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Letters [email protected] Lavelle and Schwalier famous military scapegoats, Kimmel, not to be useful and was transferred Your recent editorial “Justice Rejected” Short, and McVay, are so far the same to TAC in 1957, along with many other [March, p. 2] accurately reports that John as for Lavelle and Schwalier: none. fighters. Thus RAF Stations Bentwaters D. Lavelle continues to be denied justice Tom Kimmel and Woodbridge played important roles. in the face of overwhelming evidence that Cocoa Beach, Fla. The principal architect was Lt. Col. John he honorably carried out the orders of his Burns, who led the effort when we were Commander in Chief. It is disappointing Matador and Mace at Bergstrom Air Force Base at Austin, to note that Senator McCain has not fol­ I read with great interest the article Tex., in 1958. I was proud to play a sup­ lowed up on his promise to act quickly on titled, “Victor Alert,” in the March 2011 porting role. the nomination for posthumous promo­ issue of Air Force Magazine [p. 58]. Al­ Lt. Gen. Phil Gast, tion, particularly when one considers that though the author did a good job describ­ USAF (Ret.) his grandfather, Admiral John S. (“Slew”) ing the role that the fighter squadrons Durham, N.C. McCain, is the only other senior officer to played in supporting the Victor Alert effort be promoted posthumously to four­star in Europe, there were several missile Thanks for recognizing those who rank after being fired from his job. organizations that supported the Victor spent time in those alert facilities, McCain had led the fast carrier task Alert requirement during the period of but you did not mention that senior force in the Pacific Ocean Theatre through the article that were not mentioned. enlisted personnel were assigned in the decisive naval battles of World War Rebecca Grant did not even recognize 1968 to manage and operate Victor II with great skill and courage. He took the fact that the TM­76A (MGM­13B) Alert facilities. January 1968, I was the blame, and was denied promotion to Mace missiles of the 38th Tactical Missile reassigned from Wurtsmith Air Force four stars, when Admiral Halsey ordered Wing carried most of the Victor targets Base to RAF Weathersfield as the his forces to stay on station in the face of during the period from the summer of NCOIC of Victor Alert, along with four Typhoon Cobra which bore down on the 1961 through August 1966. (The Mace technical sergeants. We replaced four fleet. It resulted in the loss of 800 men missiles were deactivated in September lieutenants and a captain because of and 146 aircraft. In today’s parlance, of 1966.) There were six launch sites the shortage of officer personnel due Halsey was “too big to fail”; he was a with eight missiles (and later 12 missiles) to the Vietnam conflict. I believe that national figure of great stature. each that stood Victor Alert. Compare that I was the first NCO in USAFE to be McCain died shortly after returning with two Victor Alert aircraft per fighter certified as a Victor Alert duty officer home after the surrender of the Japanese. squadron assigned to USAFE during (VADO). We were informed that we A few years later, he was posthumously that period to get an idea of the portion were the test case to see if we could promoted to the four­star rank he had of the Victor Alert workload carried by perform these duties. richly deserved. Senator McCain briefly the 38th Tactical Missile Wing. Our duties were to maintain the relates the story in his book Faith of our Maj. Robert W. O’Brien, operation center on a 24­hour basis. Fathers. Mrs. Jo Lavelle (age 91) quietly USAF (Ret.) There were only five of us, and we had awaits similar justice for her beloved San Pedro, Calif. to have one man on standby to open a spouse. secondary VA in the event we had to Lt. Gen. Aloysius G. Casey, The article “Victor Alert” I believe has load all of our 70 F­100s in an emer­ USAF (Ret.) omitted an important part of the nuclear gency. This required me to establish Redlands, Calif. deterrent forces in Western Europe in a 10­hour day shift and 14­hour night the 1950s and 1960s. shift. We had an 18­bedroom facility that Air Force Magazine Editor in Chief The tactical missile Matador, TM­61C, was only fully used during a buildup Adam Hebert seemed surprised that was deployed to Germany from 1954 of all aircraft, and we were required to General Lavelle and General Schwalier to 1961, three missile groups strong. It ensure the security and feeding of all have not been treated fairly. was replaced by the Mace