Burma Policy Briefing Nr 8 February 2012

Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic Peace

Since the end of 2011, Burma/’s1 Conclusions and Recommendations government has held peace talks with all major ethnic armed groups in  The new cease-fire talks initiated by the the country. The talks represent a much government are a significant needed change from the failed ethnic poli- break with the failed ethnic policies of the cies of the last decades. They are an impor- past and should be welcomed. However, tant first step by the military-backed Thein the legacy of decades of war and oppression Sein government – which came to power in has created deep mistrust among different March 2011 – towards achieving national ethnic nationality communities, and ethnic reconciliation and peace in the country, conflict cannot be solved overnight. which has been divided by civil war since  A halt to all offensive military operations independence in 1948. By February 2012, and human rights abuses against local civil- initial peace agreements had been reached ians must be introduced and maintained. with most ethnic armed opposition groups.  The government has promised ethnic Solving Burma’s ethnic conflicts requires peace talks at the national level, but has yet breaking with the practices of the past. to provide details on the process or set out After the 1962 coup d'état, successive a timetable. In order to end the conflict and military-backed governments refused to to achieve true ethnic peace, the current take ethnic minority political demands into talks must move beyond simply establish- account, primarily treating ethnic concerns ing new cease-fires. as a security threat requiring a military  It is vital that the process towards ethnic response. After 1988 they also established peace and justice is sustained by political cease-fire arrangements in some parts of dialogue at the national level, and that key the country which did not address ethnic ethnic grievances and aspirations are conflict, but rather established a ‘neither addressed. war nor peace’ situation.2 This is part of a long and consistent pattern, with the mili-  There are concerns about economic de- tary government focusing on ‘managing’ velopment in the conflict zones and ethnic conflict rather than solving it.3 borderlands as a follow-up to the peace agreements, as events and models in the The uncertainty of the cease-fire situation past caused damage to the environment also facilitated unsustainable economic and local livelihoods, generating further developments, including uncontrolled grievances. Failures from the past must be logging and mining activities, leading to identified and addressed. loss of livelihoods among local communi-  ties and environmental degradation, caus- Peace must be understood as an over- ing new grievances to develop.4 Meanwhile arching national issue, which concerns fighting continued against ethnic forces in citizens of all ethnic groups in the country, other borderlands where cease-fires had including the Burman majority.

Burma Policy Briefing | 1 not been agreed. Military campaigns of the and was superseded by the State Peace and (armed forces) against these Development Council (SPDC). Following ethnic forces have been accompanied by ethnic mutinies that caused the collapse of severe human rights abuses, and have the once-powerful Communist Party of directly targeted the civilian population, Burma (CPB) in 1989, newly formed ethnic causing large numbers of people to be forces quickly agreed to truces offered by displaced or seek refuge in neighbouring the SLORC. These include the Myanmar countries.5 National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang region, the Ethnic conflict has ravaged the country United Wa State Army (UWSA) in the Wa since independence, and cannot be solved region, and the National Democratic Alli- overnight. Cease-fire agreements negoti- ance Army (NDAA) in the Mongla region. ated at the local level between different They had lost trust in the CPB’s mostly- armed ethnic opposition groups and the Burman leadership and saw that China had government are important first steps. How- ended its once massive support to its sister ever, in order to end the civil war and party. They were also war-weary, and achieve true ethnic peace, the current talks wanted to develop their isolated and im- must move beyond establishing new cease- poverished regions. fires. It is vital that the process is fostered by an inclusive political dialogue at the Soon after, members of the pro-federal national level, and that key ethnic griev- National Democratic Front (NDF), an ances and aspirations are addressed. Failure alliance of ethnic armed opposition groups to do so will undermine the current reform formed in 1976, came under increased process in the country and lead to a con- military pressure, and a number of them tinuation of Burma’s cycle of conflict.6 The also agreed to cease-fires. Some of them, breakdown of the cease-fire in such as the Kachin Independence Organi- with the Kachin Independence Organisa- sation (KIO), Army-North tion (KIO) in June 2011 represents a major (SSA-N) and New Mon State Party failure in national politics, and serves as a (NMSP), felt that after decades of war and clear reminder that the longstanding ethnic destruction, the cease-fires were an oppor- conflict in the country will not be solved tunity for a new effort to find a political easily. Despite ongoing peace talks with the solution to the conflict at the negotiating KIO, Tatmadaw military operations con- table. However, other present or former tinue in Kachin State and northern Shan NDF members such as the Karen National State. Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and Karennni National Progressive Party Furthermore, it is important that peace is (KNPP) refused to enter into cease-fires, as not just seen as a matter that solely involves they wanted to reach a political agreement the government and ethnic armed opposi- first. Later, some other armed groups, such tion groups. Instead, for real ethnic peace as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army to be achieved, it is essential that peace is (DKBA), which broke away from the KNU addressed in a much broader way as an in 1994 after an internal conflict, also urgent matter that concerns all citizens. entered into separate cease-fire agreements with the military government. OLD CEASE-FIRES AND CONTINUING CONFLICT Burma’s long-running conflicts thus con- tinued throughout the SLORC-SPDC era, The first ethnic cease-fires were established with no decisive process towards peace that by the State Law and Order Restoration involved all sides. Nevertheless, after dec- Council (SLORC), the military government ades of conflict, the SLORC-SPDC cease- that ruled the country during 1988-1997 fires had significant impact on the political

