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I Would Like to Thank the Organisers of This Senko Conference for Inviting Me to Present

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I Would Like to Thank the Organisers of This Senko Conference for Inviting Me to Present Hatuis! I would like to thank the organisers of this Senko conference for inviting me to present. My topic today is CYM its history and how world history has affected our organisation. CYM is fast approaching its centenary and therefore it is important to remember its roots and how our organisation came into being. Slide 2 The background to CYM lies in 1917 when Ukraine declared its independence and formed the Ukrainian Peoples Republic also known as УНР. The Ukrainian Peoples Republic was a fragile entity and caught between waring powers – Imperial Germany and what was left of the Russian empire/the emerging Bolshevik regime. Many of Ukraine’s leaders at the time were idealistic and aimed to build a state, when many people in Ukraine where not ready for this and thus susceptible to Russian influences. However, many important achievements were achieved by УНР, Ukraine was recognised by over 20 countries, Ukrainian national symbols were confirmed – The Blue and Yellow flag, Tryzub and of course the most important both Eastern and Western Ukraine united into one united Ukraine. This act is of great importance as it showed the Ukrainians were politically aware of their current situation and wished to live in unified nation. Whilst many steps were made towards creating a unified independent Ukraine, many mistakes were also made, for example no standing army was created, and many Ukrainian troops were sent home. This along with Britain and Frances reluctance to recognise Ukraine lead it to facing the Bolsheviks on its own. Thus Ukraine lost its independence and was absorbed into Soviet Russia. Slide 3 On December 30th 1922 Ukraine become one of the founding members of the Soviet Union, and whilst notionally separate from Russia, all the real power laid in Moscow. The clearest example of this can be seen in the Ukrainian Communist Party, where in 1922 only 30% of the party was ethnically Ukrainian. During this time many Ukrainian towns and villages help uprisings against Soviet authority. To combat this Lenin Introduced a policy of Ukrainization in Ukraine. This policy aimed to increase the use of Ukrainian language and culture within the Ukrainian SSR, thus quelling this discontent within the population and increasing the legitimacy of the communist party. This strategy was very successful and even managed to bring back leading figures of УНР back to Ukraine. The most prominent example of this was Muhalio Hryshevskiy - the first president of УНР, who returned to Kyiv and took up his old post as a history professor. The high speed of Ukrainization took Moscow by surprise and in April 1926 Stalin ended this policy, due to the increased sense nationalism being shown by the population. Slide 4 One of the organisations that took the Soviet authorities by surprise was Спілка Визволення України. Created by Сергій Єфремов CVY was aimed at addressing the Ukrainian question. Many intellectuals and students were drawn to CVY by Сергій Єфремов, who many called Ukraine’s conscience. The aims of this organisation were to instil the ideals of the Ukrainian People’s republic into Ukraine’s youth and provide an alternative source of information. Slide 5 We now come to the creator of CYM - Микола Павлушков, from an ethically mixed Ukrainian- Russian family, Mykola was born in Tula Russia. His father was a priest who was imprisoned for counter revolution activities. Due to this his mother sent him to Kyiv in 1921 to live with his relative Сергій Єфремов. Mykola was an active student and took part in various Ukrainian events in Kyiv. One of the organisations that Mykola joined was Товариство Єднання й Згоди – ТЄЗ. ТЄЗ was quickly put down by the local Communist party due to it being a very openly pro-Ukrainian organisation. Slide 6 In 1925 after ТЄЗ had been shut down Mykola and the most active members of ТЄЗ, created CYM. To keep CYM under the radar from the local communist authorities, they instituted the Пятіркова or 5-man system. Each group was made up of 5 people and each people was responsible to recruit another 4 people, thus expending the organisation, whilst protecting other members, as everyone only knew 8 other people within the organisation. CYM’s most active year was 1926, when in May members dropped leaflets announcing the assassination of Симон Петлюра, from St. Sophia’s Belltower. CYM was discovered and disbanded by the Soviet authorities in 1929. Slide 7 Since both CYM and CVY were openly in their intentions anti Soviet, the Communist system needed to get rid of them, but also maintain a sense of legitimacy amongst the population – thus a Show Trial was needed. Since both CYM and CVY attracted politically savvy Ukrainian’s, the show trial thus captured many highly placed figures in Ukrainian society, as can