Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection

1969 George E. Akerson : first presidential press secretary.

Pane, Marietta A.

University of Wisconsin http://hdl.handle.net/10945/12261 N PS ARCHIVE 1969 PANE, M.

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GEORGE E. AKERSONt FIRST PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY BY

MARIETTA A. PANE

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

(Journalism)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1969 pan£,m.

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MUrfTERfcY, CA mm„. M 3394^5101 YflAflSlJ XOWX Y3JGUa JOOH08 3TA« JQAflOT^ JAVJMJ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to express gratitude to the

Director and staff of the Presidential

Library, West Branch, / for the assistance they provided in completing this study.

I am particularly indebted to Professor Scott M.

Cutlip for his confidence, guidance, and patience. His expectations of excellence made him a valued advisor.

Preparation of this manuscript was accomplished through the able and professional work of Mrs. Lloyd J.

Renneberg.

As always, my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Dominic Pane, provided their unqualified confidence and encouragement.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

Purpose 1 Significance 1 Main Sources of Information 2 Organization of the Study 4

Chapter

I. THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY . . 7

Job Description Job Conditions 14 Job Qualifications 18

II. GEORGE E. AKERSON 25

Biography 25 The Newspaper Years 27 Political Appointment 29 The Commerce Period—Prelude to the 30

III. HERBERT HOOVER AND THE ... 41

1928 Campaign 42 Economic Panic and Depression 43 Hoover's Public Relations Problems 44

IV. PRESS SECRETARY/ JANUARY 1929 TO JANUARY 1931 52

The White House Secretariat 52 The Press Secretary's Routine Correspondence 56 Press Relations 65 The Press Conferences . 84

V. CONCLUSIONS 117

BIBLIOGRAPHY 127

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vi INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to describe and evaluate the performance- of George E. Akerson as press secretary to Herbert C. Hoover from January 1929 to

January 1931.

Akerson' s relations with the press and the

President will be the main emphasis of this study. The press secretary's attitudes, methods, and impact will be of particular interest along with his effort to establish productive, regular presidential press conferences. This is one in a series of Presidential Press Secretary studies written at the University of Wisconsin School of

Journalism.

Significance

Herbert Hoover created the full-time official position of Presidential Press Secretary and appointed

George Akerson as the first incumbent to this newly created job. Since the Hoover appointment, Presidents have maintained the position of Presidential Press Secretary as a primary aide. While each President and press secretary modified the job to fit his own requirements, the basic concept and title has remained intact for the past forty

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s-6 eas>: years. Richard M. Nixon, however, modified this develop- ment when he appointed his press spokesman, Ron Ziegler.

Ziegler will not carry the title of Presidential Press

Secretary nor will he function in a primary capacity on press matters. In spite of this new development, the press secretary position during the past forty years has evolved into an identified, well-known, and at times powerful assistantship.

Describing and evaluating the work of George

Akerson will establish the official institutionalization of this job. The results of this study should provide some insight into the development of presidential press relations and the failures and successes of the public relations efforts of the Hoover administration.

This is the first full-length study of George

Akerson. Little information on Akerson was published in the newspapers and magazines of his day. Hoover biographers include only a brief identification of the press secretary. This study will be based mostly on the

information available in the Akerson Papers and the

Presidential Press Files in the Hoover Presidential

Library, West Branch, Iowa.

Main Sources of Information

Three information sources were used to develop this

thesis. First, the collection of Akerson Papers was studied. This twenty-eight-box collection includes '

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correspondence dating back to Akerson* s employment on the

Minneapolis Tribune (1912-1925), his official files as

secretary to Mr. Hoover during the Commerce period, the

White House correspondence, and letters between Akerson and

Hoover after Akerson 's White House years. This collection

includes all the surviving records of the press secretary.

Akerson's son, George Akerson, Jr., has explained that

approximately two-thirds of his father's papers were lost

in the flood waters of a New England hurricane. The most

conspicuous material missing from these papers is some

record of Akerson's twice daily press briefings held with

the Washington correspondents.

The second information source was the Presidential

Press Files at West Branch. These files included the

complete verbatim record of the presidential press

conferences, the written questions from the White House

correspondents, the rough drafts of quotable presidential

announcements prepared by Akerson, and the final draft

copies of these quotations distributed to the press from

Akerson's office.

Books, magazines, and newspapers provided helpful

secondary source material. The concept of presidential

press relations explained in Elmer E. Cornwell's

Presidential Leadership Q± MMhlisi Opinion and James E.

Pollard's The. President aja& ±he_ Press was of particular

interest. Carl N. Degler's article, "The Ordeal of Herbert ]

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Hoover," published in the Xalfi. Review , was helpful in understanding Hoover's philosophy of the presidency. The impact of Hoover on the press came primarily from these three sources

1. Clair Nelson's "Herbert Hoover's Image in the Press, " an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation from Stanford University, 1956.

2. Alice Cohn Bernstein's "Press Opinion of Herbert Hoover," unpublished Master's thesis from the University of Wisconsin, 1941.

3. Surveys of press opinion sampled by the research staff of French Strother, the President's Research Secretary, collected in the Strother Papers at the Presidential Library in West Branch.

The following unpublished Master's Degree theses from the

University of Wisconsin provided a helpful appreciation for the development of the press secretary position since the appointment of George Akerson:

1. Charles O'Donnell, Jr., "Stephen Tyree Early: F.D.R. 's Press Secretary," 1967.

2. Gordon Ames Moon, II, "James Campbell Hagerty's Eight Years in the White House," 1962.

3. Rolf William Utegaard, "Pierre Salinger's •Thousand Days,'" 1967.

Organization of the study

Defining the job of Presidential Press Secretary is

the first step in this study. This job description in the

first chapter includes the responsibilities and authority of the position, the working conditions and the

qualifications of the incumbent. Particular attention is given to the relationship between the press secretary and '

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5 the President and their relationships with the press and the public.

The background and career of George Akerson are discussed in the second chapter with a detailed description of the work he did during the Commerce period.

Describing and evaluating the work of a presidential aide necessitates some consideration of the

President he serves and the events of the administration.

The third chapter describes the implications of Hoover's public relations and the events of the Great Depression with a brief review of the President's attitude toward publicity and politics and the impact this attitude had on

Hoover's ability to lead the country.

Chapter IV describes and evaluates George Akerson' performance as press secretary? his working conditions/ his and Hoover's relations with the press, and the role

Akerson played in organizing and activating the press conferences.

Some effort has been made to keep the emphasis of this study on Akerson. Except for Chapter III, the descriptions of Hoover's activities have been limited to those which involved the President in Akerson J s work. 1

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. * FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

Letter, George Akerson, Jr./ to the author of September 24, 1968.

2

CHAPTER I

THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY

In the twentieth century, Presidents of the United

States have been a powerful influence on domestic and

foreign events. This power to influence has not been given to the President by law, by Congress, or by his political party, but, rather, it comes from the public he serves.

The President's job is leadership. He is good at his job

if he can mobilize public support for his administration.

The relationship between presidential power and public support is explained by political scientists

Richard E. Neustadt and Elmer E. Cornwell. Neustadt states

that "Presidential power is the power to persuade."

Cornwell further explains this basic relationship!

The leverage the President has acquired in the law making process has been indirect, based on the use of the arts of persuasion, and ultimately grounded in the popular support he can claim to mobilize. Hence his link with the people is his key relationship.

But in an urban, industrialized, complex, mass

society, opportunities for direct dialogue between the

President and the people are severely limited. The

President's power to lead is a function of his ability to

communicate with the people. The President must talk to

the people through the mass media system of communications.

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His ability to communicate with the people depends on his ability to use this complicated, technical system. It is the President's press secretary who provides the expertise necessary for the operation of this system. The President's need for power is met in some measure to the extent the press secretary can activate the mass media to the

President's behalf.

The press secretary is appointed by the President.

The job does not exist unless the President wills it so.

The terms of the employment contract are clear* the press secretary is appointed by the President and may be fired by him at will without the advice, consent, or even the notification of anyone. The press secretary owes his loyalty to the President.

But to render this loyalty effectively, the press secretary must understand and appreciate the needs and the purposes of both the print and electronic media. The press secretary is the intermediary between two major power centers, the President and the press. He interprets each to the other. It is through the office of the press secretary that the statements, policies, thoughts, and details of the President's official and private life are collected and disseminated to the press. It is the press secretary's judgment that largely determines the content and timing of the news flow. This same office serves as a listening post for the President? it collects information, o«q a

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x *lnJL • xcft :faoq tail 9 attitudes, opinions/ and details about the press which in turn are interpreted for the President. This is not to say that there is not any direct dialogue between the President and the press; there is. But the great bulk of information which passes between the President and the press is filtered in some way through the press secretary. It is in this White House staff office that the point of contact is made between the chief executive and the news media. It is this point of contact, the press secretary, that is the main concern of this thesis. The requirements and the forces that come to bear on the press secretary/ his ability to meet these forces, and the impact of his actions are all central to this study.

Job Description A new press secretary comes to the White House with little precedent to guide him. The files of previous press secretaries are not available to him; all such files are considered private to the previous administration. What was standard operating procedure for one President does not carry over to his successor. Not law, nor custom/ nor precedent/ nor written agreement determines the press secretary's job. Whatever guidance he may have comes from a mutual understanding between the President and the press secretary. The power/ authority/ and responsibility of the press secretary may be determined by an unwritten and I

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But this does not mean the job is lacking in specific shape and character; it has both. Although it has officially existed for less than fifty years* some common and basic premises have developed which describe the press secretary's functions. What follows here is a job description* not written from any direct authoritative source but rather one based on the milieu of people and pressures that define the press secretary's job. This milieu describes the common threads of this evolving job rather than any characteristic peculiar to a particular press secretary or administration. In brief* the common aspects of the press secretary's job are these:

1. He keeps the public informed as the President's spokesman.

2. He prepares policy recommendations in the field of information.

3. He facilitates the work of the President and the press, with the President having his ultimate priority.

4. He represents the President and the press to each other. rfvtq

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The press is a protagonist in this job description.

An active, healthy, vigorous press will seek out all

possible information about government activities. This

quest is basic to the "watch dog" function the press

assumes over government. But revealing information may not

always serve the purposes of government officials. What

and when information should be made public is the issue basic to the struggle between the press and government.

"The struggle, " comments Douglass Cater, "of the govern- ment's need for secrecy versus the public's right to Know

and the press's duty to find out and tell is unending.""1

Hopefully, the effective press secretary can

minimize this struggle and conflict by merging the need of

the press to listen and the need of the President to talk.

These overlapping objectives deserve some attention.

Since the relation between the press and the

President is not one of command and obedience, a good

amount of tact, persuasion, and skill is needed to exploit

those areas where their objectives are the same and avoid

those areas of conflict. Bill Moyers, a past press

secretary to President Johnson, defines the struggle

between the President and the press as one rising out of

conflicting objectives. The press wants immediate and

timely comment but the President "resists commenting on a

situation until he can be certain his words will produce

the intended result." The press expects results from all 90S JliAW C.f.

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12 presidential promises, but "events make lies out of the best promises." The press expects the President to reach

indisputable conclusions, but "the President must sometimes 5 reach conclusions from inconclusive evidence." It is

mostly left to the press secretary to negotiate a working

detente.

The press is not only a protagonist in this

communications process but is also a malcontent, one who is

never satisfied. The nature of the press appetite for the

news is such that it is always on the hungry side. This

unsatisfied hunger accounts for some measure of discontent.

And this discontent becomes part of the press secretary's

job.

No part of the President's life is considered

sacred to the press. This prerogative was established

early in American history. A Philadelphia newspaper once

charged that John Quincy Adams wore neither waist coat nor

cravat and even went barefoot to church. Pollard quotes

Adams 1 version of the story as he wrote in his diaryi

It is true only as regards the cravat instead of which, in the extremity of the summer heat, I wear around my neck a black silk riband. But, even in the falsehoods of this charge, what I may profitably remember is the perpetual and malignant watchfulness with which I am observed in my open day and my secret night, with the deliberate purpose of exposing me to public obloquy or public ridicule.

To the present time, Presidents in some degree have

resented the invasion of their privacy. But it was Calvin V

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Coolidge who first recognized the futility of it all and probably more than any of his predecessors was willing to 7 expose the details of his private life to public gaze. It would seem that Coolidge recognized the persistence of a growing mass media. After Coolidge, Presidents would be required to accomplish their purposes in the full glare of publicity. The President could use this glare to his advantage but he could no longer ignore it. It was left to

Coolidge 1 s successor, Herbert Hoover, to fully demonstrate the dangers of ignoring the publicity glare around the

President

In addition to the President and the press, the public also defines the press secretary's job. Ultimately the allegiance of the President, the press secretary, and the press must come to rest with the public. The public is the voter to the President and the consumer to the press.

The mandate in a democratic, free-enterprise society is that the interest of the voter and the consumer must be served. In this case, the mandate rests with the "public's right to know. Since the public does not have a specific advocate to protect this right, advocacy is often split and sometimes quarreled over by the President and the press.

Serving the public interest assumes that the server can define both the public and its interest. This definition is no simple task. Conflict arises when the President and the press cannot agree on what is "the public good and I

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14 interest.

Since the press secretary's job is so closely associated with the President's need to communicate with the people, it is not surprising that the President wants a man in his outer office whose full-time attention will be given to facilitating the work of the press, a man in whom he can place his trust, who knows the dangers of bad publicity as well as the advantages of good publicity, and aiost of all, a professional who can watch and interpret the g process of public opinion formulation.

Job CQiyUtiona A full description of the office of Presidential

Press Secretary is not only a list of what the man does, but also a description of the conditions in which the man must work. The working conditions of the press secretary are pressure, conflict, complexity, and frustration.

Pressure is probably the most prevalent attendant in the daily duties of the press secretary. Presidential decisions are rarely made at anyone's leisure or conveni- ence. The press secretary shares the President's schedule.

The press, too, contributes to this pressure with its deadline organization. Considering the international quality of most presidential news items, the press secre- tary is always confronted with someone's deadline twenty- four hours a day. The public exerts its own particular .

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- 15 kind of pressure on the press secretary. Although he is not an elected official, the press secretary must live and work in the "fish bowl" atmosphere of an elected politician. He does not represent a constituency directly, yet he is ultimately answerable to the public.

The atmosphere of the press secretary's office contains a good measure of conflict. If the President is involved in a conflict, the press secretary is usually found in the front lines of the fray. When issues reach the level of presidential consideration, it is because they involve great conflicting factions. And each faction will plead its cause in the press of the day. Conflict between the President and the press is an inevitability that is particularly hard on the press secretary. The press and the President usually enjoy a short honeymoon after inauguration and then a contest of vying for advantage develops. The press secretary must often serve as a counselor during these vying sessions. Conflict between the President and the press reaches so deeply into the press secretary's job that he must negotiate the conflict with great skill or risk losing the confidence of one or both of the participants. One complaint about

Charles G. Ross, Secretary to President Truman, was his inability to negotiate conflict between the President and the press. His loss of press confidence is commented upon by Robert Allen and William Shannon, generally hostile '

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Ross has been a distinct disappointment . • • Ross was too fond of Truman to be an imaginative and helpful assistant. 10

On the other hand, a successful press secretary is able to maintain this delicate working relationship even within conflicts

Steve Early seems to have held the balance with remarkable skill between serving his boss's best interest and defending before him the rights of the press- 11

The complexities of daily life in the White House also make demands on the attention of the press secretary.

There are no easy problems or answers to the issues that gain presidential attention. The press secretary, to varying degrees, must be knowledgeable about the issues facing the President and the complexities of government for two reasons. One, as in the case of Jim Hagerty, the

President requires it. Pierre Salinger makes this point in

his book, With Kennedy , in his discussion of the difference between his role and that of Hagerty* s to provide comment on the issues of the days

In addition to running the press shop, he ^agert^/ was one of President Eisenhower's advisers on foreign and domestic policy. My own policy duties were in the information field. While Jim had a voice in deciding what the administration would do, I was responsible only for presenting that decision to the public in a way that would generate the best possible reception. 12

The second reason lies in the press secretary's ready availability to the press query about the President's views flJ

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Cater describes this aspect of the job*

He is the hourly spokesman of the President, the constant stand-in for the public image of the President. Two and three times daily he meets with the regulars and any other reporters who may wander in. These sessions may drone along on humdrum matters or just as suddenly erupt in high drama. 13

The requirements of the press also bring complexities to the press secretary job. The expertise needed to understand the ever diversifying and growing mass media strains even a professional's abilities. The growth of the mass media in the twentieth century has not only been a growth in size but also has been a growth in capabilities. Innovations in the print media as well as the development of the electronics media make available to the President a greater potential for communication. But before this potential can be realized, many complex problems need to be solved. Just bringing some semblance of equity to the variety of media agents who seek presidential news requires specific knowledge of each agent's needs. Helping the President get the best use from

the communications facilities available to him necessitates

that the press secretary keep his professional knowledge up to date.

Any job that exists in an atmosphere of pressure,

conflict, and complexity must surely generate a great deal of frustration for the incumbent. The job of intermediary a

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often be tempered by the limits placed on him by the

President, the press, and the public.

But along with frustration, the job also generates

great prestige. The Presidential Press Secretary occupies

a top position in the hierarchy of government public

relations and information posts. George Akerson, Herbert

Hoover's press secretary, was not unaware of the prestige

and advantage given to those close to the chief executive.

He described the advantage this way during a speech given

at the Paramount Convention in April 1931

It is obvious that the office of the Secretary to the President in the White House provides a great vantage point for the study of American life. It is like being on a mountain top from which one can survey all the various interests of this and other nations of the world. Sooner or later in the course of an administration, the representative heads of all large industries come to the White House to see the President. 14

A job so close to the President and the press draws

the pressures, conflicts, complexities, and frustrations

inherent in each.

