THE JOURNAL OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE Vol. 1 No. 1, April 2018

Gold Press Limited Ibadan Abuja • Owerri • Lagos Published by Gold Press Limited 33 Oladapo Street, Off Abegunde Street, Orita Challenge, P.O. Box 37568 Dugbe, Ibadan. , Nigeria. E-mails: [email protected] [email protected] website: goldpresslimitedblog.wordpress.com Visit us on Facebook : Gold Press. in association with Givani Books (Export), 101 Lost Tree Lane, Carry, NC 275 U.S.A.

For

Army War College Nigeria

First Published, 2018

© Army War College Nigeria

All rights reserved. This journal is copyright and so no part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, electrostatic, magnetic tape, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.

ISSN: 2672-4081

Printed and bound in Nigeria by Gold Press Limited, Ibadan. Tel: 08035636473, 08073618748 Editor-in-Chief • Maj Gen EJ Enenche: Commandant Army War College Nigeria.

Editors • Brig Gen C Ofoche: Director of Coordination/Studies, Army War College Nigeria. • Prof OBC Nwolise: Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan and Visiting Professor, Army War College, Nigeria.

Editorial Advisory Panel Prof Idowu Olayinka: Vice Chancellor, University of Ibadan.

Maj Gen AG Okunlola (rtd) Former Commandant, Army War College Nigeria.

Prof Kyari Mohammed: Vice Chancellor, Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola.

Maj Gen JGS Hamakim: Director-General, Resource Centre, Abuja.

Dr Aituaje Irene, Pogoson: Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.

Prof Paul Adogamhe: Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, USA.

Brig Gen MA Uba: Director, Garrison Education, Nigerian Army (former Librarian, Army War College Nigeria).

Prof Ann Fitz Gerald: Director, Security Sector Management Programme, Cranfield University - Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham.

Subscription and Marketing Annual subscription: Individuals #24,000.00, Corporate #36,000.00. These exclude cost of postage. Information about advertising and other marketing matters are obtainable from the Marketing Manager, The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria, Abuja.

Marketing Manager, Maj OJ Osoba. Tel: +2348137533109. E-mail: [email protected]

iii NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

About The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

The name of this journal “The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria” inspirationally reflects the constitutional protective functions of the Nigerian Army. “The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria ” is a peer reviewed journal instituted by the Army War College Nigeria based in Abuja. It is aimed at promoting research and advancing the frontiers of knowledge. It is a platform for publishing original, well researched, and especially ground breaking research outcomes in the fields of defence, security, peace and strategic studies. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria is published twice a year, in April, and October. Scholars and researchers who wish to have their articles published are encouraged to send original, well researched, well written, and well referenced papers to the Editors for publication consideration latest three months before each outing month. Manuscripts sent to The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria are not to be sent to other outlets at the same time, and should not have been published elsewhere. All manuscripts received and adjudged to have assessable quality will be sent out for review by qualified intellectual authorities in the field. The referees’ comments will be sent to the author(s) where necessary. It therefore becomes important for authors to keep a copy of their manuscripts. Publishers of The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria do not take responsibility for inaccuracies of data in manuscripts or for any consequences of their use. Opinions expressed in articles belong to the author(s), and do not represent in any way those of the Journal, the Army War College Nigeria, or the Nigerian army. The author of any published article is entitled to a free copy of The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria in which his or her article was published.

Guideline for Submission of Articles i. An Article should have an abstract of not more than 150 words, with keywords, immediately below it, having not more than five words. ii. Each article should be divided into introduction or preamble, the main body with subdivisions, and conclusion. iii. Articles are to be paged from 1 to the end consecutively. Page 1 should contain the title, author’s full name, address and status. Page 2 should contain only the title, abstract with keywords, and part of introduction. This is to enhance blind peer review. Authors should in the same line of thought avoid using expressions that can link them to their papers eg. “As I stated elsewhere”. iv. Articles should not be more than 18 pages of A4 size paper, (references inclusive) and should be typed 12 point font size and 2.0 line spacing, Times New Roman.

iv v. The citation style of the journal is APA, using in-text citation of author’s surname, year, and page. e.g, (Gorge, 2017:10) or George (2017:10).In the out-text (ie compiled references at the end of the article), the author’s surname, initials, year of publication in bracket, title, place of publication and name of publisher are to be provided. For example; George R. T. (2017), The Role of Intelligence in Counter Terrorism Operations, London, Mayflower Publisher. vi. Charts, diagrams, tables and figures should be placed on separate pages.

Submission of Articles

• Original, well-researched, and well-written articles may be submitted by postal or electronic means. • Electronic copies may be sent through e-mail to: [email protected] or [email protected] Two hard copies should be sent to: The Editor, The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria, Mambilla Barracks Junction, off Maitama Avenue Asokoro, Abuja, Nigeria.

v EDITORS’ NOTE

It is with great joy that the Editorial Panel felicitates with our readers over the institution and publication of the maiden edition of this journal The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria. On behalf of all the distinguished members of the Panel, I welcome all our readers on board this intellectual platform of the Army War College Nigeria. This maiden edition encapsulates fifteen articles, some of which were lectures delivered at the College by seasoned authors, and which passed through the vigorous peer review process. The articles cover wide areas relevant to contemporary national and international issues and situations. The globe is in a state of flux and it has become a truism to think that we live in exceptionally unstable times. It is a common belief that the world has never been more unpredictable. Our current worries could certainly be much worse judging by the vicious nature of violent crimes and devaluation of societal values, virtues and humanity. These fundamental changes would certainly alter our way of life, our future and that of our children, irrespective of where we live. Economic, social and demographic change, all linked to rapid technological change, have global implications which among other factors define the environment. Expectedly, these factors put a huge demand on leadership thus making leaders think of better ways of managing crises. The articles in this journal attempt to interrogate these issues to provide better understanding. We hope that defence and security personnel, leaders, scholars, students and researchers will find these papers useful in their respective fields of endeavour. The general reader and lovers of wisdom will also find this platform a valuable companion. Preparation for the next edition is now in progress, and we invite authors to send in original and well researched papers that strictly follow the stipulated guidelines.

Brigadier General C OFOCHE

Professor OBC NWOLISE

vi The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria ISSN: 2672-4081

Contents Pages

Notes for Contributors iv Editors’ Note vi Foreword ix Preface x

Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning – Lt Gen TY Buratai 1 The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East War in Focus – Maj Gen AG Okunlola 22 Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation By Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management Framework. – Maj Gen JGS Hamakim 34 The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria: The Spiritual Dimension – Professor OBC Nwolise and Dr SB Owonikoko 50 Jomini in The Twenty-First Century – Maj Gen BM Shafa 68 Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus – Cdre A Kpou 81 Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War – Cdre AO Ayobanjo 92 The History of The Nigerian Army: Analysis of its Genealogy and Development – Brig Gen OL Olokor 106

vii Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in The Fourth Republic – Dr Jude Momodu 120 Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria – Dr Willie Eselebor 140 Prison Congestion, Fanaticism, and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice – Dr H Iwu and Prof OBC Nwolise 157 The Monster called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet To Kill This Threat to National Security and Development – Professor AB Ekanola 173 Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric Security Challenges Confronting The World? – Dr Femi Olufunmilade 192 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft, and Nigeria’s National Security – Dr Anne Ibobo-Eze and Chukwuemeka Jaja Nwanegbo 206

Contemporary Logistics Support Challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations – Brig Gen Adekunle Adeyinka 238

Book Review (1) Gender-Based Violence in Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Alake Bolanle Awe – Dr. Benjamin A. Aluko 245

Book Review (2) Nigeria’s Anti-Terror War Against Boko Haram: The Turning Point and Lessons for National Security and Development – Brig Gen Bello A. Tsoho 248

viii FOREWORD

Napoleon spoke wisely when he asserted that three newspapers are to be feared more than a thousand bayonets, because at the end, ideas conquer the sword. It is true that military weapons can be awesome, and the money of the rich can be tantalisingly subduing to the lily-livered. But what really rules the world is neither the soldier’s gun nor the rich man’s money. The world is ruled by ideas and knowledge, which drive creativity, resourcefulness and innovativeness. This is why serious organisations or nations promote knowledge, research and innovation; and those who are in the field of research are always in need of credible outlets for the publication and dissemination of their research outputs. The institution of this journal increases these credible outlets. I congratulate the pioneer Commandant, Army War College Nigeria, Major General AG Okunlola (rtd), whose wisdom gave birth to the concept and ground work for this journal, and his successor, Major General EJ Enenche who brought it to fruition and the College staff for achieving this academic feat within such a short time of the College’s take-off barely two years ago. I also congratulate all the authors whose papers made this maiden edition. There is no doubt that this volume has a very rich menu for participants, lecturers, policy makers, law makers, scholars, researchers, defence and security personnel, and the general readers. To all these and others, I recommend this maiden edition of THE JOURNAL OF THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE NIGERIA.

TY BURATAI Lieutenant General Chief of Army Staff

ix PREFACE

The Nigerian security environment has rapidly evolved and significantly increased the responsibilities placed on the Military. These responsibilities have grown from the traditional protection of Nigeria’s geographical territory against external aggression to addressing internal security challenges including terrorism and insurgency. The duties of the military have tremendously expanded ranging from caring for distressed citizens to defence and security research efforts aimed at promoting the safety and well-being of Nigerians and the world, at large. The institution of this journal flows from this line of thought. The military today in Nigeria and beyond have several officers who are capable of advancing the frontiers of knowledge along with their compatriots in tertiary institutions and research organisations. This journal provides an excellent meeting point and platform for cross-fertilisation of ideas and promotion of positive civil-military relations. The Army War College Nigeria does not only train military officers in warfare, but equally in strategic thinking and research. Thus, we love, respect and advance knowledge. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria is meant to empower and galvanise its readers in this quest, and we most humbly invite you to come on board. The College is very grateful of the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General for the great support and encouragement given to the College since its inception and specifically for this journal. We also thank and appreciate the Governing Board of the College for approving the journal and their steadfast support in its publication. I must also not fail to acknowledge and appreciate the invaluable efforts of the pioneer Commandant of the College, Major General AG Okunlola (rtd) under whom this journal was conceptualised and commenced. On behalf of the officers, participants and soldiers of the College, I thank and appreciate Major General Okunlola and wish him long life, good health and success in his post-retirement undertakings. We are sure he will be glad to see the publication of this maiden edition of the journal, to serve the objectives for which it was conceived. I greatly appreciate the editors, Brigadier General Charles Ofoche and Professor OBC Nwolise, who joined the College in July 2017 on sabbatical leave, for enabling the College pull this feat through within the first two years of its existence. Finally, let me congratulate all the authors whose articles passed through the rigorous peer review process.

EJ ENENCHE Major General Commandant and Editor-in-Chief

x The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1 April, 2018

NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP VISION AND ENVISIONING

by

Lt Gen TY Buratai Chief of Army Staff Headquarters Nigerian Army Abuja

ABSTRACT

Leadership is a critical factor in the life-wire of any organisation or society. The will, vision, and exemplary behaviour, attitude and actions of a good leader motivate the followers to give their best in the achievement of established goals. In this paper, the author interrogates Nigerian Army Leadership vision and envisioning, x-raying his leadership approach through his vision for the Nigerian Army, as well as the core values underpinning response to this vision.

Key words: Nigerian Army, Leadership, Vision, Envisioning.

INTRODUCTION Leadership is the engine-house and most fundamental element in the life of any human association, from the family, through the group to the national and international levels. Its nature and quality determine the progressive locomotion, stagnation, retrogression or even extinction of the association. In the group, society or nation, it is good leadership that makes things to happen. It catalyses the process of development in pursuit of established goals. In management, leadership is the heart of the organisation. In both the nation and organisation, leadership is the propelling force. No surprise therefore that Nwolise and Ohaemesi (2001:1) observed:

1 2 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

That leadership is a crucial factor in organisational, group, national or international locomotion is a non-contestable assertion. Findings of several studies, as well as the experiences of men and nations, in human history have revealed either the cataclysmic or progressive role leaders play in the affairs of men, nations and kingdoms. While for example, Germans will always recall with sadness the destructions and humiliation brought by Adolf Hitler to their nation during the Second World War, 1939 – 1945, the South Africans will always remember with joy the selfless and patriotic role of Nelson Mandela, first in the struggle to liberate themselves from the stranglehold of apartheid, second in propelling their nation through the difficult period of transition to democracy, and third in giving their nation the appropriate milieu needed to balance racial relations in the first few years of post-apartheid reconstruction as the first Black President of South .

The key active elements in leadership are character, courage, strategy and vision. As Norman Schwarzkopf (2001) noted and advised: “Leadership is a potent combination of strategy and character. But if you must be without one, be without strategy”. Nations and human organisations, including military institutions that are lucky to have good leadership, especially visionary and courageous leaders with integrity, no doubt not only progress but do so much more easily, smoothly and speedily than those that do not. The task of this modest piece therefore is to interrogate Nigerian Army leadership vision and envisioning. To a large extent, it x-rays my leadership approach through my vision for the Nigerian Army. The rationale for this is not far-fetched. First, is to emphasise the need for good leadership at all levels of the Nigerian Army, especially in these days of multiple threats to Nigeria’s national security and tasking Peace Support Operations. For the progressive development of the service, and for the NA to hold strong in its professional and constitutional duties to the nation and humanity, at the national, regional, and global levels, giving credible leadership where necessary at all times is critical, for the maintenance of the Service’s integrity. Second, Collin Legum once remarked that Nigeria is Africa’s most important country, especially looking at its large population (largest concentration of Black people in the world), natural resources and trained people which if well managed can give the continent focused leadership. In his words:

Properly developed and with a properly functioning political system, it could provide decisive leadership for the entire continent (Legum, quoted in Ogunsanwo, 1986:24).

The Nigerian Army in particular, and the Armed Forces of Nigeria in general, have great role to play in ensuring that a properly functioning political system exists in the country to enable it continue to practise and promote democracy in the continent. Third, ensuring good leadership in the NA in particular and the Armed Forces of Nigeria in general at the domestic level is crucial for providing military leadership at continental and global levels. This Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 3 virtue was clear to Nigeria’s political leaders early and the role of the military was embedded in it at independence. For example, Chief Ayo Rosiji during a parliamentary debate in 1960 noted:

Nigeria should be prepared to give Africa not only political leadership but also military leadership... what will entitle Nigeria to that leadership is the dynamism with which we pursue our foreign policy and also the military forces which we have at our disposal will give us the respect which is due to Nigeria. (Rosiji quoted in Fawole: 2000: 27).

This is a statement of confidence in, and serious task assignment to the Nigerian military. It is very important that this confidence is maintained through ensuring good leadership of the NA and the entire Armed Forces of Nigeria, given the fact that a nation’s armed forces constitute the teeth of its foreign policy, and also its flag showing entity at the world stage especially through Peace Support Operations, and foreign visits of its Navy. The purpose of this paper is to highlight my humble contributions to the NA leadership as well as my vision for the service and envisioning the future of the service. The paper would therefore undertake a conceptual clarification and establish the nexus between the concepts. Subsequently, leadership and management at strategic, operational and tactical levels of military activities would be discussed before touching on NA leadership and contemporary challenges. Thereafter, the constitutional roles and NA leadership vision, elements of my vision as the COAS, and core values underpinning the response to COAS’ vision would be examined. Furthermore, NA leadership and strategic efforts in reviewing the NA ORBAT, operational issues for the NA, tactical matters and induction of new equipment would be considered. Finally, the welfare of personnel, and envisioning the future perspective for the NA would be addressed.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION In order to enhance better understanding and appreciation of this modest piece, it is deemed necessary to define or clarify concepts in the topic which are leadership, vision, and envisioning. Related to these concepts are military leadership, command and management which need to be understood in the light of the discourse. Leadership Leadership as a concept is difficult to define to the specificity of every one’s taste. Lippet (1990:131) underscored this problem when he wrote that: “Leadership is the worst defined, least understood personal attribute sometimes possessed by human beings.” This problem notwithstanding, it is important that an author and his readers have a common understanding of key concepts in a discourse. The separate definitions of leadership by three scholars interest us here. Pigors (1935) points out leadership in terms of the will, feeling, and vision of a leader which direct others in pursuing a common objective. In his words: 4 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Leadership is a concept applied to the personality-environment relation to describe the situation when a personality is so placed in the environment that his will, feeling, and insight direct and control others in the pursuit of a common course.

Drucker (quoted in D’souza, 1995:52-53), emphasises leadership in terms of higher vision, performance and responsibility, and ability of a leader to develop and motivate his subordinates:

Leadership is the lifting of a man’s vision to higher sights, the raising of a man’s performance to higher standard, the building of a man’s responsibility beyond its normal limitations.

He goes further to add that “effective leaders have more confidence in their own abilities; expect a great deal from themselves and from others, and have the ability to stimulate and to develop their subordinates”. Keating (1982:13) brings out the element of service in his own definition of leadership. For him:

Leadership is service, in the sense that it seeks to meet the needs of another or of the group by performing needed functions. Sometimes, strong directive power is effective leadership, such as when a group has lost its sense of direction, sometimes the group needs to be encouraged and supported; at other times, it may need to be re-orientated. Leadership serves the needs of the group.

These three definitions are worth noting with their different areas of emphasis: “will, feeling and insight direct and control others”, “lifting of man’s vision… raising of a man’s performance”, and “service”. The basic elements of leadership are: the leader, who is central to the direction, motivation, policy formulation and effective activities for accomplishing goals; the followers; the situation; and the task confronting the leader and followers. (Nwolise and Ohaemesi 2001:12). A leader should have certain qualities to be able not only to perform his duties but also to motivate his followers to bring out their best in pursuit and achievement of established goals. Different scholars have their own lists: Cronin has 14 qualities, Arnold 7, Sucik 5, Stogdill 6, Lester 20, etc (in Nwolise and Ohaemesi 2001: 31 – 37). The qualities that seem common among most scholars are vision, (sense of right direction and goal orientation), courage, integrity, discipline, loyalty, sense of justice, honour, selflessness, tact, decisiveness, moral character, good knowledge of his mission, enthusiasm, action oriented, and being humane. D’souza summed up his submission on qualities of leaders by pointing out two most outstanding qualities that mark true leaders: a. They have a dream that they are very determined and enthusiastic to achieve. b. They are people of action. Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 5

The summary therefore is vision and action.

Vision A simple meaning of vision is “the ability to think about the future with imagination or wisdom’’ (Soanes, 2001:1032). This links up with dreaming great dreams on how to give the best to the group or followers. In the realm of the military, the Masters of Huainan (quoted in Tzu, 1988 xx) assert that: “A general must see alone and know alone, meaning that he must see what others do not see and know what others do not know.” In the same vein, Simon Sinek (2014) taught us that: “Great leaders must have two things: a vision of the world that does not yet exist, and the ability to communicate that vision clearly”.

Envisioning To envision in everyday usage means “to visualise or envisage” which connotes seeing something as a possibility (Soanes, 2001:298). Envisioning is a mental process of anticipating the issues that are likely to arise in future environment. Some elements of envisioning are pro-activeness as well as critical, creative and reflective thinking. The spirit of envisioning is pivotal to the attainment of a vision or goal.

Military Leadership and Command Obiakor (2007:295) informs us that in the military:

Leadership is inseparable from command. Command, discipline, and leadership are the essence of any military system. At the head of this system stands the commander, the officer from whom all authorities radiate.

He observes that military leadership is “the projection of personality and character to get soldiers to do what is required of them’’. Quoting Slim, he notes that leadership attribute is “that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion which makes men do what you want them to do” (ibid: 305). Quoting the Canadian Military Leadership Journal, he presents the definition of command as “the legal authority to issue orders and to compel obedience”. He also presents NATO definition of command as “the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces’’. For Clausewitz, command is “leadership in war’’ (ibid: 296). Field Marshal Montgomery (1958) in his own view perceives command as “the capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which inspires confidence’’. The British Army Doctrine Publication on command identifies qualities of leadership relevant to military functions as the qualities required by commanders: professional knowledge, intellect, character, integrity, vision, ability to communicate, judgement, initiative, courage and resolve, intuition as well as self-confidence’’. Master Tzu (1988:6), the legendary Chinese Philosopher, General, and strategist has five virtues or qualities that a military leader must have. In his words: “Leadership is a matter of intelligence, 6 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria trustworthiness, humaneness, courage, and sternness’’. The ancient kings of his time considered humaneness as the most important of these five, while the Martial artists chose intelligence. Du Mu (in ibid) explains these five virtues thus:

Intelligence involves ability to plan and to know when to change effectively. Trustworthiness means to make people sure of punishment or reward. Humaneness means love and compassion for people, being aware of their toils. Courage means to seize opportunities to make certain of victory without vacillation. Sternness means to establish discipline in the ranks by strict punishments.

These five virtues must flow in their right proportion and mix as intelligence alone will result in rebelliousness, humaneness alone will produce weakness, trust alone will produce folly, courage alone will generate violence, while excessive sternness will result in cruelty. However, “when one has all five virtues together, each appropriate “to its function, then one can be a military leader”. (ibid).

Management The word management in its everyday usage means “to manage’’, “to be in charge of an organisation or people “(Soanes, 2001:547), or “the action of managing”. A manager thus is “a person who manages staff, an organisation or a sports team.” At a higher intellectual level, management is the art and science of achieving goals through people – making people do what they are supposed to do, to ensure greater productivity or continuous improvement. It is the process of planning and maintaining an environment that enables individuals working together in groups to accomplish set goals. Managers execute the managerial functions of planning, organising, staffing, leading and controlling. Thus, management is the development of bureaucracy which derives its relevance from the need for strategic planning, coordination, directing, and controlling huge and complex decision making processes. Essentially, management involves the acquisition of managerial competence and effectiveness in problem solving, administration, human resources management and organisational leadership. There has been a lot of debate as to whether management and leadership are the same or not. The consensus is that the two mean different things. Baucom (1990:23) argues:

To lead has clear connotations of influencing behaviour by example, by being in front, by going before; to lead the way, to go in advance of others…to be at the head of command, direct... On the other hand, there are aspects of management that have clear connotations of manipulation, administration, and supervision; leadership implies proximity to those being led. Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 7

Cronin in his view (in Lester and Morton, 1990:221) asserts that:

While it is true that an effective manager is often an effective leader, and leadership requires among other things, many of the skills of an effective manager, there are differences. Leaders are people who infuse vision into an organisation or a society. At their best, they are preoccupied with values and the longer range needs and aspirations of their followers. Managers are concerned with doing things the right way.

Lester (1990: 339) informs us in summary that “Leaders focus on people, while managers deal with things”. Quoting Sir William Slim, he concludes that:

...Managers are necessary, leaders are essential. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality, and vision... Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, statistics, methods, timetable and routine.

Hodges (1977) observes that the study of Management has become necessary because of two reasons: One is that society today depends on specialised organisations guided by the decisions of one or more persons called “managers”. Two, many of the persons that find themselves in managerial posts today are not trained as managers.

NEXUS BETWEEN LEADERSHIP, VISION, ENVISIONING, COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT The systems led by strategic leadership are ponderous and complex. They change slowly and only with great expenditure of energy. Within this protracted time horizon, strategic performance requires vision, envisioning, and consensus building. Thus a visionary leader is a leader who possesses the quality, competence and capacity of creative thinking, planning and mapping the future of his organisation or nation to survive challenges and make progress. When the ideals of a leader become manifest by providing guidance to impact the organisation positively, then he is regarded as a visionary leader. According to Roberts (n.d.), visionary leaders are effective at leading a team toward achieving a common goal. These leaders promote organised learning, creativity, and the development of strong relationships within the team. Visionary leadership is useful for institutions that are focused on the future. As the name implies, visionary leaders are successful in creating a positive and inspirational vision of the future and conveying that vision in an engaging manner that attracts committed followers. A visionary leader understands the need for meaning and purpose in followers, and uses that need to inspire followers to achieve more and to build better futures. Followers feel motivated by the vision and often feel a sense of solidarity within the group because of the common cause. Innovation is a vital part of vision, because to remain successful, the institution must continually grow, improve, and find new ways to achieve goals. Visionary leaders thrive on innovation and change. 8 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

These leaders encourage creative thinking and problem-solving skills to surmount complex challenges. A visionary leader embraces change and views the use of new ideas and processes as progress. He strives to find better and faster ways to achieve success, and surmount problems. This requires the visionary leader to be pro-active and possess critical, creative, and reflective thinking abilities.

Leadership, Command and Management There is no doubt that even though leadership, command and management mean different things, the three are closely connected. Leadership is an essential part of command. Management lays the structure for authority and creates responsibilities; while leadership provides direction, inspiration and vision, and communicates same to the followers or employees. The realm of management is abstract and anchored on written communication, whereas leadership is hinged on charisma and verbal prowess in communication to motivate and carry followers along. In the military organisation, command and leadership are inseparable, as noted earlier. On leadership and management, Massie (1987:V) notes that “leading is the final action of a manager in getting others to act after all preparations have been completed”. Leadership here, he notes, concerns the total manner in which the manager influences the actions of his subordinates which enables them carry out their assignments. Command requires a lot of leadership skills and qualities. Leadership is concerned with the moral or human aspects of command – involving as noted earlier the projection of character and personality to get followers perform their tasks, motivated by examples they see in their leader. Management has to do more with the allocation and control of resources to successfully accomplish established goals. Obiakor (2007: 318 – 9) states that:

In the military environment, management is seen as the use of a range of techniques to enhance the planning, organisation and execution of operations, logistics administration and procurement. Essentially, both management and command contain elements of leadership decision- making and control. It is the mix of these elements that makes for the differences between management and command, and explains why the nature of command changes with level. Whilst command must be exercised in differing conditions of peace and conflict, it is only fully tested under the extra-ordinary stress of conflict and war. It is these circumstances that differentiate between command and management.

He went further to add:

In principle, command (in identifying what needs to be done and why) embraces both management activities (allocating the means (resources) to achieve it), and leadership (getting subordinates to willingly achieve it). While management may not necessarily be a requirement of command, resources allocation, budgetary responsibilities, and associated Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 9

management techniques have become critical considerations in an increasing number of military activities. Hence, the need for senior military officers, aspiring to high commands and senior staff positions to study management techniques.

In a recent review, the competencies of effective strategic leadership were distilled to three factors. Effective strategic leadership must create and maintain absorptive and adaptive capacity in addition to obtaining managerial wisdom. Absorptive capacity involves the ability to learn by recognising new information, assimilating it, and applying it. Adaptive capacity involves the ability to change due to variations while managerial wisdom consists of discernment and intuition.

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT AT STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES This discourse comes at a time when Nigeria’s peace and security remains on a delicate balance. The international environment remains volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous, while Nigeria’s geo- strategic influence is increasingly being threatened by non-state actors at home through terrorism, militancy, and separatist agitations. Although the nature of conflicts around the world have become largely asymmetric, non-state actors are becoming more audacious and showing greater capabilities to engage state forces in near conventional scenarios. This has been demonstrated in the Middle East by the capability of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to defeat conventional armies on open battlefields. This was also attempted by the Boko Haram as it seized large swathes of our dear country between 2013 – 2014 to create a dubious caliphate based on terror, violence, intimidation and injustice. Accordingly, the Nigerian Army (NA) is saddled with the task of developing a ready mix of capabilities that can counter a wide spectrum of threats. The vision of the NA leadership is therefore encapsulated to ensure a seamless connection between the ends, the ways and the means, as the NA continues to be the pride of the nation in safeguarding our national security. In the words of Bill Newman (1993), “The greatest tragedy to befall a man is having a sight without a vision”. In other words, one of the core competencies of strategic leadership is envisioning a desired future for the organisation being led. Thus leadership and vision are invariably two sides of the same coin. Leadership as seen in its conceptualisation is central to goal setting as it involves the subjection of a group or organisation to the will of one member of the organisation. The word “group” or organisation ordinarily may sound academic, but in our military profession it refers to a command or unit with troop placed under command. Military leadership as earlier conceptualised involves controlling officers and soldiers, providing them purpose, direction, and motivation all geared to achieving organisational mission. In other words, for a military leader to achieve set goals or to accomplish assigned mission, such a leader must explicitly define his purpose, provide direction for his command, and must never underestimate the place of motivational factor for his troop. Therefore, military leadership, whether at tactical, operational or strategic level like any form of leadership is dependent on certain attributes, or qualities as we saw earlier. The proper combination of these qualities with hard work, dedication and endurance will determine 10 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria to a large extent the effectiveness of military leaders. Noah Kagan (2014) succinctly alluded to this fact, when he posited that “Every great thing takes time to happen, and one must persist no matter the circumstances. The willingness to go beyond where others stopped is the hallmark of leadership.” Effective leadership at all levels is pivotal to the success of any organisation and is the key to achieving collective excellence. In the words of Gen Norman Schwarzkopf (2001), “Leadership is the ability to inspire people to willingly do that which they wouldn’t ordinarily do.” The quest for leadership predates modern history. Therefore, understanding the leadership process, as well as the strength and weakness of past leaders becomes necessary in order to equip future leaders with the relevant leadership skills to enable them render dedicated service to mankind. This is particularly important at this time when the yearning for purposeful leadership has increased more than ever before. Leadership is an interactive process. The collective energy of a group, organisation, or nation is focused on the attainment of a common objective or goal. Through leadership, clarity of purpose, direction, and means are achieved. There is also a perception of shared commitment by members. However, leadership tasks at the top of a large-scale military organisation are different from those at lower levels, because the nature and volume of work change as an individual moves up through the hierarchy. Leaders at the tactical level are responsible for getting things done; and are thus action-oriented. When compared with strategic level leaders, they have little discretion about the decisions they make, the procedures they use, and the degree of innovation they may implement. They may improvise but they rarely invent, because, at their level, consistency of action is important. They are more of managers of men and resources placed under them. The operational level leaders are responsible for setting short and mid-term goals and directions, and for developing the plans, procedures and processes used by the tactical level. This category of leaders is also responsible for prioritising missions and allocating major resources to tailor capability at the lower levels. Strategic level leaders are responsible for the strategic direction of their organisations within the context of the strategic environment, which is now increasingly global. The term “strategic” here implies broad scale and scope. It requires forward vision extending over a long time span. Therefore, strategic leadership is a process wherein those responsible for large-scale organisations set long-term directions and obtain, through consensus building, the energetic support of key constituencies necessary for the commitment of resources. Therefore, there is a nexus between leadership and management especially from the functions of the strategic level down to the tactical level. Typically, it is understood that leaders engage in the “higher” functions of running the organisation, while managers handle the more mundane tasks. NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES The Internal Environment Nigeria has over the last decade experienced a number of threats to its national security, which have shaped the focus of the leadership of the NA. The NA has been involved in numerous operations both internally and externally in accordance with its constitutional roles as dictated by both domestic and foreign policy objectives. It is also noted that evolutionary trend in warfare and by extension global Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 11 security threats, are being influenced by political, economic, social and technological factors. These factors largely elicited the incidence and influence of non-state actors on the international scene, undermined national border limitations and reduced monopoly of power and freedom of action of nation-states. Therefore, the need for regular improvement on the existing capability and resources of the NA to be able to deal with present and future security threats is most imperative. It is crucial to warn and advise that the military generally and the NA particularly must firmly remain apolitical to defend our constitution by providing the needed security environment as a guarantee for the survival of our democracy. To achieve this as an effective military leader, it becomes paramount to carry out accurate threats assessment in the formulation of the nation’s security policies, which would enhance the ability of the NA to acquire the needed capabilities and resources to deal with these emerging plethora of Internal Security (IS) Threats.

The External Environment It is quite needless to state the obvious that some domestic threats from one nation or region often transcend national boundaries. This is particularly true and worrisome when the traditional notion of absolute sovereignty of states as conceived in the UN Charter (1945) is increasingly being eroded or challenged by globalisation. Nigeria, like other state-actors in the global system is also grappling with the menace of cross-border crimes, such as human and small arms trafficking, drugs peddling, smuggling, banditry, cyber threats, money laundering, espionage, terrorism and many others. In this vein, even the Boko Haram Terrorism (BHT) transcended our national borders with attendant devastating consequences to our contiguous neighbours particularly those of the Lake Chad region. In other words, to tackle such emergent threats, collaborative effort among neighbours, sub-regional and regional organisations becomes inevitable. Regrettably, it is observed that even in the face of dwindling economic fortunes coupled with a dramatic increase in global security threats, some contiguous neighbours continue to remain indifferent over issues of common security concern with Nigeria. This is where the NA leadership and the military as a whole in concert with the Grand strategic focus must continue to devise means of engagement with nations especially neighbouring countries towards the promotion of Nigeria’s national security. Despite our domestic security challenges, the NA under my tenure has continued to meet considerable international obligations in UN peace keeping and regional peace enforcement efforts for the overall promotion of global peace and security.

CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES AND NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP VISION The roles and tasks of the NA are derived from the Constitution and the National Defence Policy. Section 217 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria tasks the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) to defend Nigeria from external aggression, maintain its territorial integrity and secure its borders from violation on land, sea or air. The AFN are to also suppress insurrection, and act in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. Furthermore, the AFN are to perform such 12 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria other functions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly. These purposes for which the NA was established were reduced to a mission statement, which is

To win all land battles, defend the territorial integrity of Nigeria, protect and advance her national interests and accomplish other tasks as may be assigned in aid to civil authority.

Vision in the face of such mission can be regarded as a pleasing imaginative plan for or in anticipation of future events which must be idealistic and a model of a future state of an organisation. Professor Burt Nanus (1995) posited that a “vision must possess the proportion of appropriateness, standards of excellence, purpose and direction. A vision must be communicated, shared and understood by all within the organisation for a successful impact”. Added to this, it is believed, that a vision must be compelling, inspiring and credible. In the case of the Nigerian Army, the COAS’ vision must take cognisance of key aspects of the constitutional provisions relating to the Nigerian Army, the National Defence Policy, Nigerian Army Doctrine and other extant policy documents on national security. This is because in modern management, vision is a key concept to achieving organisational objectives. On my assumption of office, a deep assessment of the Nigerian Army’s capabilities vis-a-vis its ongoing operations all over the country as well as the possible future challenges was undertaken. Three things became very clear: poor state of equipment holding, manpower deficiency, and low morale. Therefore, the need to optimise existing capacity while strategising for all-round increased combat efficiency became very compelling. Consequently, I became infused with the intension to build a highly sustainable and functional Army that will be the most decisive land force in Africa.

ELEMENTS OF MY VISION AS CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF This vision is hinged on two cardinals which are professionalism and responsiveness. Professionalism is about doing things the way they should be done “based on the ability of skill expected of a professional” that should be noted for competence (Soanes, 2001: 716). The foundation of military professionalism is military discipline. Its attributes include organisation, expertise, responsibility, corporateness and adherence to professional code of conduct. On the other hand, responsiveness is the ability to respond adequately to situations by being proactive. Indeed, this is in line with the Nigerian Army offensive responsive doctrine. In between these pillars are the core values that will drive the officers and soldiers to adequately imbibe the culture of professionalism and responsiveness. Responsiveness is the quality or state of being responsive. It is the ability of an officer or soldier to promptly respond, adapt and adjust to given instructions within a given time frame. This has to do with personal responsibilities especially as it relates to a group which in this case is the NA. Paramount to personal responsibility is being responsible for one’s own actions and well-being. In this scenario, consequences are suffered when one fails to do what is right. Being responsive refers to our ability to make decisions that serve our own interests and the interests of the group. Typical examples of the pillars of professionalism and responsiveness are the NODUF exercises that the NA has been conducting Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 13 in all the established crisis areas in the country. These exercises were aimed at exercising personnel in real time operational scenarios as against simulated training situations. Ex HARBIN KUNAMA, CROCODILE SMILE and Ex CAT RACE, are typical examples and more of such NODUF exercises are planned. Professionalism and responsiveness are like joint ventures as they are interrelated and we must accept consequences, blame and retribution when we err. In the same vein, strict, conscious and consistent adherence should be recognised and rewarded. This means that we have to commit ourselves to lead, follow, solve problems and display situational awareness at all times. Indeed, it involves working hard and even taking risks, which could be daunting and also rewarding. Core issues that emanate from professionalism and responsiveness in my vision include training, regimentation, welfare, operational exigencies, logistics, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Inter-Agency Cooperation and observance of core values. We shall examine these in a little more details.

Training Training is discipline and instruction directed to the development and formation of character and acquisition of enhanced skills. Training, being a cornerstone of military professionalism underscores the importance of a sound, robust and standard engagement. The ability to be professionally responsive to any operational situation therefore depends largely on the level and type of training of a nation’s military. Therefore, my vision envisages that training in all aspects of our professional duties must be given its rightful place.

Regimentation The NA has rich customs, traditions and ethics. These translate to the high level of regimentation as witnessed in the NA from its inception up to late 1990s. Regimentation as practised during this period was built through a series of activities meant to reflect the essential elements of professionalism. These activities include drills, parades, mess life, training and recreational activities. Resuscitation of regimentation through regular conduct of parades and restoration of declining mess life amongst others are now given serious attention. Commanders at all levels are thus to ensure that orientation cadres are conducted for young soldiers and officers posted to units in order to enshrine aspects of unit regimentation early in them.

Operational Exigencies Operational exigencies are unforeseen emergencies which could disrupt and derail a Commander’s overall or original plan, if not properly managed. Our exposure in Internal Security (IS) has brought to the fore the need for detailed consideration of operational exigencies in the planning and execution of operations. This is not unconnected with the fact that response to operational exigencies is supposed to be instinctive. Therefore, my vision advocates innovative approach to prosecuting the counter-terrorism/ counter insurgency (CT/COIN) and IS operations. In fighting insurgents and other sundry criminals, the 14 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

NA has adopted the offensive posture by taking the battle to the terrorists/criminals enclaves and defeating them. Hence, response must be quick, adequate and appropriate taking into cognisance our Rules of Engagement.

CORE VALUES UNDERPINNING RESPONSE TO COAS’ VISION Core values underpinning response to COAS’ vision and values in the NA are ethics and standards which compel personnel to fulfill their professional obligations with respect and honour. The values which are implied within the pillars of my vision include loyalty, integrity, courage, knowledge, responsibility, discipline, availability and efficiency. To implement the COAS’ vision, there is no doubt that there are key challenges before us that must be overcome. These include the current complex, competitive and unpredictable security environment in which the Nigerian Army finds itself operating and may remain so for the foreseeable future. The Nigerian Army is at a turning point after a real test that seemed to have exposed so many of its frailties. Over the past seven years, the Nigerian Army had focused its resources and processes on fighting war of CT/COIN and maintaining its Peace Support Operations (PSOs) requirements. While meeting its (PSO) objectives, the achievements in CT/COIN operations have been less than desired until lately. This situation is largely attributable to inappropriate responsiveness to emerging events even when there were clear indicators.

NIGERIAN ARMY LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC EFFORTS IN REVIEWING THE NIGERIAN ARMY ORBAT It is pertinent to recall the words of General George Marshall that success at “the strategic level depends on the ability to persuade influential people and organisations, both in and out of government, to employ their efforts to accomplish a vision.” This statement is manifestly timeless and incontrovertible. To bring purposeful leadership for the NA and to actualise my vision, it became imperative to galvanise every critical element both human and material from within and outside the NA to successfully drive through strategic actions. Some of these bold strategic initiatives deserve a cursory mention or highlight here.

Efforts on Review of the NA ORBAT To achieve my vision, there are a few critical steps we adopted. The first step was looking at the professional disposition vis-à-vis our manifest constitutional responsibilities in the face of the unpredictable contemporary security landscape. It became apparent to tinker with the NA Force structure by reviewing the NA ORBAT 2010. The Nigerian Army had to begin transforming itself from a force that gradually reacts, to one that is proactive in the face of emerging events. Indeed, we brought new focus on counterinsurgency operational trends with an effective concept and flexible adaptable manner. This included the range of combat commander’s requirements as part of a Corps to deal with internal security operations and irregular warfare, deterring and defeating aggression and providing support to civil authorities, as well as, conducting humanitarian, disaster relief and other operations. Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 15

The Nigerian Army has embarked on an aggressive recruitment drive. The NA ORBAT 2010 (Revised) puts the Nigerian Army strength all rank to about 150,000. In order to address the shortfall in manpower, we have reviewed the recruitment procedure, increased the intake into Depot NA, modernised the training programme and improved the training facilities. In order to recruit trainable manpower, the Nigerian Army is making aggressive recruitment process to shore-up the NA state of manpower. Thus, the recruitment of trainable young Nigerians through a transparent procedure consistent with global best practices will enable us address the persistent manpower challenges in NA. Similarly, there was the need to re-appraise the tactics of the degraded BHT in the North East (NE) in order to address the issue of mobility in the desert terrain. In this regard, we introduced the 168 MC Bn as a novel innovation fully operational with powerful motorcycles to effectively outpace the BHT during pursuit in difficult terrains. The unit has been fully incorporated into the revised NA ORBAT and it has begun to yield positive dividends. The challenges of increased militancy, pipeline vandalism, kidnapping in the South-South have been accorded appropriate attention in the NA ORBAT by the creation of 6 Div with HQ in Port Harcourt with 2 and 16 Bdes in Uyo and Yenagoa respectively. In the same light, the ORBAT has also brought in 8 TF Div in Monguno to synergise with 7 Div in Maiduguri. On completion of CT/COIN operations, 8 TF Div will move to its location in Sokoto permanently. We have equally made a bold attempt to establish the Nigerian Army University in Biu, and efforts are ongoing to secure Presidential approval to facilitate its take off. The institution is to train service personnel to acquire adequate technical manpower that could meet up the increasing scientific needs of the NA in this Twenty-first Century.