2 | Burma Policy Briefing landscape as well as huge socioeconomic KNPP and Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) implications. These included both positive that, despite occasional talks, had never as well as negative developments. In areas agreed to formal cease-fires. The risks of where fighting halted, they put an end to escalating ethnic conflict were increasing, the bloodshed and curtailed the most and in November 2010 a new alliance was serious human rights abuses. The end of formed, the United Nationalities Federal fighting also brought relief for local com- Council (UNFC), by the “cease-fire” KIO, munities, and allowed development and the SSA-North and NMSP, as well as “non- functioning of civil society. However, these cease-fire” KNU, KNPP and CNF, to seek cease-fires were merely military accords, new ways to promote the ethnic nationality and lacked a peace process as a follow-up in cause. order to find a political solution. Further- more, the truces provided space for eco- Meanwhile, the SPDC seemed more pre- nomic exploitation and large-scale natural occupied with creating a new political resource extraction, mainly by companies order for the whole country, including the from neighbouring countries, causing Burman-majority heartlands. As part of a environmental damage and loss of local ‘Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy’, the livelihoods.7 SPDC introduced a new constitution in 2008, and held national elections in November 2010, which were won by the military backed Union Solidarity Develop- The people were going through a hell of ment Party (USDP). The elections were not “ free and fair, and there was no level playing untold miseries ” field, as the election law and procedures greatly favoured the USDP and provided President Thein Sein 8 huge challenges for opposition parties.9 Finally on 30 March 2011, after over two decades of SLORC-SPDC rule, the regime The cease-fires remained an important chairman Sr-Gen. dissolved the policy of SLORC’s successor, the State SPDC and handed over power to a new Peace and Development Council, which quasi-civilian government, led by new was in power during 1997-2011. However, President Thein Sein, a former general and in April 2009, the SPDC suddenly an- SPDC member. nounced that all cease-fire groups trans- form into separate NEW PEACE TALKS BY THE THEIN SEIN (BGFs). This controversial scheme, which GOVERNMENT would divide groups into smaller separate units under Tatmadaw control, caused Although it is early days, the advent of a great tension between them and the gov- new government has caused a significant ernment. Tensions further rose after the change in the political atmosphere in Tatmadaw occupied the Kokang region in Burma, raising the prospect of the most August 2009, following an internal conflict fundamental reform and re-alignments in within the MNDAA, ending a 20-year old national politics in decades. Government cease-fire. The main cease-fire forces thus spokespersons say the new Thein Sein refused to transform into BGFs before the administration is trying to achieve four final deadline of 1 September 2010, and main objectives: to improve relations with were told by the SPDC it would now con- the National League for Democracy (NLD) sider their status to be as it was before the and ; to address ethnic cease-fires were agreed upon. At the same conflict; to solve the economic crisis; and to time, fighting continued with the KNU, improve relations with the international

Burma Policy Briefing | 3 community.10 Among these, Burma’s trou- levels were to be followed by discussions at bled history since independence warns that the national level with the ‘National Peace addressing ethnic conflict stands out as Making Group’. This group is led by Aung perennially the most difficult and urgent Thaung and his deputy Thein Zaw, two task for the government to grapple with. former ministers under the previous SPDC regime and currently representatives from Recent cease-fire talks between ethnic the military-backed USDP.13 However, they armed ethnic opposition groups and the were also present at some of the initial talks Thein Sein government have raised hopes at the regional level. In addition, other gov- for a peaceful solution to over 60 years of ernment representatives started to initiate civil war in Burma. Fighting initially esca- talks with armed opposition groups as well lated following the open breakdown of the (see below). KIO and SSA-N cease-fires after the incep- tion of the Thein Sein government. But In September 2011, the Amyotha Hluttaw since September 2011, government repre- (Upper House) and the sentatives from the different regional levels (Lower House) also set up legislative peace- (‘State Level Peace Making Group’) and the making committees.14 These committees national level (‘Union Level Peace Making could play an important role during the Group’ or ‘National Level Peace Making national level talks that have been infor- Group’) have met with all key ethnic armed mally proposed by the government in opposition groups, including those that had meetings with armed groups (see below). cease-fires with the SPDC and those with- However, these committees are dominated out. Subsequently, most of the large ethnic by members from the USDP. Representa- armed groups have entered into cease-fire tives of the Nationalities Brotherhood agreements with the government. This pri- Forum, an alliance of five ethnic political ority in focusing on Burma’s ethnic con- parties that won seats in the 2010 elections, flicts, along with the inclusive approach argue that these committees should “in- being adopted, represent a welcome break clude representatives from our brother- with the past. hood of ethnic parties, representatives from the parliaments, scholars, and other per- For his part, President Thein Sein publicly sons of integrity, led by the new govern- called for peace negotiations with all ethnic ment”. The political alliance also called for armed groups in August 2011. “We have a nationwide cease-fire to be immediately opened the door to peace”, he said in ad- followed up by a national peace workshop.15 dress that was published in the state media. However, the President has not yet pro- “Not only KIO but also any anti-govern- vided a clear roadmap on how to move ment armed groups in Shan State and beyond establishing new cease-fire agree- Kayin [Karen] State can hold talks with ments, nor set a time-frame for such a respective governments if they really favour process. peace”.11 The move is part of an overall policy change by the Thein Sein govern- On 6 September 2011, a government dele- ment during July-August 2011, which also gation led by Aung Thaung and Thein Zaw included several other significant steps, met with representatives of the UWSA - the including meetings between opposition largest armed opposition group in the 16 leader Aung San Suu Kyi and high-ranking country - in , Shan State. The government officials, and later also with two sides signed a cease-fire agreement President Thein Sein on 19 August 2011.12 which does not include any political issues, but rather confirms the status quo and thus It has taken time, however, for a consistent freezes the conflict. The four points in- peace talk process by the government to clude: continuing the cease-fire; re-opening emerge. The peace talks at the regional liaison offices; reporting on any troop

