DOES CONSUMER IRRATIONALITY TRUMP CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY? Joel Waldfogel*
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Why Should the Consumer Be Sovereign
Lancaster University Management School Working Paper 2006/040 The moral and political economy of producers and consumers Steve Fleetwood The Department of Organisation, Work and Technology Lancaster University Management School Lancaster LA1 4YX UK © Steve Fleetwood All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full acknowledgement is given. The LUMS Working Papers series can be accessed at http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/publications/ LUMS home page: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/ The Moral and Political Economy of Producers and Consumers♣ Steve Fleetwood Abstract. There appears to be a kind of master discourse of consumption, consumers and consumer society, generated and sustained, primarily, by discourses of consumer sovereignty, and the customer-driven firm. To the extent that we, as consumers, accept (all or some of) this master discourse then we are partly responsible for the negative consequences that befall many workers producing the goods and services we consume – e.g. we often see relatively inexpensive commodities in terms of a ‘bargain’ rather than the result of someone else’s low pay. There is, however, a contradiction at work because we often do not accept all (or some) of this master discourse. We often do care about the plight of those who produce the goods and services we consume. The problem is the master discourse does nothing to encourage these ethical predispositions or to challenge us to probe our ignorance. The aim of this paper is to explore this contradiction. After reminding ourselves, in part one, of some fundamental facts of political economic life, part two introduces moral economy. -
Consumer Choice from the Heterodox Economics Point of View
The 10th International Days of Statistics and Economics, Prague, September 8-10, 2016 CONSUMER CHOICE FROM THE HETERODOX ECONOMICS POINT OF VIEW Lada Rusmichová ________________________________________________________________ Abstract In contemporary heterodox economics papers the main stream economics is most commonly criticized for its Homo Economicus concept. The paper considers this polemic senseless. As long as the neoclassical theory seeks to model with the use of mathematic instruments, it consequently must stay at the highest possible level of abstraction. The Homo Economicus concept is right within neoclassical axioms. This rational substation stays a part of decision of the agent in the institutionalised market from heterodox social economics point of view, it means, on the much lower level of abstraction. The basic part of rationality is utility - measure of consumer preferences satisfaction. Preferences are an individual and selfish impulse for rationality. Simultaneously, preferences are institutionalized; consumer derives his preferences inside psychological, cultural, historical, social consequences. This paper suggestion is that the wrong (irrational) decisions don´t exist as long as preferences are seen in these aspects. The preferences are institutionally influenced and transformed in real-world. The neoclassical conclusion about consumer sovereignty is the real and the most serious myth of mainstream economics which consequents into believe that continuing economic growth in developed countries is in concordance with growing needs of their citizens. Key words: Heterodox economics, rationality, consumer choice, consumer persuading JEL Code: A10, B50, D11 ___________________________________________________________________________ Introduction The reason why the neoclassical theory has been so influential and strong so far and that it is seen to be the main stream economics regardless real incapability of their representatives to comment contemporary economic problems is that it has been perceived as the common adversary for everyone. -
ECO 212 – Macroeconomics Yellow Pages ANSWERS Unit 1
ECO 212 – Macroeconomics Yellow Pages ANSWERS Unit 1 Mark Healy William Rainey Harper College E-Mail: [email protected] Office: J-262 Phone: 847-925-6352 Which of the 5 Es of Economics BEST explains the statements that follow: Economic Growth Allocative Efficiency Productive Efficiency o not using more resources than necessary o using resources where they are best suited o using the appropriate technology Equity Full Employment Shortage of Super Bowl Tickets – Allocative Efficiency Coke lays off 6000 employees and still produces the same amount – Productive Efficiency Free trade – Productive Efficiency More resources – Economic Growth Producing more music downloads and fewer CDs – Allocative Efficiency Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility - Equity Using all available resources – Full Employment Discrimination – Productive Efficiency "President Obama Example" - Equity improved technology – Economic Growth Due to an economic recession many companies lay off workers – Full Employment A "fair" distribution of goods and services - Equity Food price controls – Allocative Efficiency Secretaries type letters and truck drivers drive trucks – Productive Efficiency Due to government price supports farmers grow too much grain – Allocative Efficiency Kodak Cuts Jobs - see article below o October 24, 2001 Posted: 1728 GMT [http://edition.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/10/24/kodak/index.html NEW YORK (CNNmoney) -- Eastman Kodak Co. posted a sharp drop in third- quarter profits Wednesday and warned the current quarter won't be much better, adding it will cut up to 4,000 more jobs. .Film and photography companies have been struggling with the adjustment to a shift to digital photography as the market for traditional film continues to shrink. Which of the 5Es explains this news article? Explain. -
