) Organizational Responses.
At the time of the occurrence, shelves and oilstoves in the Higashi Izu Town office fell down on the floor, and officials could not stand on the floor and hid under their desks. Right after the shock, they realized that electric power had stopped and that telephones and a radio set became unusable. They f ir s t send an o fficial to check the sea. He observed that the tides quickly ebbed away, and felt that a tsunami would occur. Due to his report, the town o ffic ia ls notified about the situation the residents along the seashore and recommended that they evacuate.
It was at 12:45 pm when they established the town EOC.
Right after the establishment, they concentrated their e ffo rts on gathering inform ation as to damages and 182
Ito 'Shizuoka Izu Peninsula A tagawa @
Higashi Iz Kawazu
Shimoda
IZU PENINSULA - KAWAZU AND HIGASHI IZU TOWN FIGURE 29 183 casualties. These efforts soon provided them with a clear picture of the situation, but they could not contact with the prefectural government because no operative communication channels were available at that time. It was at 2:50 pm when they could report the situation to the prefectural government.
The quasi-voluntary fire squads were immediately dispatched to major destroyed areas in the town, except for two areas. The town EOC sent officials to these two areas to help in rescuing victims in cooperation with residents in those areas. Furthermore, the town EOC indicated all
Chonaikai's to regiment voluntary forces of residents, and set up Atagawa branch of the town EOC because Atagawa area was far from the town office as shown in Figure 29.
In Kawazu town, one o fficia l working by chance at a severely devastated area in the town reported the situation and made a request for necessary equipments to save victims.
In response to his request, the town office mobilized equipments and sent them to his area. Almost at the same time, they established the town EOC. It was at 1:00 pm, 36 minutes after the main shock. They divided 15 officials available at that time into six groups, and sent five of them to major areas in the town and one group to the
schools, using cars equipped with radios. As the situations were made clear, the officials gradually realized that the 184 degree of destruction was beyond their ability to cope with.
Thus, at 2:05 pm, the town EOC asked the prefectural EOC to make a request for the help of Self Defense Force.
It was on Saturday that the main shock occurred. Prior to the main shock, however, a relevant department of the prefectural government was staffed by 15 officials in order to make provision against an disaster. Information on the continuous earthquake shocks was released by
Meteorological Agency at 10:50 am on the day. Furthermore, approximately 40 per cent of all officials were still working in the prefectural government office at the time of occurrence. As soon as the main shock occurred, the prefectural government asked their local branches and the municipal or town offices about the situation, distributing the earthquake information provided by Local Meteorological
Observatory of Shizuoka.
In spite of these efforts, the situations in Kawazu and
Higashi-Izu towns were obscure until around two o’clock in the afternoon. As soon as the prefectural government received information from Shimoda office of the prefectural government concerning the situations in Kawazu and Higashi
Izu towns, they established the prefectural emergency operation center (the prefectural EOC). It was 2:10 pm, 106 minutes after the main shock. At the same time, they decided
to set up a branch of the prefectural EOC in Shimoda 185 prefectural office. At 4:00 pm, the Treasurer of the prefectural government le ft Shizuoka city for Shimoda to supervise the branch. Furthermore, the prefectural EOC asked the Self Defense Force to send out troops and kept contacts with other municipal and town offices, the prefectural headquarter of police, the public transportation companies, the dealers' association of LP gas, Tokyo Electric Power Comany, Japan Highway Public
Corporation, Shizuoka Local Meteorological Observatory, and the like.
The Treasurer of the prefectural government, who was appointed as d ire c to r of the Shimoda branch of the prefectural EOC, arrived at 10:00 pm, and soon le ft the branch to make an on-the-spot inspection of Kawazu and
Higashi Izu towns.
On the next day, the 15th of January, the prefectural
Governor, a department director of Civil Engineering, and a section chief of Disaster Prevention (both of which are officials of the prefectural government), and an official of
Land Agency of the national government came to Kawazu town by helicopter. They discussed, with the Treasurer and representatives of the Self Defense Force, possible measures to meet the situation. During this period, the prefectural
EOC at Shizuoka city carried out several emergency activities. They continually gathered and analyzed 186 information from local areas, asked the Self Defense Force to send out other soldiers to the spot of slag-slide disaster, requested Maritime Safety Agency or private shipping agents to transport sightseers from the stricken areas, mobilized necessary resources, and engaged in information service for mass media or various research groups. That is, at this stage, the prefectural EOC played roles of information gathering and distribution and of supporting the Shimoda branch of the prefectural EOC.
At 8:00 am on Monday, the 16th of January, Shimoda branch of the prefectural EOC decided to open the on the spot EOC at Kawazu town as instructed by the prefectural
EOC at Shizuoka. At 9:00 am on Tuesday, the 17th of January, representatives from both EOC's of Kawazu and Higashi Izu towns, police stations, fire department, and Self Defense
Force had a first meeting at the on-the-spot EOC to coordinate activities in several areas. From that time on, ameeting was held regularly twice a day, at 9:00 am and
2:00 pm,and involving the same members.
The prefectural headquarter of police received the first report of the disaster from the Shimoda police station at 12:26 pm, two minutes after the main shock.
Thereafter, reports from several police stations came in one after another. The prefectural headquarter of police established the emergency operation center(the police EOC) 187 at 12:30 pm. The police EOC sent task forces composed of
162 riot polices and some others to the Shimoda police
station at 1:00 pm. In cooperation with the Shimoda police
station, they engaged in searching activities, post-mortem
examinations, communication a c tiv itie s, traffic control,
security guard activities, and the like. It was noticeable
that police radio networks, improved after the 1974 Izu
Hanto Oki Earthquake, worked well for gathering information.
Therefore, other organizations heavily depended upon the
prefectural headquarter of police and other police stations.
The national government established an emergency operation
center at 10:10 am on the 17th of January, but it was for
form's sake and practically carried out no recovery
activities. However, some organizations on the national
level actively responded to the disaster.
The Division One of the Ground Self Defense Force
located at Nerima ward in Tokyo tried to gather information
concerning the earthquake. At 1:10 pm, 46 minutes after the
main shock, they had a meeting of operations officers and
began mapping out an operational plan for the disaster. To
inspect the situation in Izu Peninsula, they sent one
helicopter to the area at 1:58 pm. As a result of the
report from the helicopter, they ordered a few corps at Fuji
to prepare to start operations. The Division One received a
request from Shizuoka prefecture, and decided to send the 188
34th Regiment located at the foot of Mt.Fuji. At 4:00 pm, they reinforced these troops, so that the total numbers of soldiers and heavy machines like bulldozers which were sent to Kawazu town on the day of occurrence were 680 and 19, respectively. Up to the 30th of January, they spent 22,579 man-days and sent a total of 4,369 heavy machines to Kawazu and Higashi Izu towns. Their major a c tiv itie s were search and rescue, temporary restoration of roads, and clearing up debris.
Yokosuka Division of Maritime Self Defense Force also prepared for being in operation right after the main shock.
Since the situation was unclear, at 9:52 pm, they sent an escort ship with 159 crew members to inspect the situation and also transported newsmen. In response to a request from the prefectural EOC, they sent a troopship with a corps of
40 members and 400 tons of drinking water to Higashi Izu at
0:06 am on Sunday. At 1:50 pm on Sunday, the escort ship transported 98 stranded sightseers to Ito city. In the early morning on Monday, another two troopships were sent with
188 crews, 56 Ground Self Defense Force o fficials, 1,100 tons of drinking water, and 20 heavy machines. Their major contributions were to supplying drinking water and transportations.
Table 26 summarizes the organizational responses in sequence of date. 189
TABLE 26 ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE 1978 IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE
Time Events
January 14 0:12 pm The 1978 Izu OhshimaKinkaiEarthquake occurred, 0:30 pm The prefectural headquarter of police set up the emergency operation center. 0:41 pm The prefectural police EOC obtained the unconfirmed information on casualties in Higashi Izu town. 0:45 pm Higashi Izu town office set up the emergency operation center. 1:00 pm Kawazu town office set up the emergency operation center. 1:30 pm The first division of Self Defense Force made observations from the sky. 2:00 pm The prefectural government obtained information on damages and casualties in Higashi Izu and Kawazu. 2:10 pm The prefectural government set up the emergency operation center. 2:20 pm The prefectural EOC requested for help to Self Defense Force. 4:00 pm The troops of 400 so ld ie rs of Self Defense Force started for Kawazu and Higashi Izu. January 15 Maritime Safety Agency sent boats for transporting sightseers. Higashi Izu and Kawazu town-EOCs began emergency supplies of water. Electric power system was almost recovered. January 16 Maritime Self Defense Force sent boats for transporting water and sightseers. The prefectural EOC decided to set up the on-the-spot emergency operation center at Kawazu town. January 17 The on-the-spot EOC had the first meeting involving all relevant organizations. Search and rescue activ itie s in major spots almost finished. Telephone system was almost restored. 2. THE 1978 MIYAGI KEN OKI EARTHQUAKE
(1) Backgrounds and the Disaster.
Miyagi prefecture is the largest among six prefectures in the northern part of Honshu Island, containing 1,955,267 population in 1975 which was ranked seventeenth among 47 prefectures in Japan. In other items such as the number of establishments, income per prefectural citizen, the amounts of national and local taxes paid by them, Miyagi prefecture hold the lead among six northern prefectures. Figure 30 shows the location of Miyagi prefecture and Sendai city.
The Pacific coast of northern Japan is called Sanriku, and a part of Miyagi prefecture is included in Sanriku area.
Sanriku has been very famous for tsunami disasters. During
100 years after the revolution, Sanriku had three large
scale tsunami which left their marks on the history of
disasters in the world. Among others, the Sanriku tsunami in
1896 is most famous because of the number of victims. On the
15th of June in 1896, 20,000 or more people gathered on the
shore of Sanriku for a summer festival. They slightly felt
an earthquake shock at seven o'clock in the evening. Fifty
minutes after the slight shock, when they were s t i l l
praying, a tsunami struck them with waves of 110 feet high.
The tsunami destroyed 13,000 houses, and k illed 27,000
190 191
Miyagi Prefecture
Ishlnomaki
Shiogama @
Sendai
MIYAGI PREFECTURE AND SENDAI CITY FIGURE 30 192 persons.
A few years after the war, Miyagi prefecture was hit by
two large scale typhoons. In 1947, thirty lives and 209 houses were lost by Typhoon Kathleen. The next year, another
typhoon took 44 liv es and 375 houses. A tsunami disaster
caused by Chile was the most devastating one for the Miyagi
prefecture in its history. In 1960, one of the greatest
earthquake in the world with a magnitude of 8.5 occurred in
the central south area of Chile. The so-called Chile
tsunami followed the earthquake. The tsunami damaged the
Hawaii Islands, and further, hit the Pacific coasts of
northern Japan. In this tsunami, one haundred and thirty
nine people were killed, 872 persons injured, and more than
5,000 houses were destroyed. The casualties in Miyagi
prefecture, 53 k illed and 625 injured, while 2,400 houses
were destroyed. After the war the area also experienced
three major earthquakes. One was the Hokubu Earthquake with
a magnitude 6.5. This earthquake occurred in 1963 and
resulted in 3 dead and 1,911 houses destroyed. The second
was the Niigata Earthquake in 1964. The third was the
Tokachi Oki Earthquake in 1968. Both of these last two, we
have already discussed. Through these experiences,
citizens in Miyagi prefecture learned that an earthquake
shock itself may not be serious, but that a tsunami is much
threatening. Reflecting this view, disaster plannings in 193
Miyagi prefecture had focused on tsunami, almost ignoring earthquakes. In fact, the Local Disaster Prevention Planning of Miyagi Prefecture enacted in 1963 listed storm, flood, snow, and tidal wave or tsunami, but mentioned nothing about damages from earthquake.
The same situation prevails in Sendai city which is a prefectural capital. Sendai is the second largest city in northern Japan and is characterized by such social and economic features as shown in Table 37. Citizens of Sendai had believed that the ground of Sendai is firm, so it is not prone to an earthquake. However, this is at variance with the actual state of things. Sendai was not as in its old days. The city had been urbanized, and extends beyond the old districts toward the outskirts of the city. Furthermore
the expansion was accompanied by disorderly developments or
excessive land uses.
Four months before Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake, another
relatively great earthquake struck the Sendai area. On the
20th of February in 1978, an earthquake of magnitude 6.7
occurred. This earthquake caused no loss of lives, but 34
persons were wounded and 126 houses were p a r tia lly
destroyed. This earthquake is characterized by (1) injuries
resulting from broken and falling glass, (2) traffic
disorder caused not only by the collapse or cave-in of
roads, but also by the breakdowns of traffic signals, (3) 194
TABLE 27 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THE 1978 MIYAGI KEN OKI EARTHQUAKE
Casualties : the killed ...... 27 (Sendai ...... 19) the injured ...... 10,962 (Sendai ...... 10,557)
Damages: the totally destroyed houese or buildings ...... 1,273 (Sendai ...... 985) the partially destroyed houese or buildings ...... 5,652 (Sendai...... 4,635) Collapses of roads ...... 844 spots Collapses of bridges ...... 13 bridges Landslides ...... 144 spots Fire...... 11 cases
Amount of Loss: Establishments ...... ^^9 5,753,230.- (US$398,972.00) (Sendai ...... *56,774,180.-) (US$236,559.00) (Loss in large scale establishments are excluded.) Agriculture andForestry ...... *13,357,443.- (US$55,656.00) (Sendai ...... *622,158.-) (US$2,592.00) Houses...... *78,885,514.- (US$328,689.00) (Sendai ...... *4 3,656,606.-) (US$181,902.00) Public facilities...... *28,161,068.- (US$117,337.00) (Sendai ...... *3,817,069.-) (US$15,904.00) Educational facilities...... *7,593,504.- (US$31,639.00) (Sendai ...... *4,171,468.-) (US$17,381.00) 195 information confusion caused by breakdown or congestion of telephone network, and (4) speedy and appropriate responses to tsunami warning. The speedy and appropriate responses to tsunami warning seems to be due to the area's experinces in the past, but they did nothing for improving the other three undesirable situations observed in the earthquake.
At 5:14 pm, on Monday, the 12th of June in 1978, Miyagi
Ken Oki Earthquake struck the Pacific coast of northern
Japan. Although the earthquake of magnitude 7.6 was fe lt over a relatively broad area, most severely hit the Sendai area. Damages and casualties almost exclusively resulted in
Sendai city. Total damages and casualties in Miyagi prefecture and in Sendai city were as indicated in Table
27.
Some unique features of the disaster has been indicated in many reports. These can be summarized as follows.
(1) Damages unique to urban areas were observed. Eighteen persons were killed down by falling concrete block walls. Broken glass was rained upon people. Two cases of fire among seven cases were caused by chemical substances at the research laboratories of Tohoku University. Damages to reinforced concrete buildings were noticeable. A group of people were trapped in an elevator for a long time.
(2) Risks of industrial areas were reconfirmed. Oil tanks in a petroleum plant had cracks in them and drained oil off into the sea.
(3) Newly developed housing areas had more damages.
(4) Citizens suffered greatly from breakdowns of life-line functions such as services of gas, water, and electric power and from congestion of telephone use. 196
(2) Organizational Responses.
When the earthquake occurred, 714 officials, which are about 13 percent of the total office force, were still working in the city office. At 5:20, six minutes after the main shock, Sendai city set up at their office the municipal
EOC. At 5:32 pm, the municipal EOC shifted to the highest rank of an emergency system with f u ll mobilization. Since their telephones were unusable, the municipal EOC asked the broadcasting corporations to send, via TV and radio, an order that a ll city officials should come in the municipal
EOC and carry out their own tasks as soon as they could. At midnight, approximately forty percent of total number of officials was in the municipal EOC. The first meeting of the municipal EOC was held at 7:00 pm. But many section chiefs could not attend the meeting because they were involved in carrying out planned emergency responses. Therefore, the municipal EOC could not practically function until 8:00 pm or so, when they developed some rough picture of the
disaster situation. It was decided to stop supplying gas and
to notify the public about it via TV or radio network. This
was at 6:00 pm. Except for information gathering, this was
the only major action performed by the municipal EOC on the
day of the earthquake. On the other hand, the fire
department of the municipal government had much to do.
Although the fire department supposed to be an important 197
TABLE 28 ACTIVITIES BY THE FIRE DEPARTMENT OF SENDAI
Date Activities
June, 12 (l)the number of fires and the frequency of dispatch ...... 8 (2)the frequency of dispatch for search and rescue activities...... 6 (3)the frequency of turnout of ambulance cars...... 25 (4)the frequency of dispatch for preventive actions against gas leaks ...... 16 (5)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leak...... 1
June, 13 (l)the numer of fires and the frequency of dispatch ...... 1 (2)the frequency of turnout of ambulance cars...... 12 (3)the frequency of dispatch for preventive activities against landslide ...... 26 (4)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leaks...... 1
June, 14 (l)the frequency of dispatch for preventive actions against landslide ...... 10 (2)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leak...... 1
June, 15 (l)the frequency of dispatch for preventive activities against landslide ...... 59 (2)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leaks...... 1
June, 16 (l)the frequency of dispatch for preventive actions against landslide ...... 26 (2)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leaks...... 1
June, 17 (l)the frequency of dispatch for preventive activities against landslide ...... 10 (2)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leaks...... 1
J u n e, 18 (l)the frequency of dispatch for preventive activities against landslide ...... 6 (2)the frequency of dispatch for emergency responses to oil leaks...... 1 198 member of the municipal EOC, the flood of c alls from the public via emergency c all networks kept them engaged in their routine work, separately from the municipal EOC. The fire department shifted to the emergency operation setup with fu ll mobilization occuring at 5:30 pm, 16 minutes after the main shock. Right after the main shock, they had
212 emergency c a lls from citizens. However, they could practically respond to only 24 cases among them. Twelve fires broke out at 9 spots. Traffic disorder and congestion of telephone calls forced fire squads to work in extremely difficult conditions.
