DG1/481-I-M

FC : CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Original text by David Allen and Raúl Eguía, Instituto de Empresa. Original version, October 2004. Published by the Publications Department of Instituto de Empresa. María de Molina 13, 28006 , . © 2004 Instituto de Empresa. Total or partial reproduction prohibited without written permission from Instituto de Empresa.

"The club was in a dramatic situation of social break-up. Our candidature to the presidency proposed a total change that was safe and innovative. A real change in the management model. We had analysed the problem, the various situations that could arise and how to deal with them, as well as how to execute the decisions we had taken and how to make them compatible. However, we did not stop at the analysis; we also prepared and executed very ambitious projects. It was an unorthodox situation. We have done what management manuals recommend you should never do under any circumstances. And we have done it in full awareness, since we were faced with an exceptional situation. The key has been the capacity of the people in the everyday routines and work of the entity The interesting part is that we have managed to change well and we have also generated innovation with regard to the management model of entities. This is something that makes it a reference point1."

Joan Laporta gave this description of the management model implemented in his first year as chairman of FC Barcelona. The crisis in which the club found itself — with an increasing debt and with no titles from competitions are several seasons — led a group of young professionals to join together as an independent candidature and present themselves for election to the presidency. They proposed a detailed project for change and against all odds the affiliated supporters of the club gave them the highest support that has ever been given to any candidate in 104 years. They were voted in and they implemented a new management model as a solution to the break-up that existed in the three basic pillars of the club: sports management, economic management and social management.

One year later, FC Barcelona is one of the firm candidates for leading the way in world football. In this practical case, the protagonists themselves describe the challenges and the key factors that have helped them position Barça among the top five football clubs in the world in the term of only one year.

ELEFANT BLAU (the Blue Elephant): THE EMBRYO OF THE TEAM WHICH WAS TO FRONT THE CHANGE AT BARÇA

On 6 May 1978, Josep Lluís Núñez was voted as chairman of FC Barcelona with a slogan for renewal. His term of office lasted 22 years. During this time, the club underwent notable growth, financial correction and significant social expansion (a considerable increase in the number of affiliated supporters and supporters’ clubs) and increased assets — the opening of the Miniestadi (see annexe 1) and successive remodelling of the stadium. The club also had a sports record which took FC Barcelona to be the best club in the world in 1997 according to the IFFHS (International Federation of Football History and Statistics). Of these 22 years, special mention must be made of the period in which the so-called dream team (1990-1994) managed to win four Spanish League Championships in

1 Interview with (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

1 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M a row, together with the European cup, under Johann Cruyff (ex player at the club and considered as one of the best players in the history of football) as manager.

However, at the end of the so-called Núñez era the directors of BARÇA HISTORY (1899-1978) the club were not popular with all the affiliated supporters. In December 1997, a group of them, under the name of Elefant FC Barcelona was founded on 29 Blau (see annex 3), launched the official procedures for November 1899 by Hans Gamper, a presenting a motion of censure against the club's chairman, Swiss businessman. The ground known as Les Corts was opened on Josep Lluís Núñez. Elefant Blau was led by Joan Laporta, a 20 May 1922. It was called "the young lawyer who had formed part of the candidature of Ángel Cathedral of football" and was a Fernández in the last elections to chairman of the club in June magnificent stadium with an initial 1997. Elefant Blau criticised the following: capacity for 30,000 spectators. It was also the main stage for the growth of the club and represented its golden "The scorn shown by the club’s directors towards the democratic age (1919-1929). In 1924, FC culture that has always existed in Barça, the erratic sports Barcelona had 12,207 affiliated decisions they have taken, which have led to great economic supporters. Years later, Barça won damage and the lack of information about the real situation of the the first edition of the Spanish league clubs economy.2" (1928-1929). The outbreak of the civil war in 1936 took the club on a magnificent tour around Mexico and Elefant Blau, the group which opposed Núñez, had to obtain the United States, which saved its 4,600 signatures for the motion of censure to prosper. This did economy but meant the loss of half of not happen until March 1999, when the resignation of chairman the squad, who remained exile in Núñez was again requested owing to the debts of the club. Joan Mexico and . The year 1950, with 26,300 affiliated supporters, saw Laporta's argument was as follows: the arrival of the first crack or star: Ladislao Kubala. Between 1951 and "This action must be completed as quickly as possible to prevent 1953, Barça won everything in sight. the economic crisis we believe affects the entity from worsening. This winning period included the At the end of the 1995-1996 season, the club had 5,000 million golden season of 1951-1952, when the club won 5 cups: the League, the pesetas in its cash account [€30 million], and now it has a debt of Cup, the , the Eva Duarte 15,000 million pesetas [€90 million]. We believe that this debt and the Martini Rossi. Ladislao has possibly been created intentionally in order to modify the Kubala and his sporting triumphs future management model of the club. If the debt continues, the meant that Les Corts needed to be club might lean towards a situation which the board itself will expanded and the club opened the doors to the in 1957. The seek to correct in order to explain and justify the change in the new stadium, which had an initial model. In other words, the change from a sports association to 3 capacity for 80,000 spectators, was an anonymous sports association ." the setting for the enthusiasm of a team that had the support of 49,000 Although this time it obtained more than the signatures it needed affiliated supporters. In 1971, FC Barcelona won the cup and in October to prosper, Núñez beat the motion with the support of 24,863 of the and the ice- the 40,327 affiliated supporters who voted. This gave him an skating rink were opened. Two years advantage of more than 10,000 votes with regard to the later, in 1973, the signing of the Dutch opposition platform led by Joan Laporta, which obtained 14,358 player Johann Cruyff gave rise to the votes in favour of the motion4. Alfons Godall, an affiliated famous football machine which won the league in 1973-1974. With 69,566 supporter of Elefant Blau, explains the reason for the affiliated supporters, the club was now independent candidature of Joan Laporta: one of the most powerful sports entities in the world and celebrated its "We launched a motion of censure against the directors in March 75th birthday. One of the most 1999 and received 14,000 votes in favour. That was the international Catalonian artists, Joan Miró, painted the poster to beginning of the end of an era which had lasted too long. commemorate this important date. According to the principle of democratic hygiene, a board of directors and the chairman cannot remain in their posts for 20 years. This creates bad habits, defects and corruption, which is not good. With Elefant Blau, we set down the bases of what was going to be the action in the future: the presentation of an alternative candidature in the elections5."

2 El Mundo (12 December 1997). 3 El Mundo (16 March 1999). 4 El Mundo (3 February 2003). 5 Interview with Alfons Godall (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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One year later, in 2000, Josep Lluís Núñez resigned and elections were called for chairman of Barça. Two candidates stood up: (the former vice-chairman under Josep Luis Núñez) and Lluís Bassat (a publicist who owned Bassat & Ogilvy). Joan Laporta, leader of Elefant Blau, also stood for election as part of the candidature of Bassat. In the words of Alfons Godall:

"In 2000, Núñez resigned and elections were called. Joan Laporta wanted to stand with his own candidature, but he was advised not to do so because it was too soon. The vote on the motion of censure (promoted earlier by Elefant Blau) was the reason why the media reacted against his candidature. Therefore, we stood as part of the candidature of Lluís Bassat, who supposedly represented the change. However, when one delegates in other people, projects never work well. Throughout that campaign, we were very worried because at times it seemed that there was a pact between Joan Gaspart and Lluís Bassat to avoid a vote. We didn't think this was right, since we believe that it is of fundamental importance to uphold the democratic principles of an associative club like Barça. Finally, we managed to prevent a pact between Lluís Bassat and the party in power, and the voting went ahead. For reasons that are difficult to explain — I think possibly because people were afraid of the change — Gaspart won the vote as a continuity of Núñez's mandate6.”

JOAN GASPART: A CONTINUIST CHAIRMAN

On 23 July 2000, with 54.81% of the votes, Joan Gaspart i Solves became the new chairman of FC Barcelona. His first proposal was to restructure the club. To do this, he appointed a managing director as the executive in charge and the club was separated into five large areas: economy and finance; sports; commercial and marketing; social communication; and assets. Each area was under the management of five executives and five vice-chairmen. Furthermore, a board of advisers was created with affiliated supporters such as former chairmen, former players and illustrious Barcelona supporters. Gaspart gathered together all the sectors of Barcelona support into an macro-board of 100 directors, which was dissolved before the end of the first year owing to the fact that it was impractical.

In 2001, the club invested 15,331 million pesetas (€92.14 million)7 in signings. This amount was doubled in the following year with €189 million8. During this time, the club did not win any titles. Two years earlier, the club had a net debt of €82 million, which in 2002 had grown to 181 million. Furthermore, the vice-chairmen Jaime Llauradó, Josep Martínez-Rovira and Ángel Fernández questioned the management and resigned, following the footsteps of other directors who were close to Josep Lluís Núñez.

In December 2002, 133 Barcelona supporters clubs and more than 200 affiliated supporters signed the so-called Alcarrás manifesto, a text which demanded the resignation of the club's chairman. Lluís Bassat, a candidate to the elections of 2000, also signed the petition:

"Personally, I am asking him to resign as a demonstration of his support for Barcelona9."

In view of the social pressure, Gaspart's plan was presented on 1 January 2003. This was a strategic plan comprising 30 economic social and sports measures which would be applied during 2003. The objective was described by Javier Pérez Farguell, managing director of the club, as follows:

"Implementing a slight increase in the dimensional and economic strength of the institution, modernising the organisational structure to make it more efficient, dynamic and competitive, and consolidating the club's position as one of the best in the world10."

6 Interview with Alfons Godall (by July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 7 El Mundo (25 December 2001). 8 El Mundo (13 September 2002). 9 El Mundo (13 December 2002). 10 El Mundo (1 January 2003).

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In February 2003, FC Barcelona was the football club with the biggest debts in Spain, totalling €230 million11. The budget for the 2001-2002 season, initially estimated at 154.2 million, finally closed at 194 million12.

The problems in the sports management (policy for signing players, four different managers and no title), the organisational management (changes in the organisation chart), the economic management (a club that was getting more and more into debt) and the social management (the affiliated supporters showed their disagreement with the chairman's management by booing and waving white handkerchiefs during many of the matches played by FC Barcelona in Camp Nou) led Joan Gaspart to resign on 12 February 2003, two and a half years after he had become chairman. Enric Reyna (third vice-chairmen in Gaspart's organisation) was appointed as a temporary chairman and was to carry out the functions of the position until the elections, which had been brought forward to June. Joan Laporta gave his opinion of the resignation:

"It is a demonstration of responsibility which I respect and share13."

However, Enric Reyna failed to reach the elections and on 5 May 2003, during the extraordinary assembly of delegates, he presented his resignation with the rest of his board. From that moment on, the club was governed by the management commission run by Joan Trayter, whose objective was to run the club until the elections of 15 June 2003.

The final three seasons led the club to a situation of deep crisis, break-up and social disenchantment. In the last season, with Josep Lluís Núñez as chairman (1999-2000), income totalled €118.7 million, which reached only 123.4 million (with an increase of 3.9%) at the end of the third year of management (the 2002-2003 season). Expenses, however, doubled and grew by 79.5% from €109 million in 2000 to 195.7 million in 2003. Joan Gaspart increased the price of affiliation by 15% in 2001 and by 5.4% in 2002. In 1999-2000, salaries totalled 46 million and in 2002-2003 this total was 102.5 million, which represents an increase of 122.8%. From 151 employees in 2000, the figure increased to 188 in 2002 (24.5% more) and contracts were signed with top executives. The three financial years closed with a deficit in ordinary activity: €38 million in 2000-2001; 48 million in 2001-2002; and 71 million in 2002-2003. The candidates were aware that the situation of the club's recent history meant that the development of a sound strategic project was of key importance in the election campaign.

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF 2003

Joan Laporta, former leader of Elefant Blau, the platform which opposed Núñez, was asked to form part of the candidature presented by Lluís Bassat, as had happened in the elections of 2000. However, he rejected his inclusion on Bassat’s list because "affiliated supporters must continue to own the club14."

Alfons Godall explains the reason for the independent candidature of Joan Laporta:

"In 2000, we learned the lesson that one should defend one's own projects. That's why we presented the candidature of Joan Laporta15."