COAS’ STRATEGIC INITIATIVES FOR THE NIGERIAN ARMY The desire to make the Nigerian Army more responsive within the imperatives of military actions demands new equipment and special training to some extent. While every soldier will not be trained for all missions, the Nigerian Army as a whole will be trained to be capable of accomplishing all the missions with which it may be tasked. To do this the Nigerian Army must re-invigorate capabilities that have declined, develop new capabilities for the changing world and adapt processes to reflect the broader range of requirements. This will require leveraging the capacity and capabilities of the entire Army including developing an active reserve force. It will also require investments and changes in generating the needed force to ensure it is organised to optimise resources, capture and implement lessons learned. Finally, operational adaptability requires appropriately managing and developing the leaders the Nigerian Army needs to face future challenges along these lines, giving the crucial role leadership plays in organisational progress and goal attainment. It is an irrefutable fact in International Relations that no nation can exist in isolation of others or remain an island to itself in the global arena no matter how wealthy, influential or powerful. It is therefore indispensable and incumbent on nations to maintain or win friendship and favourable opinion from members of the global community especially during armed conflicts. In our years of counterinsurgency operations, Nigeria has received some stringent criticisms over human rights violations by troops in the Operations Theatre particularly among powerful Western countries and the Amnesty International (AI). This resulted in frosty relationship with Nigeria leading to suspension of military support on intelligence 16 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria sharing and arms embargo from USA, UK and their Western allies. On my assumption of Command, we began to engage our foreign partners positively as well as looking into the various allegations of rights’ violations by instituting independent investigations. Also, we began to open up our BHT detention/ holding facilities for AI in line with the FG Change Agenda and global best practices. Logistics Over the years, logistics issues in the NA operations have been major challenges. Instances abound in the ongoing NE operations whereby troops ran out of ammunition and resupply was not forthcoming, lack of spares and lack of inter-operability of equipment among others, thereby leading to unnecessary casualties. The NA has been addressing this plethora of problems by ensuring sound logistics in the field through effective procurement and maintenance system. Emphasis has been placed on needs assessment, vendor evaluation, bidding and sample evaluation, professionally handled pre-shipment inspection and inclusion of life cycle maintenance, Memorandum of Understanding in contractual agreements for procurement of new equipment. Civil-Military and Inter-Agency Cooperation The nature and scope of military operations provide non-combat challenges across the entire spectrum of the theatre. This brings to the fore the significance of Civil – Military Cooperation. In training for military operations, formations and units must consider inter-agency cooperation and administration by understanding the nature of inter-agency bureaucracy as well as recognise other agency strengths and weaknesses. Cordial relationship between the NA and other security agencies must be maintained at all times. Other security agencies must be seen as partners meant to complement the efforts of the NA. The entire world has recognised and now emphasise the importance of effective synergy between every nation’s security agencies for better results. There is warning against unhealthy inter-agency rivalries. The Nigerian Army Resource Centre organised an international seminar on October 16 – 20, 2017 on “Managing Asymmetric Security Challenges in the 21st Century”, attended by 24 nations’ participants. One of the recommendations in the Seminar’s 19-point communique is that “It is imperative for security agencies to synergise their efforts. The state should therefore ensure that no distractions are generated from inter-agency rivalry. This will enhance intelligence gathering and sharing among stakeholders and better operation results”. Consequently, Commanders at all levels must take necessary steps to ensure that healthy relationship is maintained with these agencies through joint training, informal and formal contacts, social interactions and even sports among others. Currently, each formation and unit has been tasked to open a civil-military desk. Establishment of Human Rights Desk One of the fallouts of wars and troop involvement in Internal Security operations is accusation of human rights violations. The complaints range from extra judicial killings to rape, torture, illegal detentions and violations of the press amongst others. This is unavoidable as the Internet has turned the world into a global village with preponderance of social media in the society today. Owing to the incessant complaints of human rights violations being perpetrated by own troop by both the international and local communities, Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 17

I directed the immediate establishment of Human Rights Desks. Furthermore, a handbook on Human Rights was articulated to serve as a guide for personnel on code of conduct and general expectations on issues bothering on Human Rights both in conflict and peace times. Thankfully, these proactive measures and general openness have assisted immensely in curbing the ugly trend. Subsequently, reports of human rights abuses by own troops have dropped considerably.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES FOR THE NIGERIAN ARMY We recognise the timeless and evergreen words of Gen Norman Schwarzkopf that “the more you sweat in peacetime, the less you bleed in war” (2001). Obviously, Gen Schwarzkopf drew great inspiration from that Great Chinese Military philosopher and thinker, Sun Tzu (1998) who in his Art of War stated that the greatest victory is that which requires no battle and it is the acme of strategy by taking a city. Truly, that is impossible or unattainable without training. Indeed, we firmly believe that there is no substitute to training in all human endeavour particularly in the military. Thus, training has become the pivot to drive my vision towards the attainment of operational goals and objectives. We started to evaluate our training in all the combat arms training schools to increase the depth, versatility, flexibility and adaptability of our troops and units to operational exigencies. In the same vein, training at unit and formation levels (divisional training schools) became resuscitated. I have established an in-theatre training facility at Buni Yadi, to enhance in-theatre training of troop deployed for Operation LAFIYA DOLE. Many more such training interventions are on the way. In this way, individual proficiency and group effectiveness will be enhanced for the overall better performance of our troop wherever they find themselves operating. The Nigerian Army Resource Centre has been established and it is utilising some of the best brains (civilians, as well as both serving and retired military personnel) to look at the way we have been doing things and evolve new efficient methods. I strongly believe that these changes will reinvigorate the force and place the NA in a better shape to perform its constitutional roles. Tactical Matters and Induction of New Equipment As earlier mentioned, tackling the numerous security challenges in the country necessitated the deployment of multiple military task forces to combat them. While the conduct of most of the low intensity internal security operations were largely successful as the NA deployment achieved the set objectives, embarrassing setbacks were suffered initially in the battle to contain or neutralise the BHTs in the NE. Specifically, on my assumption of Command of the NA, it was realised that the situation could not be reversed through only talks, and court martials especially in the NE theatre of operations. The pre-occupation then was to reverse this trend by ensuring provision of efficient equipment, institutionalisation of regimentation and enforcement of realistic training. Therefore, in an effort to improve operational capabilities, new platforms, surveillance and communication equipment were procured and deployed into the theatre of operations. Some of these new platforms include BTR-4-APC, BMP-1 APC, T-72 MBTs, Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL), ZSU-23 mm-4m Shilka, other artillery systems and several engineer equipment including mine sweepers. Furthermore, Mine Resistance Anti- Personnel Vehicles (MRAPS) and gun trucks which are basically Toyota Bufallo or 4x4 jeeps fitted with heavy machine guns mounted were introduced and modern platoon and long range mortar tubes were 18 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria acquired. In a bid to always obtain accurate information of the BHT locations and dispositions, a UAV unit was created with sophisticated aerial surveillance systems and drones were purchased for the frontline units. Furthermore, plans have reached an advanced stage to deploy Army Aviation assets and an additional Explosive Ordnance Device (EOD) regiment with Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) capabilities to counter the demoralising danger posed by IEDs planted by the terrorists. These new tactical and innovative introductions proved to be game changers in the fight against insurgency and led to the degradation and roll back of the BHT. However, mention must be made that as most of these equipment were new in the NA inventory or Table of Equipment (TOE), there was the need to ensure that personnel and crewmen were hurriedly trained to man them. To this end, training of personnel both at home and abroad, in the operations and maintenance of the equipment, were given priority. Special Forces training was equally intensified in a bid to best maximise the effects of these platforms in the conduct of operations. It can be said with all confidence and truthfulness that today the pride and image of the NA have been restored, both in the eyes of the international community and Nigerians alike. Welfare of Personnel This COAS’ office inherited an Army that was virtually operating in a rapidly changing environment which was volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Therefore, steps were immediately put in place to foster espirit-de-corps, well-being of personnel, regimentation and professionalism which were envisaged as panaceas to returning the force in good state to deal with the myriad of security challenges inherent in the country. Many welfare initiatives have been introduced in order to boost troops’ morale for enhanced professionalism in the NA. Review of School Fees in NA Command Schools The NA Command Schools were established to provide affordable quality education to children and wards of military officers, soldiers and selected civilians. The rehabilitation of Command Secondary Schools in order to reposition them to render qualitative education to the children of service personnel has been given priority. On my assumption of office, it was observed that most Command Schools were in a state of disrepair and disrepute. This was generally attributed to poor management over the years. Consequently, I ordered a downward review of school fees in order to lessen the financial burden faced by personnel towards the education of their children/wards. Thus, the review of the school fees was intended to make education affordable to children/wards of service personnel thereby boosting school enrollment in the NA barracks. Kitting On kitting, I have equally taken measures to systematically ensure that all personnel are adequately kitted. Thus, kitting of NA personnel has received an unprecedented major boost in recent times. Personnel of units earmarked for PSOs are now well kitted ahead of induction into mission area, which hitherto, was not the case. Additionally, all troop in the NE operational theatre are now well kitted uniformly in NA desert camouflage, while the systematic kitting of the rest of the formations is in progress. Nigerian Army Leadership Vision and Envisioning 19

This systematic approach to kitting of personnel was hitherto not the case. In the same vein, AHQ has banned the use of any camouflage uniforms other than the approved ones. Accommodation for NA Personnel Provision of decent accommodation for NA personnel has been a perennial challenge. The situation has become more pronounced as the strength of the NA has increased over the years. Added to the problem is that most barracks were constructed a long time ago and have suffered poor maintenance and are consequently in varying degrees of dilapidation. In order to address the accommodation problem, I have embarked on the enormous task of constructing new accommodation blocks and also rehabilitating the old structures in some instances. Barracks Investment Initiative Programme I wish to state that my pet project as COAS is the Barracks Investment Initiative Programme (BIIP), which is another vital policy I initiated to enhance the welfare and morale of troop. The target participants include officers, soldiers, their wives (barracks women) and dependant youths. The essential focus of the BIIP is to ensure that dependants of personnel in the barracks engage in agro-allied businesses which are suitable and viable within their local environments. This is expected to enhance income of their families and possibly reduce social vices and criminality in the barracks. The structure of the programme is based on the establishment of agric-related ventures by participants organised in cooperative associations or groups for ease of administration and monitoring. Indeed, a lot of our families are benefitting from this laudable initiative. Weight Control Policy for the Nigerian Army Considering the well-being of NA personnel, the implementation of the NA Weight Control Policy (NAWCP) has been approved by the COAS’ office. This is in a bid to check the tendency for some personnel to take their appearances for granted. This control policy is based on Body Fat Measurement (BFM) which takes into consideration the weight, height, abdomen and neck measurements for males while that of females include hips, forearm, neck and wrist measurements. The objective is to ensure a medically, mentally and physically fit NA that will not only portray a positive image to the populace but also be in good shape to execute assigned responsibilities promptly internally and externally. Improving Feedback Mechanism Considering the conscious and consistent efforts to enlighten officers and men on my vision and activities as well as directives from AHQ, it became imperative that an efficient feedback mechanism be put in place. This mechanism permits the flow of information downwards and upwards, thereby gauging the pulse of the personnel as relating to the new policies. Operational commanders at all levels must note that feedbacks are to be compiled in the form of reports or briefs and forwarded to appropriate headquarters for review and further action. Therefore, the feedback mechanism should be seen as a tool for reinforcing and balancing directives or policies and not an instrument for democratic debate. 20 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Envisioning the Future Perspectives for the Nigerian Army The past two years have been spent pondering on the future of the Nigerian Army as a critical national institution. At no other time than now has this nation come to depend on us men and women in uniform to rise to the occasion and champion the cause of unity, peace and stability of our dear country. Whatever the future portends, the Nigerian Army will not be distracted from its primary purpose of discharging its constitutional role in the defence of Nigeria and its people. We would do all in our powers to defeat all forms of external aggression, maintain our territorial integrity and safeguard our democracy. As we look to the future, our key priorities would be to maintain all-round operational readiness through improved training, modernisation of equipment, better welfare for troops and encouragement of innovation. These measures when diligently pursued would better equip and position the NA to take on present and future challenges. For a start, we will immediately begin the phased implementation of our revised ORBAT in order to enhance our posture to adequately respond to threats. This would go hand- in-hand with doctrinal review, and development of new strategies to perform our constitutional mandate. To maintain robust and constant liaison with the Nigerian populace, the Nigerian Army Information Call Centre (NAICC) recently established would provide platform to solicit for timely information and cooperation from Nigerians. This NAICC would enhance the existing quick response mechanisms throughout the NA fmn/units in order to sustain the tempo of operational activities against contemporary threats besetting the nation.

CONCLUSION The leadership position that nature has bestowed on Nigeria in the West African sub-region, and indeed in Africa as a whole, has thrust upon us the additional responsibilities to pursue peace, security and stability in the region. This burden cannot be ignored or wished away. Therefore, our military, particularly the Nigerian Army will continue to be strong and virile to meet our internal and external security challenges. The current security challenges demand the commitment of everyone in order to guarantee our collective well-being.

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Hodges R.M (1977), Introduction to Business, London, Addison Wesley. Kagan N. (2014), How I Lost 170 Million Dollars: My Times as #30 At Facebook, www.lioncrest. com:Lion Crest Publishing. Keating C (1982), The Leadership Book, New York, Paulist Press. Lippet G. (1990) “Leadership: A Performing Art in a Complex Society” in R Lester and A Morton (eds), Concepts for Air Force Leadership, Alabama Air University. Massie J. (1987), Essentials of Management, New Jersey. Montgomery of Alamein, Field Marshal the Viscount, (1958) Memoirs, London, Collins. Nanus, B. (1995), Visionary Leadership: California Jossey Bass Inc. Newman, B. (1993), The Ten Laws of Leadership, BNC Publications. Nwolise OBC and Ohaemesi GRA (2001), The Essence of Political Leadership, Ibadan CODAT Publications. Obiakor C.I (2007) “The Span of Command and Leadership in the Military” in Alex Ogomudia, Peace Support Operations, Command and Professionalism: Challenges for The in the 21st Century and Beyond, Ibadan, Gold Press Ltd. Ogunsanwo A (1986), Our Friends, Their Friends: Nigeria’s External Relations 1960 – 1985 Alfa Communications. Pigors Paul (1935), Leadership or Domination, Boston, Hugoton. Roberts, C. (n.d.), Characteristics of Visionary Leadership (Available at http://yourbusiness.azcentral. com/characteristics-visionary-leadership. Accessed 19 February, 2018. Saone’s C (2001), Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Schwarzkopf (2001), “Armed Forces Epitomise Leadership and Sacrifice”, National Real Estate Investor, Matt Valley, December 01. (http://www.nreionline.com/mag/gen-schwarzkopf-armed-forces- epitomize-leadership-and-sacrifice. Sinex, S. (2011), Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to take Action, London, Penguin Books. Sinex, S. (2014), Leaders Eat Last: Why Some Teams Pull Together and Others Don’t, New York, Penguin Books. Tzu Sun (1988), The Art of War (Thomas Cleary Translations) London, Shambhala. Valley, M. (2001), Gen. Schwarzkopf: Armed Forces Epitomise Leadership and Sacrifice (Available at http://www.nreionline.com/print/4432, Accessed 19 February, 2018). The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

THE ROLE OF NARCOTICS IN TERRORISM, INSURGENCY AND CRIME: THE NORTH EAST BOKO HARAM WAR IN FOCUS

by

Major General AG Okunlola (rtd) Former Commandant Army War College Nigeria, Abuja

ABSTRACT

A lot of the activities, war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out during terrorism, and insurgencies are executed under the influence of hard drugs such as cocaine, and Indian hemp. Children, especially are placed on hard drugs to be “charged” or “stoned” to go into battle, and or to rape, kill, maim and burn without qualms as the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil war experiences show. This paper interrogates the role of hard drugs in the Boko Haram terrorism, Insurgency and Crimes in the North East of Nigeria. It concludes that for the war on terror to succeed in good time, it must proceed paripassu with war against narcotics in the Area of Operation.

Key words: Role, Narcotics, Terrorism, North-East, Boko Haram.

INTRODUCTION A lot of the bizarre atrocities, war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated during terrorism, and insurgencies are often attributed to radicalisation processes that so convince the adherents of the justified nature of their cause that in their extreme violent frenzy, they can do any evil. However emerging facts are pointing to the contrary. The role of narcotics (hard drugs) and spiritual influences in these atrocities are becoming more glaring. In the Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Ugandan civil wars, hard drugs and spiritual manipulations played serious roles. In the case of narcotics, the confessions and case of a small boy known as O.J. of the Small Boys Unit in the Liberian civil war is typical (Nwolise, 2007, 104 – 165,

22 The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 23 from Omotoso, 1997). O.J. was in the primary school when the civil war broke out in Liberia in 1989, at which time, he was barely eleven years old. The risks spread everywhere, and the socio-economic hardship generated by the war forced him to join the rebel army in 1990 as a survival strategy. On entry at the age of twelve years, he was deployed to the Small Boys Unit and was introduced to hard drugs without delay to enable him operate, beginning with Indian hemp (“Joint”), and later “Blue pill” which is an amphetamine. He was made to smoke one big wrap (“family mold”) of Indian hemp in the morning, one in the afternoon, and one in the night. In between, hot drinks and blue pill were added to his hard drugs menu. One day, the rebels wanted to execute two men whom bullets could not penetrate as they were believed to have “African insurance” (anti-bullet immunisation). The alternative was either to kill them with a knife or through strangulation. Little O.J. who was placed high on hard drugs (“well stoned”) was ordered to execute the two men with a knife, and he did it very easily. He was later to confess that in his days in the rebel army, he killed many people on the orders of his superiors, and killed several others on his own for the fun of it. He also raped several women, girls and children, all under the influence of hard drugs. In 1992, he was moved from the Small Boys Unit to the Alligator Battalion, and the killing, maiming and raping continued. In 1993, he was debriefed, his eyes cleared and he ran away from the rebel army with the help of an Irish Non-Governmental Organisation named DONBOSCO which is specialised in the rehabilitation of former child-soldiers, child-prostitutes, and war victims. For long after O.J. was weaned from war and atrocities, he could not sleep, because each time he lied down and closed his eyes to sleep, he saw men chasing him with big knives and he woke up screaming. Thus, several children and personnel involved in terrorism, and insurgencies, in which they perpetrate all forms of atrocities, are high on narcotics. Olukolade (2015: 376) alluded to the role of drugs in crimes in his reference to Mexico under the siege of hard drugs where many citizens are kidnapped and or murdered daily. In his words:

In Iguala, Mexico, about 43 students were kidnapped from school by Police Officers under the command of a city leader who apparently also moonlights as an organised crime leader. This incident is the continuing narrative of a nation under the siege of drugs and organised crime cartels and in which tens of thousands of people have been brutally murdered.

The school shootings in classrooms and “lone wolf” terrorist phenomena in some (West) European nations are believed to be aided by narcotics consumption. Even most common criminals such as armed robbers, kidnappers, cross-border bandits, car snatchers, and rapists are always “stoned” or “high on drugs” before going into operation. In the area of spiritual influence, studies by Nwolise as collaborated by media reports of confessions made by arrested and repentant suicide bombers in Nigeria show that some of these boys and girls operate under the influence of hypnotism. As Nwolise (2015:4) noted: 24 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

There has been adequate evidence that some of the suicide bombers used by Boko Haram in their bombing of soft targets (churches, mosques, markets, schools, recreation centres, etc) are hypnotised.

The spiritual book of the Boko Haram called GUDUMA (Gana, 2017) found by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps in 2016 in an abandoned Boko Haram camp in a local government area of Borno State is believed to be one of the sources of their (Boko Haram) charm industry and hypnotising capacities.

Objective and Rationale It is clear that terrorists and insurgents in their fearless and ferocious attacks against military forces, as well as in committing atrocities and crimes in conflict areas are often under the influence of drugs. Our task in this modest piece is to examine the role of narcotics in the Boko Haram war against the Nigerian people, military and state in the North East. The rationale for this intellectual enterprise is not far- fetched. One, if as it is now known, narcotics play crucial role in enhancing terrorism and insurgency, it means that for any counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency operation to succeed in good time, the war on terror must be waged pari-passu with war against hard drugs in the area of operation. It also means that the drugs supply sources and routes to the adversary must be located through effective intelligence and knocked off. Two, the point must be made, and made loudly in the society that placing children on drugs and making them to kill themselves and others, or commit war crimes and crimes against humanity such as rape, murder, and torture is not only the apogee of human wickedness but also savagery. In this wise, humanity needs to remind itself of Ferguson’s (2001:1) solemn words which hold that “civilisation defines itself in opposition to savagery”. Three, the possible use of children or adults placed on drugs or hypnotism by terrorists and insurgents for suicide bombing missions raise moral issues for society that need to be addressed. Definitely, such persons cannot be said in all honesty to be fully conscious of what they are doing. This is dilemma for law enforcement. The situation thus places a burden on parents, school authorities, and law enforcement agents, and everyone in affected areas to be vigilant against abductions, kidnapping, and movement of hypnotised persons. Four, there is need for massive public education, enlightenment and mobilisation against the use and sale of hard drugs in the area of operation and surrounding environs. People and law enforcement officials must watch out for “joints” and dark alleys, as well as drug barons and hawkers in the conflict area particularly and the nation generally. This is as relevant for Nigeria as it is for the entire world especially nations such as Somalia, Kenya, Mali, USA, UK, India, etc that are combating terrorism and or insurgency. The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 25

Theoretical Framework Many researchers on terrorism and or insurgency have based their works on the Frustration – Aggression theory associated with Dollard, et al (1939). The theory stipulates that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” and as such, individuals become aggressive when their life aspirations and ambitions are frustrated. The question is, the people that are hypnotised from the streets or homes, as well as those who are coerced and or drugged and pushed into terrorist acts such as suicide bombing, can they in all good conscience be said to be aggressive out of frustration? The answer is obviously No. The thesis from this response therefore is that although Frustration – Aggression theory can explain some cases of entry into terrorism e.g. as a result of poverty, unemployment, etc, it cannot explain all cases of terrorism and insurgency. Hard drugs or narcotics play serious role even in the recruitment of members. Hypnotism also has a role to play as has been argued by Nwolise (2015). Hard drugs particularly are responsible for a large part of these atrocities, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS Key concepts in this paper require clear definitions to ensure better understanding and appreciation of its content. They include terrorism, insurgency, national security and narcotics. a. Terrorism Terrorism is a controversial and emotion-laden word, and therefore has no universally accepted one definition. Instead it is said that “One man’s terrorist is another man‘s freedom fighter”. This notwithstanding, we shall present some definitions. Laquer (quoted in Kegley 2007:429) conceptualise terrorism as: The use or threat of violence as a method of combat or a strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian means. The United Nations perceives terrorism as “an anxiety inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination, the direct targets of violence are not the main targets (quoted in Okpara, 2013:227). This paper will adopt the definition given by Schmid (2012:158) which is regarded as the revised academic consensus on the concept of terrorism given as:

…..a special form or tactics of fear-generating, coercive political violence and on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct, violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audience and conflict parties. 26 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria b. Insurgency Insurgency is commonly understood as an organised armed insurrection aimed at weakening, delegitimising and overthrowing a sitting government in order to introduce a new social or political order. As Osakwe and Umoh noted, insurgency is:

….a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups seek to overthrow or fundamentally change the political or social order in a state or region through the use of sustained violence, subversion, social disruption and political action.

Terrorism and insurgency are not mutually exclusive war tactics or strategies. They are both low intensity warfare elements and can go together. In fact, Boko Haram used a combination of terrorism and insurgency in the North East. The move to capture and hold territory which they made for several months hoisting their flag and declaring caliphate system in captured areas was an insurgency operation. In all the local Government Areas they occupied, they sacked the legitimate local government councils, and imposed their type of administration based on the caliphate system. c. National Security Every terrorist and insurgency action is a threat to national security; and all counter-terrorism and counter- insurgency operations are aimed at restoring or ensuring national security. Throughout the cold war era, national security was perceived in terms of state security. That is, the protection of the state through fearful amassment of strategic weapons and military personnel. Thus scholars such as Morgenthau (1960) defined national security from the angle of protecting the integrity of the national territory as well as its institutions. The successful terrorist attacks against USA on September 11 2001 with bare hands, as well as the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 both without arms or war changed the basing of national security on awesome arms. Today, national security is seen more from the prism of human security – the safety and welfare of human beings, the respect of human rights and others. McNamara’s linkage of security and development which was neglected since 1968 now has meaning. He had asserted:

Security is not military hardware, though it may include it. Security is not military force, though it may involve it. Security is not traditional military activity though it may encompass it. Security is development, and without development there can be no security (McNamara, 1968; 149).

The issue is that nations that experience unemployment, food shortages, injustices, poverty and other forms of socio-economic hardship cannot be secure. Terrorism and insurgency will find ready and easy recruits in such nations. It is here that Nwolise’s (2009: 263) conception of national security becomes instructive. In his words, national security is: The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 27

The prevalence in a nation, through conscious and adequate strategic planning, actions, and coordination of all vital sectors, of conditions of law, justice, peace, order, safety and economic well-being in such preponderance as to effectively neutralise the internal harbingers of fear ,want, violence and disintegration, as well as contain the external harbingers of aggression, subjugation and plunder.

Today, the concept of national security has expanded vertically and horizontally to accommodate several more variables instead of just one variable (state security). Vertically, national security now encapsulates the security of the individual, group (family, ethnic, religious), state, and the world. Horizontally, national security now accommodates political security, military security, economic security, societal security, and environmental security as identified by Buzan (1990: 7). Nwolise (2009: 267) also added ten more dimensions of national security as he saw Buzan’s list as too narrow and eurocentric: the ten new dimensions are: • Physical Security • Psychological Security • Technological Security • Spiritual Security • Territorial Security • Legal Security • Treasury Security • People’s Power Security • Image Security, and • Global Security

This study adopts Nwolise’s conception of national security as it is more encompassing. The intrusion of narcotics or hard drugs in warfare-terrorism, insurgency and associated crimes exacerbates the destruction of lives, properties and infrastructure, and these are threats to national security. d. Narcotics From Greek root “narkotikos’’, the word narcotics represents addictive drugs that possess the capacity to affect the mood or behaviour of an individual (Soanes, 2005). Examples of narcotics are hard drugs such as opium, Lysergic Acid Dethylamide, cocaine, heroin, Ecstasy, Methamphetamine, and Indian hemp. Marsh et al (2003) informs us that a drug is any chemical which if swallowed, breathed in, injected or consumed in any other way can affect the human body or mind. 28 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

USERS OF NARCOTICS In war theatres, terrorism and insurgencies, both adults and children use or are made to use narcotics. It is however more pronounced in children for obvious reasons (which are discussed in the next section below) especially those used in suicide bombing. Traces of hard drugs, especially Indian hemp and cocaine were seen in several sacked or hurriedly abandoned Boko Haram camps. Militants also use narcotics. Armed robbers are particularly friendly users of Indian hemp, before going on operations. They use cocaine mainly when they relax over booze, merriment and women after operations. Sea pirates and sea robbers, kidnappers, abductors and hostage takers are also on the narcotics bandwagon. Cultists in the streets and schools ride high on narcotics to be “high’’ especially before embarking on cult wars. Cross-border bandits and smugglers of various categories, as well as many traffickers of arms, drugs and human beings also patronise narcotics. In motor parks, careful nosing around reveal oozing odour of Indian hemp. Some artists who suffer from stage fright (musicians, drama actors etc) also belong. Sales boys and girls who dance ajasco and kokoma, on vehicles, and in the streets to advertise company products also get heavily “stoned” in order to perform well and earn more money. Some long distance drivers take hot drinks or hemp before taking off to “Shine” or “Clear” their eyes so that they can “see well” on the highway. The new additions to the list are boys and girls who shout out to attract customers to see and buy second hand clothes and shoes along streets and roads.

EFFECTS OF HARD DRUGS Hard drugs as heroin and opium have sedative effects, and slow down the way the body and brain of the user functions. This can also result in numbing effects which give rise to drowsiness (Marsh et al, 2003), making the user to lose power of effective mental coordination. Drugs such as amphetamine, cocaine, caffeine, nicotine, crack, and ecstasy are capable of generating stimulant effects, and make the user to be hyper alert because the drugs increase brain activity. Cannabis (hemp), magic mushrooms, and Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) have hallucinogenic effects on users and alter the way they feel, perceive or see, hear, taste or smell. This is because they work on the Central Nervous System, and affect the users’ thinking, mood, and action (Robins, 1995:12-13, Wikipedia, the true encyclopaedia). These can lead to erratic and very destructive actions. Some hard drugs such as cannabis have depressive, hallucinogenic and stimulant properties. No wonder it is very popular with common violent criminals such as armed robbers and kidnappers. It is also the most used narcotic by fighters, terrorists, insurgents, and other irregular personnel.

ROLE OF NARCOTICS AMONG TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS Hard drugs play various roles for their various users. However, our task here is to interrogate their roles in terrorism, insurgency and associated crimes. These roles include: The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 29 a. Extricates sense of fear, and emboldens action Hard drugs remove the sense of fear in fighters and embolden them for violent action. It was the historical Buddha that once asserted that, “conflict would cease if we would be aware of our own death’’ (quoted in Tzu, 2005 ii). This expression captures the “locus classicus” of fear in all war situations. The superiors or bosses, know fully well that human beings are afraid to die no matter the amount of money they are paid. As a result, hard drugs are brought in to “kill” the sense of fear. Thus when they are consumed, and the fighters are adequately “charged’’ or “stoned’’, the sense of fear disappears, and when in combat, they charge at the opponents as if there is no death. This idea of “killing” fear, is the most important role of narcotics in terrorism, insurgency, and other forms of warfare. Drugs play the same role when a vehicle is loaded with explosives, and one or more people are ordered to drive it to a location and explode it. The way and manner Boko Haram terrorists were charging at our troops in the North East during the battles over territory were not products of only weapons and radicalisation into violent extremism. Hard drugs were also in operation. b. Deadening the sense of guilt Hard drugs deaden the sense of guilt in their users in conflict situations. This is why child-soldiers are placed high on drugs or “stoned’’ on Indian hemp before they are ordered to murder or execute people with a knife. To shoot a rifle or pistol, in order to kill someone is a much easier thing to do, than to slaughter a human being like a chicken, goat or cow. It takes guts to do this. The guts are generated by hard drugs. It is in the same way a child will be strapped with explosives and told to go to the midst of several people and detonate such explosives and kill the people. The inhuman act of raping little girls or boys and old women as well as killing one’s neighbours or even own family members by a terrorist, insurgent or criminal is also made easy and guiltless by hard drugs. Radicalisation alone cannot explain the glee and ease with which Boko Haram members slashed people’s throats, dumped living human beings into deep wells, and massacred hundreds of innocent people in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno states and other areas. c. Loss of sense of humanity and morality Hard drugs make the users lose their sense of morality and humanity. This is why it is easy for some men to rape their daughters and some cultists to rape old women of 90 years of age and above as happened at Opi, Nsukka, in a few years back. In the same way, terrorists and insurgents high on drugs can massacre, maim, rape, burn houses, derail trains, or shoot down or crash planes loaded with civilian passengers without qualms. Once they are high on drugs or completely “stoned’’, they join Nietzche (German philosopher quoted in Onwu 1986) in screaming that “God was dead”. The type of atrocities Boko Haram terrorists committed and still commit in the North East do not portray them as people who believe in Allah (SWT) at all. This is why real Muslims do not regard them as fighting for Allah (SWT) or Islam. 30 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria d. Removes sense of shame The influence of hard drugs can make a person go naked in the street without shame. It is in this way that a terrorist, insurgent, or even a robber can rape a woman with several eyes around him. e. Makes subordinates susceptible to higher control Once a subordinate is well “stoned’’, his boss or superior finds him easier to command and control. In that state, he can be ordered to kill his own mother and he will readily and easily do it without qualms or question. f. Ability to do things one would not have done Hard drugs render the user capable of doing things he or she would not do under normal circumstances. This is because the sense of judgement has been tampered with. g. False sense of superiority Hard drugs imbue the user with a false sense of superiority against his or her victims in a conflict theatre. Once high on drugs or well “stoned’’ on Indian hemp, the user sees any human being on the other side as a mere ant or animal worthy of being wasted. h. Makes recruitment easier Youths or children to be recruited into the fold of terrorists, insurgents or criminals are gradually and secretly introduced to hard drugs. When under the influence of drugs, a youth would accept without critical thinking options and actions proposed to him or her. In the North East, Boko Haram used many tricks to recruit. Apart from abduction, and radicalisation, spiritual influences were also used. At a point, eating of date palm became a no go area for many. In fact, a youth corp member who visited Yobe and Adamawa states told me that the first warning he was given on arrival in was never to accept or eat date palm from anybody as it was tool of hypnotism. Drugs were also in the terrorists’ kitty.

CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD There is no doubt at all that narcotics play very serious role in terrorism, insurgency and associated crimes and activities. It is very handy in the recruitment, use and misuse of child soldiers, and suicide bombers. Thus, the war against terror can hardly be won without winning the war against narcotics in the area of operation. These truisms make the following recommendations imperative. One, all counter- terrorism, and counter-insurgency operations need to be accompanied by anti-narcotics operations in the war theatre and its environs. When there are no hard drugs, the terrorists or insurgents will be less daring, and less deadly. All routes and sources of supply of hard drugs to the terrorists and insurgents must be found out through joint effective intelligence and blocked. All local joints and dark alleys associated with drugs must be put out of service. The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 31

Two, there must be massive public education, enlightenment and mobilisation about the deadly effects of hard drugs and for vigilance against the supply, hawking acceptance and consumption of hard drugs especially by youths and children. Whistle blowers can be used in the battle to track down the local and external drug barons and hawkers. Three, the forests in and around the area of operation have to be searched for hemp farms, and once found, they have to be destroyed. Four, all arrested suicide bombers and those who surrendered voluntarily should be thoroughly investigated to find out those who were innocently pulled into terrorism with drugs, and to be treated accordingly. Such youths or children are victims of aggression rather than being aggressors and need rehabilitation if they have been held for long by the adversaries. Finally, it must be noted that war against hard drugs or narcotics is like war against the Boko Haram or corruption. It will take courage, political will, resources, and effective strategy, because the drug barons will fight back. In Colombia, the government of President Barco fought the coke princes with determination, and they also fought him, the government and the nation. From August to December 1989 for example, the government made 497 arrests, and confiscated weapons and properties worth $250 million. The coke princes in their reaction killed 187 civilians and government officials. They carried out 265 bombardments that damaged property worth over $500 million. Earlier in 1986, a half ton bomb was exploded outside a government office building in Bogota killing 52 people on the spot. It simply means that the coke princes themselves are also terrorists and as such must be configured into the counter-terrorism equation (Nwolise, 2005: 14). As TIME magazine noted, at the period:

In his offensive against the coke princes, President Barco has dented the drug pipeline, but hardly destroyed it. The barons lashed back by terrorising the innocent. (quoted in Nwolise, 2005; 14).

Drug barons are usually powerful and well connected. But they have moral burden in their hearts and the blood of innocents in their hands. Their power and connection will not deter a well-coordinated war against hard drugs in Nigeria and other nations currently facing terrorism and insurgency. The Boko Haram used and still uses hard drugs in the North East along with spiritual influence to recruit and launch terrorists into war, suicide bombing, and other atrocities associated with them. Knocking off the sources, routes, and dark alleys of these drugs supplies and consumption must go on pari-passu with the North East counter-terrorism and counter - insurgency operations if the war is to be won with finality and in good time.

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Gana Muhammadu, (2017), “The place of NSCDC in National Security: The Role Played in the fight against Boko Haram, Cattle Rustling , Farmers/Herdsmen Conflict, Kidnapping and the Best way to Achieve Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination of Operation”, Paper presented at the Army War College Nigeria, July 2017. Kegley W. (2007), World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Belmont Thomson Learning Inc. Marsh P. et al (2003), “Attachment, Autonomy and Multifinality in Adolescent Internalising and Risky Behaviour:, Symptoms Development Psychopathol, 15. McNamara R (1968), The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York, Harper and Row. Morgenthau Hans (1960), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York. Nwolise OBC, (2007),’’ Perspectives on Africa’s Code of Honour in Relation to Conflict Theatres in the Continent’’, The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal, Vol. 3. No 2, June. Nwolise OBC (2015),’’ Motion for Serious Focus of Research on The Spiritual Dimension of Human and National Security’’, in Studies in Politics and Society, (Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association) Vol 3, No 1, December. Nwolise OBC (2009), “Peace and Security”, in Isaac O Albert, (ed). Praxis of Political Concepts and Clichés in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Ibadan, Bookcraft. Nwolise OBC (2005),’’ Terrorism: What is to be Done About an Emerging Threat to Democracy, Good Governance, Development and Security of Nations in the 21st Century?’’, Special Research, Issue Vol. 1., Ibadan, French Institute for Africa Research. Okpara E. (2013), ‘’ Militancy, Terrorism and The Nigerian State’’, in Mbachu O. and Bature U (ed), Internal Security Management in Nigeria, Kaduna, Medusa Academic Pub. Ltd. Olukolade Chris, (2005), Issues in the Mobilisation of Public Support for Military Operation in Nigeria, Ibadan, Gold Press Ltd. Omotoso Kole (1997), “Who Murdered Little OJ’s Sleep?’’, Woga Africa! Music Goes To War, Johannesburg, Ball Publishers. Onwu N. (1986),’’ Religion and National Unity in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects”. The Nigerian Journal of Social Studies, Vol. 3 No 1, October. Osakwe C. and Umoh U.E (2013), “The Military and Counter Insurgency Operations in Nigeria’’, in Mbachu O. and Bature U (eds), Internal Security Management in Nigeria, Kaduna, Medusa Academic Pub Ltd. Robins L.N (1995), “The Natural History of Substance Use as a Guide to Setting Drug Policy”, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 85 No 1. The Role of Narcotics in Terrorism, Insurgency and Crime: The North East Boko Haram War in Focus 33

Schmid A.P (2012), “The Revised Academic Consensus Definition on Terrorism”, Perspectives On Terrorism, Vol. 2, No. 2. Soanes C (2005), Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Tzu Sun (2005), The Art of War, (Thomas Cleary’s Translation) London, Shambhala. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April, 2018

CONFLICT RESOLUTION SPECTRUM: NEGOTIATION BY BARGAINING IN INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

by

Maj. Gen. JGS Hamakim Director General Nigerian Army Resource Centre Abuja

ABSTRACT

Conflict is a concomitant phenomenon of human interaction, and therefore inevitable. However, conflict does not have to be violent, and, the best option is to prevent any conflict from becoming violent. Where violence however breaks out, it is necessary to bring it quickly to an end through negotiation which involves bargaining. This paper discusses some tested techniques of conflict resolution through non-violent processes as alternative to military force.

Key words: Conflict resolution, Negotiation, Bargaining, Management.

INTRODUCTION In every sphere of human endeavour, conflicts are unavoidable; be it at a global, continental, national, group, or individual basis. According to Nwolise (2004), a careful study of human history reveals that conflict has been humanity’s unending affliction and this should be a cause of concern to all. Conflict is endemic to human society and often occurs between and among individuals and groups hence its management is important for human peaceful coexistence. Historically and indeed religiously, there abound references to conflicts and conflict management in human society as conflicts have been recorded from the very early days of humankind. For instance, we find in religious books, accounts of conflicts

34 Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 35 that were resolved by various processes which include negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. We also find accounts of various types of negotiations; between animals and humans, between two persons, between an individual and a group, between two groups or between two states. According to Elaigwu (2012), conflict is the spice of every state as it tests the fragility or otherwise of the state and creates the basis of future amelioration or adjustments. However, conflicts beyond certain thresholds are detrimental to the very survival of the state, precisely because they threaten the consensual basis of the association. Conflicts which emanate from the non-recognition of the claims of others to issues of conflict could be very dangerous for the system. Such conflicts, mobilise total loyalties of the people and tend to defy all attempts at affecting desirable compromises, especially if the conflicts are over values. On the other hand, conflicts which result from the nature of resource distribution are less dangerous to the survival of the state. Since the claims of others are recognised in this case, this form of conflict is less dangerous to the process of nation-building than those which totally exclude the claims of others (Elaigwu, 2012). Indeed, the end of the cold war has turned attention, among others, to two related issues; intra-state conflict as well as insecurity within nations especially the developing ones. Both connote an increasing lack of peaceful situation. Undoubtedly, the term “peace” has come to be very important to all peoples in all parts of the world, with every one giving it his/her own definition and meaning, depending on which side of the political divide he/she belongs or empathises with. The need to return to status quo as far as peace is concerned is therefore germane for continuous human existence. For this to happen, we can therefore reasonably assert that conflict resolution and negotiation are inseparable and thus infer that the reality of life and existence is that peace is not given by mere asking but a desire of all and for all, which often is a result of an effective negotiation process. Peace is relatively a function of how conflict situation is handled; therefore mankind requires commonly tested and trusted techniques of peace path, conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution through effective negotiation. Successful negotiation requires compromise from both sides that must gain something and lose something. One must be able to give part of something up which one believes one is entitled to for peace to reign (Tanford, 2000). Conflict is a phenomenal product of clash of interests between one or two parties that may be individuals, groups, states or a collection of any of these (Nwolise, 2004). According to Coser (1956), conflict is a struggle over values and claims of scarce resources (political power, raw materials, etc) in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals. In this struggle or conscious operation, each party mobilises energy to obtain the goal at stake or desired object, perceiving the other as a barrier or threat to that goal (Stagner, 1967). The means employed and the extent to which the parties are ready to go in the struggle depend on the value attached to the goal or object and the resources available. At times, violence is introduced, but conflict need not necessarily be violent. According to psychologists, whatever its specific nature, conflict arises basically from the deep-rooted socio-economic struggles, contradictions, distortions, misperceptions, frustrations and unattainable goals. In whatever form that conflict presents itself, the need to resolve it before it escalates into something unpalatable cannot be overemphasised. This feat can only be achieved by following some principles to arrive at a desired or “close to a desired” outcome, using the Integrated Conflict Management Framework as a platform in achieving relative peace. One cannot however expect to defeat his/her opponent or win 36 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria a negotiation by either the power of negotiating skills or the compelling force of one’s logic. This is not to say that good negotiating ability is irrelevant. In most cases, a range of possible outcomes exists. A skilled negotiator often can achieve a settlement near top of the range. Preparation for negotiation means hard work. Intensive preparation will however not guarantee success but it is essential to it. Preparation for negotiation can be viewed as following an orderly and structured process and it can be systematised and segmented into series of logical steps, each of which inter-relates with the other. The objective of this paper is to discuss some commonly tested and trusted techniques of conflict resolution through non-violent processes rather than military force.

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION Conflict Conflict from its Latin root “conflictus” means ”clash” – clash of views, opinions, interests or forces. When forces clash, it becomes war. Coser (quoted in Nwolise, 2004:1) perceives conflict as: “…a struggle over and claims to scarce resources in which the aims of opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals”. While we agree that conflict is a struggle, not all conflicts are violent and leading to injury and elimination of opponents. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf (1981:81) see conflict not necessarily as a struggle but a condition. In their words conflict is:

... a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings…is engaged in conscious opposition to one or more other identifiable groups because these groups are pursuing what are or appear to be incompatible goals.

In focusing on the sources of conflict, Stedman (1991:368) asserts that:

...conflict arises from problems basic to all populations, the tugs and pulls of different identities, the differential distribution of resources and access to power, and competing definitions of what is right, fair, and just.

CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION It is important to note that every plural society experiences one form of conflict or another. If properly managed before they escalate into wider crises dimensions, conflicts may be beneficial. This implies that under normal circumstances, conflicts are supposed to be avenue for growth and development rather than routes to battle grounds (Covey, 2011). Thus, when conflicts become aggravated due to poor management, it is perceived as abnormal, dysfunctional and therefore detestable. Conflict needs not follow a negative course if properly addressed, and can transform into an agent of growth and development Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 37 for all concerned parties. As Burton (1987:137-138) argued, conflict “is an essential creative element in human relationship. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values of welfare, security, justice, and opportunities for personal development can be achieved...”. Efforts should therefore be made not to demonise this phenomenon but to confront it in an efficient way through negotiation and bargaining {where applicable} (Lugga, 2016).The prevalence of conflict all over the world within the last few decades has prompted a lot of scholarly works in conflict management. Available literature in this regard is aimed at understanding the nature of conflict, identifying its causes and proffering solutions. These are aimed at its proper management, thereby creating an environment of peaceful co-existence, which will usher in growth and development of the society. Conflict is thus a dynamic phenomenon, which consists of five stages; Initiation, Escalation, Controlled Maintenance, Abatement and Termination/ Resolution (Sandole, 1993). In this process, peace is the ultimate target of conflict through negotiation. Peace is probably the most widely desired and the most longed for human condition after security. It is varied according to backgrounds, belief systems, scholarship or experiences. The teaching of Confucius (approx. 551-479BC) maintains that the attainment of peace is the ultimate human goal and that peace comes from “social harmony” and “equilibrium”. To buttress this perception, the Chinese philosopher and religious leader, Mo-tzu (468-401BC) takes a more radical viewpoint. He extols peace as an all-embracing love, and a universal human virtue or the highest earthly goal (cited in Barash 1991:7). According to Mo-tzu, those who love others will be loved in return. In his view, “do good to others and others will do good to you. Hate people and be hated by them and lastly, hurt them and they will hurt you”. It is pertinent to note that the paradox of peace is that, we live in a world of inevitable love and hate; hope and despair; agreement and disagreement, conflict and cooperation; war and peace. For the purpose of this discourse, we will toe the line of Barash (1991) who classified peace into two viewpoints; negative peace and positive peace. We shall examine these two in greater detail.

Negative Peace: Negative peace is simply the absence of war, or a condition in which no active, organised military violence is taking place. The understanding is that there is peace wherever there is absence of war, or organised violence. While this perspective is attractive, it does not say it all as it leaves out several lines of disharmonious issues and sentiments, which impact negatively on humans and their systems. There may therefore exist peace of the graveyard.

Positive Peace: Positive peace on the other hand, appears uncommon and more difficult to articulate and appreciate. It seems more difficult to achieve than negative peace because of the dynamics involved. Positive peace means (structurally) the absence of social injustice in a system (Gaya, 2006). Positive peace results from considerable control or reduction of cases of fear or dread due to marginalisation, exclusion and neglect in a system. An American peasant was once quoted in the New York Times as saying “I am for peace, but not peace with hunger” (Barash, 1991). Positive peace is about policies, programmes and projects, which promote inclusiveness, equity and social justice. Peace is not only absence of war, or extreme violence but also the presence of institutionalised mechanisms to check 38 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria impunity, oppression, repression and structural conditions of inequity and social injustice. It promotes enduring, tolerant and accommodating relationship and allows individuals and groups, the pursuit of their goals in life with human dignity and honour.

Conflict Resolution: A conflict can be frozen for years (e.g. when PSOs are introduced), terminated (by superior force as in the ), transformed, or resolved. Conflict resolution implies uprooting the root causes of the conflict. As Nwolise (2004:11) notes:

where conflict however inevitably breaks out, and becomes violent, then steps should be taken immediately to keep the peace, including peace enforcement. While these are on, or thereafter, peace-making sets the platform for the actual resolution of the conflict. Once the root causes of the conflict are removed, peace-building follows to ensure a lasting peace buttressed by confidence building.

According to Mitchael (1993), conflict resolution is essentially aimed at intervention to change or facilitate the change of the course of a conflict. It is important to state that conflict resolution provides an opportunity to interact with the parties involved in the conflict, with the hope of at least reducing the scope, intensity and effects of conflicts. Conflict resolution in plural societies however, can be quite complex, principally because of dominant effects of cultural and language symbolisms. It is thus argued that it is quite dangerous to relegate culture to the background in conflict resolution (Black and Avruch 1993). There are several modes of intervention in the integrated conflict management framework, which include but not limited to Peace Building, Mediation, Conciliation, Power Politics, Arbitration, Adjudication and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).It is however very important to note that in as much as a combination of these modes could be used to resolve conflict, a final decider is always ‘situation specific’ even if it means using minimal force. It is agreed that the right to use force is a right of an individual, group, state or international authority to handle conflict situation or to present certain actions by using force to dissuade another party or physically intervene to halt another from a particular course of action. However, it should be noted that only necessary force proportional to the perceived threat or intended action of the other party is allowed in such rightful circumstances (Nwolise, 2014). Conflict resolution, transformation and management as key elements of the integrated conflict management framework, have been part of human experience for centuries. Wilmot and Hocker (cited in Lugga 2016), identified some crucial ideas for dealing with conflicts. These include: clarification of communication and the checking of perceptions, which in turn involves: speaking out what is in one’s mind or heart, listening carefully, expressing strong feelings, appropriately remaining rational, asking reasonable questions and maintaining a spirit of ‘give and take’ as well as avoiding harmful or combative statements. Conflict management must occur in a polite atmosphere and context; however, conflicts do not generally follow the demands of politeness, hence conflict managers must be skilful to overcome the Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 39 generally chaotic and disorderly scenes associated with the behaviour of parties in conflict (Lugga, 2016).

CONFLICT HANDLING When a conflict is imminent or occurs, there are streams of workable strategies for handling it such as: a. Aggressive strategies: The use of necessary minimum force comes in here especially when the party or parties involved are reluctant to make compromise thus creating an avenue for a violent outcome. This model, often results in a win - lose situation. Conflicts that are managed this way, have a high tendency of reoccurring later in a more severe form. b. Passive strategies: These result in a lose-lose outcome where neither party gets the result they wanted, meaning the conflict will reoccur later. This approach however gives room for cooling of nerves and could make the next stage of conflict management easier. c. Assertive strategies: These are the most successful approaches in conflict resolution, resulting in a win - win situation leading to a true resolution of the conflict.

FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION It is very important to note that a poorly managed conflict has the potential of escalating into destructive crisis or war. Conflict therefore is a graduation from: a. Early warning indicators. b. The resistance level. c. Escalation or explosive level, which is usually a case of badly managed conflict.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND PEACE EDUCATION Early warning system assumes that conflict does not take place automatically without conflict signals or indicators. It is insensitivity and delayed responses to conflict indicators that lead to resistant conflict or explosive stage of conflict. The value of Early Warning System (EWS) is built around peace education (Akpuru-Aja, 2007). It involves proactive enlightenment of the people on knowledge and skills of observing and responding to early warning indicators or conflict signals. This is because if uncontrolled early enough, the negative outcomes of conflict are likely to affect those who are not even directly involved. Peace education may take the form of public advocacy to promote appreciation of how rewarding peace is to all. It is to recognise and cherish values and activities of peaceful co-existence. Some examples of useful phrases are given as: a. Peace is good for all. b. Life is fulfilled in a peaceful atmosphere. 40 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

c. Conflict or crisis is evil for all. d. There is nothing responsible in violence or war. e. Conflict or crisis or war is a setback. f. Embrace peace and not violence. g. Make peace, Not War.

Early warning system requires:

a. High level of networking, collaboration and coordination between persons, institutions, experts and authorities. b. The pattern of response by authorities or those involved (directly or indirectly) determines the value of helpfulness of Early Warning System.

BASIC TECHNIQUES IN PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Negotiation Negotiation is a non-violent and out of court process whereby two or more parties by mutual consent seek to discuss, settle or resolve differences or lines of dispute or conflict. Communication skills in negotiation such as good listening, openness, frankness and willingness to make concessions, if needed, are very important. Negotiation is the first embrace of dialogue as the supreme strategy of conflict resolution and management. Negotiation techniques include: a. Clear identification of issues involved. b. Venue/physical setting. c. Language of communication. d. Listening habit. e. Provocation control. f. Issue based, not personalities. g. Searching for common grounds. h. Keeping avenue of retreat open.

Enabling Conditions/Factors for Conflict Handling Techniques. The starting point of negotiation between parties to a conflict situation is to gain clarity of insights on the nature of issues involved. This helps in identifying the nature of contending values, interests, aspirations and strategies. Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 41

Venue/physical setting. Choice of venue for grievance ventilation is very vital, to stamp out fear or dread of attendance and participation. Parties involved should consent to any choice of time, venue and where applicable, the form of security measures put in place. It is important that seating arrangement that avoids combative eyes contacts is preferable.

The place of communication. In understanding each other in a conflict situation, there is no alternative to open and frank dialogue. Communication is therefore key to all forms of conflict handling and should be mutually up-building. What parties say, and how they say “them” matter in sustaining the spirit of conflict resolution. Hate speeches and personality attacks are counter-productive. It is therefore very important to have frank and open communication instead of the use of combative words or giving deadlines or ultimatums. Helpful communication identifies with the “fears” and “facts” of the other party.

Listening habit. Listening is the lifeblood of relationships and conflict handling (Ahuja and Ahiya, 2006). Some parties tend to concentrate more on their emotions and viewpoints rather than good listening attention to others thus creating unnecessary distraction, hence, cognitive closure or rigidity must be avoided. Even at the displeasure of the other party’s views, it is helpful to get a good sense of them by listening. Efficient listening is active, dynamic, and requires hard work. The purpose of listening is an investment that pays important dividends to the listener as against ineffective listening which causes serious problems, for example, in marriages, religion, business and inter-personal relations.

Provocation control. Emotion is necessarily involved in negotiation since there are expectedly lines of vexation. However, to sustain listening attention, parties need to mind what they say; how to say them as well as combative attitudes and actions because humility is often challenged. To help, everyone must learn to manage his/her provocation and those of others. Quite important to note is that display of humility is no sign of weakness, but strength put under control.

Issue Based, Not Personalities. In reality, it seems difficult to separate issues from personalities involved. It therefore needs persistence to focus more on issues involved because socio- psychological traits of individuals differ considerably. Understanding this will provide additional guard against hate speeches and attitudes that tend more to demonise personalities.