4 | Burma Policy Briefing movements outside their respective areas in Another cease-fire force, the DKBA, split advance and in agreement with the other into separate groups during the SPDC- party; and holding further discussions in Thein Sein government transition, with the future.17 The smaller NDAA (Mongla part of it converting into BGFs in August Region), bordering the UWSA region, 2010. DKBA units that refused to do so signed a similar agreement the following resumed fighting on election day 7 Novem- day. ber 2010, and temporarily occupied the border town Myawaddy. In September A UWSA delegation visited Nay Pyi Taw 2011, DKBA leaders met with Aung on 1 October 2011 to follow up on the Thaung and Thein Zaw as well as Karen agreement, including allowing for the State government officials in Moulmein, return of staff from the government’s but no official agreement was reached. On health and education departments to the 3 November, 2011 these DKBA units, now Wa region, as well as of international calling their organization Kloh Htoo Baw agencies providing support to ex-poppy (‘Golden Yellow Drum’), signed a five- growing communities. These had been point initial peace agreement similar to the asked to withdraw by the central govern- UWSA terms in Karen State capital Hpa-an ment following the UWSA’s refusal to with the Karen State Peace Making Group.21 accept the BGF proposal. On 28 December A further six-point agreement with a union 2011, a government delegation visited the level peace making group led by Aung Thaung was signed in Hpa-an on 11 December, which confirmed the previous “ I trusted them and they also trusted me. I am very agreement and also included agreement “not to secede Kayin State from the Union” satisfied with this meeting. ” and “to cooperate with the Union govern- 22 Minister of Railways (after meeting with ment in the fight against narcotic drugs”. 18 NMSP) Later, Thein Sein appointed Railway Minis- ter Aung Min as another government rep- resentative for talks with ethnic armed Wa region to conclude a six-point agree- groups. Aung Min operates under the ment with the UWSA. The agreement direct mandate of President Thein Sein. He reaffirmed the previous agreement, and has been able to build up trust and better further stated the need to develop the Wa personal relationships with the armed region and improve education and health groups, offering to be a direct line of com- services, as well as to continue negotiation munication with the President for them, on the participation of representatives from and in the meetings he has held with them UWSA areas in the country’s new parlia- the atmosphere was generally seen as posi- 19 mentary system. tive and reconciliatory. Aung Thaung and Thein Zaw, in contrast, are perceived by The agreement does not address the ethnic armed groups as hardliners from the UWSA’s political demands, but neverthe- SPDC era, and they do not have their less presents a welcome shift away from the trust.23 possibility of war that had been looming since the UWSA’s refusal to accept the A division of labour now seems to have transformation into BGFs. A similar emerged, where Aung Min is now dealing follow-up six-point agreement was also with the KNU, Chin National Front, Shan signed a day earlier between the Union State Army–South, Karenni National Pro- level Peace Making Group led by Aung gressive Party and the New Mon State Thaung, and NDAA representatives at the Party, while Aung Thaung and Thein Zaw NDAA headquarters in Mongla.20 are in charge of negotiations with the

Burma Policy Briefing | 5 UWSA, NDAA, Kachin Independence The second large group to enter into an Organisation the Shan State Progress initial peace agreement with Aung Min was Party–Shan State Army-North. Initially, the KNU, which has been in armed opposi- some armed groups complained that they tion against the central government since were approached by several actors for talks 1949. Until recently, the KNU had refused with the government whose status and to enter into a truce in the absence of any mandate was unclear. But in many respects, political agreements. The KNU, which is such confusion represented the diversity of based in the Thai-Burma border, has good personalities and departments in different contacts with the international community areas of the country during a time of and international campaign groups. There change. Under the previous SPDC, military are also over 100,000 Karen refugees in government action was tightly and cen- official camps in Thailand along the Burma trally controlled. border, and a cease-fire with the KNU would be a first step to facilitate their Finally, during 19-20 November 2011, return to Burma.27 Aung Min held talks with a number of armed ethnic groups in the Thai town of Aung Min first met with KNU leaders in Chiangrai. This included non-cease-fire the Thai border town Mae Sod on 12 groups the KNU, the KNPP, the SSA-South October 2011, and although no agreement and CNF, as well as groups who had a could be reached, the KNU responded to cease-fire in the past, including the KIO. the government’s initiative by forming a The NMSP, also a former cease-fire group, 'Committee for Emergence of Peace'. This refused to attend, saying that it would only committee held discussions with Aung Min meet jointly with other ethnic allies as a co- in Chiangrai in November 2011, and sub- member of the United Nationalities Federal sequently met with a government delega- Council (UNFC), which had been formed tion led by Aung Min in the Karen State the previous year. Initially, the UNFC’s capital Hpa-an on 12 January 2012. position was that it would only enter into negotiations with the government as a Apart from Aung Min, two other Union- group, but later all members (including the level ministers participated in the meet- 28 NMSP) entered into separate talks with the ing. According to a KNU statement: “The government. KNU delegation reached an initial agree- ment with the Burmese government's The first group to agree to Aung Min’s representatives towards a ceasefire agree- overture was the SSA-South, whose leader ment. When the delegation returns to our Yawd Serk proposed four points, which headquarters, the KNU leadership will were all accepted by Aung Min’s delega- discuss about subsequent steps required in tion: cessation of hostilities; political nego- this dialogue with the Burmese govern- tiations; setting up of a special development ment.” The KNU team also signed an 11 zone, and cooperation in the eradication of point agreement with the government “to 24 narcotics. The two sides met again on 2 be continuously discussed at the Union December 2011, in the Shan State capital level peace-making talk”.29 Taunggyi, to sign an initial peace agree- ment.25 The agreement with the SSA-South On 8 January, 2012, an initial peace agree- is significant, as it is one of the larger ethnic ment was also signed between the CNF and armed opposition groups that had never the Chin State Peace Making Group in the had a cease-fire. Earlier attempts by the presence of Aung Min.30 Later that month, SSA-South to enter into peace talks with a truce was signed by Aung Thaung and the government at the end of the 1990s representatives of the Shan State Progress were rejected by the SLORC-SPDC military Party / Shan State Army (often referred to regime.26 as the SSA-North).31 In early February,