The fire department consists of the headquarter and three stations staffed by 528 firemen. On the day of the disaster, 145 firemen were ready for everyday emergency operations as usual. Most of the rest, however, came in or returned to the fire department around six by the evening.
The quasi-voluntary fire squads in Sendai city were composed of 1,438 members. They closely cooperated with the fire department. Their activities can be chronologically summarized as in Table 28.
At 6:00 pm, the fire department sent several groups to
the coast area for res.ponding to the tsunami warning and to
an on-the-spot EOC at the petroleum plant, the tanks of
which had oil leaks. Furthermore, at midnight on the day,
the municipal EOC released an evacuation order to the 199 residents of a newly developed housing area. Upon hearing of the order, the fire squads were sent to the area for help residents to safely evacuate.
When the earthquake occurred, though it was a little after the closing time of the prefectural office, approximately one third of the total 2,500 officials were s t i l l working in the office. The prefectural government established their EOC at 5:30 pm, 16 minutes after the main shock, and at the same time, they issued an emergency order for every local office of the or prefectural government to set up a branch of the prefectural EOC. However, it was around 8:00 pm when approximately half of the total officials assembled in the prefectural EOC. The first action they took was information gathering. The major sources of information for them were their branches in local areas, the offices of 73 cities or towns, and the prefectural headquarter of police. Those branches and the municipal or town offices were connected by an emergency radio network with the prefectural office. However, the communication channels were not activated, because (1) those present were not fam iliar with radio units, (2) it took a long time for each communication, and (3) it was the two-step communication channels between the prefectural office and the municipal or town offices. The third reason means that information from the municipal or town offices was sent to 200 the prefectural EOC via the local branches of the prefectural EOC. Among all sources of information, the prefectural headquarter of police department was excellent.
Information from them had relatively high accuracy and was wide-scoped, because (l)they could exclusively use their own police radio networks, and ( 2)information came to them directly from local police stations.
At 7:50 pm, the prefectural EOC sent a request to the
Self Defense Force for help. At 9:30 pm, the prefectural EOC
instructed the Sendai office of Land Transportation Bureau
of Ministry of Transport, the Sendai City Bureau of
Transportation, and some major bus and taxi companies to
provide vivtims with necessary transportation means, but the
instructions seemed to be just for form sake and accordingly
had no effect. At 10:00 pm, the prefectural officials had
the first meeting on possible measures to take. The meeting
involved the major staffs of the prefectural government and
a few officials of the fire department. However, not all
relevant staffs could attend the meeting because most fo
them were extremely busy carrying out their own tasks. There
was no discussions in the meeting. It resulted only in
information exchanges and, because the division of labor and
roles of each unit were not clearly specified, therefore,
was not fruitful. Thereafter, the meetings of the
prefectural EOC took place three times on the 13th of June, 201 twice on the 14th of June, and once every day after the 15th of June. However, since the conditions were as mentioned above, there was no clear grasp of the situation before the
14th of June and instructions or suggestions for the municipal or town EOC's were seriously delayed. The major measures taken by the prefectural EOC after the 14th of June were summarized by the following.
(1) On the 15th of June, they instructed the municipal and town EOC's to prepare for and check the preventive and responsive measures to landslide disaster owing to after-shocks or rain.
(2) On the 16th of June, they establishedthe on-the-spot EOCatthe petroleum plant in cooperation with the Self Defense Force, Maritime Safety Agency, Fire Department of Sendai city, andother related organizations.
(3) On the 16th of June, they set up a special section for the victims, and, thereafter, dealt with and gave assistance to 432 cases.
At 2:15 pm, one minutes after the main shock, the prefectural headquarter of police set up the police EOC, and issued an order that every police station should also set up its emergency operation center. The police EOC was staffed by 341 officials and 2,536 policemen. Although the staffs were divided into seven groups, approxim ately 1,000 officials (37 percent of the total staffs) were assigned to the group dealing with traffic control. Furthermore, they
sent riot squads to help at the Sendai Police Station.
Their major activities were (l)traffic control,
(2)information gathering and processing from the public via 202 emergency telephone "number 110", (3)dissemination of information on traffic and road conditions, and (4)panic prevention activities.
3. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
(1) Patterns of Interorganizational Coordination.
The stages of recovery process in both cases are indicated as in Table 29.
TABLE 29 THE STAGES OF RECOVERY PROCESS
Periods: IzuOhshima Kinkai MiyagiKen Oki Earthquake Earthquake
the emergency from 12:24 pm, 5:14 pm, period January 14 June 12 to 7:30 pm, 12:30 pm January 15 June 13
the restoration from January 15 June 13 period to January 21 June 18
In both cases, the declaration of applying the Disaster
Relief Act to the stricken area was regarded as the end of the emergency period and the beginning of the restoration period. In the case of the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake, the e lectric power system was restored on the 15th of
January, and the telephone system was mostly rehabilitated on the 17th of January. On the 21st of January, the final shelter was closed. However, Self Defense Force engaged in 203 recovery activities up to the 30th of January.
In Sendai, both the e lectric power and telephone systems were mostly restored by the 14th of June. On the
18th of June, the emergency supply of water was ended and the Self Defense Force pulled its troops out of Sendai.
However, the shelter operation continued until the 1st of
July. In comparison with the case of the Izu Ohshima Kinkai
Earthquake, the shelter existed much longer in Sendai. This may be due to the fact that the victims had few relatives in the Sendai area. In the case of the Izu Ohshima Kinkai
Earthquake, the victims had their relatives in their own town and were w illing to move out of the shelters. Also, since the Self Defense Force in the case of the Izu Ohshima
Kinkai Earthquake withdrew on the 30th of January, the duration of recovery activities by them was much shorter in
Sendai. This may be attributed to the fact that most casualties were caused by landslides in the case of the Izu
Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake, while, in Sendai, most casualties were due to fallen blocks or houses. Generally speaking, it takes longer to find the dead from the spots of landslide disasters.
Thus, the end of the restoration period in the case of the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake was marked by the closing of the final shelter, and in the case of the Miyagi Ken Oki
Earthquake it was marked by the withdrawal of the Self 204
Defense Force.
In the emergency period after the Izu Ohshima Kinkai
( 1 ) (5)
( 11) ( 12) ( 6 )
( 2 ) (3) (7) ( 8 )
(9) (10)(9> ( 10)
(14)
* (1): the prefectural EOC, (2); the Kawazu town EOC, (3): the Higashi Izu town EOC, (4): the Shimoda branch of the prefectural government, (5):the prefectural headquarter of police, (6); the Shimoda police station, (7): the Kawazu police box, (8): the Higashi Izu police boxes, (9): the headquarter of quasi-voluntary fire squads, (10): the Association of Chonaikai and Jishubo, (11): other cities and towns, (12): other police stations, (13): the quasi voluntary fire squads, (14): Chonaikai or Jishubo.
**Broken lines show the request or instruction couplings. Solid lines indicate the report and/or direction couplings.
***Units with a single c ircle are cognition centers and units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE EMERGENCY PERIOD AFTER THE 1978 IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 31 205
Earthquake, the prefectural EGG obtained information mainly from their branch office in Shimoda. As a matter of course, they asked most municipal and town offices about the situations in each area. However, they could not reach the most severely stricken areas without the mediation of their
Shimoda branch. At the later stage of the emergency period, they could get information from the prefectural headquarter of police. The prefectural headquarter of police also made inquiries of all police stations. As a result, they could recognized that Kawazu and Higashi Izu were most severely devastated area in the prefecture. This information was sent to the prefectural headquarter of police via the Shimoda police station, which had jurisdiction over Kawazu and
Higashi Izu. The Shimoda police station obtained the information from the police boxes in Kawazu and Higashi Izu.
The town EOCs of Kawazu and Higashi Izu were respectively in cooperation with Chonaikai and the quasi-voluntary fire squads in each area. The pattern of interorganizationa1 coordination in the emergency period after the Izu Ohshima
Kinkai Earthquake can be illustrated as in Figure 31.
As shown in Figure 31, there were four coordinating units in the network. The number of mediation units for
these coordinating units and the concentration score are as
in Table 30.
The prefectural EOC of Miyagi and the municipal EOC of 206
Sendai, both tried to gather information to the best of their ability. In spite of their significant efforts, they could not obtain a clear picture of the situation. This is partly due to the fact that they had too few outlying agencies and too few radio sets. However, the root reason seemed to be that they failed to develop effective contacts
TABLE 30 CALCULATION OF CONCENTRATION SCORE FOR THE EMERGENCY INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK AFTER THE IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE
thenumberof mediation units (1) In the report couplings:
the prefectural EOC 7 the prefectural headquarter of police 1 the Kawazu town EOC 2 the Higashi Izu town EOC 2
(2) In the direction couplings:
the prefectural EOC 1 the prefectural headquarter of police 1 the Kawazu town EOC 2 the Higashi Izu town EOC 2
The total number of mediation units : 18
The concentration score: 18 / 8 = 2.25
with the prefectural headquarter of police or the fire
department. The system for gathering information from the 207
( 1 ) ( 2 )
(3) (4) (5) ( 6 )
( 10) (7) IHE
(9)
* (1): the prefectural headquarter of police, (2): the prefectural EOC, (3): the police stations, (4): other cities and towns, (5): the municipal EOC (Sendai), (6): the fire department, (7): the headquarter of the quasi voluntary fire squads, (8); the fire stations, (9): the quasi-voluntary fire squads, (10); the police boxes.
** Broken lines show the request or instruction couplings, while solid lines show the report or direction couplings.
*** The units with a single circle are cognition centers and the units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE EMERGENCY PERIOD AFTER THE 1978 MIYAGI KEN OKI EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 32
public and the outpost units is well established for the prefectural headquarter of police and the fire department.
In the emergency period, these systems worked well. The 208 prefectural and the municipal EOCs should have made use of these systems. At any rate, the pattern of interorganizationa1 coordination in the emergency period can be illustrated as shown in Figure 32.
In Figure 32, we identify four cognition centers and two evaluation centers. The prefectural and the municipal
EOCs could not engage in any decision makings in the emergency period. In addition, because of their isolated positioned, as a cognition center, they could not carry out their tasks well. Thus, both of them cannot be regarded as coordinating units. The number of mediation units and the concentration score are as in Table 31.
TABLE 31 CALCULATION OF CONCENTRATION SCORE FOR THE EMERGENCY INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK AFTER THE MIYAGI KEN OKI EARTHQUAKE
the number of (l)In the Report Couplings: mediation units
the prefectural headquarter of 4 police the fire department 1
(2)In the Direction Couplings:
the prefectural headquarter of 4 police the fire department 1
The total number of mediation units: 10
The Concentration Score : 10 / 4 = 2.5 209
In the restoration period, the on-the-spot prefectural
EOC was set up in Kawazu and a ll relevant organizations converged to the on-the-spot EOC. That is to say, the on- the-spot EOC was composed of the prefectural EOC, the Kawazu
town EOC, the Higashi Izu town EOC, the headquarters of the
quasi-voluntary fire squads in both towns, the tentative
local headquarter of police groups, the operation center of
the Self Defense Force, and the like. The representatives of
these organizations were always in the same room. Reports
from their outpost units, whatever the parent organization
might be, reached their representative in the on-the-spot
EOC, and were always shared and processed with other
organizations. Directions were issued by their
representatives in the name of the on-the-spot EOC.
It can be said that the merger of all relevant organizations
was temporarily accomplished in Kawazu town. Therefore,
reports and directions were directly sent to the local
headquarters at the on-the-spot EOC or the outpost units of
all relevant organizations without any mediation units.
Figure 33 delineate the pattern of interorganizationa1
coordination in the restoration period after the 1978 Izu
Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake.
On the other hand, in the restoration period after the
1978 Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake, the prefectural and the
municipal EOCs solved their isolation problems by keeping 210
( 1 ) (3) (4)
( 2 )
(5) (6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)
* (1): the prefectural EOC, (2): the Shimoda branch of the prefectural government, (3): Self Defense Force, (4): the prefectural headquarter of police, (5): the on-the- spot EOC of the prefectural government, (6): the operation center of Self Defense Force, (7); the Kawazu town EOC, (8): the headquarter of the quasi voluntary fire squads in Kawazu town, (9): the Higashi Izu town EOC, (10): the headquarter of the quasi voluntary fire squads in Higashi Izu town, (11): the local headquarter of police groups, (12): the outpost units of all relevant organizations.
** Broken lines show the request or instruction couplings, while solid lines show the report or direction couplings.
*** The units with a single circle are cognition centers and the units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD AFTER THE 1978 IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 33
contacts with the prefectural headquarter of police or the fire department. Based on the information from them, the prefectural and the municipal EOCs began operations of 211 recovery activities. However, their actions were still isolated from other organizations. The prefectural headquarter of police, the fire department, and Self Defense
Force were active but operated independently of others.
Thus, the pattern of interorganizationa1 coordination can be illustrated as shown in Figure 34.
We identify five coordinating units in the pattern.
The number of mediation units and the concentration score are as in Table 32.
TABLE 32 THE NUMBER OF MEDIATION UNITS AND THE CONCENTRATION SCORE
the number of mediation units in report in direction couplings couplings
the prefectural EOC 5 0 the municipal EOC 6 0 the prefectural headquarter of police 4 4 the fire department 1 1 Self Defense Force 0 0 Total Number of Mediation Units 16 5
The Concentration Score = 21 / 10 = 2.1
As summarized in Table 33, a l i t t l e difference can be
found between two patterns in the emergency period. That is,
the pattern after the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake is more
decentralized than the pattern of the Miyagi Ken Oki 212
Earthquake, while both patterns have the almost equal degree of concentration. This reflects the fact that the prefectural and the municipal EOCs in the network after the
Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake could not be a coordinating unit.
( 2 ) (3) ( 1 )
(7) (6 ) im
m ( 12)
( 11)
* (1): the prefectural EOC, (2): the prefectural headquarter of police, (3): Self Defense Force, (4): the municipal EOC, (5): the fire department, (6): other cities and towns, (7): the branch offices of the prefectural government, (8): the police stations, (9): the police boxes, (10): the headquarter of the quasi voluntary fire squads, (11): the quasi-voluntary fire squads, (12): the fire stations.
** Broken lines show the request or instruction couplings, while solid lines show the report or direction couplings.
*** The units with a single circle are cognition centers and the units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION A IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD AFTER THE 1978 MIYAGI KEN OKI EARTHQUAKE FIGURE 34 213
TABLE 33 SUMMARY OF THE FOUR PATTERNS
TheIzu Ohshima TheMiyagi Ken Kinkai Earthquake Oki Earthquake The Emergency Period :
the number of coordinating units 4 2
the concentration score 2.25 2.5
The Restoration Period :
the number of coordinating units 1 5
the concentration score 0 2.1
On the contrary, in the restoration period, the pattern after the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake is much more centralized and concentrated.
(2) The Factors Which Influence the Pattern.
Izu peninsula is famous for being a resort area near
Tokyo. Nowadays, it is also known throughout Japan as "the nest of earthquakes", which means that earthquakes frequently occur one after another. Shizuoka prefecture and the municipal or town governments have enthusiastically devised measures against earthquakes since 1976, when a seismologist read a paper at the meeting of Japan 214
Seismologic Society about the high possibility of the Great
Tokai Earthquake. People in Shizuoka prefecture have been
well trained and preserve the intense consciousness against
earthquakes.
In contrast, in spite of the fact that Miyagi
prefecture had been struck by several earthquakes in the
past, they were retarded in their mitigation efforts. The
citizen in Sendai held the strong belief that Sendai city
was free from earthquake disaters because the land was very
solid. When the Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake occured, the
prefectural and the municipal governments did not know where
the local disaster prevention planning was, in which the
emergency shift of organization, the emergency communication
network, and the like were defined. Taking these
circumstances into consideration, we cannot escape the
conviction that the public and relevant organizations in Izu
area had much more experiences and knowledge than in Sendai
area.
As to the size of interorganizationa 1 network, no
significant difference can be found. The number of private
organizations involved was more in Sendai than in Izu area.
However, those private organizations in Sendai did not
participate in general recovery activities. They mainly took
care of their organizational members who suffered losses.
Certain private organizations such as the electric company. 215 the telephone company, and so on were exceptions. As far as the public organizations are concerned, both disasters involved almost the same number of organizations.
The size of the member organizations is slightly different from each other as shown in Table 34.
TABLE 34 THE SIZE OF RESPECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS
The Izu Ohshima The Miyagi Ken Kinkai Earthquake Oki Earthquake
the prefectural government 2,280 2,500
the municipal or town office 86 4,700
the fire department - 418
the quasi-voluntary fire squads 821 728
the prefectural headquarter of police 91 341
the on-the-spot group of police 269 2,536
Self Defense Force 12,554* 2,025*
* The figures show the total man-power during the emergency and the restoration periods.
