Tsunami Generation of the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earthquake
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Fault Model of the 12Th Century Southwestern Hokkaido Earthquake
Ioki et al. Earth, Planets and Space (2019) 71:54 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40623-019-1034-6 FULL PAPER Open Access Fault model of the 12th century southwestern Hokkaido earthquake estimated from tsunami deposit distributions Kei Ioki1* , Yuichiro Tanioka2, Gentaro Kawakami3, Yoshihiro Kase3, Kenji Nishina3, Wataru Hirose3, Kei’ichi Hayashi3 and Ryo Takahashi3 Abstract Tsunami deposits were collected along the coast of southwestern Hokkaido and Okushiri Island, northern Japan. The distribution of these deposits suggested that large earthquakes and tsunamis have repeatedly occurred of south- western Hokkaido. Along the southern coast of Okushiri Island, fve tsunami sand/gravel layers have been deposited during the last 3000 years. The latest was deposited by the 1741 Oshima–Oshima landslide tsunami and the second by the 12th century tsunami. The later tsunami was probably generated by a large earthquake because submarine seismo-turbidites with similar age exist in the region and a large inland landslide had occurred in Okushiri Island in approximately the 12th century. The ages of paleo-tsunami events prior to the 12th century are 1.5–1.6, 2.4–2.6, 2.8–3.1 ka. In this study, a fault model of the 12th century earthquake was estimated by comparing tsunami deposit distributions and calculated tsunami inundation areas at fve sites in Okushiri Island and Hiyama region. Fault model F17, a submarine active fault in the Japan Sea near Oshima–Oshima, is a probable source for this tsunami. Numerical simulation of the tsunami was performed based on fault model F17; we modifed the fault parameters (length and slip amount) from the original model to explain tsunami deposit distributions. -
Ground Liquefaction Is Not Dangerous for Human Lives
13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering Vancouver, B.C., Canada August 1-6, 2004 Paper No. 3225 GROUND LIQUEFACTION IS NOT DANGEROUS FOR HUMAN LIVES Motohiko HAKUNO1 SUMMARY The casualties by the liquefaction of the ground in the past earthquakes for 60 years in Japan are only six persons and more than ten thousands by other causes. It seems to be the following two reasons why we have so small number of casualties by the liquefaction of the ground like this. 1. The S wave of earthquake ground motion does not propagate into liquid, therefore, the earthquake motion on the surface of the ground upon the liquefied layer is not so severe. 2. Although the ground liquefaction causes the phenomenon of inclination, subsidence, and float-up of the structure, the process of these phenomena goes very slowly, therefore, people can have the time to refuge from the breaking structure. Although the loss of human lives due to the ground liquefaction are negligibly small, the economical loss due to such as the inclination or subsidence of structures occur by the liquefaction, however, the amount of those loss is not so much, because the economical damage of liquefaction occurs not frequently, but once every two or three years, and it is limited in narrow areas in Japan. Therefore, I would like to propose not to conduct the liquefaction countermeasures of ground all over the country because it is not economical. Of course, the sufficient liquefaction countermeasure should be done on such structure as the earth dam near the city by the liquefied collapse of which a lot of human lives would be lost. -
USGS Open File Report 2007-1365
Investigation of the M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007 Robert Kayen, Brian Collins, Norm Abrahamson, Scott Ashford, Scott J. Brandenberg, Lloyd Cluff, Stephen Dickenson, Laurie Johnson, Yasuo Tanaka, Kohji Tokimatsu, Toshimi Kabeyasawa, Yohsuke Kawamata, Hidetaka Koumoto, Nanako Marubashi, Santiago Pujol, Clint Steele, Joseph I. Sun, Ben Tsai, Peter Yanev, Mark Yashinsky, Kim Yousok Open File Report 2007–1365 2007 U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey 1 U.S. Department of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne, Secretary U.S. Geological Survey Mark D. Myers, Director U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia 2007 For product and ordering information: World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth, its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment: World Wide Web: http://www.usgs.gov Telephone: 1-888-ASK-USGS Suggested citation: Kayen, R., Collins, B.D., Abrahamson, N., Ashford, S., Brandenberg, S.J., Cluff, L., Dickenson, S., Johnson, L., Kabeyasawa, T., Kawamata, Y., Koumoto, H., Marubashi, N., Pujol, S., Steele, C., Sun, J., Tanaka, Y., Tokimatsu, K., Tsai, B., Yanev, P., Yashinsky , M., and Yousok, K., 2007. Investigation of the M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake of July 16, 2007: U.S. Geological Survey, Open File Report 2007-1365, 230pg; [available on the World Wide Web at URL http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1365/]. Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. -