6 | Burma Policy Briefing Aung Min’s delegation signed similar armed opposition groups. Even groups agreements with the NMSP and KNPP. such as the SSA-South, with whom the government in the past refused to have In summary, therefore, by February 2012 cease-fire talks, are now included in the the government had signed initial peace process. Furthermore, the government agreements with the UWSA, NDAA, dropped all preconditions and, in meetings DKBA, SSA-South, CNF, KNU, NMSP and with the armed groups, Aung Min recog- KNPP. Truces were also agreed with some nized that the previous ceasefires had not smaller organisations. The agreements are been successful because they did not benefit similar to each other, and contain four the people. He also made clear that the basic points: ending the fighting and reach- government has now dropped earlier de- ing a cease-fire; establishing liaison offices; mands for armed groups to convert into informing each other in advance in case of BGFs.33 troop movements outside each others' zones; and conducting further talks in the This approach by Aung Min stands in con- future. Some also contain pledges on trast with that of the former SPDC’s focal working together on issues such as drug point for dealing with the armed ethnic control, education, development and the groups, Lt.Gen. Ye Myint. Ye Myint was resettlement of group members. Of the unable to build a rapport with them, and was regarded by cease-fire groups as a messenger only. It was also unclear to whom he reported, and what information “ The biggest challenge for our country is national unity, and messages he actually passed on to Senior General Than Shwe, the SPDC which can be seen only after peace is built among all the chairman. Trust did not develop with him, and some ethnic representatives described nationalities equally ” their meetings with him as “very tense”, Former Prime Minister after being released complaining that he only came “to give a 34 from house arrest 32 lecture”. In contrast, Aung Min has taken a more conciliatory approach, focusing on building ethnic organizations that have had talks, trust. “Aung Min replied that the situation only the KIO has so far refused to enter today was unlike in the past, because in the into a new cease-fire, saying that the old past all military leaders had to listen to or- truce was broken by the government and ders from one person, Snr-Gen Than Shwe, that any new agreement must have a politi- but today that is not the case,” said a Mon cal basis. In addition, despite KIO com- monk present at the meeting with the plaints, government military operations NMSP. “Aung Min said that current presi- have continued during the recent period of dent Thein Sein was a person who wanted peace talks (see below). However, both the to have peace and political change in Bur- KIO and government have agreed to meet ma, and signing a ceasefire agreement was a again in the near future for further talks. first step for building trust.”35 According to a KNPP official: “It is a good first step. U BREAKING WITH THE PAST Aung Min talked openly with us. We think we can trust him, and we believe that we Despite continuing difficulties and suspi- can hold another meeting.”36 cions, the initiatives for peace by the Thein Sein government represent a significant Significant also is that all of the new agree- break with the past. First of all, the talks for ments are in writing, unlike the informal the first time include all major ethnic verbal truces of the past, when only the

Burma Policy Briefing | 7 KIO had a written agreement. Further- natural resources from Burma’s border- more, the contents of the new agreements lands. Large-scale unsustainable logging have been made available to the public and mining caused great damage to the through government media. livelihoods of local communities, as well as to the environment. Perhaps most importantly, in his meetings with armed groups Aung Min promised Socioeconomic development is important “ultimately a national conference in the as a peace dividend, and is key to rebuild- style of Panglong”. This is a reference to the ing war-torn and neglected ethnic areas. 1947 Conference at the town of Panglong, However, economic development in itself resulting in the historic Panglong Agree- will not solve ethnic conflict and, if carried ment between representatives from some out in inappropriate and inequitable ways, ethnic groups (Shan, Kachin and Chin) and is even likely to bring about new conflicts. the Burma national liberation movement Economic development, especially large- led by Aung San about the principles for a scale infrastructure and agricultural pro- future Union of Burma. jects, should therefore benefit local com- munities, who should also have a say in While this is a very welcome initiative, it how these projects are developed and has not yet been formally announced by the managed. Failure to do so will not only government, and has also not been part of have a negative impact on conflict resolu- any of the written agreements that have so tion and national reconciliation, but also far been signed with armed groups. The create new grievances among ethnic com- government has yet to make clear what munities, thus contributing to Burma’s such a conference will look like, what proc- cycle of conflict. ess will lead up to this, or provide a time- table. Clearly, these are key issues to be These issues are especially important now resolved in making the current peace proc- that several large-scale development pro- ess successful. It is vital that such a process jects, financed by foreign investment, are is both inclusive and participatory. planned by the government in ethnic areas. These include the Dawei Deep Seaport on In addition, Aung Min told the ethnic the Gulf of Martaban in southern Burma, armed groups that there will be talks “at the various large dams in Shan and Karen national level on socioeconomic recovery/ States, Chinese-built oil and gas pipelines 37 development plans”. Burma is a poor from a new deep-sea port in Rakhine State country by any international standards, and to Yunnan province in China, and several health, humanitarian and other socio- other infrastructure projects.39 These pro- economic indicators are consistently worst jects will have a profound impact both on in the ethnic states and borderlands. While the future of ethnic states and the country their territories are rich in natural re- as a whole. It is vital that policies are devel- sources, ethnic community leaders com- oped now to ensure that these develop- plain that the government has been keen to ments benefit local communities and the extract these for profit but has done very country as a whole, and not just foreign little to reinvest revenues back into the investors, central government and a small local communities. Following the truces of group of favoured businessmen. They must the 1990s, the cease-fire groups were prom- also be carried out in a sustainable way. ised aid and development by the military government. However, instead the uncer- Finally, the role of civil society in the peace tainty of the situation created a ‘cease-fire process is new. In the talks between Aung economy’,38 where all conflict parties made Min and armed groups, representatives deals with companies from neighbouring from Myanmar Egress, a civil society orga- countries – especially China – to exploit the nisation based in , were present.