As to the degree of task complexity and the variety of
necessary resources, we find it difficult to clealy conclude
anything. In Izu area, most search and rescue activities 216 involved in digging for and finding the victims. Clearing debris and supplying water, food, and shelter are other major activities. On the other hand, in Sendai, in addition to these basic activities, they had to respond to oil leak from a large oil tank in a petroleum plant and to chemical fires. However, in Kawazu town, right after the earthquake, the deposit of slag at Mochikoshi mine company was collapsed and the slag which contained poisonous cyanogen flew out to the Kanogawa river. Since the sources of water supply in several towns were the Kanogawa river, the public health centers in these towns inspected the water with chemists many times. Thus we find only a slight difference between two cases as to the degree of task complexity and variety of necessary resources.
As mentioned earlier, our hypothetical proposition concerning the amount of tasks is that it is positively related to the degree of damages and casualties. Table 35 compares between the degrees of damages and casualties by both earthquakes. From the figures in Table 35, it may be concluded that the amount of tasks after the Miyagi Ken Oki
Earthquake is more than a fte r the Izu Ohshima Kinkai
Earthquake. The amount of tasks after the Miyagi Ken Oki
Earthquake was relatively increased, because their preparation against a disaster was extremely poor.
The greatest difference between the areas exists with 217
TABLE 35 DEGREES OF DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THE IZU OHSHIMA KINKAI EARTHQUAKE AND THE MIYAGI KEN OKI EARTHQUAKE
The Izu Ohshima The Miyagi Ken Kinkai Earthquake Oki Earthquake
the killed 20 13
the fatally injured 25 (0.5 %) 125 (1.5 %)
the injured 112 9,175
the totally 72 715 destroyed houses (1.0 %) (0.3 %)
the partially 3,487 77,276 destroyed houses (48 %) (34 %)
the households 606 2,269 suffered (8.2 %) (1.0 %)
fires 0 8
the broken points on the roads 869 844
the broken bridges 2 95
* The percentages in parentheses are to the total population or to the total number of households in the area.
regard to the degree of urbanization. Sendai is the prefecture! capital and the largest city in the northern part of Japan. Izu area is only a small hot-spring resort.
Both towns in Izu area have no national or prefectural level of organization. On the contrary, most of the national organizations have a branch in Sendai. Private organizations 218 also have branches in Sendai, too. In this way, Sendai became the center of p o litic a l and economic a c tiv itie s in the northern part of Japan.
The number of establishments, shown in Table 36, provides supporting evidence for the difference.
TABLE 36 THE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS
The number of: Izu area Sendai
Establishments 1,874 33,736 Manufacturers 218 1,876 Retailers 886 8,539 Large-scale Retailers 3 65 Banks 4 170
As to community properties. Table 37 provides us with more comparative and comprehensive description. These are major differences in the two cases.
The other major difference is in the scope of impact.
The damages and c a s u a ltie s by the Izu Ohshima Kinkai
Earthquake were concentrated in the towns of Kawazu and
Higashi Izu, while the Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake affected broader areas involving other five cities and towns. In fact, in Miyagi prefecture, six cities and towns were applied to the Disaster Relief Act by the prefectural government, while these were only two towns that the Act was 219
TABLE 37 COMMUNITY PROPERTIES
Community Properties Izu Area Sendai
Population 27,096** 642,489 The Number of Households 7,316 226,233
P o litical A small The prefectural Characteristic community capital
Economic A fishing The central Characteristic village and business district a hot-spring in the northern resort. half of Japan.
Distribution of Labor Forces into the Primary, the 42:15:43 2:22:76 Secondary, and the Tertiary Industry
* The figures are based on the data of the 1980 Census and of the 1978 Census of Industry. **The figure shows the total number in both towns of Kawazu and Higashi Izu.
applied to by the prefectural government.
Our discussions on the pattern in the restoration period and the factors are summarized in Table 38. This table enables us to indicate some findings with respect to our hypotheses.
Both cases contradict each other when a comparison is made between the patterns in the emergency period and in the restoration period. That is, the pattern in the emergency period after the Izu Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake is a little 220
TABLE 38 THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION AND SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE IT
The Izu Ohshima The Miyagi Ken Kinkai Earthquake Oki Earthquake
Pattern of Inter- the centralized- the decentralized- organizational concentrated ' diffused type. Coordination type.
Experience and Knowledge elaborated poor
The size of Inter- organizational same same Network
The Average Size of Member same same Organizations
The Task Complexity lower a little higher a little
The Variety of Necessary lower a little higher a little Resources
The Amount of Tasks small large
Organizational Complexity low high
Urbanization not urbanized urbanized
The Speed of Onset - -
Predictability - -
The Scope of Impact narrow wide 221 more decentralized and diffused than the pattern in the restoration period. In contrast, the pattern in the emergency period after the Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake is a
littl e more centralized and concentrated than the pattern in
the restoration period. This seems to reflect the fact that neither the prefectural nor the municipal governments in
Miyagi functioned as defined in the local disaster
prevention planning after the disaster, especially in the
emergency period.
Our hypothesis on the relationship between the amount
of experiences and knowledge and the pattern of
interorganizationa1 coordination was partly supported. That
is, the hypothesis was supported in the dimension of
centralization/decentralization, while it was not in the
dimension of concentration/diffusiveness. So far as these
two cases are concerned, the amount of experiences and
knowledge was negatively associated with the degree of
diffusiveness.
Our hypotheses on the relationships between the pattern
of interorganizationa1 coordination and the degree of task
complexity or the variety of necessary resources were
supported. However, the differences in the degree of task
complexity and in the variety of necessary resources were
not large enough to strongly support the hypotheses.
The hypotheses on the amount of tasks, the degree of 222 organizational complexity, and the scope of impact were respectively supported by these two cases. That is, each of them was positively related to the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness.
The relationship of the degree of urbanization with the pattern of interorganizational coordination was most clearly delineated, and our hypothesis with regard to the relationship was supported. CHAPTER VII
A STUDY ON THREE TYPHOON AND FLOOD DISASTERS
1. THE NAGASAKI DISASTER BY TORRENTIAL RAIN
(1) Backgrounds and the Disaster.
Nagasaki city is one of famous historic cities in
Japan. From 1616 A.D. to 1854 A.D., for two hundred and thirty eight years, Japan had closed her door to foreigners.
During the seclusion period, there had been two places of temporary residence for foreigners in Japan. One of the places had been Nagasaki. The other historical event in
Nagasaki is the atomic bombing in 1945. These historical facts have impressed people that Nagasaki is peaceful and international, as well as historical, and made the city a well-known sightseeing spot. Figure 35 gives the geographical description of Nagasaki.
Nagasaki city is the prefectural capital, and the center of economy and culture of Nagasaki Prefecture.
Moreover, several nation-wide companies of shipbuildings, fisheries, and electrical manufacturings are located in the city. This, combined with the fact that the city is among the three largest trade ports in Japan, assigns an important
223 224
Tsushima Islands zuhara
Fukuoka Prefecture
Saga Prefecture
Sasebo'--.
Kumamoto o Oseto, O Ohmura Prefecture
Isahi
aki
♦Broken lines show the prefectural borders.
NAGASAKI PREFECTURE FIGURE 35 225 role in Japan to Nagasaki city. The city ranks twenty-first in population among over 600 cities. Geographically,
Nagasaki prefecture is characterized by the relatively large
portion of mountaneous areas, scattered islands, and Rias
coasts. Nagasaki city is famous for a Rias coast and
residential areas stretched on the slope up to the tops of
mountains or scattered amid the mountains.
Major disasters which struck Nagasaki in the past were
mostly caused by typhoons and torrential rains in the rainy
season. The most severe, and therefore, famous disaster in
the prefecture is the Flood disaster in Isahaya city next to
Nagasaki city. The flood caused by 587 milimeters of
torrential rain fell upon Isahaya city on the 25th of July
in 1957. The flood carried away 1,564 houses and 519 lives.
However, in Nagasaki city, no damages and casualties were
recorded at this time. The other famous disaster was caused
by the localized torrential downpour on the 9th of July in
1967. The torrential downpour of 145.5 milimeters per hour
(12:12 pm to 1:12 pm) struck Sasebo city, 55 kilometers
north of Nagasaki city, and killed 50 persons. In addition
to these, the prefecture had two other large-scale flood
disasters after the war. One was on the 11th of September in
1948, and killed 118 citizens in Sasebo city. The other was
on the 14th of April in 1955, and killed 83 persons.
On the 23rd of July in 1982, it rained s lig h tly 226 throughout the day. However, Izuhara meteorological station, which is located at Tsushima Island, recorded 64 milimeters rain per hour due to a precipitation cloud, and issued a heavy rain and flood warning at 2:20 pm. Since the precipitation cloud was moving toward Nagasaki area, the
Nagasaki meteorological observatory issued the heavy rain and flood warning in Nagasaki area at 4:50 pm. In spite of the warning, Nagasaki city had only a slight rain in the evening of the day. The issued warning was automatically sent to the organizations concerned, such as the prefectural government office, the municipal government office, the municipal fire department, the prefectural headquarter of police, the broadcasting coorporations, and the like. Since it had to be issued before five o'clock which is the closing time of work in most organizations, Nagasaki meteorological observatory made a decision to issue the warning in spite of such a slight rain in Nagasaki.
This warning was the fifth warning of heavy rain and flood in July. In addition, the observatory had issued 20 precautionary warnings of heavy rain, flood, storm, and the
like for ten days from the 10th to the 20th of July.
However, none of these warnings was followed by a disaster.
This made organizational officials and the public pay less
attention to the warning. The quantity of precipitation
in the evening of the day drastically increased as shown in 227
Figure 36. If we know the standard of issuing a warning defined by the Meteorological Agency, as shown in Table 39 we can easily understand how extraordinary the quantity of precipitation which Nagasaki had in the evening of the day.
Actual damages such as submergence of roads and houses, washing-away of automobiles, and the like occurred after
Quantity of precipitation per h o u r ______
5:00 pm - 6:00 pm (15 mm)
6:00 pm - 7:00 pm (27 mm) = - 7:00 pm - 8:00 pm ■■ (115 mm)
8:00 pm - 9:00 pm (98 mm)
9:00 pm - 10:00 pm r (102 mm)
10:00 pm - 11:00 pm (61 mm)
11:00 pm - 12:00 am (29 mm) Total quantity of precipitation for six hours. 447 milimeters
THE QUANTITY OF PRECIPITATION IN NAGASAKI IN JULY, 1982 FIGURE 36
7:00 pm. At about 8:00 pm, sveral rivers in the city
overflowed. The flooded water reached a height of 4 feets or
so and washed away 32 lives in the heart of the city.
Damages and casualties in Nagasaki city are summarized in 228
TABLE 39 THE STANDARDS OF ISSUING THE WARNINGS
the precautionary the warning warning the quantity of precipitation over 90 mm. over 150 mm. for 24 hours. the quantity of precipitation over 60 mm. over 100 mm. for 3 hours. the quantity of precipitation over 30 mm. over 50 mm. per hour.
TABLE 40 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THE TORRENTIAL RAIN IN NAGASAKI IN JULY, 1982
(1)Casualties. The killed ...... 267 The missing ...... 5 The fatally injured ...... 13 The injured ...... 741
(2)Damages. Totally destroyed houses ...... 447 Partially destroyed houses ...... 1,081 Houses flooded above floor....14,704
(3)Amount of loss. Loss in agriculture and forestry ...442,035,506.- (US$175,148.00) Loss in fishery ...... 41,922,427. (US$8,010.00) Loss in commerce and manufacturing..485,676,173. (US$356,984.00) Loss in public fa c ilitie s...... 430,778,967. (US$128,245.00) 229
Table 40. Among these damages ' and casualties, special note should be made of the damages to autom obiles, and to casualties caused by the landslides. In the heart of the city, over 1,700 cars were damaged by flooded water: 319 cars were washed away, and 1,393 cars were p a r tia lly damaged. Some drivers were carried away in their cars by the flood water.
As mentioned earlier, Nagasaki is famous for the slopes and they are thought as fascinating just like in San
Francisco. However, residential areas stretched on the slopes up to the top of mountains are extremely prone to landslides. In fact, most damages and casualties were caused by landslides in Nagasaki city. These landslides also broke the tra ffic and communication networks, so that recovery activities were made extremely difficult. The torrential rain caused 500 landslides in Nagasaki area, and, 41 landslides among them caused the to ll of 230 lives, which occupies 88 percent of the total t o ll by the torrential rain. Major spots of landslides are as shown in Figure
37.
(2) Organizational Responses.
The warning issued at 4:50 pm was responded in a "for
form sake" fashion. Most organizations formally took
necessary measures defined in the disaster prevention
1 230
<0 Nagasaki • CO C ity CO • C6) C?) • C4)
(24)
/•(y) •O)
1 : Nagasaki Station 2 ; Nagasaki Municipal Office 3 : Nagasaki Prefectural Office • : Places of landslides Numerals in parentheses show the number of the killed.
Source: Mimeographed data provided by Nagasaki Fire Department.
NAGASAKI CITY AND SPOTS OF LANDSLIDES FIGURE 37 231 plannings. However, as symbolized by the fact that only two officials in the municipal office reluctantly engaged in disaster-relevant activities at that time, it is clear most could not imagine that the torrential rains would result in a major disaster.
In the municipal office, the chief director of general affairs department, who is in charge of disaster prevention a c tiv itie s, was going to go home at about 6:00 pm. At about
7:00 pm, telephone calls from the citizens alerted them to
the fact that something was happening in the city. At that
time, approximately 10 o ffic ia ls in the department of
general affairs were still working in their office. The
deputy mayor came back to the municipal office at about 7:30
pm, and reported the disastrous situation in the city.
However, the mayor, who should have issued the order of
establishing the municipal emergency operation center(the
municipal EOC), was absent and nobody knew where he could be
located. The deputy mayor and the chief directorof general
affairs department, instead of the mayor, made a decision at
8:30 pm to set up the muncipal EOC.
The municipal EOC concentrated their efforts on the
following four activities. First, they tried to mobilize
their officials by telephone. However, the disruption or congestion of the public telephone system made this task
very d ifficu lt. Second, they tried to open up a ll of the 232 designated shelters. However, victims had already evacuated to the planned shelters or other places before officials took action. It is estimated that 485 victims were in the designated shelters and 572 victims were in other places by about 8:30 pm. Third, the o fficials said they issued an evacuation order and tried to notify citizens. Many reports in the mass media indicate that no evacuation order was
issued by the municipal EOC, but the municipal office insist
that they did. According to a municipal official, the chief
director of the department of general affairs realized that
the tide in Nagasaki Bay was fu ll at 10:35 pm on the day
and that it would cause floods as in the past. At 8:50 pm,
he decided to issue the evacuation order for the citizens
living along major rivers in the city. Although they had
several municipal cars equipped with loud speaker, only the
one car was sent out to give the evacuation order. Moreover,
it was about 10:00 pm when the car equipped with loud
speaker was driven out. At that time, most rivers in the
city had already flooded and most people had already
evacuated. Probably this is a reason why mass media reported
that no evacuation order was issued.
The fourth activity taken by the municipal EOC was to
gather information on the situation in the city. However, in
addition to the broken network of communication, the
municipal EOC was physically isolated by the flood water. 233
Thus, because of lacks of o fficials and information, the municipal EOC could do almost nothing on the 23rd of July.
After the next day, the municipal EOC enaged in various recovery activities. Since such activities as search and rescue at the spots of landslides were beyond the ability of the municipal EOC, their activities were limited to such a c tiv itie s as supplying food, water, clothing, temporary
housing facilities, or cleaning up the debris so as to
prevent epidemics.
The municipal fire department, whose headquarter is at
a distance of one kilometer or less from the municipal
office, established their own EOC at the same time when they
received the warning. However, as mentioned above, they also
failed to recognize that the warning was a forecast of a
major disaster. The communication center of the fire
department received a large volume of information from the
citizens through the emregency c all "number 119." The
emergency c alls from citizens began increasing at around
7:00 pm, and the to tal number of emergency c a lls reached
1,140 by 2:00 am on the 24th of July.
Responding to the information, a l l fire squads were
dispatched to the spots of landslides or flooded areas. The
total number of firemen dispatched on the 23rd of July was
2,240, eighty percent of which was the quasi-voluntary
firemen. However, this does not mean that the formal fire 234 forces were less available at that time. Rather, their efforts to mobilize the full members were very effective and almost all staffs and firemen were available at about 7:30
pm. The major a c tiv itie s they engaged in were to provide
aids for evacuation and for search and rescue.
On the 24th of July, the fire department EOC, obtaining
reinforcements from the neighbouring cities or towns,
decided to devote their efforts mainly to the areas most
severely struck by landslides.
Nagasaki prefectural office established their
pre-emergency operation center right after the warning
issued by Izuhara meteorological station at 2:20 pm. The
pre-emergency operation center is prescribed in the disaster
prevention planning. It states it should be established when
a disaster is expected, e.g., when the warning is issued.
According to the regulation, the pre-emergency operation
center is to notify other relevant organizations such as the
Self Defence Force, the prefectural headquarter of police,
the Red Cross, and the local meteorological observatory that
they established the pre-emergency operation center.