Galb2001.Pdf
the essential Galbraith k John Kenneth Galbraith selected and edited by Andrea D. Williams A Mariner Original houghton mifflin company boston • new york 2001 books by john kenneth galbraith [a partial listing] American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power The Great Crash, 1929 The Affluent Society The Scotch The New Industrial State The Triumph Ambassador’s Journal Economics, Peace and Laughter Economics and the Public Purpose Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went The Age of Uncertainty Annals of an Abiding Liberal A Life in Our Times The Anatomy of Power A View from the Stands Economics in Perspective: A Critical History A Tenured Professor The Culture of Contentment A Journey Through Economic Time: A Firsthand View A Short History of Financial Euphoria The Good Society: The Humane Agenda Name-Dropping: From F.D.R. On The Essential Galbraith contents Preface vii Introduction ix Countervailing Power 1 from American Capitalism The Concept of the Conventional Wisdom 18 from The Affluent Society The Myth of Consumer Sovereignty 31 from The Affluent Society The Case for Social Balance 40 from The Affluent Society The Imperatives of Technology 55 from The New Industrial State The Technostructure 66 from The New Industrial State The General Theory of Motivation 79 from The New Industrial State Economics and the Quality of Life 90 from Economics, Peace and Laughter vi C0ntents The Proper Purpose of Economic Development 109 from Economics, Peace and Laughter The Valid Image of the Modern Economy 118 from Annals of an Abiding Liberal Power -
Cooperation in a Peer Production Economy Experimental Evidence from Wikipedia*
Cooperation in a Peer Production Economy Experimental Evidence from Wikipedia* Yann Algan† Yochai Benkler‡ Mayo Fuster Morell§ Jérôme Hergueux¶ July 2013 Abstract The impressive success of peer production – a large-scale collaborative model of production primarily based on voluntary contributions – is difficult to explain through the assumptions of standard economic theory. The aim of this paper is to study the prosocial foundations of cooperation in this new peer production economy. We provide the first field test of existing economic theories of prosocial motives for contributing to real-world public goods. We use an online experiment coupled with observational data to elicit social preferences within a diverse sample of 850 Wikipedia contributors, and seek to use to those measures to predict subjects’ field contributions to the Wikipedia project. We find that subjects’ field contributions to Wikipedia are strongly related to their level of reciprocity in a conditional Public Goods game and in a Trust game and to their revealed preference for social image within the Wikipedia community, but not to their level of altruism either in a standard or in a directed Dictator game. Our results have important theoretical and practical implications, as we show that reciprocity and social image are both strong motives for sustaining cooperation in peer production environments, while altruism is not. JEL classification: H41, C93, D01, Z13 Keywords: Field Experiment, Public Goods, Social Preferences, Peer Production, Internet * We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the European Research Council (ERC Starting Grant) and logistical support from the Sciences Po médialab and the Wikimedia Foundation. We are grateful to Anne l’Hôte and Romain Guillebert for outsdanding research assistance. -
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods John R. Hamman Florida State University Roberto A. Weber University of Zurich Jonathan Woon University of Pittsburgh How effectively do democratic institutions provide public goods? Despite the incentives an elected leader has to free ride or impose majority tyranny, our experiment demonstrates that electoral delegation results in full provision of the public good. Analysis of the experimental data suggests that the result is primarily due to electoral selection: groups elect prosocial leaders and replace those who do not implement full contribution outcomes. However, we also observe outcomes in which a minimum winning coalition exploits the contributions of the remaining players. A second experiment demonstrates that when electoral delegation must be endogenously implemented, individuals voluntarily cede authority to an elected agent only when preplay communication is permitted. Our combined results demonstrate that democratic delegation helps groups overcome the free-rider problem and generally leads to outcomes that are often both efficient and equitable. ocial scientists have long recognized individuals’ to Hobbes’ ideal vision of an absolute sovereign, decision strong incentives to “free ride” on the contribu- makers in modern democratic governments wield their S tionsofotherswhenpublicgoodsareprovided power temporarily, subject to popular approval, and reg- through decentralized, voluntary institutions (Dawes ular elections give citizens the opportunity to select new 1980; Hardin 1968; Lindahl 1919; Olson 1965; Samuelson leaders. 1954). As a result of such individual incentives, society will We explore the extent to which delegation through tend to underproduce public goods and will sometimes repeated elections can solve the free-rider problem by even fail to produce them at all. -