Job Qualifications

Just as there are no written, standardized criteria

to determine the qualities of the press secretary's job,

so, too, there are no written qualifications for the job's

incumbent. What background and experience best qualifies

a man to succeed at this kind of job is an open discussion

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It is assumed that the incumbent needs media experience. Since the position was officially established by Herbert Hoover, every incumbent has in some way participated in the news process. There have been wire service men, news bureau chiefs, newspaper reporters, and a

journalism professor; the experience of each varies, but

all have had to face the questions and problems of press

relations before they came to serve their respective

Presidents.

That the press secretary be experienced in some phase of government work or in politics is not so easily

assumed or demonstrated, but there is some suggestion that

this experience would contribute to his effectiveness.

James Hagerty, who not only had newspaper qualifications but also had government experience as Executive Assistant

to Governor Dewey, makes this comment about that service:

It took about a year to become "reasonably confident." Going into government work is quite an education in itself. Despite what you think you know from the outside about government, you really have to go to school, learn the fundamentals, and study government all the time. 15

The variations and combinations of personality

traits needed by the incumbent press secretary will always

be subject to some discussion. There have been colorful,

extroverted secretaries as well as reserved, quiet men.

Some personality descriptions of men who have served

Presidents as full or part-time press secretaries have been -

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On Fred Carpenter/ President Taft's secretary:

He was a shy, reserved, quiet chap, who had been private secretary to Mr. Taft in the War Department. 16

On William Loeb, President 's

secretary*

To the press, Loeb was a sympathetic collaborator and gentle pacificator of ruffled feelings. The kindly secretary issued statements ... although when necessary, he could be as bland and discrete as a polished diplomat. 17

On Joseph Tumulty, President Wilson's secretary*

What a rather austere and dignified president lacked in human warmth and gregariousness was more than made up for by the personal qualities of this genial Irishman. 18

On George Akerson, President Hoover's secretary:

Mr. Hoover seems to derive great comfort and perhaps some amusement from Akerson 's hearty self- assurance, his back-slapping expansiveness, his boyish bluster. 19

On Steve Early, President Franklin Roosevelt's

secretary:

A quick and (while it lasted) almost ungovernable temper. 20

There is little to convince any observer that any

one personality combination best answers the requirements

of the job. Having said this, the one crucial exception

will now be considered.

To be good at his job, a presidential press 1 «

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The secretary must have ready access to the presidential office as the need requires. A "walk-in M privilege is necessary if the press secretary is to respond quickly and accurately to press queries. The press must know that the press secretary speaks with the full knowl- edge and backing of his boss.

Confidence and credibility are no less required between the press secretary and the press. The press must not only believe in the authority of the press secretary, but must also believe in his honesty as a professional newsman. The combined pressures of an inquisitive press on one side and a reluctant President on the other side may often tempt the press secretary to engage in "little white M deceptions. But to do so usually proves disastrous for both the press secretary and the President.

Certainly a White House staff member who stands so close to the President and is so visible to the public must also command the confidence of the public. Anything less than public confidence renders the press secretary ineffective in his job and a political liability to the

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Men are attracted or not attracted to this kind of job for a variety of reasons. Like most government jobs, the pay is not nearly commensurate with the responsibil- ities. But the challenge, the fame, and the proximity to power is a tempting inducement. When Franklin Roosevelt asked Steve Early to join his secretariat and reorganize the White House and governmental press relations, Early was quoted as saying, "It was like a bugle call. I couldn't 21 afford it, but it never occurred to me to refuse."

Perhaps every man who has accepted the presidential invitation to the office of the Presidential Press

Secretary hears a bugle call in the form of a challenge to pit his particular qualifications against the pressures, conflicts, complexities, and frustrations of this job. He is tempted to test his ability to routinize and control these forces in the service of a President. crfW 8

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23

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York, 1960), 23.

Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership. SJL £u3aiic Opinion (Bloomington, Indiana, 1965) , 4. 3 James E. Pollard, TJas. Presidents M JLhS. Ex&SS. (New York, 1947), 21. 4 Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch QJL Government

(Boston, 1959) , 113.

Bill Moyers, "Press or Government: Who's Telling the Truth?" TV Quarterly (Summer 1968), 27. 6 Pollard, 129.

7 Cornwell, 97.

q Oliver McKee, Jr., "Who Creates Our Political Prejudices?" Haxth American Rejgfiw. (October 1930), 410. 10 Ii2isi.* 214. 11 U2ld..# 211. 12 Pierre Salinger, Him Kennedy (New York, 1966) 73. 13 Cater, 23. 14 George Akerson Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, White House

Secretary Files (WHSF) , Box l-D/243. 15 Gordon Ames Moon, II, "James Campbell Hagerty's Eight Years in the White House" (Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1962) , 26. 16 Archibald W. Butt, Taft ajad. Roosevelt 8 TJae. Intimate Letter, ©_£ AxsMs. fiiiii, Military Aide (New York, 1930), I, 30. 17 Louis W. Koeing, Zhe. Invisible Presidency (New York, 1960) , 173. LsUtSL

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18 Cornwell, 43. 19 -Right-Hand Man, M Outlook Magazine (July 31, 1929), 537. 20 Charles 0*Donnell, Jr., "Stephen Tyree Early: FDR's Press Secretary" (Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967), 137.

21Delbert Clark, "Steve Takes Care Of It," New York Time a Magazine (July 27, 1941), 22. Quoted in 0» Donne 11, 23. * V?l"VJ s

» CHAPTER II

GEORGE E. AKERSON

George Akerson rarely appeared to be the man he really was; mistakes and misrepresentations blur the picture we have today of this man. He was Norwegian on both sides of his family, yet the press referred to him as

"The Big Swede, M He was rarely without a bad debt letter pending, yet he wore custom tailored suits, belonged to the most exclusive clubs, and even when finances restricted his choice of car to a Chevrolet, he employed a chauffeur. He was employed as a newsman and later as a press secretary, yet most of his activities were political in nature. He was always in close proximity to the Secretary of Commerce and the President, yet he rarely participated in major decisions.

Biography

George Akerson was born September 5, 1889, into a

farm family near Minneapolis, Minnesota. He worked on his uncle* s farm near Minneapolis until he was ready for college. To prepare himself for the entrance requirements of Harvard University, he attended Allegheny College in

Meadville, Pennsylvania.

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He graduated from Harvard in 1912 with a B.A.

degree. During these years at Allegheny College and

Harvard, Akerson supported himself by playing the piano and organ for any group that would pay a struggling student.

While at Harvard/ Akerson married a Wellesley co-ed,

Harriet Blake of Omaha, Nebraska. There were three

children by this marriage, all sons.

Akerson worked for the Minneapolis Tribune from

1912 to 1921 as a city and state political reporter. He was named the paper* s Washington correspondent in 1921. In

1923, he returned to Minneapolis to serve as assistant

managing editor for the Tribune . In 1925, Secretary of

State Prank B. Kellogg, named Akerson Secretary to the

National Sesquicentennial Exhibition Commission. This

appointment was a political acknowledgement of the work

Akerson had done on Kellogg *s behalf in Minnesota. The

Exhibition was held in Philadelphia to celebrate the 150th

anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of

Independence. Kellogg, as Secretary of State, and Hoover,

as Secretary of Commerce, represented the as

the host country. This appointment resulted in Akerson'

meeting Mr. Hoover and subsequently led to Akerson*

appointment as Mr. Hoover's personal secretary during the

Commerce period and press secretary during the Presidential

period. In January 1931, two years into Mr. Hoover's term

of office, Akerson resigned as press secretary to the r 4 - v

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President to accept a job with Paramount Publix Corporation in New York City. His association with Paramount was unsuccessful, ending in 1934. This started a long and bitter terra of unemployment for Akerson. He died in 1941.

These, in brief, are the life events of a midwestern Norwegian farm boy whose ambition and luck took him from the farm to the outer offices of the President.

The Newspaper,, Yeagg

Akerson learned his politics during the nine years that he reported state and municipal government for the

Tribune . His promotion in 1921 to be chief of the

Washington Bureau Service for his paper reflects how well he had learned his trade. His energy and capacity for work were his chief assets. To Washington correspondents and politicians in 1921, he was known as "The Great Nordic

Monsoon." Akerson' s energies evidently could get the most out of a full day's work and the managing editor of the

Tribune . T. J. Dillon, expressed his praise in a letter of

January 18, 1922

Our Washington Bureau Service for the last three or four days has been so good that I am moved to express my. satisfaction thereat in my well known millifluous /sifl/ fashion. We cleaned up on the high dam proposi- tion in spite of Mr. Cullen to the extent that left very little meat on the bone for the Journal .

The letter continues with praise for the job that Akerson was doing. It closes referring to Akerson* s political interests and abilities: as.

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I have been wondering as to the time when you should come back to Minneapolis to take a hand in the political fray. Even to my unpracticed eye, it is obvious that the pot is beginning to simmer. There are some wild suspicions that Kellogg may not get the Ramsey county delegation.

Akerson can not be described as a political reporter in the sense that we understand this term today.

He was not a dispassionate observer of the political events of his day. He reported the political scene, but he was also part of that scene. He and his Republican newspaper had vested interests in the Republican campaigns. The tradition of the newspaper as a political voice remained a major part of Akerson' s political publicity thinking.

Akerson 1 s political skills and bias were recognized during the presidential campaign of 1924. He was then considered so competent about the political situation in the Midwest that he was called to the Chicago headquarters of the Republican National Committee to consult and advise party leaders. His work in Chicago helped to stem the LaFollette tide in the farm states and bring the strength of these states to the Coo lidge-Dawes ticket.

President Coolidge expressed his appreciation for this contribution in a letter written to Akerson on

March 26, 1925:

Your helpful and valued participation in the publicity work during the late political campaign was of such assistance that I want you to know that I have > 3

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been, along with those who were intimately associated with your work, thoroughly appreciative of everything that you contributed toward the result at the polls.*

It was Akerson's work with the Republican National

Committee that gained him the acquaintanceship of Herbert

Hoover, which two years later would lead to a friendship.

Akerson* 3 successes in the 1924 campaign were also rewarded by his paper. He was returned to Minneapolis to serve as the assistant managing editor of the Tribune until

1925.

Political Appointment

Akerson's reputation as a newsman with political savvy was well established by 1925. In that year, at the age of thirty-six, Akerson accepted the invitation of

Secretary of State Kellogg to be the Secretary to the

National Sesquicentennial Exhibition Commission at a salary of $5,000 a year. Akerson evidently worked hard at this job, for once again his energies and capabilities were recognized, this time by his future friend, employer, and

President. Herbert Hoover, in a letter to Secretary Kellogg of June 2, 1926, made this request on Akerson's behalf:

I find that Akerson is devoting practically his whole time to this Exposition, to the prejudice of his other earnings, and it is hardly fair to hold him temporarily on so low a salary as he is now getting. If you approve I would propose to raise him to the rate of $7,200.00 a year.

For Akerson, this appointment was opportunity knocking. Hoover's own secretary had resigned and a o

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Akerson at a time when he most needed the aid of a hard- working, capable assistant. In October of 1926, George

Akerson* s full-time job carried with it the title

Secretary to Mr. Hoover, Secretary of Commerce.

The Commerce Period—Prelude to the White House During the Commerce period, Hoover and Akerson worked well together, traveled with some pleasure together, and became good friends. But the friendship between this

Presbyterian secretary and Quaker President was not based on any obvious similarities between the two men. Outlook magazine lined the two men up as polar opposites:

Hoover is serious, Akerson is showy. Hoover makes few promises, Akerson makes many. Hoover shakes few hands, Akerson everybody's. Hoover confers with statesmen, Akerson soft-soaps politicians.

The two men even approached recreation from opposite extremes. For Hoover, fishing was everything. But

Akerson enjoyed the society of city life and private clubs.

Akerson liked to dress up in the latest fashion and be seen.

Known as "Gorgeous George, " he is the most decorative member of President Hoover's three-ring secretariat. He likes to dress, to impress, to shine in society. At the moment he is trying to wangle the President into week-ending at some smart resort where his own attainments would sparkle more brilliantly than at secluded fishing pools in Virginia and Maryland.

While Hoover was Secretary of Commerce, Akerson was his personal secretary for three years. It was during .t iy*' I ritt

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these three years that the basis for a working relationship between Hoover and Akerson was established. Some details

of the work accomplished by Akerson during the Commerce

period are given here as a prelude to the description and

evaluation of Akerson' s work during the White House years.

During the Commerce period* the Akerson corres-

pondence can be categorized as the papers of a political

publicist. While it is reasonable to assume that Akerson

performed many secretarial/personal-aide functions for the

Commerce Secretary , such as travel arrangements, appoint-

ments, bread and butter requirements, the collection of

correspondence that has survived in the Akerson Papers

almost entirely reflects the activities of a political

publicist. The following identifies what appears to be the

essence of Akerson* s job as Secretary to Mr. Hoover and is

assumed to be the basis upon which the President-elect

appointed George Akerson to the position of Presidential

Press Secretary.

Prom the fall of 1927 through the spring primaries

of 1928, the summer nominating convention at Kansas City

and the fall elections, Akerson was heavily involved in the

process of nominating and electing a President. The record

is complete and speaks very well for itself. Sample

excerpts have been selected, edited, and organized to

present here a representative description of Akerson' s job

during the Commerce period. fa

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Since Hoover had never run for a political office, there was no Hoover political organization in existence to carry his banner. Although Hoover was honored, respected, and had been mentioned as "Presidential timber" as early as

1920, there were no "Citizens for Hoover" groups established, no Hoover headquarters opened, and no Hoover delegates, precinct captains, and ward workers lined up prior to 1928. These activities were assumed and accom- plished through the direction of George Akerson. Evidently

Akerson had been in contact with the power structure within the states and when the time came to organize, he gave the

signal. This is how it happened in Massachusetts.

Akerson had been in contact with, among others, the

Secretary of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen in

Massachusetts, Frank Chase, who would send him clippings

and political information from time to time in 1927

Everywhere we hear very favorable comment on Mr. Hoover's talk before the New England Council. He certainly had made many new friends up this way, including the press. The Catholic Bishop in his sermon Sunday "thanked God for men like Hoover. "8

In January 1928, Akerson gave the signal to set up the

Massachusetts organization, in a letter to Mr. Chases

I believe that we should take advantage of this new interest /Massachusetts Senator Gillett had just endorsed Hoovery and proceed with forming a New England Organization, and very soon open a New England Headquarters 9

Akerson received detailed information on the

political influentials of an area. Charles M. Blackman, a X

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lawyer and early Hoover supporter in Kansas City, sent

Akerson a list of prominent Hoover supporters including ward committeemen/ ward presidents, and precinct captains

in a letter of January 26, 1923, making this requests

We have quite a number of precinct captains and ward workers who desire to be assistant sergeants at arms, door-keepers, and messengers. Can arrangements be made to take care of them? ... Our present plan is to proceed to enlarge the committee and to establish an organization in every wardship and township. 10

Akerson 1 s reply of February 1, 1928, does not respond to the request but does render his support for their committees

I shall try to see Wilson of the Kansas City Star today. ... by all means, the Kansas City star should proceed with vigor to help you people out. ... As you know, there is a banquet to be held by the Young Republicans of Missouri in Jefferson City. I believe it would be a good idea if some of the representatives of your organization were there also.il

Akerson was closely involved himself in this political organization process. He wrote to Charles B. Cheney, political editor of the Minneapolis Journal . in a

January 19, 1928, letters

Just as soon as we locate headquarters, there will be some sort of a public announcement. ... Knowing how much the Journal and you are interested in the cause, I am hoping that you will give us all the help you can. 12

As the political organization for Hoover sprang to

life across the country, lists of hometown influent ials were sent to Akerson. From these lists, Akerson would

select those whom he wished to specifically encourage. The

requests to join the Hoover effort were signed by Akerson l%f

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I am wondering if you would like to do something for your country. If so* the best way you can do that is to get busy in your town on behalf of Herbert Hoover. 13

The political organization functioned closely within the advice and guidance of Akerson. At the grass roots level, he had detailed knowledge of the organization and often exercised his influence. In a March 16, 1928, letter to a

Mr. Bannister, a Denver lawyer, Akerson offered counsel on the selection of Colorado State Treasurer Hodges as a possible delegate to the Kansas City Convention:

If you are convinced that Hodges is not an out-and- out Hoover man (and I am inclined to agree with you that he is not) then he ought not to be made a delegate. It is my information that Hodges is playing the neutral game with certain eastern financial interests .... This is just for your own confi- dential information. We want out-and-out Hoover men on the Colorado delegation just as we want them on every other delegation in the country. 14

Once the organization was established, it needed to be nourished with political publicity. The publicity had to be initiated, circulated, and coordinated. This Akerson did. Akerson was the distribution point for the following material. The Akerson Papers contain inventories and distribution lists of this printed material!

1. Names and addresses of political influentials. 2. Names and addresses of newspaper and magazine editors. 3. Hoover position papers on various issues. 4. A clip sheet called "The Political Digest." Contained 6-8 editorials, 10-11 one-sentence paragraphs from various newspapers, and usually one 1* political background article. V

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Akerson' s office became the information warehouse out of which the Hoover organization drew its needs:

Our state /Colorado/ convention will be held here April 16th and I want to have available all the information possible having any bearing on "Secretary Hoover as a Republican" and "Secretary Hoover and the Farmer" so that should defensive purposes require, I may have it at my command. 16

Akerson's return letter of March 29, 1928, acknowledged this request and established one of a series of distribu- tion centers to cover the nation:

It seems desirable that a small office should be opened in Denver for purposes of distributing publicity and general information perhaps with a small committee of guidance and with such modest financial support as may be required to be secured locally. Such an establishment is much desired as a center point for distribution not alone in Colorado but Arizona, Wyoming, Montana, and Western Nebraska. The other states are being served by offices at other points. It would seem to me that the necessary work could be done by a part-time newspaperman as the number of newspapers in the territory is not very large. 17

That Akerson would hire working newspapermen to be on his publicity team recalls his own career as a political reporter when he never felt there to be a conflict of interest when a reporter actively participated in politics.