Actually, this was the only activity they undertook. At 4:50
pm, they received the warning from the Nagasaki local
meteorological observatory, but they did nothing special. It
was only at 7:00 pm when they took the firs t action. That
is, right after they confirmed information on the situation 235 in Oseto town, they recognized that a major disaster was inevitable. From 7:00 pm to 8:00 pm, the pre-emergency operation center instructed all of their local offices and the municipal or town offices about mobilizing resources and officials, issuing an evacuation order, and providing aids for evacuees.
At 8:30 pm, when they received the information that 60 people were isolated and in a critical condition in Oseto town, they decided to transform the pre-emergency operation center into an, emergency operation center, which is prescribed to be set up when a large-scale disaster actually occurs or is expected. On their setting up the prefectural
EOC, they sent one o fficial to serve as a messenger at the
prefectural headquarter of police. At 9:26 pm, in order to
deal with the flood water in Oseto town, they asked Maritime
Self Defense Force at Sasebo to rescue the citizens in the
town. At 9:40 pm, responding to the request by the Nagasaki
municipal EOC, the prefectural officials made a request for
help to the 16th regiment of the Ground Self Defense Force
stationed at Ohmura.
At about noon on the next day, the prefectural EOC held
the first meeting which involved the police EOC and the 16th
regiment of the Ground Self Defense Force. Up to this time,
the prefectural EOC was also operationally isolated, since
they almost totally depended on the police EOC for gathering 236 information. The meeting, however, did not result in other or regular meetings thereafter. The prefectural police
EOC also established a pre-emergency operation center at
2:20 pm when Izuhara meteorological station issued the first warning. The pre-emergency operation center was composed of
15 officials at the prefectural headquarter of police.
However, since the rain in the early evening was slight and nobody could expect a disaster under the situation, they took no measure against a disaster. At 4:50 pm, when the warning was issued by Nagasaki local meteorological observatory, the pre-emergency operation center was transformed into a second-rank emergency operation center and was composed of 35 officials. In response to the warning and the establishment of the second-rank emergent operation center at the headquarter, a ll police stations in Nagasaki city made pre-emergency dispositions for preparing against a disaster. Each police station, following the directions from the headquarter, prepared by mobilizing all policemen and officials, and dispatching police officers to several places in the city.
The first information about landslides which came in the prefectural headquarter of police was from Hirado city.
After 7:00 pm, the information on overflowing of the rivers in the city came in one after another via the emergency telephone call "number 110". Judging from what they heard in 237 these c a lls, the prefectural o ffic ia ls transformed the second-rank emergency operation center into an emergency operation center (the prefectural police EOC) at 7:30 pm. It was manned by 98 officials at the headquarter. Every police station in the city followed the same procedure. After setting up the prefectural police EOC, officials dispatched the riot squads for rescue activities in several places. At about 7:40 pm, the police officers who had already been dispatched to several places in the city engaged stated to instruct citizens to evacuate and otherwise to provide other help. All police cars available at that time were mobilized to help in notifying the citizens of an evacuation order which was independently issued by the prefectural police
EOC.
On the 23rd and the 24th of July, the prefectural
police EOC and the police stations mobilized 1,713 policemen
and officials, and engaged in (l)providing aids for the
citizens to evacuate, (2)search and rescue, and (3)traffic
control. Especially, at around 8:00 pm, when the number of
evacuees reached the peak, all of these activities were
combined in a serial task. The prefectural police EOC also
accommodated, in their office, about 200 citizens who had
been caught on the way back to their homes, and sent rescued
people to safe places which were not necessarily the
designated shelter. 238
Responses by the police EOC can be summarized as shown in Table 41.
TABLE 41 RESPONSES BY THE POLICE EOC IN NAGASAKI '
Events Responses by the police EOC July,23 14:20 the warning by the pre-emergency operation Izuhara meteoro center. logical station. 16:50 The warning by The secondary-rank pre Nagasaki meteoro emergency operation center. logical observatory Directions topolice stations to prepare against a disaster. 17:15 Information on the landslides in Hirado. 18:00 Increase of rainfall in Nagasaki city. 19:03 Information on over flows in the northern part of the city. 19:13 Information on over flows at the heart of the city. 19:30 The police EOC. Directions to police stations to set up the branch of the police EOC at each station. Direction to riot squads to be dispatched. 19:40 Break-down of electric power. 20:00 Large-scale Search and rescue at the landslides at the heart of the city. eastern part of the city. Release of an evacuation order by the police EOC. 239 Table 41 (Continued)
20:30 Break-down of Request to broadcasting telephone network. companies to put the evacuation order on the a ir. 21:00 Large-scale land The frequency of emergency slides at the heart calls "number 110" of the city. reached the peak. 22:00 Directions to relevant police stations and boxes to respond to or deal with the telephone c alls from the citizens. Search and rescue at the heart of the city. 23:00 Request to Nagasaki Local Maritime Safety Headquarter to be dispatched. July, 24 5:00 Request to the police of other prefectures to help. Survey of traffic and roads' conditions. Instructions to the public not to use a car. (Continued up to July,29.) July, 25 Instructions to establish ments not to use a car. (Continued up to July,29.) Search and rescue at some areas stricken by land slides.
It to rren tially rained in Ohmura, where the 16th
regiment of the Ground Self Defense Force is stationed. Host
of the soldiers in the 16th regiment expected that they were
goin to bedispatched somewhere, and spontaneously met
together at the post. Thus, over sixty per cent of them were
ready to be dispatched. On receiving the request from the
prefectural EOC at 9:40 pm, officers formally ordered the 240 soldiers to prepare for moving out. At 10:15 pm, the regiment sent a reconnoitering party out to assess the
traffic conditions. On the basis of the information provided
by the reconnoitering party, officers decided at 10:56 pm to
send 230 soldiers and 27 vihicles to Nagasaki City.
Thereafter, other military personnels were sent to Nagasaki.
At about 2:00 am, on the 24th of July, these troops began
engaging in search and rescue activities in the northern
part of Nagasaki city independently of other organizations.
At 8:50 am, on the 24th of July, the main-force unit
composed of 333 soldiers and 42 vihicles under the command
of the regimental commander le ft Ohmura for Nagasaki, and
they arrived at the northern part of Nagasaki at about 11:30
am. The commander and his staff went to the prefectural EOC
in order to obtain further information and discuss about
allocation strategies. Based on the discussion, they decided
to sent several units to other stricken areas at the heart
or in the eastern part of the city.
The 16th regiment established the command post in the
northern part of the city, where they began search and
rescue activities first, and set up their information center
at the prefectural EOC.
They continuously engaged in search and rescue
activities up to the 31st of July. The total number of
working days was nine, the total man-days were 6,691, and 241 the total nubmer of vihicles was 839.
(3)Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination.
The recovery process in the Nagasaki disaster are shown in Table 42.
TABLE 42 RECOVERY PROCESS AFTER THE NAGASAKI DISASTER
from to The warning period : 2:20 pm, July,23 8:30 pm, July,23
The emergency period : 7:00 pm, July,23 0:00 pm, July,24
The restoration period : 0:00 am, July,24 July,31
The warning period started with the warning issued by the Izuhara meteorological station at 2:20 pm on the 23rd of
July. The warning by Nagasaki meteorological observatory followed the firs t warning. However, when these warnings were issued, the situation in Nagasaki was quite normal.
Among the citizens and organizations there existed no consciousness of danger. The increased ra in fa ll at about
6:00 or 7:00 pm indicated possible dangers. Thus, it may be
said that the actual warning period began at 6:00 pm or 7:00
pm. However, the major organizations which were supposed to
coordinate or assume the leadership of an ION, e.g., the
municipal and the prefectural governments, were not yet 242 conscious of the dangers. Their establishments of EOCs at
7:30 pm and at 8:30 pm are regarded as the beginning of the formal consciousness of the danger. This may be the beginning of the restoration period. However, the situation was exremely disordered at that time, and therefore, it was s t i l l at the end of the warning period or in the beginning of the emergency period.
The emergency period began at the time when the
citizens took responsive actions. It was at about 6:00 pm or
7:00 pm that they did so, as mentioned above. It ended at
about noon on the 24th of July, when most organizations were
system atically introduced into the scene. Since other
organizations such as the police EOC, the fire department.
Ground Self Defense Force, the electric power company, the
telephone company, and the like had already been in action
before the noon of the day, it may be said that the
restoration period began earlier than at 0:00 am, on the
24th of July. However, it was at about 0:00 am that the
relevant organizations participated in search and rescue
activities in the most severely stricken area in the eastern
part of the city. Thus, we regard it as the beginning of the
restoration period.
It should be noted that the emergency period of this
disaster is relatively longer than that in the cases of
earthquake. This may be due to the difference of 243 characteristics of disaster agent. The speed of onset and predictability are quite different between flood or typhoon and earthqauke. In the case of flood and typhoon, the speed of onset is usually more gradual and predictability is usually higher than in the case of earthquake. This implies the following two things. On the one hand, the gradual onset means that a l l damages and casualties do not occur at the almost same time but are induced here and there at several different time points. This makes it difficult that all organizations would simultaneously realize the degree of overall disaster. In addition, since flood and typhoon disasters have relatively higher predictability, organizations tend to followthe situation so as to form a clear view of developments. Thus, it can be said that it is difficult for organizations to decide the timing of their activation. These two things may contribute to the fact
that the duration of the emergency period is longer in
typhoons or flood disasters than in earthquake disasters.
Both of the prefectural and municipal EOCs were forced
to operate in somewhat isolatation. The municipal EOC
actually decided nothing on the 23rd of July except issuing
an evacuation order, which, however, was made in a highly
i s o l a t e d c o n d itio n . The same was tru e for o th er
organizations, too. For example, the Ground Self Defense
Force enagaged in search and rescue a c tiv itie s in the 244 northern part of the city, because they accidentally encountered the disastrous scenes caused by overflows and landslides at those locations, and not because they were instructed to operate at the place by someone. Thereafter, they established their own command post at that place distant from the prefectural or the municipal EOCs, and decided their strategies or tactics by themselves.
The police EOC and the fire department, though both of them made almost a monopoly of information on the disaster, were also very busy responding to emergency calls of "number
110 or 119" or to reports and requests from their local stations or boxes scattered around in the city. As a result, they made their decisions on their activities by themselves with less contacts with other organizations, and l i t t l e information was shared with other organizations.
In the emergency period, the interorganizational network established for information gathering was characterized by the higher degree of deffuiveness.
Decisions as to the issue of the evacuation order were also made in the highly decentralized fashion. The municipal EOC, the prefectural EOC, the police EOC and the fire department respectively issued the evacuation order without any consultation with one another.
In the restoration period, the network of the report-request couplings or of the direction-instruction 245 couplings became a liitle less diffused, as shown in Figure
44. Self Defense Force discussed about their strategies or tactics for search and rescue activities with the
prefectural EOC at around the noon on the 24th of July. This
shows that the prefectural EOC and Self Defense Force came
into the concerted decision making. The police EOC and the
fire department respectively exchanged messengers with the
prefectural and the municipal EOCs for several times on the
24th of July. However, they were s till independently making
decisions. Thus, although decisions as to the search and
rescue activities, supplying water, and the like were also
made a l i t t l e more centralized fashion in comparison with
those in the emergency period, it was s till in the shape of
the decentralized network. 2. DISASTERS CAUSED BY THE TYPHOON NO.10 IN 1982
Typhoon No.10 in 1982 passed across the central part of Japan as shown in Figure 38. When the typhoon reached
Atsumi Peninsula at midnight on the 2nd of August, the barometer registered 973 millibars and its power was gradually weakening. However, since it was accompanied by winds of 25 meters per second or more and torrential rains, twenty seven prefectures were seriously affected. Among the seriously affected prefectures were Mie, Nara, Osaka, Gunma, and Yamanashi. Table 43 summarizes the damages and casualties caused by Typhoon No.10 in 1982. In this chapter, two local communities stricken by Typhoon No.10 in 1982 are discussed.
l.The Case of Misugi-Mura.
(1) Backgrounds and the Disaster.
Misugi-mura is located at the western edge of the central portion of Mie prefecture, and consists of seven villages segregated by timbered mountains from each other, the whole of which are also isolated amid mountains from other areas. It comprises a population of 11,408. When the seven villages were integrated into Misugi-mura in 1955, the
Mura had a population of 17,212 souls. Since then, it is
continuously losing population. The deminution of population
246 247
TABLE 43 OVERALL DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY TYPHOON NO.10 IN 1982
killed missing injured destroyed land prefecture houses slides
Akita 3 21 Yamagata 5 205 Fukushima 3 10 Tochigi 18 4 Gunma 3 2 27 9,329 379 Saitama 4 1 4 1,275 30 Chiba 2 98 4 Tokyo 5 137 15 Kanagawa 6 1 10 703 23 Niigata 2 14 16 Nagano 4 7 1,975 73 Yamanashi 6 17 1,622 275 Shizuoka 1 3 1,871 115 Aichi 3 269 14 Gifu 1 6 Mie 19 5 15 5,596 502 Ishikawa 3 55 Fukui 564 25 Shiga 855 56 Kyoto 1 931 184 Osaka 8 2 6,489 118 Hyogo 1 1 3 285 35 Nara 10 3 8 4,663 362 Wakayama 1 1,077 16 Tokushima 3 Tottori 11 2 Okayama 1 Toyama 33 Total 67 14 132 38,109 2,042 * "Injured" includes the both numbers of the fatally injured and the injured. ** "Destroyed houses" includes the followings, e.g., the numbers of totally destroyed houses, partially destroyed houses, houses flooded abo.ve floor, houses flooded below floor, and damages of public and private buildings. *** Source: Hiroshi Takahashi ed.,Flood Disaster Caused by the Typhoon 82-10 and their Impacts on the Socio-economic Activities (1982) 248
Nagoya
Typhoon No.10
Tsu O HisaiO
Nie Prefecture
MISUGI AND THE TYPHOON NO.10 FIGURE 38 249 is remarkable especially in a youth population from fifteen to twenty-nine of age. In fact,- the number of the youths decreased to half of that in 1955. Misugi-Mura is one of depopulated areas where a relative increase of an old-age population and a shortage of young labor forces become more serious. Figure 39 illustrates a geographical position and spacial structure of Misugi-mura.
The major industry in Misugi-Mura is agriculture and forestry. Approximately eighty seven per cent of the area in
Misugi-mura is under forest. The number of farming families
is beyond the half of the total number of households in
Misugi-Mura. Commerce and manufacturing are minor in this
area, though there are 63 small manufacturers of wooden
products, 108 retail stores of groceries, and some others.
However, because of unimproved network of roads and
railways, the productivity in these industries is very low.
Misugi-Mura experienced several disasters by typhoon
and torren tial rain. Among them, the 1959 disaster by
Typhoon Ise Bay, the 1972 disaster by Typhoon No.20, and the
1974 disaster by a torrential rain are noticeable in their
resulted damages and casualties. Table 44 shows the damages
and casualties by these disasters.
At 9:20 pm, on the 31st of July in 1982, Tsu local
meteorological observatory issued a torrential rain and
flood watch. At 12:45 pm on the next day, they issued a 250
To Hisai
Kimigam YachiU) q Dam
(5)
I Taroo Shimonokawa
“Nara Prefecture OTake
Isechi Ikitsu station
Misugi Mura
: Meisho Line of Japan National Railways. O : Villages 2S. : The control office of the Kimigano Dam. (1) ; Mura Office (2) : Misugi Police Station (3) : The Agricultural Coorperative (4) : The Forestry Association (5) : The Haedquarter of the Quasi-Vo 1 untar y Fire Squads ♦Broken lines show the prefectural border.
MISUGI MURA FIGURE 39 251 torrential and flood warning to the areas. In Misugi-mura, rainfall became heavier after 1:00 pm, on the 1st of August, as shown in Table 41. At 4:00 pm on the 1st of August, a land slide occurred in Yachi village, so that the v illage was physically isolated from other villages. At 6:15 pm, the
TABLE 44 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES BY THREE DISASTERS IN THE PAST
Year of Disaster 1959 1972 1974 Casualties. the killed 12 0 4 the fatally injured 3 0 7 the injured 60 0 25 Damages. the totally destroyed houses 55 ■ 0 7 the partially destroyed houses 84 1 11 the houses flooded above floor 100 7 42 landslides 1,000 146 220 water level of the Kumode river went above the dangerous watermark and, after 7:00 pm, several rivers overflowed. At about that time, landslides occurred at several areas so that roads and houses were crushed. It was at about 1:00 am on the 2nd of August that these disastrous events terminated, and was at 3:38 am that Tsu local meteorological observatory transformed the warning back into the watch. Damages and casualties are summarized in Table
45. 252
TABLE 45 DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES IN MISUGI-MURA BY TYPHOON NO.10 IN 1982
Casualties, the killed ...... 1 the fatally injured ...... 1 the injured ...... 17
Damages. the totally destroyed houses ...... 17 the partially destroyed houses ...... 41 the houses flooded above floor ...... 96 landslides ...... 521 the broken spots of roads ...... 854 the broken spots of embankments... 404
Amount of Loss. Agricultural facilities...... ^1,545, 000.- (US$6,438.00) Forestry facilities ...... Hi,305,600.- (US$5,440.00) Public fa cilities...... ^15,582,105.- (US$64,925.00) Loss in products ...... H921,200.- (US$3,838.00)
(2) Organizational Responses.
