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Linguistic Ukrainization, 1923-1932

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Linguistic Ukrainization, 1923-1932 3 Linguistic Ukrainization, 1923-1932 On October 10, 1920, Stalin published an artide in Pravda that for the first time authoritatively announced the Soviet policy of korenizatsiia: "It is nec- essary that all Soviet organs in the borderlands-the courts, the administration, the economic organs, organs oflocal power (as well as Party organs)-be com- posed to the greatest possible degree of people who know the customs, habits and language of the local population. »1 Korenizatsiia, as definitively formulated at party congresses in March 1921 and April 1923, consisted of two major tasks: the creation of national elites (Affirmative Action) and the promotion oflocal nationallanguages to a dominant position in the non-Russian territories (lin- guistic korenizatsiia). Linguistic korenizatsiia would prove much more difficult to achieve. Between April 1923 and December 1932, central party and soviet organs issued dozens of resolutions urging the immediate implementation of linguistic korenizatsiia. Local republican and oblast authorities issued hundreds, if not thousands, of similar decrees. Nevertheless, linguistic korenizatsiia failed almost everywhere. Why? 1 initially assumed that central authorities must have been sending mixed signals, publidy trumpeting the need for irnmediate korenizatsiia while privately letting it be known that this public rhetoric was largely for show. 1 was wrong. Not only did the soft-line soviet bureaucracies in charge of nationalities policy, such as TsIK's Soviet of Nationalities and VTsIK's Nationalities Depart- ment, vigilantly monitor the implementation of korenizatsiia, hard-line organs attached to the party's Central Committee were equally vigilant. The Orgburo 11. Stalin, "Politika sovetskoi vlasti po natsional'nomu voprosu v RDssü" (1920), in Marksizm i natsional'no-kolonial'nyi Tlopros (Moscow, 1934): 62. 75 Implementing the Affirmative Action Empire and TsK's influential Cadres Department frequently rebuked local party orga- nizations for failing to implement korenizatsiia. In 1926-1927, the Orgburo formed a special commission on korenizatsiia, chaired by the future Politburo member A. A. Andreev, which likewise categorically demanded that this policy be implemented. Finally, in 1929-1930, when lower party activists began to attack the policy of korenizatsiia and to call for its elimination, Stalin publicly and pril'ately defended korenizatsiia and silenced its critics. Despite this sus- tained central support, linguistic korenizatsiia failed. Why? Central officials were initially also baffied by this question. They viewed kor- enizatsiia as a popular policy designed to satisfY heartfelt national desires, not as a threatening policy like coUectivization. As a result, early korenizatsiia resolutions allowed for absurdly short periods of time to implement the policy. Korenizatsiia was generally popular with non-Russians, but it encountered unexpectedly fierce resistance from a variety ofinfluential groups: urban workers (who were usually Russian-speakers), Russians and russified titular nationals in the party and state bureaucracies, industrial specialists, and the filials of all-union enterprises. These were all groups that the partY leaders relied on and, if pos- sible, preferred not to offend. StiU, such resistance alone cannot explain the failure of linguistic korenizat- siia. Fierce resistance did not prevent the Soviet state from deporting several million peasants, expeUing over one hundred thousand party members, terror- izing tens of thousands of valued specialists, and abolishing all trade union autonomy in pursuit of its twin goals of industrialization and coUectivization. In comparison with coUectivization, the opposition to korenizatsiia was trivial: bureaucratic non-cooperation rather than violent and desperate resistance. Yet, Bolshevik values made it difficult for the state to justifY the use of terror to force the implementation of korenizatsiia. As we have seen, popular party opinion never accepted korenizatsiia as a core Bolshevik project, like industrialization or coUectivization, but rather as a kind of concession. In Bolshevik vocabulary, it was a soft-line rather than a hard-line policy. Although the Soviet leadership did consistently and sincerely support kor- enizatsiia, it nevertheless also viewed its implementation as a secondary task, an auxiliary rather than a core Bolshevik project, and therefore its support was soft. Failure to implement korenizatsiia was censured, but unlike failure to meet grain requisition quotas or industrialization targets, it rarely led to demotion and never resulted in arrest or execution. Interestingly, this meant that local conditions proved decisive. If a republic's leadership