It seems evident that Akerson watched the distribution of publicity carefully and gave orders to insure information moved quickly without any bottlenecks.

By April 1928, he was "on top" of the publicity organization:

We_are now sending you /Colorado distribution officfi/ daily packages of material. Will you arrange to have someone on the job there to send this material 1

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out every day. You can obtain lists of Republican papers for three states. This is a most important job to be undertaken right now.iS

Akerson also served as a receiving point for progress reports on the distribution of publicity. Typical of these reports is this May 25, 1928. letter from Edward Anthony, a committee member of the "Hoover for President Club, and a publisher, printer, and distributor of publicity materials

I thought you would be interested to know that our material is being widely used in West Virginia. Forty- four newspapers in that State are carrying our three column weekly plate and mat service and 37 papers are carrying our Pictorial Life of Hoover. 19

Akerson was a relay station in the distribution organiza- tion. He would pass on the techniques that had been used with success in one state to the publicity people of another state. Akerson wrote this to Anthonys

I would like to call the attention of your office to the great importance of seeing to it that the news- papers who are giving us active support should print every day a statement of some local citizen as to why he is for Hoover. These statements should cover all classes of people, especially at this time, women and farmers. Where the citizen has more than local importance these statements should be clipped and circulated to other friendly newspapers in the area where he is known.

This was the sole basis of the Cleveland publicity campaign, and it proved tremendously effective. 20

Some of the states reported the results of their research to Akerson. This also helped him make decisions.

About a week ago, we polled all the N.Y. staters who are in Who's Hbja.. ... so far we have received 1,134 replies. Of these, 830 unqualifiedly expressed themselves as being strongly pro-Hoover. The State Committee is very happy over the results of this poll & si i ad

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which will serve a double purpose. First, it will give us material for several good news stories? second, it gives us the names of many important friends that we did not know about. 2 !

The publicity effort which Akerson guided was not just a passive "clip and send" organization* but it actively participated in the political process.

Throughout the Commerce period, Akerson maintained a close contact with the members of the working press.

This contact provided the feedback on rumors and intrigues needed in politics. During the spring of 1923, Akerson *s contact with W. Turner Cat ledge of the editorial department of the &u& represented the kind of intimate contact Akerson maintained with some members of the press.

Cat ledge's letter of March 1, 1928, sets the tone of this contacts

As the thing started warming up today, I resolved to write you and I trust that you will not take this as any meddling for Z have nothing else in mind than to acquaint you with the facts here and to become acquainted if I may with the attitude there. Of course, if there is anything wise to be published, as a newspaperman with his horns ever out, I would like the break. But until you expressly tell me the latter, I shall say nothing but shall keep trying to see all.

Should it come to the point where I could be of any service to you here, you know, George, that your slightest wish is a command and that your cause and the cause of Herbert Hoover is my cause, thenceforth and forever more. Amen. . . .22

This collection of letters, memos, lists, inventories, and press clippings suggests that Akerson was a well-organised, efficient, active participant in a major hUMj V.l>>v i fO£

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"know how** neceaaary to organise and activate political publicity. The impact of this effort ia difficult to measure , but Hoover was nominated and was elected and perhaps that was convincing evidence for the President- elect.

In George Akerson, for whatever the consequences*

Mr. Hoover had choaen the man he wanted to sit in his outer office, one who should know the value and the dangers of publicity and could monitor the trends of public opinion.

Hoover had chosen his intermediary with the press and his counsel for information policy.

Before the secretaryship of the first press secretary can be described and evaluated, some pause must be given to the perplexing paradoxes of hia "chief and the complexities of the Great Depression, neither press secretary nor President could extricate themselves from the events of their tiroes.

Akerson 's story is written within the constraints of pressure, conflict, complexities, and frustrations discussed earlier and also within the qualifiers of Herbert

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

"Right-Hand Man, M Out look Magazine (July 31, 1929), 537. 2 Akerson Papers, WHSF, Box l-D/246. 3 Review of Reviews (December 1929), 116.

Akerson Papers, WHSF, Box l-D/246.

Akerson Papers, WHSF, Box 1-1/428. 6 "Right-Hand Man," 537.

7 IbJ^L.

Akerson Papers, letter to Akerson of November 21, 1927, WHSF, Box l-D/246. Q Akerson Papers, Box l-D/246.

1 Ifcisl. , Box l-D/245.

l2IhM., Box l-D/246. 13 Ibid . 14 IbJ^.., Box l-D/245. l5 Ihl&* , Box l-D/252. 16 Ibid . , letter from Bannister to Akerson of March 16, 1928, Box l-D/245. 17 Akerson Papers, Box l-D/245. 18 .did,. , letter from Akerson to Bannister of April 2, 1928, Box l-D/245. 19 Akerson Papers, Box l-D/245. 20 JEbi&. , letter from Akerson to Anthony of April 9, 1928, Box l-D/245. .

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HERBERT HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION

In the memory bank of most Americans* the account marked "Hoover* is a long record of deposits made before

1929 and after 1932* as well as a long list of withdrawals made from 1929 to 1932. The Hoover fondly remembered in popular history is the accomplished engineer who modernised the mining industries of Australia and China* the humanitarian who organized the Belgium Relief Fund to save starving children in Europe* the great organizer who made the economizing plans of the Food Administration work* the executive who expanded the scope and powers of the Commerce Department* the special assistant to

Presidents who headed numerous commissions* and the kindly senior amongst former Presidents whose birthday celebrations annually occasioned laudatory editorials and cartoon tributes. But another Hoover also exists in the

American memory—the Hoover of the Great Depression* the man who sat by in frustrated idleness while Americans lost their farms* businesses* and life savings. When he was

Food Administrator* Hoover was so closely associated with the virtue of economizing that a new word was coined. To

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"Hooverize" meant to be patriotic and economize to help the

war effort. When he was President* Hoover was so closely

identified with the deprivations of the depression that the

huts and shacks of the miserably unemployed were called

". " Had Hoover not been elected President* his

bank account with the American people would have been a

long* continuous record of deposits. But he did become the

thirty- first President of the United States and it is the

nature of this presidency that concerns this study*

1928 Campaign The presidential campaign of 1928 was remarkable in

two ways: Herbert C. Hoover and Alfred E. Smith, For the

Democrats there was Al Smith* a colorful* popular* Irish

Catholic; he had formerly been associated with Tammany Hall

but he was a respected governor of New York. Por the

Republicans there was Herbert Hoover* the respected and

popular Food Administrator and Secretary of Commerce for

Presidents Harding and Coolidge* but Hoover was not "Mr.

Republican." He believed in the free enterprise system and

the non-intervention of government* but Hoover was not a conservative in the tradition. Old Guard

Republicans never felt too secure about Hoover's political

stripe. The party loyalties of a man who had never run for an elected office must have seemed a little unreliable to the party regulars then in the saddle. ,

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The most unremarkable thing about the Hoover-Smith election was that Hoover won the clear mandate of the people because the party in power was riding a wave of prosperity. If a change was needed, the burden of proof was on the Democrats and the Irish Catholic candidate lost his case for a change.

Economic Panic and Depression

Hoover had little opportunity to enjoy his victory or for that matter little time in which to put his house in order before the events of a crisis crashed down on his administration. The peak of the stock market was reached in 1928; the collapse which came in 1929 seemed unbeliev- able. Yet, on October 24, 1929, "Black Thursday," more than sixteen million shares of stock turned over in Wall

Street as the market plunged downward. The rout was on.

The panic triggered a list of events that became known as the Great Depressions unemployment, bread lines, bank failures, dropping farm prices, and relief. The mood of a desperate nation in 1931 and 1932 was said to be revolu- tionary. But no revolution came. Instead, a majority of the electorate switched allegiance from the party of

Herbert C. Hoover to the party of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

On the day that Hoover left the White House, March 4, 1933, virtually every bank in America was closed.

The thirty- first presidency ended in bitter, disappointing failure. To say that no administration could :

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:ixoqq*axb 51 iis on *i £8e oT .• 44 have survived the shock of the Depression is a plausible but overly simple answer. A depression is not an automatic consequence of a stock market crash. The magnitude of the

1932 failure was not an inevitability of the 1929 panic.

Hoover had the necessary power and resources in 1929 to preclude the sequence of events that went from economic panic to depressions a Republican Congress* a cooperative and friendly press, and a clear mandate from the people.

Yet Hoover could not activate his will with Congress* the press* or the people. He had lost his credibility as a leader and this rendered him helpless. It was not the events of the Depression that led to this credibility loss but rather a combination of failures that immobilized the

President.

aoover's Public Relations frofeiemji President Hoover had serious public relations failures. In part* these failures explain his inability to control the events of his administration. Publicity and politics* in one form or another, determined most of

Hoover's public relations problems during the presidency.

As Food Administrator and as Secretary of Commerce*

Hoover's political and publicity efforts had been effective* but as President* Hoover was a somewhat reluctant public and political man.

Hoover had always been a well-motivated public >« at*

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servant , but during his presidency when he most needed to make some of his service public and his politics effective, he faltered, allowing information and power vacuums to form and be filled with erroneous, harmful speculation. Hoover

failed to realize that, like it or not, he had to work in the full glare of public scrutiny. Ignoring this reality was at the heart of his public relations problems.

Suspicion, distrust, and resentment were the conditions created by the political and publicity reluctance of the

President which developed when the storm broke. The public relations problems that developed from the President's reluctance to use his full powers as a public and political man limited the effectiveness of both the President and the press secretary.

First a look at Hoover the public man. Ironically,

the publicity build-up that made the 1928 campaign a success

also helped to make the 1932 campaign a failure. Nothing

is more dangerous in the strategy of public relations than

to excite expectations that cannot be realized. In 1928,

Hoover was pictured as the Great Humanitarian, the Great

Problem Solver, and the Great Engineer. Later, all of

these great images took on bitter double meanings in the

press. His international acclaim and his successful

association with three Presidents made him a ready subject

for a big publicity build-up. The gap between promise and

reality developing out of this publicity build-up a©*«

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contributed to the administration's public relations problems. Hoover's options to speak and act as a credible

leader were limited by the unrealistic image he was measured against.

While it is true that the 1928 campaign used political publicity methods to accomplish its ends. Hoover was more naturally a private man than a public one. Once

in the White House* his natural tendencies toward privacy became evident and more often than not he would decline to

use the full publicity powers that his office commanded.

Hoover defined the dignity of his office in rather narrow

terms for a twentieth century President. When asked to

reply to some criticism made of himself or of his methods

that appeared in the press, his standard response was. B A

President cannot with decency and with the proper regard 2 for the dignity of his office reply to such stuff. w

Aloof dignity was a quality that the President not only practiced but was one in which he received some

measure of support, as seen in this editorial from the

Saturday Evening £a&t of July 6. 1929s

Finally, there seems to us no great wisdom in frequent or promiscuous speech-making on the President's part. It is all very well for the kings and princes of Europe to make neat little corner-stone oration. But our President has no Prime Minister. He should speak on a great occasion only, and where he has something definite to say.

The Akerson Papers provided an interesting side-

light on the issue of presidential dignity during the .

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47

Hoover administration. In an undated memo to the T»yl*>yine

staff signed by Akerson as assistant managing editor* he

said* MThe office of the Presidency, along with Kings and

Popes, shall be accorded the dignity of a capital P.; governor and mayor shall remain lower case." 3

Hoover's unwillingness as President to publicise himself in the press resulted in an information vacuum

about his personality* When hard times came and the

President did not bring relief, a disheartened, bitter,

economically ravaged public was ready to believe Hoover to be cold-hearted, dispassionate, unfeeling, and sullen.

Before the public relations aspects of Hoover the political man can be discussed, one quality about Hoover's

political personality needs to be made clear. Hoover was

an activist within a very rigid framework of Ideology? he

acted on the basis of his beliefs and only on that basis.

His pragmatism, what little he had of it, emerged only

after the prodding of great events. In short. Hoover was

not a pragmatic, consensus politicians

Perhaps the puzzle of Hoover is to be explained by the fact that he was in a way the first President who took his ideology seriously. The American political tradition had been pragmatic? we dealt with whatever came in whatever way seemed to be appropriate, using the government as an instrument if need be. Hoover, however, adhered to principle.

It was this adherence to principle that limited

Hoover's manipulation of the political forces of the tsmmumm

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art* *o tool; Juumt e'?»vooH 48 presidency. There was no limit to the effort Hoover would spend to persuade a political opponent with facts, details, and logical arguments, but the paucity of political bargaining and applied pressures in this argument was equally striking. Armed with the facts and the powers of reasoning, it was Hoover's belief that Congressmen, party leaders, businessmen, reporters, and voters would make the right decision. Acting from this principle produced particularly disastrous results with Congress. Charles

Michelson, publicity director of the Democratic National

Committee, in his political column for the New York World , prefaced some political criticism he had of Hoover with the argument that a successful President must be able to use his political power, he must be a great politician in the

finest sense of the word. It is the power of politics that enables him to function as an equal with the other branches of government. Michelson points out in his book, The Ghost

Talks , the tradition of the political relationship between the presidency and the Congress?

T. R. bullied his Congress, Wilson impressed them, Harding fraternized with them, Coolidge understood their political problems. But Hoover had no knack of 5 dominating the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Michelson tried to put Hoover's political ineptitude in perspective:

. . . hard-driving, intelligent individual with a splendid capacity for handling a definite state of facts, and he is a master at arranging them and -

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49

coordinating. But in the business of persuading Congress by pressure of political friends and naviga- tion amid the pride and personal concern of his cabinet members, he was helpless. The intangibles were beyond him. He did not know how to overcome opposition. ... But like all amateurs at the art of politics, he feared antagonisms for which he had no slide rule of calculations .

Hoover's political reluctance seemed to perpetuate criticism. One of the earliest critics against Hoover's use of Commissions grounds the criticism in the President's political ineptitudes

He was very successful in organizing philanthropic projects in which everyone believed, that he handled admirably problems solvable by blueprints. But stacked up against problems that involve the handling of men with strong wills and able intellects opposed to him, Mr. Hoover seemed to have no refuge except to appoint a commission.

The lack of political leadership from the White

House and the President's refusal to act and respond within the traditions of a political man gave credibility to the

Democrats' charge that he was a "do-nothing" President, a

President who sat idly by while his countrymen lost their wealth. Later critics would infer that the "do-nothing"

President was lazy, inept, and indifferent. These were the speculations that filled the political vacuum Hoover created. When his political powers went unused, they atrophied to the point where he could not activate Congress to support his recovery plans even in the face of national disaster.

The Hoover failure was not the inevitable product >

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ioubc so of the Depression so much as the consequence of the

Presidents public relations failures in the areas of politics and publicity once he got to the White House,

These failures so limited and inhibited the President's exercise of power that he could no longer function as a leader. ',

,

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. 51

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

David A. Shannon, %h§L 0££a£. Degression (Englewood

Clif fs/ New Jersey, 1960) , x. 2 Herbert Hoover, Memoirs , Vol. Ill (New York, 1952), 232. 3 Akerson Papers, WHSF, Box l-D/2bl.

4 , , . V* O. Key, Jr., PufrlV.' QgAIUOn M ftrasrican Democracy (New York, 1961) , 201.

Charles Michel son, Xhe_ Ghost XalXa (New York, 1944), 32. 6 Ihid .. 28. 7 Summary of Press Critics, Literary p_ige_sjL (December 14, 1930), 7. .C .

, (

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CHAPTER IV

PRESS SECRETARY* JANUARY 1929 TO JANUARY 1931

The White House Secretariat

The appointment of George Akerson to the position of Presidential Press Secretary was announced on

January 2, 1929. This position was established as part of

Herbert Hoover's new concept of how the executive business of -the President should be best accomplished. Former

Presidents had employed a White House clerical staff headed by a personal secretary to the President. Hoover was to change this. He brought corporate organization to the White House. Hoover wanted executive level assistance.

Congress made President Hoover's innovative

"Secretariat possible by authorizing three additional executive aides to the President. Each of these three was 2 to receive an official salary of $10,000 a year. This brought to four the number of executive level presidential secretaries.

Reaction to this new business approach was mixed.

While it was not a major issue of controversy in the press, there was some comment

It was to be expected that the appearance in the

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53

White House of a Big Executive should see an accompanying enlargement of office quarters* expansion of equipment* and massing of secretarial help. In bygone days the President had a secretary. ... But that was in the days before the Super Administrator* before Efficiency came to the White House.

A less cynical evaluation* but one from a Hoover supporter* applauds bringing the new business techniques to the White

House:

He had to have three additional secretaries because they simplified his expanded relationship with public and private affairs. Avid for information* he had to provide his own sources* and also the human pipeline through which data could flow to him in condensed and workable form. Furthermore* he needed a link with experts for the program of social betterment which is so close to his heart. The whole secretarial system* therefore* elucidates his theory of utilization of every factor at his command for service .4

The authorization and appointment of this new

secretariat called for an enlargement and remodeling of the

White House office space to physically accommodate the additions. This enlargement construction went on through the summer and autumn of 1929* and included the remodeling of press facilities.