8 | Burma Policy Briefing They have also played an advisory role to clear are the serious humanitarian conse- Aung Min as well as the President. In the quences: following the outbreak of hostili- talks between the government and the ties in June, some 60,000 civilians have KNU in mid-January, representatives of become displaced in Kachin State and Karen civil society, the electoral Karen northern Shan State. People’s Party that won seats in the 2010 elections, local media and an international Government tensions have, to some extent, observer were invited to attend the public been reduced with the SSA-North follow- signing of the initial agreement (although ing the release from prison of the detained not the negotiations itself).40 These are SSA-North leader Gen. Hso Ten, as well as another welcome and significant break with Hkun Htun Oo and several other leading the past, when all negotiations and their Shan politicians. A de facto truce has been outcomes were shrouded in secrecy. reintroduced between the government and SSA-North (a UNFC member), while all TOO LITTLE AND TOO LATE? sides reconsider their positions.

Ethnic conflict has ravaged the country for No such breakthrough, however, has been decades, and cannot be resolved overnight. achieved in the Kachin State or northern Despite the welcome policy changes of the Shan State where KIO forces have re- new government in solving ethnic conflict, mained under pressure from the Tatma- daw. Various meetings between different government representatives (from the “ We have talked with the government for 17 years, but regional ‘Kachin State Peace and Stability Coordination Committee’ as well as the nothing came out of it ” union level ‘National Peacemaking Group’) and the KIO, as well as an exchange of 41 KIO Vice Chief of Staff Gun Maw letters between the two sides, have so far failed to produce a new agreement. On 29 November the KIO met in the Chinese and the progress made in recent months, border town of Ruili with a government serious challenges remain ahead. The delegation led by U Aung Thaung and resumption of open conflict in northeast Thein Zaw, but also including Aung Min.43 Burma in the Kachin and Shan States is the In a meeting on 18 and 19 January, 2012, first great test for the government’s reform again in Ruili but this time without Aung agenda. Min, both sides agreed to “continue the negotiation between them through political Initially, fighting restarted in the northern means”, and to “coordinate matters related Shan State when the Tatmadaw attacked to military units of both sides in the hot positions of the SSA-North, ending a truce spots to control military activities and dating back to 1989. The KIO is also based building trust.”44 among the Kachin population in the north- ern Shan State and subsequently, after 17 To explain the depth of the current crisis, years of cease-fire, fighting spread to the KIO leaders say that, during 17 years of Kachin State when clashes broke out be- cease-fire, they were promised a political tween Tatmadaw and KIO troops near a dialogue, but this never materialised. strategic hydroelectric dam on 9 June 2011. Instead, the SPDC demanded that the KIO convert into BGFs (a demand that was only For the moment, there is no common withdrawn after the fighting had started) understanding of who started the fighting and the national Election Committee in Kachin State, with the government refused to accept the registration of the putting the blame on the KIO.42 What is KIO-backed Kachin State Progressive Party

Burma Policy Briefing | 9 (KSPP) to participate in the 2010 elections, Sein is unable to control the army and/or excluding them from the political process. some hardliners in the new government, The exclusion of the KIO, they believe, was who may be unhappy with some of his quite deliberate on the government side – reforms. They may also object to giving even though the KIO had attended the ethnic groups more political rights. At the National Convention and cooperated with same time, security remains a prime con- the SPDC’s “political roadmap”.45 cern for Tatmadaw commanders, and the territorial safeguarding of government In addition, the KIO points out that it al- projects, such as the projected gas pipelines ready had a cease-fire agreement, which through the northern Shan State to China, was broken by the Thein Sein government is regarded as a national cause for which when the Tatmadaw attacked KIO posi- the Tatmadaw has the right to autono- tions on June 9, 2011. Therefore, the KIO mously take pre-emptive action. wants any new agreement to include a political settlement.46 Complicating matters The fall-out, however, from the govern- is the inconsistency that negotiations with ment’s failure to address the Kachin crisis is the KIO have been conducted by different serious. The fighting in Kachin State and government delegations. At the moment, northern Shan State has antagonised and the government’s delegations in meetings potentially radicalized a new generation of with the KIO are led by U Aung Thaung Kachin youth, who had not seen fighting in (former Minister of Industry and now their areas during their lives. It has created USDP legislator) and U Thein Zaw (former strong anti-Burman sentiments that were Minister of Communication and now not there in the past. Local communities in USDP legislator), and not by Aung Min, Kachin State are now skeptical about talk of who had met the KIO during previous peace-building. Said a representative of a peace talks. In September 2011, , local NGO in Kachin State: “If we would Minister for Cooperatives and former come to tell them now we want to work on Myitkyina-based Tatmadaw Regional peace, they will say we are anti-Kachin, and Commander, also approached the KIO for would see us as a traitor.”50 Public support talks but KIO leaders refused to see him as for the KIO in Kachin State increased dra- they felt his mandate was unclear.47 matically following the KIO’s refusal to concede to the government’s demand to On 12 December, media reports quoted a convert into BGFs, and further grew after spokesperson of the President office in the outbreak of hostilities. In contrast, Naypyitaw as saying: “The president in- public resentment against the KIO had structed the military on Saturday not to increased after the cease-fire agreement in start any fighting with the KIA (Kachin 1994, for their perceived failing to press Independence Army) in Kachin State, forward a clear political agenda and focus- except for self-defence. All military com- ing too much on lucrative business con- mands were sent the president's instruc- tracts – especially logging and mining. tion.” 48 President Thein Sein’s order to halt all offensive action by the Tatmadaw in The irony is that the KIO, which was the Kachin State is also an unprecedented and main armed ethnic opposition group that positive step towards building peace and followed the SPDC roadmap, participated reconciliation. However, fighting in Kachin in the National Convention and supported State and northern Shan State has contin- the constitutional referendum, is now fight- ued, according to government officials, ing the central government again, while the because the order has been proving hard to main group that refused to sign a cease-fire implement on the ground.49 It is unclear with the SPDC without any political whether this is a sign that President Thein agreement – the KNU – has just signed a