TM­76 from assigned personnel. Additionaly, we Perhaps the Navy can offer some clar­ 1961 to 1969. ity to this matter: “Even admitting for the Wilmer Schimke, sake of argument all of the facts alledged, New London, Wis. Do you have a comment about a ... the more important consideration current article in the magazine? in these cases is, ... unapologetically, Your readers might be interested to Write to “Letters,” Air Force Mag­ protection of the established scope of know that in early 1959, the F­101A/C a­­­­­zine, 1501 Lee Highway, Ar­ lington, VA 22209­1198. (E­mail: Presidential power itself.” became the first single­seat fighter to [email protected].) Letters should So wrote Cmdr. Roger Scott in his become operational in England as a 24­ be concise and timely. We cannot June 1998 Military Law Review article hour, day­night, all­weather Victor Alert. acknowledge receipt of letters. (Vol. 156, p. 52) “Kimmel, Short, McVay: That was not what the Soviets wanted, We reserve the right to condense Case Studies in Executive Authority, for we were providing around­the­clock letters. Letters without name and Law, and Individual Rights of Military good/bad weather coverage in the event city/base and state are not accept­ Commanders.” they were to attack NATO. able. Photographs can­­not be used A comparison of the results so far The F­101 was procured by SAC or returned.—the editors obtained for requested relief of other to escort the B­47, then determined 8 AIR FORCE Magazine / May 2011 Letters determined the runway to be used and Forgotten Defectors? clouds, shut off all communications, and weather in the target and recovery area. Having read with great interest your headed west. When he was about to run We maintained coding material for substantive article on “Spying on the out of fuel, he spotted a potato field and the aircraft launch and the arming of the MiGs,” I was disappointed in not seeing a decided that he would be worth more nukes and were trained to manually arm reference to a MiG delivered to the West to the West if he could deliver his MiG, a nuke if the aircraft system failed to arm by a Soviet pilot in mid­1967 [March, p. besides himself. He circled the field and the bomb. The senior bomb commander 78]. The pilot in question had planned landed, wheels up, after ripping through and the VADO each were armed with a to defect to the West while stationed in some telephone wires and just barely 45 mm handgun and both had the com­ Czechoslovakia. He planned on doing making it over an irrigation levee. He bination to their separate locks on the so in the course of one of the training/ sat on the plane’s wing, fired his pistol safe. No one person had access to the scramble exercises. However, there were into the air, and finally decided to walk code material or to the aircraft. During an two obstacles to his plan: 1) a lack of out to a road he remembered seeing alert when we received a coded message a detailed map showing areas beyond while circling the field. On the road, he from the command post, we placed the East Germany, and 2) a limited supply saw an approaching old station wagon. pilots in the aircraft cockpit, and upon a of fuel. Nevertheless once his unit was He stopped the driver and asked him: launch order, we broadcasted the launch given the go­ahead—after many delays “East or West?” “West,” replied the message. Before we placed the pilots in and false starts—he dove into some driver. As a USAF Reserve captain, I, their aircraft, they were informed of the runway to be used and the weather in the target and recovery area. On a day­to­day basis, we preflighted all alert aircraft, and on Thursdays we ran up each aircraft. I had an aircraft maintenance NCO, but each aircraft that entered VA came with its crew chief who was required to maintain the aircraft. When we were placed on alert, such as a NATO Tactical Evaluation, we opened a secondary VA and began to build up all available aircraft. The alert usually ran for 10 to 14 days. We placed trucks in front of our nuclear­loaded aircraft to prevent an unauthorized launch when the other aircraft were launched. Upon H hour, we broadcast the aircraft launch message that began the movement of all aircraft. I managed the RAF Weatherfield alert facility for more than two years before being reassigned as the superintendent for wing operations. Six months later, in June 1970, RAF Weathersfield was closed and the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing (20thTFW) moved to RAF Upper Heyford to transition into F­111s.

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