The American Mercury Magazine gave this description of the new press rooms

The room on the right has been turned into a ritzy loge for the press. Its walls of amber tint are hung with autographed likenesses of Harding* Coolidge* J. Ba scorn Slemp and other departed immortals. A rich yellowish carpet and new typewriter desks help to dress the room but the boys are not especially happy with it. It's all too fancy. There are gaboons and waist-high ash trays all about* but who wants to get up from a card game to make sure he doesn't miss the receptable* and how can you sprawl your feet on a shiny new desk- top? 5 :

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The four men appointed to the new secretarial positions had equal authority and responsibility in the

White House organization. None enjoyed seniority over any of the others. While each secretary did have his separate areas of responsibility* there was some overlapping of functions. Since Akerson was responsible for the

President's appointment calendar as well as White House press relations* he had to work closely with the other three secretaries. Some introduction to these three men and their jobs is given here as description of the immediate working conditions of the press secretary.

The correspondence secretary* Lawrence Richey* was in charge of all correspondence prepared for the President's signature. Richey 's previous employment as a Secret Service agent and Mr. Hoover's many references to him as "my trouble man" led to this kind of speculation about Richey *s specific duties in American Mttxcury Magazine:

He was Mr. Hoover's confidential agent* his gum- shoe man* the major domo of his private affairs* his go- between and policeman. • • • He is in a vantage place from which he can and does maintain a constant and all- pervading scrutiny of White House personnel. ... Indefatigable* a trained and experienced investigator* unobtrusive as a fleeting shadow. ... No one in any way connected with the White House* it is said* is exempt from this surveillance. Even the reporters assigned are under his eye. 7

Perhaps the most accurate description of Mr. Richey 's job is this brief description written in Review &£ Rev lews 2

In addition to his secretarial duties at the White House* Mr. Richey will be entrusted with liaison and '

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55

personal contact duties for the President. He will also serve as personal bodyguard and a member of the •"." 8

Prench Strother was appointed by President Hoover to the position of research assistant. Strother had been the editor of World's Work magazine. His job was to provide the President with research data on a great variety of subjects. Hoover's approach to the decision-making process was first to collect all available facts. The

President employed Strother to mobilize men, facts, and agencies to provide the kind of information the President felt he needed before he could decide the issues of his administration.

Walter Newton, like George Akerson, served Hoover as an intermediary; Newton's clientele was Congressmen. He resigned his membership to the House of Representatives from Minnesota to serve as President Hoover's legislative liaison assistant. Of his political qualifications, there were two views

... no man knows better the technique and psychology of the legislative game. ... He was a member of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce when Hoover was Secretary of Commerce. . . • Newton collaborated with Hoover on the famous rubber report which indicated the British control of an essential commodity.

Mr. Newton is the perfect type of Farm Belt politician. He talks much about the need of Farm Relief and yet when he was in the House he voted for the Hawley tariff bill, one of the most bold-faced steals ever attempted on the farmer and against the debenture plan, a device which would have applied the tariff principle to agricultural exports.! >^5

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Newton and Akerson had known each other in Minneapolis when

Akerson had worked for the Tribune . There is some reason to believe that Akerson had a part in the Newton appoint- ment since many of the political tasks that Newton was charged with in the White House had been part of Akerson 's job during the Commerce days.

These, then, were the men who shared the outer offices of the White House with George Akerson. Each was an innovator in some aspect of running the business of the presidency. Each had an area of primary responsibility—

Richey as correspondence secretary, Strother as research secretary, Newton as political secretary, and Akerson as press secretary. When viewed in combination, these four men served to relieve the President of routine details, supply him with factual information, project his views on occasion, and thereby give him the latitude of action he required to activate his style of presidential leadership.

The Press Secretary's Routine Correspondence

Akerson* s White House correspondence is not a continuation of the kind of work he did during the Commerce period. Political party publicity is not the primary effort of Akerson' s job at the White House. While there is no way to recreate the total routine of the first press secretary from the surviving record, some inferences can be made. The following description of Akerson' s routine emo& . ..' £?.J-1 t-rfj 10* oc^iov b*if rxc^- MCA

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ad ne^ »*> xnoa , 57 correspondence is based on the official White House correspondence clearly bearing Akerson's action.

The most obvious inference is that Akerson was a point of contact and a buffer between the President and his various publics. Although this description can also be

applied to the other members of the secretariat* it was a crucial part of Akerson's routine as appointments

secretary and as press secretary. The content of this official correspondence suggests that the press secretary's

routine was as much determined by service to the

President's various publics as it was to the President himself.

To aid in the description of this large and varied collection of correspondence, three general subject

categories have been noted which help identify the areas of

responsibility given to Akerson. These three categories

are Akerson 'ss

(1) action on routine requests,

(2) mediation of press problems* and

(3) facilitation of press policy.

The first category, Akerson's action on routine

requests* numerically represents the greatest portion of

the correspondence. A sampling of this request corres-

pondence is presented here as illustrative of what was

probably some of the simple routine but time-consuming

part of Akerson's work. This selection was made on the a*.

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9tU no sbam aew noi*»aIaa axrfT .x'utv a 9 noai»:{A lo *2*q 58 basis of variety and represent iveness. Each selection

represents a kind of routine request* Selections were made only if there were at least fifteen pieces of correspondence

of the same kind in the Akerson and Presidential Papers.

The survey indicated that the following list of

categories could be identified according to this criterion!

1. Requests that the President accept an honorary

club membership.

2. Requests that the President be a guest speaker.

3. Requests for an autographed presidential

photograph.

4. Requests that the President endorse an

organization or cause.

5. Requests that the President or Akerson inter-

cede on behalf of an individual seeking a job.

6. Requests for a personal appointment with the

President.

7. Requests that the President accept some kind of

a gift.

In content* these are the kinds of requests

Akerson acted on in his capacity as press secretary and

appointments secretary. Most of the correspondence seemed

perfunctory in nature; usually the letters were a standard

kind of reply that bore Akerson *s signature. This was a

public relations, service routine that did not require the

exercise of great power on important issues* but certainly .

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-a^ieo MM »aa*»; xoqjai imwco **«>** *© aaisiaxs 59 roust have consumed the time and energies of the press secretary.

Of the remaining two categories of correspondence/

mediating press problems and facilitating press policy , there are far fewer pieces of correspondence. The number/ content/ and variety of this correspondence precludes applying the measurement standards of the request corres- pondence. In addition/ the collection of these two types of correspondence was not complete. The examples presented here are not typical of the content of the problems Akerson mediated or the policies he facilitated but are illustrative of the process of mediation and

facilitation.

It was as press secretary that Akerson most often

found himself in the position of mediator. Although the

President is never mentioned in the letters/ the implica- tion is that Akerson is mediating a problem between the

President and the press. Usually/ the dissatisfied party

is the President. Akerson* s letter of May 8/ 1929, to

Byron Price of the AP Bureau in Washington, D. C, is

interesting in its date—the administration was hardly two months old:

Some means must be found to prevent premature publication of the President's speeches/ even if the White House has to take steps to see that the guilty of such infractions are denied the privilege of advance copies. 11 v

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Akerson also came to mediate between agents of the press.

The content of this kind of correspondence was usually one agent registering a complaint about another agent with the

White House. In November 1929, the president of

United Press Association, K. A. Bickel, wrote to Akerson:

A very serious situation exists in South America where the Havas Agency has apparently frequently released President Hoover *s addresses not moments but upwards of an hour in advance of the release date and apparently are doing this persistently. It ought to be easy for you to determine directly how the Havas Agency receives these speeches and establish the responsibil- ity for the Havas Agency, if the Havas Agency cannot be made directly responsible to the White House. Very frankly, we are not going to continue to permit Havas Agency to continuously place the UP, or rather the clients of the UP, in a ridiculous position by their constant violations of the release pledge in Brazil and Argentina. 12

Akerson mediated this problem between Havas and UPA through a series of letters and evidently with some personal contact. In his letter to the Washington, D. C, representative, Akerson wrote

I have two most serious complaints to the effect that the Havas Hews Agency broke the release on the President's Armistice Day speech in Europe and also in South America. I want to go into the whole matter with you and through you, with your representatives in N.Y. If the Havas News Agency continues to break press releases, I have to see that they are not extended the courtesy of advances from the White House .13

When the President had a grievance, when the press had a grievance, Akerson acted on the problem; not always to the satisfaction of the grievants or even to the

solution of the problem, but this kind of mediation was a part of Akerson *s routine as press secretary. i

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Facilitating White House press policy also contributed to Akerson* s correspondence routine. The main thrust of press policy concerned the press conference and will be discussed in a later chapter. But Akerson also implemented a variety of press decisions on other matters.

In October of 1929/ the Commissioner of Education of

Massachusetts wrote to Akerson noting a statement in the public press to the effect that it would be the policy of the President to disregard letters publicized before they were received by him and requested to be advised whether this policy was given out by the President to the press or 14 whether it appeared in official correspondence. Akerson replied with this policy statements

The President made it plain to the press that this policy /disregarding letters publicized before being received by the President/ would be followed from now on. Considerable publicity was given to that official White House announcement.^

The question of release dates was a recurring policy problem for Akerson. Often he would try to anticipate the problem by attaching this kind of transmit- tal note to whatever the release might bet

Caution to editors:

Your attention is respectfully called to the release for the Budget Message. The Message is neces- sarily dated Dec. 2nd, the date of the opening of Congress. It will not be read until Dec. 4th at earliest. It must not be confused with the President's Message, which will likely be released at noon on Dec. 3rd. I call your attention to the Budget Message release in order that there may be no violation of said release due to any misunderstanding as to the date.^6 »o aV

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Except for the correspondence dealing with the operation of the press conference, this resume describes the official Akerson correspondence in the record during the White House years. This is not the record of a man who was close to the decision-making process, as was true during the Commerce period. While Akerson was an active participant during the Commerce period, his role in the

White House seemed to be more one of a passive agent. Some of this initiative had been absorbed by a strong President who actively preferred to accomplish his press objectives

in private dealings between himself and the publishers.

Additionally, some of this initiative had been assumed by

the other presidential secretaries. Newton and Strother participated in some aspects of the press secretary's job

and assumed duties that had been Akerson' s during the

Commerce period.

It is assumed that Secretary Newton accomplished

the political publicity activity in which Akerson was so

heavily involved in the Commerce period. None of the

political contacts who contributed to the Commerce period

correspondence appear in Akerson 's White House corres-

pondence. The many files on the political organizations in

the various states are not duplicated in his White House

files. There is no file on the Republican National

Committee nor on James West, the director of publicity for

the Republican National Committee. While it is true that b »smot

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President's publicity were handled by someone else. The most likely person would have been Walter Newton. Since

Newton was specifically charged with the responsibility of presidential political appointments, it is likely that the political obligations incurred by Akerson during the

Commerce period were "paid off" by Newton during the White

House period.

The Research Secretary, French Strother, routinely handled books and magazine articles to be published about the President. Authors would seek the President's cooperation through the research secretary. Review of the material before publication would also be made by 17 Strother. There is no evidence to suggest that this

arrangement caused any contention between Akerson and

Strother. As the former editor of World's Work , it

probably seemed natural that Strother take over this kind

of job.

It was Strother, not Akerson, who was charged with

the effort of watching and reporting public opinion to the

President « As part of his research job, Strother studied

the editorial comment of more than 600 newspapers of every -

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15.000*000.

Under Strother's direction* offices were established

in a Washington office building to study editorial comment.

Here the newspapers were delivered every day* reviewed for

items relating to national questions* and clipped

accordingly. The clippings were sorted according to

subject and pasted on sheets. From these sheets* research- ers with newspaper experience made typewritten digests which were laid on the President's desk twice a day. These

digests were then compiled into a running survey of public

opinion on various national issues. These surveys were

duplicated* but their distribution beyond the President is 18 not known.

Unlike his predecessors* Hoover was not satisfied

that he could read public opinion from the few newspapers

he could read daily* from his own callers* and from his own

correspondence. Nor could he rely on the traditional White

House news and editorial clipping approach. It is to

Hoover *s credit that he tried to systematize the process of

reading public opinion. The fallacy of this approach*

however* was equating the editorial opinion of newspapers with public opinion.

Strother* Newton* and the President preempted some

of the work that would usually be considered part of the

press secretary's routine. .

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Akerson participated heavily during the Commerce period in political party publicity. He did relatively little of this in the White House. During the Commerce years, Akerson had very little direct contact with the

Washington press corps. The Secretary of Commerce met with them informally and frequently. There was never any indication that Akerson was present during these press meetings. A review of the periodical literature before

1929 shows that Akerson' s name is not listed in any of the magazines or newspapers. It is probable that during the

Commerce period, Akerson was nothing more to the reporters than an ex-newspaperman employed in the outer office. But this changed during the White House years when Akerson* job was almost exclusively press relations with the

Washington correspondents including the planning and operation of twice-weekly presidential press conferences and twice-daily press secretary briefings.

Preas Relations

Washington, D. C, is the site of a great and continuing struggle between government officials and the

Washington press corps. What is finally reduced to a contest between reporters skilled in ferreting and officials adept in straddling is known as press relations.

Officials and newspapermen meet essentially for conflicting purposes. The official wants to work in privacy until such ill .

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oollxxc e 66 time as he can reveal information that will most favorably reflect on him. Guided by traditional news values, the reporter is interested in precisely that type of news which 19 the official is least eager to reveal.

Herbert Hoover came to the White House at a time when press representation in the capitol was being extended in cities of medium size and in small cities above 25,000 20 population. Hoover faced a growing corps of competent newsmen representing a variety of news agencies.

From his press experience as Secretary of Commerce and as a Republican campaigner, the President had a ready appreciation for the power and the workings of the press.

At the first of eight Gridiron Dinners that Hoover attended as President in the spring of 1929, he revealed with some good humor his relationship to the press:

And I have found in all the representatives of the press at all times a desire to be helpful in most unexpected ways. For instance, they daily assist me beyond my greatest hopes by their suspicious research work in new implications for my most carefully formulated phrases. I discover by the time an idea of mine has filtered through the clear and crystal minds of one hundred different correspondents, that partic- ular idea throbs with a sense of courage and public service, that it has sinister implications, that it is filled with personal bias, that it bristles with idealism, sanity and progress. When I take refuge in silence, the gentlemen of the press again assist me by the workings of their own speculation. 21

In a more serious mood a year later, Hoover wrote of the need for a strong, independent press in a letter to the Pean of the School of Journalism, University of

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The steadily rising standards of journalism are an encouragement to those who believe that the press should be not only one of the most powerful agencies in the life of the people but also one rendering the highest possible service through the dissemination of constructive thought in science, social advance, and civic idealism. The greatest challenge to the ingenuity of the journalist is to make these things as interesting to the public as are the more familiar subjects which apparently must be treated in terms of conflict. I am happy to believe that continual progress is being made in that direction by the press. 22

If the story of Mr. Hoover's press relations had to be predicted in 1929, there would be sound evidence to speculate a success story: he had a good working record with the press, he understood their needs, and he appreciated their power. Yet failure was the fulfillment of this prediction, not success. In 1937, Leo C. Rosten wrote this comment on Hoover's press relations failure in

Fublic Opinion Quarterly* Herbert Hoover was aware of the technique of press relations. It was only after Mr. Hoover, as President, alienated the press corps by a series of surprising inept acts that they turned against him. ... He resorted to high-handed measures and a rank antagonizing of the correspondents which brought down a storm of protest. 23

As Secretary of Commerce, Hoover enjoyed the respect and confidence of the newspapermen, who regarded him as one of the best news sources in Washington. Mr.

Hoover's good press during the Secretary of Commerce period generally conveyed the image of an efficient, experienced, business executive; a trusted public servant, an adminis- 24 trator; an economist; and an organizer. Paul J. Y-£

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Anderson/ in an article written for Nation in 1931/ described the easy, productive relationship Hoover had with the press as Secretary of Commerce:

Long before the death of Harding, it became the custom of a group of correspondents, including some of the ablest in the business, to gather several after- noons each week in Hoover's office. There he talked freely not only about his own department but about the departments of his colleagues in the cabinet and about the affairs of the Presidency, ... He was the best "grapevine" in Washington, and a perfect goldmine of "graveyard stuff." He was able, moreover, invariably to convey the impression that he knew what he was talking about. Gradually ... an impression pervaded the Washington press corps, just as it had pervaded their editors and the American public, that Hoover knew more about the affairs of the government and the actual condition of the country and the world than any other man in the administration. 25

The press, along with the public, had rising

expectations about the new President. Considering the good press relations Hoover had as Secretary of Commerce, how generous he was with his time and information, and how he

seemed to appreciate the correspondent's news function, it was with some good reason that they expected the end of the

dull, meaningless, presidential press conferences of the

Coolidge era. The press felt confident that their close

and productive relationship with the Secretary of Commerce

would continue with the President. But Hoover the President

was quite different from Hoover the Secretary of Commerce.

Hoover took the dignity of his new office seriously and

literally. Except for a few chosen favorites, he held

himself aloof from the press. This regard for the -

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Presidency made him extremely thin-skinned about criticism.

Hoover believed the Presidency as well as the incumbent was damaged by criticism. His presidential skin* under the pressures of the Depression* thinned to a dangerous shearness. It was well known by the working press that the

President would track down the source of criticism and apply whatever pressures he could with publishers. The

President was attentive to the press and knew its powers.

In a telegram to Roy Howard of Scripps-Howard Newspapers the President's sensitivity and response to criticism is demonstrated

The country deserves an apology from the Washington Bureau of the United Press for an attempt this morning to ascribe personal and partisan politics to the proposal of the United States government of construc- tive action to end this depression and to reestablish social and economic order to the world. I am confident that you as head of that service do not your- self approve such activities by your agents. 26

The President drew sharp criticism from the press on this point from Washington correspondent Paul Y. Andersons

Knowing that the newspapers made him, he assumes they can with equal ease destroy him. In this he is mistaken. ... Such is the nature of this humorless and resentful man that he must know the worst that is said of him, must take steps to anticipate or prevent its repetition and must, if possible, punish the responsible author. 27

Tension between the President and the press came early and escalated. Aside from the great and complicated issues of depression, tariff reform, and prohibition which concerned both the President and the reporters, the '

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President was strained by annoyances on both sides*

Most of all/ Mr. Hoover disliked being the subject of publicity!