Searching for Common Grounds. Werner and Yuen (2005) argue that negotiational decisions reached through common accord is more durable than imposed, coerced or intimidated ones. a. No matter the nature of conflict, there are bound to be common grounds of agreement or understanding. b. Parties should seek to patiently understand the other side’s perspectives and, perhaps, constraints. c. Openness to concession is mutually helpful. d. Avoid time lines or ultimatum. 42 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Keeping Avenue of Retreat Open: The adage that rats will fight back, if trapped in a corner often applies to parties in a conflict (Rourke, 2008). It is very useful to leave yourself and your opponent an “out”, which is an exit way with honour. If a party accepts its own mistakes or over reactions and decides to step down hard bargaining, it is unwise for the other party to insist on a “pound of flesh”.

TYPES OF NEGOTIATION There are two broad types of Negotiation: a. Positional or Distributive Bargaining. b. Collaborative or Integrative Bargaining. (1) Positional Negotiation (Bargaining): In this type of negotiation, attitudinal traits tend more to identify people as either soft bargainers or hard bargainers or even principled bargainers. (2) A Hard Bargainer may adopt an attitude which is suggestive of a position of strength rather than weakness, and will insist on dictating the tunes and terms. The mindset of a hard bargainer is to win rather than lose, and approximates a zero-sum game. (See Table1). (3) A Soft Bargainer displays more trust and confidence in mutually beneficial way of conflict settlement or resolution.

The unfortunate misconception is that a soft bargainer is weak in character. This is untrue. A soft bargainer displays the virtue of humility and wholesome appreciation of the value of harmony, cooperation, collaboration and solidarity.

Collaborative Negotiation: The more principled bargaining is through collaborative efforts. (Fisher and Ury 1983; Imobighe, 2001, 2012; Akpuru-Aja 2007). The process is known as integrative bargaining because the parties show similar concerns and anxieties in the belief that they share a whole lot in common and hopefully will continue to share more in the future. (See Table 2). In this type of negotiation, rather than focus on fault lines, parties should focus on bridge building; fence mending; things that benefit all in the long run. Having the same bargaining disposition, parties remain open and receptive to a number of options or possibilities before arriving at end point decision criteria. Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 43

Table 1 COMPARATIVE VIEW OF SOFT AND HARD BARGAINERS

SOFT BARGAINER HARD BARGAINER * He sees participants as friends * He sees participants as adversaries. * His goal is agreement. * His goal is victory. * Makes concession to cultivate the relationship. * Demands concession for the relationship. * He is soft on the people and the problem. * He is hard on the problem and the people. * He trusts others. * He distrusts others. * He changes his position easily. * He digs into his position. * Makes offers. * Makes threats. * He is prepared to disclose his bottom-line. * He misleads as to his bottom-line. * He is prepared to accept one-sided losses to * He demands one-sided gains as a price of reach agreement. agreement. * He searches for the single answer the * He searches for the single answer that is opponent would accept. acceptable to himself. * He tries to avoid a contest of will. * He tries to win a contest of will * He easily yields to pressure. * He applies pressure.

Source: Imobighe 2001. 44 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Table 2 COMPARATIVE VIEW OF HARD, SOFT AND HARD COLLABORATIVE BARGAINERS

HARD SOFT PRINCIPLED COLLABORATIVE Participants are adversaries Participants are friends Parties are problem-solvers * The goal is victory * The goal is an * The goal is a wise outcome. * Demand concessions to agreement. * Separate the problem from the maintain the relationship. * Make concessions to relationship problem. * Are hard on the problem and cultivate the relationship. * Are soft on the people; hard on the people. * Are soft on the people on the problem. * Distrust others. and the problem. * Proceed independently of * Dig into position. * Trust others. trust. * Make threats * Change position easily * Focus on interests, not * Mislead as to bottom line * Make offers. positions. demand one-sided gains as the * Disclose bottom line. * Explore interests. price of agreement. * Accept one-sided losses * Avoid having a bottom line. * Search for the one solution you as the price of * Invent options for mutual will accept. agreement. Search for benefit. * Insist on position. the one solution they * Develop multiple options to * Try to win a contest of wills will accept. choose from; choose later. * Apply pressure * Insist on agreement * Insist on objective criteria. * Try to avoid a contest of * Try to reach an agreement wills based on interests, not wills. * Avoid pressure. * Yield to principle, not pressure; reason and be open to reasons.

Source: Imobighe, 2001.

It will be naive for a hot-tempered person to lose a vital interest. In the same way, a mild-tempered person should not hastily forgo a vital interest just to avoid trouble. Generally, parties are better off when they do not bury differences, but discuss them openly and frankly. Negotiation involves readiness to make concessions, where applicable, so that peace reigns in a relationship. Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 45

THE INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MODEL/FRAMEWORK A conflict management model sees conflict management as a process embracing three levels of activities: a. Conflict prevention, peace promotion and consolidation. b. Conflict control and abatement. c. Conflict resolution. The above three levels of activities constitute what is represented below as an integrated conflict management circle.

Source: Thomas A. Imobighe, 2010, NIPSS, Kuru.

Mediation Mediation is a continuation of negotiation by the use of a third-party to help the people involved in persistent conflict, or nagging conflict to get talking for an agreement (Barash, 1991: 309). Key principles in Mediation: a. Define the problem. b. Lay down clearly the ground rules. c. Help parties develop listening attention necessary to understand each other’s facts, fears, anxieties or concerns. d. A third-party is unbiased and trusted by both sides as the “go-between”, and should not betray trust. 46 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

e. A third-party can serve as a fact finder, and is allowed to make non-binding, but helpful suggestions that might be agreeable to both sides. Acceptance of suggestions is entirely voluntary. f. A third-party is in a position to propose a solution that both contending parties find even acceptable, but neither would be willing to propose for fear of being seen as too reconciliatory and thus, weak. g. Confidentiality is the hallmark of a third-party. h. Emphasis is on common grounds and future benefits rather than divisive emotions and short- sighted interests. i. A third-party, has no final words on settlement or agreement. Hence, there is no room to hand out authoritatively any option or solution. j. Free flow of communication is very vital to control, or avoid communication gap(s). k. Sitting position that places each party on balance rather than “low self-esteem” should be considered. Types of Mediators. Goodong, (2006), identifies three types of mediators: a. Social network mediator. b. Authoritative mediator. c. Independent mediator. Social Network Mediator a. Social network mediator has increased with the emergence of age grade associations, political groups, concerned friends, business or professional associations and faith-based organisations. b. Social network mediators come from the understanding that they too are involved; affected for good or bad. c. A successful dispute settlement between parties would strengthen an existing social network in a given environment. Authoritative Mediator a. Authoritative mediators identify those whose personalities or positions would help in exercising influence on the disputing parties at both the exploratory (early contact) stage and the negotiating stage without necessarily handing out authoritative decision as judge. b. The authoritative mediator is wholly an acknowledged influential office or authority, who only acts as the ice- breaker (Goodong Sam 2006: 35). c. The process is no arbitration. d. Think of influential personalities as former and incumbent Presidents, religious leaders, traditional monarchs, vice chancellors, director-generals, justices, service-chiefs in the armed forces and the likes. Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 47

e. In international politics, it includes super powers, great powers and highly influential power blocs (The European Union). Independent Mediator a. Independent mediator does not necessarily belong to a known social network, but shows great concern on the conflict situation. b. Usually, independent mediators have a sense or feeling of possessing expertise needed for social engineering by offering services, rather than “forcing them”. c. The parties have the ultimate option to accept or reject any intervention. Other Functional Techniques and Variants TECHNIQUE VARIANTS Judicial Method. Arbitration.Adjudication. Conciliatory Method. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Power Politics (through Strength). Peacemaking. Peacekeeping. Peace-enforcement. Arbitration Arbitration is a judicial variant of a third-party involvement in resolving a conflict, except in an authoritative method. The arbiter has the consent of the disputing parties to hand out authoritative decision or solution (Gaya-Best, 2006: 108-109). On an individual basis, an arbiter poses as a judge and listens impartially to both sides. In the end, an authoritative decision, which often may be acceptable to parties is made. The authoritative decision is called award. Arbitration may apply out of court or in court. In the court of law, arbitration is commonly used to adjudicate over several inter-state border disputes, usually brought forward by the voluntary consent of parties. Prior to the final ruling, the court (such as International Court of Justice, at The Hague in the Netherland), would seek re-affirmative consent of parties to its rulings. Once ruling is made authoritatively, the parties are not under the coercion of the court to accept or reject. However, whichever party that enjoys the advantage of judgment commands more diplomatic recognition. A party may reject the judgment and is free to use political and diplomatic means to seek further redress as the case may be.

Adjudication Adjudication hands out its rulings based on evidence before the court of competent jurisdiction. In effect, judgment does not seek the consent of disputing parties. When negotiation and arbitration processes fail, parties who decide to seek adjudication in court run the risk of a zero sum game outcome (winner takes all). Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques. It is an out-of-court process of settling disputes with remedies, appeasements and needs assessment” (Imobighe, 2001). The mediators include, culturally: 48 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

a. The king’s council or paramount ruler, b. Council of elders, c. Council of chiefs, d. Age grade systems and village assembly. e. Any of the mediating systems may apply.

SUMMARY OF PREPARATION CYCLE OF NEGOTIATION

IX. CONCLUSION Generally, the desire for honest, non-violent resolution of conflicts is getting stronger and more widespread today than at any time in the past. Basic techniques of conflict resolution are not far-fetched. All that we need is attitude change towards conflict, especially by controlling hasty resort to the employment of violence in the settlement of disputes or differences. Perhaps, peace education that promotes peace as a public good for all, and any violence as counter-value is helpful. Not to be forgotten is that the application of basic techniques of peace and conflict resolution is conflict situation specific. Choices of the most appropriate combination of techniques are key to success. The end state is not a “start stop event”, but a process. Even when expected results are not forthcoming, there is need for patience; for more spirited efforts. No one can be more secure than the security of its social environment. This is the ideal. It is the message! Perhaps, more than basic techniques, we all need good faith and goodwill to promote peace through conflict resolution, which in essence requires uprooting the real causes of a given conflict to ensure that there is no relapse to violence, instead there will be lasting peace. Conflict Resolution Spectrum: Negotiation by Bargaining in Integrated Conflict Management ... 49

REFERENCES Ahuja, P and G.C. Ahuja (2006), Communication Skills: How to Resolve Conflict, Benin-Abuja- Aba-Nigeria, Mindex Publishing Co. Ltd. Akpuru-Aja, A. (2009), Basic Concepts, Issues and Strategies of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Enugu-Nigeria, Kenny and Bros. Barash, D. (P. (1991), Introduction to Peace. California, Wadsworth Publishing Company. Black, P.W. and K. Avruch (1993), Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict Resolution Theory, in Negotiated Journal, Vol. V. Burton, J. (1969), Conflict and Communication, London, Macmillan. Burton, J. (1987), World Society, New York. Coser, L.A. (1956), The Functions of Social Conflicts, The Free Press, Glerico III. Covey, R.S. (2011), The Third Alternative: Solving Life’s Most Difficult Problems, London: Simon and Schuster. Dougherty J. and Pfaltzgraf R. Jnr (1981), Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, New York, Harper and Row. Elaigwu, J.I. (2012), Security and Peace: The Imperatives for National Development in Nigeria, Jos, Institute of Governance and Social Research. Fisher, R. and William, U. (1983). Getting to YES, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin. Gaya-Best, S. (ed), (2006). Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies, Ibadan, Spectrum Books. Goodong, S. (2006), “Mediation and the Mediation Process,” in Imobighe, T.A. (2001), Conflict/ Crisis Management Exercise, Kuru-Jos, NIPSS. Lugga, S.A. (2016), Towards Peace, Katsina, Lugga Press Ltd. Nwolise, O.B.C. (2004), The Nigeria Police in International Peace-Keeping under the United Nations, Ibadan. Spectrum Books Limited. Nwolise, O.B.C. (2014), Oracles on Excessive Use of Force, Ibadan Journal of Peace and Development, Vols. 3 and 4. Rourke, J.T. (2008), International Politics on the World Stage, New York, McGraw-Hill Coys. Sandole, D.J.D. (1993) Paradigm, Theories and Metaphors in Conflict and Conflict Resolution; Coherence or Confusion, Manchester University Press, Manchester. Stagner, R. (1967) Psychological Aspects of International Conflict, Belmont, Brooks. Stedman, S. (1991), “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework”, in F. Deng and I.W. Zartman (eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington D.C. Werner, S. and Amy Y. (2005), “Making and Keeping Peace”, International Organisation, 59/2: 261 – 292. Wilmort, W.W. and J.L. Hocker (1998) Interpersonal Conflicts, WWC. Brown. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

THE HYBRIDISED NATURE OF THE BOKO HARAM WAR AGAINST THE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES OF NIGERIA: THE SPIRITUAL DIMENSION AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

by

Professor OBC Nwolise Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, and Visiting Professor, Nigerian Army Resource Centre, and Army War College Nigeria. (Tel: +2348037013069; (E-mail: [email protected].

and

Dr. SB Owonikoko Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola, (E-mail; owonikoko [email protected]).

ABSTRACT

War today has transmuted from between states that move regular armies to non-state actors that wage asymmetric warfare. Anything and everything is thrown into this form of warfare by the non-state actors to make up for its inferiority vis-a-vis the state in terms of size of armed forces and weapon systems. In this article, the two authors highlight the hybridised nature of the Boko Haram war in the North-East with particular emphasis on the spiritual dimension. The paper draws lessons for the future especially the need to watch the role of religious beliefs and symbols in asymmetric warfare, and the need to train the military to be able to engage the adversary in all spectrums of warfare. Key words: Hybridised nature, Boko Haram, War, Spiritual Dimension, Lessons.

50 The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 51

INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the security architecture of modern states has changed significantly. Rather than the conventional warfare pitting one or more states against another, what is often experienced in contemporary period is internal insurrection by non-state actors that challenge a state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force. In waging these wars, several tactics are used by armed irregular groups against forces of the state. Such tactics include guerrilla war, terrorism and spiritual warfare. In confronting these enemies from within, the military organisations of countries face herculean task because of the hybridised nature of warfare mounted by these irregular adversaries. The herculean task of the military organisation is made more difficult because national militaries are only prepared for conventional wars and they are far less prepared for terrorism and probably unprepared at all for spiritual warfare. Since the outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis in 2009, the group has metamorphosed into a complex insurgent group embarking on hybridised warfare against the Nigerian state and its forces. Although, the Armed Forces of Nigeria intensified efforts vigorously to put an end to the insurgency and terrorism of the group, it continues to bounce back wrecking serious havoc on lives and property. For instance, in spite of dismantling Camp Zairo in the Sambisa Forest and killing major commanders of the group by Operations Lafiya Dole and Gama Aiki, the group still carries out attacks. This points at the resilience of the group. This paper discusses the spiritual angle of the hybridised nature of Boko Haram war in Nigeria and the need for Nigerian military force countering the group to also reinforce its strength and factor spiritual power into its war effort especially the use of Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI). Unfortunately, we tend to down play the place of spirituality in contemporary warfare because of the toga of Science which emphasised that whatever cannot be seen, touched, measured or weighed does not exist. However, the fact remains that spiritual power is real and the spirit controls the physical. Anthropologists have highlighted the relevance of the spirit to perception of power in Africa (see Ellis, 1999; Lan 1985; Weigert, 1995; Behren, 1999) but they are yet to show the role spiritual power plays in contemporary hybrid warfare and how the state can respond strategically to this. This will constitute the focus of this paper using the Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism and government’s response to it as a reference point. The paper has seven sections. Section one is the introduction. Section two is the conceptualisation of terms. Section three discusses spiritual warfare in historical perspective. Section four discusses spiritual warfare in modern period. Section five discusses Boko Haram hybridised warfare. It vividly explains the evolvement of Boko Haram hybridised war from 2009 till date. Section six discusses lessons and strategies that can be employed by the state. Section seven is the conclusion. The thesis of the paper is that in countering Boko Haram terrorism, Nigerian troops need to be effectively prepared for the hybrid nature of warfare prosecuted by Boko Haram. Boko Haram will not be conquered if the group wages terrorism, guerrilla, and spiritual warfare and the Nigerian troops are responding with conventional warfare.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS Certain concepts are very germane to this paper and need to be effectively conceptualised for clarity. These concepts are: war/warfare, hybrid/hybridised warfare, guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism and 52 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria counter-insurgency. These concepts will be appropriately conceptualised one after the other in that order.

War/Warfare The word “war” is derived from the old French word “were” which literarily means “to confuse”, “to perplex” or “to bring to confusion”. Therefore, war, defined from the etymology of the word is a situation of perplexity and confusion in a state or society. This definition of the term underestimates the destructive tendency of war. War, properly defined in military terminology, is a situation of armed conflict characterised by extreme aggression, destruction and mortality using regular or irregular military forces. It entails a degree of confrontation between two or more belligerents in which weapons and other military technology feature. That is probably why Carl Von Clausewitz conceptualised wars as: “A duel on an extensive scale... an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds...directed upon the destruction of the enemy’s power.” (Clausewitz quoted in Fuller, 1968:47). Humanity votes for peace and abhors war because as Nwolise rightly observed:

War destroys life and property, principles and values, and wakes up beastly elements in man. War leads to environmental pollution and degradation. It kills human beings in their millions depending on the magnitude... and forces people to leave their homes... War diverts the developmental resources of a state to defence and war-making. It retards the rate of development of a people. It spreads pestilence, destitution, hunger, and starvation. It creates gross insecurity and traumatises people. War is a very costly venture. (Nwolise, 2004: 7-8)

Despite these ugly features of war, Plato (quoted in Momah, 1993:35) informs us that there is no end of war in sight in human civilisation. In his words expressed over 2,400 years ago, “only the dead have seen the end of war”. In the same vein, Momah (1993:34-35) asserts that “war remains the greatest tragedy to have ever betaken mankind because to win a war, it must be fought not as we may wish, but as we must”. He concluded that:

War in its totality is evil... it destroys, ruins, maims, changes boundaries, topples governments, humiliates peoples, brutalises the human psyche, wrecks the precious family togetherness, and most regrettably, often sows the seeds of other wars.

Although, the origin of warfare among human groups and states is a subject of intense debate, some theories have been put forward by scholars (for the discussion of these various theories (see Keith, The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 53

1997; Dawson, 1996; Keeley, 1996; Stedman, 1991, Sanjide, 2004). Some scholars have alluded to injustices, claims over scarce resources, pursuit of incompatible goals, personality (ego) clashes, etc. One major reality in the contemporary world is that hybridised warfare is more complex than the war modern militaries were trained for.

Hybridised War/Warfare The concept of hybridised war/warfare is relatively new in military/security studies. It was first used in 2005 by US General James Mattis at the Defence Forum sponsored by the Naval Institute and Marine Corps Association on September 8. The concept was later popularised by General James Mattis and Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman in their work titled “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare” published in the Naval Institute Proceedings in November, 2005 and later in numerous publications such as Hoffman (2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b, and Nemeth (2002). Since this period, the concept began to be used, although some scholars believe that the concept is nebulous and vague (see Scott and Scott, 2014; Greg, 2008; Fleming, 2011). Hybrid warfare is a form of warfare in which the enemy uses various available strategies and tactics including moving from conventional to non-conventional and between guerrilla warfare and terrorism to attain certain objectives from the state. Nemeth concisely define the term as any warfare in which an adversary adaptively employs a fuse of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behaviour in the battle space to obtain their political objectives. A new reflection of hybridised nature of threat to national security especially in Africa is the use of spiritual power in the bid to overcome the state by non-state armed groups.

Guerrilla Warfare This is a form of irregular warfare in which a small combatant group uses military tactics which may include ambushes, sabotage, raid, petty warfare, hit and run, among others to engage a large traditional or conventional military with a view to conquering or annihilating them. This is usually used in an asymmetrical warfare where the guerrillas try as much as possible to avoid any confrontation with enemy troop. Even when any confrontation occurs, it is a handful of the guerrillas against a large number of the state’s regular forces. While the major means of achieving victory in conventional warfare is the strength of arms of the military, in guerrilla warfare as in terrorism, terror tactics, violence, fear and propaganda are relied upon.

Counter-insurgency/Counter-terrorism Counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism refers to all the integrated measures, kinetic and non-kinetic, deployed by a state to quell an insurgency and resolve its underlying causes in order to make for enduring peace, security and stability. 54 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

SPIRITUAL WARFARE IN TRADITIONAL TIMES Waging war and defending the territorial integrity of a people was one of the ancient practices of human societies in history before the development of technology as well as the evolution of social organisation such as the state (Holsti, 1967). Therefore, human societies from time immemorial have had to prosecute war or use brute military force to deter enemies, defend their territory and achieve any other goal. In doing this, the use of supernatural powers was often employed. Although, this is not limited to Africa, the continent before it came into contact with the colonial forces had rich records of martial spirit mixed with supernatural powers used in waging war or defending the territory. African pre-colonial societies can be essentially grouped into three broad categories: centralised societies, semi-centralised and non-centralised (acephalous) societies. These forms of society practised two different forms of military organisation. The first is the citizen-army or the “levee en masse” military organisation. This is a form of military organisation in the society in which able-bodied men were conscripted into the military from the society during the period of emergency, at the end of which the army was disbanded and the warriors went back to their various (civilian) occupations. This was most practised in acephalous societies. For instance, among the Igbo in pre-colonial period, because of the republican nature of the society, there was no centralised source of power that could control the military. Therefore, there was no standing army that was clearly recognised. Everybody was a soldier in an emergency period (Muraina, 2014). In this kind of society, the continuous training of the military to make them professionals could not be achieved because of the economic activities of the people. The second type of military organisation in the pre-colonial period was the professional army which could be found in well-established centralised or semi-centralised kingdoms and empires. Especially among the Oyo , the Alaafin must demonstrate martial art to be considered a king. Oranmiyan used his bravery, martial art and war-like character to create a political federation which grew up to become known as Oyo Empire. Alaafin Alaka was also deposed from the throne by the Oyo Mesi for his lack of militarism and was replaced by Sango who was known to have demonstrated warlike characteristics (Atanda, 1975). In waging war or defending the territorial integrity of all these societies, the use of spiritual power was often employed. Spiritual power was not only employed, it also contributed significantly to the determination of success or otherwise in warfare. There are at least five different ways by which spiritual power was used in the prosecution of war or defence of the society. These are discussed below:

(i) Divination for Intelligence This was often employed before going out for war to get information about the adversary and predict the likely outcome of the war. It involved consulting the gods/God through its/His priests. This was considered necessary to ensure that the right decisions were made before going out to war. One very important function of divination was prediction of the probable outcome. Such prediction was often the basis for the decision as to whether the army would engage in the battle or not. During the 19th Century Yoruba warfare, the priestly diviner’s views had to be taken before waging or going to war. In some cases, Yoruba armies were accompanied by a contingent of priests and traditional doctors who regularly The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 55 consulted Ifa oracle through Ifa priests called Babalawo (diviner) for them every morning and counselled them before setting out (Fadipe, 1970). For instance, an ancient Oyo king- King Ajaka relied heavily on the guidance of the oracle and medicine men as he prosecuted his expansionist war with his many chiefs and princes (Johnson, 1978). Ignoring the prediction of the oracle often meant a serious negative consequence for the army. This was the case with the Ibadan army after the Kiriji war which resulted in stalemate. In their search for a clue as to why victory eluded them, they recalled that they disobeyed the injunction of the oracle which suggested that they made Akintola the Balogun (war general) but refused and picked Ajayi Osungbekun simply because Akintola was not a titled chief as at the time of the death of Balogun Ajayi Ogboriefon (Johnson, 1976; Adefila and Opeola, 1996). Among the Modakeke too, a similar case of disobedience to divination was recorded. The incidence involved a great Modakeke warrior named Adepoju who fought many battles for Modakeke and became a hero as a result. Unfortunately, he was killed in a battle between Modakeke and Ile-Ife. According to the report of Chief Amusan Popoola (cited in Adefila and Opeola, 1996), Adepoju was told by the Ifa oracle to sacrifice to his ancestors before going to the battle-field but he said he was in a hurry to do that promising he would sacrifice a human being instead of a goat to his ancestors after the war. It was reported that before he got to the battle-field his horse stumbled which was a bad omen enough to warn him that the ancestors or gods were angry with his disobedience. However, he ignored the divine advice of the oracle and the warning of the ancestral spirits. He went to the war and died subsequently as he was killed by the Ijebu army. Among the of Nigeria, this was also a usual practice. There were traditional priests (Eze Mmoo) who contacted gods to elicit intelligence information on the war their armies were about to embark on (Anyawu, 1988). In the biblical period, the Israelites, before embarking on any warfare sort the face of God through the prophets. This always served as assurance of possibility of success in the war. At times, fake prophets deceived the kings into war with disastrous consequences, but kings who obeyed the words of real prophets of God came out victorious.

Ritual Sacrifice Performing ritual sacrifice before the commencement of war was one of the ways of inviting the supernatural into the conduct of war. An elaborate sacrifice was offered to the god(s) of war to appease him and to invite their favour during the course of the war. Among the Oyo Yoruba, it was a standard practice to make an elaborate sacrifice to the war god and smear their weapons of war with magical potion. Before the Balogun and his army went out to the war, a sacrifice was made as required from divination. The object of the sacrifice was pushed from one grove of one god to the other until it finally arrived at the Oranmiyan grove. It would then be decapitated and the Balogun and his principal officers and army would come forward to rub the blood of the object of sacrifice on their sword and war instruments. After this, the army will be led to the warfront by the Balogun with the belief that the outcome of the war will be favourable. During the Kiriji/Ekitiparapo war, Ibadan did not consider the performance of ritual necessary because much importance was not attached to it initially. As the war was getting out of control of Ibadan army, the war chiefs of Ibadan found it expedient to offer the customary sacrifice but they were overruled by the then Aare Latosa who happened to be a Muslim. It was after his death in August 56 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

1885 that a belated sacrifice was made. It was believed that the inability of the Ibadan army to conquer the confederate force was due to neglect of the god of war by not making the eventual customary sacrifice to him. This is also common among the Igbo people in South-eastern Nigeria before their contact with the colonial masters. As Anyawu (1988) reported, traditional priests usually offered sacrifices to the god of war on behalf of the armies to pray for a successful war engagement with enemy forces. Use of Spiritual Herbs on Weapons and Incantations This involved the use of leafs and herbs in the prosecution of war. The primary objective of utilising herbs on weapons was not only to render the users absolutely invincible at the battle front but also to neutralise the power of the enemy. Among the Yoruba people, afose (magical power to make utterances come to reality), epe (curse), okigbe (magical power that disallow penetration by cutlass, sword etc), Isuju (magical power that conceals user’s physical presence from the enemies) and herbal bullet-proof such as “asakiibon”, “afoobon,” “ayoeta”, among others were used. Similarly, herbal weapons like egbe and afeeri empowered the user to disappear at will. There was also the use of incantations to stimulate the potency of herbal weapons. Captain Jones (cited in Adefila and Opeola, 1998) observed that the Egba armies in 1861 were used to wearing “gree-gree” or charm while the principal wore elaborately marked war dresses studded with cowries and teeth of wild animals. All these contributed to the success of their warfare and defence. Similarly, among the Igbo people of South-eastern Nigeria, medicine men prepared protective medicine and charms for the army to embark on war in defence of their community (Anyawu, 1988). Special herbs, were rubbed on weapons and where backed with incantations to bring down adversaries that were proving powerful in the battle front. Spiritual Fortification To fortify is to protect a person or a place by making it strong against any attack. Spiritual fortification is the use of supernatural power such as charm to provide strong invincibility for an object. One of the most used objects of spiritual fortification is witchcraft. Witchcraft is a form of spiritual power which enables the witches to identify herbs both for killing and healing. The witches possess the secret of the knowledge of vital force. Many witches accompanied their husbands to the warfront to be of assistance to their war efforts. To be spiritually fortified, the warriors had incisions made on their bodies. Some swallowed ritualised objects. All were meant to immunise them against enemy weapons and charms. SPIRITUAL WARFARE IN MODERN TIMES Although, the development of technology as well as the evolution of state as a distinctive social organisation appears to have relegated the use and relevance of supernatural powers, it continues to be used in prosecution of war and defence in contemporary times. Many wars and armed conflicts fought in post- colonial African states are fraught with the use of occultic and magical powers. The use of magical power which comes in the form of charms, potions, and rituals, among others in these warfares perform some strategic functions for the users. Firstly, it offers fighters some kind of protection from the harms they may be inflicted with by the attacks or their enemies. Secondly, it is also used to imbue and enhance the ability of the fighters to fight. In other words, it serves as motivation for fighters to fight and The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 57 intimidation for the enemy fighters. It is therefore very possible to see a fighter display ruthlessness in warfront without fear for anything whatever because of reliance on the magical power she/he possesses. This is why Yoruba people usually have it in one of their proverbs that “okete jeun tele ikun koto senu bembe solode”, meaning that a mouse must have used a magical power before it can withstand the hunter. Lastly, possession and use of magical power in contemporary warfare aid mobilisation and recruitment of armed groups. Civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Kenya and in Uganda have seen conspicuous use of magical powers by either fighting forces or government forces or both. For instance, the Holy Spirit Movement in Northern Uganda placed spirit guidance and assistance at the core of their military activities (Behren, 199; Wlodarczyk, 2009d). The Liberian war was another case in point. During the Liberian civil war, fighters on all sides wore protective charms to prosecute the war. Among all these armed groups, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Liberian United Front for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) were notorious for the use of magical powers. President Samuel Doe was captured and the whole country was brought under ruin easily through the magical powers of the enemy armed groups. As Blahyi (cited in Nwolise, 2014) explained, Samuel Doe had all the symbols of authority of the Liberian state buried at the Nya-gbe-a-weh shrine in the Gede Mountains and he was initiated into the cult. His death was the product of his entry into the Poro Secret Society to which some of his enemies also belonged. Those who never forgave him for killing General Kiwanpa decoded him (Doe) spiritually, and revealed his spiritual powers to his enemies who captured and killed him (Nwolise, 2014). In the civil war in Sierra Leone, the display of magical powers by the Kamajor militia was well known. Members of the group were known for their efficacious and vigorous initiation processes, and abundant use of charms as part of their dress. Members of the group were so spiritually fortified that they could walk into and out of barrage of bullets and artillery fire without a scratch on their body. An account by a Kamajor ex-combatant cited in Wlodarczyk (2009 :) illustrates the magical powers possessed by the group during the Sierra Leonean civil war. In his words: I led an attack on AFRC forces on the main road between the diamond area in Kono and Makeni. The AFRC and the RUF attacked our position with heavy artillery. To prove that our society’s medicine really works, I decided to go onto the road and face these guys. They were shooting at me, but I walked on towards them, and none of their bullets or artillery hit me. At a bridge there, I shot the driver of a rebel vehicle. There were six rebels in the truck. I captured the vehicle with all the ammunition inside. I drove it back to our base. It was one of the key battles because it weakened the rebels in the northern area. During the Mozambican civil war, Renamo fighters were seen carrying or wearing charms provided by witchdoctors as defence. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Mai Mai group also used magical powers for which they became very popular in the 1960s (Wlodarczyk, 2009). In all the cases cited above which occurred in not too distant past, use of spiritual powers involved performance of a ritual and the administration of magical protection against enemy fire before going into battle. The 58 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria primary aim of this practice was to make fighters immune to enemy fire. All these are pointing to the fact that reliance on spirituality and spiritual powers continue to be relevant in contemporary armed conflicts as drivers. Personal interaction of one of the authors with men of the Nigerian armed forces shows that before they also embarked on any major operations either within or outside the Nigerian state, prayer is offered to God. Some even visit clergymen to offer prayer for safety and protection throughout the engagement. Even though this does not involve rituals as the cases mentioned above, it still shows spiritual beliefs and practices.

THE NIGERIAN CASE: MILITANTS OF THE NIGER DELTA AND BOKO HARAM HYBRID WARFARE Before the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, the Niger Delta region used to be the hotspot of crisis in the country. The crisis reached its peak from 2006 and 2009 before the Yar’Adua-led Federal Government decided to introduce the amnesty programme to ameliorate the crisis in the region after the military approach could not resolve the crisis. Studies have shown that military approach was unable to vanquish the militants because of their use of spiritual powers during the peak of the crisis. In order to spiritually fortify the militant leaders against the offensive operations of the Nigerian military forces, a lot of charms and ritual engagement were carried out by the leadership of the militant groups. One of such rituals involved being bathed by menopausal women with spiritual concoction to make their bodies impenetrable to bullets. As explained by Oriola (2013) and validated by Owonikoko (2016), the post-menopausal aged women and militant leaders during the ritual process become one in nudity in the performance of the sacrifice to spiritually fortify them. In the process of the spiritual fortification, the militants took “gbere” (incisions) on their heads, back and under their eyes. They were forbidden from sexual encounter with women and also prohibited from eating food cooked by a woman within the reproductive age (specifically because of menstruation). This was why most of the cooks in the militant’s camps were men and not women. This does not only make them spiritually strong, they were also well able to perceive impending dooms. Oriola (2013:15) reported that a major militant leader in who has retired “from active service” lives with an elder woman who often accompanies him everywhere he goes and even tastes the food prepared by his wife before he can eat it. In addition to these personal spiritual fortifications, their camps were also spiritually fortified with rituals and charms. As a result, it was totally forbidden to have sex in the camps. Women members of the group who were also getting close to their menstrual period were excused from the camp as it could break the spiritual consecration of the place. All these along with their significant martial art contributed to the inability of the military forces to vanquish the groups before the introduction of the amnesty programme. As the crisis of militancy in the Niger Delta was abating, the problem of Boko Haram started in the North East of Nigeria. Although, the group became well known from 2009, however the group has a deeper origin. The true historical roots of the group can be traced to 1995 when Abubakar Lawan established Ahlulsunnawal’jama’ahhijra or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth Organisation) in Maiduguri, Borno State. The group flourished as a non-violent movement until 2002 (Onuoha, 2014). Boko Haram’s origin can be traced to 2002 and it is believed to have originated from a group of radical Islamic youth The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 59 who worshipped at the Alhaji Mohammadu Ndimi mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State. The leader of the group was Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian who was radicalised by Jihadi literature in Saudi Arabia and was also believed to have fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan (Kyari, 2014). In 2002, an offshoot of the group declared the city of Maiduguri and the practice of Islam to be corrupt by the society. It therefore declared that it would move away from the city of Maiduguri to a small village called Kanama in Yunusari Local Government Area. The motive was to set up a separate community of people that would run basically on the principle of Islam. The choice of the place was strategic as it was remote and good for defence. While operating at the Kanama village, Mohammed Ali, the leader of the group exposed anti-state ideology and invited other Muslims to join him to return to what he considered to be true practice of Islam. In December 2003, the group began an intensive conflict with the Nigeria Police Force regarding fishing right in a local pond. In the cause of the conflict, the group overpowered the police and took over their weapons. This led to the invitation of the army who invaded their camps and dislodged them. In the process, several members of the group, including the leader, Mohammed Ali, were killed while the group’s mosque was crushed. The few survivors of the group returned to Maiduguri and lived with others from the youth group that had originated from Ndimi mosque. Mohammed Yusuf, the new leader of the group began the process of establishing a new mosque for the group known as Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid built on the land owned by Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. During this period, the group expanded and created a state within a state without disturbance from state authority. As Mohammed puts it, the group embarked on:

...intensive proselytisation, recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalisation of its members...extensive criticism of the extant secular system; debates with opposing ulama (clerics) on the propriety or otherwise of Western education, Westernisation, democracy, and secularism; and unceasing criticism of the corruption and bad governance under Governor Ali Modu Sheriff (2003-2011) of Borno State as well as the conspicuous consumption and opulence of the Western-educated elite in the midst of poverty (Mohammed, 2014:16).

The extensive and intensive proselytisation of the group coupled with its offering of welfare handouts such as cash, food, shelter, among others enabled the group to attract many followers under its roof and expand to other states like Bauchi, Yobe and Niger (Walker, 2012). Many of those attracted were refugees and jobless Nigerian youths. The commencement of arm-bearing and violent activities of the group can be traced to 2009 when members of the sect who were riding on bikes to the funeral of a fellow member were stopped by the members of Operation Flush II (the Borno State security outfit for tackling armed banditry) for not putting on crash helmet. Violence ensued in the process leading to the death of one of the members of the sect. Angry at how the police killed one of its members; the group launched a rebellious uprising against the state following the order by Yusuf to retaliate the killing of his men (Sani, 2011). Thus, 60 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria members of the sect attacked police stations in Bauchi and Yobe States killing several police officers. When it had become obvious that the power of the Nigeria Police Force could no longer control the sect’s uprising, the Nigerian Army was deployed to assist the police overwhelm the sect. The involvement of the Nigerian Army led to the arrest of Yusuf and his father-in-law while several members of the group were scattered. Yusuf Mohammed was handed over to the police but was later declared dead in the custody of the Nigeria Police. During the military onslaught on the sect in Borno State, members of the sect who were not apprehended by the soldiers fled Maiduguri even to outside the country. One year after this onslaught (2009-2010), Maiduguri was free from the violent activities of the Boko Haram sect. This period was a moment for members of the sect to regroup and undergo sophisticated training and seek technical support from other international terrorist groups outside the country. Walker (2012) cited Nigeria-based security sources as telling Reuters in January 2012 that several dozens of Nigerians were tracked to insurgent training camps in Algeria, Mali and across the whole of the Sahel region during this period. In the mid-2010, Boko Haram returned to Maiduguri to commence its terrorist campaign which has been ongoing since then till date. Since the re-emergence of Boko Haram activities in 2010, and the assumption of leadership by Shekau, the group has undergone several changes and waged hybrid war against the Nigerian state. This is represented by change in tactics of the group. From the period of re-emergence of Boko Haram in mid-2010 till date, Boko Haram has undergone at least two different changes swinging from non-conventional to conventional warfare. The first approach of the group was the use of guerrilla warfare approach which involved the adoption of hit and run tactics. This first approach ranged from the use of open armed operation/campaign, targeted killing/assassination, drive-by-shooting and use of improvised explosive devices.

Open-Armed Operation/Campaign In a remarkable change from the use of crude implements under Mohammed Yusuf, the first of the tactics used by the group after the assumption of leadership by Shekau was open armed operation/ campaign. This is similar to but slightly different from the traditional hit-and-run tactics. This involved the use of a large number of operatives say between 10 to 60 to engage the security forces in gun battle or to mount a surprise attack on security establishment such as stations, barracks or prisons and/or soft targets such as gatherings like church and market. This tactic was usually used where there are a large number of security forces or people who can overpower the operatives of the sect.

Targeted Killing/Assassination From open armed operation, the sect moved to targeted killing/assassination. This was adopted to trail and kill anybody who was considered an enemy. As a result of this approach, several people were targeted and killed. This approach entailed the trailing of the target to a place where the individual was very vulnerable to being successfully killed by an assigned operative. Sometimes, cars or motorbikes were used to trace such targets and shot at a very close range basically at the chest, head or abdomen to ensure that the chance of the person surviving the attack was very narrow. Several civilians, politicians, religious leaders, security agents, community leaders especially those who spoke against the ideology The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 61 and activities of the sect were killed using this tactic. This was basically used to kill village heads, community leaders and Islamic clerics who were speaking against the sect or conniving with security agents. Mohammed (2014:20) explained this thus:

Once the sect was militarily crushed and their headquarters, the Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah, burnt and razed to the ground, the remainder of the leadership went underground while most members either fled or melted into the local population. The state compelled traditional rulers not to conceal Boko Haram members in their domain and in the process many were identified and handed over to security agencies. However, lack of confidentiality within the security system and Boko Haram’s intelligence network ensured that they got to know who gave information on them to state authorities. The first phase of resurgence was marked by targeted killing of ward and village heads that had collaborated with state security agents, prison officials whom they accused of torturing or poisoning their members in detention, prominent politicians of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) government of Borno State, and all security officials.

Drive-by-shooting Another approach used by the group was drive-by-shooting. This was in a way similar to targeted assassination. One reason for adopting this tactic is to kill the targets that have proven very difficult to track down. It was usually used when target assassination was to be carried out in a busy city centre or build-up areas. With this method, the target could easily be shot at close range and the killer could escape without being apprehended.

Use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) From this approach, the sect graduated to the use of IEDs. The IEDs were configured in such a way that they could be detonated when thrown or could be set off through a timer or a remote control. These IEDs were usually placed in peculiar places where they would have maximum effect when exploded. Such places are roads, bridges, rail lines etc. They may even be deposited in a bag or container left in public places such as church, drinking joints, lecture halls, car parks and bus stops. The size of the IEDs ranged from a small contraption stuffed in used drink cans or large container such as drum fitted into the boot of a car. These IEDs were usually constructed using powerful explosive substances. The period between when Boko Haram became sophisticated down to when the use of IEDs was adopted, the group found refuge in Sambisa Forest from where attacks were planned. Having been motivated by the successful conduct of the various phases in their guerrilla operation, the group became bold to delve into seizure of territories. By 2014, there was a significant transformation of Boko Haram from a group adopting guerrilla strategy to an insurgent group controlling territories. Over 22 local government areas were controlled in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa States. This made Boko Haram a mini-Islamic State 62 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria with its own territory covering about 20,000 square miles; an area put to be the size of Belgium. However, with the offensive effort of the Nigeria military forces, the areas were recaptured from the control of Boko Haram. As a result, Boko Haram reverted to the use of guerrilla tactics. The group quickly adopted suicide terrorism as its main tactics. This is a form of extremely committed violence carried out by someone who takes his or her life alongside killing or destroying a chosen target. This involved the use of body-borne improvised explosive devices (BBIEDs). According to Onuoha (2014), some factors accounted for Boko Haram’s adoption of suicide terrorism. First is the emergence of a radical leadership in Abubakar Shekau since the death of Yusuf. Second, increase in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism, counter- insurgency measures put in place by government to curtail the traditional tactics of the group such as open armed confrontation or the use of vehicle-borne IEDs that obviously reduced the activities of the group. Third, is improved funding to the organisation and the affiliation of the group to deadly foreign terrorist networks which has increased the fanatical indoctrination of its members.

Boko Haram’s Spiritual Warfare There is no doubt that the Boko Haram is engaged in asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare in itself is war by other means which are essentially non-conventional mainly between a state actor and non- state actors. The non-conventional means include crude and inhuman methods that generate fear, violence and intimidation which could enable the non-state actor achieve psychological and political victory while the state actor pursues military victory. The non-state actor screams and presents poverty, government neglect, injustice, inequality, discrimination and exclusionism to the populace to win their hearts, minds, sympathy and support against the state. These are laced with spiritual strategies, operations and tactics marshalled against the people, and armed forces. The Boko Haram was adept in these as highlighted below in several ways.

(i) The use or misuse of religion as veil The Boko Haram used or misused religion as a veil to radicalise the youths, poor, unemployed and illiterate elements of the populace. These vunerable groups were given cash, promised jobs, etc to attract them into the terror fold. Religion is a spiritual phenomenon, and it was combined with coercion, deception, or life-threatening measures of forceful conversion. This was conceived at the strategic level of leadership.

(ii) Use of Charms

(a) The Boko Haram fighters used charms of various types and purposes. This was mainly at the tactical level when fighters engaged each other. In this direction some Boko Haram fighters had themselves immunised against bullets, motars, mines, bayonets and machete cuts. Thus when our soldiers were firing bullets at such terrorist fighters, they kept marching forward against our troop. This was part of the reason why our soldiers were running away from battle in 2014. The other reason was the superior fire-power of the Boko Haram terrorists. The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 63

(b) Boko Haram used charms in their recruitment process. Different methods were used here. For example people given date palm to eat, and then hypnotism that made victims susceptible to kidnap or abduction, and then recruitment into the fold.

One evidence on the use of charms apart from what we gathered from some Nigerian soldiers that fought Boko Haram in the North East is the discovery of a big book called “Guduma” in a hurriedly abandoned Boko Haram camp in Dikwa Local Government Area of Borno State in 2016 by the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). “Guduma” is a book used as manual for different magical or spiritual activities, including preparing charms to make members disciplined and obedient to the leadership. This means that the idea of the use of charms is not limited to the tactical level but also at the strategic and operational level. Another evidence of the use of charms by Boko Haram is that Nigerian soldiers seized several charms from arrested Boko Haram members, and many were seen in their camps. The pictures of these charms along with captured weapons are in the war museum at the Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja.

(iii) Powers to appear and disappear Some Boko Haram members had powers to appear and disappear. With such powers they harassed our troop taking them unawares and evading capture.

(iv) Power to turn into animals for safety Nwolise was told the story of four Boko Haram fighters who were being pursued to be captured by some Nigerian soldiers. The four terrorists ran into a hut, and in few minutes, four dogs ran out of the hut to different directions. Our soldiers entered the hut to find nobody. That was when what happened dawned on them.

(v) Hypnotism

(a) Hypnotism is a spiritual process of taking control of the mind, thinking and behaviour of an individual. Many of the children whom Boko Haram deployed for its suicide bombing missions were hypnotised. It’s not all of them that went on such missions on conviction of the cause they were fighting. This raises the issue of whether all the suicide bombers can be blamed. It only means that those who surrender, refused to detonate, or survive explosions should be held innocent till proven guilty. (i.e. ensuring that they undertook missions voluntarily). (b) Hypnotism as mentioned earlier was also used in the process of recruiting new members especially in the heydays of insurgency. (c) Some of the girls the Boko Haram members forcefully turned into their “wives” were hypnotised. This explains why some of the girls who were liberated by the Nigerian Army personnel wanted to go back to their terrorist “husbands”. 64 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

(vi) Spiritual Fortification of vehicles and weapons The Boko Haram spiritually fortified vehicles meant for special operations. For example the car used to attack the United Nations Headquarters in Nigeria on August 27, 2011 was said to have been spiritually fortified in a neighbouring country. The implication is that only an initiated person could stop the vehicle.

(vii) Performance of spiritual rituals Rituals were carried out by Boko Haram members for certain operations and activities. (a) The most open example was the rituals they performed before copulating with the girls they illegally and forcefully turned into their wives. Their purpose of performing such rituals was to ensure that the children born from such copulation continue the terrorist struggle when they grow. (b) Rituals were also performed to imbue fighters with immunity against bullets. (c) Some new recruits were also meant to undergo rituals to ensure their loyalty to the group especially unalloyed allegiance to the leadership.

(viii) Use of Strategic Spiritual Intelligence Sun Tzu (in Cleary, 2005), the great and legendary Chinese philosopher, General and Strategist wrote that foreknowledge (intelligence) could not be gotten from spirits and ghosts but from people (Spies) who knew the enemy very well. Nwolise (2012, 2013, 2015) has already proved that assertion to be false given the great works of Nostradamus (in Hogue, 2003) and other prophets, and Imams, seers, and visioners. Nwolise (Ibid) insists that intelligence can be gotten from both empirical and spiritual sources. The empirical aspects are what the intelligence community of the world do such as the Central Intelligence Agency (USA), MOSAD (Israel), Department of State Security, National Intelligence Agency and Defence Intelligence Agency (Nigeria) and others. The spiritual sources and means come from prophets, Imams, and Chief Priests of local deities. The intelligence from these Nwolise calls Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI). The Boko Haram used and still uses SSI. It helped them a lot in their golden era. (2011-2015) not only in Nigeria but also in their operations in Chad, Niger, and . This covers the period the words ‘’cowardice”, and “sabotage” featured against Nigerian troops. Even President at a point screamed that Boko Haram had penetrated his government. There were leakages of plans of military operations. The fact is that it is not all the leakages that were from black legs or insiders. Some were products of SSI. It was like the days of the King of Syria who was fighting against the tribes of Israel. All his plans and ambushes were thwarted. At a point, he began to suspect his military officers and civilian officials, until one of his trusted advisers told him that Elisha the prophet tells the Jewish King the words he (King of Syria) speaks in his bedroom. It was part of the challenges the Nigerian military was not prepared for. If not, what the military high command would have done even if at the tactical level was to go for what Nwolise called Counter- Strategic Spiritual Intelligence, (C, SSI) and that would have neutralised Boko Haram’s SSI. The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 65

The elements of spiritual warfare are not new in asymmetric warfares. They were used even in greater depth by the Kamajors in Sierra Leone, General Butt Naked platoon in Liberia, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, and many others.

CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW There is a lesson for Nigerian military to learn from the hybridised nature of Boko Haram warfare. Nigerian military personnel are acquainted with conventional warfare. In their various participations in peacekeeping operations, they have been appreciated as brave soldiers. However, unconventional warfare such as those of guerrilla warfare and terrorism were strange to them. This contributed to why the Nigerian forces were unable to quickly handle Boko Haram terrorism at the early stage of its evolution. The Nigerian military with upgraded training in counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency operations have come to terms with military operations against unconventional war. But the military is yet to master the spiritual aspect of the hybrid war – an area the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) covered very well. But the CJTF will not follow the Armed Forces of Nigeria to Peace Support Operations when the country is invited to keep the peace in a nation where the belligerent groups apply spiritual powers. Moreover, terrorism is known as “the long war”. How long will the CJTF be involved in the North East anti-terror war? The point is that the Armed Forces of Nigeria especially the Nigerian Army should raise and train its own special unit of personnel in the waging and countering of Spiritual Warfare. With the current move by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen. TY Buratai, to have Special Forces for the Nigerian Army, Nigeria should have a spiritual warfare wing in the Special Forces Configuration.

REFERENCES

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Fadipe, N.A. (1970), The Sociology of the Yoruba, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press Plc. Fleming Brian (2011), Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Arts, United States Army Command and General Staff College Fuller, J. E.C. (1968), War and Western Civilisation 1832-1993, New York, Books For Library Press. Greg Grant (2008), Hybrid Wars: Government Executive, National Journal Group. Hogue J. (2003), Nostradamus; A Life and Myths, The First Complete Biography of History’s Most Famous and Controversial Prophet, London, Element. Hoffman Frank G (2006a), “Complex Regular War: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs”, Orbis. Hoffman Frank G (2006b), “How the Marines are Preparing for Hybrid Wars”, Armed Forces Journal International. Hoffman Frank G (2007a), Preparing for Hybrid War. Marine Corps Gazette. Hoffman Frank G (2007b), Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Virginia, Arlington. Johnson Samuel (1976), The History of the Yorubas, Lagos: C.S.S. Bookshop. Keeley Lawrence (1996), War Before Civilisation: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keith F. Otterbein (1997), “The Origin of War.” Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, 11(2). Kyari Mohammed (2014), “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram” in Marc Antoine Perouse de Montclos (ed) Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria, West Africa Politics and Society Series, Vol. 2. Lan David (1985), Guns and Rain: Guerrilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe, London, J. Curry. Momah S. (1993), Global Disorders and the World Order, Lagos, Vista Books. Muraina, A.I. (2014) “Adam Smith and Public Funding of Defence” in A.I. Muraina (ed), Changing Roles of the Nigerian Armed Forces and Funding Implications. Ibadan: Gold Press Limited. Nemeth J. William (2002), Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School. Onuoha Freedom (2014) “Boko Haram and the Evolving Salafi Jihadist Threats in Nigeria” in Marc Antoine Perouse de Montclos (ed) Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria. West Africa Politics and Society Series, Vol. 2. Onuoha, F.C. (2012b), “(Un) Willing to die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria”, Report, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. 24 December. The Hybridised Nature of the Boko Haram War Against the People and Armed Forces of Nigeria… 67

Oriola Temitope (2012), The Delta Creek, Women’s Engagement and Nigeria’s Oil Insurgency. British Journal of Criminology. Sani, S. (2011), “Boko Haram: History, Ideas and Revolt,” The Constitution Vol. 11, No 4. Sanjide O’Connell (2004), “Apes of War: Is it in our Genes?” The Daily Telegraph, London. Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland (2014), The Islamic State as a Hybrid Threat. Why does that matter? Small War Journal. Stedman, S. (1991), “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework”, in F. Deng and I.W. Zartman, (Eds), Conflict Resolution in Africa, Washington DC. Walker Andre (2012), What is Boko Haram? United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Special Report 308. Weigert Stephen (1995), Traditional Religion and Guerrilla Warfare in Modern Africa, London, Macmillan. Wlodarczyk Nathalie (2009), Magic and Warfare: Appearance and Reality in Contemporary African Conflict and Beyond, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

JOMINI IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

by

Maj. Gen. BM Shafa Director of Operations, Defence Intelligence Agency, Abuja, Nigeria.

ABSTRACT

Any nation or military General that goes into a war without strategy will definitely come out a loser. This is so because military theories and strategies are crucial in warfare; and human civilisation and world history have thrown up several war theorists such as Sun Tsu, Carl Von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan, Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and Antoine-Henri Jomini. Every officer or Commander that wishes to make a good career in the military must be schooled in the thoughts of these classical theorists on war. This paper engages Jomini’s theory of war, and its effects on land power in the Twenty-First Century. It covers a brief biography of Jomini, and the essential elements of his theory, his ideals of war, strategy and operational art.

Key words: Jomini, Theory of war, Twenty-First Century.

INTRODUCTION Military theories and strategies are of vital importance to the state and have great impact on warfare. Usually, the phenomenon place things already known into systems; provide ways to think about conflict, and provide advice on problem solving regarding wars and use of military forces. Generally, modern war theories and strategies are based on strategic cultures, as well as historical lessons learned by observing war behaviours and technology. Theories of war have existed from time immemorial before the principles guiding war fighting were published. But these theories do not exist in written treaties. Rather, they were confined to the understanding and born of imaginations of their authors. (Jomini in http://www.Clausewitz). Consequently, Marshal Saxe noted that war was a science shrouded in 68 Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 69 darkness, in the midst of which movements were done without assured steps; but by routine and prejudices which were natural consequences of ignorance. He also observed that, all sciences but war have theories and that one has to be profound to comprehend a few documented theories of war. (Saxe, in http:// www.Clausewitz). The study of conflict is a search for certain truths and scientific rules to follow. This arises from human desire for certainty, especially in human conflict – the most complex and perilous endeavour. There have been no shortages of thinkers offering iron and immutable rules of war. (Jomini in http:// rethinking). Several military theorists and strategists have made tremendous contributions to war fighting and their thoughts have continued to guide the conduct and execution of military operations even in this Twenty-First Century. Some of these strategists are Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan, Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell and Antoine-Henri de Jomini. Sun Tzu significantly influenced Mao Zedong who subsequently wrote on revolutionary warfare. Sun Tzu stressed the unpredictability of battle and the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics and military policy and high cost of war. Clausewitz’s ideas on war were heavily influenced by the mass popular warfare of the French Revolution period and Napoleon’s Prussian adversary Gerhard von Scharnhorst. According to Clausewitz, war was neither an art nor science, but a continuation of policy by other means and a form of social interaction. He also saw war as a wrestling match; an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will. He however noted that, it is not unilateral but a contest between two independent wills. Additionally, Clausewitz noted that poor intelligence, chance, friction etc make war in practice different to war in the abstract, and went further to argue that military efforts should be focused against enemy’s centre of gravity. Alfred Mahan considered sea power to include the overlapping concept of command at sea through naval superiority and that combination of maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets produce national wealth and greatness. He also thought that the navy should be used offensively, and that its principal object should be to destroy enemy’s fleet thus making the sea untenable for the enemy’s merchant fleet. He also argued that to be effective, fleet should not be divided and should be autonomous. Alfred Mahan considered the navy to be a better instrument of national policy than the army. Giulio Douhet argued that air power added a third dimension that revolutionised warfare by granting new flexibilities and initiative. He considered air power to be supreme claiming that without the control of the air, all operations; land, sea and even air were doomed. Giulio noted that appropriate target was not the enemy’s planes in the air, but their airfields and air industry on the ground. Antoine-Henri de Jomini, on his own part, sought natural laws to govern the conduct of war and developed a very geometrical and scientific approach to war. He also stressed the principle of concentration, the strategic value of interior lines and the close relationship between logistics and combat. Additionally, Jomini emphasised that politicians must conclude whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable and determine the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war. Furthermore, Jomini stressed that statesmen must not interfere with a commander’s authority once a war had been declared. Not only did he thoroughly understand the nature of war, he knew the intercourse of societies; and the source of war to be continuously occurring. These beliefs of Jomini are major considerations 70 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria even in contemporary military operations. Although, several military writers preceded Jomini, no one has impacted on professional military thinking, doctrine, and vocabulary as his work remains relevant even today. Our Objective in this piece is to outline the essential elements of Jomini’s Theory of War and its effect on Land Power in the Twenty-First Century. The paper will cover a brief biography of Jomini, essential elements of Jomini’s theory and Jomini’s ideals of war, strategy and operational art.

BIOGRAPHY OF ANTOINE – HENRI DE JOMINI: AN OVERVIEW Jomini was born on 6 Mar 1779, at Payerne in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland, where his father was minor official. As a child, he was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war and was eager to attend the Prince de Wurttemberg’s Military Academy in Montbeliard, but his family’s circumstances did not permit this. His early life was spent in the armies of the French Revolution and Helvetic Republic. After the 1801 Treaty of Luneville that ended hostilities between Hapsburg Austria and France, Jomini relocated to Paris ostensibly to resume the business career interrupted by war and revolution. More importantly, he wrote his first work on military theory, “Treatise on Grand Military Operations” which brought him to the attention of Marshal Ney and Napoleon. He was subsequently appointed on Marshal Ney’s staff, promoted Colonel and General de Brigade and awarded Legion of Honour. After the 1806 – 1807 campaigns in Prussia and Poland, Jomini rejoined Marshal Ney as his Chief of Staff, until 1813. After Napoleon’s victory over the Russians and Prussians at Bautzen, Jomini quit French Army and joined the Russian Services at the end of armistice and got promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, based on the reputation of his writings. He was also appointed aide-de-camp to Czar Alexander. Jomini’s post-war career was primarily in the Russian Army where he was employed in the military education of Prince Nicholas and played a principal role in the organisation of the Russian Staff College. He retired from service in 1829 and spent his long retirement writing and commenting on military affairs. His work, The Art of War, comes from the early part of his retirement. The purpose of The Art of War was to primarily educate serving officers on military matters outside the regimental routines that were the bread and butter of most Nineteenth Century officers’ lives. The Art of War is based on simple, easily understood maxims or principles which provide commanders with a clear framework by which to plan operations and eliminate the unpredictable variables involved in making war.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF JOMINI’S THEORY AND THE EFFECTS ON LAND POWER Jomini’s theory of war propounded seven elements of warfare which are statesmanship (or diplomacy) in its relation to war, military policy, strategy (or art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, either for defence or for invasion) and grand tactics. Other elements of Jomini’s theory are logistics (or the art of moving armies), engineering (or the attack and defence of fortification) and minor tactics. The knowledge of these is indispensable for a general and staff officer worth their salt. We need to discuss some of these in details. Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 71

Statesmanship/Diplomacy According to Jomini, statesmanship/diplomacy are those considerations for which a government concludes whether a war is proper, opportune or indispensable and determine the type of operations necessary to attain the objective of the war. Accordingly, Jomini propounded that a state could go to war for any of the following reasons: a. To reclaim certain rights or defend them. b. To protect and maintain the great interest of the state, such as commerce, manufactures or agriculture. c. To uphold neighbouring states whose existence is necessary either for safety of government or the balance of power. d. To fulfil the obligation of offensive and defensive alliances. e. To propagate political or religious theories to crush them out or to defend them. f. To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisition of territory. g. To defend threatened independence of the state. h. To avenge insulted honour. i. From a mania for conquest.

Also, Jomini’s theory espoused that war is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art, but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operation to be undertaken which should depend upon the circumstances of the case as follow: a. A state could simply make war against another state b. A state could make war against several states in alliance with each other. c. A state in alliance with another could make war upon a single enemy. d. A state could be either the principal party or auxiliary. e. A state could join a struggle at its beginning or after it has commenced. f. The theatre of war could be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an ally, or upon its own. g. If it is war of invasion, it could be upon adjacent or distant territory; it could be prudent and cautious, or it could be bold and adventurous. h. It could be a national war, either against the state or against the enemy. i. The war could be civil or religious war. 72 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Military Policy Military policy emphasises the importance of good intelligence. Accurate knowledge of the geography, demographics and military strength of an opponent are obviously necessary in order to prosecute a war successfully, but such information, according to Jomini has often been ignored by generals and policymakers. Jomini discusses the form military institutions should take, the relationship between the head of state and the principal military commander, organisation of military headquarters and military spirit of the nation and morale of the armies. One of the most important aspects of the military policy of a state is the nature of its military institutions. According to Jomini, a good army commanded by a general of ordinary capacity may accomplish a great feat; but a bad army with a good general may do equally well; but an army will certainly do a great deal more if its own superiority and that of the general are combined. He therefore propounded essential conditions that makes a perfect army. The conditions are as follow: a. A good recruiting system. b. A good organisation. c. A well-organised system of national reserves. d. Good instruction of officers and men in drill and internal duties as well as those of a campaign. e. A strict but not humiliating discipline, and a spirit of subordination and punctuality, based on conviction rather than on the formalities of the service. f. A well-digested system of rewards, suitable to excite emulation. g. A well instructed special arms of engineering and artillery. h. An armament superior, if possible to that of the enemy, both as to defensive and offensive arms. i. A general staff capable of applying these elements and having an organisation calculated to advance the theoretical and practical education of its officers. j. A good system for commissariat, hospitals, and of general administration. k. A good system of assignment to command and of directing the principal operations of war. l. Exciting and keeping alive the military spirit of the people. m. A good system of clothing and equipment.

Strategy and Fundamental Principle of War Strategy according to Jomini is the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, either for defence or for invasion. It is also the art of bringing the greater part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theatre of war or of the zone of operations. Alternatively, strategy is the art of making war on the map which results in campaign plan. In crafting strategy, Jomini explicitly noted the following steps: Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 73

a. Select theatre of war and discuss different combinations it admits. b. Determine decisive points and most favourable direction for operations. c. Select and establish fixed base and zone of operations. d. Select objective points whether for offensive or defensive purposes. e. Select strategic fronts, lines of defence and fronts of operations. f. Select lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front. g. Select best strategic lines and different manoeuvres necessary to embrace all possible cases. h. Determine eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves. i. Consider the manoeuvre of the armies/forces. j. Select fortresses to be used as refuge or those that could constitute obstacle and make provisions for sieges and recovery. k. Select points for entrenched camps. l. Consider diversions to be made and the large detachment necessary.

Jomini noted that there is a fundamental principle which must be followed in all good combinations. The principle embraces the following: a. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively upon the decisive points of a theatre of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one’s own. b. To manoeuvre to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces. c. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive points or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. d. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and energy.

The fundamental principle is supported by the following principles: a. The first means is to take the initiative of movement. The general who succeeds in gaining this advantage is the master of employment of his forces at the place where he chooses to take them. On the other hand, the general who waits for the enemy can make no strategic decision since he has subordinated his movements to those of his adversary and since he does not have time to stop the troops that are already in motion. The general who takes the initiatives knows what he is going to do; he conceals his movements, surprises and crushes an extremity or a weak point. The general who waits is beaten at one point before he learns of the attack. 74 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

b. The second means is to direct movement against the most important weak point of the enemy’s forces. The selection of this point depends upon the position of the enemy. The most important point will always be the point that offers the most favourable opportunities and the greatest results, for example positions that may lead to the severing of the line of communications between the enemy force and his base of operations. c. The result of the preceding truths is that preference is given to the attack of extremities of a line, then care must be taken not to attack both of the extremities at the same time. d. In order to be able to act in a combined effort on a single point, it is important to hold your forces in an area that is very nearly square so that they will be highly dispatchable. Large fronts are as contrary to good principles as broken lines, large detachments and divisions isolated beyond supporting distance. e. One of the most efficacious ways to apply the general principle is to make the enemy commit errors that are contrary to the principles. f. It is very important when one takes the initiative to be well informed of the positions of the enemy and the movements that he is capable of undertaking. Espionage is a useful means. g. It is not sufficient for success in war to skilfully bring masses to the most important points; it is necessary to know how to employ them there. If a force arrives at a decisive point and is inactive, the principle is forgotten; the enemy can counterattack. h. If the art of war consists of bringing the superior effort of a mass against the weak points of the enemy, it is undeniably necessary to pursue actively a beaten army. i. In order to make superior shock of a mass decisive, the general must give care to raise the morale of his army. j. By this rapid review, it is seen that the science of war is composed of three general activities, which have only a few subdivisions and few opportunities of execution. The first is to hold the most favourable lines of operations, second is the art of moving masses as rapidly as possible to the decisive point and the third is the art of simultaneously bringing the greatest mass to the most important point on the field of battle. k. Order of battle or the most suitable dispositions for conducting troop to combat should have for their object to secure at the same time mobility and solidity. l. In a ground difficult to access, the defensive order of battle should be composed of troop deployed in two ranks and covered by numerous companies of riflemen. But troops intended for the attack as well as the reserve should be arranged in columns of attack on the centre. For the reserve having fallen upon the enemy at the decisive moment, it should be done with force and rapidly, this is to say in columns. A part of the reserve can be kept deployed until the moment of falling on the enemy for the purpose of imposing upon him an appearance of numbers. Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 75

Grand Tactics and Battles Grand tactics is the art of making good combination preliminary battles, as well as during their progress. It is also the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon ground in contradistinction to planning on a map. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as those in strategy is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army and upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results. Grand tactics relates to the following: a. The choice of position and defensive lines of battle. b. The offensive in defensive battle. c. The different order of battle or the grand manoeuvres proper for the attack of the enemy’s line. d. The collision of two armies on the march or unexpected battles. e. Surprises of armies in the open field. f. The arrangements for leading troop into battle. g. The attack of positions and entrenched camps. h. Coups de main.

Battles are the chief and deciding features of war. There are types of battles; defensive, offensive and unexpected battles. Defensive battles or those fought by armies in favourable positions taken up to await the enemy’s attack while offensive battles are the ones where one army attacks another in position. Unexpected battles are fought unexpectedly and resulting from collision of two armies meeting on the march. According to Jomini, the results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which are not always within the scope of the military art, but in the morale of armies and nations.

Logistics Logistics is the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troop. It is also the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises. Additionally, logistics comprises the means and arrangements which works out the plan of strategy and tactics. While, strategy decides where to act; logistics bring the troop to the point. According to Jomini, logistics is the planning duties of a staff officer; arranging marches, drawing up orders and itineraries, directing reconnaissance, coordinating subordinate units and supplying an army. These duties entail the following: a. The preparation of all materials necessary for setting the army in motion, or in other words, for opening the campaigns. Drawing up orders, instructions and itineraries for the assemblage of the army and its subsequent launching upon its theatre of operations. b. Drawing up in a proper manner the orders of the general-in-chief for different enterprises, as well as plans for attack in expected battles. 76 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

c. Arranging with the chiefs of engineering and artillery the measures to be taken for the security of the posts which are to be used as depots, as well as those to be fortified in order to facilitate the operations of the army. d. Ordering and directing reconnaissance of every kind, and procuring in this way, and using spies, as exact information as possible of the positions and movement of the enemy. e. Taking every precaution for the proper execution of movements ordered by the general. Arranging the march of the different columns, so that all may move in an orderly and connected manner. Ascertaining certainty that the means requisite for the ease and safety of marches are prepared. Regulating the manner and times of halts. f. Giving proper composition to advanced guards, rear guards, flankers, and all detached bodies, and preparing good instructions for their guidance. Providing all means necessary for the performance of their duties. g. Prescribing forms and instructions for subordinate commanders or their staff officers, relative to the different methods of drawing up the troops in columns when the enemy is at hand as well as their formation in the most appropriate manner when the army is to engage in battle according to the nature of the ground and character of the enemy. h. Indicating to advanced guards and other detachments well-chosen points of assembly in case their attack by superior number and forming them what support they may hope to receive in case of need. i. Arranging and superintending the march of trains of baggage, munitions, provisions and ambulances, both with columns and in the rear in such manner that they will not interfere with the movements of the troops and will still be near at hand. Taking precautions for order and security, both on the march and when trains are halted and parked. j. Providing for the successive arrival of convoys of supplies. Collecting all the means of transportation of the country and of the army, and regulating their use. k. Directing the establishment of camps, and adopting regulations for their safety, good order and police. l. Establishing and organising lines of operations and supplies as well as lines of communications with these lines for detached bodies. Designating officers capable of organising and commanding in rear of the army, looking out for the safety of detachments and convoys, furnishing them good instructions, and looking out also for preserving suitable means of communication of the army with its base. m. Organising depots of convalescent, wounded, and sickly men, movable hospitals and workshops for repairs, providing for their safety. n. Keeping accurate record of detachments either on the flanks or in rear, keeping an eye upon their movements, and looking out for their return to the main column as soon as their service Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 77

on detachment is no longer necessary; giving them when required some centre of action, and forming strategic reserves. o. Organising marching battalions or companies to gather up isolated men or small detachment moving in either direction between the army and its base of operations. p. In case of sieges, ordering and supervising the employment of the troops in the trenches, making arrangements with the chiefs of artillery and engineers as to the labour to be performed by those troops and as to their management in sorties and assaults. q. In retreats, taking precautionary measures for preserving order; posting fresh troops to support and relieve the rear-guard; causing intelligence officers to examine and select positions where the rear guard may advantageously halt, engage the enemy, check his pursuit, that nothing shall be left behind and that they shall proceed in the most perfect order taking all proper precautions insure safety. r. In cantonments, assigning positions to the different corps; indicating to each principal division of the army a place of assembly in case of alarm; taking measures to see that all orders, instructions and regulations are implicitly observed.

JOMINI’S IDEALS ON WAR, STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL ART War Jomini categorised war into offensive wars to reclaim rights, wars of invasion, wars of expediency, wars with or without allies, wars of intervention, wars of opinion (national wars, civil and religious wars) and double wars.

Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights. The most just war is the one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and which in addition promises to the state advantages commensurate with the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. In wars of this nature, the most natural step is to occupy the disputed territory and conduct military operations in accordance to the circumstances and respective strength of the parties. Successes in wars to reclaim rights depend largely on the alliances each party is able to secure with other interested states and their respective military resources. In this type of war, scrupulous care must be taken not draw any other state to aid the enemy. Therefore, it is part of the duties of the statesman to foresee this chance and obviate it by making proper explanation and giving proper guarantees to other states.

Wars of Expediency. The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II and wars of the Spanish Succession were wars of expediency. Wars of expediency are undertaken by a powerful state to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political reasons, and to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or prevent his aggrandisement. In most cases, wars of expediency involve coalition of countries of interest. 78 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Wars with or without Allies. Military History teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and neglected by any power, however formidable. Therefore, in war, ally is to be desired all other things being equal. Alliances do not only furnish a contingent of troops, it annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening portions of its frontier which otherwise would have been secure.

Wars of Intervention. There are two kinds of wars of intervention; intervention in internal affairs of neighbouring states and intervention in external relations. The first type is rarely successful, though a state could interfere in internal affairs of other state when the situation propagates disorder with consequences on adjoining states. Intervention in external relations of states is more legitimate and more advantageous. There are three reasons for intervention in external relations; by virtue of treaty which binds to aid; to maintain political equilibrium and to avoid certain evil consequences of the war already commenced to secure certain advantages from the war.

Wars of Conquest. War of conquest, unhappily are often prosperous. However, there are natural lines in these wars which cannot be passed without incurring great disaster. There are two kinds of wars of conquest; attacking an adjoining state (invasion) and attacking from a distant point.

Wars of Opinion. Wars of opinion may be both internal and foreign. They may also be foreign or external without being internal or civil. National, civil and religious wars could originate from wars of opinion. Wars of opinion between two states belong to the class of wars of intervention, for they result either from doctrines which one party desires to propagate amongst its neighbours or from dogmas which it desires to crush. These types of wars originate from religious or political dogmas and are most deplorable. They also enlist worst passions and are, vindictive, cruel and terrible.

Double Wars. A government may be compelled to maintain a war against two states; but it will be extremely difficult if it does not find an ally to come to its aid with a view to its safety and political equilibrium. A government’s decision to undertake double war is influenced by certain circumstances; localities of the wars, possibility of finding allies to restore and equality of strength between parties. Generally, double wars should be avoided, and if cause of war be given by the two states, it is more prudent to dissimulate or neglect the wrongs suffered from one of them, until there is a proper opportunity to redress them. Notwithstanding the arbitrariness of Jomini in categorising war, he warned that proper attention must be given to the general diplomatic situation and international opinions, and that public opinions should not be ignored. This is because, knowledge of domestic opinion is important so that leaders have an understanding of the level of sacrifice their people will be willing to accept. According to Jomini, an accurate assessment of the popular opinion in enemy’s state is vital in evaluating the level of opposition that can be expected during war. Jomini in the Twenty-First Century 79

Strategy Strategy is about how leadership will use the power; means or resources available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographical locations to achieve objectives (ends) that supports the state interests (Vicksburg, on-line). It simply means ways to employ means to achieve ends. Traditionally, there are 3 military strategies; attrition, exhaustion and annihilation. Attrition, is the reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and materiel, while exhaustion is the gradual erosion of a nation’s means to resist. Annihilation on the other hand is the seeking of the immediate destruction of the combat power of the enemy’s armed forces (Vicksburg). Jomini’s view on strategy (ends, ways and means) is that strategic objectives need to be explicitly expressed and derived against the backdrop of issues, trends, and challenges. He also stressed that ends (the political objectives) should be ends driven and not resource driven (Hunsang, on-line). Also, “strategy is the key to warfare. That all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and that these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory” (Jomini, in http://rethinking). Consequently, Jomini concluded that a good strategy must be relative to objectives, current realities, future, risk, costs, adversaries and allies (in Hunsang, on-line).

Operational Arts Operational art is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organisation, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practised not only by commanders, but also by senior staff officers and subordinate commanders (JP 3-0). Operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Operational art focuses in particular on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronisation of the various components of the force. Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions: What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends); What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways); How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means); and What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions? (JP 3-0) Operational art is characterised by the following fundamental elements: Synergy, simultaneity and depth, anticipation, balance, leverage, timing and tempo, operational reach and approach, forces and functions, arranging operations, centres of gravity, direct vs. indirect approach, decisive points, culmination and termination. (J.P. 3-0). 80 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

CONCLUSION Jomini’s theory of war has been the focus of this modest discourse, bringing out the essential elements of the theory and his ideas on war, strategy and operational art. His works along with other classical theorists such as Sun Tsu, Carl Von Clausewitz, Alfred Mahan, Billy Mitchell, and Giulio Douhet, present every military officer with fundamental intellectual menu and solid rock upon which to stand and for equipment for war.

REFERENCES

Jomini, Baron Antoine-Henri de, The Present War And its Utility, http://www. Clausewitz.com/readings/ Jomini/JOMINIESS.htm Jomini: Mass Science and Future Warfare, http://rethinking-nkingscurity.typepad.com/rethink ingscurity)2009/01/jomini-mass-ascience-and-future-warfare.html,accesed July, 3 2017. Jomini, Antoine (2005), The Art of War, (G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill translation), Texas, EL Paso Norte Press. Kim Hunsang (Lt Col.), Understanding The Nature of War and Theory Through Jomini’s View, https:/ /sites-google.com (accessed July 3 2017). Overview of Operational Art, JP 3-0, Chaps II and III. Saxe Marshal in http://www.Clausewitz.com) readings/Jomini/JOMINESS.htm Vicksburg Basic Military Doctrine, http://www.Scribd.com (accessed June 29, 2017). The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

POLICY AND STRATEGY FORMULATION PROCESS AND NEXUS

by

Cdre A Kpou (rtd)

ABSTRACT

Policy and Strategy are twin concepts of common knowledge and great importance in governance and defence. While policy generally exudes statement of intent for pursuit of national or public interest, strategy is the comprehensive plan of action for the achievement of policy (objectives). This paper interrogates both the content and formulation processes of these two concepts, as well as the nexus between them. It goes further to demonstrate how military strategy is formulated for national defence, and transmitted to the operational level, with focus on Nigeria.

Key words: Policy, Strategy, Formulation Process, Nexus.

INTRODUCTION Policy and strategy are two enduring concepts that managers and leaders of organisations and national systems would surely encounter in furtherance of corporate or national goals. They both define the nature and character of organisations and nations. In spite of their conceptual and practical affinities, policy and strategy have their peculiarities. Policies are framed at the topmost echelon of human systems as deliberate set of normative principles to guide decisions and reach rational outcomes. A policy is a statement of intent, sometimes defining the object but more often stating the procedure or protocol for the conduct of the business of a nation, an institution, a group or an individual. Strategy on the other hand, is a comprehensive plan of action formulated or designed in order to achieve a particular goal. Thus, it is obvious that strategy is a path to achieving the objects of policy. There are a number of conceptual formulations to explain the policy making process. A common framework is the “stages approach” typified by elements in a policy cycle. The concept of public policy

81 82 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria cycles was first developed by Harold Lasswell in the 1950s and embodies “recurrent patterns shown by procedures that ultimately lead to a public policy” (Fisher et al, 2007). A typical policy cycle has five key elements namely: Agenda Setting; Policy Formulation; Decision Making; Policy Implementation as well as Performance Measurement and Evaluation (PME) and Feedback (Howlett et al, 2003). Policy Formulation is the development of effective and acceptable courses of action for addressing problems placed in the policy agenda. It typically includes Statement of the Policy Problem(s), Policy Objectives, Underpinning principles, values and philosophies, Strategic Outlook, Authority and Performance Measurement Indicators (PMIs). Policy can be developed in a routinely, analogously or creative manner (Jones, 1977). Generally, strategy formulation or strategic planning emanates from the Strategic Outlook and enables an organisation to evaluate its resources, allocate budgets and determine the most effective plan to attain the objectives. It requires six basic steps. These are organisational definition, establishment of strategic mission and strategic objectives, analysis of choices, detailed definition of strategy, implementation strategy and evaluation. Policy and strategy are very important instruments for goal attainment of nations, institutions, groups and even individuals, but this presentation shall be delimited to national policy and strategy. Secondly, policy and strategy can be applied to all aspects of a nation’s life, and the discourse thus far gives the general nature of both. However, the focus in this presentation shall be on policy and strategy for national security, particularly defence. Thirdly, we need to note here the three levels of military engagement namely strategic, operational and tactical. The discourse shall transit from the strategic level of defence to the operational level. The purpose is to enable the average reader appreciate the linkages between theory and practice of both policy and strategy in the Vulnerable, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) national security environment in which they may operate, especial middle level commanders and senior staff officers. The task of this discourse is to highlight the essential processes of policy and strategy formulation for the defence of the nation. The discourse will cover the following: a. National Security Architecture. b. Formulation of National Defence Policy. c. Transmission of National Defence Policy to Operational Level. d. Guidelines for the Formulation of Military Strategy; and e. SAFE Test for Military Strategy.

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE The roles of defence derive from the overall security posture of a nation. Security is a multi-functional requirement in a nation and interconnects several themes. Indeed, the complex instruments for security management are depicted in the national security architecture in Fig. 1 which is discussed further below: Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus 83

Figure 1: National Security Architecture. a. National Purpose: The imperatives for national security policy and strategy emanate first and foremost, from the national purpose. This is a culmination of the overall aspirations of a nation. In other words, the national purpose captures what and where a nation wishes to be in the future. b. National Interests: National Interests (NIs) are the shared enduring values and beliefs of a nation. They represent the moral, philosophical and legal basis for the survival and continuance of a nation. The NIs of nations are commonly categorised into core, vital, strategic and peripheral. The performance of the security instruments and measures are often measured against the NIs. c. Elements of National Power: National Power (NP) refers to overall capabilities of a nation whereas the Elements of National Power (ENP) define the factors that influence a state’s ability to attain its objectives in the light of environmental risks. The ENP are numerous and include geography, strategic population, leadership, quality of diplomacy, political style, natural resources, economic wealth, social order, military capabilities (Dunmoye, 2007). d. Grand Strategy: Grand Strategy (GS) is the aggregation of all the ENP of a nation to attain its national purpose in times of peace or war. Mead (1971) noted that Grand Strategy is “that which so integrates the policies and armaments of a nation that the resort to war is rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory”. It thus defines the nation’s overall real and potential power such that it can prevail in conflicts even without committing military resources. e. National Security: National Security (NS) is a nation’s ability to protect and preserve the state, its territory and people from physical, political, economic, social, environmental, human and natural threats from within and without, and the capability to project its abilities in the international arena. 84 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria f. National Security Policy: National Security Policy (NSP) is a dynamic, comprehensive and coherent set of principles articulated by government to protect, preserve, promote and project the national interests in the face of real, internal and external threats (National Defence College, 2012). g. National Security Strategy: National Security Strategy (NSS) is a comprehensive document outlining the major security concerns of a nation and how it plans to deal with them. h. National Defence: National defence is the ability of a nation’s armed forces and affiliated resources to protect, preserve, promote and project the national interests of a nation. i. National Defence Policy: National Defence Policy (NDP) is a set of regulations, guidelines and stated intentions of government for the development and employment of military power in conjunction with affiliated resources for the protection, preservation, promotion and projection of the national interests both within and without (Kpou, 2017).

FORMULATION OF A NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY The formulation of a NDP typically reflects some fundamental and critical inputs. These include the following: a. Legal Framework: Legal framework indicates the authority to issue far-reaching policies in the defence sector. It gives the NDP many advantages including governmental and non-governmental buy-ins, assurances of resource provision and public support. b. Security Vision: A good starting point is a definition of the vision of security for the nation. This could be derived from the NSP. c. Defence Mission: The NDP must define the mission of national defence, derived from the vision of security for the nation. d. Defence Objectives: Defence priorities and specific objectives including performance criteria based on the stated mission. e. Strategic Environment and Threats Analysis: Conduct of external/internal scan of strategic environment to identify and analyse threats to national defence interests. Threats could be analysed using a flexible/dynamic framework to facilitate evidence based decision-making and provide informed rationale for resource allocation. f. Occasions for Military Force Deployments: Unambiguous determination of the types of threats and occasions requiring military force deployments derived from the nation’s defence posture. g. Authority for the Use of Force. Clear determination of the authority to use force, flow of such authority and procedures. This is to include the principles of Civil Military Relations (CMR), legislative controls and Higher Management of Defence (HMD). h. Organisation of the Armed Forces: Comprehensive mid to long term planning perspectives on the organisation of the armed forces and allied resources. This is to include force design and force Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus 85

levels particularly the number/type of armed services, their shape and sizes such as ORBAT and major platforms/hardware/equipment. i. Military Doctrines: Outline of military doctrines consistent with NDP objectives. These would guide joint/inter-agency operational planning and the multi-track contributions of military forces to campaigns, major operations, battles and engagements. j. Resourcing: This involves principles for resource allocation, procurement, development, replenishment, sustainment and retention. The resources refer to financial, human, C4ISR, platforms/ hardware, system/equipment and materiel. Critical issues such as Defence Economics, Human Resource Management and Defence Logistics. k. Self-Reliance: Promotion of Science, Technology and Initiative or Innovation, (STI), Research and Development (R and D), military productions, local content and Military Industrial Complex (MIC). l. Ethical Issues: Statement on rule of law, human rights, environmental concerns, gender mainstreaming and Espirit De Corps. m. Civil Support: Principle to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace in times of conflict. This is to include Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), information and education strategies. n. Military Transformation: Application of contemporary paradigms of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This is to enable continuous, regenerative and transformational change in the armed forces to ensure force modernisation in the light of future wars. o. Measurement and Evaluation: Principles and processes for Performance Monitoring, Measurement and Evaluation (PME) against set objectives and standards. p. Review. Periodicity/conditions for statutory/contingent review.

TRANSMISSION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY TO THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL The NDP is transmitted to the operational levels through different layers as shown in Fig. 2 below: 86 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Layers of Transmission of NDP

THE PRESIDENCY (See Policy Dev’t and Strat Formulation Strategic Guidance NSP and NSS )

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS Strategic Guidance (Def Dev’t and Military Strat Formulation) NDP and NMS

DEFENCE and SERVICE HEADQUARTERS Operational directives Operational orders

Multi-national Joint Task Force, Joint Task Forces, Special Task Forces and single-Service Operations

Figure 2: Layers of Transmission of National Defence Policy.

The Presidency is required to give grand strategic direction on security. This is to be applied by the National Security Council (NSC) to give strategic guidance and indeed, produce the NSP and/or NSS. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is required to develop the NDP and formulate a National Military Strategy (NMS) in conjunction with Defence Headquarters (DHQ) and the Services. It thereafter issues defence guidance. Depending on the type and scale of operations, the DHQ or services (Svc) HQs may issue operational directives in the form of Operational Orders to the operational commanders and/or theatre commanders. Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus 87

GUIDELINES FOR THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY STRATEGY Having dealt with the super structure and security architecture of a nation, with reference to Nigeria, we must now deal with the particular issue, military strategy. We have seen strategy as a generalist tool for mobilising deliberate efforts to attain the objects of policy. But strategy in its pristine form was the exclusive preserve of generals. No wonder that a number of military thinkers and strategists had a lot to say about strategy. In his often quoted definitive book, On War, the famous 19th Century military strategist, Carl Von Clausewitz (1976 Translation) stated that Strategy is “...the use of engagement for the purpose of war”. While Clausewitz elaborated on the psychological and political meaning of war, it was his contemporary and perhaps, competitor, Jomini, who brought the idea of strategy to the table of the strategic planner. He reflected deeply on the detailed vocabulary of geometric terms such as bases, strategic lines and key points. To Jomini (2005 Translation), Strategy is “...the art of making war upon a map...” Against the background of the ideological struggles in the Cold War era, Beaufre (1965), depicts the inherent contestations in strategic contemplation when he asserted that Strategy is “…the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute”. The policy-strategy nexus was aptly captured by Hart (2009) who defined Strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy”. He also introduced the concept of indirect approach and two fundamentals to strategy. A more contemporary definition of Strategy is given by Edward (1971: Viii) as:

the art of controlling and utilising the resources of a nation, or a coalition of nations, including its armed forces , to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential or merely presumed.

This discourse shall adopt the definition of strategy given by the United States Army War College (USAWC) as “the skilful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways and means to promote and defend the national interest”. As a way of further elaboration, a. Ends are policy objectives: In other words, what is the nation trying to achieve? For instance, for Nigeria, is it to overcome Boko Haram insurgency in the North East? b. Ways are Courses of Action: In other words, how will the nation achieve its objective? For instance, using a military coalition of partners, and mobilising an optimal bouquet of non- kinetic elements of national power. c. Means are the Resources: These may be tangible or intangible assets available (on hand or attainable) to use for the achievement of the desired objective(s). 88 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

It is to be noted that the formulation of strategy is often confronted with the consideration of internal and external risk factors. Consequently, strategy can be here defined as the skilful formulation, coordination, and optimum application of ends, ways and means in the face of environmental risks, to promote and defend the national interest.

The Guidelines: The guidelines for the formulation of a military strategy given by the USAWC are as follows: a. Identify and determine the National Interests (indicate the type of interest) b. Determine the level of intensity of the national interests (Indicate if it is a core, vital, strategic or peripheral interest) c. Evaluate the issues, trends and challenges in the internal and external environment concerning the national interests. Identify the critical actors, their interests and policies. Identify the actors with whom the nation has convergence of interests, and those with divergence. Indeed, conduct a threats and opportunities analysis. d. Identify the policy objectives (Ends). Indicate the current policy or precedent on this national interest. e. Identify the means available. f. Consider the alternative courses (ways) that the means can be applied to the ends of policy. This should be comprehensive considering all amenable elements of national power in combination with military power. Use the SAFE Test. g. Conduct a risk analysis. h. Present and communicate the details of the strategy. i. Indicate mechanisms for PME and feedback.

The strategy formulation outline above conforms with the Strategy Formulation Model adapted from the USAWC shown in Figure below: i Indicate mechanisms for PME and feedback The Strategy formulation outline above conforms with the Strategy Formulation Model adapted from the USAW shown in Figure 3 below. Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus 89

Ext’l Risks National Purpose Int’l Risks

Globalisation National Interest Judiciary

International Law Political Instability

Grand Strategy

NSAs Bureaucracy

Ideological National Policy Institutional Weaknesses

Struggles

IPOs Strategy Formulation Process Marginalisation

Climate Change Human Conditions National Objectives (Ends)

Neo-colonialism Rentier Economy Strategic Concepts National Power

(Ways) Common Security (Means) Unpatriotic Media

WMD SAFE Test System of Government WTO Rules

GWOT Interest Groups

Alliances Risk Assessment

STRATEGY

PME and Feedback

Figure 3: Strategy Formulation Model

DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY STRATEGY AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL A crucial phase of the strategy development process is the conduct of the SAFE Test and risk assessment. The SAFE Test evaluates the Suitability, Acceptability, Feasibility and Ethics of the suggested strategy. This process is further examined below: a. Suitability. Would the strategy achieve the ends of policy? What is the level of fit between the strategy and the ends? Is the strategy adequately exploiting the identified opportunities and decisively dealing with the identified threats? b. Acceptability Test. Are the ways reasonable? Is the strategy agreeable to both local and international stakeholders? How predictable is/are the outcome(s)? Is it likely to meet the expected benefits of the stakeholders? How would the stakeholders react to the strategy? 90 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria c. Feasibility Test. Do we have the overall means to execute the strategy? In other words, do the resources and competencies currently exist? If not, can they be obtained? Can the resources be integrated into the overall strategic effort, for different phases of strategy implementation? The resources here refer to Finance, Hardware, Equipment and Technology, Materiel, People and Partners, Information and Physical resources. d. Ethics. Is the strategy legal and ethical? Does it embody the values of the nation? Does it meet international and local best practices? How durable and enduring is the strategy?

Risk assessment on the other hand, is in the realm of probability. It considers the chance that the chosen strategy will attain the policy objectives and the likely second and third order effects of the implementation of the strategy. The effects could be estimated on politics, the economy, foreign relations and so on. The reason for the risk assessment is that no strategy is likely to command all the resources required for a 100 per cent assurance of success. Consequently, the risks assessment is anticipatory and proactive and helps to reduce undue risks.

CONCLUSION Policy and strategy are important instruments for security and defence management of any nation. In Nigeria, we are yet to imbibe the security culture and develop the legal/policy imperatives to regularly develop these important national security and defence documents. It is hoped that discourses as this would help to develop this culture and consciousness. When that happens, the skills of policy and strategy formulation would be helpful. The guidelines for strategy formulation given here would be useful for the development of strategy at any level of military engagement. As a checklist, it is important that Strategy: a. Should always be holistic and comprehensive. b. Should always balance ends, ways and means. c. Is generally end-seeking while ways are always constrained by means. d. Is always subordinate to the strategic environment. e. Should focus on effectiveness rather than efficiency. f. Is anticipatory instead of predictive. It is inherently risky and generates friction and its own security problematique. Policy and Strategy Formulation Process and Nexus 91

REFERENCES

Beaufre, A. (1965) Introduction to Strategy, New York: Praeger, Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War, translated by M Howard and P Parel, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Dunmoye, R. A. (2007), “Elements of National Power”, Lecture delivered to Participants of National Defence College Course 16, October. Edward, M.E. (1971) Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fischer, F.GJ Miller and MS Sander (eds) (2007), Handbook of Public Policy: Theory, Politics and Method (New York: CRC Press, http://www.dictionnaire.enap.ca/ dictionnaire/docs/definitions/ definitions anglais/policy_cycles.pdf assessed 26 Sep 16. Howlett M. and M Ramesh, (2003), Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Toronto: Oxford University Press. Jomini, .A.H, 2005), The Art of War, Translated by GH Mendell and WP Craighill Texas: El Paso Norte Press. Jones, C.O. (1977), An Introduction to the Study of Policy, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press. Kpou, A. (2017), lecture on “National Defence Policy Formulation”, delivered at the Air Force War College, 10 March. Liddell Hart, B.H. (2009), Strategy, London: BN Publishing. National Defence College, “National Security Policy, 2012” being a contribution to the National Security Policy formulation process by the National Defence College. USAWC, “Guidelines for Strategy Formulation”, in National Security Policy and Strategy Module. USAWC, Lesson 1, Theory of War and Strategy. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ AND MODERN WAR

by

Commodore Adeseye Oke Ayobanjo

ABSTRACT

Technology is a key influence in modern warfare, as its continuous transformations make wars more destructive. But one key factor in warfare that has not changed like technology is the body of theories of warfare. The concepts, methods, views and manoeuvres of classical war theorists continue to make their impact in contemporary wars, as if they were espoused just last year.

This paper engages Carl Von Clausewitz’ theories on warfare, and examines their influences in modern wars. The author dutifully shows how the theories of this classical thinker influenced the Gulf War I, (1990-1991).

Key words: Carl Von Clausewitz, Modern War, Theories of War.

INTRODUCTION Since the Industrial Revolution (1760 - 1840), war has been fashioned progressively more by technological change. As a result, no major wars since the mid-nineteenth century have been fought with the same weapons. From a technological point of view, wars are apparently different from each other, especially when comparisons are made between the First and Second World Wars, the Vietnam War, the Arab- Israeli 1967 and 1973 wars, Nigerian Civil War (1967 – 1970), First Gulf War and even the Liberian War 1990 among others in the modern era (New, 1996). Modern warfare refers to warfare using the concepts, methods, and military technology that have come into use during and after the Second World War (1939 - 1945), (Townshend, 2005:206). The concepts and methods have assumed more complex forms of the 19th and up till this 21st Century

92 Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 93 experiences, especially due to the extensive use of highly advanced information technology. Even though modern warfare appears to be mainly characterised by changing weapons technology, other factors such as human nature, the political essence of war, the quality of leadership, national commitment, coalitions and diplomacy have remained the same (Creveld, in Townshend, 2005:349). This explains why modern strategists and military professionals can, despite revolutionary changes in the material nature of warfare, derive great benefit from reading the classical works on war. Of all the classic studies on war, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu (544 – 496 BC), and On War by Clausewitz (1780 -1831) are still the most outstanding, “modern,” and relevant despite the passage of time. According to Moran, no comprehensive paradigms or frameworks for the study of war have been published that significantly modifies the works of Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, (Moran n.d:10). Not distracted by constantly changing technological, bureaucratic, organisational, and economic factors, as well as new dimensions of warfare in the air, under water as well as outer and cyber space, the insights of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz identify the immutable human dimensions of warfare so essential for victory. Carl Von Clausewitz was a Prussian (now Germany) General of the Calvary division who was involved in numerous military campaigns during his life time. He was also a notable military theorist who was passionate about the examination of war and he emphasised on the moral/psychological and political aspects of war. He wrote a methodical and philosophical examination of war in all its aspects and the result was his principal book, On War. The book, On War is a classical work that has continued to influence the preparations and conduct of modern wars. Indeed, several military strategists have commented that the theories of Clausewitz as contained in On War were critical factors that characterised the conduct of the First Gulf War 1990 – 1991. Also, several war colleges all over the world include it as a must study in their curricula with profound results following their application of the theories. The purpose of this paper, is to interrogate some of the theories of war as propounded by Clausewitz in his book, On War. such as; definition and nature of war, absolute and real war, paradoxical trinity, strategy as well as attack and defence. Lastly, the paper will discuss the application of Clausewitz’ theory of war in the First Gulf War 1990 – 1991.