10 | Burma Policy Briefing preliminary truce with the Thein Sein political decision-making processes; the government. Furthermore, while the absence of economic and social develop- previous cease-fire with the KIO was ment in their areas; health and humanitar- established by the SLORC-SPDC military ian neglect; and what they see as the mili- governments, fighting in Kachin State has tary government’s “Burmanisation” policy, resumed under the new quasi-civilian which translates into repression of their government of President Thein Sein. cultural rights and religious freedom. Few ordinary Burmans are aware of or under- For sustainable peace, such anomalies and stand the grievances and aspirations of the inconsistencies must be addressed if the country's other diverse ethnic groups. failures of the past are not to continue into Burma’s new political era. At the same time, many people among mi- nority communities in the conflict zones TOWARDS A NATIONAL PEACE view ethnic Burmans as the ‘enemy’. In MOVEMENT isolated and war affected areas in the ethnic states, the only Burmans local communities Until recently, peace in Burma has been will encounter are soldiers in the Tatma- seen as an issue that only involves armed daw. The military campaigns of the Tatma- opposition groups and the government. daw against armed opposition groups have Clearly, in order to achieve national recon- directly targeted the civilian population, and have often been accompanied by gross human rights violations, including extra- “ Everybody wants peace, nobody wants fighting. The judicial and summary executions, torture, rape, forced relocations, the confiscation of more killing there is, the more the cycle of hatred grows” land and property, and forced labour.52 However, mistrust towards Burmans Kachin development worker 51 among ethnic communities also includes the government as well as democratic opposition parties among the Burman ciliation, ending armed conflict is a prereq- majority. uisite. However, it is important that peace is also seen as something that concerns all Furthermore, in Shan State some of the citizens of all ethnic groups in the country, smaller minority groups, such as the Wa, including the Burman majority. Akha and Lahu, resent what they see as the dominance of the majority Shan popula- It is very important to realise that Burma is tion. These sentiments mirror the feelings a divided society and that there also exist of minorities towards the Burman popula- disagreements between non-armed actors, tion. There are also conflicts within ethnic which may have the potential to lead to communities that need to be addressed. For future conflict and violence. There exists instance, there are tensions between deep mistrust and even hatred within and various Karen groups in the country, such between ethnic communities. Decades of as between those based in Karen State of civil war and military rule have further whom the majority is Buddhist, and those exacerbated old grievances, and generated living in the former capital Yangon, who new ones. are mostly Christian and have better access to international donors and policy makers. The most obvious ethnic divide is between the Burman majority and the other ethnic Lastly, Burma’s Muslim population has nationalities. Ethnic minorities feel margin- probably suffered the most from religious alized and discriminated against. Their and ethnic discrimination. Anti-Muslim main grievances are lack of influence in the riots have taken place on numerous occa-

Burma Policy Briefing | 11 sions in several towns in central Burma. However, until very recently, there have Muslim community leaders claim that been no civil society organisations repre- these attacks were instigated, or at least senting the majority Burman population tolerated, by the military government. 53 fostering peace and reconciliation in the country. “Peace should be a national issue,” Tensions are particularly high in Rakhine says a representative of a Kachin civil State, where a Muslim minority, often society organisation. “No Burman NGOs known as Rohingya, face ethnic and reli- are working on peace, because peace is gious discrimination. During 1991 and framed only as an ethnic issue.”57 For real 1992, about 250,000 minority Muslims fled ethnic peace to be achieved in Burma, it is to following a Tatmadaw vital that mutual understanding and trust is campaign. Most of them have since been built between all communities in the coun- repatriated to Rakhine State by the UN try. This requires the involvement of all High Commissioner for Refugees, but they sectors in society. face limited freedom of movement, forced labour, and administrative barriers to While there is some logic to limited partici- marriage, and many are not recognised as pation in cease-fire talks between represen- Burmese citizens. Historical conflicts tatives of armed opposition groups and the between minority or ethnic groups, such as government (plus some observers), talks about the political future of the country should include other key stakeholders. These include ethnic nationality parties and “ Our people have been living in the dark for more than civil society organisations, as well as parties and communities among the ethnic Bur- 50 years. It is good that the sun has come up. However, if we mans. It is unlikely ethnic conflict in the country will be solved overnight, and it is are unable to prevent continued inequality and therefore vital that a process is established discrimination, another eclipse is bound to come” which is inclusive, transparent and builds trust and mutual understanding. SSA-South leader Yawd Serk (to Aung Min)54

between the “Muslim Rohingya” and “Buddhist Rakhine” population in Rakhine State, further complicate the religious landscape and exacerbate tensions.55

There are a number of ethnic civil society organisations working for peace in Burma. The most well-known is the Shalom Foun- dation and its Ethnic Nationalities Media- tors Fellowship, which has mediated in talks between the government and ethnic armed groups. There are several other eth- nic organisations that have been involved in similar activities, including faith-based organisations (Christian and Buddhist). Some of them have also tried to address conflict not only between, but within ethnic groups.56