Predictions and Nudges: What Behavioral Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and Vice-Versa
Book Review Predictions and Nudges: What Behavioral Economics Has to Offer the Humanities, and Vice-Versa Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. Pp. 304. $26.00. Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. New York: HarperCollins, 2008. Pp. 280. $25.95. Anne C. Dailey* Peter Siegelman** Rationalists, wearing square hats, Think, in square rooms, Looking at the floor, Looking at the ceiling. They confine themselves To right-angled triangles. If they tried rhomboids, Cones, waving lines, ellipses- As, for example, the ellipse of the half-moon- Rationalists would wear sombreros.1 Evangeline Starr Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Connecticut School of Law. ** Roger Sherman Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. We thank Ellen Siegelman for helpful comments. 1. Wallace Stevens, Six Significant Landscapes, VI, HARMONIUM (1916). Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [21:2 The informed law and humanities reader can hardly fail to be aware that the field of economics has undergone a "behavioral revolution" over the past several decades, and that this revolution has spilled over into the legal academy. Open an economics journal these days and you are likely to find any number of articles billing themselves as "behavioral" in orientation. Similarly, law reviews are filled with articles bearing titles ranging from "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics"'2 to "Harnessing Altruistic Theory and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries" 3 and "Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers. -
Galbraith and the Management of Specific Demand: Evidence from the Tobacco Industry
UCSF UC San Francisco Previously Published Works Title Galbraith and the Management of Specific Demand: Evidence from the tobacco industry Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0t240047 Journal Journal of Institutional Economics, 2(3) Authors Anderson, Stacey J Dunn, Steve Publication Date 2006-11-01 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Journal of Institutional Economics (2006), 2: 3, 273–296 Printed in the United Kingdom C The JOIE Foundation 2006 doi:10.1017/S1744137406000415 Galbraith and the Management of Specific Demand: evidence from the tobacco industry STACEY J. ANDERSON∗ University of California, San Francisco STEPHEN P. DUNN Department of Health, London Abstract: In The New Industrial State John Kenneth Galbraith famously argued large corporations would seek to manage the demand for their products. Although attracting a degree of attention and notoriety around the time of publication, Galbraith’s thesis of the direct manipulation of the consumer has slipped somewhat from view in favor of a view of advertising as information provision. We reconsider Galbraith’s theory of the Management of Specific Demand and illuminate its salience in the context of the US tobacco industry. We conclude that the US experience is congruent with many of the claims that Galbraith made regarding the manipulation of the consumer by large corporations and thus warrants rehabilitation of the Galbraithian view. 1. Introduction In The New Industrial State, John Kenneth Galbraith (1967) argued that the nature of modern production was such that large corporations would seek to manage the demand for their products.1 In the conventional wisdom, the industrial structure is wholly in the service of the individual consumer – what Galbraith calls the Accepted Sequence. -
1 Issue: 17, 2010 Reconceptualizing Consumer Power: a View From
Issue: 17, 2010 ________________________________________________ Reconceptualizing Consumer Power: A View from Market Segment Theory in Retailing AUTHOR(S) : David Burns ABSTRACT The focus of this study is to suggest how the degree of power consumers possess in the marketplace develops in part from the nature of the relationships between retailers and their targeted markets. Propositions are developed to facilitate empirical research by consumer researchers. By furthering awareness of the nature of consumer power, consumer educators and activists may gain a clearer understanding of the relationships between consumers and retailers, and retailers may be in a better position to determine the optimal investment of limited resources. ARTICLE ________________________________________________________________ Introduction Given the pervasive role that shopping activities and consumption play in the lives of individuals, an examination of the power possessed by consumers in the marketplace appears warranted (Denegri- Knott, Zwick, and Schoeder 2006). The relative power held by consumers can be expected to have a direct bearing on the nature of their relationships with businesses, namely retailers (Shaw, Newholm, and Dickinson 2006). Relatively powerless consumers, for instance, can be expected to experience a greater incidence of retail encounters where they may be at a disadvantage whereas relatively more powerful consumers can be expected to experience a lesser incidence of retail encounters where they may be at a disadvantage. Although a number of approaches to studying consumer power exist (e.g., the effects of integrative marketing communication strategies on consumer power; consumerism and consumer power; individual consumer characteristics and consumer power), the focus of this paper is more fundamental. The objective is to explore the nature of consumer power emanating from the relationship between retailers and their targeted markets and to develop propositions to guide further inquiry. -