Great East Japan Earthquake, Jr East Mitigation Successes, and Lessons for California High-Speed Rail
MTI Funded by U.S. Department of Services Transit Census California of Water 2012 Transportation and California Great East Japan Earthquake, Department of Transportation JR East Mitigation Successes, and Lessons for California High-Speed Rail MTI ReportMTI 12-02 MTI Report 12-37 December 2012 MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE MTI FOUNDER Hon. Norman Y. Mineta The Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) was established by Congress in 1991 as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act (ISTEA) and was reauthorized under the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st century (TEA-21). MTI then successfully MTI BOARD OF TRUSTEES competed to be named a Tier 1 Center in 2002 and 2006 in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Most recently, MTI successfully competed in the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2011 to Founder, Honorable Norman Thomas Barron (TE 2015) Ed Hamberger (Ex-Officio) Michael Townes* (TE 2014) be named a Tier 1 Transit-Focused University Transportation Center. The Institute is funded by Congress through the United States Mineta (Ex-Officio) Executive Vice President President/CEO Senior Vice President Department of Transportation’s Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R), University Transportation Secretary (ret.), US Department of Strategic Initiatives Association of American Railroads Transit Sector Transportation Parsons Group HNTB Centers Program, the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. Vice Chair Steve Heminger (TE 2015) Hill & Knowlton, Inc. Joseph Boardman (Ex-Officio) Executive Director Bud Wright (Ex-Officio) Chief Executive Officer Metropolitan Transportation Executive Director The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface Honorary Chair, Honorable Bill Amtrak Commission American Association of State transportation modes. -
400869 Why Did Tsunami Fires? : in the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki and The
NH41C-1012 Why did tsunami fire? : in the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki and the 2011 Tohoku-Oki earthquakes Yuji Enomoto* & Tsuneaki Yamabe (Shinshu Univ.)Shigeki Sugiura & Hitoshi Kondo (Geneses Res. Inst. Inc.) *Corresponding author, e-mail: [email protected] 130° 140° 150° 1993 M7.8 45° Aonae district a Hokkaido b c e f Nansei-Oki eq. Hokkaido M7.8 (Depth:35km) 5 4 Okushiri 3 5 4 3 2 island Hokkaido 40° 2 Tohoku Okushiri Tsunami 2011 M9 Tohoku-Oki eq. NHK Video 1 camera d g ̴10min 1 Okushiri 35° Island after ̴a few the e.q. min. Honshu at later 50km 22:17JST 30° Aonae 100m Fig.1 a right & g; the Okushiri-cho kirokusho on 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki jisin:Tsunami simulation by Disaster Control Research Center, Tohoku University, :1b & e photo by Geographical Survey Inst.: c,d & f, NHK TV Special Program “Okushiri-toh karano Houkoku, aired at 20:00-20:50 on 16 July 1993. Mysterious tsunami fires When the tsunami struck Aonae Mesh Labo-experiments, where a weight was a) Electrode To: have occurred at the Aonae district, a people who witnessed mA meter at electrode Falling bias 0 volt, dropped on the seawater bubbled with methane, this situation testify as follows: weight: or district of Okushiri Island, 1.5kg Electrostatic showed that splashed mists were positively Hokkaido ,Japan in the 1993 “Mists was rising, and sea Voltmeter charged (Fig.3 b & c). Hokkaido Nansei-Oki water was foaming” A b) c) I (uA) 200 earthquake (Fig.1a). About 10 similar scene could be observed 1 2 3 0 minutes after the M7.8 in the video footage shot during Acrylic pipe50mm 100 , mA Deionized water Time, sec. -
An Investigation on the Liquefaction Behavior of Sandy Sloped Ground During the 1964 Niigata Earthquake
6th Japan-Taiwan Workshop on Geotechnical Hazards from Large Earthquakes and Heavy Rainfall July 12-15, 2014, Kitakyushu, Fukuoka, Japan An investigation on the liquefaction behavior of sandy sloped ground during the 1964 Niigata Earthquake Chiaro, G., Koseki, J. and Kiyota, T. Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo, Japan email: [email protected] INTRODUCTION Liquefaction of sloped ground is a major natural phenomenon of geotechnical significance associated with damage during earthquakes, which is not fully understood yet. To address this issue, in this paper, a simplified procedure for predicting earthquake-induced sloped ground failure, namely liquefaction and shear failure, is proposed and validated by predicting the liquefaction-induced large-deformation slope failure that occurred in Ebigase area (Niigata City, Japan) during the 1964 Niigata earthquake. A SEMPLIFIED PROCEDURE FOR SEISMIC SLOPE FAILURE ASSESSMENT The proposed simplified procedure for seismic sloped ground failure analysis consists of a framework where cyclic stress ratio (CSR), static stress ratio (SSR) and undrained shear strength (USS) are formulated considering simple shear conditions, which simulate field stress during earthquakes more realistically. In this procedure, the occurrence or not of ground failure is assessed by means of a plot ηmax (= [SSR+CSR]/USS) vs. ηmin (= [SSR- CSR]/USS), where a liquefaction zone, a shear failure zone and a safe zone (i.e. no- liquefaction and no-failure) are defined. The earthquake–induced CSR at a depth z below the ground is formulated by adjusting the well-known simplified procedure for evaluating the CSR [1] to the case of simple shear conditions: cyclic 0.65 (amax / ag ) rd (1) CSR7.5 p0 ' MSF [(1 2 K0 ) / 3] [1 0.5 (zw / z)] where MSF [6.9 exp(Mw / 4) 0.058] 1.8 ; rd (1 0.015 z) ; amax = peak ground acceleration (g); ag = gravity acceleration (=1 g); Mw = earthquake moment magnitude; K0 = coefficient of earth pressure at rest; z = depth below the ground surface (m); zw = depth below water level (m). -
Postseismic Crustal Deformation Following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei- Oki Earthquake, Northern Japan: Evidence for a Low-Viscosity
JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH, VOL. 108, NO. B3, 2151, doi:10.1029/2002JB002067, 2003 Postseismic crustal deformation following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei- oki earthquake, northern Japan: Evidence for a low-viscosity zone in the uppermost mantle Hideki Ueda National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention, Tsukuba, Japan Masakazu Ohtake and Haruo Sato Department of Geophysics, Graduate School of Science, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan Received 3 July 2002; revised 5 November 2002; accepted 19 November 2002; published 14 March 2003. [1] Postseismic crustal deformation following the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-oki earthquake (M = 7.8), northern Japan, was observed by GPS, tide gauge, and leveling measurements in southwestern Hokkaido. As a result of comprehensively analyzing these three kinds of geodetic data, we found the chief cause of the postseismic deformation to be viscoelastic relaxation of the coseismic stress change in the uppermost mantle. Afterslip on the main shock fault and its extension, by contrast, cannot explain the deformation without unrealistic assumptions. The viscoelastic structure, which we estimated from the postseismic deformation, consists of three layers: an elastic first layer with thickness of 40 km, a viscoelastic second layer with thickness of 50 km and viscosity of 4 Â 1018 Pa s, and an elastic half-space. This model suggests the presence of an anomalously low- viscosity zone in the uppermost mantle. The depth of the viscoelastic layer roughly agrees with that of the high-temperature portion and the low-Vp zones of the mantle wedge beneath the coast of the Japan Sea in northern Honshu. These correlations suggest that the low-viscosity primarily results from high temperature of the mantle material combined with partial melt and the presence of H2O. -
Island Island
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The Role of Diffraction Effects in Extreme Run-Up Inundation at Okushiri Island Due to 1993 Tsunami
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 15, 747–755, 2015 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/15/747/2015/ doi:10.5194/nhess-15-747-2015 © Author(s) 2015. CC Attribution 3.0 License. The role of diffraction effects in extreme run-up inundation at Okushiri Island due to 1993 tsunami K. O. Kim1, D. C. Kim2, B. H. Choi3, K. T. Jung1, J. H. Yuk4, and E. Pelinovsky5,6 1Marine Radionuclide Research Center, Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology, Ansan, 426-744, Korea 2Technology R&D Institute, Hyein E&C Co. Ltd., Seoul, 157-861, Korea 3Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Chunchun-dong 300, Jangan-gu, Suwon, 440-746, Korea 4Disaster Management HPC Technology Research Center, Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information, Daejeon, 305-806, Korea 5Nizhny Novgorod State Technical University n.a. R.E. Alekseev, Nizhny Novgorod, 603950, Russia 6Institute of Applied Physics, Nizhny Novgorod, 603950, Russia Correspondence to: B. H. Choi ([email protected]) Received: 15 October 2014 – Published in Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. Discuss.: 13 November 2014 Revised: 27 February 2015 – Accepted: 4 March 2015 – Published: 8 April 2015 Abstract. The tsunami generated on 12 July 1993 by 1 Introduction the Hokkaido–Nansei–Oki earthquake (Mw D 7.8) brought about a maximum wave run-up of 31.7 m, the highest The tsunami generated on 12 July 1993 by the Hokkaido– recorded in Japan during the 20th century, near the Monai Nansei–Oki earthquake (Mw D 7:8) produced the worst lo- Valley on the west coast of Okushiri Island (Hokkaido cal tsunami-related death toll in Japan in 50 years, bring- Tsunami Survey Group, 1993). -
Liquefaction Damage of Sandy and Volcanic Grounds in the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earthquake