BRIEF ON CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ Carl Von Clausewitz was born on 1 June 1780 at Burg bel near Magdeburg in the defunct kingdom of Prussia (in modern day Germany). Clausewitz joined the Prussian Army at the age of 12 and witnessed combat at 13 against France. He was promoted lieutenant at 15 while serving at the garrison in Neuruppin. In 1801, Clausewitz at the age of 21 was admitted into the military academy in Berlin where he studied the writings of Immanuel Kant, a renowned military philosopher. He served during the Jena Campaign as aide-de-camp to Prince August of Prussia and was among the 25,000 Prussians captured at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt on 14 October 1806, when Napoleon invaded Prussia. Clausewitz was held prisoner in France and Switzerland from 1807 to 1808. On return to Prussia in 1810, he married Countess Marie von Brühl and socialised with Berlin’s literary and intellectual elite. In opposition to Prussia’s enforced alliance with Napoleon I, Clausewitz left the Prussian army and served in the Imperial Russian Army from 1812 to 1813.He fought in all major battles of the Napoleonic wars. He took part 94 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria in the Battle of Borodino1812 and like many Prussian officers serving in Russia, he joined the Russian- German Legion in 1813. In the service of the Russian Empire, Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen (1812), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies at the battle of Waterloo in 1815. Clausewitz died of cholera which he contracted in the field in 1831. His famous book, Vom Kriege translated On War was first published by his widow in 1832. The expose on the life and times of Clausewitz has been deliberately included in this paper in order to bring out the humanity that could be brought to bear in war. In Clausewitz, a case of ‘catch them young’ could be observed, with the higher chance to imbue war-like passion and genius. It was such passion and perhaps genius that saw Clausewitz taking part in all the Napoleonic wars and in the course of time reached an apogee of potency and experience that helped him to defeat Napoleon, whom he had come to refer to as ‘the god of war.’ Additionally, it would be seen that Clausewitz was influenced by the politics, education, philosophy and socio-economic conditions of his days. Of course, the harmful impact of the environment (call it Biological Warfare) revealed the vulnerability of human life as cholera and not gun/ sword eliminated a hero of several battles. Lastly, the expose brought out the importance of writing down personal experiences and even carrying a spouse along in order to influence future generations.

THE BOOK: ON WAR The book, On War originally, published as Vom Kriege in German is a compendium of the theories of war as set out by Clausewitz. It was written between 1816 and 1830, and as noted earlier was published posthumously by his wife, Marie Von Bruhl in 1832. It was translated into English and has been edited and reviewed by several authors. It is made up of eight chapters covering; the nature of war, theory of war, strategy in general, the engagement, military force, defence, attack, and war plans. The book contains a wealth of historical examples used to illustrate its various concepts with Napoleon Bonaparte being perhaps its central figure. Clausewitz used a dialectical method to construct his argument in the book, leading to frequent modern misinterpretation because he explores various – often opposed – ideas before coming to conclusions. Modern perceptions of war are based on the concepts Clausewitz put forth in On War, though these have been very diversely interpreted by various leaders such as Moltke, Vladimir Lenin, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mao Zedong, thinkers, armies, and peoples. Indeed, Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticised by competing theorists, Antoine-Henri Jomini in the 19th Century, Liddell Hart in the mid-20th Century, and Martin van Creveld and John Keegan more recently. Again, the take away from this portion of the paper is that On War is a book on the theories of war which are not cast in stone. According to Azar Gat, (in Hoyt, 2014) the conduct of war must not be reduced to universal principles. Clausewitz also avers that the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled. Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 95

SOME THEORIES OF WAR BY CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ Several individuals before and after Clausewitz have propounded various theories on war. As earlier stated, the theories by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz continue to attract concurrence or criticisms and even create confusion. According to Clausewitz (Howard and Paret, 1976), theory is “intended to provide a thinking man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to carry out, rather than to serve as a guide, whom at the moment of action lays down precisely the path he must take. It will focus on the definition and nature of war, distinction between absolute and real war, paradoxical trinity, centre of gravity (CoG) as well as attack and defence. Definition of War War has been defined variously by scholars and institutions based on their scale, purpose, duration and means among others. Clausewitz also defined or described war in various ways in different portions of On War. Avoiding a doctrinaire definition of war, he sprightly referred to war as, “... nothing but a duel on a larger scale” (Ibid: 75). He stated further that countless duels aggregate to make a war. He described it as the interplay of physical forces between two wrestlers seeking to compel the other to do his will. In essence, he held that “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” In a theoretical sense, Clausewitz referred to war as fighting, which is the only effective principle in all activities that constitute war. He pointed out that the need to fight compelled man to invent appropriate devices to gain advantages in combat, which in turn led to great changes in the form of fighting. This definition is however, limited in its scope and does not properly showcase the reality of war. In conceptualising war on a larger generic scope, Clausewitz saw war as part of man’s social existence and described war as “…a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed – that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts” (Ibid: 149). This definition portends that even a duel between mixed martial artists of the US Ultimate Fighter Championship (UFC) is war, except that the meaning of ‘major interest’ is left to the thoughts of those involved in the fight. In consideration of the major interests of states and the natural tendencies of man to fight, Clausewitz conceptualised war as belonging to the realm of chance, which is incomparable to no other human activity, (Ibid: 104). He saw war as a very serious human activity and not as a pastime that brings joy through daring and winning. Indeed, he saw the reason for war in a political situation that involves whole peoples, especially the civilised ones, and the occasion is always due to some political object. He therefore described war as an act of policy. He continued further by asserting that, “...war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means,” (Ibid: 86-87). It therefore means that if the political object is the goal, and war the means of attaining the goal, then the two can never be treated in isolation. Thus, if war springs out from some political purpose, the natural expectation is that the prime cause of war will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. Nature of War The nature of a war varies based on the emotive character of those waging it, the location, period of occurrence and the materials being used to wage it. Clausewitz avers that war essentially involves force; 96 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria force that is created through artistic and scientific enterprise, (Ibid: 75). He describes the force as, “Force – that is physical force, for moral force has no existence save as expressed in the state and the law – is thus the means of war ;…”( Ibid). Indeed, he views moral force as self-imposed, imperceptible limitation that scarcely impairs the physical force. He went further to assert that war is a very dangerous business and that it is a fallacy to think that it could be waged without much bloodshed. However, the use of force was to be compatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect. It could then be understood why some wars are regarded as conventional, asymmetric, irregular, guerrilla, hybrid as they depend on the art and science involved in the creation of the materials used to generate required physical force, manner of applying the force and regard to the accompanying moral force. The motives of people and the developing or existing circumstance also influence the nature of war. Clausewitz posited that, “The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war, the more they affect the belligerent nations and the fiercer the tensions that precede the outbreak…the more important will be the destruction of the enemy… and the more military and less political will war appear to be. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military elements natural tendency to violence,… and the conflict will seem increasingly political,” (Ibid). He also emphasised that, “…Wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kinds of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive,” (Ibid; 88-89). Understanding the nature of a war to be waged is therefore a necessity during its preparation, conduct, termination and re-assessment.

Absolute War The concept of absolute war is an abstract construct by Clausewitz, which is discussed only in the first half of Book 8 in On War. He asserted that, “As policy becomes more ambitious and vigorous, so will war, and this may reach the point where war attains its absolute form,” (Ibid: 106). It was characterised by very high levels of energy and professional competence, and it aims at the destruction of the opposing force and the attainment of a political decision by force of arms. Although it is presented as a philosophical concept, and thus probably not capable of perfect attainment in the real world, it is believed to have been modelled very closely on Napoleon’s most masterful campaigns and was intended to be pursued or emulated by commanders when possible, (Ibid). The paradox in the absolute war construct is brought to the fore where Clausewitz wrote that, “Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction. Such an interaction could lead to a maximum effort if a maximum could be defined. But in that case all proportion between action and political demands would be lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise. In this way the belligerent is again driven to adopt a middle course. He would act on the principle of using no greater force, and setting himself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose,”(Ibid: 585). Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 97

The absolute war construct is closely related to the “Ideal War” theory described in Book 1 of On War. Here, war is viewed in abstraction. Clausewitz stated that, “…in the field of abstract thought, the inquiring mind can never rest until it reaches the extreme…a clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own.” He stated further that, “…you might try to deduce absolute terms for the objective you should aim at and for the means of achieving it; but if you did so the continuous interaction would land you in extremes that represented nothing but a play of the imagination issuing from an almost invisible sequence of logical subtleties…If we were to think purely in absolute terms, we…could…proclaim that…since the extreme must always be the goal, the greatest effort must always be exerted. Would this ever be the case in practice?”(Ibid: 78). The answer to the question on extreme exertion of effort was surprisingly a ‘Yes’ according to Clausewitz. However, it was premised on three conditions, if: war were a totally isolated act, occurring suddenly and not produced by previous events in the political world; it consisted of a single decisive act or a set of simultaneous ones; and the decision achieved was complete and perfect in itself, uninfluenced by any previous estimate of the political situation it would bring about,” (Ibid). A cursory look at this logic of the Absolute War theory sadly, reveals that war is never an isolated act, does not consist of a single short blow, and in war, the outcome is never final, but transitory. Absolute War, therefore, lies only in the realm of theory and is impracticable in the real world.

Real War Clausewitz identified early that the requirement for the use of extreme force was not attainable in real war. He posited that, “Once the antagonists have ceased to be mere figments of a theory and become actual states and governments, when war is…a series of actions obeying its own peculiar laws, reality supplies the data from which we can deduce the unknown that lies ahead”, (Ibid: 80). Furthermore, he asserted that, “…war is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matter…In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts,” (Ibid: 149). This action and reaction interplay in real war was also brought out in Clausewitz assertion that, “In war the result is never final…The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date”(Ibid: 80). In distinguishing Real War from Absolute War, Clausewitz recognised that the effort to be applied in war was subject to moderation as dictated by the political aim. He therefore averred that, “The political object – the original motive of the war – will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort that it requires…Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation”(Ibid: 81). The influence of political object on war and its outcome reveals that absolute or extreme exertion of force was not a possibility in real war, which is an act of policy. Clausewitz noted that, “Were it a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence (as the pure concept would require), war would of its own independent will usurp the place of policy the moment policy had brought it into being; it would then drive policy out of office and rule by the laws of its own nature, very much like a mine that 98 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria can explode only in the manner or direction predetermined by the setting…If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it…” (Ibid: 87). It would then be seen that in real war, policy will have a continuous influence on military operations as far as war’s violent nature will allow.

Paradoxical Trinity Clausewitz’s theory of the paradoxical trinity is captured in his assertion that, “War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon, its dominant characteristics always make war a remarkable trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” (Ibid: 89). This trinity is interpreted to mean the government, the commander and his army (the military), and the people as further posited by Clausewitz, that, “The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second, the commander and his army; the third the government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander and his army; but the political aims are the business of the government alone” (Ibid). He describes the trinity as “…three different codes of law, deep-rooted in the subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. Our task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets” (Ibid). It could be seen that Clausewitz’s trinity is like a three-legged stool and all the legs; government, military and the people are indispensible. If one leg is missing or shorter than the other, the stool is not functional. The purpose and means of war are found in the trinity. The government defines the political purpose, the military the instrument or means to achieve the political goal, and the people provide the will. Indeed, all the three components are essential to Clausewitz’s strategic concept and could be employed in any conflict or war.

Strategy and the Strategist Strategy is another concept that has been explained by various theorists, some accurate, some wrong and some confusing. Clausewitz aptly brought out the meaning of strategy, stating that, “Fighting…consists of a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which…are called ‘engagements’ and which form new entities…tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war, (Ibid: 128). This implies that the strategist must define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will conform to its purpose. Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 99

Strategy in the words of Clausewitz also decides the time, place, and the forces with which the engagement is to be fought and once the result of the tactical has produced be-it victory or defeat, strategy will use it to serve the object of the war, (Ibid: 177-178). The implication of this is that the strategist must draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it. He must therefore shape the individual campaigns and decide the individual engagements within them. The further implication of the assumptions in the plan is that the strategist must go on the campaign himself and maintain control throughout. If I may borrow the words of General Schwarzkopf, “It doesn’t take a hero to order men into battle; it takes a hero to be one of those men who goes into battle” (Schwarzkopf and Petre, 1992). In essence, the strategist is a hero.

Defence and Offence The political object of a war determines the strategy that will lead to the attainment of the object. The strategist is thus expected to draw up a plan that will conform to either defence or offence as set out by policy. The situation in the theatre could also dictate whether a change from either element to the other is necessary and this must be clearly and promptly married with policy. In reference to defence in the international system, Clausewitz posited that, “If we consider the community of states…we do not find a systematically regulated balance of power…but we certainly do find major and minor interests of states and peoples interwoven…The sum total of relations between states thus serves to maintain the stability of the whole rather than to promote change…” (Clausewitz in Howard and Paret, 1976: 373). In a campaign however, he opined that there are two options and therefore two kinds of reactions open to a defender; either the attacker is to perish by the sword or by his own exertion. This he exemplified with the example of Fabius Verrucosus ‘Cunctator’ (280-203 BC), a onetime Roman politician and General, who was noted for his strategy of pitched battles and avoidance of frontal assaults. Clausewitz averred that, “All campaigns that are known for their so-called temporising, like those of the famous Fabius Cunctator, were calculated primarily to destroy the enemy by making him exhaust himself” (Ibid: 385). It could be deduced that defence as a strategy must necessarily achieve the object of the war, victory over the enemy by the sword or through his own exhaustion. Offence or attack as a strategy involves the exertion from a belligerent against the defender. This often leads to the exhaustion of the attacker that rarely attains the object of war. Clausewitz posits that, “If the superior strength of the attack – which diminishes day by day – leads to peace, the object will have been attained. There are strategic attacks that have led directly to peace, but these are in the minority,” (Ibid: 358). Clausewitz however, leaves the decision to adopt either defensive or offensive to the strategist. He posited that, “We have already indicated in general terms that defense is easier than attack. But defense has a passive purpose: preservation; and attack a positive one: conquest…If defense is the stronger form of war, yet has a negative object, it follows that it should be used only so long as weakness compels, and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object,” (Ibid). Although this seems to show Clausewitz’s preference for a defensive strategy over an offensive one, it behoves the strategist in the theatre of war to decide which way as a war progresses. 100 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Centre of Gravity (CoG) Clausewitz in the fourth chapter of Book 8 went down history lane to ponder on what could lead to the defeat of an army, which he affirmed was the aim of war. He considered the Napoleonic wars from 1792 – 1807 and averred that success was not due simply to general causes, rather particular factors could be often decisive, the details of which could be known only to those on the spot. He further suggested that these could be moral factors that are not readily discovered and other issues could be decided by chance and incidents that are so minute as to be observed or recorded. Yet, it is minute factors that once discovered could lead to the enemy’s defeat. In attaining the aim of war, Clausewitz emphasised that, “Small things always depend on great ones, unimportant on important, accidentals on essentials.” It is these considerations he expects should guide the approach of the strategist that seeks to defeat the enemy. He therefore, affirmed that, “One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics, a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.” (Ibid). He subsequently suggested based on his experience that the enemies’ CoG could be: a. Destruction of his army/ military (if it is significant, then it’s easiest way to force an enemy to negotiate). b. Seizure of his capital city (if it is not only the centre of administration but also that of social, professional and political activity). c. Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he).

Although it may be very difficult to discover the enemy’s CoG, yet the defeat of the enemy depends solely on its neutralisation. It would also be noted that although Clausewitz’s CoG is based on the assumption of a single enemy CoG, whereas, in modern war, there could be multiple CoG depending on its nature and complexity. It is therefore, important for the strategist to painstakingly carry out thorough analysis of his and the enemies’ CoG so that he would defend his and concentrate appropriate energy on that/ those of the enemies.

Civil-Military Relations Clausewitz has clearly brought out the fact that war is a political instrument and that the strategist must conduct the war only to attain the object of policy. These point to the need for an effective relationship between the strategist and the statesmen. He therefore emphasised that “…when people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is right – that is, successful – any intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good,” (Ibid: 608). Clausewitz also pointed out the harmful effect of the statemen’s interference with the conduct of war. He averred that “Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 101 that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse… statesmen often issue orders that defeat the purpose they are meant to serve. Time and again that has happened, which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy,” (Ibid). This assertion points at the unending difficulty that the strategist will encounter in conducting war as a result of the statesman’s interferences. So, while efforts are being made to help the statesmen improve in their knowledge of military affairs, the strategist must endeavour to maintain a cordial relationship with the policy maker.

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE FIRST GULF WAR The First Gulf War (2 August 1990 – 28 February 1991), codenamed Operation DESERT SHIELD (2 August 1990 – 17 January 1991) for operations leading to the build up of troops and defence of Saudi Arabia and Operation DESERT STORM (17 January 1991 – 28 February 1991) in its attack phase, was a war waged by US-led coalition from 35 nations against Iraq. The war was waged in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The war is also known under other names, such as the Persian Gulf War, Gulf War I, Kuwait War, First Iraq War, or Iraq War. It is sometimes confused with the 2003 Iraq War, which is named Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The First Gulf War started based on a defensive doctrine, specifically to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi attack and invasion. However, the coalition changed to an attack doctrine when on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be Iraq’s nineteenth province and Saddam named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, as its military-governor. The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial and naval bombardment on 17 January 1991, which continued for five weeks. This was followed by a ground assault on 24 February. The ground forces advanced into Iraqi territory and within 100 hours, the Iraq Republican Guard, which was the last line of defence for Saddam Hussein surrendered. Subsequently, the coalition ceased its advance and declared a ceasefire. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which liberated Kuwait and declared a ceasefire on its terms.The war was marked by the introduction of live news broadcasts from the front lines of the battle, principally by the US Cable News Network (CNN). The war has also earned the nickname Video Game War after the daily broadcast of images from cameras on board US bombers during Operation Desert Storm. According to Larry New, the US victory in the First Gulf War was extraordinary given that no armed force had achieved such a great victory at such low costs with limited casualty. He averred that their victory laid in their tremendous technological advantages, coalition initiative and their ability to think about war better than the Iraqis (New, 1996). He went further to affirm that “Without good thinking, the best technology and the most capable men are useless perfunctory cogs in the machine of wartime violence” (Ibid). Also, he stated that Clausewitz’ war theories had a significant influence on the use of the US military instrument in the First Gulf War. Having also read the book, It Doesn’t Take A Hero by Gen Norman Schwarzkopf (US Army), the Commander of the coalition force in the First Gulf War, now deceased, it is reasonable to concur with Larry New that the application of Clausewitz’ war theories by the US-led coalition in the First Gulf War was a principal factor for their 102 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria decisive victory. Therefore, it is expedient to consider some of these theories as they were applied in the First Gulf War.

The Paradoxical Trinity The ingenious application of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity theory by the US Government played a pivotal role in orchestrating the outcome of the First Gulf War. Clausewitz contends that politics is the only source of war, and war is an instrument. He is also emphatic that the military point of view is subordinate to the political, “No one starts a war or rather, no one in his right mind ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it.” The US grand strategy involved the use of all the instruments of statecraft in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. As Clausewitz stated, the political object is the goal, and war is the means of reaching it. “The political objective will determine the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” Therefore, observing this important Clausewitz concept, the US political objectives in the region were clearly stated: “immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government, security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad. Clausewitz believed that the commander and his army should be concerned with the conduct of the war. During the First Gulf War, President Bush recognised the military leadership, had faith in their abilities, and gave them a “free” (military) hand to conduct the war. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collin Powell was a capable general and well versed in the political arena. His understanding of the way political forces were formed in Washington was vital to the smooth relationship between the military and political leaders. Also, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Commander of the coalition interacted frequently with General Powell throughout the prosecution of the war. This close working relationship is the epitome of what Clausewitz expected from the statesman and the general. The President and his advisors sought and accepted the recommendations of the military commanders. At the termination of hostilities, then President Bush commented that, “once and for all, the US had licked the Vietnam Syndrome.” Also, General Schwarzkopf acknowledged President Bush for giving him what Clausewitz believed an imperative, the ability to advise and make recommendations to the statesman, and to be concerned with “fighting” or executing the war. Since the US government clearly articulated the military objectives, and ensured they remained subordinate to the political objectives, Clausewitz was again proven correct in his assessments. The use of military force to compel an enemy to do our will resulted in the ability to clearly win wars. A properly balanced trinity will also garner the public support necessary for a nation to wage war. The national will is defined by a nation’s citizenry, and is key to the support needed to wage war and win. In the First Gulf War, the “will” of the people affected the nature of war, and what was acceptable in terms of fighting. When whole communities go to war; whole peoples, and especially civilised peoples, the reason always lies in some political situation, and the occasion is always due to some political object. This point was made clear to the American public by the government. Most Americans had an opinion on two distinct areas that would impact the way the generals planned to “win” the First Gulf War. One Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 103 was to avoid a prolonged Vietnam-style war; rather they wanted a short, decisive war. Americans seemed unwilling to accept the cost in men, resources and material to support a protracted war. The other important area of concern was American casualties. Although, the government had clearly articulated the vital interests of the US, which were threatened by Iraq, many citizens were not willing to accept high casualties. This single factor proved to drive both military planners and politicians to ensure every precaution was taken to minimise US casualties in the war, domestic and international political considerations were consistent with sound military objectives. This link resulted in tremendous public support for the use of military force. The media played a vital role in building public opinion, a contribution unmatched in any previous war or conflict. For example, CNN’s Peter Arnett and Bernard Shaw, from their vantage point in the Al Rashid Hotel in downtown Baghdad, beamed the sights and sounds of the start of Gulf War “live” around the world and in homes across America. Indeed, the world was treated to a front row seat at press briefings from CENTCOM to trips throughout the theatre of operations. Close adherence to Clausewitz’s theory of the paradoxical trinity in the US strategy during the First Gulf War resulted in a swift resolution of the war, few American casualties and clear victory for the US-led coalition.

Centre of Gravity The US-led coalition recognising, like Clausewitz, the CoG as the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends; it correctly identified its CoG and those of the Iraqis in planning and executing the First Gulf War. Although Clausewitz believed in a single CoG and attacking it with great force, the increasing complexity of modern wars such as the First Gulf War, multiple centres of gravity exist at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Nevertheless, Clausewitz’s broad notion of CoG remains the same today. In the First Gulf War, the US correctly identified its strategic CoG as the strength of the alliance, which was hinged on international support, and the will of the American people. On the other hand, the strategic CoG of Iraq was identified as the will of the Iraqi political leadership. At the operational level, the US CoG was the anti-missile systems deployed in defence of Saudi Arabia during Op DESERT SHIELD; while the combination of its sea, air and land capability was the CoG during Op DESERT STORM. On the other hand, the Iraqi operational CoG was identified as the Republican Guard. The US coalition, basing its offensive on Clausewitz’s theories of attrition and annihilation, effectively unhinged the Iraqi operational CoG with immense synchronisation, fury and precision. The attacks caused paralysis in decision making, destruction of command, control, and communications (C3), destruction of the Republican Guards, retardation of Iraq’s capability to wage future war, and ultimately dampened Iraqi leadership and military’s will to fight.

Attack and Defence Clausewitz believed that attack and defence formed a continuum. He believed defence was the stronger form of war because of positioning, gaining time, gathering strength like a coiling spring, and depleting the strength of an attacking force. Clausewitz believed though, since attack and defence were a continuum, 104 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria at some time the defenders would unleash the “flashing sword of vengeance” and strike against a weakened foe. In this line of thought, the defender couldn’t hope to win without assuming the attack and attaining a decision. The US-led coalition executed the attack-defence continuum in two phases; defence for Op DESERT SHIELD and attack for Op DESERT STORM. While the defence phase was meant to facilitate the build up of the allied forces and prepare for the attack, the attack phase was designed to be brief and decisive in order to keep the trinity of war stable and ensure their political and military culminating points were not reached before war termination. In addition to the application of Attack and Defence theories, the US coalition used Clausewitz’s theories of attrition and annihilation in their attack into Iraq and Kuwait. For example, they used air attrition to reduce the enemy to an acceptable force level and lower his will to resist. After reducing the enemy’s power and morale, they used mass violence on the ground and in the air to annihilate Iraq. The attrition cum annihilation continuum meshed well with the limited nature of the war and the political objectives.

CONCLUSION The strength of Clausewitz’s theory is in its timelessness and relevance to modern and indeed future wars. This fact has been revealed in various sections of this paper, especially as it was applied to the First Gulf War, which was conducted 159 years after On War’s first publication. A very clear understanding of Clausewitz trinity clearly brought out the role of the statesman, strategist and the people in the waging of war. Indeed, the importance of a very effective CMR was identified as a necessity to attain the object of war. It is crucial for the statesmen to comprehend this relationship and the strategist to facilitate their understanding. There is need for the military strategists in Nigeria to not only understand the object of the nation’s wars, but also relate well with the statesmen, where the use of the military as its instrument of war comes to light. War is a very dangerous venture as postulated by Clausewitz and should not be planned as an absolute war, which is purely an abstraction. The strategist is expected to translate the political object of war, which is the defeat of the enemy through well thought out strategy. The identification of his and the enemy CoG is a critical step towards waging the war that will end in the defeat of the enemy. It behoves the AFN strategists to conduct appropriate CoG analysis before and during the conduct of the nation’s wars. To bring this paper to its end and indeed, in line with enduring Engineering principle, where an engine is not started without first knowing how to stop, it would suffice to quote Clausewitz again. He asserted that, “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” It therefore behoves the political leaders, AFN strategists and the Nigerian people to establish the right balance that will translate to the effective conduct and positive outcome of the nation’s wars. But it needs to be borne in mind that it takes the strategist in the war theatre to be a hero. Carl Von Clausewitz and Modern War 105

REFERENCES

Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War, Edited and Interpreted by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. Creveld, Martin Van. “Technology and War II: Postmodern War?”. in Charles Townshend, The Oxford History of Modern War. Hoyt, T.H (2014), “Clausewitz, On War and the Foundations of Strategy,” Lecture delivered at US Naval War College. Moran, D., Strategic Theory and the History of War, Naval Post-Graduate School, USA. New, Larry D (USAF), (1996), “Clausewitz Theory: On War and its Application Today”, in Airpower Journal. Schwarzkopf, Norman Jr and Peter Petre, (1992), It Doesn’t Take A Hero. Townshend C. (ed), (2005), The Oxford History of Modern War, New York, USA: Oxford University Press. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

THE HISTORY OF THE NIGERIAN ARMY: ANALYSIS OF ITS GENEALOGY AND DEVELOPMENT

by

Brigadier General OL Olokor PhD Director of Museum Nigerian Army Resource Centre Abuja.

ABSTRACT

It has often been said that a people without history, just like a people without culture are dead people. This assertion underlines the great importance of history, and by extension military history. A military without good knowledge of its history has no institutional memory. When it combines this with lack of knowledge of the history of other key militaries and military campaigns, then that military is as good as dead too. This author devoted intellectual energy on the history of the Nigerian Army, from 1863 to present. It highlighted the key milestones in the period with explanations of what happened, why and how. It is an interesting narrative that should interest not only young Nigerian Army personnel, but also those who have retired and disengaged long ago.

Keywords: History, Nigerian Army, Analysis, Genealogy, Development

INTRODUCTION History occupies a significant part of human life. This all-important discipline is necessary for knowledge, understanding and a means of addressing the future. Gbor (2004) posits that history reveals knowledge of the past which prepares us for a better understanding of the present, and subsequently provides us

106 The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 107 with lessons and facts to chart the course of the future. He further submitted that history as it concerns the military, forms the bedrock of human strategic thinking in all spheres of life. To appreciate the history of the Nigerian Army of over 154 years, there is the need to be aware that the study of military history as an institution of memory cannot be jettisoned. This is due to its indispensable role in linking past military operations, institutional development and other relevant military associated activities to the present. The history of the Nigerian Army, one of the strongest and most resilient military forces in Africa is not an exception. It derives its nucleus from a beginning associated with proof of strength, honesty and bravery as expressed by Glover. It will not be out of place to know that there was a large number of independent political organisations that thrived in both the northern and southern areas making up contemporary Nigeria. Idress (2004) acclaimed that groups like the seven Hausa states, the Kane- Borno state, the Nupes, Igalas, Oyo empire and the Igbo political system among others possessed well defined military systems designed for territorial defence, aggrandizement or external aggression and enforcement of internal social, economic and political order. Ukpabi (2004) alluded to the fact that when Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century, decided to make its power and influence felt along the Niger littoral it therefore needed a military force with the capability to carry out its objectives. The conquest of territories by the British in Nigeria started from Lagos in 1851. This was made possible with the use of military personnel and ships of the Royal Navy supported by about 650 soldiers of the King of Lagos. Lagos was made a British colony and this required expanding the frontier and making sure all aggressive indigenous groups were subdued. The task of making sure that all groups considered hostile to British interest were subdued, was not without its limitations in operations along the Nigerian coast. British troops falling sick of malaria was an issue, as well as their inability to hold ground due to the low strength. Ukpabi (2004) noted that the groundwork for the takeoff of a force which will form part of the British military establishment was beginning to take shape. The plan to institutionalize a relied upon force to solve minor problems and maintain order in and within the trade routes saw the beginning of the Nigerian Army. The task of this paper is to discourse the history of the Nigerian Army, as a strategy of placing on the front burner the relevance of not only history, but as it concerns us here, of military history. 3. The discourse covers the following: a. Nigerian Army History from the formative Years of Glover Hausas. b. The West African Frontier Force and Campaigns. c. Renaming and Nigerianisation Policy. d. Training for Replacements and Changes in Forms. e. Prelude to Crisis in the Nigerian Army. f. Outbreak of the Civil War and Establishment of Divisions. g. Explanation of the motif of Nigerian Army Cap Badge and logo (Lt Col Cap and below). h. Dark days and happy moments in the Nigerian Army. 108 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

i. Contemporary Challenges; and j. The need for History.

NIGERIAN ARMY HISTORY FROM THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF GLOVER HAUSAS Lieutenant John Glover of the Royal Navy (British) on his way to Lagos had waterways challenge after his boat known as Dayspring capsized at Jebba and was put out of action. The need to seek for assistance from reliable and able-bodied dedicated young men arose when he decided to go by road. Glover on his way came across some indigenes of northern extraction and selected eighteen of them to carry out this worrisome task of escorting him with his luggage to Lagos. He was so impressed with the show of strength and zeal by the men that he formed them into a force known as “Glover Hausas” in 1863. A notable event of importance that became altruism occurred in the course of moulding this early force. This was the Glover’s farewell speech to his soldiers:

Remember that you are a small tree which I have planted, but you will grow big and stretch forth far with wide spreading branches, and you will take root in the ground. You must never let this tree wither but water it day by day till it grows and flourishes.

The force was used for both military and police duties. The force changed from its name at inception to “Hausa Constabulary” in 1865 when it became a regular force. The Royal Niger Company was granted a charter in 1886 empowering it to administer the Delta and the valleys of Niger and Benue respectively and raised in the same year the Royal Niger Constabulary with its main base in Asaba. There was a struggle for ownership and control of some parts of the east of River Niger and this led to Britain exercising deliberate control by setting up a colonial force led by Sir Ralph Moor referred to as “Niger Coast Protectorate Force”. The mean posture and hard manners of treating enemies and friends alike gave it the name “Oil Rivers Irregulars”. The various forces in the north and south were meant to serve the need of the colonial government in the localities as they remained independent of each other. However, the West Indian Regiment, an Imperial force stationed in Lagos was put to use specially in the conquest of Ijebu which was outside the area of responsibility of the Lagos government.

THE WEST AFRICAN FRONTIER FORCE AND CAMPAIGNS The formation of the West African Frontier Force was initiated by Joseph Chamberlin, the Colonial Secretary. This was triggered off by the forming of the incipient body of what was later called West African Frontier Force in Jebba in Northern Nigeria in 1887 by Lord Fredrick Lugard. The British government as a matter of fact needed a more formidable and effective force to combat the French who were already laying claims to some British claimed territories in parts of Northern Nigeria. The claims became competitive due to the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885 which stipulated that the occupation of territories in order to be valid must be effective. To this end, each of the European powers The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 109 was to maintain a stationed force in claimed areas. The West African Frontier Force was to carry out this task for Britain that felt threatened by France occupation of areas in dispute and in the neighbouring French territories. The force in 1901 incorporated all para-military units in British claimed areas including Lagos Constabulary which became the Lagos Battalion. The merging of the Northern Nigeria Regiment and Southern Nigeria Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel CHP Carter and Colonel J Wilcox respectively was due to the amalgamation in 1914. These two regiments were used by Lord Lugard for the annexation of Nigeria. The 1st and 2nd Battalion of the Nigeria Regiment were under the Northern Nigeria Regiment while the 3rd and 4th Battalion of the Nigeria Regiment were under the Southern Nigeria Regiment. It is pertinent to note that a mounted infantry of the Northern Regiment became the ordinary infantry Battalion as there also existed a field Artillery. Marino (2017) stated that, the regiments participated actively in the World War I in the , 1914 to 1916, and in the East Africa and Abyssinia battle 1916 to 1918. It also played crucial roles in the 2nd World War where the regiment carried out the fastest advance in military history against the Italian forces and in Burma with the provision of the main fighting force comprising of 81st and 82nd West African Divisions. The attachment of 3 West African Brigade in the War effort in the 2nd Chindits operation of 1944 was commendable and applauded by the Colonial government. Gen Cunliffe while briefing Lord Lugard after the East African Campaign, noted “There is no doubt that it was the Nigerians who won the campaign, they alone could stand the starvation and malaria and showed indomitable pluck in action.” Several individuals who fought on Nigerian side received medals for exhibiting bravery and gallantry. Few outstanding war veterans in this category include Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) Chari Maigumeri, the most decorated soldier in the history of the Nigerian Army, Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) MM Hamakin who was awarded the Military Medal (MC) for singlehandedly attacking a Japanese position in Burma (Father to Maj Gen JGS Hamakin; Director General Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Sergeant Dambazau (Father to Lt Gen AB Dambazau former Chief of Army Staff and now Minister for Interior), and Alhaji Yusuf Buratai, father to the present Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen TY Buratai. The trend from the preceding names shows the passing of baton to children by men who sacrificed so much for the maintenance of peace and stability for mankind. According to the History of the Nigerian Army 1994, the end of the World War II witnessed the naming of military barracks in which the force gained distinction. The Barracks at Kaduna and Zaria were named Mogadishu, Dialet and Chindits while was named Nyangao and those in Lagos Ashanti, and Albalti, Myohaung, Arakan, Tamandu and Marda. Some of these names of significant areas were also used in military training schools and in naming newly constructed military cantonments. Demobilisation of troops was effected and many of the affected men were provided with jobs preserved for them in government and private sectors. The size of the force was reduced to a manageable proportion in tandem with the rising cost of living. This resulted in having five infantry battalions and formed units and services for peace time functions. The Nigerian Army as described by Nwolise (2004) is a symbol of nationhood that has found itself in governance, economic production and developmental process. The NA in contributing to global peace engaged in its first peace-keeping operation in 1960 which was the Congo operation under the aegis of the United Nations (UN). The NA as mentioned earlier participated 110 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria in World War I and World War II and especially in Western Cameroon. The NA had continued to play this role till date with outstanding records of successful participations in several UN peace-keeping missions and others for assistance in training and leadership. Nwolise posits that the Nigerian contingents’ operations in the Cameroons, World War I and World War II can be regarded as the forerunners of modern peace-keeping missions.

RENAMING AND NIGERIANISATION POLICY The nomenclature of the West African Frontier Force changed (WAFF) when it was renamed the Royal West African Frontier Force in 1948 and thereafter became the Queens Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR) on the visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Nigeria in 1956. The same year also witnessed the regionalisation of the WAFF as each military force became autonomous. The new policy then made the name to change from Queen’s Own Nigeria Regiment (QONR) to Nigerian Military Force (NMF) in 1956. The British Government relinquishing control of the NMF to the Nigerian Government in June1958 prelude to independence changed the name to the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA) and when Nigeria became a Republic in 1963 it changed to the Nigerian Army. This has remained so for about 55 years now which probably may stand forever having reached a level of satisfaction and general acceptance. The Nigerian Army changed its uniform, rank, instruments and structure to reflect the new name accordingly. Gbor (2004) noted that the Nigerian Government inherited from the British an Army that was about 7,878 of both officers and men. The number of officers at independence was 283 out of which 61(22%) were Nigerians and 222 (78%) were British. Also a greater number of the non-commissioned officers were British. The Nigerianisation or indigenisation of the officer corps resulted in the granting of a Short Service Commission in 1948 to Lieutenant LV Ugboma as the first Nigerian with a British service number to attain that height. Four other Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) were commissioned as SSC as follows: WU Bassey, Seyi, JTU Aguiyi Ironsi and SA Ademulegun in 1949 and RA Shodeinde and Wellington in 1950 and 1952 respectively. For several different reasons many of the NCOs commissioned did not remain in service. Lt Seyi had resigned his commissioned in 1952 while Lt Ugboma and Lt Wellington were out of service by 1953. Lt Bassey became the most senior Nigerian Army officer at this time as more Nigerians were granted the same type of commission. They include Lt BAO Ogundipe, Lt RA Adebayo in 1953, Lt CDC Nwawo and Lt RA Fajuyi in 1954. The officers were trained in the United Kingdom until in 1953 when the Colonial office established the Regular Officers Special Training School (ROSTS) at Teshie, Ghana for a six-month training for all RWAFF Officer Cadets before proceeding to the United Kingdom for the remaining part of the training in any of the cadet training institutions. The SSC was meant for suitably serving soldiers with required qualification of the General Certificate of Education (GCE) and medical fitness and recommendation from the Commanding Officers. Other means of entry into the NA was through the Regular Commission open to interested young Nigerians with passed school certificate. The candidates must pass the written exam, medical test and the interviews at the Nigeria Sub-District and Hq Nigeria Regiment. Other hurdles after this included Candidates who satisfy the aforementioned trained in Mons or Easton Hall for four months and at the end, those successful at the regular officers commission board are admitted to the The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 111

Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) for an 18 months and at the successful end granted the King’s or Queen’s commission as a regular officer in the Nigeria Regiment. Cadets training schools were established in selected public schools in the country in order to foster enlistment in the NA through the regular commission. The schools with cadet units included Government College Zaria (Barewa College), King’s College Lagos, and Government College Umuahia. The cadet units served as route through which many Nigerian Officers in the Nigeria Regiment came into the Army. The first in1950 from this group were Zakariya Maimalari and Lawan Umar both from Government College Zaria. They were trained at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and commissioned Second Lieutenants in 1953. Others trained in same manner in 1951 were Kur Mohammed and Abogo Lagema who were from Government College Zaria and commissioned in1954. Ejoor (2003) stated that JY Pam and GT Kurubo from Government College Zaria and Government College Umuahia were trained in 1953 and commissioned in 1955 while other group commissioned in 1956 from Sandhurst through the cadet programme include Victor Banjo, , , Alexander Madiebo and A Unegbe. These officers were at various times documented for their roles as it affects the evolution of the NA. They were at a time in different camps and took up arms against themselves for reasons known to history. All the officers mentioned exited the scene through several means except for Gen (Dr.) Yakubu Gowon former Head of State and Maj Gen David Akpode Ejoor former Chief of Staff (Army) who are alive. It would not be out of place to continuously retrieve the iconology of the Nigerian Army formation and other aspects both in written, audio and visual forms before its dawn.

TRAINING FOR REPLACEMENT AND CHANGES IN FORMS The training of Nigerians to be Commissioned Officers continued after 1956 in different cadet training institutions. At this time it was evident that the reservation of places in training Nigerian cadets in Sandhurst was not sufficient to meet the pace of the Nigerianisation policy. Nigerians with WASC were sent to Mons and Eaton Hall for training for six months and granted SSC like the NCOs. The first batch of this group commissioned in 1959 included Igboba, Sotomi, Obasanjo and Amadi. The second group comprised of Aniebo, Kyari, Ohanechi, Agbazue, Omanayi, Jalo, Orogbu and Odiwo. Nigerian graduates were also trained for six months and granted SSC into the Army. In this group was Ojukwu who was commissioned in 1957, Olutoye in 1959, Ifeajuna and Rotimi in 1960 and Ademoyega in 1962. At independence on 1st October 1960, the Nigerian Army was then known as the Royal Nigerian Army (RNA) as hinted earlier. The size of the army was relatively small and not well equipped. Changes took place as the Nigerian Government took full control. Training started externally in many countries to get officers properly groomed both in staff and command. Depot Nigerian Army was already established by 1922 while the Nigerian Military School (NMS) was established in 1954 as a Boy’s Company to make children of serving personnel develop interest in the military and possess a family tradition in the force. Products of the two institutions especially NMS have contributed immensely to the history and achievements of the NA. The Royal Nigerian Military Force Training College (Infantry Centre Corps and School) was established in 1959. In the same vein the (NDA) was established in 1964 to take care of the training of junior leader officers for the Armed Forces. The 112 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria establishment of training institutions in Nigeria became paramount considering the challenges in the building of an army handed over by the British hurriedly. The building of an Ordnance factory (Defence Industries Corporation) was established in Kaduna to produce weapons and ammunition. There were changes in weapon system and in the buildings and rehabilitations of barracks and depots. Remarkable changes that occurred between1960-1963 were in the Army uniform and insignia as follows: a. Green uniform of long sleeve jacket, long trousers and peak cap replaced the old colonial ceremonial dress of red fez, zouave jacket, red cummerbund and khaki shorts. b. The six edged star and eagle replaced the old four edged star and crown for the officers’ badge of rank. c. The officers’ sword bearing the Nigerian Coat of Arms as against the former with the monogram of Queen Elizabeth II of Britain was issued for use by officers. d. The new logo of an eagle standing on a star superimposed on a scroll replaced the old RWAFF cap badge of a palm tree used by all British Territories in West Africa. (The former motto in Arabic script – Nasrumnillah meaning – Victory is from God alone was retained). e. Subsequent changes: There was also the introduction of new service and ceremonial dresses with change from the brown shoes for officers to jungle boot. In 1974, green cremplene material replaced the L&k material. Clothe epaulettes were introduced for Officers’ badges of rank while name tag was introduced in 1977. Berets were introduced in that same year as green was for infantry and other members of the Army. Red berets for Military Police, Maroon berets for Medical Corps, sky blue berets for Education Corps, Finance and APRD (now using light black). Dark blue beret for Signal Corps; Light black beret for Supply and Transport, Ordnance and Workshop Corps; Deep black beret for Engineers, Artillery and Armoured Corps and Dark green beret for Intelligent Corps.

The size of the Army however did not change much even though units were formed. The nucleus of the Guards Brigade was formed as Federal Guards Company mainly to perform ceremonial duties around Lagos, and the existing five battalions provided men to make for the 6th Battalion in1966. Changes were also in the position of commanding officers of the battalions as the last expatriate Battalion Commander was changed in 1963. There were changes virtually in all the appointments at the Army Headquarters except the GOC Maj Gen Welby-Everard who was replaced in 1965 by Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi- Ironsi. Several changes occurred within the period and as at January 1966 the location and command of the main units including mascots were as follows: The Nigerian Army Headquarters and other formations had the following Nigerian Army Officers occupying offices as follows: a. Army Headquarters Lagos: (i) General Officer Commanding – Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi. The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 113

(ii) Chief of Staff (Army) – Col K Mohammed. (iii) Training Branch (G Branch) – Lt Col DA Ejoor. (iv) Adjutant General Branch (A Branch) – Lt Col JY Pam. (v) Quarter Master General (Q Branch) – Lt Col Unegbe. (vi) Federal Guards – Maj DO Okafor. b. Headquarter 1st Brigade Kaduna: (i) Brig SA Ademulegun – Brigade Commander. (ii) Lt Col JY Pam – CO 3rd Battalion-KADUNA (Bald-headed White Eagle). (iii) Lt Col Odumegwu Ojukwu – CO 5th Battalion-KANO (The Antelop). c. Headquarter 2nd Brigade Apapa: (i) Brig Zakariya Maimalari – Brigade Commander. (ii) Maj DS Ogunewe – CO 1st Battalion – ENUGU (Burutu Bird). (iii) Lt Col HA Igboba – CO 2nd Battalion – IKEJA (Crown Bird). (iv) Lt Col A Lagema – CO 4th Battalion – IBADAN (The Pelican Bird). (v) Lt Col FA Fajuyi – CO Abeokuta Garrison. d. Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA): (i) Brig MR Verma (Indian) – Commandant. (ii) Col RA Shodeinde – Dy Commandant. e. Regimental Depot Zaria: Lt Col WU Bassey – Commandant.

PRELUDE TO CRISIS IN THE NIGERIAN ARMY The political crisis experienced in Nigeria from 1965 to 15 Jan 1966 dovetailed into the first military coup d’état led by Maj Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, an Igbo from the then Midwest region now made up of Delta and Edo States of Nigeria. The Officer was born in Kaduna and attended St John College Kaduna. He however claimed to have organised the coup with four other Majors who he refused to mention. According to the History of the Nigerian Army, he was quoted as saying:

We wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade union and whole clumsy apparatus of the federal system. We wanted to gun down all bigwigs on our way.

The coup took the lives of Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Region, Brig Gen SA Ademulegun, Commander 1 Brigade, Col RA Shodeinde Dy Commandant Nigerian 114 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Defence Academy, Chief SL Akintola, Premier of the crisis-torn Western Region, Prime Minister Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh. Other military officers include Brig Zakariya Maimalari; Commander 2 Brigade Apapa, Col Kur Mohammed, Lt Col JY Pam, Lt Col Arthur Unegbe and Lt Col A Lagema. The coup succeeded in the northern part of the country but failed in the south. Maj Chukwuma Nzeogwu was arrested as the politicians and the Council of Ministers handed over power to Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi Ironsi, the General Officer Commanding the Nigerian Army. He became the first military head of state and appointed military governors for the four regions in his first two days in office on 17th January 1966 as follows: a. Maj HU Katsina – Northern Region. b. Lt Col FA Fajuyi – Western Region. c. Lt Col DA Ejoor – Midwest Region. d. Lt Col C Odumegwu Ojukwu – Eastern Region.