The summer fe stiv al was scheduled at a river beach of
Kumode river for Sunday, the 1st of August. At night on the previous day, officials of Misugi-mura felt convinced that the festival would be called off owing to the torrential rain at that night. The next morning, eight o fficia ls were in the Mura office to deal with several problems resulting from the calling-off.
They established the Mura emergency operation c e n t e r ( t h e Mura EOC) r ig h t a f t e r the Tsu lo c a l 253 meteorological observatory issued the warning at 12:45 pm on the 1st of August. At the outset, the Mura EOC was composed of these eight officials and no actions for mobilizing other o fficia ls were taken. Eight o ffic ia ls communicated with their branch offices located in each village by means of cable telephones, and gathered information on the typhoon and rainfalls through facsimile transmission from the prefectural office. Judging from the information gathered, they issued the first evacuation order through the cable telephones and the administrative radio network at 3:00 pm.
When they received the information on landslides occurred in
Yachi village, they issued the second evacuation order at
4:30 pm. The second evacuation order instructed all citizens
to evacuate, while the first one was only for residents at
some dangerous areas. The Tsu local meteorological
observatory issued the storm warning at 4:45 pm. Responding
to the warning, they transformed the Mura EOC into the
higher rank EOC. By this transformation, the Mura EOC bacame
composed of a ll relevant officials of the Mura office, three
leaders of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, some
representatives from the Mura assembly, and one messenger
from the police station.
Because the water level of the Kumode river went over
the dangerous watermark at 6:15 pm, they further transformed
the Mura EOC into the highest rank EOC at 7:16 pm, which 254 involved all officials of the Mura office and all members of the quasi-voluntary fire squads. Right after the transformation, they instructed their branches and the quasi-voluntary fire squads to accomplish a speedy and complete evacuation of all residents in the Mura. The
shelters were chosen by the respective branch or the quasi
voluntary fire squad in each village.
The Mura EOC called the first meeting at 2:00 am on the
2nd of August in order to discuss mobilization of foods and
cloths, and recovery activities of life-line functions such
as electric power supply, telephone network, and the like.
The attendants were the Mura headman, other executives of
the Mura, leaders of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, and
representatives from such organizations as the police
station, the agricultural cooperative, the forestry
association, an e lec tric power company, and a telephone
company. Since the warning was cancelled and transformed to the
watch at 3:38 am on the 2nd of August, and the situation was
relatively calmed down, the Mura EOC was re-formed back into
the second rank EOC at 6:00 am. However, activ ities of
providing the injured with medical cares were still
continued mainly by the quasi-voluntary fire squads. In the
morning on the 3rd of August, the prefectural government
sent eight officials to the Mura and established the on-the- 255 spot emergency operation center of the prefecture in the
Mura office. The Mura EOC, via the prefectural on-the-spot
EOC, reported the degree of damages and casualties in the
Mura and requested foods and cloths for evacuees and the manpower available for reconstructing roads and embankments of rivers.
From the early morning on the 4th of August, the Mura
EOC began supplying drinking water at several areas. At 2:00 pm, the electric power supply was completely recovered. At
4:00 pm foods and other relief items were transported by
helicopters of Self Defense Force and of an electric company
to the Mura from the prefectural EOC. At 5:00 pm, the
telephone network was mostly reconstructed.
2. The Case of Umegashima Area.
(1) Backgrounds and the Disaster.
Umegashima is a part of Shizuoka city. However, the
area is at 35 kilometers distance from the downtown of the
city. In addition, the area had been an independent Mura
before 1969. Geographically, the area is surrounded by
mountains and separated from other areas of the city. These
facts make the area the almost self-governed region. The
Abegawa river flows through the center of the area from
north to south. The only bus route and nine v illages lie
along the riv e r. As of 1970, Umegashima contains 915 256 population and 260 households. Just like in Misugi-mura, the population has d rastically decreased during these twenty
years. In fact, the 1,070 population is only three fifths of
the 1965 population. Umegashima is also a ty p ic a l
depopulated area where the relative increase of the old-age
population and the decrease of the young labor forces become
serious.
Major industries in the area are agriculture, forestry,
and tourist industry. Japanese horseradish, mushroom, green
tea leaves are major agricultural products in the area. The
northern depth of the area is famous for hot spa. Eighteen
hot-spring hotels accepted approximately 276,000 tourists in
1970. However, the major pubic facilities such as schools,
the branch of the city government, the post office, the
police box, the agriculatural cooperative, and the like are
located at the southern part of the area, which is the
entrance to the area from the heart of the city.
The area experienced several typhoons in the past. The
disaster caused by the 1959 Ise-Bay Typhoon was the largest
one. No casualty was recorded, but more than 30 landslides
occurred in the area at that time. The landslides made the
area completely isolated for approximately one week. Through
this experience, the residents became mentally tough against
a disaster.
From the late evening on the 31st of July in 1982, a 257 torrential rain started as shown in Figure 40. After 8:00 am on the 1st of August, collapses of several portions of the bus route were successively reported. The electricity was cut off at about 10:30 am, and the telephone network was broken down at about 12:20 pm. At about 5:30 am on the 2nd of August, the southern portion of the bus route, extending over 70 meters, crumbled down into the Abegawa river, so that
Time The Amount of Precipitation
July 31, 21:00
August 1, 6:00
(161) 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 (160) 24:00 August 2, 1: 00 2:00
5:00
11:00
* Source: Pluviometrical data by the Umegashima police box. Figure 6-3 in Yasumasa Yamamoto, " A Typhoon Disaster and an Isolated Community" in Hiroshi Takahashi ed.. Flood Disasters Caused by the Typhoon 8210 and Their Impacts on the Socio-Economic Activities (1983) p.77
PRECIPITATION IN UMEGASHIMA AREA FIGURE 40 258 the area was completely isolated from other areas. In addition, collapses at other portions of the bus route and of other roads, which are shown in Figure 41 blocked the mutual traffic among villages in the area.
Most of the small water supply systems in villages were also broken down in the morning of the 1st of August. The kindergarten, the elementary school, and the junior high school in the area were partially destroyed by landslides, though there were no casualties. Damages and losses are as shown in Table 46.
TABLE 46 DAMAGES AND LOSSES IN UMEGASHIMA BY TYPHOON NO.10 IN 1982
Damages.
Partially destroyed houses and buildings ...... 28 Collapsed portion of Roads ...... 18 The small water supply system collapsed ...... 7
Loss. *
Loss in ag ricu ltu re...... (approx.)^40,000,000.- (US$166,666.00) Loss in forestry...... (approx.)^65,000,000.- (US$270,833.00) Loss in tourist industry..(approx.)%80,000,000.- (US$333.333.001 *The lo sses were estim ated by Abe Agr i*c u 1 t u r a 1 Cooperative, Abe Forestry Association, and Umegashima Tourist Service Association. 259
J j I r Umegashima / I Shimizu ; city V Shizuoka
Yaizu City
. '•Â'91'^ m ■)Umegas||iima Hot Spa 1 , 3 5 7 ^ \ 1 ,'^18ml /I ,^3m OTomoc^i OHonmui^ Umegashima ^rea CBekinosiwa I l,^73i (Yunomori i V / nyujima o 1, (^3ni ' O 1 ^ Fujishirq X : Places of \ ; : I landslides \ ; : \ O : Villages A ; Mountains -A = : Roads - : Border of the area
*The Abegawa River flows along the road
UMEGASHIMA AREA AND MAJOR SPOTS OF LANDSLIDES FIGURE 41 260 (2)0rganizational Responses
The branch office of the city government is located at
Nyujima, and was staffed with two o fficia ls at that time.
The to tal number of staffs of the branch was three, but, because it was Sunday on the 1st of August, one official was not in the office. Two officials came to the office.at about
5:00 am on Sunday on their own in itia tiv e s. In addition to these two officials, the head of Umegashima Chonaikai also came to the office in order to take measures against the disaster right after the bus route was crumbled down at about 5:30 am. These three persons established the informal emergency operation center. Later on, a policeman, the
leader of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, and an executive
of the agricultural cooperative joined the informal EOC.
What they did first was to gather information on damages and
casualties. Fortunately, they were equipped with wireless
telephones in 1970 to communicate with other villages in the
area and with the office of the city government not only in
case of a disaster but also in the normal situation. By the
early afternoon, they could make up a clear picture of the
situation.
At about 1:00 pm on the 1st of August, they had the
first meeting at the branch office and discussed on possible
activities for (l)supplying foods and (2)providing the
tourists with transportation. The agricultural cooperative 261 supplies foods for eighty per cent of a l l households in
Umegashima. According to an advance order, they deliver rice and other foods to each home twice a month. It was on the day before the date of rice deliveries that the Typhoon
No.10 hit the area. This means that few foods were kept in each household. Thus, one of the most serious problem at that time was how to supply foods for them. The agricultural cooperative also supplies propane gas for them. However, since gas cylinders at each house had already been filled up and no cylinder was damaged at the time of the disaster, they had no problem about propane gas. Although the agricultural cooperative laid in a good store of rice, they had no means to deliver because the roads were shut off from traffic. Thus, the branch office sent a request to the municipal EOC to airdrop rice in each village.
Due to the disaster, one hundred and seventy two tourists were left at the northern depth of the area. Each hotels had enough amount of foods to feed them for two days because it was on season at that time. However, since the only route to the outside was collapsed at several portions, no body knew when the tourists could escape from the area.
This caused a lot of anxieties among the tourists and employees of hotels. These circumstances were reported to the EOC at the branch office in the afternoon on the 1st of
August via the wireless telephone, and further to the 262 municipal and prefectural EOCs. On the 4th of August, responding to the request from the municipal and prefectural
EOCs, Self Defense Force and the prefectural headquarter of
police sent foods, dry batteries, gasoline, and the like by
helicopters and put their return flight at services for the
tourists. It was at about 4:30 pm that all tourists left
Umegashima.
In the afternoon on the 2nd of August, the telephone
company sent a crew to the area by helicopter. The electric
power company also set about recovery actities at the area
in the morning on the 4th of August. They went to the branch
office first and discussed with the branch EOC members about
the order of priority in recovery a ctiv itie s. Thus, the
telephone network was reconstructed in the afternoon on the
2nd of August and the supply of electricity also returned to
normalcy on the 5th of August.
3. Unique Aspects in Responses in Both Cases
Responses observed in these two cases of disasters
exhibit a striking contrast to those in the case of Nagasaki
disaster. The fir s t is that people in Misugi-mura or in
Umegashima were re la tiv e ly more fam iliar with typhoon,
flood, and landslide than the citizens in Nagasaki. This
difference can be partly ascribed to the geographical
properties of the areas. That is, both areas of Misugi and 263
Umegashima are very similar to each other in that (1) they are surrounded by steep mountains and deep valleys, (2) the
villages are located on the banks of a large river or in a
valley, and (3)the only one main route is available for
going to the outside of or coming into the area. Landslides,
floods, and isolation of the areas from other regions due to
a storm or a torrential rain are almost the daily
experiences for them. Therefore, they hold a
well-established disaster subculture superior to that among
people in Nagasaki city. In fact, while one of the basic
factor of Nagasaki disaster was the aberrant and disordered
developments of residential districts, the houses in Misugi
and Umegashima are located at the places which have been
known as being safe since early times. Although the ratio of
the number of totally or partially destroyed houses to the
total number of households in Misugi is almost the same as
that in Nagasaki, no casualties were recorded in Misugi.
Only one worker of the electric company, who was checking
the water level of the dam, was killed by a landslide.
Most damages in Umegashima were to public facilities such as
schools or bridges built by outsiders.
In addition, these geographical factors make people in
these areas more self-reliant, and keep the areas from
urbanizing. This is the second unique aspect. There is no
fire department in Misugi. The fire fighting system in 264
Misugi consists only of the quasi-vo1 untar y fire squads, which usually take part not only in fire fighting but also
in flood control, search and rescue activities after
landslides, typhoon, earthquake, and the like. They often
engage in policing activities in large regional events such
as a fe stiv a l or election. As noted earlier, the quasi
voluntary fire squads are composed of ordinary citizens.
Although they are poorly paid, most of them make their
livings by other work. Misugi-mura head-office is staffed
with 46 male- and 16 fema1e-officia 1 s , and seven branches
are respectively staffed with two officials. On the other
hand, four hundred and forty-three members of the
quasi-voluntary fire squads are posted at every village in
Misugi. Most emergency and recovery activities were
performed by them.
In Umegashima, the traditional mutual help system s till
exists. Residents are forced to co11aborative1 y engage in
farm works, share and maintain the small water supply
system, and take turns at sending a group of children in
their village to schools by car. After a disaster, they
repaired the small water supply system for themselves, and
voluntarily engaged in reconstruction works at schools and
roads. Thus, when the formal work groups came into the area
on the 6th of August, the f a c ilitie s essential to their
lives had already returned to normalcy. Furthermore, since 265 there was only three o fficials in the branch office, and since the chief manager started to assume charge in the
Umegashima branch of the city government in the previous year, most emergency activities such as information gathering, search and rescue, making decisions on possible measures, and the like were performed mainly by leaders of the quasi-voluntary fire squads and Chonaikai.
3. Patterns of Interorganizational Coordination
Responding to the typhoon warning, Shizuoka prefectural and municipal governments had already set up the pre-emergency operation center with a few persons on duty on
Saturday, the 31st of July. Since the typhoon warning was issued at 9:30 pm on the 31st of July by the Shizuoka local meteorological observatory, it can be said that the warning
period began at that time. In Umegashima area, they had the
first meeting involving some organizations at about 1:00 pm
on the 1st of August. This is the event which shows the
beginning of the restoration period. It was at about 10:00
am on the 1st of August that the heavy rain caused actual
damages here and there in the area. Thus, the emergency
period began at that time. The telephone system was mostly
recovered in the afternoon of the 2nd of August, and the
electric power supply was recovered on the 5th of August.
On the other hand, the heavy rain and flood warning was 266 issued for Misugi area at 9:20 pm on the 31st of July. At the same time, the Mie prefectural government took an emergency shift with staffs on duty. Misugi Mura established their emergency operation center right after the warning issued by Tsu local meteorological observatory at
12:45 pm on the 1st of August. However, at that stage, the
Mura EOC had not yet been fully operated because the
established EOC was composed of only a few staffs on duty
at that time. The first damage confirmed was a landslide in
Yachi v illag e at 4:00 pm on the 1st of August. It was at
7:16 pm on the 1st of August that the EOC was shifted into
the highest rank. This will be the beginning of the
restoration period. In the evening of the 3rd of August, the
electric power supply and the telephone system were mostly
recovered, and this will be the end of restoration period in
Misugi. Thus, the stages of disater process in both cases
are respectively defined as shown in Table 47.
TABLE 47 STAGES OF DISASTERS IN MISUGI AND UMEGASHIMA
Misugi Umegashima the Warning Period 9:20 am, July 31 9:30 am, July 31
the Emergency Period 4:00 pm, August 1 10:00 am, August 1 the Restoration Period 7:16 pm, August 1 1:00 pm, August 1 267
In Umegashima, the organizations concerned informally kept contact with the branch office of the municipal government in the warning and emergency periods. However, no organizational action was taken, and therefore no interorganizational network was establishedin those periods. On the other hand, the Misugi-Mura office actively engaged in communication a c tiv itie s with their branch offices and other organizations in the warning and emergency periods. The agricultural cooperative, the quasi-vo1 un tary fire squads, and the police station also actively gathered information, respectively.
In the restoration period, the Umegashima branch of the municipal office became an EOC, and such organizations as
Chonaikai, the Umegashima police box, the quasi-voluntary fire squads, the elementary school, the junior high school, and the agricultural cooperative participated in the EOC.
The EOC directly communicated with the municipal EOC.
The Misugi Mura EOC also became the only EOC established in the area in the restoration period. The quasi-voluntary fire squads, the Misugi police station, the agricultural cooperative, and the forestry association were merged into the Mura EOC.
The illustrations for these interorganizational patterns will appear in the next section. 268
3. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
1. The Pattern of Interorganizational Coordination.
The types of interorganizational coordination in the emergency and restoration periods were roughly discussed for each case in the previous section. In the case of Nagasaki disaster by torrential rain, the pattern was the decentralized diffused type. On the contrary, both disasters in Misugi and Umegashima induced the c e n tra liz e d
concentrated pattern of interorganizational coordination.
Figure 42 illustrates the interorganizational network after
the Nagasaki disaster, while Figure 43 delineats them after
Misugi and Umegashima disasters.
As shown in Figure 42, four cognition centers can be
identified in the interorganizational network in Nagasaki in
the emergency period. Among them, the municipal EOC was most
handicapped, because they had no direct source of
information. They had several telephone calls from the
citizens. The staffs observed the situation and reported to
the EOC. However, these sources are not effective in that
the information gathered lacks the reliability and
comprehensivility. Hence, they mostly depended upon the fire
department and the prefectural EOC. During the emergency
period, the prefectural headquarter of police and the fire
department made many decisions on prevention of casualties
or search and rescue activities, while the prefectural and 269 municipal EOCs engaged in few decision makings. The only exceptional case was the decision by the municipal EOC to issue the evacuation order. However, this decision was made only for form sake, and hardly disseminated to the citizens.
Thus, we identify only two evaluation centers, e.g., the prefectural headquarter of police and the fire department.