11 Association of users of financial services. 12 El Mundo (7 February 2003). 13 El Mundo (8 February 2003). 14 El Mundo (20 May 2003). 15 Interview with Alfons Godall (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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TABLE 1 ELECTION CALENDAR

ELECTION CALENDAR 8 May Publication of the call to election 13 May Designation of the affiliated supporters who will make up the election board and table 15 May Constitution of the election board and table 16 May Publication of the electoral roll and handing out of ballot papers for the collection of signatures 20 May End of the publication period of the electoral roll 23 May Approval of the definitive electoral roll 24 May Start of the period for the presentation of candidatures 31 May End of the period for the presentation of candidatures (21:00) 4 June Announcement of candidatures 5 June Start of the election campaign period 13 June End of the election campaign period 14 June Day of reflection 15 June Elections (Miniestadi, from 09:00 to 21:00)

Six candidates stood up for election, with Lluís Bassat as the clear favourite according to surveys. On 30 April 2003, Lluís Bassat had 42.6% of the votes according to the surveys and Joan Laporta had 2.2%. Almost one month later, on 20 May, Bassat seemed to have consolidated his leadership with 44.65% of the voting intention, whereas 11% corresponded to the candidature presented by Joan Laporta.

THE TEAM BEHIND THE CANDIDATURE PRESENTED BY JOAN LAPORTA: THE CHANGE

The hard core of the candidature presented by Joan Laporta was made up of former affiliated supporters of Elefant Blau (Alfons Godall, Albert Vicens, Alfons Castro and Jordi Moix). Joan Laporta attracted the hard core to the collective known as Els Pinyols (the fruit stones), a group with a very Catalonian root which collaborated with non-governmental organisations such as Justicia i Pau (justice and peace). Jordi Moix put Laporta in contact with , former director of Nike for Spain and South America, and son of Jaime Rosell, ex manager at the club. Rosell added another family to Elefant Blau and Els Pinyols: He signed up Marc Ingla, a partner at the consultancy firm Diamond Cluster (formerly Clusters Consulting), a firm that had launched numerous telecommunications projects onto the market. In turn, Marc Ingla brought another partner from Diamond Cluster into the candidature: .

TABLE 2

1: Joan Laporta. 2: Sandro Rosell. 3: Albert Vicens. 4: Ferran Soriano. 5: Alfons Godall. 6: Marc Ingla.

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Everything came together in only a few weeks, as remembered by Sandro Rosell, Ferran Soriano and Alfons Godall, respectively:

"Barça is part of my life. As a worker in the sports business, I was embarrassed by what was happening to Barça. So I decided to join a project to help the club become what I had known it to be during my childhood. At the beginning, I had a few meetings with Bassat and was on the verge of taking a decision when I received a phone call from Jordi Moix. I then met with him and Joan (Laporta). Joan told me that nobody knew that he wanted to present an independent candidature. I had known Joan for 20 years because we had played together in the same football team, Sant Andreu, but we hadn't seen each other since then. We met that night in Hotel Hesperia. After dinner and after speaking for six hours about Barça, around two o'clock in the morning, we shook hands and decided to begin the project to present our candidature for the elections16."

"Marc Ingla met Sandro Rosell and then we met Alfons Godall and Joan Laporta. Nine weeks before the elections, we met together over breakfast in a bar. We talked about what we would do with Barça with regard to management, sports and social management, etc. We realised that our ideas made a lot of sense and that we all agreed with each other. Some others had received offers to take part in another candidature, but we decided that as a group, our profiles were quite similar. We were all around 40 years of age and agreed about what had to be done with Barça. We decided to present our candidature. We weren't sure that we were going to win but we did know that we were capable of putting together a good project, of learning and, perhaps, winning in four or eight years time. The elections were called two weeks later. We therefore had seven weeks and a lot of work to do17.”

"We had been working in and around FC Barcelona for a long time, writing opinion articles, analysing the club's progress on a social and economic level and looking at its image and future. We attended conferences at the University of London on the analysis of the football business in the digital era. We had a very elaborate vision of the real situation and of the business itself. As soon as we saw that Gaspart would not end his office, we set to work. We had all the financial information about the club from 1996. This enabled us to put together a very specific analysis which led us to the conclusion that sports and economic management were closely related. It is very important to have a clear policy for salaries and signings, as well as for bringing in players from the youth teams. In short, to run a club like Barça you have to have a model and we had been working on such a model. Furthermore, during the months prior to the elections of 2003, we met up with top-level executives in sports and economic management, such as Sandro Rosell, Marc Ingla and Ferran Soriano18."

Joan Laporta put together a candidature with Barcelona supporters from different areas (sports managers, strategy consultants, etc.), entrepreneurs, with a creative and global vision for business. His candidature was presented under the motto Primer, el Barça (Barça comes first). Joan Laporta was committed to change:

"Continuism takes you nowhere. It is time for a change at both sporting and management levels19."

JOAN LAPORTA'S PROJECT

Laporta’s project was based on an initial investment of €50 million, with an increase of income and a reduction of expenses which would end with zero deficit in the first year and grow in the following four until the club was at the same levels of sports and economic prestige as during the era of the dream team put together by Johann Cruyff.

16 Interview with Sandro Rosell (8 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 17 Interview with Ferran Soriano are no (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 18 Interview with Alfons Godall (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 19 El País (9 June 2003).

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"The idea was to position Barça back at the top of the world of sport and media. Manchester United charges €2 million for each friendly; Barça charges only €300,000. We must succeed in achieving the situation where a young boy in Singapore or Tokyo wears a Barça shirt and not a Manchester United shirt."

The net investment of €50 million would be aimed, in principle and partially, at signing a big star in the world of football such as , who was playing for Manchester United at that time. That investment was part of the so-called "virtuous circle" for Barça's revival (see table 3) as a result of sporting success that would generate greater enthusiasm and higher income.

TABLE 3 THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF FC BARCELONA

2 Great sport 1 results Sign the 3 Return to the fore of the world best players of sport and media Sports area 4 9 International New projection of sources of income Barça Social Economic area area 5 ... at the same time as rationalising 8 Identification and spending cohesion of affiliated 6 supporters and other Capacity for supporters 7 Continued strengthening of expensive the team signings

Joan Laporta detailed his objectives: keep FC Barcelona independent from financial and political groups and not sell the club's assets, together with a greater commitment to the historic values of the club (support for , public-spiritedness, democracy, etc.). It was a commitment to an in-depth renewal of structures, style and individuals. Laporta’s objective was to achieve income of €200 million per annum in the mid-term.

The campaign was developed under the leadership of Ferran Soriano as campaign director. Alfons Godall pointed out the following:

"The incorporation of Ferran Soriano was of key importance for the organisation of the campaign with regard to the distribution of tasks and persons in charge. As an executive, he had led a series of complicated projects20."

The expertise of the various affiliated supporters of the candidature was put into practice and the planning and training of the messages we issued was critical. In the words of Ferran Soriano:

"Marc Ingla and I stopped working in our companies. We put together a strategy plan, which was a 100-page document with a classic professional structure: what the industry is like, where its strengths lie, what competitors do, etc. I also contacted a political consultant in Washington to find out how an election campaign is put together. In several sessions, he told us how campaigns are organised in the United States, who does what, etc., and we organised ours. During those seven weeks, I took up the post of campaign director and we hired a press

20 Interview with Alfons Godall (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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officer: an adviser from Barcelona who was recommended by the political consultant in the United States. This person fulfilled the role of political adviser and helped with the construction and transmission of the message, etc. The campaign was planned in detail. Our message was clear and direct: "Change". The adviser helped us shape the message and decide on the timing when the messages would be transmitted. We had a strategic project for the club which was well-prepared and set down in that 100-page document (no other candidate did this), individuals with drive and capacity, a great candidate and a message: "The change"21.

"During the first weeks, we focused on the project to increase our credibility and to become a consideration. The risk to which we were exposed was that we would be considered to young. Consequently, we made great efforts to qualify ourselves. We took the strategic plan and we explained it to the leading journalists in the city, including sports and economy journalists. This gave us our qualification. The next thing we did was to speak about ourselves, about our team. And the third thing we did was to speak of the change, but we did this after we had qualified ourselves because if we had done it the other way round, we might have failed. Only in the fifth the week (three weeks before the elections) did we speak about change: "We are the change". In the sixth week, we change the message and we said: "We are the change wanted by the majority". And in the last week, we said: "We are ready to govern". On the last day, we published an insert in the newspapers containing the strategic plan.”

"For seven weeks, five all of us worked full-time on the project: the candidate; Marc Ingla, who was given all the ideas, working on the business plan and a strategic plan; Sandro Rosell, who is experienced in the world of football and transmitted the message there; Alfons Godall, who was responsible for economy and Finance; and myself, who worked as campaign director. All the other candidates who were to form part of the board of directors also worked on the project, albeit part-time. We also had a team of qualified collaborators who were working non-stop. We spent seven weeks in premises on Paseo de Gracia, where we had a meeting every day at eight o'clock in the morning. During the meeting, we set out the planning for what would happen during the day. We wrote what was to happen each day on a wall, together with the message that day, so that everyone knew the idea they had to get across22."

"I think that was the first time anything like that had been done in the world of football. What we did was to bring together the expertise of management and to buy the expertise of campaign management. My experience as a partner in a consultancy firm was important for two reasons: for putting together a plan and also for the organisation. The seven weeks’ work was very intense and costly. The people who had taken part in previous campaigns thought that an election campaign was something chaotic and disorderly, but we put together a campaign that was organised and focused. In hindsight, we perhaps did more work than we needed to because "we won by a huge difference". We started out in last place and the opponent was very important (he owns a huge advertising agency and we were simply a group of friends)."

"We had to work twice as hard and we had to do it four times better. We set up this campaign machine and Bassat simply didn't react until the last week. I think there may be several reasons that this: he tried to put together a candidature of consensus; he tried to create political balance, a consensus among Barcelona's establishment, and that takes up a lot of energy. While you're doing that you don't put together any content. Secondly, he underestimated us: he realised he had a problem when there were three weeks left. And when he realised, we were at the crossroads and we had surpassed him in voting intention. We were on the way up and he was on the way down. He was overconfident. When he realised, it was too late23."

21 Interview with Ferran Soriano (by July 2004). Instituto de Empresa. 22 Interview with Ferran Soriano (by July 2004). Instituto de Empresa. 23 Interview with Ferran Soriano (by July 2004). Instituto de Empresa.

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THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS

On 8 June, Joan Laporta had notably cut back the difference between his candidature and that of Bassat. The surveys showed that Bassat had 26.6% of the voting intention and Laporta had 23.9%24 (see table 4). Five days later, Joan Laporta, with 29.5% of the voting intention, surpassed Bassat, who had 28.3%25, in the surveys.

On 15 June 2003, Laporta won the elections with 52.57% of the total (27,138 votes). He beat Lluís Bassat by 21 points (31.80% and 16,412 votes) and he also beat the record for the number of votes ever in Barça's history (25,441 votes for Josep Lluís Núñez in 198926) (see annexes 4 and 5). Laporta was to be the new chairman of Barça with a young team of directors (an average of 40 years of age) and with four years of office in front of them (until 30 June 2007). Joan Laporta:

"We forced Bassat to change his opinion. The new image of Barça is on the move27."

"People have wanted and made a commitment to the change28."

TABLE 4 SURVEYS FOR THE 2003 ELECTIONS

45%

40% 35% Survey Date Bassat Laporta 30%

25% 1 30 April 03 42.60% 2.20% 20% 2 20 May 03 39.50% 10% 15% 3 08 June 03 26.60% 23.90% 10% 4 13 June 03 28.30% 29.50% 5% 0% 1234

Alfons Godall speaks of Laporta's leadership in the following terms:

"From a very young age Joan Laporta showed the qualities of a leader. He was an individual with very strong principles, a hint of rebellion and he had very prominent characteristics of a student leader. Laporta won the elections against all odds because we were capable of generating the enthusiasm and hope for the change. He also showed himself to be a leader here29."

A YEAR FOR THE CHANGE: TOWARDS A NEW MANAGEMENT MODEL

Joan Laporta talks about the first steps taken by the club:

"The process took on continuity from the moment we won the elections. We had planned a package of 45 measures which we were to adopt from the very first day. This meant that we were very clear about each of our functions, as we had made clear in the campaign. We had analysed the problem, the various situations that could arise and how to deal with them, as well as how to execute the decisions we had taken and how to make them compatible. This is not an orthodox method in the world of business management. We were not satisfied simply

24 Durán-Tortosa survey, data presented in Sport (8 June 2003). 25 Durán-Tortosa survey, data presented in Sport (13 June 2003). 26 El País (15 June 2003). 27 El País (16 June 2003). 28 El País (17 June 2003). 29 Interview with Alfons Godall (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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with the analysis; we also wanted to be compatible with the preparation and execution of very ambitious projects, which would enable us to achieve what we had proposed in the election campaign. That is why we organised the Gran Repte campaign and canal Barça TV, together with other projects which were developed in parallel to the shock we had to create30."

