Ending Burma's Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic Peace
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Burma Policy Briefing Nr 8 February 2012 Ending Burma’s Conflict Cycle? Prospects for Ethnic Peace Since the end of 2011, Burma/Myanmar’s1 Conclusions and Recommendations government has held peace talks with all major ethnic armed opposition groups in The new cease-fire talks initiated by the the country. The talks represent a much Thein Sein government are a significant needed change from the failed ethnic poli- break with the failed ethnic policies of the cies of the last decades. They are an impor- past and should be welcomed. However, tant first step by the military-backed Thein the legacy of decades of war and oppression Sein government – which came to power in has created deep mistrust among different March 2011 – towards achieving national ethnic nationality communities, and ethnic reconciliation and peace in the country, conflict cannot be solved overnight. which has been divided by civil war since A halt to all offensive military operations independence in 1948. By February 2012, and human rights abuses against local civil- initial peace agreements had been reached ians must be introduced and maintained. with most ethnic armed opposition groups. The government has promised ethnic Solving Burma’s ethnic conflicts requires peace talks at the national level, but has yet breaking with the practices of the past. to provide details on the process or set out After the 1962 coup d'état, successive a timetable. In order to end the conflict and military-backed governments refused to to achieve true ethnic peace, the current take ethnic minority political demands into talks must move beyond simply establish- account, primarily treating ethnic concerns ing new cease-fires. as a security threat requiring a military It is vital that the process towards ethnic response. After 1988 they also established peace and justice is sustained by political cease-fire arrangements in some parts of dialogue at the national level, and that key the country which did not address ethnic ethnic grievances and aspirations are conflict, but rather established a ‘neither addressed. war nor peace’ situation.2 This is part of a long and consistent pattern, with the mili- There are concerns about economic de- tary government focusing on ‘managing’ velopment in the conflict zones and ethnic conflict rather than solving it.3 borderlands as a follow-up to the peace agreements, as events and models in the The uncertainty of the cease-fire situation past caused damage to the environment also facilitated unsustainable economic and local livelihoods, generating further developments, including uncontrolled grievances. Failures from the past must be logging and mining activities, leading to identified and addressed. loss of livelihoods among local communi- ties and environmental degradation, caus- Peace must be understood as an over- ing new grievances to develop.4 Meanwhile arching national issue, which concerns fighting continued against ethnic forces in citizens of all ethnic groups in the country, other borderlands where cease-fires had including the Burman majority. Burma Policy Briefing | 1 not been agreed. Military campaigns of the and was superseded by the State Peace and Tatmadaw (armed forces) against these Development Council (SPDC). Following ethnic forces have been accompanied by ethnic mutinies that caused the collapse of severe human rights abuses, and have the once-powerful Communist Party of directly targeted the civilian population, Burma (CPB) in 1989, newly formed ethnic causing large numbers of people to be forces quickly agreed to truces offered by displaced or seek refuge in neighbouring the SLORC. These include the Myanmar countries.5 National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in the Kokang region, the Ethnic conflict has ravaged the country United Wa State Army (UWSA) in the Wa since independence, and cannot be solved region, and the National Democratic Alli- overnight. Cease-fire agreements negoti- ance Army (NDAA) in the Mongla region. ated at the local level between different They had lost trust in the CPB’s mostly- armed ethnic opposition groups and the Burman leadership and saw that China had government are important first steps. How- ended its once massive support to its sister ever, in order to end the civil war and party. They were also war-weary, and achieve true ethnic peace, the current talks wanted to develop their isolated and im- must move beyond establishing new cease- poverished regions. fires. It is vital that the process is fostered by an inclusive political dialogue at the Soon after, members of the pro-federal national level, and that key ethnic griev- National Democratic Front (NDF), an ances and aspirations are addressed. Failure alliance of ethnic armed