A Summary of Papers on Fieldexperiments.Com
A SUMMARY OF PAPERS ON FIELDEXPERIMENTS.COM: ALL FIELD EXPERIMENTS POSTED John A. List1 January 2019 Back in 2000, I was moved by Charlie Holt’s website that collated exactly 2000 (mostly) laboratory experiments. That site continues to be quite helpful for my students, colleagues, and me when we have a need to trace the great work that experimentalists have done over the years in the lab. Need insights on multi-unit auctions, “visit Charlie’s site” I often say to my students and colleagues. That site compelled me several years ago to create my own bibliographical site http://www.fieldexperiments.com, which lists publications and discussion papers in experimental economics that make use of the "field" in some manner. The site remains quite active, with an open source that allows scholars to post their own work, and to download hundreds of field experimental papers. With the growth of field experiments, I felt it apropos to provide a site that collated papers using field experiments--both published and working. In my own work I have reserved the term "field experiment" for those cases where I observed subjects in their naturally occurring environments. I explicitly, therefore, discriminated between explorations in this environment and laboratory studies that used non-standard subject pools. In a JEL paper (Harrison and List, 2004), such important differences are accounted for via qualifiers. I followed this nomenclature on the site by placing studies into three groups: 1. Artefactual field experiments, which are the same as conventional lab experiments but with a non-standard subject pool (i.e., non-students). -
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics
California Law Review VOL. 88 JULY 2000 No. 4 Copyright © 2000 by California Law Review, Inc. Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics Russell B. Korobkint Thomas S. Ulen$ Introduction ............................................................................................1053 I. The Uses and Shortcomings of Rational Choice Theory ................ 1060 A. Conceptions of Rational Choice Theory ................................... 1060 1. The Definitional Version .................................................... 1061 2. The Expected Utility Version ............................................ 1062 3. The Self-Interest Version ..................................... 1064 4. The Wealth Maximization Version .................................... 1066 Copyright © 2000 Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen t Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law and University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs. Visiting Professor, UCLA School of Law (2000-01). J.D., B.A., Stanford University. * Alumni Distinguished Professor, University of Illinois College of Law and Professor, University of Illinois Institute of Government and Public Affairs. Ph.D., Stanford University, M.A., Oxford University, B.A., Dartmouth College. We would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems in Jena, Germany, for providing support and a stimulating environment in which to complete an early draft of this work. We also thank Robert Ashford, -
Consumption and the Consumer Society
Consumption and the Consumer Society By Brian Roach, Neva Goodwin, and Julie Nelson A GDAE Teaching Module on Social and Environmental Issues in Economics Global Development And Environment Institute Tufts University Medford, MA 02155 http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae This reading is based on portions of Chapter 8 from: Microeconomics in Context, Fourth Edition. Copyright Routledge, 2019. Copyright © 2019 Global Development And Environment Institute, Tufts University. Reproduced by permission. Copyright release is hereby granted for instructors to copy this module for instructional purposes. Students may also download the reading directly from https://ase.tufts.edu/gdae Comments and feedback from course use are welcomed: Comments and feedback from course use are welcomed: Global Development And Environment Institute Tufts University Somerville, MA 02144 http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae E-mail: [email protected] NOTE – terms denoted in bold face are defined in the KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS section at the end of the module. CONSUMPTION AND THE CONSUMER SOCIETY TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 5 2. ECONOMIC THEORY AND CONSUMPTION ............................................... 5 2.1 Consumer Sovereignty .............................................................................................. 5 2.2 The Budget Line ....................................................................................................... 6 2.3 Consumer Utility ......................................................................................................