In the first meeting of the board of directors, after taking up our posts, we defined the positions and responsibilities of the board (see annex 6).

THE REAL SITUATION OF THE CLUB

It was important to discover the real situation of the club in order to develop action plans for the possible deviations from the estimates we had made in the Barça comes first project. Joan Laporta pointed out the following:

"We had to know where we stood. Our first obligation was to make the club work31."

To do this, the new directors performed an audit. Sandro Rosell:

"The decisions have been developed, but now we have to confirm the diagnosis. We must perform an audit in the economic and sports areas32."

The audit revealed that at the close of the last financial year (30 June 2003), the real situation of the club differed from that put forward by Enric Reyna on his resignation, when he stated that the net debts totalled €98 million. The audit showed that FC Barcelona had suffered the largest net losses in its history (€164 million) during the 2002-2003 season. Ferran Soriano, economic vice-chairman, recognised in a press conference that the club had obtained income during said season for €123.4 million and had also had expenses totalling €195.7, which, compensated by €1 million from the net financial results, implied losses from the ordinary activity of €72.3 million. These losses had increased up to €164 million33 as a result of various provisions of funds from the board of directors: one for a total of €29.5 million to pay a tax bill; and another totalling €63.8 million to compensate the losses resulting from the signing of footballers by previous directors. Joan Laporta argued the following:

"What surprised us most were the commitments that had been taken on. There was no logic in either the price or the term. I am disappointed to see that these commitments have been accepted because they do not benefit the entity and, to a certain extent, they condition the club's future. However, the situation can be corrected34."

The way of correcting the situation and turning the club into a solvent entity was based, according to Ferran Soriano, on three pillars: clear objectives; introducing an in-depth organisational change; and maintaining an aggressive attitude. About the third of these pillars, Ferran Soriano said the following:

"One of the most important factors has been the concept of what has to be done this year. An aggressive turnaround had to be carried out. When I appointed myself as managing director, I spoke with the employees and I told them the following: "This is like a start-up: In the next 12 months we are going to turn everything around. This is the only priority and I don't want to see anyone worrying too much about the tiny everyday problems with the organisation35."

30 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 31 El País (23 August 2003). 32 El País (17 June 2003). 33 El País (7 August 2003). 34 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 35 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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A NEW ORGANISATIONAL MODEL

The new organisational model included a team of directors who had compromised their assets by providing a guarantee for their management totalling €25 million. They had left their companies to work full-time at the club and did so without pay for the first year of the change. After this first year of management, they were to be replaced by professionals in the field. Furthermore, one of the pillars of the new organisational model was the in-depth organisational change in both structure and personnel. To do this, in the first weeks the directors from the Gaspart-Reyna era were replaced. Ferran Soriano:

"The management committee was made up of nine people and after four weeks, seven of them left. In the meantime, we had recruited people and we had trained interdepartmental teams. We then hired freelance workers and reliable consultants to take up executive positions and to implant the organisation while we hired the definitive executives. Consequently, the project also included a change in personnel. The eventual justification lies in the results. The previous team had lost €70 million and the general atmosphere was one of disappointment. We thought that they were incapable of completing the change. We assumed the risk of asking some of the top executives to leave without having replacements at the ready. We did this because we knew that with those people the change was not possible. We began to hire people who had no experience in the world of football. We sacked people and Marc Ingla and I took over the management positions ourselves. We had to complete a full turnaround, almost as if it were a start-up36."

The organisational model varied towards an interdepartmental change, but the change became particularly evident with regard to the leadership in the management of the change itself. Contrary to traditional models of change management, in this case the directors dropped a level in the hierarchy of the entity to lead the change from executive positions. This situation was to be maintained only during the first year. As Joan Laporta explains:

"The impact on the directors has been one of a renewal and almost complete replacement, with the incorporation of new expert executives in each of the fundamental areas in the entity. The management model we want to implement during this shock phase (first six months and/or first year of management) consists of directing the club with the new executives and directors, who are the members of the board, involved in the management. One particular case is that of the economic vice-chairman, who is also completing the functions of managing director (Ferran Soriano). Each of the vice-chairmen intervenes directly in the management and, in my case, as executive chairman, my function consists of coordinating the team as a whole. Everyone works in conjunction with a vice-chairman and a director. This is not an orthodox situation. The management manuals recommend that this should never happen, but we have done it. And we have done it in full awareness, since we were faced with an exceptional situation37."

THREE ACTION AREAS: THE SPORTS AREA, THE ECONOMIC AREA AND THE SOCIAL AREA

THE SPORTS AREA

One day after Joan Laporta's investiture as chairman of the club, the new sports vice-chairman of Barça held a meeting with Javier Pérez Farguell (managing director of the club in the previous era) to talk about the most urgent matters. The new board of directors will have to solve almost immediately the future of the current manager, Radomir Antic, and also that of five players.

A few days later, Txiki Beguiristain, a former Barcelona player, is appointed as the new technical secretary of the club. In 2000, Beguiristain had represented the sports area of Bassat's candidature to the chairmanship. Beguiristain describes the club’s project in this area as follows:

36 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 37 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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"Our aim is to achieve a football identity and the style that distinguishes the club. We have four years to put together a team which will grow in keeping with an idea, a style and a unique way of playing football. The first step was to sign the manager, a coach who symbolises the football concept we are looking for. Now we have to put together the squad. We cannot mix things together — as we have done in the past. Now we have to gradually shape our idea: discarding and signing step-by-step38."

On 23 June 2003, , ex National coach of Holland, reached an agreement to become the new manager of Barça. Once the organisation of the sports area had been established with Sandro Rosell, Txiki Beguiristain and Frank Rijkaard, the development of the action policies began in keeping with the provisions laid down in the strategic project of the candidature. To do this, and taking the virtuous circle as reference (see table 3), the first step was to sign international stars.

During the campaign, there was speak of signing David Beckham. However, owing to the impossibility of signing the player — he was to finally sign for Real Madrid C.F. — the club decided to sign another player of similar characteristics: de Assis Moreira (Ronaldinho Gaucho). Ronaldinho was the fifth signing of the Laporta era and his first star. The player signed for five seasons and for €27 million plus another 3 million linked to Barça's results; the payment was spread over five years39. Joan Laporta described the signing as follows:

"Beyond the magic in his boots, we have a player of great human quality, a man who is very close to the people. He is the type of player we want to represent Barça40. We could not let the opportunity of signing Ronaldinho pass us by. The importance of this signing is firstly economic, since 75% of the investment in this area has been placed on this player. The other players have great futures, but their amounts are not relevant in relation to the club's budget41."

The new board of directors proposed its objectives for the sports management. Joan Laporta:

"As with all culés42, I would like to win every title, but the technical team is being very careful and is saying that time is needed to form the correct squad: We have minimum objectives, which includes being among the top four in the Spanish league and reaching the final of the UEFA cup43."

THE ECONOMIC AREA

"We found out about the situation of the entity through the official accounts that were adopted by the club. We had the economic financial information and knowledge about the world of football thanks to our past and by monitoring the sports and social activity of the club. The surprises came when we carried out a due diligence on taking up our posts and reviewing everything. The economic magnitudes were as we expected; however, confirmation of the fact surprised us. There was an operative deficit of €70 million. Furthermore, after the provisions we had to make, we reached a deficit of 164 million and a debt of 150 million. In any case, of all the things we discovered it wasn't this that surprised us most because this could be solved by reducing expenses, increasing income and refinancing the debt44."

Joan Laporta describes the basic guidelines for the management of the club's economic area as follows: reduced spending, an increase in income and refinancing the debt. To this, he set up a workgroup. Joan Laporta:

38 El País (14 July 2003). 39 Le Figaro (21 July 2003). 40 Canal Barça “100 days” (30 September 2003). 41 Interview with Joan Laporta. 42 This term refers to all FC Barcelona supporters. 43 Marca (9 September 2003). 44 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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"Four people worked full-time in the financial area during the months of July, August and September. We monitored the refinancing process on a daily basis and dealt with the situations as they arrived. We had to act like firemen: putting out fires45."

The new board of directors wanted to reduce expenditure from €195 million to the €165 million budgeted for 2004-2005. To do this, their objectives were clear: zero-deficit, with a deadline set for 30 June 2004. The cutback in spending would be divided into two large areas: the reduction of the players’ fixed salaries and the dismissal of top level executives who were being paid astronomical sums of money.

The increase in income was to come from increased ordinary and extraordinary income. The new board of directors presented a strategic plan for increasing the €125 million to €162.7 million. The club wanted to distribute income among five areas: The renegotiation of television rights (€7.2 million); the increase in the price of season tickets (€8.5 million); the renewal of sponsorship contracts with the brands that were already being advertised at the club (€3.5 million) so that the team's goals would appear on the screens of users anywhere on the planet (€2.5 million); and the profits resulting from the new policy for the commercialisation of tickets (2.5 million).

La Caixa and the solution to the debt

FC Barcelona could not pay its debts in this first year. Ferran Soriano described the club's situation with this simile:

"We have picked up a rucksack that is very heavy and we can't walk with it46."

"During the first year, we won't be able to pay anything. And in the second year, very little. We can't walk with this rucksack. We are negotiating with four groups of banks to restructure the debt. The weight of the rucksack can't be changed, but we can change its shape47."

The need to renegotiate the debt in the long-term was critical, since without that the club would not have resources for investing in its sports project (the first point of the virtuous circle), which would dismantle the new board of directors’ strategic project.

At the beginning of December 2003, FC Barcelona reached an agreement with La Caixa, a bank which was to front a syndicated credit for €151 million48 together with other entities such as Banco Sabadell, Caixa Catalonia, Banco Popular, Banesto, Caja Mediterráneo (CAM), Cajamar and Deutsche Bank. The transaction, which was spread over seven years, would make it possible for the current sports project to go ahead and for the sports centre in the Barcelona town of Sant Joan Despí to be completed. Joan Laporta:

"We convinced the banks that the important thing at that time was to invest in the sports project. We worked very professionally. We spoke with the banks and they trusted our business plan. They were convinced by the idea that it was innovative in the world of sports entity management. To start with, they advanced the payments for affiliations that were to be made in August (€35 million) and this advance put us in a position where we could begin to negotiate with, I think, a certain amount of success. Finally, we reached an agreement on the syndicated credit and this has enabled us to refinance the debt over seven years as well as reduce costs. This made it possible to make the debt compatible with investments in signings, since we now had a certain amount of room to move49."

45 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 46 El Entorno Blaugrana (23 October 2003). 47 El Entorno Blaugrana (23 October 2003). 48 El Mundo (5 December 2003). 49 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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Reduction of expenses: deficit-zero

From the beginning, the new board of directors took measures to control spending by eliminating intermediaries in certain services, contracting suppliers by means of tenders and reducing the number of invitations at the football matches played at Camp Nou. The objective was clear: the reduction of spending involved an economic policy of deficit-zero. This is how it was explained by Joan Laporta and Ferran Soriano, respectively:

"The situation was dramatic. Consequently, we drew up a very aggressive business plan which consisted of achieving deficit-zero in the first season, in other words, reducing spending and increasing income in such a way that the €70 million deficit would be reduced to zero during the first financial year. Then, we would have to deal with investments in signings and the payment of salaries50."

"The objective was easy to see and that helped us a lot: ‘deficit-zero’. Last year, the club lost more than €70 million and this year we are going to lose nothing. Furthermore, we were hampered by a historic debt that was not very well structured and totalled approximately 150 million. Our objectives were easy to communicate: stop losing money, no excuses51."

This clear objective of deficit-zero had two main areas: the dismissal of top level executives who were being paid astronomical sums of money and the reduction of the players’ fixed salaries.

As for the first area, the new organisation model, according to which new directors guaranteed their management work with €25 million and carried out executive tasks during one year with no pay, made it possible to fall in line with the policy that was established. Furthermore deficit-zero was an objective for the entire organisation, in other words, the new executives who were hired — Anna Xicoy (finance), Laurent Colette (installations), Jordi Badia (communication), Laura Alsina (external relations) and Elias Frade (security) — and the executives in the previous organisation chart — Esteve Calzada (marketing), Josep Vergés (resources and services) and Fèlix Palau (information technology) — also accepted a variable salary which was linked to the objectives achieved: 50% for posts with greater responsibility and 25% for the rest.