be seen on the slide. Slide 8 The results were a forgone conclusion, with most of the 45 members on trial receiving some kind of prison sentence. Микола Павлушков, due to his political activities and being the creator of CYM, received a 10 year sentence. Mykola was sent to northern Russia to the Сандармо́х Gulag camp to serve out his sentence. On November 3rd 1937 Павлушков was one of 1,111 people who were shot in honour of 10th anniversary of the October revolution. Today on that site the Ukrainian community has set up a memorial to all those killed at the camp. Slide 9 After the Kharkiv trials, CYM was destroyed in Ukraine, however various organisations were created using the name of CYM. One of the most famous of these organisations was the Ukrainian Far- Eastern Sich in Harbin, China. This organisation was active until 1945, when Manchuria was invaded by the Soviet Union. At that time, Manchuria had a population of around 21 thousand Ukrainians, most of whom were then deported back to the USSR or escaped to the Diaspora. During this time and throughout the period of Soviet Occupation in Ukraine many local underground organisations were also created using the CYM name, including in Сумщина, Галичина and Тернопільщина. When these organisations were discovered their leaders were usually sentenced to prison sentences and were sometimes exiled to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union Also, in Slovakia a similar organisation was created during the Prague Spring. Slide 10 After WWII many Ukrainian’s found themselves spread-out throughout Europe, particularly in Germany. In an attempt to preserve the idea of the Ukrainian nation, CYM was created under the slogan of God and the Fatherland. This was strongly encouraged by OUN and Ukrainians from central Ukraine, who wanted an organisation that would unite all Ukrainian youth into a single body. OUN took an active part in helping CYM get of the ground and its leaders have continued to take interest in the organisation. 1946 saw the establishment of the first Oseredky in Germany. Originally CYM was aimed at 18-30 year old’s, with Yunatstvo being established in 1948. Slide 12 With the mass migration of Ukrainian’s out of Germany to other countries around the world, CYM followed them and established local branches. First in Europe, then in North and South America and then finally in Australia. When the 4th World Congress of CYM occurred in Brussels in 1952 CYM had grown to over 8,000 members. Local branches began to buy real-estate and worked on the education of Yunatstvo. During this period the Правильник was also adopted. In the late 1940’s CYM also launched its magazine Аванґард and Голос Молоді. By 1969 CYM had grown to over 14,000 members worldwide. When looking back at this time, CYM was a way for many of our forefathers to gather together in a foreign land and keep their connection to their ancestral homeland. Their support for the organisation was monumental when put into a modern-day perspective: For example, a copy of Криляті in 1951 was 30 cents, today it would cost almost 3 dollars, this was a monthly subscription. Аванґард which cost 75 cents, today would cost $7.25, in 1955 CYM released a photo book at of cost of $6.30 or $60.20. Slide 14 During the 1970’s CYM again expanded, this time with Druzhynnyky with the introduction of the 5 Druzhyny and specific courses that expanded their skills. This was also the time when the first international CYM camps began to be organised, creating the strong international bonds that we know today. At this time CYM began to actively support Ukraine’s political dissidents and spread the word about the political situation in Ukraine. Usually these protests would coincide with state visits of Soviet officials or during important Ukrainian anniversaries. A prominent example of this was CYM’s campaign to help free Валенти́н Моро́з who was arrested for publishing anti communist materials. CYM also campaigned for the release of Юрій Шухевича who was imprisoned for simply being the son of Роман Шухевич. Part of this process included the first international Zlety, in 1968 the first Druzhynnyky’s world Tabir took place in Belgium. CYM and its members were also active in the world anti communist movement taking part in conference organised by the World Anti-Communist League. Our organisation also actively supported OUN and its work in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Due to CYM’s political activity the Soviet Union began to release propaganda materials against CYM using many familiar names such as Banderite, Pro-fascist, OUN extremists etc. showing how far Russia has progressed today in its views on Ukrainian patriotism. The other major event that occurred during this time was the тисячоліття хрещення України which united Ukrainian’s around the world and culminated in a Zlet held in Rome where CYMivtsi were able to hold an audience with the Pope followed by an audience in Istanbul with the Ecumenical Patriarch.
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