Within the period, there was cause for discontent from the inability of the government to arrest and punish according to known military traditions, those involved in the 15th January 1956 coup. There were also complaints about promotion and government non-chalant attitude coupled with plans to rotate the battalions in the country. The situation at this time was tense and on the night of 28th to 29th July 1966, another coup erupted in Abeokuta Garrison. Maj Gen JTU Aguiyi Ironsi and his host Lt Col Fajuyi were kidnapped and subsequently killed in Ibadan. Others killed in the counter-coup were the Garrison Commander Lt Col G Okunweze and Maj TI Obienu Commander 2 Recce Squadron. Several other officers from the Eastern part were killed at Ikeja, Kaduna and Kano. Brig Gen BAO Ogundipe, the most senior officer after Ironsi retired and later became Nigerian High Commissioner to Britain. The mantle of leadership fell on Lt Col Yakubu Gowon, Chief of Staff (Army), who then became the new Head of State. Within two weeks after the coup, the decision to send soldiers to their respective regions of origin began as this was a turning point in the history of the Nigerian Army. However, with little movement in Midwest region, the West and Lagos did not partake in the repatriation to the north and those to the eastern region. Lt Col C Odumewu Ojukwu refused to recognise Lt Col Yakubu Gowon as the new Head of State and Commander in Chief despite several reconciliatory measures. Some of the measures include the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference of September 1966 in Lagos and Aburi Conference in Ghana. There were several killings of easterners and northerners from both sides. A conference of Eastern Leaders of Thought was held in May 1967 where Lt Col Ojukwu was given the mandate by Igbo leaders to break away from the rest of Nigeria. In an attempt to stop the action, Maj Gen Yakubu Gowon created 12 states by decree out of the four regions on 27 May 1967, while Lt Col Ojukwu reacted three days later by declaring the new nation of Biafra. The use of force by the Federal government to compel Biafra to revert and remain part of Nigeria was the only option. The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 115

OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIVISIONS The Nigerian Army was organised into four Area Commands resulting in the formation of about twelve different units at the beginning of the civil war. Recruitment into the Army was carried out during the period especially at the peak without appreciating the duration and magnitude of the war. Many lives were lost including those trained to replace the colonial forces. The war paved way for the establishment of formations as several lessons during and after the hostilities were learnt. The Federal troops fought and brought back the Biafrans to the fold with the verdict of “No victor no vanquished”. The endorsement by the Federal Government for acceptance of surrender by Biafran’s Maj Gen Philip Effiong on 15th January 1970 officially brought the civil war to an end after thirty months. The logo and Cap Badge of the Nigerian Army (Lt Cols and below) with the eagle, two interlaced triangle-like 6 pointed stars and Arabic script is explained as, Eagle – representing the graceful power of the Nigerian Army. The army maintains keen surveillance in peace and strikes very swiftly and decidedly only when provoked beyond tolerance. Two interlaced triangle-like six pointed stars –First symbol of Nigerian unity. It was struck by Lord Lugard in 1914 when Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalgamated to form one country. The Nigerian Army shall maintain the unity of Nigeria. Arabic script (Nasruminallah) – means – “victory is from God alone”. This motto was inscribed on the banner under which the Nigerian indigenous forces defended their fatherland against the colonial forces: The Nigerian Army stands to defend the territorial integrity of the country at all times. The Nigerian Army I Area Command of 1st Brigade metamorphosed into the 1 Division Nigerian Army. It was moved from Kaduna to Makurdi, a boundary town between Eastern and Northern Regions for strategic reasons. This made the troops nearer to the Biafrans as they fired the first shot that was countered by the Biafrans on 6th July 1967.This day is celebrated in solemn remembrance of the Nigerian first shot fired; marking the commencement of the thirty-month civil war as Nigerian Army Day yearly, starting from 6th July 1978. It is meant to commemorate fallen heroes and the contributions of distinguished personnel in the development of the NA. The last celebration took a different dimension when art and museum artefacts were organised through exhibition to chronicle the 154 years history of the NA. The use of military and civil collaborating allied artists added colour to the outing. The logo of 1 Division is a white horse on its hind legs on a sky-blue background. The charging appearance shows the premier and unique position it occupies. The white colour symbolises peace which is sought after every war. The Division is located presently at Kawo in Kaduna. The unexpected invasion of Mid-West by the Biafrans when they used Col Victor Banjo as Commander of that operation led to the creation of 2nd Division. The Division was commanded by Lt Col Murtala Mohammed, the then Inspector of Signal who later became a General and Head of State. Cooks, batmen, clerks and all manners of soldiers in Lagos area made up the nucleus of the Division. It was formed from the second Brigade. The Division halted the Biafran’s incursion that would have changed the civil war story. The first logo was One finger sign to symbolise the liberated people of Mid- West raising one finger with the slogan “One Nigeria”, to celebrate Murtala Mohammed. Lt Col IBM Haruna changed it to a Leaping Tiger as a sign for preparedness and ruthlessness to counter the secessionist force as a moral booster. Maj Gen Martin Adamu in 1975 changed it to the Snarling Tiger. The logo 116 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria represents the invoked strength, stealth and speed of that fear installing jungle land animal. The alertness and ability to take on task readily is represented by the logo. Yellow is for creative thought of soldiers in installing optimism and energy while black signifies death, earth and stability. The Division is located at Odogbo in Ibadan Oyo State. The 3rd Marine Commando changed to 3 Infantry Division, 3rd Armoured Division and 3 Division respectively. The Division was created out of the 6th Battalion in Ikeja to handle the challenge of the Sea borne attack on Biafra from the Bight of Bonny formally (Bight of Biafra). The Commandos as they were known was commanded by a Sandhurst trained Col Benjamin Maja Adekunle alias “Black Scorpion”. The Commando was renamed 3rd Infantry Division in March 1971 and moved from Port- Harcourt to Jos in 1975.The logo is the octopus that belonged to the intelligent group of water animals. It was chosen by Col Benjamin Maja Adekunle for the role the formation played during the war and terrain of operation. The effectiveness of the water animal in dealing with prey was a reason for its choice. The colour of the octopus which appeared green was superimposed on red and later changed to superimposing the octopus on yellow and red colour (Colour of the Armoured Corps). The logo was retired and subsequently changed by Maj Gen Saleh Maina to a rhinoceros, an animal that operates in the savannah where armoured vehicles can also manoeuvre as against the old octopus that cannot when taken out of water area. The colours were modified. The yellow colour signifies the savannah area of operation and ability to operate in nuclear, biological and chemical environment. The red signifies destruction and blood. A change of the red colour over the yellow was also made to show that death comes before dishonour. The Division is located in Rukuba, Jos in . The reorganisation in the Nigerian Army in 1975 was responsible for the formation of the 4 Infantry Division now 82 Division. It took over the Headquarters of the Lagos Garrison Organisation (LGO) and changed from an infantry to a Composite Division and relocated to Enugu, its present location. The logo changed from the coconut with two crossed sword to a scorpion and later on assumption of a composite role adopted the dragon, a mystical monster-like reptile as logo. Maj Gen OE Obada, a Sandhurst trained officer was the first GOC. The present Army Headquarters Garrison was formed in 1981 and named Army Headquarters Garrison and Signal Group located in Lagos to take over the duties of the disbanded Lagos Garrison Command. It was to administer AHQ Directorates, Corps and Services in Lagos area. It has a Division status and at a time, it was called in 1991 AHQ Camp. The logo was a coconut and two crossed swords on red background. The present logo is the same with the Nigerian Army logo. The first Commander was Lt Col AT Ayuba and is currently located in Abuja. The Lagos Garrison Command now 81 Division was formed on 15th January 1992 as a result of the envisaged movement of Headquarters Nigerian Army from Lagos to Abuja. The logo was a palm tree and crossed swords with yellow and green background. The palm tree represents the good roles played by the Royal West African Frontier Force during the colonial era and the signification of the popular cash crop in its Area of Responsibility (AOR). The sword represents the might and the green colour the vegetation. The present logo is a charging hippopotamus. The green colour represents the vast and dominant mangrove vegetation while the blue represents the water body that criss-crossed the Area of Operation (AO). The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 117

Brigade of Guards now called Guards Brigade started as Federal Guards in 1963 with a Company moved to Lagos to perform duties on three-month basis. Troops of the unit were sent to stop the Biafrans. The unit is responsible for the security of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Federal Capital with other security agencies. The logo is a black scorpion imposed on red and green in a shield like shape. The red signifies the bloodshed during war while the green in the background represents the vegetation where the troops operate. The first commander was Maj WU Bassey and the unit is presently located in Abuja. The unlawful activities of terrorists in the North Eastern part of Nigeria in 2009 gave rise to the establishment of 7 Division. It inherited the existing 21 Bde in Maiduguri and became operational on 22 August 2013 while 5 Bde was created in Monguno. The logo is a wolf in an aggressive position facing right. It has numeral 7 on the left corner representing its nomenclature with a yellow at the edge. The use of the wolf was due to its tactics, nature and habitation. The yellow ochre represents the desert region where the Division is located. Black represents stability and the earth. Green represents hope and sparsely forested green area in the desert region. Yellow for intellectual spirit, brightness and winning spirit, while red is for the bloodshed by fallen heroes. The logo was designed by Col OL Olokor while serving in Maiduguri. The first GOC was Maj Gen OE Ethan. The 8 Task Force Division with HQ in Monguno was established in January 2016. It was the NA strategy to decimate the Boko Haram terrorists and deny them access of mobility and manoeuvre. The logo is a hawk which represents the resilience and toughness of the division to flush out the insurgents. The yellow ochre represents the terrain of the troops of the Division while red symbolises the bloodshed by fallen heroes. The first GOC was Maj Gen O Ejemai.

DARK DAYS AND HAPPY MOMENTS IN THE NIGERIAN ARMY The Nigerian Army had recorded several dark days as well as happy moments in its history. The sad events for the dark days range from road accidents, air mishaps to loss of lives in battle. The fallen heroes we celebrate during Nigerian Army Day Celebration fall into this category. The recently concluded NADCEL reminded NA personnel of some of the NA dark days with the list of victims of the ill-fated Calie-130 aircraft in Ejigbo of 26 September 1992. The list of the 17 September 2006 Obudu air crash and photograph of a survivor (Maj Gen Nuhu Angbazo) and the road mishap of 8 March 2016 involving Maj Gen YM Abubakar and Brig Gen MSA Aliyu along Damaturu- Maiduguri road. The survivor, Brig Gen MSA Aliyu (now Maj Gen) was visited in a German Hospital while on treatment by President . The NA happy moments include decoration ceremonies, award of COAS commendation, emerging winners in military Exs, successful completion of courses and breakthroughs in technological innovation like was done by Lt Col TM Opurum when he repaired and fabricated a single Rocket Propelled Gun into double barrel launcher. This earned him COAS award. Photographs of fallen heroes and other museum items of significant relevance were exhibited during NADCEL 2017 to show these moments of sadness, joy, hopefulness and determination. Paintings and depicting scenes of war and campaigns were also displayed. The event of conferment of the highest honour in Brazil on Lt Gen TY Buratai was reproduced on flex and exhibited in a special corner exclusively meant 118 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria for the COAS. A tour of the exhibition stand like was done during NADCEL 2017 will further clarify this point.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES The contemporary challenges in Nigeria as it affects the NA varies from one part of the country to the other. The post-civil war period was mainly characterised by armed robbery and other criminal vices including illegal sales of firearms and involvement in coup d’état. The result culminated in serious security problems which the State had to battle with and leaving other areas of needs unattended. Other vices such as kidnapping, oil theft, cattle rustling, cultism and terrorism may not have taken place by chance. The Civil War may have contributed significantly to the many of the crimes against mankind and the State we experience today.

THE NEED FOR HISTORY The need for the NA to make history a priority needs no debate. There is so much to gain from it especially in this arena of unimaginable events of dangerous dimensions. Gbor (2004) stated that history is relevant and an inevitable companion to humans in making choices available to us. The choices available to leaders at all levels are products of history in which absence, analogy would be drawn. History as suggested by Foreman gave three major reasons for its inevitability as follows: a. History separates myth from reality and saves us from making mistakes as problems can be approached from basic historical foundation. b. Understanding historical background to issues and events can save us the problem of policy making in void. c. Historical perspective can avail us an in-depth understanding of a problem thus allowing us a better choice in decision making. d. Policy makers can see and analyse the complexity of issues through a proper appreciation of history and find a way out especially towards achieving peace.

CONCLUSION The Nigerian Army has passed through several transformative stages. It has continued to develop over time from the 19th century when men were bare footed to a mechanised and motorised fighting force with the establishment of training institutions. The Civil War that ended with the slogan “no victor no vanquished” took several lives and properties worth millions of the currency then. Lessons were learnt from the various operations. The NA has transformed from its early beginning to suit the threat perception of likely enemies in line with the Federal Government decisions. The NA is responding decisively to enemies of the State in whatever form they may appear. The Nigerian Army is a force to be reckoned with today. It has a lengthy history with a lot of lessons, and lots of glory. To bring this piece to an end, it is necessary to make four recommendations here: The History of the Nigerian Army: Analysis of Its Genealogy and Development 119

One, the genealogy of the Nigerian Army evolution should be included in the curriculum of NA schools. Two, the indigenous innovations discovered in the course of the civil war should be developed for further technological development. Three, relics from the history of the NA should be chronologically assembled in various forms of documentation to meet future demands and used as reference for historical research. Finally, the NA needs to document all key campaigns and other significant events in innovative form using technology and other aesthetic means.

REFERENCES

Gbor W.T. (ed) (2004), Military History, Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to Present, Ibadan. History of the Nigerian Army, Second Edition, Abuja. Information from Major General David Ejoor, Former Chief of Staff (Army), 1971-1975. 10 May 2003. Makata D.E.O (2016), “The tree must not wither”, Kwality Printing and Packaging Ltd, Abuja. Nwolise O.B.C. (2004), “The Nigerian Military in Peace keeping since Independence”, in Gbor (ed) Military History, Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to the Present, Ibadan. Ukpabi S.C. (2004), “The Evolution of the Nigerian Army under Colonial Rule”, in Gbor (ed), Military History, Nigeria from Pre-Colonial Era to Present, Ibadan. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

CHALLENGES OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY IN INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

by

Jude A. Momodu, Ph.D. Centre for Peace and Security Studies Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola Adamawa State Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

The armed forces of a nation are established and maintained to defend it from external aggression primarily. Internal security duties belong to the Police as the lead agency and other security agencies. However, when these internal security agencies are overwhelmed, the military are called in to render assistance to civil authority. In the process they encounter certain challenges. This piece examines the participation of the Nigerian military in internal security operations (ISOs) and the attendant challenges. It observes that the military despite being overstretched in these ISOs, have performed very well in the Fourth Republic. The challenges found also include inadequate funding, corruption, accusations of human rights abuse, and poor motivation and welfare. The paper recommends feasible measures to overcome the identified challenges.

Key words: Challenges, Nigerian Army, Internal Security Operations, Fourth Republic.

INTRODUCTION The engagement of the military in internal security operations (ISOs) has increased dramatically since Nigeria’s return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999. This is mainly due to the liberalisation of the political space which was closed under successive military administrations that has now given the

120 Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 121 impetus for groups to express their deep-seated grievances. This is in addition to the emergence of different forms of crimes and domestic security threats like terrorism, insurgency, cattle rustling, militancy, commercialised kidnapping, armed robbery, cultism, electoral related violence, small arms and light weapons proliferation among others. These internal security threats are often fuelled by the deepening poverty, perceived structural exclusion of individuals and groups, massive unemployment, an expanding demography as well as ethnic, religious, social and economic grievances. The Nigeria Police and other traditional internal security agencies that have the constitutional responsibility to tackle the numerous internal security threats are largely ill-equipped, ill-trained and poorly motivated to handle them. As a result, the military whose core duty is to defend the nation’s territorial integrity against external aggression is often called upon by civil authorities to assist in the management of internal security threats. This is reinforced with the belief that its personnel are better trained and equipped, and in any case, ISOs is the Armed Forces’ (military’s) third function of “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order” (Omede, 2005). The main purpose of engaging the military in ISOs by the Nigerian state is usually to restore public order and national stability. This is important because “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power” (Waltz, 1979). In essence, it is only under a peaceful and orderly environment that the rule of law can prevail, democracy can flourish, and state can function optimally to achieve its corporate objectives among which is to guarantee the human security of its citizens. Therefore, the axiom of the primacy of national security among the responsibilities of government cannot be escaped. Governments, as a matter of empirical fact, almost invariably commit as much resources and sacrifice as many other desiderata as they feel necessary to preserve their national security (Smoke, 1993).The role of the Nigerian military in ISOs is contained in Section 217 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which expressly states that the Armed Forces of the Federation have the responsibilities of: (i) Defending Nigeria from external aggression; (ii) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea, or air;(iii) Suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President; (iv) Performance of such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly. The military’s role in the management of internal security threats in the Fourth Republic needs to be appreciated, especially because it has successfully subordinated itself to the civilian constituted authorities for almost nineteen years now (May 29, 1999 – 2018). It has also been able to prevent the Nigerian state from disintegration through the exercise of its coercive power. As at 2016, military personnel were deployed on ISOs to thirty-two out of the thirty-six states of the federation (Crisis Group, 2016) and currently, they are deployed to thirty-three out of the thirty-six states of the federation. This is an indication that its engagements in ISOs in the Fourth Republic have increased dramatically and it appears to be overstretched, by the activities of insurgent groups such as the Boko Haram sect, the Niger Delta militants, the marauding herdsmen and secessionist groups like the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Arewa youths and others. The capacity of the military to be able to continue to tackle these internal security threats needs to be strengthened as Feaver argues that the “military must be strong enough to meet the threats as defined by the group and subservient enough so as not to endanger the liberty of the group” (Feaver, 1996:149). 122 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

The Nigerian military are seriously challenged operationally by factors such as personnel, logistics, equipment, funding deficits among other factors. Hence, the United States Department Office in August 2017 noted that the Nigerian security forces’ handling of the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram lacks coordination and effectiveness. But the successful degradation of the terror group by the Nigerian military places a question mark against such assertion. The military’s professional conduct in the discharge of ISOs has also been consistently called into question both locally and internationally as some of its personnel are in the habit of committing human rights abuses on innocent civilians that they are supposed to protect (see, Amnesty International, 2015, International Crisis Group, 2015).The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine the successes and challenges of the military’s role in ISOs in the Fourth Republic. This study draws on a combination of both primary and secondary sources of information generation. Interviews were conducted by the author with key informants on the challenges of internal security operations of the Nigerian Military in the Fourth Republic.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION: SECURITY The term security is a vague and contested concept with many interpretations ascribed to it. For instance, during the Cold War era, security was dominantly conceived as being coterminous with military security as against other states’ military power (Booth, 2005).This state-centric conception of security informed why states’ defence budgets were high as more monies were expended on defence procurements. However, since the end of the Cold War, the conception of the term security has moved away from merely military concerns to include economic, societal, political and environmental issues, focusing on people rather than positing a state-centric perception in security studies (Sheehan, 2005, 44), which undermines a proper understanding of security ‘when security is moved out of the military sector’ (Sheehan, 2005).The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (Human Development Report 1993 – www.undp.org/hdro/e93over.htm). The expansion of the meaning of security from a state-centric one to the inclusion of human centered security, perhaps informed the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs’ definition of the concept as a “condition in which States consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress” (1986). It is a fact that since the end of the Cold War, threats to the state now emanates from within and such threats are often engendered by human security issues such as: economic, political, social, environmental among others. In a very practical sense, the term security as defined by Buzan refers to “the pursuit of freedom from threats” (1991). He maintains that: ‘Security can be approached both objectively (there is a real threat) and subjectively (there is a perceived threat), and nothing ensures that these two line up’ (Buzan, 1997). In the same vein, security also means ‘the absence of threats to acquired values’. The focus on values has made Baldwin (1997) to pose some very fundamental questions such as: security for whom, security for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost, in what Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 123 time period? Answering these questions in the affirmative helps to determine the appropriate issues that should form the content of a balanced meaning of the concept of security. Therefore, in defining the concept of security, there is the need to synergise the threat concerns of the state with that of the citizens as this will enable the concept to reflect the threat concerns of both the state and the citizens. More importantly, the term security generally refers to a conscious perception of safety from danger and freedom from existential threats. Such existential threats cover areas like: physical, economic, political, environmental, social, health, psychological and security of groups. The various internal security threats in Nigeria include, sectarian agitations, armed banditry, human trafficking, drug trafficking, armed robbery, border security, financial/economic crimes, threats to critical state infrastructure, electoral violence, farmer-herder conflict, community clashes, ethno-religious conflicts, kidnapping/abduction, assassinations, Boko Haram insurgency, and militancy/oil theft, civil unrests among others. According to The Law of Armed Conflict Internal Security Operations-Part A (International Committee of the Red Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 2002), the document highlights the activities carried out by the military while performing ISOs to include the following: a. cordon and search operations (sealing off a village or an area to search for offenders, weapons or equipment); b. urban and rural patrols, possibly joint patrols with police or paramilitary Forces; c. manning observation posts; d. guard duties at key points or for very important personalities; e. road blocks or vehicle check points (VCPs); f. identity checks; g. controlling peaceful demonstrations; h. controlling or dispersing unlawful assemblies or demonstrations (riot situations); i. enforcing curfews; j. making arrests; k. detaining persons; l. acting as a reserve or reinforcement. i.e. quick reaction duties on standby for incidents; m. keeping sides apart (manning a “peace line” or “green line”); n. escort duties for the police, civil defense units, the fire brigade; o. hostage rescue; p. ambush; q. securing or picketing routes, for example to ensure safe passage of supplies through sensitive areas; and r. bomb disposal, or dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Other ISOs activities include: counter terrorism and counter insurgency, cracking of armed bandits, participation in complex humanitarian emergencies or disaster management such as flooding, disease outbreaks, wild fires management and election duties. 124 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

THEORETICAL INSIGHT This paper is anchored on‘Social Contract theory’ propounded by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke, and James Rousseau. The basic tenet of social contract theory is that security and order could only be achieved by a contract in which all citizens would give up all their individual powers to a central power, the sovereign in return for the protection of life and property (Marshall, 1998).The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines “social contract” in the context of fragility and state-building which underline interactions among three elements: (1) expectations that a given society has of a given state; (2) the state capacity to provide services, including security, revenue generation and control of territory to provide these services; and (3) the presence of a political elite that manages state resources and has the capacity to fulfil social expectations (OECD, 2008). Under the social contract theory, the state is seen as the guarantor of security and the provider of welfare to the citizens. In pursuant of the objective of providing security and welfare for its citizens, the state formulates national security policies to guarantee law and order as it has been observed that “it is only under a secured atmosphere that a state can develop, and direct its human and material resources towards a productive end” (Willie, 2008).The main objective of national security is therefore to uphold a country’s national values, which include national survival, self preservation, territorial integrity and economic progress (Abidde, 2014). The military is a major instrument of guaranteeing national security and by law it is subordinate to civilian control to the extent that the civilian authorities decide when, why and where the military is to apply coercive force, but how to apply coercive force is determined by the military institutions through their rules of engagement. Ball and Fayemi (2008) rightly observe, that “the quality and effectiveness of protection for the territorial integrity of a nation state and its citizens are directly proportionate to the level of subordination of the security organisations to democratically elected leadership structures and civil authorities”. Notwithstanding, however, caution must be made here that the military must not carry out any directive from civilian authorities that is unconstitutional and capable of threatening societal peace. It needs to understand that it has a constitutional responsibility to the society by protecting and preventing it from returning to Thomas Hobbes’ ‘state of the nature’, it needs to guarantee the society’s continued existence through the use of its coercive force to protect public order and national stability. Therefore, the theory of social contract is relevant to the extent that it explains the primacy of the role of the state in providing security for its citizens through the security agencies. However, the responsibility of protecting the state and its citizens from large scale violent domestic and external threats is best soothed for the military because it has the “unique, professionalising skill for the “management of violence” (Huntington, 1957).

NIGERIAN MILITARY’S ENGAGEMENT IN ISOs IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC Tables 1 and 2 show the ISOs the Nigerian military have engaged in since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1999. While Table 1 shows the engagements by government, Table 2 shows the current ISOs. Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 125

Table 1: Nigerian Military’s ISOs in the Fourth Republic (1999 – 2017)

Administration Period of Nigeria Operational Areas and Dates of ISOs Army’s ISOs

Chief Olusegun May 29, 1999 – a. Odi crisis, 1999, . Obasanjo May 29, 2007 b. Zaki Biam invasion 2001, . c. Onitsha disturbances, 2006, . d. Niger Delta crisis, 1999-2009, South-South States. e. Ikeja Bomb blasts, 2001, . f. Ife-Modakeke crisis, 1999-2000, . g. Plateau State (Jos) crisis, Plateau State. h. Sharia crisis in parts of Northern Nigeria (1999-2004). i. Niger-Delta militancy (Operation Hakuri – 1998; Operation Flush II, – 2004). j. Zagon-Kataff riots, 1999-2001, . k. Umuleri-Aguleri communal crisis 1999-2000, Anambra State. l. Kano religious crisis. m. Plateau state (Jos) crisis n. Itshekiri/Urhobo/Ijaw crisis of 2004, . o. Danish religious cartoon crisis, 2006, Bauchi, Kano and Borno States. Alhaji Umaru May 29, 2007 – a. Quelling of Islamic insurgency in Borno (Maiduguri), Yar’Adua May 5, 2010 2009. b. Niger-Delta militancy (Operation Restore Hope, Warri – 2008; Operation Pulo Shield – 2012; and Operation Delta Safe – 2016). c. Invasion of Gbaramatu Delta State in 2009 by the Nigeria military with the aim of routing the militants. d. Jos crisis, Plateau State. Dr. Goodluck 2010 – a. Jos crisis (till date), Plateau State. Jonathan May 29, 2015 b. Post-elections crisis (April, 2011) Northern States. c. Umbasse ethnic killings in Nassrawa State 2013. d. The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Military and police in 2014. e. Wukari crisis 2000-2015, . f. Boko Haram crisis till date, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States (Operation Restore Order I (ORO I); Operation – 12 June 2011 – 15 May 2013; Restore Order III (ORO III) –- 13 December 2011 – 15 May 2013; Operation BOYONA- May 2013 – August 2013 and Operation Zaman Lafia – August 2013 – to date). President May 29, 2015 – a. Boko Haram insurgency. Muhammadu Present b. Niger-Delta militancy 2016 to date. Buhari c. Farmer and Herdsmen conflicts 2015 to date. d. Violent crisis between Muslim Fulani herders and Southern Kaduna, 2016. e. The Shiite crisis with the Nigeria Military in Kaduna in 2016. f. Agitations of the indigenous people of Biafra (IPOB) in South eastern states leading to Operation Python Dance II in October 2017. g. Armed banditry in South western states. h. Commercialised Kidnappings in the South-south, South east and North west regions. 126 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Table 2: Current ISOs of the Nigerian Military S/no: Name of ISOs Mandate of ISOs Region

1. a. Operation Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Operations. North-East Lafiya Dole It also has an expanded scope, scale and depth region comprising three divisions and more than five states. This has dovetailed to other specialised operations like Operation Crack-down to wind down the war against insurgents and clear the remnants of the Boko Haram sect in Sambisa Forest; Operation Gama Aiki, which serves same purpose in the northern part of Borno state;

and Operation Safe Corridor, set up for the de- radicalisation and rehabilitation of repentant Boko Haram terrorists. Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Operations launched to clear the remnants of Boko Haram b. Operation insurgents. Deep Punch

2. Operation Safe To quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal North Haven activities. It is stationed in Plateau State with area of Central operation extending to Benue, Kogi, Nasarawa and Kwara States to quell ethno-religious conflicts and other criminal activities.

3. Operation Sara Established to battle the criminal activities of armed North West Daji and bandits, cattle rustlers and robbers operating particularly Operation Harbin in Zamfara, Kaduna and fringes of Sokoto, Kebbi, Kunama Katsina and Kano states.

4. a. Operation It is now complemented by the Nigerian Army’s South- Delta Safe Operation Crocodile Smile, and Navy’s Operation South formerly TseraTeku. These operations are all aimed at crushing Operation the resurgent Niger Delta militancy and other acts of Pulo Shield. criminality like oil theft, vandalism, and bunkering in the region.

5. Operation Awase To contain the criminal operations around Ogun-Lagos South West axis, particularly in Arepo where illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism are regular occurrences. South East has Operation Iron Fence to combat armed robbers, hooligans and kidnappers. 6. Operation Iron Established to combat armed robbers, hooligans and South East Fence kidnappers.

Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 127

7. Operation Mesa It is a Joint Task Force (JTF) operation against Nationwide all forms of criminal activities in all the states of operations the federation. 8. Operation The military drafted on the directive of Acting Taraba State Mambila President, Yemi Oshinbajo to maintain peace in Mambila Plateau between Fulani herdsmen and the Mambila people. 9. Operation Safe It is to guide armed forces participation in Nigeria Conduct electoral matters with a view to creating a conducive atmosphere for elections 10. Operation It is to guard the Sea which was launched early Coastal Areas of TsareTeku this year by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Nigeria It’s being spearheaded by Navy to secure the maritime environment and it has been very successful in reducing hijacking of ships and piracy. Author’s field data

Since the country’s independence on October 1st 1960, the military has successfully contributed to several internal security operations, assisting the police and other traditional internal security agencies and the civil authorities to maintain and restore law and public order. The Fourth Republic has been very challenging to the military and in spite of domestic threats the Nigerian state is confronted with, the military has prevented it from disintegration through its active engagements in ISOs. They have responded to threats such as, sectarian violence, terrorism and insurgency, armed robbery and banditry, oil-theft, farmers-herdsmen conflicts and of recent, secessionist agitations. Colonel Sagir Musa, Deputy Director, Army Public Relations, highlights the achievements of the military’s engagements in ISOs as follows:

The Command Post and Field Training Exercises were initiated and executed with the major objective of addressing peculiar security challenges across the various regions of Nigeria. This idea assisted significantly in the huge successes achieved in all the areas where the Exercises were conducted. The Buratai’s Approach – that of putting – realism/pragmatism and subterfuge into training, exercises and/or operations strategically aimed or targeted to solving identified security threats across the nation has so far yielded the desired results (This Day, 2016).

There is no gainsaying the fact that the military’s engagements in ISOs in the current republic has largely assisted in tackling several internal security challenges. In this regard, the military has busted many criminal gangs and has also prevented the escalation of several ethno-religious and community violence such as: the Tiv-Jukun conflict in Wukari, Taraba State 1999-2000; Aguleri-Umuleri conflict in 128 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Anambra State 2000; Ife-Modakeke conflict 1999-2000; Jos crisis 1999-2000; violent crisis between Muslim Fulani cattle herders and Christian farmers in Kaduna crisis 2016; Shiite crisis with the Nigerian Army in Kaduna in 2008 and many others. Some of the organised criminal groups busted are cattle rustlers in Plateau, Zamfara and Yobe States, armed robbery gangs in Lagos State and cult groups and kidnappers in Edo, Rivers, Delta and Kaduna States as well as some south east states among others. The military in conjunction with other security agencies sacked the Boko Haram insurgent group from areas they captured and declared as caliphate in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 2014. Generally, the military, under the current republic have tirelessly struggled to ensure national stability and the continued existence of the Nigerian state. Its men and women have put their lives on the line in discharging their constitutional responsibilities of maintaining both the internal and external security of Nigeria. Frankly, the military has lost so many of its gallant officers and some have had their limbs and arms amputated due to the injuries they sustained in the course of discharging their constitutional responsibility of keeping Nigeria safe.

Military’s Response to Ethno-Religious Conflicts in the Fourth Republic Several ethno-religiously motivated conflicts have occurred since the return to democratic governance on May 29, 1999. Most of these conflicts are instigated by factors such as, bad governance, structural exclusion, contest for land and other economic/environmental resources, unemployment, injustice, elite manipulation, weak institution of governance and internal security architecture among others. The military have been deployed by the federal government to respond to these conflicts and they have effectively prevented them from escalating further to threaten public peace. However, the army was alleged to be excessive in some cases, committing human rights abuses, such as Zaki Biam and Odi Community. In both cases, several hundreds of innocent citizens were extra-judicially killed by the military.

Military’s Response to Boko Haram Insurgency/Terrorism The military have been engaged in the counter-insurgency operations against the Boko Haram jihadist group in the north east region of Nigeria since 2009, when the sect waged a violent campaign against the Nigerian government in Maiduguri the capital of Borno State. The Islamist group is popularly known as Boko Haram but it prefers to be called Jama’ atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’ awatiwal Jihad, meaning “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad.”The group’s core objective is to replace the secular Nigerian State with a caliphate which will be strictly governed by the Shari’a Islamic laws. When the sect’s atrocities and violence overwhelmed the Police, the military was called in for Internal Security Operations. Between 2009 and 2013, the military operations in the north east against the Boko Haram extremist group changed from internal security operations to a “full scale offensive against the BHT [Boko Haram terrorist] insurgents.”Amnesty International also reports that:

In 2013, as attacks by Boko Haram intensified, former President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency, which was subsequently extended Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 129

repeatedly, in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. The state of emergency gave overly broad emergency powers to the security forces. Former President Goodluck Jonathan set up a Joint Task Force to lead the operations against Boko Haram, which included personnel from the Nigerian Army, Police Force and other security forces. The army took full control of operations against Boko Haram in August 2013 (Amnesty International, 2015).

It should be noted that the military’s alleged highhandedness and repression of the sect in the July 2009 uprising and the consequent declaration of emergency rule by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan on May 2013 in the three states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and its renewal after six months, largely contributed to the escalation and intensification of the violence and the sect’s metamorphosis, first into a terrorist group (2010-2013). Later on in 2014, it graduated into an insurgent group due to the territories it captured and declared as part of its acclaimed caliphate in the BAY states, namely Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. Also, from 2015 to date, the sect has shrunk back into a terrorist group after it had lost the territories it captured due to a combined military offensive which include the Nigerian security forces, civilian joint task force, vigilantes, hunters and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Several major operations have been launched by the Nigeria military and other security forces against the Boko Haram sect since 2011. These operations are noted by Amnesty International thus:

Since 2011, there have been four major operations in the north-east to counter Boko Haram. Operation Restore Order I (ORO I), from June 2011 till May 2013, was the first. Some 4,000 troops served in Borno State and, together with the police and members of other security forces, formed the Joint Task Force (JTF). In Yobe State, ORO III was established.... ORO I was replaced by Operation BOYONA, which covered Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (the acronym derives from the names of the three states). Operation BOYONA was launched when the state of emergency was announced in May 2013 and had some 10,000 troops. Both ORO I and its successor Operation BOYONA reported to the Chief of Defence Staff. On 19 August 2013, operational command of Operation BOYONA was taken over by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) when the newly established Army Division 7 took over from the JTF and military forces took over fully from the police in actions against Boko Haram. Operation Zaman Lafiya, with 10,000 troops, was launched as the successor to Operation BOYONA. Including ‘Operation Lafiya Dole’ which is currently ongoing in the north east against the Boko Haram terrorism (Amnesty International, 2015).

The military have been able to degrade the capabilities of the Boko Haram insurgents, forcing the group out of the areas they hitherto declared as caliphate. Since 2016, the violent activities of Boko Haram had increased with the group launching series of attacks and suicide bombings on rural communities, 130 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria civilian populations and military targets in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, resulting in several deaths, injuries, and massive destruction of property. That resurgence of the group indicated that it still remained a dangerous asymmetric threat to the north east region, the Nigerian state and its neighbours in the Lake Chad region. In fact, a report of the Crisis Group (2016) warned that “the nature of Boko Haram’s tactics and geographical reach would make the group’s comprehensive defeat difficult. But having degraded the terrorists in December 2016, the military went into mop-up operations, and on February 4,2018, the Nigerian Army announced that the Boko Haram has been completely defeated (Rojers, in New Telegraph, Feb. 5, 2018:51).

Military’s Response to Sectarian Agitations in the Current Political Dispensation Sectarian agitations in the current political dispensation have been threatening Nigeria’s domestic security. Sectarian groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) from the South-East region, the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) from the South-South region; AREWA Youth Movement from the northern region, and Odua Movement from the South-West and of recent the Middle-belt association. These groups have been issuing threats and counter threats on the Nigerian state. IPOB is an offshoot of MASSOB, but it is led by Nnamdi Kanu, a British-Nigerian based in London. Despite the arrest and imprisonment of Kanu for about two years and his release in 2017, the group continued to demand for the secession of the South East region from the Nigerian state until it was proscribed in October 2017. Of recent, the Arewa youths from the northern region of the country issued a quit notice to all south easterners residing in the north to leave before 1stOctober, 2017.This was also followed by the issuing of a quit notice by a group from the Niger Delta, threatening that all northerners and Yorubas residing in the region must leave before 1st October 2017. Again, all the sectarian groups declared their own republics. These groups have continued to threaten the Nigerian state with hate speeches which have been undermining the country’s peaceful coexistence. Recently, the Acting Vice President, Professor Yemi Oshinbajo, said that the federal government will henceforth treat hate speeches as acts of terrorism, promising that the security agencies including the military will crack down on all those groups and individuals making hate speeches. The military have also promised to monitor and sanction hate speeches on social media. The military have also been clamping down on Biafra agitators.

CHALLENGES OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY’S ENGAGEMENTS IN ISOs (a) Long Neglect in the Days of Military Rule The initial decline in the performance of the Nigerian military in ISOs is a function of the long years of neglect of the institution under successive military administrations that tactically and strategically weakened the capability of military institution. According to President ’s inaugural address which he delivered on May 29, 1999, he lamented that ‘Professionalism has been lost... my heart bleeds to see the degradation in the proficiency of the military (Herbert, 2001).The International Crisis Group report (2015) identifies the root causes of the inefficiency that plagued the Nigeria military as follow: Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 131

The decline began during thirty-three years of military dictatorship that took a serious toll on professionalism, operational effectiveness and accountability. Return to democratic rule in 1999 raised hopes the institution could be restored, but successive civilian governments’ pledges of much-needed reforms proved largely rhetorical. Presidents, defense ministry and parliament lacked the commitment and expertise to implement significant changes. They left the military badly governed, under-resourced and virtually a drift. Administration and accountability deteriorated throughout the sector. Poor, indeed lacking senior leadership has been compounded by equally poor legislative oversight and defense headquarters coordination and planning (ICG, 2015).

The decline only began to recede with the emergency of the Buhari government in May 2015 when new platforms were purchased, and the morale of the troop boosted.

(b) Deployment for Police Duties and Associated Overstretching The military is today overstretched and overused for internal security operations. They are deployed in about thirty-two out of thirty-six states of the Federation. This has denied them enough manpower to face the Boko Haram menace. As Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yakubu Dogara lamented:

It is worrisome that Nigeria is effectively permanently in a state of emergency as the Armed Forces are deployed in more than twenty-eight states of the Federation in peacetime, the speaker said. The Armed Forces have virtually taken over routine police work in Nigeria. It is no longer acting in aid of civil authorities but has become the civil authority itself. (Premium Times, 2017). (c) Corruption in the Military One major impediment to the effectiveness of military engagements in ISOs in the current dispensation is corruption, which the International Crisis Group (2015) has also laid credence to. It observed accordingly:

Corruption is system-wide. Legislators often manipulate the appropriation process at the National Assembly to serve private business interests rather than benefit the armed forces. Dubious procurement practices, fraudulently bloated payrolls, poor financial management and weak auditing systems at the national security adviser’s office, the defence ministry and armed services headquarters often mean funds are diverted to private or non-military purposes; arms, ammunition and other equipment are sometimes substandard and not always delivered. Inadequate funding, corrupt procurement and poor maintenance result in serious equipment and logistics deficits (ICG, 2015). 132 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Some former and serving military officers have been arrested and charged to court for stealing money meant for defence purposes. Also, in November 2007, military and media sources reported that a syndicate had, over a long period, allegedly sold arms, including AK-47 assault rifles and general purpose machine guns, as well as ammunition, from the army’s Central Ordnance Depot in Kaduna. Investigations traced some of the arms to Niger Delta insurgents fighting the military (Sunday Punch, Lagos, 20 January 2008 and , 15 January 2008.). A significant number of military personnel have been involved in other criminal activities, from armed robbery to ransom kidnappings (Vanguard, 29 December, 2015). Corruption within the military has a tremendous direct negative impact on the efforts of equipping the military personnel with the right and up-to-date weapons and facilities to conduct ISOs. Corruption is also the main problem affecting the capacity of the military to carry out effective ISOs in Nigeria. In order to check the problem of corruption in defense sector, there is need for those institutions that have oversight on the sector to develop their capacity and ensure that they consistently carry out robust oversight on the sector particularly, the executive, ministry of defence, military officials, contractors and all those actors engaged in the sector.

(d) Personnel Deficit In the aftermath of the civil war, the much expanded size of the military, around 250,000 in 1977, consumed a large part of Nigeria’s resources under military rule for little productive return. Currently, the military is largely under-staffed, poorly trained and over-stretched. According to a report of International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (2014), Nigeria’s 1: 1,000 ratio of military and paramilitary personnel to overall population is lower than those of all its neighbours (Chad 3.4: 1000; Cameroon 1.2: 1000; Benin 1.1: 1000), except Niger (0.7: 1000). The army’s reported 100,500 strength is less than half the 18,966 officers and 190,139 soldiers which the defense headquarters, in 2010, projected as necessary to meet its challenges in the near future (Crisis Group, 2015). In a bid to address the problem of personnel deficit in the army, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lt General Tukur Buratai, has said that army planned to increase its personnel strength from its present 100,000 to slightly above 200,000 in the next eight years. He explained that the army’s expansion programme was aimed at boosting its response capacity while stressing that its capabilities to effectively deal with its present challenges were however not in doubt (This Day, 14 January, 2016). (e) Equipment and Logistics Deficits Another major challenge of the military is equipment deficit. This was so serious before the coming of the Buhari government that for many years, the military made no major acquisitions, at best taking delivery of refurbished platforms (Leadership, 21 July 2014). Thus, to fight the Boko Haram, the country had to carry cash and cap in hand to beg for arms from South Africa. The cash running into millions of dollars was seized. The limited equipment available is often poorly maintained (The Guardian (Lagos), 9 November 1999). For instance, the army’s 35mm anti-aircraft guns, imported from Switzerland in 1979, became unserviceable in 2002 and were left in that condition until 2013 (This Day, 31 October 2013). Crisis Group (2014) report observed that many soldiers deployed to fight Boko Haram in Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 133

2013-2014 reported their equipment broke down frequently, and they had severe shortages or lack of body armour, radio equipment and night vision goggles. This was a major factor for the many desertions in those years. From 2000 to 2008, defense budget was less than 3 per cent of overall government expenditure. From 2009 to 2014, it increased to an average of 7.2 per cent of government spending ($5-$6 billion); but, as in the past, this was still allocated disproportionately to recurrent expenditures, leaving very little for crucial capital investment (ICG, 2015). According to the report of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2017), “military expenditure in Nigeria increased by only 1.2 per cent to $1.7 billion in 2016, despite its large-scale military operations against Boko Haram; while 2017 defense budget is 465 billion naira. Generally, the deficit in equipment and logistics in the military became very visible in 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance. This was a calculated and deliberate attempt by the successive military administrations starting from the time of President (1985- 1992) spanning to General (1993-1998). Their aim was to demobilise the military so as to prevent military take over against their governments. The deficits in equipment and logistics have contributed significantly to the poor performance of the military in ISOs in the current political dispensation.

(f) Nigerian Military and Human Rights Abuse Accusations The Nigerian military is a professional organisation trained in the application and management of violence in responding to both domestic and international security threats. With regards to its ISOs duties, the Code of Conduct for the Nigerian Armed Forces Personnel on Internal Security and Aid to Civil Power Operations, enacted during the administration of then Chief of Defence Staff, Marshall Paul Dike, in February 2010. Paragraph 6 of this Code provides with respect to Rules of Engagement of the Armed Forces in ISOs as follows:

In enforcing domestic law and order, members of the Nigerian Armed Forces shall use firearms as a last resort with maximum restraint, and respect for the principle of minimum force even in situations of self- defense. Force may only be used when absolutely necessary and to the extent required to perform their duty. To this end, all operations must be guided by appropriate Rules of Engagement (ROE) to direct personnel on the use of force.

The above ROE explains the reason why military personnel on ISOs employ maximum or excessive force in responding to internal security threats. To borrow some words from the Armed Forces ROE “members of the Nigerian Armed Forces shall use firearms as a last resort with maximum restraint… Force may only be used when absolutely necessary and to the extent required to perform their duty”. These statements confer on the personnel of the military extensive discretionary powers to use ‘reasonable force’ in the event that it is necessary. Unfortunately, however, this discretionary power is at times abused and misapplied by some personnel, who flagrantly commit human rights abuses. However, it is instructive to note that, the international human rights law applies during armed conflicts 134 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria and in peacetime. It also applies to both domestic and international armed conflict situations. The essence of its application is to protect civilians as well as ensure that the security forces conduct themselves within the reasonable ambit of the law and their profession. In May 2009, over 500 people were allegedly killed in a coordinated attack by a combined team of army, navy, and air force personnel in Gbaramatu kingdom of Delta State (Francis, LaPin & Rossiasco, 2011). According to Amnesty International publication titled: “Stars on their Shoulders, Blood on their Hands: War Crimes Committed by the Nigerian Military”. (2015): the military engagements in the counter-terrorism operations against Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria, has resulted in the extra-judicial execution of more than 1,000 people; they have arbitrarily arrested at least 20,000 people, mostly young men and boys; and have committed countless acts of torture. The fact of the matter is that military engagements in ISOs cannot be conducted without its personnel sometimes crossing the threshold of violence in terms of recording excessive use of violence especially when dealing with terrorists that do not obey any law other than their own, and do not respect any human rights. What is important is that military personnel should be strictly guided by their ROE as this is necessary to reduce to the barest minimum cases of infractions and human rights abuses during ISOs. Military personnel that violate the ROE on ISOs should be tried according to military laws and if guilty, they should be punished accordingly as this will serve as deterrence for others. It is heartwarming to note that under the able leadership of Lt. Gen, Buratai as Chief of Army Staff, accusations of brutalities against civilians have drastically reduced as the Army always take up accusation cases for investigation and seeing personnel found wanting punished. There is also the moral issue of Amnesty International fighting for the respect of the human rights of terrorists that not only do not respect the human rights of the people they kill and maim in mass, but also take delight in killing such innocent people! (g) Poor Motivation and Welfare The personnel of the Nigerian military, the army, navy and air-force, are still relatively poorly motivated despite the great efforts of the current service Chiefs in the direction of personnel motivation. They are confronted with poor welfare conditions such as, inadequate staff accommodation, poor health, educational and recreational facilities, including poor remunerations, retirement packages, among others. For instance, discontent over welfare conditions aggravates relations between senior officers and junior ranks. There was unease in January 2008, when a group calling itself “Patriotic Majors” threatened to “act” by 15 February if certain welfare needs and other demands were not met. There has been a lot of improvement since 2008, but much still needs to be done, and much depends on defence budget size! No doubt things have improved today beyond the 2008 level, but it is not yet Uhuru.

(h) Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) The proliferation of SALWs within the country has dramatically increased crimes and incidences of violent conflicts, thereby posing huge threat to national security (Keili, 2008). This is also evident in Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 135 terms of the number of seizures made by the Nigeria Customs Service at the Lagos sea port, airports, border areas and other locations within the country, including those impounded by other security agencies. SALWs proliferations in the country have equipped many individuals and groups with weapons potent enough to challenge the coercive power of the Nigerian state. This is evident from groups like Boko Haram, militants in the Niger Delta, Fulani herdsmen, armed robbers, kidnappers, cult groups among others. SALWs have been contributing to the erosion of the Nigerian state authority by criminal and insurgent groups in the current republic.

(i) The Need For Improved Civil-Military Relations Civil military relations refer to the total gamut of interactions between soldiers and civilians as individuals or groups. It assumes the interdependence of civil and military sector based on the principle of civil control of the military organisation as a fundamental requirement for a lawful free and democratic society (Nwolise, 2005:108). Civil-military relations is an aspect of national security policy, established by heads of state to protect the nation’s “social, economic, and political institutions” (Huntington, 1957). Basically, civil military relations deals with the strategic relationship that the military develops with both the civilian authorities and the civil populace in order to gain the social capital that will assist it to deliver better and efficient security services to the country. There are two levels at which civil military relations take place, which are: a. between military and civil authorities (i.e. interface between military and the executive and parliament) and b. between military and civilian relations (i.e. interface between military and the general public and civil society bodies). The crisis of civil-military relations in the current political republic is as a result of the long years of military domination of the political space which lasted for about thirty-three years and has overtime pitched the military and civilians against each other. This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ syndrome between the military and civilians is what Janowitz‘s (1960) confirmed as “separate military and civilian worlds existed”. The military perceives the civilians as weak and inferior to them and therefore calls them ‘bloody civilians’. On the part of the civilians, they perceive the military as an enemy because they feel that they are unnecessarily aggressive, domineering and ruthless. The military institution has a dented public image owing to the way and manner its personnel at times arrogantly subject civilians to intimidation and inhuman treatments thereby making the public to develop trust deficit in the military. An Afro- barometer survey carried out in 2014/2015 across 36 African countries including Nigeria, revealed that public trust in both the police and army was lowest in Nigeria. Only 21 percent and 40 percent of citizens indicated they trust the police or the army “a lot” or “somewhat” respectively (Buchanan-Clarke & Lekalake, 2016). This schism creates problems especially in the area of public support and cooperation with the military which are needed for smooth flow of real intelligence during ISOs. This poses a serious challenge to the military, and has to be corrected. The NA strategies under Lt. Gen. Buratai in the North East which have closed this gap should be applied in other parts of the country to shore up public trust and cooperation for the military. 136 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

CONCLUDING REMARKS The role of the military in tackling internal security threats cannot be over-emphasised in a democratic nation as Nigeria. The military has shown compelling evidence of subordination and loyalty to the constituted civil authorities since May 29, 1999 to date, including defending the corporate existence of the Nigerian state. Despite the dramatic increase in the number of internal security threats that have been confronting the Nigerian state, the military has done very well in terms of maintaining public peace and protecting the country from disintegration. The military’s effectiveness in ISOs in the current dispensation is challenged by factors such as, limited funding, corruption, poor welfare and motivation for its personnel, personnel deficits, equipment and logistics deficits, civil-military relations among others. In addition, the military’s engagements in ISOs in the current political dispensation have also been marked by unprofessional conducts such as: human rights abuses, extra-judicial killings, rape, extortions, torture among others. These misconducts have often negatively affected the public image of the institution both locally and internationally. It is imperative, therefore, that the military institution should try to re-invent and re-calibrate its strategies in order to enhance the capacity and effectiveness of its men and women on ISOs towards securing the Nigerian state from the enormous domestic threats seeking to terminate its existence. Finally, it is important to stress at this juncture, that the regular engagements of the military on ISOs in the current republic, is reflective of the fragility of the Nigerian state and the inefficiency of its institutions especially the Police and Court. Therefore, the regular engagements of its personnel in ISOs, is only a treatment of the symptoms of these social and structural problems and not the cure. To address these problems, government at all levels should ensure social justice and good governance. This will help to assuage and engage most of the tendencies that instigate the current internal security threats overstretching the Nigerian military.