Furthermore, the board made sure that all the directors realised on a daily basis that this objective was fundamental for the development of the club's strategic project. Ferran Soriano:

"We even started to measure the degree of compliance with deficit-zero (now every month, but during the first months it was every two weeks). All the department managers were called to a meeting so that everyone felt the pressure of the objective. We said, "this is how much you are going to spend and not a penny more52".

All the purchases made by the club had to have a person who was responsible, and the more important transactions would be carried out by tender. Under these criteria, we adjudicated the works for altering the offices, a change that made it possible to revitalise the club with the new trends in open spaces and ergonomics, where it would be possible to encourage interpersonal contact and the flow of new ideas. The idea was to give the club a new look, beginning with the accounts and ending up with its most visible side. Another of the measures taken by the board was to review the guest and invitation packages implemented by the previous directors. Up to the previous season, 6,900 people had seen a football match at Camp Nou for free. The club gave away 4,800 tickets: 600 season tickets and 1,500 invitations. The directors used most of them, as they did the almost 600 tickets to the chairman's box, and expected to receive between €3-4 million for the sale of these tickets.

As already mentioned, the second critically important area for achieving deficit-zero was the reduction of the fixed salaries paid to the players. The new directors understood that the players’ salaries were ‘too high':

50 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 51 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 52 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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"The team's salaries? All I can say is that they are too high. The multi-million salaries we have to pay have been inherited. As far as we can, we are going to apply a more rationalised salary policy53."

The imposition of a more rational salary policy involved an investment in signings of below €50 million. Joan Laporta reiterated the policy of austerity:

"We have set down a series of economic conditions and we intend to uphold them whatever the consequences54. As for the players that were already under contract to the club when we arrived, we understand that some of their contracts are not in line with our philosophy. Consequently, together with our trainers and the technical secretary, we have to restructure these contracts in a way that benefits both the players and the club. To this end, we have opened negotiations with some of them and we are receiving their cooperation. As for the new players, the club has established a fixed amount that is indexed to a variable in accordance with performance and titles55."

Laporta’s final objective was for all the squad to receive a salary with a fixed part and a variable part. This is how it was explained by Txiki Beguiristain and Ferran Soriano, respectively:

"We are working with previous contracts. We need another year for all the squad to be receiving a salary in accordance with the same structure. Clearly defined objectives have been laid down: classifications, and then titles. Each member of the squad and their responsibility are valued so that the way in which their salaries are paid is the same. We are convinced that the dual format of fixed/variable salary is a good idea and that these amounts should be 60:40 or even 50:5056.”

"We want the players to share more risks with the club. For example, we propose that if they are paid 100, they should be paid 70 as fixed payment and 60 as a variable57."

The new directors wanted to save €40 million with the changes in their salary policy. The new signings — except for Ronaldinho owing to his status as star — reduced the cost of salaries with regards to the players who left the club. Furthermore, the salaries of other players were reduced:

"We have had the good fortune, the skill and understanding of players who have come new to the club and of others who were already in the squad and who are prepared to accept a reduction in their salary. We must be very grateful for this because it means that everyone in the club is becoming involved in the project58."

As Joan Laporta stated, the cost of the squads was reduced by €15-20 million. Ferran Soriano:

"With the reduction of the salaries paid to the footballers, we have managed to save between €15 and 20 million for the club each year59."

However, and despite the debt, Barça (with €41 million60) was the European club to invest the second- highest amount in signings during the 2003-2004 season, preceded only by Chelsea. This meant the club incorporated seven new players: Rüstü, Luis García, Márquez, Cuaresma, Ronaldinho, Mario and Van Bronckhorst.

53 El País (5 August 2003). 54 El País (7 July 2003). 55 Canal Barça "100 days" (30 September 2003). 56 Interview with Txiki Beguiristain (8 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 57 El País (5 August 2003). 58 Marca (9 September 2003). 59 El País (5 August 2003). 60 El País (5 December 2003).

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Increased income

Parallel to the reduction in spending, the new directors face the challenge of increasing income sufficiently to position Barça among the top four or five clubs in the world with regard to income (see table 5). Ferran Soriano:

"We needed to increase our income because Barça was number 13 (on the list of football clubs by income) and 10 years ago it was among the top three. This position does not correspond to FC Barcelona. It is our aim to position the club among the top four or five with the highest income in the world and this cannot be achieved gradually; we have to make a huge leap61."

TABLE 5 INCOME FOR THE 2002-2003 SEASON (IN MILLIONS OF EUROS)

251.4

218.3 200.3 200 192.6

162.7 162.4 149.6 149.4 138.9 133.8 132.4 123.4 119.5

Man. Utd. Juve Barça Madrid Bayern Inter Arsenal Liverpool Newcastle Chelsea Roma Barça Schalke 2006 Utd. 04

To do this, Barça tried above all to create a sports project filled with enthusiasm. This would lead to an increase in the average attendance at the stadium during the season. The new directors began to set up innovative projects, transforming match days at the stadium into spectacular shows. With this, they tried to attract affiliated supporters through a series of spots which showed the club's players in cartoon form, which they called Barça Toons. One spot was created for each match and shown on the TV screen. Another project put on shows before the matches, such as live music, food tasting, etc.

However, the first measure that most directly affected the economy of the affiliated supporters was the increase of between 20% and 40% of the price of the affiliation. According to forecasts, this would give the club an income of €8 million62. A comparative study made by the club's directors with information from the 2001-2002 season showed that Manchester United received €1,149 for each seat, Real Madrid received €749, Arsenal received €639 and FC Barcelona received €413. Joan Laporta:

"An increase in the price of affiliation is possible at the discretion of the directors to counteract a delicate moment in which the difference between income and expenses is very great63. Faced with the economic situation of the club, people have to be aware that the increase all of the affiliation prices of between 20% and 40% is necessary for the institution, but it is not very pleasant for the chairman of Barça to have to announce. In any case, we must also point out that compensatory measures are also being offered, such as seient lliure, where the affiliated supporter can save a significant amount on his season ticket cost64."

The club promoted the use of the seient lliure (free seat). The initiative consisted of the affiliated supporters being able to sell their seat at matches they were unable to see. In this way, they could minimise the effect of the increased prices, since affiliated supporters received 50% of the price of the sale of their ticket and could save between 17% and 35% of the total amount of their season ticket if

61 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 62 Cadena Ser (25 July 2003). 63 El País (25 July 2003). 64 Canal Barça (30 September 2003).

16 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M they used the free seat system for five or six matches per season. However, the money they could receive by using this formula was limited to a maximum of 90% of the cost of the affiliation price per season.

Another area of income that directors had to take into account was sponsorship. The first point of the virtuous circle — the signing of a star such as Ronaldinho — could increase this income. Joan Laporta:

"The investment in this player also meant that all the negotiations for the review of contracts with sponsors were closed successfully. It gave us the strength we required in negotiations, since at Ronaldinho's presentation, in the month of August, when people in Spain are on holiday, no fewer than 35,000 people were present. The sponsors saw it as a magnificent investment. There is no doubt that it was one of the key factors because each of the sponsor’s contracts (La Caixa, TV3, Telefónica, Damm and Nike65) increased their income."

The area of sponsorship also included the possibility of sponsoring the first team's official shirt, since FC Barcelona was the only club to field its players without advertising. The possibility of this sponsorship was approved by the assembly of delegates in the early stages of the new board of directors. Joan Laporta:

"We do not want to rush into things. We shall take the decision around the month of December. What I can say is that it will almost certainly be sponsored by at global company in accordance with criteria that have already been discussed with Nike. What I can also assure you is that the sponsor will pay the price we think FC Barcelona's shirt deserves66."

Despite the fact that this sponsorship seemed fundamental to achieve the objective of deficit-zero — since it was estimated that the club could receive income of around €10 million — and if the assembly of delegates so allowed, the intention of the board of directors was not to use said permission unless it was absolutely necessary. Ferran Soriano concluded thus:

"With or without sponsorship, we shall achieve deficit-zero67."

Another source of income was Canal Barça. One of the new board’s first objective was to gain control of the channel so that they could then promote support for Barcelona and the other areas in which the club competed (see annex 7), such as , and hockey, which did not appear on the theme channel and were of great importance on both the sports and social level. Most of the affiliated supporters were proud of the fact that FC Barcelona was more than a football club, although not from the economic point of view, since the different sections were in deficit. Consequently, the intention was to increase the number of subscribers from 10,000 to 30,000, making the channel self- financed. The opening of Canal Barça, with its new name Barça TV, took place on 15 February 2004.

Similarly, income could come from friendlies, which were closely linked to the TV channel, the sponsors and the internationalisation of the club. Joan Laporta:

"Other important sources of income are friendlies and our sponsors, who have showed their interest and trust in us by negotiating their contracts in the light of the expectations we have created and in view of this current wave of enthusiasm68."

An example of these friendlies were those that took place during the preseason in the United States, together with other teams from the football elite such as Manchester United. Joan Laporta:

65 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 66 Canal Barça (30 September 2003). 67 El Mundo (28 January 2004). 68 Canal Barça (30 September 2003).

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"I think the balance so far is very positive. It is helping us to promote the image of our club beyond our frontiers, more specifically in the United States. From here, the objective is to broaden our horizons towards the South American and Latin American markets69."

The income from property assets was also an important part of the management of the club's extraordinary income. Joan Laporta:

"The Barça of the future also has other options. The property assets (500,000 square metres of property assets) can be modified with regard to how it is used to provide a very significant increase in extraordinary income. Accordingly, our future could be magnificent from the economic point of view if we administer our resources well. And there would be no need for 're-qualification transactions' that would make us operate with extraordinary income. The model is aimed at achieving balanced ordinary results and for the extraordinary results that are generated to make it possible to strengthen the club in the sports area70."

However the balance of income tended more towards an innovative project in the world of sports management. Joan Laporta:

"We have a very interesting plan for greatly increasing Barça's income. We want to position Barça at the top with regard to income. Other clubs tend to sell their assets or re-qualify their land, but this is not our case. Barça's great strength lies with its supporters. Consequently, we are very interested in involving everyone in the club and we are working along lines that we think can make us the strongest club in the world71."

The project called El Gran Repte (the great challenge) sought a substantial increase in the number of affiliated supporters in the club, which would have the effect of increasing income significantly. This is how the situation was seen by Joan Laporta, Ferran Soriano and Marc Ingla, respectively:

"All the additional income could position us at the same level of income as the elite. We are almost there, but there is still a little way to go because the reference with regard to income is Manchester United, a club with a budget of €260 million. With the refinancing of the debt and with deficit-zero, we will be in a similar position. To be extremely competitive, our project for increasing the number of affiliated supporters is fundamental because this would make Barcelona a much stronger club. For every 10,000 affiliated supporters, the club receives a net income of €1 million. So, why not obtain 100,000 or 200,000 additional affiliated supporters? This would significantly increase income and would position us as the strongest club in the world with regard to income, and we would achieve that thanks to all the affiliated supporters of Barça all around the world The objective of El Gran Repte is for the club to be very strong economically72.”

"The campaign of El Gran Repte comes from the idea that 'we are going to use our best asset'. The argument is one of quality, but it can also be turned into one of economy. Football receives one third of its income from the gate at the matches, another third from television and the final third from marketing. Barça had approximately 100,000 affiliated supporters (one year ago) who, on average, pay €100 a year. This means we have an income of €10 million from our affiliated supporters. The question is as follows: if instead of 100,000, we had one million affiliated supporters, would we have an income of €100 million? If we add 100 million to our 170 million turnover, we move to a situation above other clubs. But, are there one million people who want to be affiliated supporters of Barça? We have evidence that suggests there are. In Spain, there are 7 million people who say they support Barcelona. If you think that 20% would be prepared to become an affiliated supporter and pay €100 a year, the result would be 1.4 million affiliated supporters. This is why we have opened registration for affiliated supporters. Everyone can be an affiliated supporter and we have removed the entry fee. Being an affiliated supporter has tangible advantages and it is also a way of contributing to the

69 Website of FC Barcelona: www.fcbarcelona.com (31 July 2003). 70 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 71 Canal Barça (30 September 2003). 72 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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club. I am sure that in five years’ time one of the best clubs in the world will be owned by a Russian and it is quite probable that another club will be owned by an Arab and another by someone from Thailand. We have the opportunity for one of those clubs to be Barça and for it to be owned by all its affiliated supporters. It is an initiative aimed at bridging the gap; we are going to work hard to increase sales at the same rate as they are increasing at present and we are going to use our competitive edge, i.e. our people73."