All the wiles of correspondents could not persuade Herbert Hoover to pose for pictures as are commonly taken of campaigners . • .All through the campaign he has been the most elusive figure veteran press men and photographers have ever pursued .28

President Hoover would not allow his staff to publicize any of the numerous human interest stories connected with his adventures in China or his many humanitarian acts during the Belgium Relief days. As President/ he deliberately 29 avoided the spotlight.

Hoover added great tensions to his relations with the press by insisting on his privacy. While it may have been true in theory that he was entitled to privacy in the

White House and at his fishing retreat on the in Virginia^ the fact is that the more he struggled to assert his privacy/ the more he advertised his sensitive- ness and the less his privacy was respected.

Early in his term/ Hoover began to make unannounced automobile trips to his fishing camp on the Rapidan River in Virginia. Often/ reporters were left behind. Stories of reporters chasing the President's car at fifty-five miles per hour began to appear. The speed of the

President's "flying cavalcade" received wide publicity when a correspondent and his wife wrecked their car and suffered sac.

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At the , which became a kind of week- end White House, the correspondents were kept at a distance. Trying to report the President of the United States became a matter of long-range guesses which had little factual substance and less official support. ^^

The reporters were quartered thirty-three miles from the

President's camp with very little communications 31 facilities either to the camp or to the outside world.

This situation never corrected itself and bad feelings persisted. The President resented the invasion of his privacy and the correspondents were annoyed by the lack of cooperation.

The situation at the Rapidan was the beginning of a continuing struggle between the press and the President over his privacy. When the reporters had no real news to report from the White House, they would file stories about the President asking carpenters to stop work on White House repairs so that he might take a nap, or the First Lady taking sound tests to study and improve her speaking voice, or they would write about the dog from the presidential kennel biting a Marine. The reporters even disclosed that there was a patch in one of the White House curtains. The authors of these reports were ferreted out by the President 32 and in some cases were reprimanded by their newspapers.

Akerson, too, must have shared some of the s

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President's belief that the personal details of a

President's life were not appropriate press material. On

March 22, 1933/ he wrote this to Mr. Hoover*

I have heard that a number of men covering the press conference, and even those who have decided to go along with Roosevelt are fearful. They believe that before very long there will be some slip which will make him look ridiculous. Some of these men have the same fear insofar as the weekly press conferences which are held by Mrs. Roosevelt are concerned. The first lady apparently insists on being in the limelight at least every other day. Her daughter, Mrs. Dall, has also started_her_ broadcasting. Apparently the whole family are /sic/ publicity mad. 33

And again Akerson wrote to Hoover on April 24,

1933, his opinion on this kind of White House publicity

Newsreel pictures come out of the White House on the least provocation. One of the boys told me that Mrs. Roosevelt can be put into pictures anytime. She arranges them herself if she is not asked. Roosevelt himself posed and talked three times in two days recently. I think the public will gradually tire of that sort of stuff. 34

Another contributing factor to the President's poor press relationship is noted by Harold Brayman,

Washington correspondent of the New York Evening Post t

The President had "favorites" and "assistant favorites" among White House correspondents. To the former went invitations to the White House and the Presidential camp on the Rapidan. The latter were those who went to the office of Secretary Akerson to pick up stray enlightenment about the minor workings of Mr. Hoover's mind. Hardly more than a dog. 35

The "favorites" noted by Brayman were also called the

"White House Pen Men's Association." The membership included Mark Sullivan, New York Herald ? William Hard, magazine writer and Hoover biographer; Frank Kent, Baltimore I

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Sun ? Richard V. Oulahan, New York Timeg ? Roy Roberts, 36 Kansas City Star * and Roy Vernon/ Chicago News .

The press was only too aware of the privileged

access these men had to the President. At the July 5, 1929, press conference, in response to a reporter asking who would be the President's guests at the Rapidan camp for the coming weekend, the President replied

Walter Newton and Vernon Kellogg. I am also taking Bill Hard and Mark Sullivan for general entertain-* ment . 37

Then too, and perhaps more serious, was the charge

that Hoover made promises and statements to newsmen that proved to be less than true when the full facts became known. Drew Pearson and Robert Allen, in their book

Washington Merry-Go-Round, noted these two instances*

There was the memorable statement of 1929 that he was going to pare army costs ... But when some months later the budget was submitted to Congress, it was found that army costs had not been reduced. ...

In the case of the alleged suspended , reporters for the New York Evening Post and the New York Sun discovered that no orders had gone out to the Navy Department to stop work on them, but, on the contrary, all preparation for the construction of vessels was going forward as per schedule. 38 George Manning cited this example in Editor &

Publisher:

Hoover denied having received a letter from FDR, then Governor of New York, concerning negotiations between the U. S. and Canada regarding St. Lawrence River waterway project. When Governor Roosevelt announced that he would make public his copy of the letter, the White House admitted that the letter had been received. Then the White House denied having .

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denied knowledge of the letter and, at the same time, denied that there had been any negotiations ,39

in his book, Washington Correspondents* Leo Rosten complained that "Mr. Hoover's figures on unemployment, the federal deficit, and business conditions were proved wrong 40 on several occasions.

The President was prone to call for news moratoriums on national issues for various reasons. When the tariff bill became hopelessly bogged down in congressional debate, he remained silent in order to preserve the integrity of the legislative processes from the persuasion of the executive. Hoover made this explan- ation at his March 22, 1929, press conference:

I already tried to make it clear that in matters of major public policy the Executive should be the first to safeguard the independent relationship between Congress and the Executive side of government. 4 ^

When the Naval Treaty was being negotiated, he remained silent at his press conferences without any reason expressed. When the Depression crisis deepened, he remained 42 silent to avoid feeding national fears. The press, however, wanted to write about these issues. When there was no news from the White House, the press would speculate.

When the President did have something to say, the press would challenge him. And occasionally, when the press did not cooperate under these conditions that the President thought to be of great national importance, an irritated

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. o . chastise correspondents openly for interpre- tations however legitimate, with which he disagreed. He reacted with anger to news accounts which criticized him. ... He began to invite newspaper publishers to the White House, using the occasion to complain about correspondents whom he did not like and suggesting that he would prefer to have them transferred. 43

In view of these conditions, it is not surprising that for most of his presidency, Hoover's press relations were strained, if not downright painful.

What efforts, if any, the press secretary made to relieve the tensions between the President and the press are not clear. Akerson protected the President's right to personal privacy and he held that the dignity of the

Presidency precluded the kind and detail of information that the reporters wanted. But beyond this, Akerson had his own separate relationship with the press, with his own strengths and weaknesses separate from those of the

President.

First the strengths. Akerson made every effort to accommodate the photographers of the press corps, both motion pictures and stills. The President was at best a reluctant subject in front of the lens, but by careful planning Akerson arranged special photography sessions with the President. The use of movies, especially sound movies, in news coverage was in the developing stages in 1928 but was receiving a great deal of encouragement. Paramount

Publix Corporation, Akerson' s future employers, were in the .

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76 early stages of promoting movie news clips to be shown at movie houses. It was through Akerson 's offices that the

President and the photographic agents were able to reach a mutual understanding about the nature of the filming sessions and the use of the pictures. From the corres- pondence between Akerson and these agents/ these working agreements were established:

1. Filming session would not be held on any regular basis. 2. The President would retain the right to review and authorize the use of the photographs. 3. Sound equipment could not be used without specific permission. 4. Motion picture agents would not use their film as still shots. 5. Candid shots at these sessions would not be permitted. 44

This working arrangement enjoyed some support from the press. The Saturday Evening Post made this comment on

Akerson* s work with the photographers!

Akerson is the shepherd of the photographers. They include the men who make the still, movie and talkie pictures. Obviously there can be no indiscriminate photographing of the head of a nation. Only qualified photographers having official cards are permitted to accompany the President or snap him in the White House grounds.

The talkies presented a new problem. It was impossible to permit any informal presidential remarks to be reproduced. In consequence, the President's speech is recorded only on important occasions. 45

Akerson made an effort to give the photographer the same stature and representation in the White House as the reporter enjoyed .

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It is George too who has the keen eye for the camera* Although a reporter by experience and training, he also has been a managing editor and so knows the worth of pictures. ... So he has assidu- ously cultivated the photographers, whether of stills, movies or talkies and much to the pain of the writing corps he sees to it that the camera toters are always taken care of and fully represented. When the plan for the remodeling of the executive offices was being laid out, he made sure that they should have a lounging room of their own. Heretofore they had hung around on the public chairs in the vestibule, with their cameras dumped anywhere. 46

Akerson did make some effort to bring equity to the various news agents seeking recognition from the White

House. For his efforts on behalf of the business press, he received this letter of appreciations

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to tell you that the business paper editors are very grateful, indeed, to you for putting this important portion of the press on a parity with the daily newspapers. 47

Akerson initiated the twice-daily press conferences by the press secretary. It was his habit to meet with the press at 10:00 A.M. and 4s 00 P.M. daily except those days when the President had a press conference. On those days, the presidential press conference would be substituted for one of Akerson 1 s conferences. There are no transcripts of these conferences in the Akerson Papers. Nor is there any evidence that he prepared material for these conferences.

Occasionally the President, at his own press conferences, would make some reference to the Akerson press meetings

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Mercury magazine commented:

He is the originator of the twice-daily press conference, to which the reporters come with their queries about postmaster ships and other local items. This idea of seeing the reporters daily is plainly the invention of one who knows his Washington correspondents thoroughly. In offering them a chance to palaver daily with a presidential contact, Mr. Akerson saw that not only could a very important influence be thrown upon the copy they produced, but that the conference could be used as a screen behind which activities could be carried on which might otherwise be ferreted out—that is, if the reporters were not lulled into security. Mr. Akerson, himself for years one of the most accomplished of Washington correspondents, appreciated fully the average reporters disinclination to root into things if he can possibly avoid doing so. He knew that if the average man of the corps could feel that he was "protected" he would usually take what was given to him.

So he installed his twice-daily meetings. ... Unluckily, certain of the more independent and restless of the boys soon grasped the fact that he passed out only what the White House wanted known, and that much remained to be turned up by accident long afterward. 48

Although news management was not an identifiable phrase in the press jargon of Hoover's era, the practice of manipulating the kind and the timing of news was recognized.

Akerson was able to time his news releases with some success to assure the best possible coverage and treatment

for his "chief."

When the Senate, in the face of Presidential denunciation, approved for a second time the debenture plan, he outmaneuvered the recalcitrant chamber for the headlines the next morning by releasing late the same evening several letters that had come to the President apparently fortuitously, from the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Agriculture giving their 8V

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expert opinions on the dangers of the proposition. The press of the land, being overwhelmingly Republican, gave the President's communications the big play— at the expense, alas, of the far more significant news that the Senate, despite a heavy Republican majority and only a few months after the new Republican President had come to office, had for a second time in a few weeks voted no conficence.49

Another example of Akerson using this timing technique involved upstaging the visit of former President Coolidge to Washington. Evidently the Coolidge visit was all set for the top space in the morning papers when

George very neatly nicked it by producing a statement from the President that the Army was to be directed to investigate how it could reduce its costs— an idealistic assignment, if there ever was one. Mr. Coolidge, much to his surprise and disgust, went into the inside pages. 50

Akerson also devoted a good deal of his time and effort to maintaining professional amenities with the press. As word came to his attention that some member of the press had been promoted, he would note the promotion with this kind of congratulatory letter:

This is just to extend my congratulations to you upon your appointment as Assistant to the Publisher of the New York Evening Graphic . I am glad to know that you are going to continue your work as a political editor. 5 ^

Or at the occasion of the establishment of a new newspaper, especially a Republican one, Akerson would write this kind of lettert

I am very glad to add my word of good wishes for the first issue of the Onondaga Republican. Nothing so fosters the spirit of Republicanism as a newspaper medium given over to the dissemination of information affecting government and the activities of the party. 52 I

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There was evidently some necessity for the press secretary to "police" the actions of the correspondents while they were in the White House, But it is to

Aker son's credit that he handled these occasions with restraint. When there was a complaint that the press did

nothing but sit in the press room and play cards , it was

Akerson who asked them to keep the door closed. When members of the press left the press conference before the

President had finished, again it was Akerson who did the

"police" work with the minimum of offense?

Memo to Newsmen:

It is requested that no correspondents leave the room during a conference with the President, until such conference is at an end. There has been considerable confusion caused by several correspondents rushing out to telephones before the President has finished. It occurs to me that in fairness to all correspondents who attend the conference, no one should leave. 53

The official end of a Hoover press conference was

never clear to reporters. After the President finished his prepared remarks, reporters might get in one or two

questions, usually about Hoover's weekend plans. The

President answered these questions occasionally. The only

sure sign that the conference had ended was Mr. Hoover's

leaving the room. Today, the press conference is over when

the senior wire service man on assignment to the White

House says, "Thank you, Mr. President." This practice

started during F.D.R. 's press conferences. A. Merriman

Smith, a long time United Press White House correspondent s«

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• 1 81 and the senior wire service man, explained the official beginning and ending of the F.D.R. press conferences in his book. Thank. Xau, tsr_. President* The conference begins when either Harold Beckley of the Senate press gallery, or Bill Donaldson of the House gallery, shouts "all in" from the rear of the room. • • •

The questioning actually closes and the meeting is over when the senior wire service man on the White House assignment decides that the reporters have exhausted the news possibilities for that day and says, "Thank you, Mr. President." 54

These were some of Akerson r s successes with the press, but there were also some failures. When tension came and persisted between the President and the press, it is not clear that Akerson made any vigorous attempt to mediate the difficulties. Did he advise the President about the dangers of press favoritism? Did Akerson try to bring perspective to the President about his sensitivity to criticism and his penchant for privacy? Where was Akerson when Hoover would try to track down his critics and have them reprimanded? Did the press secretary try to help accommodate the press at Rapidan? Evidently, Akerson did not address himself to these questions. There is no evidence to indicate that the press secretary tried to mediate any of these problem areas. It is assumed that

Akerson supported the President's right to privacy*

Hoover's reprimanding of critical reporters, and the condi- tions at the Rapidan camp.

Whatever the circumstances, one weakness of rc*a aria bfls

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Akerson's relations with the press was his attempts to placate instead of mediate the problems between the press

and the President. When the President was distant and non- communicative, Akerson tried to be friendly and informa-

tive. But it didn't work. The friendly press secretary

just could not compensate for the aloof President. Some press opinion regarded Akerson's friendliness as overbearing and his information as unreliable. Words like "political valet" and "back slapper" began to appear in print and turn

the tone of press opinion against Akerson. His credibility began to wane as mistakes were made.

Akerson occasionally got his "facts" a little muddled as on the day when he nodded his head wisely and confidently in the affirmative when asked at 4 o'clock if Justice Harlan F. Stone was to be appointed Chief Justice, at 4:30 followed it with confirmation in the form of a statement naming Charles Evans Hughes. 55

The paucity of news from the President was bad

enough, but press relations were strained even further when

the available news was garbled by the press secretary.

The very heart of Akerson's job was to bring about

good relations between the President and the press but good

press relations were disintegrating by 1930. How much of

this disintegration resulted from Akerson's overbearing

personality, his political methods, and his loss of

credibility is difficult to determine. These elements were

present along with a strong-minded President who created

serious information vacuums. Assigning blame to the '

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•if^ •:.;.- aaiild pninpxaaA xl en- 83 ineptitudes of the press secretary or the strong-minded convictions of the President is risky. The following press comment tried to put the two in perspectives

He /Akerson/ is, by God's will, a jovial, expansive fellow who finds it hard to say no. As a result he sometimes promises more than he can fulfill. It is not his fault. That is exactly what Mr. Hoover has him there for. But to the victims that is small consolation, with the result that George is often accused of a double-dealing for which he is only indirectly responsible. At the Williamstown Institute last Summer, it was widely related that he was to blame for a "cordon of duplicity " that was alleged to surround the White House. That was not altogether fair to him. He is undoubtedly the visible evidence of the cordon, but like the Marines in Haiti, he is merely doing the best he can in a not very salubrious job. 57

Press opinion of Akerson never reached the extremes of laudatory praise and critical reprisals that were heaped on Hoover. The press usually viewed Akerson as a well-intentioned man who worked for a difficult boss.

Press comment on Akerson followed closely the political inclinations of the publication. The pro-Hoover and the anti-Hoover press described Akerson in accordance with their Hoover predispositions. The Saturday Evening Pjasi., a long-time Hoover supporter, described the press secretary as ". . . the best known of the secretaries, since he is the direct link between the public and the President.

Every letter asking for an appointment with the Chief

Executive passes across his desk. Every visitor who sees the President in his office must arrange the appointment through him. As liaison officer with the press—and no one >

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The American Mercury magazine, a consistent Hoover critic, made this comment on Akerson in December of 1929*

It is not every Norsky farm-boy who becomes a presidential secretary even one of four and rides about in a White House car. He has, in fact, a weakness for automobiles. Before he came to the White House, he liked to roll up to the houses of his friends in a taxi and keep it waiting for hours while he prolonged his call. 59

When Akerson left the White House, the New York Evening

Post made this appraisals

He has been so to speak, "first secretary " to the President ranking Mr. Richey and Mr. Newton. In this position he has contributed much to the human contact which the White House has signally needed. He has made excellent and efficient relations with the press. ... For the sake of the administration, we regret to see Mr. Akerson resign his office. 60

The Press Conferences

The White House press conferences dramatize most vividly the struggle between Hoover and the press, a struggle made all the more dramatic because the press conference idea held such hope for improved reporter-

President communication. The President expressed this hope in his first press conference, held March 5, 1929, two days after inauguration. He discussed his plans for future meetingss

I wish yaur cooperation on further development of these /pres,a/ conferences. As you know, the relations of the President and the press have been a matter of •taxaee

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development over a number of administrations. ... By degrees, a means has been found for a more intimate relationship, and I hope an impression that we might develop it even further in those directions which would assist the press and the President. ... I wish to be of such service as I can in these conferences, and beyond this in matters of special character that are not of general interest. I would be glad to see any of you from time to time. I want you to feel free to make such suggestions as will help me out in that direction. 6 1

The spirit of these remarks indicated that the President would not only continue the press conference practices of past administrations, but was willing to improve and expand the meetings he had with the press.