In Misugi-Mura, four cognition centers can be identified in the emergency-period network. Among these cognition centers, the agricultural cooperative limited
T2)\ (8)j
()K9T E m(4)
(5)
( 12) (7)
( 10)
* (l):the municipal EOC, (2):the prefectural EOC, (3):the prefectural headquarter of police, (4):the four police stations, (5):the headquarter of the fire department, (6):the four fire stations, (7) : the headquarter of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, (8):Self Defense Force, (9) : the branch offices of the prefecturalgovernment, (10) : the fourty-two quasi-voluntary fire squads, (11) ;other cities and towns, (12): the police boxes. **Broken lines show the exchange of messengers. ***Units with a single circle are cognition centers and units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE EMERGENCY PERIOD OF THE NAGASAKI TORRENTIAL RAIN DISASTER FIGURE 42 270
1 ( 1 ^
\ (îô)]
\ m (il ill
p T ) ITT5)1 fT5)l 1(8)1 {16)
* (l):the Mura EOC, (2):the Misugi police station, (3):the police stations in other six villages, (4):the headquarter of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, (5):the quasi voluntary fire squads in seven villages, (6):the agricultural cooperative, (7):the forestry association, (8):the control office of the Kimigano multipurpose dam, (9):the Hisai police station, (10):the Hisai municipal office, (11):the prefectural headquarter of police, (12)Tsu local meteorological observatory, (13):the prefectural EOC, (14): the six branches of the agricultural coorperative, (15): the six branches of the Mura office, (16): the six branches of the forestry association. **Solid lines show the report or direction couplings, while dotted lines show the request or instruction couplings. ***Units with a single circle are cognition center and units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE EMERGENCY PERIOD OF THE MISUGI DISASTER FIGURE 43
their activities in gathering information and observing the situation. They took no responsive actions against the disaster during the emergency period. Thus, we identify two 271
TABLE 48 THE NUMBER OF MEDIATION UNITS IN THE EMERGENCY PERIOD
(l)Nagasaki Disaster:
Cognition Centers the number of (Report Couplings) mediation units
(1) the prefectural EOC 8 (2) the prefectural headquarter of police 4 (3) the municipal EOC 2 (4) the fire department 1 Total 15
Evaluation Centers the number of (Direction Couplings) mediation units (1) the prefectural headquarter of police 4 (2) the fire department 1 Total 5
(2)Misugi Disaster:
Cognition Centers the number of (Report Couplings) mediation units
(1) the Mura EOC 0 (2) the quasi-voluntary fire squads 1 (3) the agricultural cooperative 0 (4) the Misugi police station 0 Total 1
Evaluation Centers the number of (Direction Couplings) mediation units
(1) the Mura EOC 0 (2) the quasi-voluntary fire squads 0 (3) the Misugi police station 0 Total 0 272 evaluation centers in the network.
The number of mediation units for each case is summarized in Table 48. From Table 48, we obtain the concentration score by dividing the number of cognition or evaluation centers. Those scores are as follows.
(1)The Concentration Score in the Nagasaki Disaster; The Report Couplings ...... 15 / 4 = 3.75 The Direction Couplings ...... 5/ 2 = 2.5
(2)The Concentration Scorein the Misugi Disaster: The Report Couplings ...... 1 / 4 = 0.25 The Direction Couplings 0 / 2 = 0
In the restoration period, the interorganizational
networks after the Nagasaki disaster shifted to the more
centralized pattern. The prefectural headquarter of police
was s till independent as before. The prefectural EOC made
several decisions on how to allocate the personnels of Self
Defense Force or of Maritime Safety Agency, or on what and
when to be requested to other prefectures. The HHjnicipal EOC
came into the concerted decision making situation with the
fire department. In the dimension of concentration, the
network became a l i t t l e more concentrated. This can be
attributed to the fact that the municipal EOC and the fire
department were merged with each other. Figure 44
illustrates the pattern in the restoration period.
In Misugi, the Mura EOC became the only cognition and
evaluation center, because the EOC in the restoration period 273 became composed of all of the organizations concerned. This was true for the case of Umegashima, too. Therefore, in both cases, the interorganizational coordination was carried out with the centralized-concentrated pattern.
* (1): the municipal EOC, (2): the prefectural EOC, (3): the prefectural headquarter of police, (4): the four police stations, (5): the headquarter of the fire department, (6): the four fire stations, (7); the headquarter of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, (8): Self Defense Force, (9) : the branch offices of the prefecturalgovernment, (10) : Maritime Safety Agency, (11): other cities and towns, (12): the police boxes, (13): the quasi-voluntary fire squads. **Solid lines show the report or direction couplings, while dotted lines show the request or instruction couplings. ***Units with a single circle are cognition centers and units with a double circle are coordinating units.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD AFTER THE NAGASAKI DISASTER FIGURE 44 274
In comparison with the pattern in the emergency period, the pattern in the restoration period was more centralized and concentrated. While there were four cognition centers and three evaluation centers in Misugi in the emergency period, all of the organizations concerned were converged into the Mura EOC in the restoration period, and, therefore, only the one coordinating unit can be identified. Figure 45 shows the pattern in both cases in the restoration period.
What we mentioned above can be confirmed by the calculation as shown in Table 49.
(12^ (13) ( 11)
( 10) (9)
(6)Hmj4cp40)HTp
(14? (5) (3) * (1); the Mura EOC, (2): the Misugi police station, (3): the police boxes in other villages, (4): the headquarter of the quasi-voluntary fire squads, (5): the quasi-voluntary fire squads in villages, (6); the agricultural cooperative, (7): the forestry association, (8): the control office of Kimigano multipurpose dam, (9): the Hisai police station, (10): the Hisai municipal office, (11): the prefectural headquarter of police, (12): Tsu local meteorological observatory, (13): the prefecturalEOC, (14): the six branches of the Mura office.
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD IN THE MISUGI DISASTER FIGURE 45 275
( 10) (7)
( 1 )
m (3) (4) ( 6 )
*(1): the Umegashima branch o ffice of the municipal government, (2): the Umegashima police box, (3): the agricultural cooperative, (4): the headquarter of quasi-voluntaryfire squads,(5): thequasi-vo1 untary fire squads in other villages, (6): Chonaikai headquarter, (7): the municipal EOC, (8): the prefectural EOC, (9): the prefectural headquarter of police, (10): the Shizuoka police station, (11): the five branches of the ag ricu ltu ral cooperative, (12): the nine branches of Chonaikai
THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD IN THE UMEGASHIMA DISASTER FIGURE 46
2. The Factors Which Influence the Pattern.
As to the disaster subculture, the citizens and organizations in Nagasaki had held a firm belief that
Nagasaki is free from a natural disaster. The belief seemed to be reinforced by their experience that the famous flood disaster in Isahaya in 1957 caused no damages and casualties in Nagasaki city, whereas it resulted in the tremendous damages and casualties in the adjacent city, Isahaya. In 276
TABLE 49 THE DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION AND THE CONCENTRATION SCORE IN THE RESTORATION PERIOD OF THREE DISASTERS
Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima No . of Cognition 4 1 1 Center(A) No . of Evaluation 3 1 1 Center(B)
No. of Coordination 3 1 1 Center(the Degree of Centrali zation)
Total No. of Mediation 7 0 0 Units in \ Report Couplings(C)
Total No. of Mediation 5 0 0 Units in Direction Couplings(D)
Concentration (C) / (A) (C) / (A) (C) / (A) Score (Report = 7 / 4 = 0 / 1 = 0 / 1 Coupling) = 1.75 = 0 = 0
Concentration (D) / (B) (D) / (B) (D) / (B) Score = 5,/ 3 = 0 / 1 = 0 / 1 (Direction = 1.67 = 0 = 0 Coupling) 277 addition, the citizens and organizations in Nagasaki were somewhat self-conceited. That is to say, they had typhoons every year, and the citizens and organizations in Nagasaki thought as if the typhoons were the annual events or the seasonal variations in their monotonous lives.
In Misugi or Umegashima, they also had sev eral landslide disasters in the past. However, as mentioned earlier, the traditional wisdoms for living were still alive. This has something to do with the fact that the degree of social mobility in both areas is lower than that, for instance, in Nagasaki. In addition, because of their geographical peculiarity, they were well aware that they could not expect the external helps at the time of crises.
This made them self-reliant and well-prepared against a disaster. In this sense, in comparison with Nagasaki, both of Misugi and Umegashima kept more and better disaster
subculture.
The number of organizations involved in the recovery
a c tiv itie s in the restoration period after the Nagasaki
disaster was much more than in the cases of Misugi and
Umegashima. In the cases of Misugi and Umegashima, no
external organizations came into the areas. In this
analysis, we take into account only the public
administration organizations and the quasi-public
organizations which are expected to engage in general 278
TABLE 50 THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THE RECOVERY ACTIVITIES
Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima
the prefectural the Mura Office, the branch office government, the quasi-voluntary of the municipal the municipal fire squads, government, government, the police station, the quasi-voluntary the prefectural the agricultural fire squads, headquarter of cooperative, the agricultural police, the forestry cooperative, the four police association, Chonaikai. stations, Chonaikai. the fire dept., the quasi voluntary fire squads, the four fire stations, Self Defense Force, Maritime Safety Agency, Other prefectures, Other cities. recovery activities in a disastrous situation. Those organizations for each case are listed in Table 50.
The size of respective member organization is also sharply different between Nagasaki and other two cases, as shown in Table 51.
Since the nature of a disaster is basically same in three cases, there seems to be no significant variation among cases in the degree of task complexity and the variety of necessary resources. However, as to the amount of tasks, the Nagasaki disaster supplies a contrast to other two 279
TABLE 51 THE SIZE OF MEMBER ORGANIZATION
Name of Organization: Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima
The prefectural government 1 ,760 - - The municipal government 4,750 62 3 The fire department* 460 - - The quasi-voluntary fire squads 2,019 443 282 The prefectural police** 1,713 7 1 Self Defense Force 6,691*** 0 0
* The number shows the to tal number of personnels in the headquarter and other three fire stations. **The number in Nagasaki shows the to ta l number of personnels in the headquarter, other four police stations, and the riot police. The number in Misugi shows the total number of personnels in one police station and other six police boxes. In Umegashima, it shows the number of personnel in one police box. ***The number is the to ta l man-days from the 24th of July to the 31st of July.
disasters, as shown in Table 52. It can be posited that the
Nagasaki disaster created much more recovery tasks than other two disasters.
In the community properties, Nagasaki and other two
areas make a great contrast with each other. Nagasaki is the
prefectural capital and occupies the leading positions in
every field in the prefecture. On the contrary, Misugi and
Umegashima are small communities amid mountains which are
declining in its population and economic or cultural
vitalities. As a matter of course, whereas a lot of 280 organizations and their headquarters exist in Nagasaki city,
Misugi and Umegashima have few organizations except the public organizations. Table 53 shows the difference in the number of establishments in three areas.
TABLE 52 THE DEGREE OF DAMAGES AND CASUALTIES IN THREE CASES
The Number of: Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima
the killed 267 1 0
the fatally injured 13 1 0
the slightly injured 741 17 3
the proportion of casualties to the total population 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.3 %
the totally 447 17 1 destroyed houses (0.3 %) (0.5 %) (0.4 %)
the partially 1,081 41 1 destroyed houses (0.7 %) (1.3 %) (0.4 %)
the houses 14,704 96 0 flooded above floor (9.9 %) (3.1 %) (0.0 %)
the households 29,802 159 34 suffered (20.1 %) (5.1 %) (13.1 %)
fires 5 0 0
the broken points on the roads 1,113 854 27
the broken bridge 51 42 1
the spots where at least one life was lost 41 1 0
* The percentages in parentheses are to the total number of households in the area. 281
TABLE 53 THE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS
The number of: Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima
Establishments 21,399 383 38 Manufacturers 1,092 106 3 Retailers 6,858 108 11 Large-scale retailers 28 0 0 Banks 97 0 0
TABLE 54 COMMUNITY PROPERTIES
Community Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima Properties
Population 444,317 11,408 915 The Number of Households 148,357 3,090 260 Organizational Complexity high low low
Political The préfecto A small A small Characteristic ral capital. community. community.
Economic The central A small Few Characteristic business number of business district in business. the prefec ture.
Distribution of labor forces into the Primary, 5:24:71 70:20:10 60:10:30 the Secondary, (approx.) (approx.) and the Tertiary Industry
* The figures are based on the data of the 1980 Census and of the 1978 Census of Industry. 282
The more comprehensive comparison between the areas is delineated by Table 54.
Although the scopes of impacts are different from each other, a ll of three disasters were predicted in their early stages, and characterized by gradual onset. The scope of impact was apparently wider in Nagasaki than other two areas. The damages and casualties occured throughout the city of Nagasaki, whose area is 239.39 square kilometers
(approximately 100 square miles). The area of Misugi-Mura is
207.27 square kilometers which is close to the area of
Nagasaki. However, more than eighty per cent of the area is forests and mountains. Therefore, the substantial area of
Misugi will be less than 160 square kilometers
(approximately 67 square miles). The area of Umegashima is only 92.27 square kilometers (approximately 39 square miles). Even if the whole area was devastated in the latter two cases, s till the Nagasaki disaster had the widest scope among them.
The discussions in this section can be summarized in
Table 55 in order to plainly mention the findings.
Thus, the following findings are set forth.
(1) On the contrary to the case of the Niigata
Earthquake, the pattern of interorganizational coordination in the restoration period was slightly more concentrated than in the emergency period after the Nagasaki disaster. 283
TABLE 55 THE PATTERN OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION AND SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH INFLUENCE IT
Nagasaki Misugi Umegashima
Pattern of Inter The de The centra The centra organizational centralized lized and lized and Coordination and concent concent diffused rated type. rated type. type.
Experience and Knowledge few elaborated elaborated
The Size of Inter organizational large small small Network
The Average Size of Member large small small Organizations
The Task Complexity . — - -
The Variety of Necessary Resources
The Amount of Tasks large small small
Organizational Complexity high low low
Urbanization urbanized rural rural
The Speed of Onset - - -
Predictability - --
The Scope of Impact wide narrow narrow 284
This holds true in the case of the Misugi disaster.
(2) The wide difference in the amount of recovery tasks was found among the cases. According to the amount of tasks, three cases can be put in the order of Nagasaki, Misugi, and
Umegashima. This order corresponds to the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness. Thus, our hypothesis as to the relationship between the amount of tasks and the pattern of interorganizational coordination can be supported.
(3) Since no significant difference was found as to the degree of task complexity and the variety of necessary resources, nothing can be indicated about Hypotheses (3,),
(6), (10), and (13).
(4) There seems to be only a slight difference among the cases as to the amount of experience of disasters.
However, wisdom or knowledge learned through the experiences is s till alive in their lives in Misugi and Umegashima. As mentioned ealier, people in Nagasaki had an illu sio n that they were hardened to typhoon disasters. In other words, their annual experiences of typhoons created "normalcy
bias" among them that typhoons rarely bring on disasters.
Thus, i t can be concluded that the q u a lity of th e ir
experience and knowledge is much better in Misugi and
Umegashima than in Nagasaki, though the quantities are the
same. This indirectly supports our hypothesis that the 285 greater the amount of experience and knowledge, the lower the degree of decentralization. Because the factor of "the amount of experiences and knowledge" implies that when they are made better use of in responding to a disaster, they influence the pattern of interorganizational coordination.
On the contrary, our hypothesis on the relationship between the amount of experiences and knowledge and the degree of diffusiveness is not supported here. The result was that the higher degree of diffusiveness was associated with the smaller amount of experiences and knowledge.
(5) Other two s tr u c tu r a l facto rs of the size of interorganizational network and the average size of member organizations were as expected in our hypotheses. That is to say, the size of interorganizational network was positively associated with the degree of decentralization and
diffusiveness. The same was true in the average size of
member organizations.
(6) The three indices of the degree of urbanization had
respectively the expected relationship with the degree of
decentralization and diffusiveness. The degree of
organizational complexity was higher in Nagasaki. The
overall population and the distribution ratio of labor
forces in the t e r tia r y industry were the la rg e st in
Nagasaki, too. The pattern in Nagasaki was the decentralized
and diffused. Thus, it can be said that this supports our 286 hypothesis on the relationships of these three indices with the pattern of interorganizational coordination,
(7) Although we found little about the speed of onset and predictablity, we recognized the significant variance of the scope of impact among the cases. The result was that our expected relationship of the scope of impact with the pattern of interorganizational coordination was confirmed. CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The study on the Niigata Earthquake and the Tokachi Oki
Earthquake suggested us (1) that the degree of task complexity, the variety of necessary resources, and the average size of member organizations were positively related
to the degree of diffusiveness, respectively, (2) that the
size of interorganizational network, the scope of impact, and the degree of urbanization were positively related to
the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness as expected
by our hypotheses, and (3) that the amount of experience and
knowledge was positively associated with the degree of
concentration.
As to relationships of the degree of task complexity,
the variety of necessary resources, and the amount of
experiences and knowledge with the degree of
centralization/decentralization, nothing could be clearly
mentioned. However, in the dimension of concentration
diffusiveness, it should be noted that, while the degree of
task complexity and the variety of necessary resources were
287 288 related to the degree of diffusiveness as expected in our hypotheses, the amount of experiences and knowledge was related to the degree of diffusiveness in the opposite direction to our hypothesis.