opposition groups to do so will undermine the current reform formed in 1976, came under increased process in the country and lead to a con- military pressure, and a number of them tinuation of Burma’s cycle of conflict.6 The also agreed to cease-fires. Some of them, breakdown of the cease-fire in Kachin State such as the Kachin Independence Organi- with the Kachin Independence Organisa- sation (KIO), Shan State Army-North tion (KIO) in June 2011 represents a major (SSA-N) and New Mon State Party failure in national politics, and serves as a (NMSP), felt that after decades of war and clear reminder that the longstanding ethnic destruction, the cease-fires were an oppor- conflict in the country will not be solved tunity for a new effort to find a political easily. Despite ongoing peace talks with the solution to the conflict at the negotiating KIO, Tatmadaw military operations con- table. However, other present or former tinue in Kachin State and northern Shan NDF members such as the Karen National State. Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF) and Karennni National Progressive Party Furthermore, it is important that peace is (KNPP) refused to enter into cease-fires, as not just seen as a matter that solely involves they wanted to reach a political agreement the government and ethnic armed opposi- first. Later, some other armed groups, such tion groups. Instead, for real ethnic peace as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army to be achieved, it is essential that peace is (DKBA), which broke away from the KNU addressed in a much broader way as an in 1994 after an internal conflict, also urgent matter that concerns all citizens. entered into separate cease-fire agreements with the military government. OLD CEASE-FIRES AND CONTINUING CONFLICT Burma’s long-running conflicts thus con- tinued throughout the SLORC-SPDC era, The first ethnic cease-fires were established with no decisive process towards peace that by the State Law and Order Restoration involved all sides. Nevertheless, after dec- Council (SLORC), the military government ades of conflict, the SLORC-SPDC cease- that ruled the country during 1988-1997 fires had significant impact on the political 2 | Burma Policy Briefing landscape as well as huge socioeconomic KNPP and Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) implications. These included both positive that, despite occasional talks, had never as well as negative developments. In areas agreed to formal cease-fires. The risks of where fighting halted, they put an end to escalating ethnic conflict were increasing, the bloodshed and curtailed the most and in November 2010 a new alliance was serious human rights abuses. The end of formed, the United Nationalities Federal fighting also brought relief for local com- Council (UNFC), by the “cease-fire” KIO, munities, and allowed development and the SSA-North and NMSP, as well as “non- functioning of civil society. However, these cease-fire” KNU, KNPP and CNF, to seek cease-fires were merely military accords, new ways to promote the ethnic nationality and lacked a peace process as a follow-up in cause. order to find a political solution. Further- more, the truces provided space for eco- Meanwhile, the SPDC seemed more pre- nomic exploitation and large-scale natural occupied with creating a new political resource extraction, mainly by companies order for the whole country, including the from neighbouring countries, causing Burman-majority heartlands. As part of a environmental damage and loss of local ‘Seven Step Roadmap to Democracy’, the livelihoods.7 SPDC introduced a new constitution in 2008, and held national elections in November 2010, which were won by the military backed Union Solidarity Develop- The people were going through a hell of ment Party (USDP). The elections were not “ free and fair, and there was no level playing untold miseries ” field, as the election law and procedures greatly favoured the USDP and provided President Thein Sein 8 huge challenges for opposition parties.9 Finally on 30 March 2011, after over two decades of SLORC-SPDC rule, the regime The cease-fires remained an important chairman Sr-Gen. Than Shwe dissolved the policy of SLORC’s successor, the State SPDC and handed over power to a new Peace and Development Council, which quasi-civilian government, led by new was in power during 1997-2011. However, President Thein Sein, a former general and in April 2009, the SPDC suddenly an- SPDC member. nounced that all cease-fire groups trans- form into separate Border Guard Forces NEW PEACE TALKS BY THE THEIN SEIN (BGFs). This controversial scheme, which GOVERNMENT would divide groups into smaller separate units under Tatmadaw control, caused Although it is early days, the advent of a great tension between them and the gov- new government has caused a significant ernment. Tensions further rose after the