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views from the government should not take NOTES account of disagreements; Work with us for 1. In 1989 the military government changed the common goals in the national interests”, 18 official name of the country from ‘Burma’ to August 2011. ‘Myanmar’. Using either ‘Burma’ or ‘Myanmar’ 12. International Crisis Group, “Myanmar: has since become a politicised issue. The terms Major Reform Underway”, Asia Briefing can be considered alternatives in the Burmese No.127, Jakarta/Brussels, 22 September 2011. language The UN uses ‘Myanmar’, but it is not yet commonly used in the English language. 13. Aung Thaung (a former Minister of Therefore ‘Burma’ will be used in this report. Industry) is Secretary-1 of the USDP. Thein This is not intended as a political statement. Zaw (a former Minister of Communication) is a Lower House USDP representative of Myit- 2. Tom Kramer, “Neither War nor Peace, The kyina Township constituency in Kachin State. Future of the Cease-fire Agreements in Burma”, TNI, July 2009. 14. These are the National Race Affairs and Internal Peace-Making Committee, chaired by 3. Tom Kramer, “Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk, Thein Zaw in the Lower House, and by San Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace Tun, another USDP member, in the Upper and Democracy”, TNI, September 2009. House. 4. Global Witness, “A Conflict of Interest, The 15. Independent Mon News Agency, “Brothe- Uncertain Future of Burma’s Forests”, October rhood of five ethnic state parties calls for 2003. nationwide ceasefire”, 4 October 2011. The five 5. Over 450,000 people currently remain inter- parties are the Phalon-Sawaw Democratic nally displaced in the south eastern region of Party, the Chin National Party (CNP), the All Burma. Thailand Burma Border Consortium Mon Regions Democracy Party (AMDP), (TBBC), “Burmese Border Displaced Persons”, Rakhine Nationalities Development Party December 2011. In December 2011, TBBC was (RNDP), and the Shan Nationalities Demo- providing food to 135,000 refugees in camps in cratic Party (SNDP). Thailand. There are also over 55,000 internally 16. Wai Moe, “Govt Talks with Wa, Mongla displaced persons in Kachin State following the Group Conclude”, , 8 September, breakdown of the cease-fire with the Kachin 2011. Independence Organisation (KIO) in June 2011. UNOCHA, “Myanmar, Monthly Hu- 17. Unofficial translation of UWSA agreement manitarian Update”, December 2011-January with government representatives, 6 September 2012. 2011. 6. For analysis of Burma’s cycles of conflict see: 18. Lawi Weng, “Burmese Govt Holds Peace Martin Smith, “State of Strife: The Dynamics of Talks with Mon Armed Group”, The Irrawad- Ethnic Conflict in Burma”, Policy Studies 36, dy, 22 December 2011. East West Center, (Washington DC), 2007. 19. New Light of Myanmar, “Six Agreements 7. See Kramer “Neither War Nor Peace”. Signed at Second Union Level Peace Talk”, 29 December 2011. 8. New Light of Myanmar, “The President Delivers Inaugural Address to Pyidaungsu 20. New Light of Myanmar, “Union Level Peace Hluttaw”, 31 March 2011. Making Group, Special Region 4 Sign Agree- ment”, 30 December 2011. 9. See TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 4, “A Changing Ethnic Landscape, Analyses of 21. New Light of Myanmar, “Kayin State Peace Burma’s 2010 Polls”, December 2010. Making Group, Kaloh Htoo Baw armed group (former DKBA) sign initial Peace Agreement”, 10. Communication with representative of 5 November 2011. The five-points include: to armed group attending talks with Minister for reach a cease-fire agreement; temporary settle- Rail Transportation Aung Min, November ment of the Kaloh Htoo Baw armed group at 2011. Sonseemyaing; opening of temporary liaison 11. New Light of Myanmar, “Individuals and office of Kaloh Htoo Baw armed group in Mya- organizations in the nation that have different waddy; bilateral coordination to be made in

Burma Policy Briefing | 13 advance for travelling carrying arms beyond 34. Interviews with representatives of various areas included in the agreement; holding future cease-fire groups, including KIO, UWSA and talks on peace and stability in the region. For NDAA (Mongla) during 2009-2010. background see “Burma’s Longest War”. 35. Lawi Weng, “Burmese Gov’t Holds Peace 22. New Light of Myanmar, “Six Points Agreed Talks with Mon Armed Group”, The in Union Level Peace Talk with Klo Htoo Baw Irrawaddy, 22 December 2011. (Former DKBA)”, 13 December 2011. 36. Saw Yan Naing, “Govt Peace Delegation meets Ethnic Rebels in Thailand”, The 23. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Myan- Irrawaddy, 6 February 2012. mar: A New Peace Initiative”, Crisis Group Asia Report No.214, 30 November 2011, p.22. 37. Communication with representative of armed group attending talks with Railway 24. S.H.A.N.,”SSA South reaches ceasefire Minister Aung Min, November 2011. agreement with Naypyitaw”, 20 November 2011. 38. See Kramer “Neither War nor Peace”.