"FC Barcelona's competitive edge is the level of adhesion and identification of its affiliated supporters and other supporters with the club and the close link that is generated between the two. This feeling is well described by the phrase which says that Barça is 'more than a club'; millions of inhabitants in the city, in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain live the club's victories and defeats intensely. This feeling has been developed over decades and is now more alive than ever74."

El Gran Repte had to develop a parallel project for updating the list of affiliated supporters to avoid the fraud that had been detected by the new directors, such as not removing deceased affiliated supporters from the list, or pretending to be another person, etc. To this end, the Barcelona supporters’ office was opened. This office made it possible to centralise all procedures, applications and requests between the club and its affiliated supporters, who could also visit the physical space that had been opened for this specific purpose.

They could also choose to contact the club by means of a call centre. The Barcelona supporters’ office was responsible for the launch of the project for the renewal of affiliated supporter membership, an extremely innovative project with applications at the stadium using the latest technology in mobile telephones. In conjunction with the leaders on the mobile telephone market (Movistar, Nokia and Scanbuy), an application was developed that was capable of consulting the affiliated supporters details in real-time, detecting possible errors, taking a photo with the camera installed on the terminal and including it in the affiliated supporters file on our central servers (WAP and GPRS technology). Ferran Soriano:

"We hired new staff and the Barcelona supporters’ office was up and running in three months. We have even developed new software to update the list of affiliated supporters. We purchased an application which made it possible to take a photo with a mobile telephone and send it to a database, providing interaction with the person in question. It returned a message with the details of the affiliated supporter and a message indicating any incidents75."

THE SOCIAL AREA

The social area takes into account the role of the affiliated supporter and the supporters’ clubs, as well as the historical and political profile and the social and geographical framework in which the club has been developed: Catalonia. In fact, surveys suggest that 60%76 of Catalonians are Barça supporters. Joan Laporta and Marc Ingla describe this situation as follows:

"Barça is appropriately defined by the phrase 'more than a club'. Historically, Barcelona has always defended the right to freedom and democracy. It has also been an integrating element for people who have come to live and work in Catalonia. This means that when someone comes from outside, Barça is a forum in which that person can meet others. Barça is a very transverse interclass forum. It is what it is as a result of what it means as the representation of values focused on public-spiritedness, sportsmanship, Catalonian nature and universality of the club. This makes it more than a football club, which means that the chairman has to represent the entity in the best way possible because it is an instrument which projects

73 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 74 Interview with Mark Ingla (6 September 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 75 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 76 El País (10 June 2003).

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Catalonian people and Barcelona supporters all over the world. This is something of which I am very aware as chairman of the club77."

"The club's values of reference include modernity, victory and passion for spectacular, attacking football. Furthermore, FC Barcelona has always defended other social values such as public-spiritedness, integration among people, solidarity and support the Catalonia, which are part of the club’s DNA78."

In this way, public-spiritedness, democracy, sportsmanship, solidarity, supports the Catalonian and universality were the club’s values of reference on which the specific objects and frameworks were based, as pointed out by Joan Laporta:

"One of our club’s values is solidarity, a support for Catalonia which, as we have always said, is integrating, transversal, modern and based on solidarity. A modern-day support for Barcelona based on solidarity. Consequently, the fact that we donate 80.7% of the club's income from affiliated supporters to projects that are aimed at promoting solidarity is very important, and what is even more important is that the affiliated supporters themselves will decide which project is given this amount. Therefore, as always, the affiliated supporters, the owners of the club, are the people who, with their active participation, can select the projects in which the club takes part79."

Another of the action plans based on values something which differentiated the new board of directors from those of other eras. Again, Joan Laporta:

"Violence is one of the most complex problems for which we have to find a solution. At present, we have already taken the corresponding measures for zero-tolerance with violent supporters. We will not make any concession. We have been and are a reference point as a club, affiliated supporters and other supporters with regard to the problem of violence. Football is a sport and, as such, Barça's values must be maintained so that we can continue to be more than a club80."

CRISIS AT FC BARCELONA

On a sporting level, Barça has not won a title since 1999, which saw it take the Spanish league championship. The new directors had a project filled with enthusiasm, but they had given in to the sports crisis that had been present in the club since that year. The crisis was unleashed at Christmas: FC Barcelona had 24 points, 18 less than the leader (Real Madrid). In its last matches, the team had suffered heavy defeats and the supporters were losing patience. Joan Laporta:

"The only surprise is that the crisis has come before time81."

"We are asking for trust and understanding and for the conviction that the club will again be a top ranking football institution at world level82.

At the same time, an alleged plot organised by former affiliated supporters of the club painted graffiti threatening Joan Laporta. There was even an attempted aggression. In this way, the club, which had suffered an earlier stage of disenchantment, seemed to be going back along the same lines. Success on the playing field was getting more and more out of reach.

The new directors required the services of a group of psychologists to try and solve the problem. The psychologists diagnosed that the players were suffering from 'a survival syndrome' and needed

77 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 78 Interview with Mark Ingla (6 September the 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 79 Canal Barça (19 November 2003). 80 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 81 El País (5 December 2003). 82 Cadena Ser (5 January 2004).

20 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M psychological treatment to begin to believe in the block, in the team and in themselves. The directors got involved and organised individual lunches with the players to convince them of their abilities and help them recover their self-esteem. Joan Laporta:

"The team was lacking motivation and we needed to make a recovery. If, in a team like Barcelona, you trust in the professionals and build a united team from the human point of view, you achieve results on the field because the quality of the players is tried and tested; the quality is extraordinary. The only thing that was missing was to put together the team and consolidate it from the human point of view. I think that this was also an area in which we could work83."

At the same time, on 12 January 2004, Edgar Davids was presented as the second star of the club. He was signed on loan from Juventus until the end of the season. Joan Laporta:

"We did what we had said: we signed two top ranking stars. First of all, Ronaldinho, and now Davids84."

The result of the work carried out by the directors, the technical staff, the players and the psychologists was that Barça put together a string of nine victories by 22 March 2004. The team was one victory away from matching the club's record, which was achieved in the 1955-1956 season, with 10 consecutive victories. Joan Laporta stated:

"The players have to work on a daily basis to achieve the objective of finishing among the top four85."

On 27 April 2004, Barça was in third position and had reduced the difference in points with Real Madrid by fourteen.

THE LAPORTA ERA, YEAR ONE: THE RESULTS

FC Barcelona began the first year of the change with 106,135 affiliated supporters and finished that year with 120,117 affiliated supporters, a figure which broke the club's record (108,928 affiliated supporters in 1986) (see annexes 8 and 9). Twelve players left the club and eight new players joined. The number of employees was increased from 192 to 260 (see annex 11). The income from gates and season tickets increased from €6.01 million to 8.4. Income from sponsorship increased by 4.3 million and income from internationalisation by 2.4. The number of supporters’ clubs increased from 1,546 to 1,611 and there were clubs in countries as varied as Japan, the United States, France, England, Ireland, Senegal, Colombia, the Ukraine, Russia and Malawi (see annex 12). The Barça TV channel increased its number of subscribers from 14,000 to 40,250. In the 2003-2004 season, Barça came second in the Spanish football league and qualified to play in the UEFA cup and the champions league for the following season. In the words of Marc Ingla, Barça successfully implemented the change:

"The first fundamental change is that now FC Barcelona ‘sells’ and only two years ago as a club it encountered great difficulty in setting up relationships of trust and credibility with partners and sponsors. The proof of this change in trend is that, in only one season, Barça managed to triple and, in some cases, multiplied by five its cachet for friendly matches. It also achieved an extra €6 million in sponsorship, sold 40% more in merchandising articles, received 40% more from pay-per-view programs, collected 38% more for tickets at the stadium, subscribed a further 15,000 affiliated supporters and an additional 30,000 new subscribers to Barça TV, etc. The second fundamental change is that now proactive commercial work is being carried out in developing partnerships and commercial agreements for the benefit of the club in the short and long-term86."

83 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 84 El Mundo (12 January 2004). 85 Cadena Ser (22 March 2004). 86 Interview with Mark Ingla (6 September 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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Despite all this, the most important success was that FC Barcelona managed to close its accounts with a surplus of €1.5 million, having reduced expenses from €195.7 million in 2003 to 162.5 million and increased income from €123 million to 169.7 million. Mark Ingla comments on the balance (see annexes 13 to 16):

"The truth is that this year has been unique in that basically we have completed a turnaround project for the club. The balance is very positive because in one year we have moved from having terrible current losses to earning money (a surplus of almost €2 million). We have succeeded in modernising the daily management and in the sports area we have signed top- quality players at reasonable prices87."

The last time the club actually made no losses was in the 1995-1996 season. Barça achieved the objectives set by the directors: To close the first season with Joan Laporta at the helm with deficit- zero. In other words, Barça stopped losing money. Barça was to present a budget for the next season of €200.1 million, a figure which the club wanted to reach by 2006. Ferran Soriano:

"This year we are going to close with 170 million. In one year, we have grown by more than 40 million in sales and for next year, we have budgeted 200 million88."

According to the information given by the club, FC Barcelona has progressed from 13th position to 5th in the ranking of clubs with the highest turnover. Joan Laporta:

"Achieving deficit-zero was fundamental. We had to restructure a debt of €70 million. We achieved this by reducing spending and increasing income. We can feel satisfied. We have done our homework. The club has regained its respect. That helps us to implement our management policies with ease. We have restructured the debt by means of a syndicated credit over seven years and good management. We have recovered the trust of suppliers and sponsors, who now think that Barça has a present and the future89."

"Barça can compete with any club in the world, but there is always the possibility of business tycoons arriving to break the rules of the game. Barça and Real Madrid have different models. Our next budget will be between €190 million and €200 million. We have not sold any of our assets to increase our income. And that has a lot of merit90."

"We have increased the number of affiliated supporters from 106,000 to 120,000 and Barça is part of everyday life in the city. There are 6 million Barcelona supporters. And according to one study, in China Japan and Korea there are 20 million more. We are not a brand name. We want to export a feeling and make ourselves stronger to face up to new challenges91."

Albert Vicens explains the key to the success of this first year of management:

"Was FC Barcelona a decrepit club when we arrived? No. It was on standby. Without the people, we could never have done it92."

THE NEW CHALLENGES: THE FC BARCELONA OF THE FUTURE

The next stage of the change involves a return to the classic structure of an organisation. The directors stop working as executives. Joan Laporta:

87 Interview with Mark Ingla (6 September 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 88 Interview with Ferran Soriano (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 89 El País (23 April 2004). 90 El País (23 April 2004). 91 El País (23 April 2004). 92 El País (22 September 2003).

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"We are aware that this model of organisation of the management of the club has to come to an end. The executives have to report to a managing director and the directors have to work as directors. Only in very specific cases, when required by the executive chairman, for example, should they work in support of the management of the executives93."

The questions asked by the directors of FC Barcelona are as follows: what will be the new challenges facing the club? What will the future be like? The answers to these questions are given by Joan Laporta, Albert Vicens, Alfons Godall, Ferran Soriano, Mark Ingla and Sandro Rosell, respectively:

"I would like to increase the club's prestige from the sports point of view, I would like to see it admired for the titles it has won. Sports success is fundamental because it increases the pride felt by Barça's affiliated supporters. After all, they are the owners of the club. I would also like to see this organisational model as a non-profit association owned by the affiliated supporters to continue as such, i.e. I would like to see all the affiliated supporters continuing as the owners of the club. This is one of the elements that make Barça more than a club. In the economic area, I would like to see a club that is economic and very strong, with healthy accounts, a management model reference point, and a club that is looked on as a reference point with regard to the management of sporting entities owing to its success, its coherence and professionalism, and because it has managed to change well and implement innovation as a management model of entities in a way that will make it a reference point94."

"Our plan is 'evolutionary', not revolutionary. I have realised that directors act less as representatives and more as executives, and that this situation will continue in the future. Furthermore, although I believe that it will become a profession, its location will always be executive. However, the management of the club will always be marked by the directors’ intentions. The level will rise up to where the directors are now, which is a very executive level, but the overall desire of the board to become familiar with and take part in the basic decisions taken at the club will not change. I think many things have changed, beginning with the mentality. Before, it was taken for granted that the club had money. No actions were taken to generate resources in a consistent way. Now, we have the mentality that profitability is important and that we have to obtain resources to finance the club. The future will be more difficult, I am sure, because it is easier to correct disorder than to organise success95."