The first formal White House press conference was 62 held by on March 15, 1913. Although

Wilson discontinued the press conferences as America entered , his successor, Warren Harding

(publisher of the Marion £JL2jC* an Ohio newspaper) , restored the regular White House press conference. Harding's meetings with the press were frequent, regular, and informal, but a tacit understanding of press conduct existed between the President and the press. Basically, the press agreed to keep the President's confidences when he spoke "off the record" and not to quote the President 63 directly without his permission.

Coolidge retained the press conference procedures established by Harding but the informality between the

President and the press was gone and replaced by some rigid rules. Questions had to be submitted in writing in advance .

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dun 9d ©• -e ftlm 86 of the conferences. Because Coolidge rarely spoke for

quotation, ghostly anonymity was established.

When Herbert Hoover inherited this press conference

institution, it was young, pliable, and filled with

potential. Here was a remarkable communications opportun-

ity. The increasingly important development of American

and world opinion could be addressed directly,

Hoover's intention was to build upon the press

conference practices that previous Presidents had provided.

Rules and regulations would be established, set down in writing , made public, and adhered to. At his first press

conference, Hoover set in motion the machinery which would bring recognized organization to the press conference

institution!

I would like to suggest that Mr. Young, who is President of the White House Press Association, make up a committee of the heads of bureaus and services to discuss the matter with me. I am anxious to clear up the twilight zone as far as we can between authorita- tive and quotable material on one hand, and such material as I am able to give from time to time for purely background purposes on the other. 64

At the President's next press conference, on March 8, he

was able to report to all the correspondents that some

press arrangements had been agreed upon. Specifically, Mr.

Young, his committee, and Akerson had identified and

defined three categories of press conference information.

These three categories of information have been reprinted

and rephrased in a variety of sources since they were first \o

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a:taw j nauifoa dab 87 announced, but the President originally worded them as follows:

The first category—those that I will endeavor to answer for you for quotation/ or in some cases . . . secure for you a complete answer from the responsible official, which can be used. And I will endeavor to cover as many of the important public questions as possible.

The second category—questions which are on matters of secondary interest on which the President does not like to be scattered all over the newspapers in discussing minor and secondary questions; and in the replies to these the view of your committee and myself was that they could be attributed as from the White House or the administration, but I think you will agree with me that it is not desirable for me to comment on everything in the world, and that if I were put in that position I would have to be somewhat reticent, whereas under that sort of heading I will be able to give you a* much material as possible.

The third category--purely background questions that are more or less factual on things on which you don't want any authority attributed, and you don't have to use it if you don't want it. 65

On the evening of the March 8 press conference, the

White House Correspondents Association Committee of nine newsmen and George Akerson drew up guidelines for the 66 operation of the press conferences. The results of this meeting were issued in a memorandum dated March 9, 1929.

It is assumed that the members of the White House

Correspondents Association and appropriate members of the

President's staff received copies of this memo. The memo contained six policy statements. In brief, they were:

1. The White House will issue admission tickets to the press conferences but the White House Correspondents Association will determine to whom the tickets will be issued. .

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2. All questions should be submitted in writing 24 hours in advance of the conference* except such questions as arise out of the incident of the day.

3. As appropriate, the questions will be answered in writing and may be reproduced by direct quotation either of the President or such persons as may prepare the written answer.

4. Some questions will be answered verbally at the

conference # and are not to be reproduced by quotation, but may be attributed to the authority of the White House or the administration. Transcripts of the verbal statements will be held by Mr. Akerson and may be referred to by corres- pondents for details.

5. Background questions will be answered by the President purely for the information of the corres- pondents. This material, if used, must not be attributed in any manner but is used solely on the responsibility of the reporter.

6. No reference is to be made to questions submitted to which no replies are made. 67

Admission and membership rules were further defined by this press committee and Akerson. Applications for admission had to be made to Akerson with the approval of the appropriate committee of the Correspondents Associa- tion. The details of this administration procedure are spelled out in an untitled and unsigned statement dated

May 28, 1929. These are the main points of this statements

1. Applicant must declare that he is not engaged in any conflict of interest activity, i.e., employed by U.S. or foreign government, the stock exchange, a brokerage house, or a corporation having legis- lation pending before Congress, etc.

2. Admission is confined to representatives of news- papers or press agencies requiring daily telegraphic press service, and to news-collecting agencies which furnish a daily news service to the -

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Washington representatives of newspapers and press associations for telegraphing to daily newspapers; and to such trade newspapers, not necessarily published daily, which are authenticated by the appropriate committee of management of the White House Correspondents Association.

3. Applicant must agree in writing to abide by such rules and restrictions as the President may deem necessary.

4. Representatives of an editorial staff may be temporarily admitted at the discretion of the appropriate committee of management of the White House Correspondents Association with the approval of the White House.

5. Those admitted to the press conferences on a regular basis shall be regarded as members of the White House Correspondents Association and shall elect annually a committee charged with the administration and enforcement of the rules governing the press conferences subject to the approval of the press secretary acting for the President.

6. The President alone shall exercise disciplinary measures. 68

By May of 1929, Akerson and the committee had detailed written guidelines for the administration of the press conferences that were mutually acceptable to the

President and the press.

The ground rules had been laid; the starting point

determined. Akerson* s job now was to help both the press

and the President work within these guidelines.

The two areas that required most of Akerson 's

efforts were admission to the press conferences and the

question categories. Both areas generated contention.

Akerson worked closely with the officers of the White House

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90 conflicts.

Once it was made public that the President had established the press conferences on a twice-weekly basis

Akerson received many requests for admission, some from visiting reporters, students, and home-town politicians.

Everyone felt he had a bona fide reason to be admitted.

But under the admission rules, most of these requests had to be denied. Those who were refused admittance were dissatisfied and appealed to Akerson. For example, the

Washington correspondent for the New Jersey paily Record *

William J. Boyd, asked Akerson to intervene with the 69 membership committee on his behalf. Akerson *s reply was typical of his answer to those kinds of requests

It is impossible under the rules of the White House Correspondents Association and the arrangements which I have made with the officers of that Association to grant you the privileges of the presidential press conferences.

I have no objection to your coming to see me any time that you have a particular query, but you will understand that the number of correspondents must be limited to those who are on full time of their news- papers. 70

The only instances where Akerson deviated from this kind of reply involve requests from foreign newsmen to interview the President. Instead of arranging for an interview, Akerson would arrange for the White House

Correspondents Association to admit the foreign corres- 71 pondent to the press conferences on a temporary basis.

Akerson also worked closely with the chairman of ..

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But in either case, both the press secretary and the chairman implemented the rules with the same kind of reply.

When the UPA charged that the representatives of the business press had been discriminated against, Mr. Woonton replied:

I have it on direct authority that Mr. George Akerson, secretary to the President, who is in charge of press relations, has accorded business papers exactly the same rights he has accorded the daily papers. In each instance he is working through a committee of correspondents. The executive committee of the White House Correspondents Association passes upon the applications from daily newspapers and the Business Paper Correspondents Committee passes upon the applications from the business papers.

We should appreciate a correction being released through your organization to the same papers which received the original story. 7 2

While those members of the press not admitted to the press conferences expressed discontent, generally

Akerson was able to support the admissions policy to the satisfaction of the White House Correspondents Association.

Akerson 1 s support of the second policy difficulty, the three categories of information, was exercised mainly with the President. As the press conferences progressed through March, some clarification of these information categories had to be made. The clarifications were made by aeW , tf tut. ,

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March 12/ 1929/ press conference. Hoover made this clarification on the information for quotation category:

I have this request to make of you. No one in this position wishes to be put in the attitude of constant pronunciamentos on public questions. This has been one of the difficulties in handling the twilight zone that we have discussed before, and I am giving you these answers, which we will have transcribed for you with the understanding that you will quote this little opening:

"In reply to a question from the representatives of the press the President stated today: "74

At the March 28, 1929, press conference, the

President reiterated the policy of submitting questions at least twenty-four hours in advance:

Written questions, so far as possible, should be put in 24 hours in advance on subjects that are not critical at the moment, and the questions submitted immediately before the conference be confined to matters which have arisen on the crest of the day's events. It gives me an opportunity for a considered answer, and will enable me to give you more informa- tion. I think that would facilitate the volumn of information which can be given. 75

Even with the clarifications made by the President at various press conferences, there were still clarifica- tions to be made by Akerson. These clarifications were made in letters dated throughout 1929 and 1930, similar to the one Akerson wrote to the News Manager of the United filajtfia Pally in August of 1930: »

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I thought that everyone understood the rule, namely, that when the President is to be quoted directly a complete transcript of his remarks is given out at the White House* This has been done ever since Mr. Hoover took office. He can not be quoted except indirectly unless permission is given. There have been one or two violations of this, but it has been called to the attention of the correspondents who violated the rule.

If you have been following what we are doing here you will know that all quotations of the President are mimeographed for the use of the newspapers and they oftentimes include not only a few sentences, but many paragraphs. 7 6

Although both Akerson and the President worked to bring clarity to the three information categories, the

system never worked to anyone - s satisfaction. There is

more to suggest that this system did more to inhibit rather

than aid the flow of information between the President and

the press. A closer look at how this questioning practice worked reveals some serious weaknesses. Correspondents

submitted questions to Akerson, who in turn submitted them

to the President for his selection. The President himself

would also initiate subjects for the press conferences.

The questions were submitted informally, some typed, some

handwritten; some on formal stationary, most on pad paper.

All were signed. Some bore the handwritten instructions of

the President to Akerson. Those that were chosen for a

direct quotable answer were given by the President to

Akerson to prepare the rough draft. The drafts were then

reviewed by Hoover, corrections were made, and Akerson 'a

office duplicated the answers so that copies would be 7.-1i*7 8<

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available at the press conferences. The presidential press

files contain the reporters* questions* Akerson's drafts* the final handout* and the transcripts of the press conferences. 77

Submitting written questions in advance created some difficult problems for the press. Under the agreed upon rules* the President could choose which questions were to be answered and when. Hoover could ignore some* table others* or confine his answers to "off the record" back- ground statements. The reporters had agreed to a system that ignored their news values and news deadlines. A timely story had to wait on the inclination of the

President. The disparity between what was asked and what was answered showed up early in the press conferences and contributed to some discontentment among the White House correspondents. This disparity is demonstrated in a count of the questions and answers of the first three months

1929 Reporters • Direct Quotation Background Month Questions Information Information

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March 44 16 5 April 20 7 5 May 4 10

During the month of April* with twenty-eight questions not answered from March and twenty questions

submitted in April* the President made only seven state- ments for quotation and two of them involve announcements i

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April 9. I am afraid that this is going to be a famine morning.

12. There is a partial famine today. All the notes that I have on questions are really for background, nothing for direct quotation.

16. Well, I'm afraid this is a famine day.

19. Only one announcement today.

23. This is a famine day.

26. This is a famine day again.

Less than one month after the press had been encouraged that at last there would be open and meaningful communica- tion between reporters and the President, six press conferences produce only a minimum of quotable material and what was given was of a routine nature. The President's remarks at the April 30 press conference indicate that the reporters had already lost confidence in the written question system*

I haven't a single question from the Press this morning. Apparently you have no curiosity whatever. But I think you will have to take a part of this labor upon yourselves and indicate some directions in which you would like a little information. A press confer- ence is a conference that works both ways, and I do not know that I can stand up here and deliver orations and essays or mandates or anything of that kind. 78 1

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This remark could not have helped the situation. The reporters were yetting very little feedback on their ques- tions and since all of them had to be written* the success of the press conference as a channel of communications was in trouble after less than two months. The situation never bettered itself. During Aker son's two years as press secretary* it is only in the month of November 1929 that the number of questions from the press rose above ten per months

Direct Direct Report* Quota- Back- Report- Quota- Back- eta* tion ground era* tion ground 1929 Ques- Infor- Infor- 1930 Ques- Infor- infor- hQnt'a.tiona matJQU* mation* Month tiona mation* mat ion*

May 7 4 10 Jan. 6 5 8 June 5 3 5 Feb. 10 2 5 July 5 2 6 Mar. 6 3 4 Aug. 4 3 9 Apr. 4 2 5 Sept. 3 4 5 May 6 4 6 Oct. 2 2 5 June 5 4 7 Nov. 16 4 8 July 6 9 6 Dec. 6 2 9 Aug. 2 2 6 Sept. 3 1 6 Oct. 4 1 6 Nov. 4 3 5 Dec. 3 1 4 79

Not only do these figures suggest a serious weakness in the written question system but further evidence shows that very few reporters asked questions. A tally of the questions was made, adding up the number asked by each reporter. This tally shows 112 questions submitted

from the press in 1929 and 59 submitted in 1930# for a

Included information initiated by Hoover as well as responses to reporters* questions. M

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four reporters accounted for 94 of these 171 questions.

W. P. Flythe of Universal Service asked 14; George Durno of

International News asked 21; Paul Woonton of the Times-

Picayune and McGraw-Hill asked 32; and Lawrence Sullivan of the Baltimore Post asked 37.

The President's reluctance to answer some questions and his practice of deferring the answers to others led to

apathy among the reporters. Neither the press nor the

President were fully participating in the press conference,

Hoover realized this and made this request at the

September 13, 1929, press conference

I wonder sometimes whether when we have a thin day it is worth your while to come—whether we could not hand your questions over to Mr. Akerson, or whether you prefer to come. If you would rather have the open session I am agreeable, but I always feel that I am not assisting you as much as I should like when we have a thin day like this.

The Press i I think, Mr. President, we prefer the open session. 8^

The press meant to hold the President to his word about

meeting with them twice a week. The President's recourse was to submit to the letter if not the spirit of his agree-

ment. This led to some abrupt and bitter press

conferences. The press conference of November 7, 1930, is

presented here in the complete transcription. It shows how

useless these meetings were for the accomplishment of

constructive work but how they must have served to feed the '

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The President s I have a number of inquiries from you gentlemen upon contentious questions, but the job for the country to concentrate on now is further measures of cooperation for economic recovery.

And that is the only suggestion I have for you on this occasion, Q l

within a month of his inauguration, Hoover had voiced a willingness to be informative with the press and had authorized the necessary organization to facilitate the exchange of information. However, he chose not to use the press conferences as a channel of communications to the people. Hoover wanted the press to report the actions of his administration and not the words, particularly his words, He made this very clear to the reporters in his

November 12, 1929, press conference. His specific reference here is the stock market crash.

We are dealing here with a psychological situation to a very considerable degree. It is a question of fear. ... it seriously concerns the press to give the confidence to the public that the business fabric is now organizing itself, taking steps on its own respons- ibility to carry on. So that I am trying to get this problem across by action in different industries and other groups rather than by too much talking, and therefore I don't want to talk about it, I want the action to speak for itself. &*

Perhaps some of this skepticism toward words can be traced to his October 25, 1929, press conference. The day after

"Black Thursday w the President made the following statement for quotation? it was widely published and yet the market continued to drop with no sign that confidence would be I

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"action rather than words" statement on the 12th of

November.

All the questions I have today—or most of them— are on the business situation.

The fundamental business of the country/ that is, the production and distribution of commodities, is on a very sound and prosperous basis. The best evidence is that although production and consumption are at a very high level, the average prices of these commodities, taken as a whole, have shown no increase in the whole of the last twelve months, and there has been no appreciable increase in the stock of manufactured goods. Therefore, there has been no speculation in commodities. There has been a tendency for wage increases and the output per worker has increased, all of which indicates a very healthy situation.

The construction and building material industries have been somewhat affected by the high interest rates induced by the New York speculation, and there has been some seasonal decrease in two or three other industries, but these movements are of secondary character when they are considered in the light of the whole situation.

The temporary drop in grain prices sympathetic with stock exchange prices usually happens, but, as the Department of Agriculture points out, the overriding fact in grain is that this year's world wheat harvest is 500 million bushels below last year, and will result in a very low carry-over at the end of the harvest year.

And that is all I have today.

Press a Is that for quotation? 83 2he_ President t Yes, it is for quotation.

In the press conferences between October 25 and November 12,

Hoover did not mention the business situation even though . -

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"off the record" about the business situation.* He made this clear at the November 5 press conferences

I see no particular reason for making any public statements about it, either directly or indirect ly.&4

After October 25, Hoover created a vacuum of information about the business situation. Although he explained why he did not wish to speak on the subject at the November 12,

1929, press conference, speculation continued. The

President evidently was not satisfied that the reporters were in complete cooperation with him. At the November 29 press conference, he made this suggestion to themt

There is a purely personal note that I wanted to sound with you about this business situation—not for publication.