aggressively supported kor- enizatsiia and could overcome local resistance without soliciting punitive mea- sures from the center, linguistic korenizatsiia could be and was achieved. If not, it would fail. The center would not tolerate an open and demonstrative repu- diation of korenizatsiia, but it would likewise not intervene decisively to correct a lackluster performance. In terms of linguistic korenizatsiia, the Soviet Union's non-Russian territo- ries can be divided into three categories. For the vast majority, most of the regions that the Soviets called their "culturally backward eastern national Linguistic Ukrainization, 1923-1932 77 territories," complete linguistic korenizatsiia was never seriously attempted. The nationallanguages were promoted vigorously in the press and general educa- tion but made little progress in government, industry, and higher education. There were simply too few educated titular nationals. As a result, all efforts were devoted to the Affirmative Action component of korenizatsiia: the training and promotion of natives into positions of authority. 1 analyze these policies and their consequences in Chapter 4. The opposing category, where local conditions were so favorable that linguistic korenizatsiia was achieved rapidly and with little difficulty, consisted of only two republics: Georgia and Armenia. The Georgian Menshevik and Armenian Dashnaktsutiun governments had already established their respective languages as state languages prio~ to the Soviet conquest.2 More important, both republics had experienced B'~lshevik cadres, who immediately assumed leadership positions in their respec~ve republics. Soviet Armenia and Georgia were unique in having influential na~ve speakers, such as Sergo Ordzhonikidze, who occupied the top party positions:\Moreover, both republics had large native intelligentsias and insignificant Russi:in populations. As a result, the Georgian and Armenian languages quickly assumed a hegemonic position, and linguistic korenizatsiia simply was not a salient issue in the 1920S.3 Most interesting was the third category, those republics where the local forces backing and opposing linguistic korenizatsiia were in near equilibrium. This was most true of Ukraine, Belorussia, and Tatarstan. In Ukraine, there was both exceptionally strong support for and resistance to linguistic Ukrainization. Moreover, both support and resistance carne from within the party. Nowhere else did the higher party leadership more consistently or more aggressively attempt to implement linguistic korenizatsiia. On the other hand, nowhere else did it face such entrenched opposition. In Belorussia, support for korenizatsiia was con- siderably weaker, although in contrast to contemporary stereotypes, it was not at all nonexistent. However, resistance to korenizatsiia in Belorussia was likewise weaker since there was no entrenched urban Russian and russified proletariat as in Ukraine, nor such a strong russified Old Bolshevik cadre. Tatarstan resembled Ukraine, with a very strong national movement encountering an even stronger and more entrenched Russian presence. The large and politically influential Russian population ultimately confined linguistic Tatarization to majority Tatar regions, where it was nevertheless pursued with great vigor. In this chapter, 1 undertake a detailed case study oflinguistic korenizatsiia in Ukraine in order to understand why, despite aggressive backing form Ukraine's higher leadership, linguistic Ukrainization nevertheless ultimately failed. lRonald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington, Ind., 1988): 185-208. Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, + vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1971- 1996). 30n Armenia, see Mary Matoissian, The Impact of S{J1)iet Policies in Armenia (Leiden, 1962). On the degree to which linguistic korenizatsiia was a non-issue in Georgia, see IV s»ezd KP/b/ Gruzii. Stenograficheskii otchet (Tbilisi, 1925). V s»ezd KP/b/ Gruzii. Stenograficheskii otchet (Tbilisi,1927). VI S»ezd KP/b/ Gruzii. Stenograficheskii otchet (Tbilisi, 1929). Implementing the Affirmative Action Empire The Background to Ukrainization, I9I9-I923 Throughout the 1920S, both the Ukrainian and central party leaderships remained under the influence of what Grigorii Petrovskii called "the cruellesson of 1919. »4 Petrovskii was referring to the mass peasant uprisings led by Petliura that combined with Deniken's White army in 1919 to drive the Bolsheviks out of Ukraine for a second time. The lesson, reiterated by Ukrainian Bolsheviks again and again, with uncharacteristic candor, was that their own chauvinist behavior had provoked this mass peasant nationalist uprising. Volodymyr ZatonskYi, a prominent Ukrainian nationalities specialist, recalled how Bolshe- vik soldiers "almost shot me because of a Ukrainian
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