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v (8: : 6 ): O ay, t we s ou d Sup (8:22:17 PM): ok Avr (8:22:28 PM): A = 1/2bh Avr (8:22:31 PM): I believe pin 805 (8:22:35 PM): yes pin 805 (8:22:37 PM): i concue Gerry Stahl is Associate Professor in the College of COGNITION GROUP pin 805 (8:22:39 PM): concur* GROUP COGNITION Information Science and Technology, Drexel University. Avr (8:22:42 PM): then find the area of Computer Support for Building He is founding coeditor of the International Journal of > Avr (8:22:54 PM): oh, wait Collaborative Knowledge Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning. computer science Sup (8:23:03 PM): the base and height are Gerry Stahl Avr (8:23:11 PM): no > Innovative uses of global and local networks of linked “In this bold and brilliant book, Stahl integrates three distinct fields of knowledge: computa- computers make new ways of collaborative working, tional design, communication studies, and the learning sciences. Such an interdisciplinary learning, and acting possible. In Group Cognition Gerry effort is both timely and necessary to foster innovations for human learning. This book shows Stahl explores the technological and social reconfigura- how small-group cognition can be the underlying building block for individual and collective GROUP COGNITION tions that are needed to achieve computer-supported knowledge building.” collaborative knowledge building—group cognition that —Sten Ludvigsen, Professor and Director of InterMedia, University of Oslo Computer Support for Building Collaborative Knowledge transcends the limits of individual cognition. Computers can provide active media for social group cognition “This book, which synthesizes research by a leading thinker in computer-supported collabo- where ideas grow through the interactions within groups rative learning, offers a thought-provoking and challenging thesis on the relationship of people; software functionality can manage group between collaboration, technology mediation, and learning. Its scope is broad, encompassing discourse that results in shared understandings, new philosophy, AI, and social science, and it is bound to stimulate the kind of productive debate meanings, and collaborative learning. Stahl offers soft- that Stahl argues is core to knowledge building.” > ware design prototypes, analyzes empirical instances of —Claire O’Malley, Professor of Learning Science, University of Nottingham Gerry Stahl collaboration, and elaborates a theory of collaboration that takes the group, rather than the individual, as the “Gerry Stahl’s new work targets a vitally important issue facing a twenty-first-century knowl- unit of analysis. edge-based economy: How can group cognition be fostered as a new unit of analysis for research and design of computer systems crafted for building collaborative knowledge? Stahl’s design studies concentrate on mechanisms to There are many golden nuggets in this volume that will help advance the collective intelli- support group formation, multiple interpretive perspec- gence available on the planet for finding and tackling hard problems, from educational sys- tives, and the negotiation of group knowledge in applica- tems to informal workplace learning.” tions as varied as collaborative curriculum development —Roy Pea, Stanford University by teachers, writing summaries by students, and design- ing space voyages by NASA engineers. His empirical “This groundbreaking book reflects on the decade of research that led Stahl to the timely analysis shows how, in small-group collaborations, the notion of group cognition. Those interested in collaboration will find here a plethora of group constructs intersubjective knowledge that emerges insights into the relationship between design, communication, and learning.” STAHL from and appears in the discourse itself. This discovery of —Barbara Wasson, Department of Information Science & Media Studies, University of Bergen > group meaning becomes the springboard for Stahl’s out- line of a social theory of collaborative knowing. Stahl also discusses such related issues as the distinction between Brent: This one’s different meaning making at the group level and interpretation at Jamie: Yeah, but it has same nose the individual level, appropriate research methodology, The MIT Press•Massachusetts Institute of Technology•Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142•http://mitpress.mit.edu philosophical directions for group cognition theory, and Chuck: Pointy nose cone= suggestions for further empirical work. Steven: =Oh, yeah= Chuck: =But it’s not the same engine Acting with Technology series 