The second group of our cases suggested us the followings. (1) The amount of experiences and knowledge was positively related to the degree of centralization as expected in our hypothesis, while it was positively related to the degree of concentration, which is in the opposite direction to our hypothesis. (2) Our hypotheses on the
relationships between the pattern and the degree of task
complexity or the variety of necessary resources were
slightly supported. (3) The amount of tasks, the degree of
organizational complexity, and the scope of impact were
respectively associated with the pattern of inter
organizational network as expected in our hypotheses.
On the contrary to the previous c , the Izu Ohshima
Kinkai Earthquake and the Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake
suggested that the amount of experiences and knowledge was
positively associated with the degree of centralization.
However, a ll cases so far supported that it was positively
associated with the degree of concentration, which is
against our hypothesis.
The last group of our cases supported our hypotheses on
the relationships of the amount of tasks, the degree of 289 organizational complexity, the degree of urbanization, and the scope of impact with the pattern of interorganizational network. However, the amount of experiences and knowledge was positively associated with the degree of concentration, not with the degree of diffusiveness.
Thus, so long as the seven cases in this study concerned, the amount of experiences and knowledge was positively related to the degree of concentration, which is against our hypothesis. In the dimension of centralization decentralization, only one group of cases showed that the amount of experiences and knowledge was p o s itiv e ly associated with the degree of centralization. In other cases, nothing was clear as to the relationship.
We had ten corollaries in Chapter II. The case study on the Niigata and the Tokachi Oki Earthquakes provides us (1) that the degree of urbanization was positively related to each of the average size of member organizations, the degree of task complexity, and the variety of necessary resources, as postulated in our corollaries, and (2) that the amount of experiences and knowledge was negatively associated with the degree of urbanization as expected in our corollary.
In the cases of the Izu Ohshima Kinkai and the Miyagi
Ken Oki Earthquakes, the degree of urbanization had the
expected relationships with each of the amount of tasks, the
degree of task complexity, the amount of experiences and 290 knowledge, and the variety of necessary resources. In addition, the scope of impact had also the expected relationships with the amount of tasks.
The last group of cases suggested that the degree of
TABLE 56 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
TheNiigata and ThelzuOhshima The Nagasaki, the Tokachi Oki Kinkai and the Misugi and Earthquakes. Miyagi Ken Oki Umegashima Earthquakes. Disasters.
Hypothesis Number 1 - supported supported 2 supported - - 3 - supported - 4 - opposite - 5 - supported supported 6 - supported - 7 - supported supported 8 - supported supported 9 supported - - 10 supported supported - 11 opposite opposite opposite 12 - supported supported 13 supported supported - 14 supported supported supported 15 - -- 16 - - — 17 supported supported supported 18 supported supported supported
Corollary No 1 2 3 supported supported 4 - - supported 5 - supported supported 6 supported supported - 7 supported supported - 8 supported supported supported 9 -- supported 10 supported - supported 291 urbanization had the expected relationships with each of the size of interorganizational network, the average size of member organizations, the amount of tasks and the amount of experiences and knowledge. The scope of impact had the expected relationships with each of the amount of tasks and the size of interorganizational network. These discussion can be summarized in Table 56.
These summaries, however, are given on the basis of two- or three-case comparisons. By integrating our seven cases, we are able to obtain a clearer view of relationships between the determinant factors and the pattern of interorganizational coordination. For that purpose, we put the stricken areas in order according to the dgree or amount in each factor. As we mentioned in Chapter IV, our study included two types of factors. Some can be dealt with in the form of numerical values, while others can be compared with each other simply by descriptive manner. The size of member organizations, the amount of tasks, the scope of impact, and community property or the degree of urbanization are those of the former type. The variety of necessary resources, the degree of task complexity, and the amount of experiences and knowledge are those of the la tte r type. Since our study focused on organizations which were thought of as being formally responsible for recovery activities, the size of an
ION is treated here in descriptive manner rather than in 292 mathematical fashion.
For the former type, we simply compare the numerical values. When an area has the largest value in a certain indicator of a certain factor, the area is given seven points. When the value of the other area is the smallest, the area is given one point. Since each factor has two or more indicators, the total points obtained by each area are divided by the number of indicators. The quotient will be tentatively called the rank score of area.
For example, the rank score of area for the size of member organizations was calculated as follows.
As to six organizations; i.e., the municipal and the prefectural governments, the fire department, the quasi voluntary fire squads, the prefectural headquarter and local stations of police, and Self Defense Force, the numbersof organizational members are compared. Among seven municipal or town governments, Nagasaki has the largest number of members, and, therefore, is given the score of seven.
Sendai municipal government is the second and given six points. On the other hand, Umegashima branch of Shizuoka municipal government has only two o fficia ls after the disaster. It was the sm allest, and, therefore, given the score of one. The same procedure is taken as to other five organizations. Then, the six scores of an area are added up. The total score is divided by six, which is the number 293 of indicators (the number of organizations involved) for the size of member organizations. The quotinent is the rank score of area in the size of member organizations. These scores are listed including other factors in Table 57.
TABLE 57 RANK SCORES OF AREAS
Size of Amount of Urbanization Scope of Member Tasks Impact Organi zation
Niigata 6.17 4.2 5.63 5.67
Hachinohe 4.17 4.4 4.13 4.67 Kawazu/ Higashi Izu 4.2 3.6 3.0 3.33
Sendai 5.0 6.2 7.0 5.33
Nagasaki 5.5 5.4 5.25 5.67
Misugi 2.0 3.2 1.88 2.0
Umegashima 1.0 1.6 1.38 1.33
For other factors, we judged the relative degree of each on the basis of the discussions as to the backgrounds or of interview data. The judgement has simply a relative nature among our seven cases. The area are roughly grouped into three; i.e., the higher or larger, the medium, and the lower or smaller. The results are shown in Table 58.
Combining the rank score for each factor with the degrees of decentralization and diffusiveness provides us 294 with the clearer view of the relationships between the factors and the degrees of decentralization and diffusiveness. Table 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65 show the respective relationships between the factors and the types of interorganizational coordination. Although detailed accounts of these tables are not given. Figure 47 shows the relationships among factors based on these tables.
TABLE 58 RELATIVE RANK OF AREAS
Size of Amount of Degree of Variety of ION Experience Task of & Knowledge Complexity Resource
Niigata larger medium higher higher
Hachinohe medium medium medium medium
Kawazu/ Higashi Izu smaller larger medium medium
Sendai larger smaller higher higher Nagasaki larger smaller lower lower
Misugi smaller larger lower lower
Umegashima smaller larger lower lower 295 TABLE 59 THE AVERAGE SIZE OF MEMBER ORGANIZATION
Sizeof Decentralization Diffusiveness Member Organi zation
Niigata 6.17 4 5.6
Nagasaki 5.5 3 1.7
Sendai 5.0 3 2.1 Kawazu/ Higashi Izu 4.2 1 0
Hachinohe 4.17 4 1
Misugi 2.0 1 0
Umegashima 1.0 1 0
TABLE 60 THE AMOUNT OF TASKS
Amount of Decentralization Diffusiveness Tasks
Sendai 6.2 3 2.1
Nagasaki 5.4 3 1.7
Hachinohe 4.4 4 1.0
Niigata 4.2 4 5.6 Kawazu/ Higashi Izu 3.6 1 0
Misugi 3.2 1 0
Umegashima 1.6 1 0 296
TABLE 61 THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION
Urbanization Decentralization Diffusiveness
Sendai 7.0 3 2.1
Niigata 5.6 4 5.6
Nagasaki 5.2 3 1.7
Hachinohe 4.1 4 1.0
Kawazu/ Higashi Izu 3.0 1 0
Misugi 1.8 1 0
Umegashima 1.3 1 0
TABLE 62 THE SIZE OF ION
Size of Decentralization Diffusiveness ION
Sendai larger 3 2.1
Niigata larger 4 5.6
Nagasaki larger 3 1.7
Hachinohe medium 4 1.0
Kawazu/ Higashi Izu smaller 1 0
Misugi smaller 1 0
Umegashima smaller 1 0 297
TABLE 63 THE SCOPE OF IMPACT
Scope of Decentralization Diffusiveness Impact
Niigata 5.7 4 5.6
Nagasaki 5.7 3 1.7
Sendai 5.3 3 2.1
Hachinohe 4.6 4 1.0 Kawazu/ Higashi Izu 3.3 1 0
Misugi 2.0 1 0
Umegashima 1.3 1 0
TABLE 64 THE AMOUNT OF EXPERIENCES AND KNOWLEDGE
Amount of Decentralization Diffusiveness Experience and Knowledge
Kawazu/ Higashi Izu larger 1 0
Misugi larger 1 0
Umegashima larger 1 0
Niigata medium 4 5.6
Hachinohe medium 4 1.0
Sendai smaller 3 2.1
Nagasaki smaller 3 1.7 298
TABLE 65 THE DEGREE OF TASK COMPLEXITY AND THE VARIETY OF NECESSARY RESOURCES
Task Variety Decentrali Diffusive Complexity of zation ness Resource
Niigata higher higher 4 5. 6
Sendai higher higher 3 2.1
Hachinohe medium medium 4 1.0
Kawazu/ Higashi Izu medium medium 1 0
Nagasaki lower lower 3 1.7
Misugi lower lower 1 0
Umegashima lower lower 1 0
We can roughly indicate by looking over these tables
(l)th a t the amount of experiences and knowledge is
negatively related to the degree of decentralization and
diffusiveness, (2)that the relationships between the degree
of task complexity or the variety of necessary resources and
the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness are not so
clear that nothing can be said about our hypotheses 3, 6,
10, and 13, and (3)that other factors are positively related
to the degree of decentralization and diffusiveness. 299
f—(Community Property}--,
j fUrbanizationp
Size of ION): Amount of Tasks [Decentralization I Average Size of t Variety of Member Organi Necessary zations Resources
Amount of Y Task Experiences and Complexity Knowledge I I * ------l-lj^|Dif f usiveness ^
Structural \ Task V. {Properties / Properties/
Scope of Impact
[Predictability!
Speed of Onset]
Characteristics Vjaf Disaster Agent/
* Solid lines show the positive associations, while broken lines show the negative relationships.
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG FACTORS FIGURE 47 300
2. DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTION
This research is s t i l l far from complete. This
should be taken as a report of work in progress rather than as a definitive statement. However, at this moment, several contributions of this research to both fields of organization and disaster studies can be designated. Some
of these contributions are briefly mentioned here.
A disaster often induces accute changes in
environments of organizations/^) As we discussed in Chapter
11, the environment created by a disaster will be called a
turbulent environment in Emery=Trist's term, or may show the
maximum level in the indicators of uncertainty score
developed by Lawrence=Lorsch. (^) This was the case for
seven Japanese disasters. All organizations attempted to
gather as much information as possible in order to reduce
the degree of uncertainty after trhe disasters.
Levine=White discussed three factors which influence
interorganizational e x c h a n g e s . (^) All situations of our
seven cases were characterized by relatively high degree of
domain consensus. However, as to the accessibility to
external sources of resources, the prefectural headquarter
of police and Self Defense Force always had the higher
degree of accessibility. As a resu lt, they were highly
autonomous, as Aldrich, Cook, and Pfeffer = Sa 1 ancik
indicated,(4) and were likely to function as an independent 301 coordinating unit in an emergency interorganizational network.
Although this implies several things, we here note three of those. First, since the prefectural headquarter of police and Self Defense Force are always one of major and essential bodies of an emergency interorganizational network, and since they are more likely to be an independent coordinating unit, the pattern of interorganizational coordination is also more likely to be decentralized and diffused than the pattern expected in the local emergency plannings, which usually expect the centralized and concentrated pattern of interorganizational coordination.
Theoretically, it may be cconcluded that the pattern of interorganizational coordination after a disaster follows the general tendency which has been indicated by contingency theorists; i.e., the more uncertain the environment, the more decentralized and diffused the organization.
Second, the relationships among accessibility to resources, autonomy, and decentralization or diffusiveness as indicated by Levine=White, Aldrich, Cook,
Pfeffer = Sa 1 ancik, and so on (^) were also supported in our study. Third, a practical implication for policy making will be that they should not always seek a rational or centra 1ized-concentrated type of network, but accept the decentralized-diffused type as a most frequent pattern in 302 the urbanized area after a disaster.
Litwak = Hy1 ton postulated that a coordinating unit emerges when the number of member organizations, the degree of standardization and the degree of interdependence are respectively in a medium r a n g e . (^) in our seven cases, a ll of which had high degree of interdependence, their postulate was not always supported. As indicated in the previous
section, the size of ION was positively associated with the
degrees of decentralization and diffusiveness, and this means that the larger the number of member organizations,
the more coordinating units exist. In their discussion, by
a coordinating unit was meant a certain emergent
coordinating unit which exclusively deals with the matter of
coordination among member organizations. On the other hand,
our assumption was that every member organization can be a
coordinating unit itself, if some necessary conditions were
met. This will explain the difference between their
postulate and our study.
Warren presented the concept of concerted decision
making and discussed about six dimensions for analyzing
i t . (7) According to his discussion, an emergency social
system was depicted as in Figure 5 in Chapter II. This may
be thought of as an ideal type. By comparing with this
ideal type, we could obtain some insights. First, the
participations in an emergency interorganizational network 303 were mandatory in a ll of our cases. Warren predicted that coercive participation was connected with unitary context of decision making. However, we found both types of social choice and unitary context. Second, as indicated above, all situations of our cases were characterized by the high degree of domain consensus. However, th is does not necessary mean that member organizations were less concerned with stability or extension of their organizational domains.
Rather, in an emergency situation, some organizations intruded into other organizations' domains. That is to say, although their concerns with stability or extension of their organizational domains were not always little , we found both types of social choice and unitary context. This shows us that the pattern of decision making was not linearly related to the degree of concern with organizational domain.
Turk showed us that an urban society can be analyzed as an interorganizational network.In our study, as summarized in the previous section, the degree of urbanization most clearly affected the degrees of decentralization and diffusiveness. This means that the pattern of interorganizational network varies with social properties such as ecological, demographic, economic, political characteristics of the area. Therefore, if we accept the assumption that interorganizational structure of a certain area can be representative of the social structure 304 of the area, then Turk's attempt should be thought of as
highly promising in analyzing urban areas.
In addition to these theoretical contributions, we
can list some conceptual and methodological ones.
Conceptually, our study could have two contributions. First,
it made clear the substantial meaning of coordination, the
concept of which has been le ft ambiguous and used in many
different levels or contexts. Second, designating
contractual representativeness and relative weakness of
formal authority structure as differentiating factors
between organization and interorganizational network, we
developed the basic model which can be applied to both types
of social system. The basic model which was described in
detail is also applicable to the analyses of collective
behavior or social movements. In other words, any social
system can be analyzed by our basic framework, so long as it
consists of two or more human beings or social groups.
Methodologically, our study devised a new method for
measuring the degrees of centralization and concentration,
and for identifying the pattern of interorganizational
coordination. This w ill be the fir s t contribution in
methodology. Second, we showed some findings on
longitudinal changes of interorganizational network. By
divising the indicators of the degrees of centralization and
concentration; i.e., the number of coordinating units and 305 the concentration score, we became able to analyze longitudinal changes throughout several disater stages.
Finally, since the basic framework and the indicators we developed in our study are not culturally bound, we can approach to other cases than Japanese disasters with the same conceptual and measurement tools as we used in our study. This implies that, although some important differences between or among cultures or
societies, such as the different base of leadership in an
emergency period, the different base of legitimizing
decisions, and the like, should be taken into account in
interpreting data, we can carry out a cross-cultural or
cross-societal study of emergency interorganizationa 1
network on the same line as we showed here.
3. FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
(1) Some Limitations of This Research.
There are some limitations in this study. First of a ll,
not all relevant factors are taken into c o n s id e r a tio n .I n
each dimension of the task property, the structural
property, the community property, and the characteristics of
disaster agent, some more factors should be taken into
account. Some examples are the population density, the
difference between the day time population and the 306
population at night, the degree of mitigation efforts in a
community, time and season of occurrence of a disaster,
formalization in interorganizational relationships, the amount of relevant resources each organization has, the
degree of domain consensus, the degree of specialization
each organization has, and the like.
As mentioned in Chapter I, a certain physical forces
can be a disaster only when it has something to do with
a human society. This implies that the degree of
vulnerability of a community has close relation to the
pattern of interorganizational network, because it must have
great influences on such factors as the amount of tasks, the
size of interorganizational network, the average size of
member organizations, and so on.
Pelanda discussed three types of vulnerability.(^0)
Based on his discussion, Hiroi specified several practical
measures of vulnerability. However, Hiroi’s discussion does
not distinguish an important dimension. That is, on the one
hand, a community has a certain degree of vulnerability in
its intrinsical aspects such as the nature of land, the
location, the distance from the sea or river, and so on.
These aspects, which can be called "the objective aspect,"
are not absolute but.relative. The other aspect of
vulnerability influences the degree of the objective aspect.
They usually have some mitigation efforts, whatever the 307 quantity and quality of their efforts may be. For instance, the elaborated disaster prevention planning will mitigate the possible risks posed by the objective aspect of a community. At any rate, the degree of vulnerability can be decided through the interaction of these two aspects of vulnerability, and it is too early at the present time to definitely measure the degree of vulnerability with certain specific indicators.