25. New Light of Myanmar, “Initial Peace 39. See South “Burma’s Longest War” and Agreement Inked Between State Level Peace Kramer “Neither War nor Peace”. Group and RCSS/SSA”, 4 December, 2011. 40. Interview with persons present at the talks, January 2012. 26. The previous military government replied that, because the SSA-South originated out of 41. Interview with KIO Vice Chief of Staff Gun remnants of the Mong Tai Army (MTA) that Maw, 17 October 2011. refused to surrender with the main body of the 42. New Light of Myanmar, “Government MTA in January 1996, it could only lay down its Already Acceded to Peace Proposals of KIO to arms like the MTA but not have a separate Most Possible Degree, Clarification of Leader of cease-fire. the Spokespersons and Information Team 27. For background see: Ashley South, “Burma’s Union Minister for Information U Longest War, Anatomy of the ”, on Government’s Endeavours to Enable Ethnic TNI-BCN, March 2011, p.31-33. Armed Groups to Undergo Transformation in Accord with the Constitution (Press 28. These were Minister of Industry U Soe Conference 1/2011)”, 13 August 2011. See also Thein and Minister for Immigration and remarks by Aung Min to NMSP quoted in: Lawi Population U Khin Yi. Weng, “Burmese Gov’t Holds Peace Talks with Mon Armed Group”, The Irrawaddy, 22 29. New Light of Myanmar, “State Level Peace- December 2011. Making Group, KNU Peace-Making Group Sign Initial Agreement”, 14 January 2012. KNU, 43. New Light of Myanmar, “Trio and KIO “Statement on Initial Agreement between KNU Meet for Peace Talks”, 1 December, 2011. and Burmese Government”, January 14, 2012, 44. New Light of Myanmar, “Union Level Office of the Supreme Headquarters, Peace-Making Group meets Representatives of Kawthoolei. KIO”, 20 January, 2012. 30. New Light of Myanmar, “Initial Peace 45. These views have been repeated by KIO Agreement Inked Between State Level Peace leaders in interviews since the KIO cease-fire Making Group and CNF, 9 January 2012. before and after the cease-fire broke down.

31. S.H.A.N., “Naypyitaw – SSA North agree to 46. Interview with KIO Vice Chief of Staff Gun uphold Three Causes on the basis of Panglong”, Maw, 17 October 2011. 30 January 2012. 47. Interview with KIO Vice Chief of Staff Gun 32. Myanmar Times, ‘The Strength of the Maw, 17 October 2011. Nation Lies Within’, 23-29 January 2012. 48. Agence France-Presse, “Myanmar tells army to stop attacks on rebels”, 12 December 2011. 33. Communication with representative of armed group attending talks with Railway 49. Soe Than Lynn, ‘Govt, KIO Agree to More Minister Aung Min, November 2011. Talks’, Myanmar Times, 23-29 January 2012.

14 | Burma Policy Briefing 50. Interview with representative of local NGO from Kachin State, 13 February 2012. 51. Interview with Kachin Development Worker, 16 October 2011. 52. See for instance Amnesty International, “Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar”, June 2008. 53. Human Rights Watch/Asia, ‘Crackdown on Burmese Muslims’, July 2002. 54. Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied’, 18 May 2004. 55. S.H.A.N.,”SSA South reaches ceasefire agreement with Naypyitaw”, 20 November 2011. 56. See Tom Kramer, ‘Civil Society Gaining Ground, Opportunities for Change and Development in Burma’, TNI-BCN November 2011. 57. Interview with representative of Kachin NGO, 6 October 2011.

Burma Policy Briefing | 15 TNI-BCN Project on Ethnic Conflict in Burma Burma Policy Briefings

Burma has been afflicted by ethnic conflict and civil war since Burma in 2010: A Critical Year independence in 1948, exposing it to some of the longest run- in Ethnic Politics, Burma Policy ning armed conflicts in the world. Ethnic nationality peoples Briefing No.1, June 2010 have long felt marginalised and discriminated against. The Burma’s 2010 Elections: situation worsened after the military coup in 1962, when mino- Challenges and Opportunities, rity rights were further curtailed. The main grievances of ethnic Burma Policy Briefing No.2, nationality groups in Burma are the lack of influence in the June 2010 political decision-making processes; the absence of economic and social development in their areas; and what they see as the Unlevel Playing Field: Burma’s military government's Burmanisation policy, which translates Election Landscape, Burma into repression of their cultural rights and religious freedom. Policy Briefing No. 3, October 2010 This joint TNI-BCN project aims to stimulate strategic thinking on addressing ethnic conflict in Burma and to give a voice to A Changing Ethnic Landscape: ethnic nationality groups who have until now been ignored and Analysis of Burma's 2010 Polls, isolated in the international debate on the country. In order to Burma Policy Briefing No. 4, respond to the challenges of 2010 and the future, TNI and BCN December 2010 believe it is crucial to formulate practical and concrete policy options and define concrete benchmarks on progress that Ethnic Politics in Burma: The national and international actors can support. The project will Time for Solutions, Burma aim to achieve greater support for a different Burma policy, Policy Briefing No. 5, February which is pragmatic, engaged and grounded in reality. 2011

The Transnational Institute (TNI) was founded in 1974 as an Burma's New Government: independent, international research and policy advocacy Prospects for Governance and institute, with strong connections to transnational social Peace in Ethnic States, Burma movements and associated intellectuals concerned to steer the Policy Briefing No. 6, May 2011 world in a democratic, equitable, environmentally sustainable Conflict or Peace? Ethnic and peaceful direction. Its point of departure is a belief that Unrest Intensifies in Burma, solutions to global problems require global co-operation. Burma Policy Briefing No. 7, BCN was founded in 1993. It works towards democratisation June 2011 and respect for human rights in Burma. BCN does this through information dissemination, lobby and campaign work, and the Other Briefings strengthening of Burmese civil society organisations. In recent years the focus has shifted away from campaigning for economic Burma's Longest War: isolation towards advocacy in support of civil society and a Anatomy of the Karen Conflict, solution to the ethnic crises in Burma. by Ashley South, TNI, March 2011

Transnational Institute Burma Centrum Netherlands Burma’s Cease-fires at Risk; Consequences of the Kokang PO Box 14656 PO Box 14563 Crisis for Peace and 1001 LD Amsterdam 1001 LB Amsterdam Democracy, by Tom Kramer, The Netherlands The Netherlands TNI Peace & Security Briefing Tel: +31-20-6626608 Tel.: 31-20-671 6952 Nr 1, September 2009 Fax: +31-20-6757176 Fax: 31-20-671 3513 Neither War nor Peace; The E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Future of the Cease-fire www.tni.org/work-area/ burma- www.burmacentrum.nl Agreements in Burma, Tom project Kramer, TNI, July 2009

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