0-262-19539-9 Jamie: Yeah it is, Brent: =Yes it is, Jamie: Compare two n one Brent: Number two Group Cognition Acting with Technology Bonnie Nardi, Victor Kaptelinin, and Kirsten Foot, editors Tracing Genres through Organizations: A Sociocultural Approach to Information Design Clay Spinuzzi, 2003 Activity-Centered Design: An Ecological Approach to Designing Smart Tools and Usable Systems Geri Gay and Helene Hembrooke, 2004 The Semiotic Engineering of Human Computer Interaction Clarisse Sieckenius de Souza, 2004 Group Cognition: Computer Support for Building Collaborative Knowledge Gerry Stahl, 2006 Group Cognition Computer Support for Building Collaborative Knowledge Gerry Stahl The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England © 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales pro- motional use. For information, please e-mail <[email protected]> or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. This book was set in Sabon by SNP Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stahl, Gerry. Group cognition : computer support for collaborative knowledge building / Gerry Stahl. p. cm.—(Acting with technology) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-262-19539-9 (hc : ak. paper) 1. Computer-assisted instruction. 2. Computer networks. I. Title. II. Series. LB1028.5.S696 2006 371.33′4—dc22 2005052047 10987654321 Contents Series Foreword vii Introduction: Essays on Technology, Interaction, and Cognition 1 I Design of Computer Support for Collaboration Studies of Technology Design 25 1 Share Globally, Adapt Locally 31 2 Evolving a Learning Environment 47 3 Armchair Missions to Mars 65 4 Supporting Situated Interpretation 81 5 Collaboration Technology for Communities 93 6 Perspectives on Collaborative Learning 119 7 Groupware Goes to School 155 8 Knowledge Negotiation Online 177 II Analysis of Collaborative Knowledge Building Studies of Interaction Analysis 193 9 A Model of Collaborative Knowledge Building 201 10 Rediscovering the Collaboration 213 11 Contributions to a Theory of Collaboration 227 12 In a Moment of Collaboration 245 13 Collaborating with Relational References 257 vi Contents III Theory of Group Cognition Studies of Collaboration Theory 277 14 Communicating with Technology 285 15 Building Collaborative Knowing 303 16 Group Meaning / Individual Interpretation 331 17 Shared Meaning, Common Ground, Group Cognition 347 18 Making Group Cognition Visible 361 19 Can Collaborative Groups Think? 385 20 Opening New Worlds for Collaboration 409 21 Thinking at the Small-Group Unit of Analysis 431 Notes 469 References 479 Name Index 499 Subject Index 503 Series Foreword The MIT Press Acting with Technology series is concerned with the study of mean- ingful human activity as it is mediated by tools and technologies. The goal of the series is to publish the best new books—both research monographs and textbooks— that contribute to an understanding of technology as a crucial facet of human activ- ity enacted in rich social and physical contexts. The focus of the series is on tool-mediated processes of working, playing, and learning in and across a wide variety of social settings. The series explores devel- opments in postcognitivist theory and practice from the fields of sociology, com- munication, education, organizational studies, science and technology studies, human-computer interaction studies, and computer-supported collaborative work. It aims to encompass theoretical frameworks developed through cultural-historical activity theory, actor-network theory, distributed cognition, ethnomethodology, and grounded theory. In Group Cognition: Computer Support for Building Collaborative Knowledge, Gerry Stahl challenges us with the provocative notion that “small groups are the engines of knowledge building.” He notes that research on learning has focused on either individual cognition or the larger community. Based on his extensive experi- ence in teaching and system building, Stahl points to the “decisive role of small groups” in learning. Stahl’s contribution is to alert us to the need for a theoretical representation of small groups and their pivotal role in group cognition. He explores this theme in varied ways—empirical, theoretical, philosophical—each persuasive and thoughtful in its own way. Stahl pushes hard on the notion of group cognition, proposing that we view dis- course as a “substrate for group cognition.” Discourse is defined broadly to include spoken words, inscriptions, and body language. Using these notions, Stahl hopes to position cognition in that zone of small groups
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