The second limitation will be that this study paid less attention to the problem of effectiveness in recovery activities. Even in organizational studies, there are lots of viewpoints as to measuring the effectiveness. In measuring the effectiveness of recovery a ctiv itie s, there also exist lots of problems. For example, the shorter the period of recovery activities, the better the responses.
However, the question of how to compare the duration of recovery a c tiv itie s is not easy to solve, because the duration itself is not an absolute concept. The other example is the question of how to evaluate the output.
Should the temporary rehabilitation with the shorter period
be more highly evaluated than the genuine reconstruction
based on a new community plan in the long run? These
problems at the present time keep us from taking into
account the question of effectiveness.
Drabek and others explored some structural dimensions 308 of emergency interorganizational network.In their study, they employed a subjective method to measure the degree of effectiveness. That is, they asked organizational member to subjectively evaluate the effectiveness of their activ ities. This w ill be a practical solution of the question. However, the method poses some serious problems as indicated by Seidler, Pennings, and others.
The third limitation will be regarding the measurement of the degree of centralization and concentration. We used only one indicator for each. A unidimensional definition of a concept often leads us to a fallacious conclusion. If
possible, we should prepare multiple indices for measuring a
concept. In this sense, we have to devise some other indices
for measuring the degrees of centralization and
concentration in future research.
(2) For Further Research
Katagiri proposed a typology of interorganizational
network which is very similar to ours/^^) He focuses on two
dimensions of the existence of coordinating unit and the
transactional nature on a specific issue. His classification
is as shown in Table 66.
The type (I) in his caIssification is correspondent to
the completely decentralized and diffused type in our
patterns, while the type (II) in his discussion is the same 309 as the pattern of the completely centralized and concentrated in our classification. As indicated in Chapter
III, emergency interorganizational networks, especially in
TABLE 66 A CALSSIFICATION OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK BY KATAGIRI
lack of existence coordinating coordinating unit unit manifested (III)A network of (IV)A coordinated confrontation confrontation network latent (I)A market type (II)A highly confrontation of network managed network
Japan, always have coordinating unit(s). If not, each member organization is a coordinating unit in itself. Furthermore, interorganizational networks after a disaster, especially after a natural disaster, are usually characterized by the higher degree of consensus. Therefore, his two axes are not necessarily appropriate to our purpose. However, his discussion on dynamic process of these types is suggestive.
He indicates that an interorganizational network usually changes from the type (I) to the type (IV) in a process of issue development. His discussion itse lf does not have much implication for our purpose. However, it suggests us that we have to consider a dynamic process of our four patterns of 310
interorganizational coordination.
We discussed a little as regards differences in the
patterns. The findings were somewhat contradicted from each other. The historical cases led us to the conclusion that
the pattern in the emergency period was more concentrated
than in the restoration period. The pattern after the Izu
Ohshima Kinkai Earthquake was less centralized and
concentrated in the emergency period than in the restoration
period, while the pattern in the emergency period after the
Miyagi Ken Oki Earthquake was more centralized and
concentrated than in the restoration period. The Nagasaki
disaster by torrential rains suggested that the pattern in
the emergency period was more centralized and concentrated
than in the restoration period. Our findings can be
summarized as in Table 67.
TABLE 67 A COMPARISON OF PATTERNS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION
the emergency the restoration period period
Two Historical more concentrated less concentrated Cases
The Izu Ohshima less centralized more centralized Kinkai less concentrated more concentrated Earthquake
The Miyagi Ken more centralized less centralized Oki Earthquake more concentrated less concentrated
The Nagasaki more centralized less centralized Disaster more concentrated less concentrated 311
As shown in Table 67, a slight tendency can be observed that the pattern is more centralized and concentrated in the emergency period than in the restoration period. However, this has only a heuristic significance. We should take into considerations other stages of disaster process discussed in
Chapter I.
Drabek and others studied mu 1tiorganizationa1 networks emerged for search and rescue a c t i v i t i e s . ^ T h e i r study is worth to review here. Since the summary of their research are presented in the final chapter of their book, we take up their analysis of the tornado disaster at Topeka in 1974 as an example reviewed.
They, first, explore communication structure of multiorganizationa1 network. The frequency of communication among organizations are put in a matrix table, and then classify organizations into some groups focusing on similarity of patterns of communication interaction in terms of the block model analysis. As a result, they distinguish five blocks of organizations, e.g., (1) authority block, (2) primary support block, (3) critical resource block, (4) secondary support block I, and (5) secondary support block
II. Organizations which received information most from other organizations were grouped into authority block.
Decision making structures were confirmed by evaluation
of managers interviewed. The question asked was as follows. 312
Thinking in terms of the major decisions affecting the overall search and rescue operations, rank in order the organizations that made the key decisions.(15)
Furthermore, control structures were confirmed also by managers’ evaluation. The question used was as follows.
If there was an overall chain of command overseeing activities in the area where search and rescue operations were carried on, rank in order up to six organizations that were at the top of the chain of command.(16)
A comparison among these three structures enables us to
indicate that central units in decision making structure
and in control structure were identical and the unit which
received most information from other organizations. This
implies that the frequency of communication w ill be an
indicator for measuring the degree of centralization.
On the other hand, the degree of concentration or
diffusiveness has nothing to do with the frequency of
communication. It describes only the two-dimensional
structure of communication network in terms of the number of
mediation units. Although the number of mediation units is
supposed to be a useful indicator in order to describe a
two-dimensional structure of communication network, some
factors seriously influence the number of mediation units
and, therefore, it is sometimes difficult to catch a real
communication structure. That is, (1) the a v a ila b ility of
communication devices in recovery periods sways a pattern of
communication structure, and (2) it is questionable if a 313 single indicator is enough to describe a communication structure.
The dimension of concentration/diffusiveness seems to connote two things. On the one hand, it implies the distance of communication. On the other hand, it connotes the accessibility from one another. Thus, in addition to our
two indicators for measuring the degrees of centralization and concentration, we have other two indicators for
measuring each degree.
(1) Decision making structure:
(a) the number of units which is a cognition- and evaluation-center. (b) the number of organizations in "authority block" which is obtained in terms of a block model analysis of a matrix of the frequency of communication.
(2) Communication structure:
(a)the number of mediation units in report- and direction-couplings. (b)the accessibility of every organization from one another.
As to a block model analysis, some articles should be
referred to.(^^) Instead, we have to pay more attentions to
the accessibility in communication structure, because the
concept is s till highly ambiguous.
In order to make the concept clear, some insights in a
graph theory are extremely useful. In a graph theory, some
indices for describing a shape of communication structure.
One of those was already discussed in Chapter III. Here, we 314 discuss some more useful indicators.
In a graph theory, a certain space can be treated as either an actual space which has widths and lengths measurable with feet, miles, and so on or a topological space which is an abstracted configuration of a certain space. In order to apply a graph theory to describing a communication structure, we have to treat a communication space as a topological one. Indicators for describing a configuration of communication structure as a topological space, according to
Ohtomo, are calssified into two types, e.g., indicators for measuring the interconnectedness of an network and indicators for measuring the closeness among components of a network.Som e typical indicators in both types are as follows.
(1) Indicator for measuring accessibility: a measure for the degree of reachability of a specific unit to other units in a network.
Ai = %% dij
Ai: accessibility of a certain unit to the unit i. dij: topological distance between the unit i and the unit j.
This indicator shows the number of communication lines between a certaiin unit and a ll of other units in a network. Thus, this is close to our indicators of the degree of concentration, because we have more communication lines when there are more mediation units. 315
(2) Indicator for measuring interconnectedness:
ju = m - n + p
ju : the degree of interconnectedness. Cyclomatic number. m : the number of communication lines, n : the number of units in a network, p : the number of networks.
This indicator shows the degree of complexity of a network.
(3) Indicator for measuring interconnectedness:
2m
r- n(n-l)
^ : a gamma index m : the number of communication lines, n : the number of units in communication flow.
The gamma index shows the degree of interconnectedness in comparison with a completely interconnected network in which all component units are directly interconnected.
(4) Indicator for measuring closeness:
“ " Ç? I? D : Shimbel indicator. dij : the shortest distance between the units i and j.
Some other indicators are, as a matter of course, available as indicated by Ohtomo or by Flament.^^^^ However, 316 since an exhaustive list of these indicators is not necessarily fruitful, we explore these four indicators.
The calculation of an accessibility indicators of all component organizations in an interorganizational network and the sum of them give us an overall communication distance in the network. The greater the sum of the values of accessibility indicators, the greater the overall communication distance in the network, and, therefore, the more diffused in our sense.
The cyclomatic number, which shows the degree of interconnectedness, is a scale for the degree of complexity of a network. The greater the cyclomatic number, the higher the degree of complexity of a network. This implies that the greater the cyclomatic number, the more diffused in our term.
The gamma index shows the degree of interconnectedness in comparison with the completely interconnected network.
The completely interconnected network means the network which has the maximum degree of diffusiveness, because every component units can be a meadiation unit in communication flow. Therefore, the greater the score of the gamma index, the more the degree of diffusiveness.
The Shimbel indicator shows the degree of diffusiveness of a network. In this case, the concept of diffusiveness is used in a slightly different meaning from ours. That is, it 317 refers to the degree of independence of a component unit.
The value of the Shimbel indicator becomes smaller as the degree of diffusiveness decreases.
Although each of these indicators can be related to the degree of diffusiveness in our term as above, they are not necessarily an alternative of the number of mediation units in report- and direction-couplings. The following example w ill give us that these indicators from a graph theory are different from our indicator of concentration/diffusiveness.
Let's consider the following two types of network.
In Network A, the cyclomatic number can be calculated as in Table 68.
(d)
(b)
( 8 ) (f)(f) (g)
SAMPLE NETWORK (A) SAMPLE NETWORK (B) FIGURE 48 FIGURE 49
If we use the only one indicator of the number of mediation unit as we did in the previous chapters, both networks has the same number of mediation units as shown in
Table 69, and, as a result, it often leads to a conclusion
that they have the same degree of concentration. 318
TABLE 68 CALCUALTION OF THE CYCLOMATIC NUMBER
NETWORK A NETWORK B m:the number of lines 6 7 n:the number of units 7 7 p:the number of networks 1 1
the cyclomatic number 0 1
TABLE 69 THE NUMBER OF MEDIATION UNITS IN TWO TYPES OF NETWORK
NETWORK A NETWORK B
The number of mediation units :
(a) - (b) 0 0 (a) - (c) 1 1 ( a ) - (d) 1 1 (a) - (e) 2 2 (a) - (f) 1 1 (a) - (g) 2 2 The total number of mediation units : 7 7
It is doubtless that, in addition to our measure of the degree of concentration, employing these indicators or the concept of the average cutting number introduced in Chapter
III on the basis of Mayhew's discussion enables us to elaborate the dimension of concentration/diffusiveness.^^®^
As regards the effectiveness of emergency 319 interorganizational network, Drabek and others measured in terms of respondents' evaluation on their activities as mentioned ear lie r .(^1) They asked managers to evaluate in the following four items; e.g., (1) the degree of preparedness of each organization, (2) the degree of confrontation between their organization and other organizations, (3) the degree of coordination between their organization and other organizations, and (4) the degree of achievement of their emergency goals. Although it will be a practical method to solve the problem, it inevitably poses the problems of reliablity of data and representativeness of respondents, as indicated earlier.
If we accept the major premise that coordination activities are essential in interorganizational networks, and that coordination consists of communication and decision making, we can measure the degree of effectiveness in terms of the effectiveness in communication activities. In fact,
Smart=Vertinsky indicates that implementation of a certain decision depends upon (1) degree of programming and (2)
distance between implementation and decision u n i t s . (^2)
These two factors are the matter of decision making and communication.
The problems in communication a c tiv itie s which are often indicated are as the following five.^^^^
(1) distortion of information, (2) omission of information. 320
(3) overload of information, (4) delay of communication, (5) failure or rejection of receiving information.
Smart=Vertinsky indicate the following four type of decision errors.
(1) rejecting a correct course of action, (2) accepting a wrong solution to a problem, (3) solving the wrong problem, (4) solving the right problem correctly but too late.
These items can be standards to evaluate communication and decision making activities. In further research, the problem of how to measure the degree of effectiveness should be solved in a certain way and the four prototypes of interorganizational coordination should be empirically evaluated in actual disastrous scenes. 321
NOTES
1. J. Eugene Haas and Thomas E.Drabek, Complex Organizations ; A Sociological Perspective (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1973)
2. F.E. Emery and E.L.Trist, "The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments" in Human Relations 18 (1965)
Paul R. Lawrence and J.W.Lorsch, Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (Boston: Harvard University, 1967)
3. Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships" in Administrative Science Quarterly 5 (1961)
4. Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1979)
Karen S. Cook, "Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations" in J. Kenneth Benson ed.. Organizational Analysis : Critique and Innovation (Beverly Hills : Sage Publications, 1977)
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations : A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978)
5. Howard E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (1979)
Karen S. Cook, "Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganizational Relations" (1977)
Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: _____ A Resource Dependence Perspective
Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships" (1961)
6. Eugene Litwak and Lydia F. Hylton, "Interorganizational Analysis : A Hypothesis on Co-ordinating Agencies" in Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (1962)
7. Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971) 322
8. Herman Turk, 0 i^£ji _s i.£_M J.£ (San Francisco; Jossey Bass, 1977)
9. As to other factors which seem to influence the pattern of interorganizational coordination, Kilijanek indicates nineteen factors under three dimensions of (1) organizational properties, (2) interorganizational properties, and (3) characteristics of disaster agent. We 11er = Kreps insist that studies on effectiveness of recovry activities should take into account nineteen indenpendent variables and six intermediate variables, which are pigeonholed into seven categories; e.g., (1) ecological or demographic factors, (2) organizational structure in a community, (3) experience of disasters, (4) preparedness for and program of emergency system, (5) communication structure and the amount of resouces for communication a c tiv itie s in a normal situation, (6) relationships of a community with external world, (7) characteristics of disaster agent.
T.S. Kilijanek, The Emergence of Interorganizational Communication Networks Following Natural Disasters (Technical Report No.8 of SAR Research Project, University of Denver, 1980)
J.M. W eller and G.A. Kreps," A Model of Community Coordination in Response to Disasters" (Disaster Research Center Working Paper No.29, the Ohio State University, 1970)
10. C. Pelanda, " Disaster and Sociosystemic Vulnerability" (Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper 68, the Ohio State University, 1981)
Osamu Hiroi, " Urban D isasters" in I n s titu te of Journalism and Communication ed.. Disaster and Human Behavior (Tokyo: the University of Tokyo Press, 1982)
11. T.E. Drabek et.als.. Managing Mu 1 tiorganizationa 1 Emergency Responses (Monograph No.33, Institute of Behavioral Science, the Univeristy of Colorado, 1981)
12. John Seidler, " On Using Informants: A Technique for Collecting Quantitative Data and Controlling Measurement Error in Organization Analysis" in American Sociological Review Vol.39, (1974) pp.816 - 831
J.M. Pennings,"Measures of Organizational Structure: A Methodological Note" in American Journal of Sociology 79 (1973) pp.686 - 704 323
13. Shinji Katagiri, "Chiiki Seiji eno Soshiki Renkan Approach (An Interorganizational Approach to Local Politics)" in Japanese Sociological Review33-3 (1982)
14. T.E. Drabek et.als., Managing Mu11iorganizationa 1 Emergency Responses (1981)
15. T.E. Drabek et. als.. Managing M u 11 i or ga ni za t i ona 1 Emergency Responses (1981) p.46
16. T.E. Drabek et. als.. Managing Mu 1tiorganizationa1 Emergency Responses (1981) p.49
17. As regards a blockmodel analysis of organizations, refer to the following articles.
D.Knoke and D.L.Rogers, "A Blockmodel Analysis of Interorganizational Networks" in Sociology and Social Research 64-1 (1979)
T.S.Kilijanek and T.E.Drabek, "A Blockmodel of an Interorganizational Network; Potentials and Problems" A Paper presented at the 1979 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society, Menneapolis, Minn. (1979)
Yasumasa Yamamoto, "Saigai to Soshiki (Disaster and Organizations)" in Hirotada Hirose ed.. Social Scientific Approach to Disaster (Tokyo: Shinyosha, 1981) pp.49-81
18. Atsushi Ohtomo, Chiiki Bunseki Nyumon (An Introduction to The Analysis of A Community) (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1982)
19. Atsushi Ohtomo, Chiiki Bunseki Nyumon (An Introduction to The Analysis of A Community) (1982) pp.191-204
Claude Element, Applications of Graph Theory to Group Structure (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963) translated by Kunio Yamamoto (Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1974)
2 0. B. H. Mayhew, " H ierarch ical D iffe re n tia tio n in Imperatively Coordinated Associations" in S. B. Bacharach ed.. Research in the Sociology of Organizations Vol.2 (Greenwich: JAl Presj, 1983) pp.153-229
21.T.E. Drabek et. als.. Managing M ultiorganizational Emergency Responses (1981)
22. C. Smart and 1. Vertinsky, "Designs for Crisis Decision 324
Units" in Administrative Science Quarterly 22 (1977) pp.640-657
23. R.M. Steers, Organizational Effectiveness; A Behavioral View (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing, 1977) pp.149-150
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