The handling of public psychology of this kind is a little difficult. If we overdo our job we may create a sense that the situation is more serious than it really is. There is always a very difficult point of balance, and I only wanted to make a minor suggestion to you, and that is that hereafter if you could confine your-* selves merely to the statement of the things that actually happen; ... And I am anxious that our form of news be not so much any exaggerated statement of the items as it is a definite statement of accomplishment without overdoing the situation. There is a delicate balance in it, but I will leavs. t&at to you. We probably won't arrive either /sifi/ 100%, but we will get somewhere with it. I am making thai: suggestion to you. It is not my intention to lecture the press on what they should do, but you have shown a cooperative spirit in this problem nation-wide importance, and I merely make this sug- of * gestion on the form of news. It is not censorship. 8 But even on issues that did not involve the psychology of national fear. Hoover did not use the press

"Off the record" was not an information category identified by Hoover. He used it when he spoke for reporters' ears only. .*39xj oil* ..noli •nolrtaeup »:jsv »i9n:i-

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no •?*• 'ai^jMoqei 101 conference as a channel of communication. The reduction in armaments through the Naval Treaty was an issue that greatly interested the press, one that was often the subject of their written questions. Hoover never spoke in detail "on the record" about arms limitation and his "off the record" comments were limited. Nor did he approve of the propaganda that had been sponsored by the shipbuilding corporations adverse to the Naval Conference.

The shipbuilders were opposed to any Naval Treaty that would limit ship construction. To gain support for their position, they organized a publicity campaign against the

United States signing any Naval treaty that would limit ship construction. Hoover commented on this kind of publicity in his September 6, 1929, press conferences

Every American has the right to express his opinion and to engage in open propaganda if he wishes, but it is obviously against public interest for those who have financial interest in, or may be engaged in contracts for the construction of naval vessels to secretly attempt to influence public opinion or public officials by propaganda in favor of larger armaments and attempt to defeat the efforts of the government in world limitation of such armaments or to employ persons for such purposes. I am making this statement publicly so that there can be no misapprehension of my determination that our present international negotiations shall not be interfered with from such sources and through such methods. 86

Mostly, he did not refer to the armament questions asked, but when he did, he made no reply, such as his March 29,

1930, press conference!

I have one question on instructions to Limitation of Arms Conference. There is no use getting out your paper since I am unable to make any announcement.**? oo

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While policy was being formulated, Hoover, like most government officials, wanted to work in privacy. But once agreement had been reached, he expected full coverage.

When Hoover did sign the Naval Treaty on July 22, 1930, he announced the signing with a long, prepared quotation for publication, the first of its kind on this subject for about eighteen months. After Hoover read the statement, a reporter asked, "Why the special attention, Mr. President?

The President answered, "I just thought you might get some

satisfaction out of it."

Did Akerson support this minimal use of the press conference as a channel of communication? The record is

not clear. In the collection of rough drafts, there is no evidence that Akerson prepared quotable information of the kind and number that the press requested but was overruled by the President. The corrections of these rough drafts made by the President usually involved language changes

rather than any changes in substance. In a letter to this writer from Akerson 1 s son, George Akerson, Jr., publisher

of the Boston Herald-Traveler, he notes that his father

held a conflicting opinion with Secretary Richey about the 39 press conferences. As the Depression deepened, Richey

felt that the President should discontinue meeting the

press; Akerson disagreed. While Akerson was press secre-

tary, the President met the press twice a week even if it

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Some correspondents charged that the press conference failure was Aker son's responsibility. They claimed they submitted fifty to sixty questions for each press conference, but Akerson was eliminating all questions 90 he regarded as "silly" or beneath presidential notice.

The answer to this charge is not in the record. If

Akerson did select and reject the questions, then those that did not reach the President's attention must have been discarded. But the 171 questions in the file bear evidence that the President at least read them. In any case, Akerson* s part in the processing of these questions was held suspect by the press.

Although Hoover never missed a scheduled press conference during 1929 and 1930, neither he nor his press

secretary could have taken much satisfaction in the results of these meetings they had so carefully planned. The

conferences were formal affairs. Reporters were allowed to

ask only a minimal number of clarification questions.

Reporters came to believe that the President concealed more 91 at these conferences than he revealed.

As with so many aspects of the Hoover Presidency,

the press conferences started with optimism and ended with

despair. Press comment in March of 1929, after the new

rules had been published, was optimistic. By the end of

1929, this optimism had turned to despair. In December of

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The great expectations of journalistic reforms which Mr. Hoover aroused last spring have not been realized .... The correspondents must accept administration viewpoints or go without , as secrecy surrounds all departmental dealings. ^2

Washington correspondent Harold Brayman made this comment in September of 1930:

Mr. Hoover's treatment of written inquiries is so pronounced that most correspondents no longer take the trouble to write them out.^J

Even the press conferences held twice a day by

Akerson came within this press criticism:

Here again* the reporters soon discovered that the system was being used chiefly to beguile and lull them. They found that either deliberately or because he did not know and was trying to cover up the facts, the secretary repeatedly misled them on important details; as a result of this slick policy these daily confer- ences soon fell into disrepute. 94

After two years of regular press conferences, there was general disillusionment between the President and the

White House correspondents. Two comments by Paul Anderson, who covered Washington for The Mat ion , illustrate the complete reversal of the White House correspondents after one year's association with the President. On March 3,

1929, Anderson reported:

Hoover, already a hero, promises to become a saint before his administration is a month old. I am happy to report that Hoover's attitude is much more sensible than that of his devotees ... he has drastically liberalized and broadened the relationships between the President and the press. Prom every standpoint of frankness, honesty and practicality, the new system is a vast improvement over the one it supplanted. 95 »

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It is my sad duty to report that the working of this plan has steadily been narrowed and restricted until now less reliable and printable information comes from the White House than at any time while Coolidge was President. Written questions have been so consistently ignored that few reporters any longer trouble to submit them. The direct quotation phase has degenerated into a system of Presidential "handouts" palpably propagandist ic in character and seldom 96 responsive to inquiry. . . .

The press conferences continued after Akerson left the White House, but by the end of 1930 they had failed to provide a meaningful channel of communication. The impact of this failure needs to be considered.

The antagonism of the Washington correspondents was considered a contributing factor to Hoover's defeat in

1932. During the first two years of his administration, these reporters had regular contact with the President.

Whatever Hoover's real personality and abilities were, at his press conferences he was remote, sensitive, secretive, and displayed an acute fear of criticism. The corres- pondents found nothing interesting, magnetic, or appealing in his personality, and that lack was inevitably reflected in their treatment of him.

Hoover's friends maintained that the day-by-day dispatches of the Washington correspondents did as much to defeat him in 1932 as did Charles Michelson and the Democratic Party. The photographers joined the con- flict and many of the unflattering pictures of Mr. Hoover can be traced more directly to bitter feelings than to bad light. 97

The impact of this treatment may have been signif- icant with the reading public, but it had little consequence 1

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106 in determining the editorial policy of the newspapers the correspondents represented. Even in 1932, the nadir of the

Hoover administration/ fifty-five to sixty per cent of the 93 country's newspapers supported Hoover,

By the end of Hoover's first year in office, when the reporters were already registering their complaints, even as the events of the Depression were forming, the

President retained the great proportion of editorial

support. Even a traditionally Democratic paper like the

New York World retained some editorial support for the

President as shown in this year-end review published

March 2, 1930

The most impressively hopeful aspect is the revival in Washington of the quality of large-mindedness in the direction of affairs. Mr. Hoover, whether he succeeds or whether he fails on the immediate issues, is in the line of the great Presidents. After 8 years of provincialism, there is a man in the White House who thinks nationally. ...

His conduct after the panic in the conference to stabilize business was really an amazing performance. It revealed an acquaintance with the key minds of American industry, an understanding of the nature of the crisis, a courage to conceive and to act which may have been decisive in averting what might have been a national disaster. In one sense, it is never possible to say exactly how much a man has succeeded in preventing what might have been.

Evidence of Hoover's editorial support was

presented to the President in this tabulation of editorial

opinion concerning his first year in office. The summary

was made as part of the continuing study of editorial .

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Summary of Editorial Opinion

Number of Comment Newspapers

Too short a time to judge results 133 Accomplishments listed and praised 114 President retains public confidence 126 Papers approve fact finding 66 Papers praising appointments 25 Bad luck plagued the President 43 Accomplishments disappointingly few 70 President lacks quality of leadership 66 Praise for his administrative ability 111 Blames Senate for lack of results 123 President is not a politician 74 Predict successful administration 47 Pessimistic of future 20

Hoover's second year in office ended with increasing criticism against him in the press. This criticism was not so much tied to the disillusion of reporters as the way in which Hoover dealt with prohibition and the tariff. While Hoover was generally receiving editorial praise during that year for his handling of the business crisis/ he was coming into strong criticism on prohibition and the tariff.

A Literary Digest poll in May 1930 reported that sixty per cent of the country was wet. Hoover was a well-established "dry." The New York World reported on

June 5, 1930, the polls indicated such divergent groups as farmers and Wall Streeters favored veto of the Tariff Bill, which the President subsequently signed in the face of M V

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108 opposition from the press and professional economists. The

only chance for saving the President ' s loss of some editorial support in 1930 would be a sharp upturn in the employment situation, which did not materialize. In a compilation of Hoover press clippings for 1930/ Clair

Nelson reported in his Ph.D. thesis, "The Image of Herbert

Hoover in the American Press, " that:

There can be little doubt that the President's disposition of the tariff and his H dry M position on prohibition dealt the first really serious blow to the favorable image of Hoover. 102

Generally speaking, the failure of the press conferences did not greatly upset the balance of editorial support given to Hoover. The editorial support that did wane from the administration probably did so as the result of Hoover's stand on issues and events rather than on the trials and tribulations of the reporters at the White House

Did the failure of the press conferences result in

Akerson's resignation? There is not a clear answer to this question. On January 2, 1931, the President announced

Akerson's intention to resign, with this statement to the press:

The only news item I have at the moment is that Mr. Akerson is leaving the White House service. Someone has offered him two or three times the pay the govern- ment can afford, and he has responsibilities to his family that I cannot deny. I do greatly regret to lose an old friend out of my personal service. 1Q 3

On February 5, 1931, Akerson tendered his formal resignation to the President in this letter: ''• r

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It is impossible for me adequately to express to you my deep gratitude which fills my heart for the opportunity for service which has been given to me by you during the past few years. While I leave the White House officially/ I pledge you all my energies and efforts unofficially, in furtherance of the great work which the American people have called upon you to do. I am always, as well, at your personal service. I do want you to know of my profound appreciation for all that you have done for me, and for the fine friendship which is ours.l 04

These two statements indicate that Akerson left his post for financial reasons and that he retained the

President's respect and friendship. There is evidence to suggest that this was in fact the case and neither the

President nor the press secretary was putting on a show.

That Akerson was in serious financial difficulties is well established in the Akerson papers. There are a number of bad debt letters dated throughout 1930 as well as many attempts on Akerson* s part to borrow money. As a last resort in late 1930, he borrowed on his life insurance.

The best testimony to the fact that the President retained confidence in Akerson* s abilities was Hoover's request in the spring of 1932 that Akerson take a leave of absence from Paramount to help with the campaign. This

Akerson did.

After the defeat of the 1932 campaign, Akerson 's fortunes slipped. Paramount went bankrupt in 1933 and

Akerson started a long period of unemployment, which concerned Hoover a great deal. The ex-President made this response to Akerson 's difficulties in a March 3, 1934, letter I I

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I was greatly distressed to learn of your diffi- culties. As you probably know, I am very much reduced in income and have not so far been able to pay my own way. I am, however, asking Edgar Rickard to supply you with $125.00 a month for the present as some help and I hope it will be helpful.

I do hope that some opening will turn up that will relieve both the mind of yourself and Mrs. Akerson. I am writing to some of our friends urging them to exert themselves— for your fine abilities ought to fit in somewhere. 105

While the President did remain a faithful friend and did demonstrate his confidence in Akerson by asking for

Akerson* s help in the 1932 campaign, there was at least one indication in the Presidential Papers that Hoover had reasons for wanting a new press secretary. The diary of

James A. MacLafferty, a personal friend to President

Hoover, carries this entry for November 18, 1930s

Z called on the President today and told him concerning the belligerent attitude of many congressmen toward one of his secretaries, Mr. Akerson. I told him there were, rightly or wrongly, Republican members on the hill who had sworn they would not again come to the White House unless the President sent for them.

I remembered as I spoke to him /Hoovex/ that months ago he had told me he was going to make a change. Indeed he had told me he intended to do so.

I was therefore a little surprised when the President defended Mr. Akerson by citing the difficul- ties of his job. He went ahead to state that for many years no secretary had stayed with him for more than 18 months. He took from his drawer a record of a typical day. It was a long sheet and had about twenty to thirty lines, each line a record of an appointment he had kept that day. The President explained that Akerson must protect him.

I agreed that Akerson had a most difficult job, but I said again that Akerson is driving your friends away from you. I have done what I felt was my duty. 1 ^6 '

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A series of coincidences probably were responsible for Akerson's resignation in January of 1931. Akerson needed money; he was offered a job that tripled his press secretary salary/ and the President was ready to abandon the press conference policies he had agreed to in March of

1929. Perhaps the appointment of a new press secretary would enable the President to reprieve himself from the twice-weekly press conference promise and salvage a deteriorating situation. Theodore Joslin, Washington

correspondent for the Boston Evening Transcript , was appointed to succeed Akerson. Joslin remained as press secretary during Hoover's final two years in office. These two years showed a marked decrease in the number of press 107 conferences: fifteen in 1931 and twelve in 1932.

While Hoover helped to strengthen the permanency of the press conference institution by formalizing the practices and procedures and by meeting on a regular basis during 1929 and 1930, he was not able to activate the institution as a working channel of communications. Hoover did not look upon the press conferences as an opportunity to communicate to the press and through them to the public.

The judgment of the press was that the press conference arrangements worked out to conceal rather than reveal information. Neither the President nor Akerson's successor could revive the correspondents' confidence in the useful- ness of the press conferences in the Hoover administration. icCfi

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

"The President Gets Down To Business, " Saturday Evening Post (December 21, 1929), 80.

2 Reyjew &£ Reviews (May 1929), 116. 3 "The Secretariat," The American Mercury (December 1929), 385. 4 "The President Gets Down To Business, " Saturday Evening Post (December 21, 1929), 78.

American Me,r.c,u.ry (December 1929) , 386.

°Saturday Evening Post (December 21, 1929), 80.

American Mercury (December 1929), 392. Q Review SlL Reviews (May 1929) , 116. 9 Saturday Evening PQ9t (December 21, 1929), 80.

American Mercuxy (December 1929) , 391. 11 Akerson Papers, letter of Byron Price to Akerson of May 8, 1929, Box l-D/251. 12 Presidential Press File (PPF) , Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, Box 202, November 14, 1929.

PPF, Box 202, Akerson letter to Henry Sweenhart, Havas News Agency, November 26, 1929. 14 PPF, Box 202, Payson Smith letter to Akerson, October 4, 1929. 15 PPF, Box 202, October 16, 1929. 16 PPF, Box 202. 17 Collection of letters from various authors to Strother in the Strother Papers at the Hoover Presidential Library, Box l-G/960.

- TO Strother Papers, Box l-G/954. Saturday Evening P_£&1 (December 1929), 81. 19 Leo c. Rosten, Washington Correspondent (New York, 1937), 65. } DBA lu MmJUtMfi

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20 Rosten/ 364. 21 Pollard, 756. 22 PPF, Box 82, letter dated May 2, 1930. 23 " P-Ufclic. Opinion Quarterly (January 1937) 24 Independent (June 23, 1925), 589. 25 Paul Y. Anderson, "Hoover and the Press, mtlQIL (October 4, 1931) , 382.

*°PPF, Eox 82, June 22, 1931.

Anderson, 382. 28 Drew Pearson and Robert Allen, Sfce_ Washington tt£££y_ GO. EoiiQd. (New York, 1931), 330. 29 Anderson, 332. 30 Rosten, 41. 31 Pollard, 749. 32 George H. Manning, "Strained Air Pervades Press Circles as White House •Leak' is Sought, " Editor & Publisher (July 18, 1931), 10. 33 Akerson Papers, Presidential Box, March 22, 1933, Akerson letter to Herbert Hoover. 34 IbJLfiU , April 24, 1933, Akerson letter to Herbert Hoover. 35 Harold Brayraan, "Hooverizing the Press, " Outlook And Independent (September 24, 1930), 31.

37 PPP, Box l-G/382.

Pearson and Allen, 59. 39 George Manning, "Subtle Censorship on Government News is Arising Steadily in Washington, " EsLifcox & Publisher

(September 5, 1931) , 5. 40 Rosten, 43. i*>.; -

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41 PPF, Box l-G/382. 42 "s.:,±$m* BoT«*b«r 12, L92f« ^r^ns Conference. 43 Roaten, 40. 44 Akerson Papers, Box l-D/256. 45 Saturday Evening £fiat (December 21, 1929) , 80. 46 American Mercury. 389. 47 PPF, Box 202, Paul Woonton letter of July 2, 1929, to Akerson. 48 American Mercury, 388. 49 JfciA-

51 Akerson Papers, Box l-D/253, Akerson letter of September 3, 1929, to Joseph L. Cohn, Assistant to the Publisher, New York Evening Graphic. 52 Akerson Papers, Box l-D/252. 53 Ibid . , Box 203/ August 12, 1930, Memo to Newsmen. 54 A. Memman Smith, Ihaali Yjqh, Mr.. President (New York and London, 1946), 16 and 17. 55 Brayman, 31. 56 Pollard, 745. 57 American Mercury, 389.

Saturday Evening P-Q.S.t (December 21, 1929), 80. 59 "The Secretariat, H American Mercury (December 1929), 385. 60 New York Evening Post , January 3, 1931. 61 PPF, Box l-G/377. 62 Scott M. Cut lip and Allen H. Center, Effective Public Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1964), 61. • - ,

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63 Pollard, 702. 64 PPF, Box l-G/379, March 5, 1929. 65 PPF, Box l-G/382.