Missouri University of Science and Technology Scholars' Mine International Conferences on Recent Advances 1995 - Third International Conference on Recent in Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Advances in Geotechnical Earthquake Soil Dynamics Engineering & Soil Dynamics 06 Apr 1995, 10:30 am - 12:30 pm Liquefaction Damage of Sandy and Volcanic Grounds in the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earthquake S. Miura Muroran Institute of Technology, Japan K. Yagi Chizaki Kogyo Co. Ltd., Japan S. Kawamura Hokkaido College, Senshu University, Japan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icrageesd Part of the Geotechnical Engineering Commons Recommended Citation Miura, S.; Yagi, K.; and Kawamura, S., "Liquefaction Damage of Sandy and Volcanic Grounds in the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earthquake" (1995). International Conferences on Recent Advances in Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Soil Dynamics. 3. https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/icrageesd/03icrageesd/session03/3 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Conferences on Recent Advances in Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Soil Dynamics by an authorized administrator of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact [email protected]. (\ Proceedings: Third International Conference on Recent Advances in Geotechnical Earthquake Engineering and Soil Dynamics, '-'1 April2-7, 1995, Volume I, St.louis, Missouri Liquefaction Damage of Sandy and Volcanic Grounds in the 1993 Hokkaido Nansei-Oki Earthquake Paper No. -
Unusual Rupture Process of the Japan Sea Earthquake
Eos, Vol. 74, No. 34, August 24, 1993 ure 4, which shows the result of multiple Unusual Rupture currence of large, shallow, underthrusting shock inversion of P-waves recorded by the earthquakes on the west coast of Honshu IRIS network. Process of the Japan and Hokkaido is somewhat odd. Nonethe less, there is now almost a continuous link Vertical displacements of Okushiri were age of the rupture areas of such earthquakes measured by Shimamoto et al. (Shimamoto Sea Earthquake off the western coasts of Honshu and Hok et al., personal communication, 1993). Ac PAGES 377, 379-380 kaido, and this activity extends north to cording to Shimamoto et al., the earthquake Sakalin. subsided and tilted the island. The amount On July 12, 1993, a large earthquake and The August 2, 1940, earthquake ruptured of subsidence ranges from about 20 cm associated tsunami caused terrible damage the northernmost segment along this margin; (±10 cm) at the northern end to about 90 to the Japan Sea side of Japan, Korea, and the June 16, 1964, Niigata earthquake rup cm (±10 cm) at the southern end of the is Russia. The southwestern shore of Hokkaido tured the southernmost segment; and the land. This Okushiri subsidence seems to and Okushiri Island were particularly hard May 26, 1983, Japan Sea earthquake then support the idea that the earthquake's main hit. All aspects of this earthquake will un filled in a segment off northern Honshu [see rupture occurred on the westerly dipping doubtedly be studied in great detail. This Fukao and Furumoto, 1975; Satake, 1986]. -
Fire Following Tsunami – a Contribution to the Next Wave Tsunami Scenario Charles Scawthorn, SPA Risk LLC
Fire Following Tsunami – A Contribution to the Next Wave Tsunami Scenario Charles Scawthorn, SPA Risk LLC Introduction and Summary This section assesses the potential for fires following the scenario tsunami. We begin with a brief review of fires following historic tsunamis and the related literature, in order to gain insight into ignition and fire spread mechanisms under post-tsunami conditions. The review reveals that tsunamigenic fires are typically fueled by spreading water borne liquid fuels released from petrochemical facilities damaged by the tsunami. Based on this finding, we then examine the scenario affected area for petrochemical facilities, identifying 47 major tank farms and other facilities that might be impacted by the tsunami. This examination reveals two areas, the port of Richmond (in San Francisco Bay) and the port complex of Los Angeles / Long Beach, that contain petrochemical facilities that may be impacted by the tsunami, leading to spreading oil fires borne on the tsunami waters. Given the concentration of oil tank farms in the Ports of Richmond, and especially in the POLA/POLB complex, we feel it is possible but not very likely that a spreading fire will result from tsunami damage in at least one of these facilities. If such a fire were to occur, in the context of a tsunami and its attendant other damage, it is likely it would spread over water to other facilities, resulting in a common cause fire and possibly destruction of several of these facilities. Lastly, there are typically several tankers at berths in POLA/POLB - given the perhaps two to four hour warning for the scenario tsunami, it is quite possible that one or more oil tankers may be caught in the harbor and contribute to the size and severity of any spreading fire.