Policy Recommendations Based on the major arguments that have been canvassed in this study, the following policy recommendations are proffered: First, there is the need for the National Assembly, civil society bodies and media to strengthen leadership and oversight of the military institutions in terms of ensuring accountability and transparency in its leadership and in defense procurements. Secondly, the Federal Government, National Assembly and the military leadership need to ensure the provision of adequate welfare and motivation for the personnel of the military so as to boost their spirit especially during ISOs. Thirdly, the military is a very hazardous profession and its men and women constitutionally bound to put their lives on the line if it demands so. There is therefore the need for the government to develop a life insurance package for military personnel as this will help to commit them towards discharging their ISOs duties. Fourth, government to provide adequate funding and equipment for the police and other traditional internal security agencies to be able to effectively discharge internal security duties. This will reduce the involvement of the military in ISOs and they will be able to prepare for their main duty of defending Nigeria’s corporate existence and territorial integrity. Fifth, government should adequately fund the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) to produce both military hardware and software. Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 137

It should also encourage the private sector investment in defence-related industries. This is to ensure proper and timely equipment of our troops to perform their duties always. Sixth, government should adequately fund and equip the police and other traditional security agencies so that they will be able to effectively discharge their constitutional responsibilities of securing the Nigerian state from internal security threats. Seventh, military authorities should commit more resources into the training of its personnel on international best practices on ISOs. Eight, government and military authorities should also ensure that military personnel are adequately remunerated, including paying their ISOs allowances as and when due. Ninth, at the root of most of the internal security threats in Nigeria is bad governance. In order to address this, it is important that government at all levels should ensure good governance especially in the provision of economic empowerment opportunities, social amenities, educational opportunities among others. Tenth, the military should develop an efficient human rights framework which should be mainstreamed in the training of its officer corps and the rank and file. The same framework should also be mainstreamed into its rules of engagements (ROE) for its personnel’s engaged in ISOs.

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Buzan, Barry(1997), “Rethinking Security after the Cold War”, Co-operation and Conflicts, 32/1. Feaver, P. D. (1996). “The Civil Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control.” Armed Forces and Society 23.2: 149-178. Federal Republic of Nigeria, Emergency Powers (General) Regulations, Government Legal Notice, No. 85, Official Gazette, No. 28, Vol. 100, Regulation 3. Francis, P., LaPin, D. & Rossiasco, P. (2011). Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC. Herbert M. H. (2001). Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, Lynne Rienner, Boulder/ London, 2001, p.54. Hill, J.C.N. (2012). Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile? Palgrave Macmillan. Hobbes, Thomas. 1651a. Leviathan. C.B Macpherson (Editor). London: Penguin Books (1985) Human Rights Watch (1999). “Destruction of Odi and Rape of Choba”; http://www.HRW.org (retrieved August 2, 2017). Human Rights Watch (2001). “Nigeria: Soldiers Massacre Civilians in Revenge Attack in Benue State; http://www.HRW.org Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. International Crisis Group (2015). Nigeria: The Challenge of Military Reform. Africa Report No 237 | 6 June 2016. International Crisis Group Africa Reports Nos 113, Nigeria: Want in the Midst of Plenty, 19 July 2006; 115. International Crisis Group (2016). Interview, retired non-commissioned military officer, Abuja, 6 February. Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960. Jesse, W. L. (1972). The New Military Professional: Changing Conception of Military Professionalism in the Post War Period, Ph.D. Dissertation. Riverside, CA: University of California, Riverside. Keili, F. (2008). “Small arms and light weapons transfer in West Africa: A Stock-taking”. Disarmament Forum. http://www.ssrnetwork.net/uploaded_files/4508.pdf. Nigerian Army Joint Investigation Team (August 2013 report) NOPRIN (2007) Criminal Force?: An Interim Report on the Nigeria Police Force, Network on Police Reform in Nigeria (NOPRIN), Lagos. Nwolise, B. C. (2005). Dimensions of Civil Military Relations: A case study of the Nigerian Experience and Strategising its Development, The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal, 2(1). Nwolise, O.B.C. (2007). “Military Assistance to Civil Authority as a Constitutional Duty of the Nigerian Armed Forces: Sources of Public Agonies and Outcries, Bad Military Image, and Their Challenges for Political Leadership, Military Command and Professionalism” in A. Ogomudia (ed), Peace Challenges of the Nigerian Military in Internal Security Operations in the Fourth Republic 139

Support Operations, Command and Professionalism: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed Forces in the 21st Century. Ibadan: Gold Press. OECD (2008), Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, OECD Publishing, Paris. Omede, A. J. (2005). Threats and Threats Analysis: A Strategic Analysis of Nigeria’s Territorial Defense, The Nigerian Military Quarterly Journal, Vol. 1, (2 & 3). Pp.148 -249. Sheehan, Michael (2005), International Security, An Analytical Survey (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Smoke, R. (1993). National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience in the Cold War, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 328. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (1986).Concepts of Security. Report of the Secretary-General. Waltz, K. (1979).Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 126. Willie, E.A. (2008). The Challenges of Border Management and Collective Security in Nigeria. Retrieved from http://www.spspng.org/index.php?option=com_content

Newspapers Daily Trust, 18th March 2015 IRIN (2015). “Continuous deployment for internal security has resulted in inconsistent unit training and performance decline in range practice. Leadership Newspaper (2014). “Former Military Chief Dambazzau laments use of military for police duties”, 1 July. Sunday Punch (Lagos) (2007). Plundering the armoury”, The Source (Lagos), 19 November. Nigerian Tribune (2008). “The Military Balance 2014”, 15 January. Premium Times (2017). “Dogara questions deployment of military in over 28 states”. The Sun Newspaper (2013). “Insecurity stretches military operations in 28 states – NSA”, 5 July. The Guardian (London), 5 November (2012). “Nigerian Army’s Mali mission stalls amid doubts”. The News (2008). “Rage of Soldiers”, 11 February. Vanguard (2015).”Nigeria’s ‘disgrace’ that neighbours must take on Boko Haram – Buhari”, Reuters, 9 February 2015. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

EXPLORING ALTERNATIVES IN ASYMMETRIC WARS IN NIGERIA

by

Willie Aziegbe Eselebor PhD Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan Email: [email protected] Mobile: +2348037188512

ABSTRACT

Intrastate and irregular wars are not new phenomena, but the search for durable peace remains elusive much as conflicts continue unabated, using avant-garde means by belligerents. The current surge of terrorism in Nigeria is contextualised as asymmetry, being war conducted through unconventional methods by irregular forces. This discourse aims to interrogate why asymmetric warfare is deployed and utilised by non-state armed groups as an option to make demands upon the state and how the state is engaging these problems through traditional counterinsurgency tactics. The paper relied on grievance and greed framework to explain the motivation for intractable conflicts, while questioning the concept of responsibility to protect and human rights violations in the context of abuses resulting from internal security operations. The utilisation of lethal tactics has resulted in wide scale destructions, dislocation and harm to the military, civilian population and other targets in Nigeria. The irregular wars were found to be by-products of injustice, inequality, lack of freedom and struggle over power or scarce resources. Military interventions to restore normalcy are on-going in three North Eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe under siege; but are unlikely to succeed, unless the basis for power sharing, equity and justice are addressed, alongside peace education and peacebuilding to transform the actors and failed institutions. It is important to understand that in today’s emerging asymmetric warfare, inclusiveness and good governance are alternatives to military intervention to restore peace. Key words: Asymmetry, conflict, military, counterinsurgency, peacebuilding 140 Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 141

INTRODUCTION War is the use of military means by state, non-state armed groups and others for political, cultural, religious and economic objectives. The end of wars is not in sight, but the practice keeps changing. History recorded in ancient times when bows and arrows, swords, mortars and gun powder altered combatants’ understanding of wars. The trend followed with the production of atomic bombs and nuclear weapons which enthroned Cold War hostilities. Where we are today is the era of horrific wars made possible by the use of asymmetry means by the weak against the strong. The unfolding dynamics are driven by the political economy and other normative innovations like the laws of war and the Geneva Conventions on treatment of non-combatants, which also affects the conduct of wars. With globalisation, ease of communication, new governance structures, rogue states are now investing more in armed conflicts. These include the production of smart and sophisticated weapons, which has effectively revolutionised the battlefield, leading to asymmetry in capabilities and operations; a new revolution which poses challenge to the security of nations. Asymmetry, though not new, has created fragmentary or frozen conflicts within, between and all over the world today. The security challenges include terrorism, insurgency, non-state armed uprisings, guerrilla movements and re-determination of state borders. The tragic list also includes proliferation of arms, drug and human smuggling, weak and failing states, unstable democracies, faulty elections, economic and environmental crisis, gender and human rights violation. Democracy itself has not assisted in solving these intractable conflicts. Just as the reduction in Cold War was most welcomed, the global security regime erupted into a new wave of asymmetry wars, a situation that is not abating, much as the battle field has shifted to Africa. Nigeria, since return to democracy in 1999, is challenged by incessant religious and ethnic violence in the northern parts, especially in most of the states confronted by porous borders with neighbours like Cameroun, Niger and Chad. The current crisis is heightened by the politicisation of religion, manipulation of ethnicity, poverty, corruption and other external factors related to activities of rogue states. These among others and the deficit in governance, led to the emergence of Boko Haram Islamic religious sect, formed in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, Borno State in the north eastern part of Nigeria. Following a clash between the sect members and security operatives, resulting in extra- judicial murder of its founder, the sect went underground and has grown in sophistication, thus becoming a terrorist brand in the like of Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qa’eda in the Maghreb. The leadership of the sect is hard to pin down to an individual, which makes it difficult for any meaningful negotiation to take place. Boko Haram operations are mostly asymmetric, propelled by cells scattered within and outside Nigeria, but not limited to Chad, Cameroun and Niger; that we share common frontiers with in Africa, but other terror networks that are regionally based, beyond identified limits. The group became deadly from 2010 upwards, graduating from using improvised explosives devices (IEDs) to grenades, bombs and artillery mounted on vehicles in attacking military formations, police barracks, prisons, schools, churches, markets and other vulnerable targets. The response of the government has been an admixture of military engagement, offer of negotiated settlement, consultation with northern elders and the rebranding of almajiri educational system to cater for out-of-school youths 142 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria that are potential recruits of insurgency. In addition, the budgetary allocation to the security sector was increased, tighter border controls were introduced and anti-terrorism law was passed by the National Assembly. Despite these developments, Boko Haram horrific attack seems to be on the increase and not abating, creating high level of insecurity, threat to lives and properties; which leave us with the option to search for alternatives, if any, that will bring about sustainable peace in Nigeria. But what are the issues and background of insurgency in Nigeria?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION The global perspective of insurgency is important in understanding the debate on asymmetry. The time line of events revealed that the late Osama bin Laden, one of the most sought after leaders of Al- Qa’eda, known as ‘the Base’ or Qa’idat al-Jihad, ‘the Base of Jihad’ declared a holy war on the United States and the rest of liberal democratic world on 23 February, 1998; yet the world did not take him seriously. This declaration was in the form of fatwa to all Muslins calling for a jihad against non- muslims and western interests. What we can deduct from World Islamic Front Declaration of War against the Jews and Crusaders is that a new phase and theatre of war based on asymmetry or unconventional means has commenced adopting non-traditional military tactics. Bin Laden’s Deputy-in- Command, Ayman al Zawahiri immediately after the 9/11 attack on US facilities, announced a two- phased strategy to prosecute this war which includes: (1) A jihad plan that would focus on the Middle East, turn things around, and force the United States out of the sphere of influence and re-establish an Islamic caliphate in Egypt as a historical source of spiritual Muslim authority which existed before the death of Prophet Muhammed in AD 632; and

(2) An aggressive plan to use the newly established caliphate as a launching pad for a jihad against the West in a bid to re-shape the world order and place Islam in a dominant vantage point, which will rally all Muslins around it.

What has happened and unfolded with the Arab-Spring till date, and incidences of regime change in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, lend credence to the above agenda of strict adherence to the principles of Jihad or invariably, what can be termed terrorism and the theory of change, which was negatively induced through the process of radicalisation of youths and a segment of the idle population, using religion as a veil. Change can be peaceful and acceptable, if the people believe and are not compelled by use of coercion, deception or life threatening circumstances of forceful conversion. This scenario has gained prominence with the export of several cells of jihadist movements spread all over the world; and most especially in weak regimes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somali, Mali, Niger, Morocco and Nigeria. The radicalised groups include Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria amongst others. Boko-Haram is sometimes referred to as Taliban of Nigeria. The formation of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and sustenance of Al-Shabaab in Somali cannot be divorced from the doctrinal appeal of Osama bin Laden and the globalisation of transnational threats; which in furtherance of the ideology of Jihad, the aim is to capture vulnerable nations and foster regime Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 143 types of ancient Islamic states. Al-Shabaab on September 21, 2013 attacked the Westgate shopping mall, killing more than three scores and seven persons in an 80-hour hostage saga, which caught Kenya’s security forces by a surprise. What is astonishing in these trade-offs are incidences of high civilian casualties as result of the brutality of the insurgents and incompetence of African security forces, that are untrained to meet emerging challenges of counter-terrorism. AQIM readily adopted the global jihad rhetorics and carried out a major attack, by bombing the United Nations (UN) headquarters in December 11, 2007 in Algiers; which brings to the fore Ayman al Zawahiri’s threat to attack a similar UN facility in Baghdad in 2003. Boko Haram, in following this trend, carried out similar bombing of the UN headquarters in August 27, 2011 in Abuja, Nigeria to send a signal that it is no longer business as usual in security circles on Nigeria. AQIM under fair assessment has been far less militant and violent, compared to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula. The response to emerging security challenges has been limited in scope to military options; and as long as the conflict is not de-escalating, the search for alternative solutions to the problem of asymmetry wars must be considered in the foregoing discourse as an option. The changing tactics, similarities and sophistication in attacks are evidences of linkages, including Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and AQIM franchise in Nigeria in terms of externalisation of the terror trends and collaboration without borders. Boko Haram, which means “western education is a sin”, originated in 2002 and had its bases fully implanted in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Muhammed Yusuf, who is known to be the founder of the sect, indoctrinated the members, mainly youths with his own teachings, which were based on purity and total rejection of Western modernity, thus seeking the full implementation of the shari’ah law to replace the country’s political and religious institutions that are morally bankrupt and corrupt. Boko Haram insurgency, to a large extent, resembles the earlier Maitatsine uprising of 1980, which was the first major attempt to impose a religious ideology on Nigeria. Al-Masifu, an Islamic sect led by Alhajib Muhammadub Marwa Maitatsine, who also hailed from Borno State, denounced Western ideals of capitalism and formal education. In 1999, during the tenure of President Olusegun Obasanjo, there were calculated attempts at imposing shari’ah law variants of Islamic civil and criminal codes in the Muslim dominated northern states of Nigeria. How well these developments were managed remain to be addressed, but the state policy basically revolved around avoidance and salient accommodation in conflict handling styles. Boko Haram also known and called Jamaa’atuAhlus-sunnah lid-da’ watiwal jihad, came into existence in 2001, but became popular among its adherents in 2009, when Muhammed Yusuf participated in sectarian violence and was subsequently killed by the Police. The operational base of the sect was Kanamma, northeast Nigeria. The sect has a strong disdain for anything Western that is at variance with its brand of religion. After the death of its leader, Muhammed Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau took over the reins of leadership and he is supported by Abul Qaqa and Abu Zaid, regarded as media contact persons of the sect. In the light of the political instabilities that have engulfed the Arab states of Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan; there are free flow of sophisticated weapons made possible by the porous nature of Nigerian borders with Cameroun, Niger and Chad all in the northern axis of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe where insurgencies are more intense. What we know of Boko-Haram today from intelligence sources is little, whereas their continued success in carrying out attacks on 144 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria military targets, confirm that it is not just a war of the weak against the strong, but a protracted and long drawn battle, which requires global efforts to defeat. It must be admitted that the operations of Boko Haram have grown in scale and sophistication. They network with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and AQIM, seeking assistance expressed through financing, weapons and ammunitions sourcing, military training in camps, provision of safe haven, escape routes and joint simulation in carrying out suicidal attack on schools, police stations, military barracks, government buildings, newspapers, and banks. The sect attempted to smoke out the former Inspector-General of Police, IGP Hafiz Ringim in June, 16, 2011. The sect members successfully carried out jail break on March 30, 2014 at the Department of State Security (DSS) facility located in high security environment, which further confirm their high level of dexterity, intelligence and organisation. Unconfirmed account reveals that about 21 sect members were killed in the encounter by the operatives of the DSS. Till date, the government of Nigeria has engaged this problem through military means as well as an offer exchange of Chibok girls-hostages for high valued commanders. The offer of peace deal in the context of amnesty for Boko Haram militants, an optional suggestion by northern elders for the insurgents to lay down their arms was rejected, setting the stage for long drawn battle. Since May 2013, the hotspots and affected states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have remained under security watch due to turbulence and instability. The stalemate leaves us with no other option than to search for alternatives to peace, even when the Nigerian Army announced February 4, 2018, that it has totally defeated the Boko Haram.

Source: Field work, 2014.

Figure 1: Map showing Conflict-prone states in Nigeria. Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 145

ASYMMETRY The concept of asymmetric warfare is not new, but had existed in the history books. Drawing our attention to strategy in wars, Sun Tzu, the sage of warfare theory in his book The Art of War, written more than 1,500 years ago, states: All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. (Tzu, 1971:66-67) Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is nothing short of this strategy or tactics; and the exploits are asymmetric. The German strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, (1976) believes that war is a means of reaching other goals, which must not be intertwined with politics, but made subservient to politics and waged through other means: We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course is no small demand, but however much it will affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose. Clausewitz’s principles apply equally to conventional/traditional/symmetric warfare, like the opinion held by Sun Tzu; but his assertion that war is an extension of politics through other means is germane to our understanding of asymmetry war in Nigeria. Terrorism is a perfect fit in the matrix of threats employed by insurgents. Terrorism is a politically motivated violence, directed primarily against civilians or non-combatants, undertaken with the intention to coerce societies through fear and submission. Whereas insurgencies are radicalised movements that seek to overthrow the status quo through actions of subversion, political activity, insurrection and armed conflict. The mode of operation is through irregular warfare, whereby any method not sanctioned by Laws of Armed Conflict are employed in combat with regular armed forces. Boko Haram in this context seeks to overthrow the government of Nigeria with a view to establishing a caliphate through a process of extremism and insurgency. The ultimate goal is the adoption of Islamic shari’ah law as against the secular structure of the Nigerian state. Although Nigeria faces some challenges in the build up to democracy, the existence of globalised Islamist jihad network, geared toward the overthrow of weak structures in governance is made possible by politics of disunity, corruption and flawed electoral system. The polity is full of distorted assertions, hate speeches and separatist quit notices, which reflect disillusionment in governance. These cannot be separated from the events occurring in the north east states of Nigeria. The brand of global jihad 146 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria appears to be a strong movement that seeks to change the status quo through violence and subversion, made possible by asymmetry wars; in the guise of insurgency; and unfolding through terrorism as a key tactic. By extension, insurgency seeks to overthrow the status quo through armed unrest and insurrection or/and jihad. The foot soldiers are sourced from neglected socio-economic groups, unemployed youths and their leadership from radicalised elite, who, paradoxically, are beneficiaries of Western education.

Boko Haram: War or Insurgency? In conception, three key terms - terrorism, insurgency and wars are used interchangeably. They all come within the framework of either asymmetry or symmetry activities related to the conduct of wars. In the case of symmetry, war is acceptable if it is fought in consistent with international laws of armed conflict. What is most challenging in the case of Boko Haram is that it is beyond traditional asymmetry. Even our leaders who have assessed the situation have failed to agree whether these occurrences fall with the classification of wars, insurgency or terrorism. The confusion over the ensuing debate is amplified by the Governor of Borno State, who enthused realistically on February 17, 2014 that “Nigeria is in a state of war”. Fielding questions from journalists after a visit to President Goodluck Jonathan to brief him about the security situation in Borno, Shettima said Nigeria was facing a threat of war. He said the faster Nigerian leaders braced up to the challenge, the better it would be for the nation:

Well, in a nutshell what we are being confronted with is that we are in a state of war. It is what I came to update Mr. President; the sooner we stop playing the ostrich and rise up to the challenges of the day, and marshal all resources towards visualising the antics of Boko Haram, the better for all of us. But the bottom line is that we need more resources, more vote on ground. In all fairness to the officers and men of the Nigerian Army and Police, they are doing their best given, the circumstances they have found themselves in. But honestly Boko Haram is better armed and is better motivated than our own troops (in Premium Times, Feb. 17, 2014).

The response of the government to the above was downplayed, when Doyin Okupe, spokesman to the Presidency, insisted that:

It is wrong to assert that Nigeria’s armed forces cannot defeat Boko Haram or to insinuate that the insurgents are better armed. It is clear that Governor Shettima does not have the expertise to categorise or classify the effectiveness of any weapon (in Premium Times, Feb. 25, 2014)

This situation have altered with the coming to power of the incumbent President M. Buhari in 2015, who being a past military President and a retired general in the Nigeria Armed Forces understands the intricacies of modern warfare. He quickly rallied regional allies Chad, Cameroun and Niger, backed up Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 147 with intervention from France and changed the tide of defeat to partial success. While this advantage was maintained and also witness de-escalation in the capacity of Boko Haram to carry out sporadic attacks, the danger still remains eminent. Perspective from the seat of government believes that, despite the recent upsurge of attacks by the sect, the Nigerian military is winning the war against the insurgents, and that the Armed Forces of Nigeria and security agencies are on top of the situation; and if the insurgents have not been completely routed out, it is because the armed forces are constrained by the rules of engagement considering the co-location of civilians in conflict-prone areas. The inability of our leaders to properly situate and analyse the security challenges we face as a nation, leaves us more confused and helpless. Therefore, finding solutions becomes more difficult and indeterminate. The rationalisation for wars can be explained from several perspectives including classification of conflict and insights on interrelatedness of conflict triggers. If we understand conflicts as derivate of disagreement over incompatible goals, then we must begin to look at failures in the bargaining process, according to Fearon (1995: 379-414) as a driver, which is premised on anticipated gains from wars in terms of resources, power, glory, territory and otherwise which may necessarily exceed the cost of war; but not limited to harm, loss and damage to property. We cannot certainly divorce the May –August 2017 upsurge in sporadic attacks from the faulty bargaining process that led to the release of key commanders of Boko Haram in exchange for the Chibok girls. Jackson and Morelli (2008:3) believe that there are five reasons for bargaining failures, which effectively justify wars: 1. Asymmetric information about the potential costs and benefits of war; 2. A lack of ability to enforce a bargaining agreement and/or a lack of the ability to credibly commit to abide by an agreement. 3. Indivisibilities of resources that might change hands in a war, so that not all potentially mutually beneficial bargaining agreements are feasible. 4. Agency problems, where the incentives of leaders differ from those of the populations that they represent. 5. Multilateral interactions where every potential agreement is blocked by some coalition of states or constituencies who can derail it.

Wars can be dynamic and protracted; and a peace deal only becomes feasible when conflict becomes ripe and parties to the disagreement become wary. This can take a long time as currently witnessed in Boko Haram feud with the government of Nigeria due to insincerity of purpose and the willingness to act proactively. It is observed that the asymmetric information about the relative strength of the insurgents is misleading, and it explains why the government is unable to engage in rational bargaining process, considering prioritising the trade-offs. The Nigeria government appears to be under severe pressure to deliver on election promise to release the Chibok girls unharmed. The pressures are both external and 148 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria sustained internally by the #Bring Back Our Girls campaign group. In the light of the developments and waning confidence in governance structure, the exchange was more of win-lose outcome, rather than a win-win situation. The just war theory and its applicability to Boko Haram insurgency is difficult to mainstream in emerging scenario of instabilities in Nigeria. In the opinion of Orend Brian (2005), jus ad bellum sets forth the following six requirements, all of which must be met for a war to be considered conventional and just: 1. Just cause – in self-defence of a nation that is physically and aggressively attacked by another nation; 2. Right intention – a nation waging war must do so with the right intention; devoid of ulterior motives such as racial, religious, ethnic cleansing or land grab; 3. Proper authority and public declaration – decision to go to war must be made by proper authority, following constitutional procedures. It must be made public to the citizens and the nation that is an enemy state. 4. Last resort – war should be a last resort, if all options of diplomacy have been exhausted; 5. Probability of success – weigh all options, cost benefit and the likelihood of success and the consequences of failures; and 6. Proportionality – Weigh also the universal good against the universal evil of death and destruction.

Simply put, the rationalisation of Boko Haram insurgency does not meet any of the above requirements to classify them as fighting for a just cause, be it a doctrinal cleansing or wars based on purity of religious belief (jihad) which are unconventional and does not accommodate just causes in modernity. This informed the designation of Boko Haram and its splitter group, Ansaru in the list of groups classified as Foreign Terrorist Organisations by the United States, Britain and Canada. Ironically, the United Nations whose facility was bombed and destroyed in Abuja, is yet to take a bold initiative to formally classify the insurgents as terrorists. War in whatever dimension, produces human tragedies on a colossal scale, and creates humanitarian crises contributing to global, regional and local insecurity. Although the theoretical understanding of causes of war is still evolving, there are innumerable case studies of war and the challenge in analysing such war is that no one situation is exactly the same. Therefore, it is difficult to find a systematic framework that analyses the origins and dynamics of wars across different platforms. A richer understanding of the origins of wars can be discerned from the greed and grievances scholarship of Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 563-595), where it is widely believed that civil wars stem from the greedy behaviour of a rebel group in organising an insurgency against the government. Greed is about opportunities and the probability of success available to the rebel groups. The opportunities fall into three categories; 1. Financing - appropriation of captured natural resources, rents, donation from diaspora, contributions from affiliates, laundered and drug money; Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 149

2. Recruitment – Recruitment is about the availability of fighting manpower, school drop outs, poverty induced and vulnerable groups, unemployed and radicalised youths; 3. Geography – porous borders, mountainous and desert terrains and safe haven and escape routes. In the context of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, central to the underlying root cause of the problem is grievances over issues connected to identity, right to worship and group dynamics. The demands Boko Haram are making on the state are derived from widely held religious beliefs and certain normative forms of behaviour appropriate to the identity of Islam but considered deviant by other groups, but they need a space to practise unhindered the brand of religion they proclaim. Again, constitutionally, Nigeria is a secular state. Attaining this type of behavioural paradigm shift is practically impossible without organised large scale violence, dislocation and destruction; even if the insurgency is not motivated by greed. Grievances are purposely driven on three platforms: 1. Relative deprivation – discrepancy between what people feel they deserve and what they can get or, simply put, disparity between aspirations and achievements. Frustrated youths are likely to resort to violence if unemployed or if their needs are unmet. Feelings of being relatively deprived provides arsenal for protests and violence. 2. Polarisation – it is related to the alienation that groups of people feel from one another, and such alienation is fuelled by the feeling of within-group identity. It is a situation when two groups seem divided and exhibit greater intra-group homogeneity. There are situations of economic, ethnic and religious polarisation; these have wide range implications for conflicts. 3. Horizontal inequality – the basis for horizontal inequality stems from classification according to ethnicity, religion, linguistic differences and tribal affiliations which trigger sectarian conflicts. Horizontal and vertical inequalities are not the same. Vertical operates within a homogenous group, whereas horizontal may overlap with the relative deprivation and polarisation of groups.

Taking into consideration that Nigeria is an ethnically divided, religiously polarised and a state where inequality is the norm, the peace architecture of the nation is effectively challenged by varying degrees of insurgencies. If the unfolding dynamics of conflicts in Nigeria is anything to go by, the recent trends in Fulani-Herdsmen’s and farmers’ clashes in Nassarawa, Benue and Plateau states reflect the changing nature of insurgencies in Nigeria. Interrogating these developments in the context of asymmetry of change is important to our understanding of the problems we seek alternatives in resolving.

ASYMMETRY AS OPTION IN WAR Previous attempts to define asymmetry have not been very helpful in identifying the specifics in the context of its boundaries, and when it is best suited to assume that certain categories of wars are symmetry. What is certain is that asymmetry is highly context-specific and may include reference to power, means, methods, values, time and ideology or belief. The changing nature, new tactics and 150 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria targets make it difficult to situate, and there are dissimilarities from region to region in terms of what constitute the entry levels. Simply put, asymmetry means war by other means, which effectively employs crude, but aggressive operational strengths against the weaknesses of the opponents, in the context of the ability of the state to respond and deter attacks. The aim is to instil fear, threaten, harm and destroy in order to achieve disproportionate effect of psychological victory. In classical sense, asymmetric warfare used to be a form of conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and economic power. This perspective has now been altered with the decline in interstate and escalation in intrastate wars; and more especially as a response to the 9/11 attacks on United States (US) facilities. The shift has some sort of moral, doctrinal and value based impetus, far away from normative affinity involving non- state armed groups, resistant fighters, rebels, insurgents and terrorists without borders. Asymmetry occurs, when the incentive and triggers are sufficiently playing out in political system under weak leadership and poor governance. In divided societies with ethnic and religious discord, insurgency cannot be ruled out. There are other contending issues connected to political repression, exclusion, inequality and impunity of office. These problems combine to give rise to rebellion. The objective of rebellion expressed in violent dissent is to capture the machinery of state, secede from it or/ and render it prostrate. Asymmetric rebellions are carried out to disrupt economic and development activities, which constitute a threat to national security; and by extension, security of lives and properties. The enemy envisages victory and the probability of victory depends on the incapability of government to defend its position and secure the state from vulnerabilities. Why insurgencies remain unsolved in Nigeria has to do with leadership, the capacity to act proactively and above all the willingness to transform the underlying causes in terms of peacebuilding. Constant reference to terms as inequality, exclusion and discrimination to justify the need to gain acceptance and sustain the war, explains how insurgents win the minds and soul of the population in a sympathetic manner. Any intervention to reverse asymmetry must take this into consideration. The employment of unconventional means is made possible by global market trends in terms of laundered funds, network financing, arms proliferation, which makes rebellion another form of occupation providing income for the unemployed youths; left unattended to by the social security system of governance, absent in Africa. Since the majority of schools are closed in north east states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe under attack by terrorists; and under distress, they have a larger population of idle youths, who are vulnerable to recruitment into Boko Haram rank and file. When analysing the causes of asymmetry, it is informative to differentiate between the underlying causes that created the opportunity for the potential rebellion and also the more recent triggers. I like to note that if asymmetry persists so long, it will be creating and enlarging its own causes, direction and horizon; while the level of analyses will not clearly identify why the conflict started, but why it is continuing and what are the root causes. All of these relate to changes in the political system, war economy and disputes over resources which may have created a radicalised group of criminal network ready to challenge the legitimacy of the state system like in Nigeria and elsewhere around Africa. Enforced discriminatory policies, electoral fraud, economic disparity, unemployment and historic oppression are issues to contend with in transitional democracies; which explains why asymmetry persists and will continue to challenge established state structures and institutions; leading to security failures. Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 151

The actors and stakeholders in asymmetry war in Nigeria are still shrouded in mystery, but they have a mission, strategy and structure designed to actualise their desire to seize control of the state structure. The command and control; including propaganda capacity of the non-state armed insurgents are constantly upbeat, with periodic attacks and claims of victory over state military apparatus. In the conduct of asymmetry, the distinction between combatants and civilians is obviously blurred, which makes all including women, children, schools, hospitals and places of worship amongst others possible targets of attack. They enjoy robust collaboration with internal and external stakeholders, including linkages with Al- Qa’eda in the Maghreb (AQIM) or the global Qa’idat al-Jihad that are potent forces in global terrorism and cannot be disputed as financers. Therefore, the war against terror is beyond the physical boundaries of Nigeria, which effectually means that the search for solutions to this problem must go beyond our borders and include other alternatives to reduce the capacity of insurgents to terrorise the innocent and law abiding citizens. These include the scores of school children murdered in cold blood and those surviving, but dislocated from the future opportunity of education, which the terror group believe, is an anathema to their goal objectives.

Internal security operations The internal security operations began with the deployment of military forces to the axis of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in 2009. The collapse of the conciliatory peace deal and incidences of aggression exhibited by the insurgents changed the rules of engagement from peacekeeping to outright field combat. The military high command became suspect with the politicisation of the treatment meted out to insurgents who were arrested, detained and subsequently released or treated with kid-gloves; whereas the army suffered heavy casualty from attacks carried out in the barracks and other military facilities. The change in tactics to full combat was to enable the army limit the terror activities, prevent a prolonged war and restore confidence in the general populace that defeat is not imminent. These measures have not sufficiently addressed the problems, but helped in reducing the impunity of attacks to the periphery of towns. The pie chart in figure 2 captures this trend and oscillation of Boko Haram death toll in Nigeria from 2009- 2014. The new wars are classified as low, medium and high intensity, and it will sometimes oscillate from low to medium and high intensity, depending on the security climate and the context, ranging from identity-based wars propelled by ethnicity and religion; or/and hinged on exclusion or radicalisation of dispossessed segments of the population, all leading to the deliberate erosion of the capacity of the state to respond appropriately. The diversity in terms of ethnic, religious and cultural pluralism makes it complex to deal with conflicts rationally. The responsibility to protect, who is to be protected and human rights violation were among other considerations that effectively bogged down outright military operations. Amnesty International claimed that some 600 unaccounted Boko Haram suspects may have been killed after a jailbreak at a military detention facility in Maiduguri, the state capital of Borno, on March 14, 2014. Sometimes these figures are doubtful and speculative. 152 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Source: Nigeria Watch Database, 2014

Figure 2: Boko Haram Insurgency Related Deaths in Nigeria 2009-2014

Asymmetry of Change Asymmetry is more about problem of change, and change comes in its dynamics as identifying who an enemy is and the activities that must change through terrorism or insurgency. Change is central to the struggle in context and these translate to rejection of Western ideologies, institutions, politics and economic models. Even more fundamental, which makes the change radicalised, is the secular-causal linkages which past histories has not addressed adequately and will continue to manifest and projected in movements onto insurgency. Therefore, adversary restiveness and rebellious attitudes, with apology to those who understand peace is all about power, are expressed in wide scale revolt, instead of non-violent confrontations. Asymmetric enemies do not respect rules and they are not bound by laws of warfare, including the Geneva Conventions. Insurgents routinely direct violent action against civilian population and military targets. They use unconventional tactics of terror and horrific images, and they are willing to sacrifice their own lives for their cause in a suicide attack. All of these must be weighed when planning intervention to engage the asymmetric enemy. No atrocity is beyond this enemy’s capability, but it is not in tandem with just cause in wars. Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 153

In the search for alternatives, it is proposed to strategise along the thinking of Paul Lederach (2011), who advocated two approaches including isolation and engagement through a process of peacebuilding. Isolation in this continuum is conceived as a strategy of identifying, targeting and limiting individuals who espouse violence defined as terrorism and insurgency; whereas engagement is not used in purely military terms. Engagement is used in the context of peacebuilding, which requires contact, consultation and dialogue. Engagement should be with a wider set of people, groups and stakeholders in the conflict arena. Initiating dialogue with the Boko Haram leadership has been difficult, if not impossible. But in the opinion of Lederach (2011:11-15), engagement with designated leadership of the group will: Increase understanding of their key grievances, create potential openness to alternatives and will augment capacity to identify opportunities for change resulting in increased potential to build alternatives to violence. In addition to the above, there is the need to conduct preliminary conflict assessment to know about the key grievances of the sect, the justification for violence, history and context of the conflict; opportunity and capacity to respond and achieve constructive change. An increased capacity for dialogue remains a plausible option in de-escalation of violence. Islam is a religion of peace and on a fair assessment, bringing change to Islam or re-inventing purity does not intrinsically require insurgency and terrorism. The new wars are more of asymmetry, devoid of actual battle grounds and boundaries. It is fluid and difficult to counter using traditional military approaches to war. The Search for Alternatives The alternative open to transform asymmetry is sustainable peace. Peace is a condition other than one of organised armed conflict (war); and most often distinguished from a situation of non-war. Positive peace in the opinion of Burgess & Burgess (1997:230-23) consist of four core principles: 1. Peace as harmony (stressing the absence of conflict); 2. Peace as order (stressing stability and peace through strength); 3. Peace as justice (stressing the absence of domination and poverty); and 4. Peace as conflict management (stressing peace as a process for obtaining interests and needs, rather than as an end itself.

Galtung’s (1967:238), positive peace relations include presence of cooperation, freedom from fear; freedom from want, economic growth and development. Other variables are absence of exploitation, equality, justice, freedom of action, pluralism and dynamism. The absence of these implies negative peace. Exactly how long the Boko Haram war will last depends on a number of factors, but since the peace prospect appears ignored, and military solution to the problems of insurgency is becoming expanded and more complex, the search for alternatives must begin with the state in the context of confidence building, law enforcement and peacebuilding. In consideration of military approach, the combination of prevention, pre-emption and deterrence are likely to dictate whatever options are available in any 154 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria conflict reduction. Intelligence gathering and dissemination will remain critical to any success in counter- terrorism, just as technology will play a dominant role in contending with insurgency and limiting the adversary capacity to operate unhindered. Practical measures will necessarily include: 1. Our vision, mission and budgets must be aligned to take care of future gaps, including national interest, ideologies as well as science of living together as a nation. Let peace education be included in school curriculums to prepare our youths for the battle of wits, mind and emotion in order not to make terror and hate a primary income earner in our society. 2. Invest in and sustain tighter border controls to limit the insurgents’ access to slush funds, flow of arms, ability to flee to safe haven and also to receive re-enforcement from transnational networks. Border patrol in this context must be technology driven and proactive to prevent and deter the enemy and illegality. 3. Reduce vulnerability of the people through a process of sustainable development, employment generation and youth empowerment that will make financial inducement to the youths by the insurgents insignificant, making recruitment drive unattractive; 4. Discourage impunity of office and disregard for the rule of law, which will necessarily make marginalised, excluded and deprived citizens resort to violence in settling matters, especially in the spheres of elections and electioneering, census, resource allocation, sharing of sovereign wealth, and power sharing. 5. Managing complex asymmetry requires a wide range of internal and external actors, stakeholders, civil society and multinational agencies. The multi-track approach and the comprehensive approach to the management of security challenges will be of importance in the present circumstances of insurgency. 6. Peace education cutting across religion and ethnicity should be encouraged and this entails restriction on separate schools and tight monitoring of the school curriculum. 7. Engagement in interfaith dialogue to regulate and limit the radical literature available to adherents of both religions. Government must stop funding religion and sponsoring pilgrimages in place of development projects. 8. Mainstreaming good governance as a subset of governance, wherein public resources and problems are managed effectively, efficiently and in response to the needs of society.

Although Nigeria is not at war, still the Boko Haram phenomenon is fundamentally unconventional, leaving in its trail high death toll, destruction and dislocation. The Nigerian brand of terrorism suffocates and cannot be exported to any other sane society. It is abnormal in abducting, raping and murdering in cold blood, innocent school children and harmless elderly statesmen. According to Madunagu, (2011:11): “You cannot effectively respond to Nigerian terrorism with a single weapon; however well designed…Only a new social order, a popular democratic and emancipatory social order can create the conditions for an accelerated withering away of Nigerian terrorism.” Exploring Alternatives in Asymmetric Wars in Nigeria 155

CONCLUSION The phenomenon of asymmetry in the context of war keeps changing over the years. Some of these changes are the result of technological advances, while others have to do with the emergence of non- state actors as contenders in contemporary warfare. Future wars are unlikely to be symmetrical and will be described as asymmetrical in some form or another. Asymmetry, in this context, basically means one party in the conflict adopting different and morally controversial means, strategies, and tactics to gain advantage over the adversary or exploit the opponent’s weaknesses in armed conflict. The puzzle we need to find answer to is if war can be won through other means than by resort to arms; which makes non-violence a plausible option. Other alternatives to war include justice, peacebuilding, peace education, technological advancement and good governance. Thinking of these alternatives requires no special lens, or viewing things from the crystal balls; it must be scientific, rational and not incremental.

REFERENCES

Anneli Botha, (2008). Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute of Security Studies, 2008). Carl von Clausewitz, eds. /trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book 1, chapter 1, section 25. Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 56(4). Fearon, J.D. 1995. “Rationalist explanations for war,” International Organisation, 49:3. Galtung, J. 1967. Theories of Peace: A synthetic approach to peace thinking. Oslo, International Peace Research Institute. Jackson, M.O. and M. Morelli (2008) “Strategic Militarisation, Deterrence and War between Nations,” http://www.stanford.edu/jacksonm/gunsbutter.pdf Lederach, J. P. 2011. Addressing Terrorism: A theory of change approach in J. P. Lederach et al eds. Somalia: Creating Space for Fresh Approaches to Peacebuilding. Uppsala, Sweden, Life & Peace Institute Lederach, J. P. 2003. The Little Book of Conflict Transformation. Intercourse PA, Good Books Madunagu, E. 2011. Reflections on Nigerian Terrorism. A Journal of Constitutional Development, 4: Orend, B. 2005. War in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter Edition) Edward N. Zalta (ed) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war Schanzer, J. 2004: ‘Yemen’s War on Terror’, in Orbis, Summer 2004. 156 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Schanzer, Jonathan 2003: The Egyptian Underground in National Review Online, October 29, 2003. Schanzer, Jonathan 2004: “Inside the Zarqawi Network” in Weekly Standard, 16 August 2004. Schanzer, 2005: Al-Qaida’s Armies; Middle East Affiliate Groups & the Next Generation of Terror (New York: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy). Sun Tzu, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 66–67. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

PRISON CONGESTION, FANATICISM AND TERRORISM: CASE FOR INVESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

by

Dr Hyacinth Iwu Department of Political Science, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akumgba, , Nigeria.

and

Professor OBC Nwolise Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria. Visiting Professor Army War College Nigeria Abuja.

ABSTRACT

Prisons in Nigeria, Africa and the world are overpopulated by Awaiting Trial inmates, leading to congestions. The congestions in turn result in inadequacy of food, uniform, medical needs, and even space. This paper argues that fanaticism and terrorism that are emerging wide-spread phenomena will worsen prison congestion and conditions. It makes a strong case for investing in criminal justice to avoid this problem and the need and temptation of prison expansion.

Key words: Prison Congestion, Fanaticism, Terrorism, Investing, Criminal Justice

157 158 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

INTRODUCTION A nation is peaceful, orderly, lawful, and internally secure to the extent that its criminal justice system is just and fair, effective and efficient. That prison congestion which is actually court congestion is a precursor of several prison maladies is an understatement. The fear today however is that the growing spate of fanaticism and terrorism in the world is no doubt going to worsen the over-crowding situation of prisons especially in African nations where criminal punishment centre mainly on imprisonment and raise the temptation to expand prisons which is retrogression. The cry about prison congestion and the need to find lasting solutions to it is not only an African problem. It is worldwide but more pronounced in Africa. For example in the United States, prison designed to hold 84,000 inmates, had 158,000 inmates crowded in them in California in 2009. About 14,000 of the inmates were sleeping in very tight spaces, hallways or on floors. The enormity of the problem and human suffering in United States’ prisons can be imagined when one recalls that the USA has the world’s largest prison population with over 2.3 million in prison or jails (http://en.wikpedia.org/ wiki/prison). In the same year, China’s prison population stood at 1.6 million, while that of India was 332,112, all suffering overstretched facilities. In Malawi, the Maula Prison meant for 800 inmates at a point held 1805 inmates (Wines, 2005). Malawian prisons were believed to have exceeded their capacity by 200 percent (http:// www.penalreform.org). The consequences in that country include extremely unsanitary conditions, poor nutrition and abnormal high death rate, as cells meant for 50 inmates had 150 people (Wines, 2005), cramped in them. Many inmates sleep on blankets on the floor, too tightly packed with most lying on their sides with serious difficulty in even turning. Prison uniforms and blankets do not go round, and no soap for bathing or washing clothes; while the diet is monotonously beans and nsima. With these conditions, diseases like scabies, tuberculosis (Africa News, 2005), and HIV/AIDS take their toll on inmates. Maula Prison lost an average of thirty inmates per annum in 2003 and 2004 (one per 60 inmates), while Zomba Prison lost one in twenty inmates annually (Wines, 2005). In Nigeria, the story of prison congestion is the same. For example, Nwokolo (2014:31) who visited the Oba Prison in Abeokuta, in June 2014 informs us of the view of a Sociologist, Sola Aluko Arowolo who observed that in Nigeria:

…It is not uncommon to see twenty people huddled together in a cell meant for two or three inmates. This he reckoned, stretched the prison facilities thin, bred unhygienic surrounding, health challenges psychological problems, aggressive behaviour and peer influence that sabotage the prisons reformative efforts on inmates.

In fact, the Governor of Ogun State, Senator Ibikunle Amosun who visited the Oba Prison in Abeokuta on May 29 (Nigeria’s Democracy Day), 2014 with the intention of releasing some deserving inmates shed tears publicly at the condition of the inmates, some of whom were mere skeletons that had to be helped to stand on their feet. The prison housed 538 inmates, far above its capacity, with only 42 being convicts and the rest 496 being awaiting trial persons (ATP) (Nwokolo, 2014). Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 159

Prison congestion has been of long history in Nigeria. Nwolise’s first study of prison congestion in Nigeria titled “Dynamics of Prison Congestion in Nigeria” was in 1988. In Table 1 below, Agomo gives us an update to 2000.

Table 1 Breakdown of Prison Population and Original Capacity in Selected Nigerian Prisons in 2000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SN Name of Prison Original Total Excess Convicts Awaiting Capacity Inmates Inmates Trail Persons

1. Kano 690 817 127 225 592 2. Kirikiri Medium 704 2,289 1,585 521 1,768 3. Ikoyi 800 1,661 861 144 1,517 4. Port- Harcourt 804 1,344 540 379 965 5. Owerri 630 1,045 415 100 945 Total 3,628 7,156 3,528 1,369 5,787

Source: Adapted from Uju Agomo, “Prisons decongestion and Reforms in Nigeria-Issues. Note: In 2014, Nigerian prisons had a total of 41,524 inmates, out of which 29,372 were Awaiting Trial Cases. In 2017, the figure rose to 74, 508 inmates out of which 50,427 were Awaiting Trial Cases.