"For us, success will consist of this organisation being recognised for four qualities: having achieved a balance between a traditionally run sports club and modern management; having made the club be respected internationally and locally as an honest club that respects the practices of law in a sector that is not too transparent; having succeeded in Barça offering Catalonia and Barcelona supporters an opportunity for enthusiasm as a sports club that is capable of winning; and having been capable of demonstrating that Barça has values that reach beyond the sports field (fair play, public-spiritedness, support for Catalonia, defence of democracy and cosmopolitanism). Accordingly, I remember that our club was founded by a Swiss national and that it welcomes everyone who comes to this country96."

"The challenge facing Barça is to position itself among the top five clubs of the world. In the 1980s, football was a local industry and the relationship between profitability and sales was somewhat volatile. In the 1990s, with television, it became a media industry. Today, the industry is more like Walt Disney than anything else. We have characters and personalities, and they can be used to make films, play football matches, open theme parks, sell merchandising and appear on television. And in order to be among the top five clubs of the world, we have to implement what we call 'the virtuous circle': signing the players, winning and generating income in order to attract new players. What is the challenge in the short term? Winning. Each year you fail to win erodes your value. To deal with the challenge in the mid- term, we have to win in the short-term97."

93 Interview with Joan Laporta (February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 94 Interview with Joan Laporta (17 February 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 95 Interview with Albert Vicens (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 96 Interview with Alfons Godall (5 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 97 Interview with Ferran Soriano (by July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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"After a year in which we have implemented a plan for a shock on the economic and sports levels, the situation is sufficiently stable for the directors who acted as executives to move away from executive tasks. The main challenge is to be successful on the playing field. Sports success and the sports policy that is sustainable in the long-term as well as successful are the main driving force for the club to continue increasing its income and consolidating its position among the top five teams in the world of football. Furthermore, the club is facing the challenge of continuing its process of internationalisation within the football industry, which is becoming increasingly globalised98."

"Success is measured only by titles. But work does not change. People will value our work in accordance with the titles we have won. Unfortunately, in football you can have an astronomical debt but be winning titles and they will say that you are a great manager; and you can be not winning titles but develop a perfect management model, and they will say that you're a bad manager. In the mid and long term, if the management at the club is good, the team wins titles; but in the short term, this is not so. If we do not win titles, we shall be hostage to the enthusiasm we have created99."

98 Interview with Mark Ingla (6 September 2004). © Instituto de Empresa. 99 Interview with Sandro Rosell (8 July 2004). © Instituto de Empresa.

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ANNEXE 1 FC BARCELONA'S INSTALLATIONS

La Masía. A former farm residence built in 1702. In 1966, La Masía was turned into the club's social headquarters, and 13 years later, in 1979, it was converted into a residence for Barça's players. The purpose of this residence is to offer sports and intellectual training to the young players who have left their families and hometowns to join Barça. At present, more than 30 young footballers trained in La Masía have made their debut with the first team. La Masía does not only receive footballers from Catalonia or from the rest of Spain, but also those who come from other countries. It is worth pointing out that, since the 1987-1988 season, La Masía has places reserved for young players from the basketball team.

Joan Gamper Sports City. In 1989, the process began for the purchase of the first lands in the town of Sant Joan Despí, under the chairmanship of Josep Lluís Núñez. With an approximate investment of €9 million (approximately 1,500 million pesetas), the club bought 30 ha of land, approximately 300,000 square metres. This land is ideal for the club's needs: It is near the Camp Nou stadium (4.5 km) and has easy access and is well connected with the main communication routes (motorways, roads and railroads). Furthermore, the construction of a train platform and an El Baix tram stop has been planned next to the sports centre. The plan includes the marking-out of different areas:

ƒ Professional football (three football pitches, a training area, a multi-sports area and residence). ƒ Base football (three football pitches, a swimming pool and a residence for the athletes). ƒ Multi-sports pavilions (for the basketball, handball and hockey teams). ƒ Athletics (with a field and athletics track).

Camp Nou. When it was opened, Camp Nou had a capacity for 93,053 spectators (the former project of reaching a capacity of 150,000 was abandoned) and the dimensions of the playing field were 107 x 72 m (at present, they are 105 x 68, in compliance with the regulations laid down by the UEFA). Nowadays, the stadium has a maximum height of 48 m and a surface area of 55,000 square metres (250 m long and 220 m wide); the time required to empty the stadium is five minutes. During the 1998-1999 season, the UEFA recognised Camp Nou as a five-star stadium.

Palau Blaugrana. This was opened on 23 October 1971. It had a capacity of 5696 spectators, but the extension work in 1994 increased the capacity to a possibly 8000.

Miniestadi. "On 24 September 1982, the Miniestadi is used by FC Barcelona's youth teams, such as Barça B and Barça C. The stadium has a capacity for 15,276 spectators.

The ice rink. The ice rink was opened one week after Palau Blaugrana, on 30 October 1971. This facility is used by two of the clubs teams: (school, teams and veterans) and figure skating (school, ice ballet, competition team and private tutoring).

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ANNEX 2 THE TITLES WON BY FC BARCELONA

ƒ One European Cup: 1991-1992.

ƒ Four European Cup winners cups 1978-1979, 1981-1982, 1988-1989 and 1996-1997. «

ƒ Three Fairs Cups: 1957-1958, 1959-1960 and 1965-1966 (won and kept in 1971).

ƒ Two European Supercups: 1992-1993 and 1997-1998.

ƒ Two Latin Cups: 1948-1949 and 1951-1952.

ƒ Four Pyrenees Cups: 1909-1910, 1910-1911, 1911-1912 and 1912-1913.

ƒ Sixteen league titles: 1928-1929, 1944-1945, 1947-1948, 1948-1949, 1951-1952, 1952-1953, 1958-1959, 1959-1960, 1973-1974, 1984-1985, 1990-1991, 1991-1992, 1992-1993, 1993-1994, 1997-1998 and 1998-1999.

ƒ Twenty-four Spanish Cups: 1909-1910, 1911-1912, 1912-1913, 1919-1920, 1921-1922, 19241925, 1925-1926, 1927-1928, 1941-1942, 1950-1951, 1951-1952, 1952-1953. 1956-1957, 1958-1959, 1962-1963, 1967-1968, 1970-1971, 1977-1978, 1980-1981, 1982-1983, 19871988, 1989-1990, 1996-1997 and 1997-1998.

ƒ Five Spanish Super Cups: 1983-1984, 1991-1992, 1992-1993, 1994-1995 and 1996-1997.

ƒ Two League Cups: 1982-1983 and 1985-1986.

ƒ One Macaya Cup: 1901-1902.

ƒ One Barcelona Cup: 1902-1903.

ƒ Twenty-one championships of Catalonia: 1904-1905, 1908-1909, 1909-1910, 1910-1911, 19121913, 1915-1916, 1918-1919, 1919-1920, 1920-1921, 1921-1922, 1923-1924, 1924-1925, 1925-1926, 1926-1927, 1927-1928, 1929-1930, 1930-1931, 1931-1932, 1934-1935, 19351936 and 1937-1938.

ƒ One Mediterranean league: 1937.

ƒ One Mediterranean league championship: 1937-1938.

ƒ Two Generalitat Cups: 1990-1991 and 1992-1993.

ƒ Three Catalonia Cups: 1999-2000, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005.

TOTAL: 93 trophies.

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ANNEXE 3 LEADING MEMBERS OF THE ELEFANT BLAU PLATFORM (FOUNDED IN 11 DECEMBER 1997)

Joan Laporta Sebastià Roca Albert Perrín Armand Carabén Pep Munné Jacint Borràs

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ANNEXE 4 ORGANISATION CHART 2002-2003

E.COMBAS A. IGLESIAS R. SAPERAS DEPARTMENT R. DOMÈNECH DEPARTMENT F. CARRETERO ASSETS ASSETS FACILITIES SECURITY J. MUNNÉ ASSETS DEPARTMENT FIRST-TEAM SECURITY SECURITY FIRST-TEAM FACILITIES DEPARTMENT FACILITIES TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT J. LACUEVA J. FCB FOUNDATION OFFICE F. PALAU J. CAMPS M. QUÍLEZ ATTENTION AFFILIATED SERVICE AND SUPPORTERS’ SECRETARY'S CLUBS OFFICE SUPPORTERS’ AND PROTOCOL R. MAXENCHS SOCIAL AREA AREA SOCIAL DEPARTMENT PUBLIC RELATIONS TONI RUIZ PRESS OFFICER PRESS A. PUJOL J. SENE F. LLADÓS F. O. SANTOS DEPARTMENT P. PLASENCIA J. MONTSERRAT J. MONTSERRAT J. MONTSERRAT NEW TECHNOLOGIES ICE RINK COORDINATOR RINK ICE MUSEUM COORDINATOR MUSEUM CAPACITY DEPARTMENT CAPACITY FACILITIES DEPARTMENT FACILITIES MARKETING DEPARTMENT MARKETING DEPARTMENT E. CALZADA MARKETING MARKETING COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT F. PALAU TREASURY J. VERGÉS R. NAVARRO J. GONZÁLEZ J. MESEGUER J. PARÉS J. S .PALANCA DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT FINANCIAL FINANCIAL ECONOMIC ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT SPENDING CONTROL HUMAN RESOURCES RESOURCES HUMAN INFORMATION SYSTEMS LABOUR RELATIONS AND PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT PURCHASING DEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT PURCHASING X. PÉREZ FARGUELL GENERAL MANAGEMENT GENERAL DEPARTMENT JORDI ARDEVOL JORDI MEDICAL SERVICES J. LLORCA J. J. MARÍN FOOTBALL A. MACEIRASA. C .FOLGUERA FOOTBAL SECTION JOAQUÍM PAULS JOAQUÍM MANAGER LA MASÍA LA MANAGER BASKETBALL SECTION INDOOR SECTION AND SKATING COORDINATOR C. NAVAL AND T.ALONSO HANDBALL COORDINATOR HANDBALL AND OUTDOOR SECTION COACHES FIRST-TEAM SPORTS MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT TECHNICAL TECHNICAL SECRETARY'S OFFICE SECRETARY'S J.Rifé BASE FOOTBALL BASE

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ANNEXE 5 FC BARCELONA ELECTORAL ROLL (JUNE 2003)

Total: 94,339

Distribution by gender Men: 77% Women: 23%

Distribution by age From 18 to 30 years: 15% From 31 to 45 years: 26% From 46 to 65 years: 35% Over 65 years: 24%

Geographical distribution The city of Barcelona: 53% The rest of the province: 39% The rest of Catalonia: 6% The rest of Spain: 1% Abroad: 1%

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ANNEXE 6 ELECTION RESULTS

30

25 Thousands 20

15

10

5

0 Laporta Bassat Majó M. Rovira Minguella Llauradó White Null and void

Candidates Votes % Laporta 27138 52.60% Bassat 16412 31.80% Majó 2490 4.80% M. Rovira 2388 4.60% Minguella 1867 3.60% Llauradó 987 1.90% White 238 - Null and void 98 -

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Annex 7 ORGANISATION CHART 2003-2004

ASSEMBLY BOARD OF ILLUSTRIOUS OF DELEGATES SUPPORTERS

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIRMAN SECRETARY SPOKESMAN JOAN LAPORTA TREASURER XAVIER CAMBRA JAUME FERRER SECURITY A. ECHEVARRÍA

VICE-CHAIRMAN OF VICE-CHAIRMAN OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE VICE-CHAIRMAN OF RELATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS MARKETING AND MEDIA SOCIAL AREA FOOTBALL AND SPORTS ALBERT VICENS FERRAN SORIANO MARC INGLA ALFONS GODALL SANDRO ROSELL

MEMBERS OF THE BOARD MEMBERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE FOR ECONOMY, BOARD FOR THE BOARD FOR SPORT TRANSACTIONS AND SOCIAL AREA MARKETING J. M. BARTOMEU C. VIVES FIERRO JOSEP CUBELLS XAVIER FAUS ANTONI ROVIRA JORDI MONES JORDI MOIX ALFONSO CASTRO

GENERAL MANAGEMENT FERRAN SORIANO

INSTITUTIONAL FINANCE MARKETING AND AFFILIATED SECTIONS FOOTBALL MEDICINE SECURITY COMMUNICATION SUPPORTERS RELATIONS FERRAN SORIANO J. M. BARTOMEU SANDRO ROSELL JORDI MONES A. ECHEVARRÍA M. INGLA A. GODALL ALBERT VICENS