Box l-E/202, Committee Memo of March 9, 1929. 67 PPF, Box l-G/382. 68 UiJLa. 69 PPF, Box l-E/202, letter to Akerson of March 13, 1930. 70 IfcM. , Akerson letter to Boyd of March 26, 1930. 71 Number of letters between Akerson and the State Department through whom the foreign correspondents work are in PPP, Box 203, dated throughout 1929. 72 PPF, Box l-E/202, Woonton letter of July 1, 1929. 73 PPP, Box l-G/382. Akerson* s roughs are undated but are filed with the press conference transcripts. 74 PPF, Box l-G/382. 75J&M. 76 PPF, Box l-E/202, Akerson letter of August 5, 1930. 77 PPP, Box l-G/382. 78 Ibj£. 79 PPP, Box l-G/283. 8(W. 81 XhiA.

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86 lbid . 87 JQaM. 88 Iki&.# July 22, 1930. 89 George E. Akerson, Jr., letter of September 24, 1968, to author. 90 Pollard, 743. 91 Carl N. Degler, MThe Ordeal of Herbert Hoover," Yale Review (Summer 1963), 577. 92 "Backstage in Washington, M Outlook ajQ& Independent, (December 11, 1929) 3 QutlQQk an& ?n<3epen<3ent (September 24, 1930), 15. 94 Pearson and Allen, 331. 95 Ihe. Nation (March 3, 1929), 321.

gas, Nation (April 4, 1930), 420. 97 Alice Cohn Bernstein, "President Hoover and the Press" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of

Wisconsin, 1946) , 46. 98 Ibid ., 193. 99 Strothers Papers, Box l-G/960.

Clair Everet Nelson, "The Image of Herbert Hoover as Reflected in the American Press" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1956), 105. 101 New York XifflftE, May 20, 1930. xw102 *Nelson, 87. 103 PPF, Box 903. 104 U>id.. 105 Akerson Papers, Box l-D/243.

PPF, Box 105, General Accession. 107 xw Pollard, 741. .

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- CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

George Akerson did not come to the White House on the crest of a distinguished career nor did he leave the

President's service in a rising tide of expectation. The traces of his efforts on the historical record are few and faint. He was a man of average ability whose ambition/ hard work/ and luck brought him very close to a President.

His contributions to the Hoover administration were significant not because he was able to control or influence

the events of his day, for this he clearly did not do # but rather/ because he was an innovator. As the first

Presidential Press Secretary, he was the first man to give his full-time attention to the President's press relations.

Akerson had to initiate the duties and dimensions of his job. While most of his innovations failed/ his attempts are significant.

In Chapter I, four aspects of a press secretary's duties were summarized. This summary will be used as a guide to these concluding remarks.

The press secretary is expected tot

1. Keep the public informed as the President's spokesman.

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2. Prepare policy recommendations in the field of information.

3. Facilitate the work of the President and the press with the President having his ultimate priority.

4. Represent the President and the press to each other.

Using this guide, the first question is did

Akerson, as the President's spokesman* keep the public informed? Akerson made significant innovations in this area. He held his own twice-daily press briefings; he organized and planned the twice-weekly presidential press conferences; he brought news photographers into the White

House on an equal parity with reporters. Akerson established the communications channels needed to keep the public informed. The President, however, was reluctant to use the press conferences or his press secretary as a channel of communications. When not used, these channels lose their ability to serve the communications function.

The final result was that little information about the

President reached the public.

Douglass Cater wrote that the press secretary is the "hourly spokesman for the President." Akerson certainly was not Hoover's "hourly spokesman." Along with the other members of the White House secretariat, Akerson met with the President at 9»00 a.m. each day, but Akerson did not have immediate "walk-in" privileges to the

President's office. Akerson held his daily meetings with aeaztq a/ or* art"* -a:tfi3. il .£

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erf* o* aapelxvxxq >*sxbe*r erf son bib rfixw a^nx*»am Yl*sb axrf blerf noaxoXA bxae** 119 the press at IOjOO a.m. and 4:00 p.m. each day. These meetings usually involved minor announcements and routine information. Akerson's press conferences were held in low regard by the reporters who realized that the press secretary did not have full access to the President.

Reporters claimed that the content of Akerson's press meetings was either trivial, evasive, or erroneous. Since

Akerson did not enjoy Hoover's full confidence, the press secretary had little credibility as the President's spokesman.

The second role for a press secretary is the preparation of policy recommendations in the field of information. The policy recommendations that determined the operation of the presidential press conferences were clearly prepared by Akerson. It was Akerson who formulated the details of the press conference policies with the White

House Correspondents Association and obtained Hoover's approval. Akerson also prepared the policy recommendations that determined the rules and practices required in the photography sessions with the President. Akerson's correspondence suggests that the press secretary had participated in policy decisions concerning speech release dates, the President's public appearances, his membership in clubs and organizations, his acceptance of gifts and honors, and a variety of activities that involved the

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Akerson's participation in information policy matters did not include all aspects of communications. In matters concerning book and magazine publication, French

Strother suggested the policy and carried out the

President's will. In matters concerning publishers, the

President himself made the decisions.

There is no evidence to suggest that Akerson participated in the major policy-making decisions of the

Hoover administration. His counsel on the events of the

Depression, prohibition/ armaments, and tariff was evidently never considered. Akerson's opportunities to make policy recommendations to his chief were very limited.

Cutlip and Center describe the significance of a public relations man limited in this way to the mechanics of publicity:

All too often he cools his heels in the outer office while a major policy decision is formulated. He is called in and given a ten-minute briefing on the decision with a completely subjective analysis of why it was the "right" decision. Then he is told in effect: "Now, you get your gang to explain why this decision was made and why it is the right one, so that we'll get the credit we deserve." Obviously, in such cases the practitioner is, and is expected to be, simply a paid apologist.

The next consideration is whether Akerson was able to facilitate the work of the President and the press.

Akerson's major effort in this area was the organization

and management of the presidential press conferences. The details of the President's meetings with the press were t t Jf^.

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Akerson did facilitate the physical needs of the press in the White House. When the White House was remodeled during the early part of 1929, Akerson assured facilities not only for the reporters but also for the photographers. This same effort to accommodate the needs of the press was not extended to the Rapidan camp where press facilities were so inadequate.

Akerson' s opportunities to facilitate the work of the President were limited. For example, it was French

Strother, not Akerson, who watched the trends of public opinion and collected information about various publics the

President must serve.

In the delicate task of facilitating meaningful and productive communication between the press and the

President, Akerson 's innovations were unsuccessful. The

President lived up to the letter of his press conference agreements with the reporters and therefore considered .

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122 criticism from the reporters unjustified. The press, expecting the President to be more responsive to their questions, sought whatever comfort they could by complaining in print. Aker son's efforts to facilitate the work of the press and the President ended in bitter disappointment

The final measure of Akerson 's performance is his ability to represent the press and the President to each other. Aker son's success in this area was determined by his influence with the press and the President.

First the President. Akerson *s influence with the

President was best demonstrated in Hoover's acceptance of the press conference agreements. Unfortunately, the press conferences showed early signs of failure. The failure of

the press conference agreement persisted throughout 1929

and increased in 1930. This annoying failure probably diminished the influence Akerson had with Hoover and prevented Akerson from gaining Hoover's approval on other matters. Nothing in the White House papers suggests that

Akerson had any significant influence with the President beyond the press conference agreement. The failure of the press conferences, along with a strong-willed and

excessively sensitive President, made it unlikely that

Akerson was successfully able to plead the press*

case to the President.

Akerson 's influence with the press was also 1»\ ,anoiie

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unflattering. Akerson was usually described as a pushy back-slapper who made idle promises or a well-intentioned glad-hander who was more decorative than useful. Akereon's

showy methods and style probably were not the basic reason

for his limited influence with the press. The reporters realized that the press secretary did not enjoy full and

immediate access to the President. Akerson simply did not know what was going on in the President's office, consequently Akerson was not considered to be a reliable

information source about the President. Under these conditions/ the press secretary could hardly represent the

President with any credibility.

Akerson* s successes and failures as the first

Presidential Press Secretary established some sound lessons

for his successors. In brief, these lessons are:

1. The system of written questions from the press is a poor technique to stimulate productive communica- tion at the President's press conferences.

2. A predetermined schedule of press conferences is an unnecessary burden for the President; a rigid schedule limits his flexibility in dealing with the press.

3. Accuracy and knowledge must be the hallmark of the press secretary if he is to maintain credibility with the reporters.

4. The press secretary must have the full confidence of his chief including a "walk-in " privilege to the President's office. b»

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5. The President must be discouraged from indulging in press favoritism or press recrimination.

6. Except in cases of dire national emergency/ the press must be permitted to travel with the President with full communications facilities provided.

Herbert Hoover was a President who desperately needed a strong, well-qualified, respected press secretary.

No matter how successful Hoover's press relations had been prior to 1929, as President his sense of publicity, including the value and timing of information and the working relations with the press, was inadequate.

Hoover's need was great, but Akerson's ability to influence the President was not commensurate with this need.

Akerson was a well-qualified newspaperman. He was hard working and well intentioned. Akerson knew how a news story developed; he understood news timing and values.

During the Commerce period, he demonstrated his abilities as an organizer and activator. Akerson's great weakness as press secretary was his inability to gain the

President's full confidence. Without this confidence, the first press secretary's work can be judged as little more than publicity mechanics.

Summarizing the accomplishments and failures of a presidential administration remains a perplexing question.

Writing an evaluation of Hoover's administration in the

Saturday Evening Post of March 4, 1933, William Allen White posed the question that is still open to speculation todays iitv

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"So history stands hesitant waiting for time to tell whether Herbert Hoover • . . by pointing the way to social recovery ... is the first of the new presidents ... or whether ... he is the last of the old. M

President Hoover as a scientist, executive, humanitarian, and businessman had a twentieth century record. But as a communicator, a persuader, and a publi- cist, his record was with his predecessors. Both Hoover and Akerson were honest men who respected the truth but during the first two years of Hoover's administration, neither the President nor his press secretary was able to activate the mass media system of communications to get their message to the public. . . .

. - -:&1 . .. . .

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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

Cater, TJafe Fourth Branch* 21. 2 Akerson Papers, Box l-G/252, Akerson letter of July 2, 1929, to Paul Woonton. 3 Cutlip and Center, Effective Pjifclis. RelatXQng, 137. ffk r pi i

.r; BIBLIOGRAPHY raqjui&oijua — .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boafcft

Butt, Archibald W. Taft and Roosevelt: TJoe. Intimate Letters ol Archie B_yJt£, Military Aitie* Vol. I. New York* Harper and Row, 1930.

Cater, Douglass. The SOiiSlh Branch 21 Government Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1959.

Cornwell, Elmer E., Jr. Presidential Leadership Ql £llklic Opinion . Bloomington, Indiana s University Press, 1965.

Cutlip, Scott M. , and Center, Allen H. Effective Public Relations. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.

Hoover, Herbert C. Memoirs . Vol. III. New York: MacMillan, 1952.

Irwin, William. Herbert Hoover, A Reminiscent Biography. New York: The Century Company, 1928.

Key, v. o., jr. Public Opinion ansL American Democracy* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961.

Koeing, Louis W. The Invisible Presidency . New York: MacMillan, 1960.

Lyons, Eugene. Herbert HDjffizex, A Biography* New York: MacMillan, 1964.

Michelson, Charles. TJhs. ShO&L Slal&s.. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1944.

Myers, William Starr, and Newton, Walter. The Hoover Administration a Documented. Narrative* »•*» York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947.

Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential ££8*exa. New York: The New American Library, 1960.

128 la 13933^1

iaof sxlcQj^ ip c?iffp .' ^bssJ Ltkllnmblm*** 3oI3 »llawrr.

: alldb* avl:*ae* .1 , it. _o bne , uD

"2* -JiiiataM .9 *:iacnaH ,:iavooH ttosM

>0 ar ioT w©K

iOY wail , >n»biitft^q alcflaiv/tE * .W iiu< xaoX lOallUtDSJI

jrfioY wan dmii.Vi& A siaVPQfi J - -oiuli .an xltoeM

.3 .v uhtoY wall .JuLLfcX -iSJ2ll2 *rfT .aalaerfD »aoaIarfoiM 'oasnijjq

jXtcoy wan .gYLtra^aM fa»an«mrea &~nQiJs?.j*iaisib& *G1 *ndlioa a«I:nsrfO

waK .A2£UELi rgi^nab^^a^q .2 b:xarfoi* ,:> be:* await :*mA waff arfT

BSI . . . . " .

129

Pearson, Drew, and Allen, Robert. The. Washington Merry-Go- BaiiM. New York: Horace Liveright, Inc., 1931.

Pollard, James E. The President aja& ills. Erjgss.. New York: HacMillan, 1947.

Rosten, Leo C. Washington Correspondents. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1937.

Salinger, Pierre. With Kennedy . New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966.

Shannon, David A. The, £££fl£. Depression. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960.

Smith, A. Merriman. ThanK Xfltli, Mr_. President. New York and London, 1946.

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Anderson, Paul Y. "Hoover and the Press," nation (October 4, 1931).

"Around Washington," ^independent (June 23, 1925).

Brayman, Harold. "Hoover i zing the Press, " Outlook ajisi Independent (September 24, 1930)

Clark, Delbert. "Steve Takes Care of It," New York T^mes Magazine (July 27, 1941)

Daniels, Jonathan. "Free News Por a Pree Press, Saturday Review (May 12, 1935)

Degler, Carl N. "The Ordeal of Herbert Hoover, " Yale Review (Summer 1963)

"George in the Movies, " Outlook (January 14, 1931)

Gregory, John. "All Quiet on the Rapidan, " Outlook .and Independent (August 5, 1931).

Hart, A. B. "President Hoover's Challenge to Big Navy Propaganda," Current History (October 31, 1929).

"How the President Helps to Form Public Opinion, " New York TJjQ&S. Magazine (February 26, 1961) .

Manning, George H. "Subtle Censorship on Government News is Arising Steadily in Washington, " Editor &, Publisher (September 5, 1931). o©J »n©iao* ...

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imnisvDr- r leioen*. .H ©p"io©D tOuinaaM A ^f^ifrff " *no^pnix{«cW iba©*S pnxai:tA ai *©

130

McKee, Oliver, Jr. "Who Creates Our Political Prejudices?" HC-rth American texISXL (October 1930) .

Movers, Bill. "Press or Government: Who's Telling the Truth?" TV Quarterly (Summer 1968).

"Portrait" (Various articles about Akerson under same title), QutlPQfr (July 31, 1929), World* a Work (April 1929) , Saturday Evening East. (December 21, 1929)

"The President Gets Down to Business, " Saturday Evening Post (December 21, 1929)

"Presidential Secretaries," New Republic (October 9, 1929).

Review Q± Reviews (December 1929), 116.

"Right-Hand Man," Outlook Magazine (July 31, 1929).

Rosten, Leo C. Public Opinion Quarterly (January 1937).

"The Secretariat," The. American Mercury (December 1929).

"Secretaries of Efficiency, " Review q£ Reviews (May 1929)

"Summary of Press Critics, " Literary Digest (December 14, 1930)

Unpublished, Manuscripts

Bernstein, Alice Cohn. "President Hoover and the Press." Master's Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1946»

Moon, Gordon Ames, II. "James Campbell Hagerty's Eight Years in the White House." Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1962.

Nelson, Clair Everet. "The Image of Herbert Hoover as Reflected in the American Press." Ph.D. disserta- tion, Stanford University, 1956.

O'Donnell, Charles, Jr. "Stephen Tyree Early* FDR's Press Secretary." Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967.

Utegaard, Rolf W. "Pierre Salinger's 'Thousand Days.'" Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967. 1

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Personal Correspondence

Akerson, George, Jr., letter to author, September 24, 1968.

Anthony, Edward, letter to G. Akerson, March 10, 1928.

Anthony, Edward, letter to G. Akerson, May 25, 1928.

Bannister, M. , letter to G. Akerson, March 16, 1928.

Blackman, Charles M. , letter to G. Akerson, January 26, 1928.

Boyd, William J., letter to G. Akerson, March 13, 1930.

Cat ledge, W. Turner, letter to G. Akerson, March 1, 1928.

Chase, Frank, letter to G. Akerson, November 21, 1927.

Coolidge, Calvin, letter to G. Akerson, March 26, 1925.

Dillon, T. J., letter to G. Akerson, January 18, 1922.

Hoover, Herbert, letter to Frank B. Kellogg, June 2, 1926.

Hoover, Herbert, telegram to Roy Howard, June 22, 1931.

Hoover, Herbert, letter to Dean of School of Journalism, University of Missouri, May 2, 1930.

Price, Byron, letter to G. Akerson, May 8, 1929.

Smith, Payson, letter to G. Akerson, October 4, 1929.

Woonton, Paul, letter to G. Akerson, July 2, 1929.

Woonton, Paul, letter to G. Akerson, July 1, 1929.

George E. Akerson, letters to*

Anthony, Edward, April 9, 1928.

Bannister, M. , March 16, 1928.

Bannister, M., April 2, 1928.

Blackman, Charles M. , February 1, 1928.

Boyd, William J., March 26, 1930. Lll

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Chase, Frank, January 5/ 1928.

Cheney, Charles B., January 19, 1928.

Cohn, Joseph L., September 3, 1929.

Hoover, Herbert, March 22, 1933.

Hoover, Herbert, April 24, 1933.

Newsmen, August 12, 1930 (memo)

News Manager of the United States Daily . August 1, 1930.

Staff, Minneapolis Tribune , undated memo.

Sweenhart, Henry, November 26, 1929.

Woonton, Paul, July 2, 1929.

Manuscript Collections

George Akerson Papers, White House Secretary Piles, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.

Presidential Press File, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.

French Strother Papers, White House Secretary Files, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. aazH ,ae«rfO

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