EXTERNAL SOAFFILIATED RELATIONS FINANCE MARKETING COMMUNICATION SUPPORTERS FOOTBALL MEDICAL SERVICES SECURITY LAURA ALSINA ANNA XICOY ESTEVE CALZADA JORDI BADIA DAVID FALK JORDI ARDÈVOL ELIES FRADE

ƒ Public relations ƒ Administration ƒ Sponsorships ƒ Documentation ƒ OAB ƒ First team ƒ Supporters clubs ƒ Planning and ƒ Brand name ƒ Own channels ƒ General service ƒ Base football and protocol control ƒ Internet mobiles ƒ Development ƒ Purchasing ƒ The media ƒ Treasury

BASKETBALL HANDBALL AND HOCKEY AND INDOOR OUTDOOR A. MACEIRAS D.GODAYOL J. MARIN

RESOURCES AND LEGAL SERVICES INFORMATION INSTALLATIONS SERVICES TECHNOLOGIES L. COLLETTE JOSEP VERGÉS ORIOL RAFOLS FÈLIX PALAU ƒ Programme ƒ Sales management ƒ Production ƒ Staff ƒ MOU ƒ Services ƒ Revenue ƒ Sports management management ƒ Own installations

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ANNEXE 8 FC BARCELONA SPORTS SECTIONS

PROFESSIONAL Football (founded in 1899) Basketball (1926) Handball (1942) (1942)

AMATEUR Athletics (1915) Rugby (1924) Hockey (1927) Baseball (1941) Volleyball (1970) Figure skating (1972) Hockey (1972) Five-a-side football (1978) Women's football (2002) Cycling (1928-1943 and again since 2004)

RELATED TEAMS CE Instituto Guttman FC Barcelona (2001) UB Barça Women's Basketball (2002)

DISAPPEARED SECTIONS Wrestling (1924-1928) Tennis (1926-1936) Swimming (1942-1945) Figure roller-skating (1952-1956) Gymnastics (1957-1976) Judo (1961-1976) FC Barcelona Dragons American football (2002-2003). Related team

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ANNEXE 9 EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF AFFILIATED SUPPORTERS (I)

140

120 Thousands 100

80

60

40

20

0 1929 1934 1939 1984 1989 1994 1899 1904 1909 1914 1919 1924 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1999 2004

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ANNEXE 10 EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF AFFILIATED SUPPORTERS (II)

135,000

130,000

125,000

120,000

115,000

110,000 105,000

100,000 123456789101112131415161718

Affiliated Date supporters 1 jan-02 105,453 2mar-02105,510 3jul-02105,691 4 sep-02 106,054 5 apr-03 106,418 6 14-may-03 105,983 7 28-may-03 106,135 8 sep-03 106,766 9 nov-03 106,372 10 dec-03 108,929 11 19-jan-04 111,545 12 27-jan-04 112,849 13 25-feb-04 115,250 14 26-feb-04 116,188 15 19-mar-04 120,431 16 31-mar-04 118,699 17 18-may-04 120,117 18 27-aug-04 128,767

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ANNEXE 11 DISTRIBUTION OF AFFILIATED SUPPORTERS

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

- 0-14 15-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 >65

Affiliated Age supporters % 0-14 13,131 10.9 15-25 10,576 8.8 26-35 18,631 15.5 36-45 19,553 16.2 46-55 18,654 15.5 56-65 18,077 15.0 >65 21,757 18.1 Total 120,379 Affiliated Sex supporters % Men 92,087 76.5 Women 28,292 23.5 Total 120,379

Distribution City of Barcelona 48.50% Rest of Catalonia 48% Outside Catalonia 3.50%

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ANNEXE 12 EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

300

250

200

150

100

50

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Year Employees 2000 173 2001 175 2002 182 2003 190 2004 260

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ANNEXE 13 EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF BARCELONA SUPPORTERS’ CLUBS

1800

1600

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Supporters’ Date clubs 1 1970-71 80 2 1974-75 152 3 1978-79 96 4 1979-80 176 5 1980-81 217 6 1981-82 241 7 1982-83 295 8 1983-84 331 9 1984-85 367 10 1985-86 413 11 1986-87 442 12 1987-88 458 13 1988-89 488 14 1989-90 516 15 1990-91 555 16 1991-92 595 17 1992-93 700 18 1993-94 801 19 1994-95 905 20 1995-96 1,002 21 1996-97 1,125 22 1997-98 1,230 23 1998-99 1,322 24 1999-00 1,388 25 2000-01 1,450 26 2001-02 1,489 27 2002-03 (20 may) 1,533 28 2003-04 (18 february ) 1,591

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ANNEXE 14 BALANCE SHEET (2003)

-75,303,526 2003 ------TOTAL First team Base football Basketball Handball Hockey Other sections Other activities -75,303,526 FIXED ASSETS: FIXED IntangibleTangible assets fixed Other expensesDeferred CURRENT ASSETS: StocksReceivables investments financial Temporary accountCash 22,345,530 assets current Other 111,677,142 105,704,688 356,249 6,091,022 1,193,771 3,501,479 104,484,725TOTAL ASSETS 38,983,4666,070,982 7,370,130 934,634 2,556,475 934,634 477,958 Equity 4,888,041 - - 902 - 30,051 1,582,875 158,039 26,814 44,714,944 4,941,579 612,205 - 161,299 56,367,238 200,961 - - - 813,989 6,270 294,325,195 - 160,608,796 - - 7,070,389 601 15,781 - 37,535,690 - 6,436,164 1,636,768 - 1,445,676 - 6,612 935,235 - - - - 16,082,084 22,393 - - - - 117,806,542 - - - - 2,452,038 - - - - 2,556,475 - - 200,961 161,299 813,989 Deferred incomeDeferred Provisions for liabilities and expenses Long-term payables 134,637,014 Short-term payables 66,663,300 TOTAL LIABILITIES 1,507,405 - 65,321,001 32,543,519 137,127,187 6,321,045 294,325,195 2,521,310 34,657,129 2,757,994 110,162,784 - 4,265,399 - - - 2,700,506 - 1,500,506 1,200,000 ------66,466,309 - - - - 177,196,506 56,241,962 101,270,058 28,521,703

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ANNEXE 15 BALANCE SHEET (2004)

63,514,450 -73,809,225 205,689,397 -5,492 -5,492 2004 ------TOTAL team First football Base Basketball Handball Hockey sections Other activities Other -73,809,225 Temporary financial investmentsTemporary Cash accountOther currentassets ASSETSTOTAL - - 585,203 21,733,205 315,056,215 104,109,901 - - 1,478,609 - 3,439,999 341,097 - - - 2,704 ------21,733,205 585,203 FIXED ASSETS: FIXED IntangibleTangibleOther fixed assetsDeferred expenses ASSETS: CURRENT StocksReceivables 105,826,209 100,404,753 290,687 165,886 2,485,485 113,358,882 - 6,825,533 291,121 - 62,159 2,420,413 601,012 32,820 - 66,255,710 1,222,576 795,569 678,891 49,716 158,945 - - - 180,786 - - 260 - 2,478,964 - 2,704 ------33,799 - - 3,804,108 113,358,882 - 180,786 Equity Deferred income expensesand liabilities for Provisions Long-term payables payablesShort-term 79,806,050 11,895,899 TOTAL LIABILITIES - 53,386,216 142,130,526 113,542,648 44,100,513 4,890,505 42,871,730 315,056,215 - 2,119,153 103,758,647 - - 2,119,153 - 350,000 - 1,178,008 350,000 - 380,016 - 829,262 - 348,746 99,773 - 280,243 - - - - 207,270,391 - 69,391,883 67,910,151 97,401,024 46,376,558

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ANNEXE 16 PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (2003)

98,865 -32,413 -32,413 -337,009 -33,432,000 -33,432,000 -28,046,218 -28,046,218 -39,855 -39,855 21,841 20.597 22,209 22,040 1,194,584 22,209 22,040 -89,697 -34,113 -34,113 -89,697 -40,714,974 -32,951 -141,344 -139,903 2003 -101,181 ------1,686,227 64,937 1,688,255 188,867 3,795,426 1,885,993 134,439 85,984 78,181 2,073,873 -1,309,138 -22,937 -22,937 -1,309,138 -13,920 -8,848 -494,862 TOTAL First team Base football Basketball Handball Hockey Other sections Other activities -552,051 -345,046 -42,707 -104,451 -43,446 -70,067 -70,067 -43,446 -45,199 -104,451 -42,707 -345,046 -552,051 -5,334,190 -1,189,957 -2,078 -128,936 -1,478 -1,478 -128,936 -1,189,957 -5,334,190 -2,078 -407 -1,505 -4,009,829 -1,921,973 -71,330,634 -72,645,883 -72,645,883 -71,330,634 -72,306,670 -75,282,722 -75,282,722 -72,306,670 -46,296,143 -30,702,490 -2,632,491 -4,299,050 -1,421,777 -1,421,777 -637,160 -4,299,050 -901,412 -5,701,763 -2,632,491 -30,702,490 -46,296,143 -33,997,464 -25,943,568 -260,422 -54,927 -1,674,189 -798,033 -40,790,396 -44,441,129 -16,286 -846,876 -112,382,752 -66,499,672 -4,910,164 -4,910,164 -66,499,672 -112,382,752 -169,406,953 -135,974,953 -135,974,953 -169,406,953 -164,021,171 -135,974,953 -135,974,953 -164,021,171 -102,528,503 -80,260,378 -6,756,875 -7,934,054 -2,931,097-1,514,706 -1,383,631-7,934,054 -102,528,503 -1,747,762-6,756,875 -80,260,378 Profit from fixedassets andextraordinary income Losses from fixedassets andextraordinary income 14,306,433 3,170,602 3,223,937 36,244 231,041 12,272 12,354 7,619,983 Financial incomeFinancial expenses RESULTORDINARY RESULT PRE-TAX 6,310,226 3,826,796 50 5,006 37 39 62 2,478,236 NET OPERATING RESULT OPERATING NET TaxCorporate RESULT AFTER TAX 5,385,782 ------5,385,782 Net amountINCOMENet Other incomeOPERATING Purchases 4,421,835 2,233,874 2,110,543 13,834,032 2,670,643 3,648,291 1,733,530 13,064,340 114,089,152 75,753,885 1,768,339 12,312,663 2,638,659 11,040,587 108,895,954 75,753,885 5,193,198 - 2,023,753 1,521,369 773,544 500,344 342,204 31,984 VALUE ADDEDVALUE Other expenses Other IncomePersonnel expenses RESULT OPERATING GROSS Fixed assetdepreciation fund variation andinsolvency fund Credit 4,378,389 2,163,807 2,065,344 13,729,581 2,769,508 13,021,633 113,537,101 75,408,839 9,343,977 1,556,565 163,159 389,516 108,924 74,043 297,880 6,753,890

40 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M

ANNEXE 17 PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT (2004)

- -1,764,197 -4,755,955 -6,000 -- -- -6,340 2004 - -71,551 -1,428 -1,428 -71,551 -128 -1,001 -3,978,119 -323,203 -149,115 -115,541 -857,984 -290,218 --- - 5,750 473,979 -6,103,512 -8,789,511 -3,901,954-6,103,512 -8,789,511 -1,419,284 -1,578,979 -9,941,610 -7,118,484 -8,718,613 -3,945,911 -1,419,158 -1,582,075 -6,832,498 -6,958,566 -6,901,607 -3,715,416 -1,419,158 -1,576,075 -2,076,544 -7,112,734 -8,789,526 -3,947,339 -1,419,284 -1,583,075 -6,103,152 -8,789,511 -3,901,954 -9,100,657 -1,419,284 -1,578,979 -9,941,610 -5,301,200 -6,173,719 -2,895,000 -1,106,658 -1,096,961 -13,532,920 543,976 -2,885,841 57,964,330 537,976 TOTAL First team Base football Basketball Handball Hockey Othersections Otheractivities -2,698,017 -487,977 -5,719,667 -3,928,712 -20,418 -20,418 -3,928,712 -5,719,667 -39,008,999 -17,378,622 -1,769,026 -3,633,553 -926,828 -3,633,553 -348,612 -1,769,026 -866,304 -14,086,053 -39,008,999 -17,378,622 -88,070,788 -230,495 -1,817,006 -33,237,992-159,918 -26,274,619 Creditinsolvencyvariation and fund Other IncomeOther Personnel expenses 109,053 3,512 17,746 211,655 7,710,035 70,573 1,179,425 9,301,998 VALUE ADDEDVALUE expenses Other GROSS OPERATINGRESULT assetFixed depreciation fund NET OPERATING RESULT incomeFinancial expensesFinancial ORDINARY RESULTProfit from fixed assets and extraordinary income 157,232,198 39,454,410 Losses from fixed assets and extraordinary income RESULTPRE-TAX 136,265,302 62,101,775 TaxCorporate TAX AFTER RESULT 4,974,963 41,087 6,754,394 2,796,613 2,965,888 36,371,132 102,899 1,030,000 2,416,924 6,932,318 2,239,000 18,367 15 34,191,614 706,323 1,494,297 175,535 51,724 1,494,297 - 33,228,790 17,832,395 - 33,228,790 - 638 - - 4,095 923,243 - 2 - 1 - 1,709,960 - - - Net amountOther incomeOPERATING INCOMEPurchases 159,930,216 155,933,542 136,753,279 3,996,674 136,753,279 515,066 494,780 3,119,816 - 3,119,346 252,015 235,143 20,286 133,908 133,908 470 1,033,520 964,483 16,872 18,122,612 14,232,604 - 69,037 3,890,009

41 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M

ANNEXE 18 CLUB BUDGETS

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233

Year € million Year € million 1 1971/72 1.03 18 1988/89 23.06 2 1972/73 1.21 19 1989/90 31.4 3 1973/74 1.57 20 1990/91 33.64 4 1974/75 2.18 21 1991/92 38.39 5 1975/76 2.99 22 1992/93 40.77 6 1976/77 3.4 23 1993/94 43.05 7 1977/78 4.07 24 1994/95 47.45 8 1978/79 4.91 25 1995/96 52.97 9 1979/80 5.73 26 1996/97 59.68 10 1980/81 6.61 27 1997/98 74.73 11 1981/82 7.55 28 1998/99 89.68 12 1982/83 9.48 29 1999/00 105.74 13 1983/84 10.79 30 2000/01 106.75 14 1984/85 11.92 31 2001/02 154.23 15 1985/86 12.58 32 2002/03 170.73 16 1986/87 13.97 33 2003/04 162.75 17 1987/88 17.43

42 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M

ANNEXE 19 ORGANISATION CHART JUNE 2004

ASSEMBLY OF BOARD OF ILLUSTRIOUS DELEGATES SUPPORTERS BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIRMAN SECRETARY SPOKESMAN JOAN LAPORTA TREASURER XAVIER CAMBRA JAUME FERRER SECURITY A. ECHEVARRÍA

VICE-CHAIRMAN OF VICE-CHAIRMAN OF VICE-CHAIRMAN OF VICE-CHAIRMAN OF VICE-CHAIRMAN OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE MARKETING THE SOCIAL AREA FOOTBALL AND RELATIONS TRANSACTIONS AND MEDIA SPORTS ALFONS GODALL ALBERT VICENS FERRAN SORIANO MARC INGLA SANDRO ROSELL

MEMBERS OF THE BOARD MEMBERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD FOR ECONOMY, TRANSACTIONS BOARD FOR THE FOR THE SPORTS AREA AND MARKETING SOCIAL AREA XAVIER FAUS J. M. BARTOMEU C. VIVESFIERRO JORDI MOIX JOSEP CUBELLS ANTONI ROVIRA ALFONSO CASTRO JORDI MONES

GENERAL MANAGEMENT ANNA XICOY

EXTERNAL AFFILIATED RELATIONS FINANCE MARKETING COMMUNICATION SUPPORTERS FOOTBALL MEDICAL SERVICES FERNANDO LÓPEZ ESTEVE CALZADA JORDI BADIA TXIKI BEGIRISTAIN JORDI ARDÈVOL LAURA ALSINA DAVID FALK ƒ Public relations ƒ Administration ƒ Sponsorships ƒ Documentation ƒ OAB ƒ First team ƒ Supporters clubs ƒ Planning and ƒ Brand name ƒ Own channels ƒ General service ƒ Base football and protocol control ƒ Internet Mobiles ƒ Development ƒ Purchases ƒ The media ƒ Cash account

BASKETBALL HANDBALL AND HOCKEY AND INDOOR OUTDOOR A. MACEIRAS J. MARIN D.GODAYOL

RESOURCES AND LEGAL SERVICES SECURITY INFORMATION INSTALLATIONS SERVICES TECHNOLOGIES JOSEP VERGÉS ORIOL RAFOLS ELIES FRADE L. COLLETTE FÈLIX PALAU ƒ Program management ƒ Sales ƒ Staff ƒ Production ƒ Services ƒ MOU ƒ Sports management ƒ Revenue management ƒ Own installations

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ANNEXE 20 CHRONOLOGY OF FC BARCELONA (2003 AND 2004)

2003

16 June. Investiture of Joan Laporta. 400 people attended the investiture in the club's auditorium. Laporta gives a 10-minute speech. Two members of Laporta's team meet with the chairman of the club's management commission, Joan Trayter, on 16 June to transfer the powers and manage the presentation of the guarantee before the LFP.

17 June. Sandro Rosell, vice-chairman of sport at Barça, meets with Javier Pérez Farguell, managing director of the club, to discuss the more urgent matters. The new board of directors will have to solve almost immediately the future of the current manager, Radomir Antic, and also that of five players. Txiki Beguiristain, former player at the club, is to be the new technical secretary of FC Barcelona.

23 June. Frank Rijkaard, former national coach of Holland, reaches an agreement to manage the club and is presented at Camp Nou that same afternoon.

25 June. During the first meeting of the board of directors, after they have taken up their posts, their responsibilities and functions are defined. The secretary and spokesman, Xavier Cambra, has announced the institutional responsibilities and functions of each of the 15 members of the board.

30 June. Close of the financial year. FC Barcelona's deficit totals around €150 million according to an audit carried out by the new board.

19 July. Signing of Ronaldinho. Ronaldinho is the fifth signing of the Laporta era after Márquez, Cuaresma, Rüstü and Luis García. Ronaldinho has been one of the stars of the Brazilian team in the World Cup of Korea and Japan (2002).

25 July. A significant rise in the prices of affiliated supporter membership fees is ordered to increase income by €8 million. The increase varies between 20% and 40%, depending on the location of the seat.

8 August. From this date, the delegate members are given all the information they need so that it can be studied before the assembly of delegates on 22 August.

22 August. Assembly of delegates. The affiliated supporters adopt the accounts of the previous financial year: an overall debt of €169.7 million and a deficit of 72. The advertising on the shirt is approved, as is the new budget of €162.7 million. On the same day, the Joan Gamper Trophy is played. The aim is to re-launch the trophy with a great festival atmosphere organised in the area around Camp Nou before the match between Barça and Boca Juniors. A record number of supporters watch the Joan Gamper match (80,000).

Preseason. FC Barcelona, Manchester United, FC Internazionale Milano and A.C. Milan sign an agreement to spend their preseason in the United States. With €41 million, Barça spends the second- highest amount on signings in that season, preceded only by Chelsea. The club signs seven players: Rüstü, Luis García, Márquez, Cuaresma, Ronaldinho, Mario and Van Bronckhorst.

Match 1 30/08/2003 F Athletic 0-1 the Spanish league begins Match 2 02/09/2003 C Sevilla 1-1

9 September. Laporta announces Zero tolerance with violent supporters.

Match 3 14/09/2003 F Albacete 1-2 Match 4 20/09/2003 C Osasuna 1-1

25 September. This date marks the first 100 days in management of the new board of directors.

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Match 5 28/09/2003 F Atlético 0-0 Match 6 05/10/2003 C Valencia 0-1 Match 7 18/10/2003 C Deportivo 0-2

23 October. Barça is incapable of paying its debts, estimated at €219.4 million.

Match 8 26/10/2003 F Mallorca 1-3 Match 9 29/10/2003 C Murcia 3-0 Match 10 02/11/2003 F 3-3 Match 11 09/11/2003 C Betis 2-1

13 November. Death threats aimed at Laporta are painted on the walls of his home. They have also been painted in the area near Camp Nou and in the towns visited by the club.

19 November. The Barcelona supporters’ office is opened. It is opened to the public from Monday to Saturday, from nine o'clock in the morning to nine o'clock at night, and on Sundays when there is a match at Camp Nou, from two hours before it begins. All the calls to FC Barcelona are channelled through one single telephone number (902 18 9900) from 19 November on. Calls are accepted from nine o'clock in the morning to nine o'clock at night, 365 days a year.

Match 12 22/11/2003 F Villarreal 2-1 Match 13 30/11/2003 C 0-0

1 December 2003 21 January 2004. First stage for the renewal of affiliated supporter membership. To make the process easier, affiliated supporters can visit the Barcelona supporters’ office during the month of December to process their renewal and have their photo taken. During the month of January, they receive their definitive affiliated supporter’s card at their homes.

Match 14 03/12/2003 F Málaga 5-1

The crisis at FC Barcelona is unleashed.

5 December. Barcelona reaches an agreement with La Caixa, a bank which is to lead a syndicated credit for €151 million100 so that the club can refinance its current historic debt, which totals said amount. The transaction, which was spread over seven years, would make it possible for the current sports project to go ahead and for the sports centre in the Barcelona town of Sant Joan Despí to be completed.

Match 15 06/12/2003 C Real Madrid 1-2 Match 16 13/12/2003 F Espanyol 1-3 Match 17 21/12/2003 C Celta 1-1

2004

1 January 2004 to 30 March 2004. Second stage for the process of renewal of affiliated supporter membership. During this period, when affiliated supporters are renewing their affiliated supporter membership at the Barcelona supporters’ office, they receive their card as they apply. During these three months, they are also given the possibility of renewing their affiliated supporter’s card at one of the renewal points that are placed at the affiliated supporters’ disposal within the enclosure of the club on match days. In this case, the affiliated supporter’s card is sent to their homes. El Mundo (5 December 2003).

Match 18 04/01/2004 F Racing 3-0

100 El Mundo (5 December 2003).

45 | Instituto de Empresa F.C. BARCELONA: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME DG1/481-I-M

Despite the crisis on the playing field, Joan Laporta ratifies and confirms his trust in the manager.

Match 19 11/01/2004 C Zaragoza 3-0

12 January 2004. Edgar Davids was presented as the second star of the club. He was signed on loan from Juventus until the end of the season.

Match 20 17/01/2004 C Athletic 1-1 The second half of the season begins Match 21 25/01/2004 F Sevilla 0-1 Match 22 01/02/2004 C Albacete 5-0 Match 23 08/02/2004 F Osasuna 1-2

14 February. Laporta is booed and pushed by several affiliated supporters at Palau Blaugrana and is on the verge of being physically attacked.

Match 24 15/02/2004 C Atlético 3-1

15 February. Barça TV. The new channel is launched as a new version of Canal Barça, which was created five years earlier by Josep Lluís Núñez. At that time, the channel has more than 14,200 subscribers. Unlike the former Canal Barça, Barça TV is also aimed at promoting the other sections.

Match 25 21/02/2004 F Valencia 0-1

25 February. A Barça employee is stopped in his intention of beating up Laporta.

Match 26 29/02/2004 F Deportivo 2-3

1 March. A security guard, who designed the security system at the stadium, is stopped at camp Nou accused of planning to beat up Laporta.

Match 27 07/03/2004 C Mallorca 3-2 Match 28 14/03/2004 F Murcia 0-2 Match 29 21/03/2004 C Real Sociedad 1-0

31 March. The affiliated supporter membership renewal process for 2004 comes to an end.

Match 30 14/04/2004 F Betis 1-1 Match 31 03/04/2004 C Villarreal 0-0 Match 32 10/04/2004 F Valladolid 1-3 Match 33 18/04/2004 C Málaga 3-0 Match 34 25/04/2004 F Real Madrid 1-2

29 April. It is revealed that a former Barça director is caught up in a plot to threaten Laporta. The Barça plot mentions violent supporters and two former employees who were sacked in autumn; a motion of censure is sought.

Match 35 02/05/2004 C Espanyol 4-1 Match 36 08/05/2004 F Celta 1-0 Match 37 16/05/2004 C Racing 1-0 Match 38 23/05/2004 F Zaragoza 2-1

Last match of the Spanish league championship. FC Barcelona finishes the competition in second place.

21 June. Barça launches the Japanese version of its web site (http://jp.FCbarcelona.com), which offers the main sports, social and institutional news about the club. 850 Japanese supporters become affiliated supporters of Barça during the first two weeks the Japanese website is in operation.

30 June. The club's accounts are closed.

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