Column 5 of Table 1 shows the excess number of inmates in each prison. For example, Kirikiri Medium Security prison based in Lagos exceeded its capacity of 704 by as many as 1585 inmates! The five prisons exceeded their collective original capacity of 3,628 inmates by 3,528, almost 100% excess! Nwolise as a Visiting Professor at Igbinedion University, Okada (2008 – 2010) took his students on a study tour of strategic establishments in Enugu (Enugu State) in 2010. Their tour took them to the Enugu Prisons, where the students interacted with the inmates. It was not a nice experience for the students – the congestion, sufferings, poor funding, inadequate manpower and others. For the first twenty minutes when the students returned to their vehicle, they remained speechless. The situation is even worse today, given the socio-economic hardship that has faced Nigerians since 2015, and more especially given the hundreds of arrests following Boko Haram terrorism, militancy in the Niger Delta, and Separatist agitations in the South-East. For example, the Awaiting Trial Inmates figure as at November 2017 in Nigerian prisons as given by the Citizens United for the Rehabilitation of Errants stood at 50,427 out of 74,508 prisoners (in Nnadi, 2017). This gives 44% increase in total inmates, and 42% increase in Awaiting Trial inmates from 2014 figures given earlier. 160 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

The task of this modest paper is to interrogate the nexus between prison congestion, fanaticism, and terrorism, and make case for investing heavily in criminal justice. The rationale for such discourse at this point in (Africa’s) history is not far-fetched. First, it is obvious as studies (See Byrne and Hummer, 2007) have shown that prison congestion is the root of many maladies in contemporary prisons such as violence, prison riots, jail breaks, shortage of essentials, hunger, etc. Second, contemporary world experience indicate upsurge in fanaticism and terrorism, which are capable of leading to explosion in prison population. It is thus timely to begin now to brainstorm and strategise feasible solutions. Third, fanatics and terrorists constitute a different breed of people from common criminals such as armed robbers, rapists, pen robbers (corrupt politicians) and others. Fanatics and terrorists are die-hards. Those of them inside the prison always look out for the least opportunity to launch their escape, while their colleagues outside always plan attacks on prisons to rescue their detained or imprisoned inmates. Nigeria’s experience with Boko Haram detainees who tried to escape from the facilities of the Department of State Security in Abuja recently is a case in point. Thus standard prisons in terms of security and fortification are needed to keep them. It is also dangerous to mix them with common criminals. These standard prisons are rare in African states, including Nigeria. Four, there is urgent need to isolate, focus on, and solve the problem of Awaiting Trial Persons who mainly populate Africa’s prisons. Institutionalizing convicts with Awaiting Trial Persons creates psychological, health, and physical ailment problems. It also produces more criminals in the society as minor offenders are converted into real criminals in prison. In Nigeria, 80% (http://www.Osunde...) of prison inmates are awaiting trial, as the police and courts use the prisons as dumping ground to decongest their own congestions. Official government figure put the percentage at 70.7% when in January 2014 the then Minister of Interior, Abba Moro during his inauguration of a twelve-man Presidential Committee on Prison Decongestion put the figure at 41,524 inmates, in Nigerian prisons, out of which 29,372 were awaiting trial inmates.(http://thepointer). Five, there is urgent need to diversify punishment options in the continent, away from the monotonous and long over flogged imprisonment to other non-custodial methods such as probation, community/ public service etc, for lesser offences. There is also need for greater “noise” to be made for separate jail or Bail Hostels to be established by governments for Awaiting Trial Persons. Prison service can also be made a concurrent matter in Federal states to enable state and local governments establish jails outside the prison four walls, so that prisons can be set free to comfortably concentrate on their sacred correction mandate on convicts. Six, the criminal justice system in several African nations, especially Nigeria is currently very weak, with the result that hundreds of people commit crimes and walk freely, boldly and arrogantly in the society. The capacity of the criminal justice system therefore needs to be built, and its glory restored and this requires huge investment. Seven and finally, it is very necessary that we think about prison congestion today because by the time the criminal justice system of several African nations is fully capacitated, thousands of citizens will be behind bars, due to crimes even without the fanatics and terrorists. Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 161

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE To ensure better appreciation and understanding of this discourse, there is need for us to have a common understanding of key concepts in the paper: Prison Congestion, Fanaticism, Terrorism, and Criminal Justice, in that order.

Prison is commonly understood as a “building where people are kept as punishment for a crime they have committed or while they are waiting for trial” (Horn, 2005:1154). But we all know that a prison need not be a building. Also, this definition, totally neglected the task of reforming and rehabilitating (treating) the inmates while in prison. Thus as defined elsewhere by Nwolise, (2008: 69), prison is:

…a specialised facility of the state where people who have infringed the laws of the land are kept as punishment (not for punishment) for a given period of time, and to make possible their reform and rehabilitation which prepare them for reintegration with the society; and which where well- organised, adequately funded, and managed can become a national wealth spinner, security enhancer, and development catalyser.

Prison congestion has to do with the overcrowding of a prison. Once a prison holds inmates in excess of designated capacity, it becomes congested, and makes the sacred duty of prison staff difficult or even impossible when the degree of congestion becomes too excessive.

Fanaticism relates to the possession of excessive or extreme uncritical zeal especially when laced with violent disposition for a political, racial, or religious Cause. A “fanatic displays very strict standards and little tolerance for contrary ideas or option’’ (Wikipedia). It goes on to state that” Fanaticism is a belief or behaviour involving uncritical zeal or with an obsessive enthusiasm for a pastime or hobby’’ (Wikipedia). Philosopher George Santayana (in Wikipedia) defines fanaticism as “redoubling your effort when you have forgotten your aim’’. Winston Churchill (Wikipedia). tells us in this direction that: “A fanatic is one who cannot change his mind and won’t change the subject”. Fanaticism has its roots in the Latin word “fanaticus”, which means “of a temple”, which in turn means a “building devoted to the worship of a god or gods’’ (Soanes, 2001:323). This gives the insight that fanaticism roots from religion essentially. The uncritical disposition or obsession of the fanatic with his activity or cause imbues him with the belief and conviction which propel him to violate prevailing social norms even without qualms, to abnormal or disproportionate levels. There are different types of fanaticism such as consumer fanaticism, emotional fanaticism, ethnic or racial fanaticism, nationalistic or patriotic fanaticism, ideological fanaticism, political (party) fanaticism, leisure fanaticism, atheist fanaticism, religious fanaticism, and sports fanaticism (football hooliganism). Each of these types of fanaticism can generate offences that can lead to mass arrests that may result in expanding prison population. However, the key ones that ravage the contemporary world and have grave implications for prison population are: ethnic or racial fanaticism that fans ethnic or racial conflicts, 162 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria riots and mini wars; political fanaticism that propels political thuggery and election rigging; and religious fanaticism that fuels religious conflicts, riots, mini wars, and terrorism. Terrorism is essentially the use of fear and violence to pursue (political) narrow objectives. The African Union Convention (1999) defines terrorism as:

Any act by an individual, group, organisation, a state, or its agents (excluding liberation struggles, armed struggles against Oppressive governments, colonisation, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces), which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and international law instruments criminalising it, and which may endanger life, physical integrity, or freedom of or cause serious injury or death to any person, any number or group of persons, or causes or may damage public or private property, natural resources, environment or culture heritage and is calculated or intended to achieve those objectives.

Alexander (in Pogoson, 2013:29) sees terrorism as “the use of violence against random civilian target in order to intimidate or to create generalised fear for the purpose of achieving political goals’’. Terrorism can also be unleashed on military targets. The United Nations General Assembly (1999) Resolution 49/60 described terrorism as criminal acts which are intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purpose. Of course, we all know that terrorism is a value laden word, because of issues of international politics, colonialism, racial domination and others, which make one man’s terrorist to be another man’s freedom fighter. However, the dividing line must not be lost, and that is who is the person or group using terror tactics (fear and violence) fighting for? Once terror tactics are not deployed for the common good of the masses of the people, terrorism is it.

Criminal Justice can be understood from three angles: as a system, as a legal process, and as an academic discipline. As a system, criminal justice is seen as “the system of practices and institutions directed at upholding social control, deterring and mitigating crime, or sanctioning those who violate laws with criminal penalties and rehabilitation efforts” (Criminal Justice, Wikipedia). In this direction, three key agencies currently make up the criminal justice system of modern states: i. The police that detects crime, investigates, and prosecutes suspects. ii. The court that decides innocence or guilt and sentences offenders as punishment. iii. The prison (correctional facility), which receives sentenced offenders, executes court’s decision, classifies inmates, and reforms, rehabilitates and reintegrates them with society on discharge. As legal process, criminal justice constitutes the interactions and coordination’s that occur between the various components of the criminal justice system from arrest by the police, through trial by the court, to confinement and treatment (reform and rehabilitation) by the prison. In this process each component relates with and depends on the other. Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 163

As an academic discipline, criminal justice studies and provides knowledge and skills about the criminal justice system and processes of a nation. Its various aspects include law enforcement, legal studies (criminal law, criminal investigation, security management), and imprisonment or correction. For the purpose of this study, criminal justice will be treated as a totality – a system, process, and academic discipline. This is because they all work together, and deserve investment reinvigoration.

WHY PRISONS ARE CONGESTED AND THE NEED FOR DECONGESTION Factors in prison congestion There are several factors responsible for prison congestion. These include: i. High rate of remand of suspects into custody. ii. Slow investigations by the police which lead to the presence of several Awaiting Trial Persons in prison. iii. Indiscriminate arrests by the police in abuse of their arrest powers. iv. Abuse of bail conditions by the police. v. Too much reliance on the imprisonment (custodial) option by judges in neglect of other non- custodial options, such as parole, fines, probation, community/public service, compensation and restitution, etc. vi. Too long prison sentences, some extending to ten years, twenty years. Small boys are sentenced to three years for stealing bread. vii. High rate of recidivism, due to improper reform, rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration; and poor prison conditions that breed hardened criminals, and no job for them in society or rejection by the society. viii. Inadequate legal aid facilities. ix. Infrequent visits to prisons by judges (for case reviews) and chief executives, meant to exercise the principle of prerogative of mercy. x. Corruption. xi. Lack of political will in leaders to take decisive steps to decongest prisons. xii. Inability of governments to construct new prison facilities fired probably by the wrong belief that prisons are for punishment of inmates. xiii. Dumping of some people who are not supposed to be in the prison there. Police and greedy relatives of some people connive to throw them in prison to make way for them (greedy) to claim property.

The Benefits of Prison Decongestion It is very beneficial for prisons to be decongested. i. There will be less tension and mental agony for staff. 164 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria ii. A lot of money will be saved for government from caring for so many people. iii. The prison personnel will experience drastically reduced workload. iv. Prisons will be better and more comfortably administered. v. Prison conditions will improve drastically – more space for inmates, better feeding, and improved healthcare. vi. Less number of inmates will share facilities and essential items such as soap, water, uniform, blankets etc. vii. There will be less tension in inmates, and this will drastically reduce indiscipline, aggressive behaviours, violence, and negative peer influence. viii. Less cases of jail breaks and prison riots. xi. Drastic reduction in chances of criminal recruitment and socialisation in the prison.

NEXUS BETWEEN PRISON CONGESTION, FANATICISM AND TERRORISM There is serious nexus between prison congestion on the one hand, and fanaticism and terrorism on the other hand. This nexus is reinforced by challenges in criminal justice. The phenomena of fanaticism and terrorism have the potentials for the arrest, detention, trial and imprisonment of an unusual number of offenders even in one swoop. From the point of arrest, to that of actual imprisonment, the accused remain in the custody of the prison staff, being transported, fed, and medically treated by the staff. This is unlike the crime of armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, drug trafficking etc that involve one to five persons at a time. For example, in Nigeria, 486 northerners were in 2014 arrested while travelling in thirty-three buses in (South East). Initially, they were suspected of being dreaded Boko Haram members as the security agents stated that they identified one wanted Boko Haram leader among them. It was later that they were said to be mercenary voters being migrated to the South by an opposition party in preparation for the 2015 general election (Sunday Tribune, 2014:4). Whether these 486 northerners are Boko Haram members or mercenary migrants, getting them arrested and placed under trial would have worsened prison congestion in the country. Again in March 2014, the Nigerian Army authorities stated that they had 500 Boko Haram suspects in their custody yet to be prosecuted due to “lack of standard prisons where they can be kept in the North East” (in Saturday Punch, 2014:46-47). The problem here is much more than just prison congestion. Terrorists and fanatics are peculiar breed of people as noted earlier, especially terrorists. They are ever ready to strike whether inside the prison or from outside the prison when their colleagues come for them. As a result, any prison keeping them must be standard in terms of security facilities and arrangements. Another issue is that terrorists and fanatics grow from small number or size to large number, and as they grow, the numbers arrested and placed under trial and subsequently imprisoned also grow. Apata (2014:64) informs us writing about the Taliban that: Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 165

The Taliban grew from a small cell of fanatics until it became a very powerful sect capable of imposing its extreme fundamentalist kind of Islam on the whole of Afghanistan.

Even the Al-Qaeda that overwhelmed Yemen, and hit the United States seriously in 2001, grew from a small sect, just like Al-Shabaab that has overtaken Somalia and extending its destructive fires to Kenya and other nations. As the fanatics and terrorists grow and carry out their disastrous attacks on society and get arrested, they worsen prison congestion in their states of operation.

THE CASE FOR INVESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE The most common understanding of the word “invest” relates to putting “money into financial scheme, shares, or property with the expectation of making a profit” (Soanes, 2001:479). For the purpose of this discourse, “investing” goes beyond putting money. It also embraces devoting energy, time, and thoughts to an undertaking (criminal justice), with the expectation of worthwhile results. In other words, investing here refers to the strategic and systematic application of human, material, and natural resources for the optimum achievement of established ends. As the discourse here proceeds, it is necessary to recall that it was earlier stated that criminal justice is understood in this paper in its triangular form as a system, a process, and a discipline. Our discussion on investment recognises these three aspects of criminal justice. The Imperative of Investment in Criminal Justice The following reasons may be advanced for the urgent need to invest in criminal justice. i. There is very serious gap in funding criminal justice. The police, court, prisons and even law schools are grossly underfunded and this results greatly in slow police investigations, slow court trial processes, the inability of the prisons to carry out their sacred tasks of reforming, rehabilitating, and reintegrating inmates, and the production of adequate lawyers. One ultimate result of all these is prison congestion. The police transfer their congestion (as a result of slow investigations) to the courts, and the courts transfer their congestion (as a result of slow processes, inadequate judges, outdated equipment etc) to the prisons. Unfortunately, because the prisons must keep the inmates, they (prisons) have no place to transfer their congestion to other than the inmates, hence congestion in the prisons. ii. There is urgent need to provide adequate qualified manpower in the police and prisons just as more judges need to be appointed for the courts to handle cases speedily. These require investment in recruitment and training for efficient and effective police, judges and prison staff. iii. Obsolete facilities and equipment need to be rehabilitated or updated. Most African prisons are not standard prisons; and many court judges use obsolete equipment instead of laptops and computers. Some write judgments with lantern. Court processes have to be modernised. iv. There is shortage of lawyers in most African states. And this negatively affects legal aid. It spells the need for more law programmes in universities, and the establishment of more law schools. In 166 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

the same vein, more police colleges, and prison academics are needed for the training of relevant personnel on their peculiar job specifications. v. The most risky public jobs in the world are in the (defence and) security sector. The whole criminal justice system belongs to this sector; and the staff need to be adequately motivated to give their best in performance output. vi. Legal aid needs to be enhanced so that very poor inmates who pay for lawyers can be assisted. vii. The society has to be educated, trained, enlightened, and mobilised to be effective and efficient part of the security calculus of the state, providing accurate and prompt information to security agents, and cooperating with them during investigation of crime, prosecution of suspects, and reintegration of discharged inmates. The programmes for these have to be thought out, tested and mounted. People have to be educated too on the need to be law abiding and to avoid crime, in order to enjoy their freedom. viii. It is high time victims of crimes were given compensation as a matter of right. The situation, for example, in which a female is raped, and the state sentences the rapist to jail, and abandons the victim to bear her fate without compensation is unAfrican, and inhuman, and also destroys patriotic zeal in citizens. The criminal (rapist) and the state which failed in its primary obligation to protect the female citizen must pay compensation to the victim. The same goes for victim of armed robbery, kidnapping, ritual activities, terrorism, fanaticism, etc. The growing cases of ritual rape in African states today make it imperative that the police must establish the motive for each rape case in order to save the lives of victims (Nwolise 2013, 2015). ix. Intelligence is the heart of security calculus. Most African states do not invest adequately in intelligence, and this has made crime detection and prevention, as well as speedy investigations uphill tasks. Europe rely heavily on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technology-based intelligence such as electronic intelligence (ELINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Africa is weak in both, and yet refuses to apply the very cheap, reliable, fast and predictive Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) which is even superior to both human intelligence and technology- based intelligence. Most African leaders and defence and security personnel still hold on to the false assertion of Sun Tzu, (2005: 165) the Chinese legendary philosopher, strategist, and warrior to the effect that: “foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits……it must be obtained from people.” Nothing can be farther from the truth. Studies by Nwolise (2012, 2013, 2015, 2016) have challenged this position of Sun Tzu. There are millions of innocent people in prisons all over the world whom human and technological intelligence cannot help, but whom SSI can set free to decongest hundreds of prisons. Investing in human and technology-based intelligence can assist, though in slow, and very costly manner in decongesting prisons. x. Prison farms and industries not only help in the training of inmates, they also enable inmates to eat better food that increase their body immunity and make them live healthier lives. The money paid to inmates from their farm and industrial services and products, part of which is saved and given to Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 167

them on discharge, empower them and give them that initial confidence they need to face the world after discharge. But most African prisons today do not have farms and industries. There is need for investment in this direction, as a strategy for faster and better re-integration of the discharged inmate, and to minimise recidivism, and rejection by society. xi. Separate jails or bail hostels have to be built for Awaiting Trial Persons outside the prison premises. This will totally eliminate the ugly phenomenon of prison congestion. xii. Separate facilities have to be established for mentally-ill inmates, who need treatment instead of punishment. xiii. Separate facilities are also to be established for probation and parole run by separate agencies as facilities operating under the law and for the maintenance of law and order, and upholding and promoting standard human behaviour. xiv. It is important to establish more and encourage extensive use of Alternative Dispute Resolution houses, where minor offences can be resolved without going to court and prison.

These fourteen points making investing in criminal justice imperative and necessary are not just requiring money. Even though financial input is critical here, there is also need for hard thinking, proper planning and execution, and devotion of time and energy to ensure that criminal justice works effectively, efficiently and progressively. The investment is not also just in the police, court, and prisons which are seen as the three legs of the criminal justice system. It covers the wider society, law programmes and others. Investments in these areas are to tackle the control of prison population from the reception rate, duration in custody, and re-entry (recidivism). This is because the task of decongesting the prison has to be faced at four stages: i. Pre-arrest, trial and incarceration stage. ii. Trial stage. iii. Incarceration stage; and iv. Post-incarceration stage.

Investment must cover these four stages for the battle against prison congestion to be meaningful and successful. The Sunday Sun (2014:1) carried the story of a Nigerian, one Mr. Okorie Orie who suffered double tragedy in the hands of unrepentant armed robbers. These robbers robbed him millions of naira in 2004, and since he was able to identify one of them, the entire gang members were arrested, tried and imprisoned for ten years. For the ten years they were in prison, they nursed revenge on Mr Orie, and on discharge from prison after ten years prison term, the gang reassembled, invaded his residence, and unknowingly killed his son whom they saw sleeping on Mr Orie’s bed. This revenge mission spells real failure in the prison’s sacred duty of reforming inmates. It also shows that the post- 168 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria incarceration stage of their lives was not properly taken care of while in prison. Now the gang will return to prison as they have been rearrested, to add to the existing overcrowding. This is where the observation of Orakwe (2011:9) becomes instructive to the effect that the “focus of criminal justice should be on how to restore the ability of the system to rise up to the challenges of crime and its treatment….”

CONCLUSION To bring this discourse to a close, the following clustered recommendation directed at the level of government, civil society, police, court, and prison are imperative for tackling the issue of prison congestion:

Government level Tackling the causes of crime, terrorism, militancy, separatist agitations, and fanaticism. These are essentially exclusionism, social injustice, marginalisation, neglect, poverty, unemployment, lack of civic education emphasising tolerance, and more dependence on use of force instead of dialogue. Job creation to avoid idle, hungry and angry groups that constitute a pool for crime perpetration and recruitment. Focusing education on practical and short courses that impart skills required in industries, agriculture, etc; and reducing emphasis on bogus certificates, and theoretical teachings. Combat poverty through payment of living wage, establishment of micro-credit facilities, and job creation. Massive public education, enlightenment, and mobilisation on the need for political, religious, and ethnic or racial tolerance to eliminate fanaticism. Civil and moral education on the benefits of being law abiding and patriotic in order to remain a free citizen.

Police level Avoiding indiscriminate police arrests of people most of whom end up in prison while awaiting trial. Adoption of community policing to provide preventive policing. Ensuring adequate and completed investigation before charging a suspect to court. This will ensure that suspects that have no business being taken to court are not in the court from where they are sent to prison to await trial while their cases are still being investigated by the police.

Court level Establish and encourage people to use Alternative Dispute Resolution houses. Minor offences can be settled in these houses without going to court. Judges to diversify punishment option away from monotonous imprisonment. Fines, community or public service, compensation or restitution, house arrest, etc can also be applied. Juveniles should be sent to remand homes. These will reduce drastically the rate of inmates’ reception in the prison. Court bail processes and conditions should be drastically improved. Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 169

Modernisation of court equipment, proceedings to increase the speed of case disposal by judges. Increased application of probation under the supervision of well-trained probation officers. Appointment of more judges and magistrates to speed up trial to reduce Awaiting Trial cases and to free the innocent. Increase legal aid to inmates through government Legal Aid Council, lawyers in the civil society, the Bar Association, Lawyers Without Borders etc. Judges to avoid long prison sentences, which adversely affect duration in custody. First offenders particularly and juveniles should be given room to reform quickly. Judges to avoid prolonged trials which keep suspects in custody for too long. Establishment of more courts to enhance speedy disposition of cases.

Prison level Another agency should be established to keep Awaiting Trial persons in Bail Hostels that are well garrisoned. Increased use of parole for temporary or permanent release of inmates who are very old or have transparently demonstrated remorsefulness and good behaviour before the completion of their prison terms. More frequent application of the use of prerogative of mercy facility for state pardon, the service of Prison Decongestion Committees, and Prison Visits by Judges. Establish half-way houses for inmates that have about six months to complete their sentences, and have demonstrated good behaviour. There, the inmates can get more visitors, job placement, and proper resettlement or reintegration briefing and training. Establishment of prison overseeing or monitoring bodies especially Non-Governmental Organisations concerned with human rights, Church Ministries, Medical Associations, Legislative Committees, etc. These will frequently report on prison conditions, welfare of inmates, help in case reviews and ensuring that no inmate overstays. Establish Remand Homes and Borstal Institutions for youths and children where they can be protected from abuse, and reformed more quickly and appropriately. Movement of prison away from the exclusive list or preserve of the Central Government, so that states, regions or local governments can play their own custodial and reformatory roles as long as the central government sets the regulatory standard. Society level Be active and vigilant over security matters, and in crime prevention as it is the committal of crime that leads a person to prison. Provide prompt and adequate information to police to quicken investigations and prosecution. Assist in the smooth reintegration of ex-convicts through ready acceptance, job offers, avoiding of stigmatisation, and empowerment to start something useful. Socialisation of children and youths into lawful life, patriotism, peace, order and security is necessary. Finally, two more points need to be highlighted here. The first is that these authors do not support the 170 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria idea of expanding prisons or constructing more prisons in order to decongest prisons. It is uncalled for. It is retrogression. The root causes of crime should be addressed by governments. If the Awaiting Trial Persons are removed, things will improve, all things being equal. Moreover, we vote for zero prison inmates level, which can lead to the closing down of some prisons, if government does the right thing – applying political power and national resources for the common good. Our advice to politicians and political leaders is always “Get the power, do what the people want and there will be no criminals to send to prison”. Thus we strongly stand with the argument of the Citizens United For the Rehabilitation of Errants (CURE-Nigeria) made through its Executive Director, Mr. Sylvester Uhaa, to the effect that building more prisons is not the ultimate solution to prison congestion. Addressing the root causes of crime is it. In his words:

Doing so without addressing the root causes of the rising crime rate in Nigeria would not solve the problem and the new prisons would soon be filled up... and then we would need to build bigger ones. This would lead to prison expansion and mass incarceration in our country. The argument that we need to build more prisons, recruit more police, increase security budgets and buy more arms for law enforcement as the only way to reduce crime is false and does not serve the common interest, and must be rejected... Any effective and economically sustainable public safety strategy must include investments that will help reduce recidivism and address the root causes of crime such as unemployment and marginalisation (Quoted in Nnadi, 2017:5).

Second, it needs to be reiterated here that no national army has ever defeated a determined terrorist group. The only case of Sri Lanka was achieved at a great human cost to the nation. The lesson here is dialogue even when holding the big stick. This is where advice of the United States Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. James Entwistle (in Sunday Newswatch, 2014:1) becomes instructive. He had told the Nigerian government in July 2014, in reference to the Boko Haram menace that Nigeria needs more than military might to dislodge insurgency. While assuring Nigerians that the United States is interested in seeing Nigeria win the war on terror and succeed as a nation, he advised the then President Jonathan administration while fighting the insurgents through military strategy, to also develop impoverished areas where extremism takes root, make education accessible to all, empower free and fair press, protect civilian population, encourage people to trust government, and engage the growing youth population being swayed towards extremism as a result of lack of economic opportunities, education, and trust in government. This advice is as good for all African States leaders facing terrorism, militancy, insurgency or separatist movement, as far as prison congestion is concerned. Prison Congestion, Fanaticism and Terrorism: Case for Investing in Criminal Justice 171

REFERENCES

Africa News, UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 24, 2005. African Union Convention On the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 (Article 3). Apata, Diran (2014) ‘‘Boko Haram Takes Bold Steps to the South West‘‘, Sunday Tribune, July 6. Agomoh, Uju “Prison Decongestion and Reforms in Nigeria-Issues and Methods”. Byrne J. and D. Hummer, “Examining the Impact of Institutional Culture on Prison Violence and Disorder – An Evidence – Based Review”, in J Byrne, D. Hummer, and F. Taxman, The Culture of Prison Violence, Boston, Pearson. Criminal Justice – Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/criminal justice (5/7/ 14) Horn S.A. (2005), Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, Oxford, Oxford University Press. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/prison. http:/www.penalreform.org/central-east-and-south-africa.html. http://thepointernewsonline.com/?p=22495(30/6/14) http://www.osundefender.org/?p=74144(30/6/14) Nnadi Chidi, (2017) “50,427 Awaiting Trial in Nigeria-Group”, Daily Sun, November, 17. Nwokolo, Ernest (2014), “Sorry State of Oba Prison”, in The Nation. June 4. Nwolise, OBC (2008), “Towards The Humanisation of Africa’s Prisons Currently Worse Than Zoos: A Strategic Discourse”, in African Notes, Journal of the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, Vol. 32, Nos. 1 and 2. Nwolise, OBC (2015), ‘’Motion for Serious Focus of Research on The Spiritual Dimension of Human and National Security’’, Studies in Politics and Society, Journal of the Nigerian Political Science Association, Vol.3 No 1. December. Nwolise, OBC, (2013) Is Physical Security Alone Enough for the Survival, Progress and Happiness of Man?, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press. Nwolise, OBC, (2013b) ‘‘Forensics and Human Security in Nigeria: The Place of Strategic Spiritual Intelligence”, Strategic Periscope, Ibadan Exotic Dezines, 2016. Orakwe, Ifediorah (2011), ‘‘Strategies for the Attainment of Total Prison Decongestion within the Context of the Proposed Criminal Justice Reform”, Paper Presented to Nigerian Bar Association Criminal Justice Reform Conference, held at Abuja, July 18. Pogoson, Irene (2013), Nigeria’s National Security in Age of Terrorism, Maiden Departmental Lecture, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan. 172 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Samuel, Walker, “Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm: The American Bar Foundation Survey 1953 – 1969” , Justice Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1;. Santayana, G. (1905), Life of Reason in Common Sense, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons. Soanes, C. (2001), Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Sunday Sun (2014), “Unrepentant Convicts: Jailed Robbers Return 10 Years After to Kill Victim’s Son”. Sunday Tribune (2014), “Opposition Floods South with Northern Migrant Voters”. July 6. Saturday Punch, (2014), Interview with the Minister of Interior, Abba Moro by F. Soriwei and A. Adepegba, ‘‘Nigerian Prison Facility Outdated – Moro‘‘, March 15. Sunday Newswatch (2014), “US to Nigeria: ‘‘You Can’t Defeat Terrorism by Military Power Alone”, July 6. Tzu Sun (2005), The Art of War, (Thomas Cleary translation) London, Shambhala. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 Adopted December 9, 1994, Titled ‘‘Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism”. Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/fanaticism. Wines, Michael, (2005), “Wasting Away, A Million Wait In African Jail”, New York Times. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

THE MONSTER CALLED CORRUPTION: ANY SILVER BULLET TO KILL THIS THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT?

by

Adebola B. Ekanola Professor of Philosophy

and

Director, Office of International Programmes University of Ibadan Tel: +234802346990

ABSTRACT

Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon currently devastating several nations of the world threatening the security and development of nations, with a propensity and capacity to fight back. Effectively combating it needs well thought out effective measures. The Buhari administration came on board in 2015 promising to fight corruption which was in itself a major issue that propelled the January 15 1966 coup. This paper delves into the corruption quagmire, x-raying its international character, its nature, and methods, before interrogating its Nigerian context within which it threatened the nation’s security and development. The author is of the view that killing corruption will require a combination of several measures.

Key words: Monster, Corruption, Silver Bullet, National Security.

INTRODUCTION When national security is perceived not from the cold war era angle of mere state security based on militarism (Morgenthau, 1960; Lippman in Imobighe, 1998:14) but from the post cold war era prism of

173 174 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria human security, welfare and development of the nation (McNamara, 1968, Hubert, 1999; Nwolise, 2009), it becomes clear that corruption is not just a mere crime against the state, but a serious threat to human and national security. Two claims can easily be made given our general experience of the phenomenon called corruption in Nigeria. One, corruption underpins economic recession and there cannot be sustainable development in any society beset by corruption. Two, radical socio-political transformation is required to effectively address the problem of corruption in Nigeria, and neutralise its current threat to Nigeria’s national security and development. The broad objective of this presentation is to some extent define the direction of the dialogue on corruption. Some views will seek to show the nexus between corruption and economic recession, as well as, try to establish the necessity for socio-political transformation if the problem of corruption would be resolved in Nigeria. However, before these issues can be effectively addressed, the nature of corruption must first be interrogated and fully understood in its diverse manifestations. This is because a good understanding of the nature and manifestations of a problem is requisite to finding a viable solution to it. The need to have a clear and full understanding of the true nature of corruption comes particularly to fore by the fact that stakeholders in the Nigerian project, across its diverse social strata, seem to operate different conceptions of corruption, most of which are obviously inadequate and unacceptably too narrow, thereby excluding a lot of instances and forms of corruption. Three examples will drive home the point I am trying to establish very pungently: (a) Some 34 years back, a teacher came to distribute some textbooks to my class. As he was about to conclude the exercise, he realised that a copy of the book was missing as he had brought the exact number of books that matched the number of students in the class. He immediately decided to carry out a search on every student in the class. Before long, the missing book was found on one of us. The ‘thief’ was brought to the front of the class and the teacher began to flog the boy with the instruction that with each stroke of the cane delivered, the boy should say “I am a thief”. What was shocking and quite remarkable was that the young lad refused to say that he was a thief, insisting that he was just smart. The more he was beaten, the more he insisted that he was just smart. The teacher had to take the erring boy to the office of the principal when he got tired of beating him. He never agreed that he was a thief. If that boy was to find himself in an important political position, I wonder how he would have defined corruption. (b) It was a Monday in the month of February 2001. I had to take a bus from Dugbe to the University of Ibadan early in the morning to teach an early morning class. At a point during the journey, the bus was stopped by a police woman who demanded from the bus driver her “eto” (dues or right). The driver was not forthcoming with it. Before long, all the commuters in the bus, except me, became agitated by the delay and accused the driver of delaying them needlessly by refusing to give the police woman her dues. They all seemed to believe that the police woman had a right to demand and receive bribe from the bus driver. To these people, I wonder how they would define corruption or fight it if they were in an official position meant for that. The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 175

(c) An ex-governor of a state recently returned to Nigeria after he was jailed in the UK for corruption and, more specifically, money laundering. Upon his return in pageantry, he organised a church thanksgiving for himself and in the process remarked that he was neither a corrupt politician nor a thief. He justified his claim that he was convicted for money laundering and not corruption, insisting that there is a remarkable difference between the two. This brings up two important questions: what is money laundering and what is corruption? I will return to these questions later when I clarify the notion of money laundering.

SETTING THE CONTEXT Corruption is a global phenomenon that is as old as human society itself. Going by the world map and table of the 2016 Corruption Perception Index generated by Transparency International (www.transparency, 2016), corruption is found in every part of the world. However, while no society is entirely free from it, corruption appears to be more entrenched and widespread in some countries than in others.

Figure 1: Corruption Perception Index 2016 176 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Table 1 Corruption Perception Index 2016

2015 2014 2013 2012 Country 2016 Score Region 2016 Score Score Score Score Rank

Europe and 1 Denmark 90 91 92 91 90 Central Asia

1 New Zealand 90 88 91 91 90 Asia Pacific

Europe and 3 Finland 89 90 89 89 90 Central Asia

Europe and 4 Sweden 88 89 87 89 88 Central Asia

Europe and 5 Switzerland 86 86 86 85 86 Central Asia

Europe and 6 Norway 85 87 86 86 85 Central Asia

7 Singapore 84 85 84 86 87 Asia Pacific

Europe and 8 Netherlands 83 87 83 83 84 Central Asia

9 Canada 82 83 81 81 84 Americas

Europe and 10 Germany 81 81 79 78 79 Central Asia

Europe and 10 Luxembourg 81 81 82 80 80 Central Asia

Europe and 10 United Kingdom 81 81 78 76 74 Central Asia

13 Australia 79 79 80 81 85 Asia Pacific

Europe and 14 Iceland 78 79 79 78 82 Central Asia

Europe and 15 Belgium 77 77 76 75 75 Central Asia

15 Hong Kong 77 75 74 75 77 Asia Pacific

Europe and 17 Austria 75 76 72 69 69 Central Asia

18 United States 74 76 74 73 73 Americas

Europe and The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 177

Europe and 19 Ireland 73 75 74 72 69 Central Asia

20 Japan 72 75 76 74 74 Asia Pacific

21 Uruguay 71 74 73 73 72 Americas

Europe and 22 Estonia 70 70 69 68 64 Central Asia

Europe and 23 France 69 70 69 71 71 Central Asia

24 Bahamas 66 N/A 71 71 71 Americas

24 Chile 66 70 73 71 72 Americas

United Arab Middle East and 24 66 70 70 69 68 Emirates North Africa

27 Bhutan 65 65 65 63 63 Asia Pacific

Middle East and 28 Israel 64 61 60 61 60 North Africa

Europe and 29 Poland 62 62 61 60 58 Central Asia

Europe and 29 Portugal 62 63 63 62 63 Central Asia

31 Barbados 61 N/A 74 75 76 Americas

Middle East and 31 Qatar 61 71 69 68 68 North Africa

Europe and 31 Slovenia 61 60 58 57 61 Central Asia

31 Taiwan 61 62 61 61 61 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 35 Botswana 60 63 63 64 65 Africa

35 Saint Lucia 60 N/A N/A 71 71 Americas

Saint Vincent and the 35 60 N/A 67 62 62 Americas Grenadines

Sub Saharan 38 Cape Verde 59 55 57 58 60 Africa

38 Dominica 59 N/A 58 58 58 Americas

Europe and 38 Lithuania 59 61 58 57 54 Central Asia

41 Brunei 58 N/A N/A 60 55 Asia Pacific 178 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

41 Costa Rica 58 55 54 53 54 Americas

Europe and 41 Spain 58 58 60 59 65 Central Asia

Europe and 44 Georgia 57 52 52 49 52 Central Asia

Europe and 44 Latvia 57 55 55 53 49 Central Asia

46 Grenada 56 N/A N/A N/A N/A Americas

Europe and 47 Cyprus 55 61 63 63 66 Central Asia

Europe and 47 Czech Republic 55 56 51 48 49 Central Asia

Europe and 47 Malta 55 56 55 56 57 Central Asia

Sub Saharan 50 Mauritius 54 53 54 52 57 Africa

Sub Saharan 50 Rwanda 54 54 49 53 53 Africa

52 Korea (South) 53 56 55 55 56 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 53 Namibia 52 53 49 48 48 Africa

Europe and 54 Slovakia 51 51 50 47 46 Central Asia

Europe and 55 Croatia 49 51 48 48 46 Central Asia

55 Malaysia 49 50 52 50 49 Asia Pacific

Europe and 57 Hungary 48 51 54 54 55 Central Asia

Middle East and 57 Jordan 48 53 49 45 48 North Africa

Europe and 57 Romania 48 46 43 43 44 Central Asia

60 Cuba 47 47 46 46 48 Americas

Europe and 60 Italy 47 44 43 43 42 Central Asia The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 179

Sao Tome and Sub Saharan 62 46 42 42 42 42 Principe Africa

Middle East and 62 Saudi Arabia 46 52 49 46 44 North Africa

Europe and 64 Montenegro 45 44 42 44 41 Central Asia

Middle East and 64 Oman 45 45 45 47 47 North Africa

Sub Saharan 64 Senegal 45 44 43 41 36 Africa

Sub Saharan 64 South Africa 45 44 44 42 43 Africa

64 Suriname 45 36 36 36 37 Americas

Europe and 69 Greece 44 46 43 40 36 Central Asia

Middle East and 70 Bahrain 43 51 49 48 51 North Africa

Sub Saharan 70 Ghana 43 47 48 46 45 Africa

Sub Saharan 72 Burkina Faso 42 38 38 38 38 Africa

Europe and 72 Serbia 42 40 41 42 39 Central Asia

72 Solomon Islands 42 N/A N/A N/A N/A Asia Pacific

Europe and 75 Bulgaria 41 41 43 41 41 Central Asia

Middle East and 75 Kuwait 41 49 44 43 44 North Africa

Middle East and 75 Tunisia 41 38 40 41 41 North Africa

Europe and 75 Turkey 41 42 45 50 49 Central Asia

Europe and 79 Belarus 40 32 31 29 31 Central Asia

79 Brazil 40 38 43 42 43 Americas

79 China 40 37 36 40 39 Asia Pacific

79 India 40 38 38 36 36 Asia Pacific 180 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Europe and 83 Albania 39 36 33 31 33 Central Asia

Bosnia and Europe and 83 39 38 39 42 42 Herzegovina Central Asia

83 Jamaica 39 41 38 38 38 Americas

Sub Saharan 83 Lesotho 39 44 49 49 45 Africa

87 Mongolia 38 39 39 38 36 Asia Pacific

87 Panama 38 39 37 35 38 Americas

Sub Saharan 87 Zambia 38 38 38 38 37 Africa

90 Colombia 37 37 37 36 36 Americas

90 Indonesia 37 36 34 32 32 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 90 Liberia 37 37 37 38 41 Africa

Middle East and 90 Morocco 37 36 39 37 37 North Africa

The FYR of Europe and 37 42 45 44 43 90 Macedonia Central Asia

95 Argentina 36 32 34 34 35 Americas

Sub Saharan 95 Benin 36 37 39 36 36 Africa

95 El Salvador 36 39 39 38 38 Americas

Europe and 95 Kosovo 36 33 33 33 34 Central Asia

95 Maldives 36 N/A N/A N/A N/A Asia Pacific

95 Sri Lanka 36 37 38 37 40 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 101 Gabon 35 34 37 34 35 Africa

Sub Saharan 101 Niger 35 34 35 34 33 Africa

101 Peru 35 36 38 38 38 Americas

101 Philippines 35 35 38 36 34 Asia Pacific

101 Thailand 35 38 38 35 37 Asia Pacific

101 Timor-Leste 35 28 28 30 33 Asia Pacific The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 181

101 Trinidad and Tobago 35 39 38 38 39 Americas

Middle East and 108 Algeria 34 36 36 36 34 North Africa

Sub Saharan 108 Côte d´Ivoire 34 32 32 27 29 Africa

Middle East and 108 Egypt 34 36 37 32 32 North Africa

Sub Saharan 108 Ethiopia 34 33 33 33 33 Africa

108 Guyana 34 29 30 27 28 Americas

Europe and 113 Armenia 33 35 37 36 34 Central Asia

113 Bolivia 33 34 35 34 34 Americas

113 Vietnam 33 31 31 31 31 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 116 Mali 32 35 32 28 34 Africa

116 Pakistan 32 30 29 28 27 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 116 Tanzania 32 30 31 33 35 Africa

Sub Saharan 116 Togo 32 32 29 29 30 Africa

120 Dominican Republic 31 33 32 29 32 Americas

120 Ecuador 31 32 33 35 32 Americas

Sub Saharan 120 Malawi 31 31 33 37 37 Africa

Europe and 123 Azerbaijan 30 29 29 28 27 Central Asia

Sub Saharan 123 Djibouti 30 34 34 36 36 Africa

123 Honduras 30 31 29 26 28 Americas

123 Laos 30 25 25 26 21 Asia Pacific

123 Mexico 30 35 35 34 34 Americas

Europe and 123 Moldova 30 33 35 35 36 Central Asia

123 Paraguay 30 27 24 24 25 Americas

Sub Saharan 182 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Sub Saharan 123 Sierra Leone 30 29 31 30 31 Africa

Middle East and 131 Iran 29 27 27 25 28 North Africa

Europe and 131 Kazakhstan 29 28 29 26 28 Central Asia

131 Nepal 29 27 29 31 27 Asia Pacific

Europe and 131 Russia 29 29 27 28 28 Central Asia

Europe and 131 Ukraine 29 27 26 25 26 Central Asia

136 Guatemala 28 28 32 29 33 Americas

Europe and 136 Kyrgyzstan 28 28 27 24 24 Central Asia

Middle East and 136 Lebanon 28 28 27 28 30 North Africa

136 Myanmar 28 22 21 21 15 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 136 Nigeria 28 26 27 25 27 Africa

136 Papua New Guinea 28 25 25 25 25 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 142 Guinea 27 25 25 24 24 Africa

Middle East and 142 Mauritania 27 31 30 30 31 North Africa

Sub Saharan 142 Mozambique 27 31 31 30 31 Africa

145 Bangladesh 26 25 25 27 26 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 145 Cameroon 26 27 27 25 26 Africa

Sub Saharan 145 Gambia 26 28 29 28 34 Africa

Sub Saharan 145 Kenya 26 25 25 27 27 Africa

Sub Saharan 145 Madagascar 26 28 28 28 32 Africa

145 Nicaragua 26 27 28 28 29 Americas The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 183

Europe and 151 Tajikistan 25 26 23 22 22 Central Asia

Sub Saharan 151 Uganda 25 25 26 26 29 Africa

Sub Saharan 153 Comoros 24 26 26 28 28 Africa

Europe and 154 Turkmenistan 22 18 17 17 17 Central Asia

Sub Saharan 154 Zimbabwe 22 21 21 21 20 Africa

156 Cambodia 21 21 21 20 22 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 156 Democratic Republic of Congo 21 22 22 22 21 Africa

Europe and 156 Uzbekistan 21 19 18 17 17 Central Asia

Sub Saharan 159 Burundi 20 21 20 21 19 Africa

Sub Saharan 159 Central African Republic 20 24 24 25 26 Africa

Sub Saharan 159 Chad 20 22 22 19 19 Africa

159 Haiti 20 17 19 19 19 Americas

Sub Saharan 159 Republic of Congo 20 23 23 22 26 Africa

Sub Saharan 164 Angola 18 15 19 23 22 Africa

Sub Saharan 164 Eritrea 18 18 18 20 25 Africa

Middle East and 166 Iraq 17 16 16 16 18 North Africa

166 Venezuela 17 17 19 20 19 Americas

Sub Saharan 168 Guinea-Bissau 16 17 19 19 25 Africa

169 Afghanistan 15 11 12 8 8 Asia Pacific

Middle East and 170 Libya 14 16 18 15 21 North Africa

184 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Middle East and 170 Sudan 14 12 11 11 13 North Africa

Middle East and 170 Yemen 14 18 19 18 23 North Africa

Middle East and 173 Syria 13 18 20 17 26 North Africa

174 Korea (North) 12 8 8 8 8 Asia Pacific

Sub Saharan 175 South Sudan 11 15 15 14 N/A Africa

Sub Saharan 176 Somalia 10 8 8 8 8 Africa

Both the 2016 corruption perception map and table above show the extent to which the phenomenon of corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians globally. Both show that no country is totally free of corruption. Over two-thirds of the 176 countries and territories in that year’s index fall below the midpoint of the scale of highly corrupt to very clean countries in terms of corruption. This suggests that these countries are more than averagely corrupt. Indeed, the global average score, according to the corruption perception index indicates endemic corruption in more than half of the countries of the world. Again, from the diagram above, the top-scoring countries (yellow in colour) are far outnumbered by orange and red countries where citizens face the tangible impact of corruption daily, with corruption threatening their existence and peace, and of their nation’s security and development. A very saddening aspect of the 2016 report on corruption perception is that more countries degenerated than improved in the year’s results, showing the urgent need for more determination in the global efforts to thwart corruption. In most nations including Nigeria, corruption has permeated the defence and security apparatus and diverted funds meant for national security and development into private pockets. Thus, corruption all over the world is today a major threat to the security and development of peoples and nations.

THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT By the 2016 corruption index, the perception of corruption in Nigeria is very high. It is ranked 136 of the 176 countries on the table with the implication that Nigeria is the 40th most corrupt of the 176- ranked countries. It is important to note that, historically, Nigeria has always recognised and at least paid lip-service to the urgency of the need to undermine corruption. It is for this reason that various anti- corruption laws, policies, strategies and parastatals have been established. Anti-corruption laws in Nigeria include: The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 185

1. Banks and Other Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act 1991 2. Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks (Amendment) Act 1994. 3. Independent Corrupt Practices & Other Related Offences Act 2000 4. Penal Code Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004 5. Criminal Code Law of Federation of Nigeria 2004 6. EFCC Est. Act 2004 7. Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 2006 8. Fiscal Responsibilities Act 2010 9. Freedom of Information Act 2011 10. Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act 2012 11. Miscellaneous Offences Act 12. Code of Conduct Act 13. Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Act

Unfortunately, from the prevailing level of corruption in the country, it is clear that previous efforts to undermine corruption have not yielded desired level of results. Going by the 2014 corruption index, Nigeria ranked 136 out of 176 countries with a score of 27. It also reported the public perception of corruption to be very high with 85% of Nigerians surveyed holding that corruption in the country has increased between 2011 and 2013. Global Financial Integrity estimated as at 2014, that more than $157 billion had left the country illicitly. (www.gfintegrity.org) The corruption score sheet for Nigeria, despite all the anti-corruption laws and parastatals, suggests that corruption cannot be easily legislated out of existence in Nigeria. Perhaps this is because corruption is not primarily a legal problem. At least, it is clearly a universal human phenomenon, with diverse dimensions, that is not peculiar to Nigeria and Nigerians. Nonetheless, the truth about corruption in Nigeria is that it has been very visible right from its inception. This claim was copiously made by such Nigerian scholars as O. B. C. Nwolise, Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka who in various ways affirmed that the beginning of corruption in Nigeria is located in its colonial foundation, especially the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates to create the entity now known as Nigeria (Gashinbaki, on-line). The aforementioned scholars are all agreed that since its inception as a country, the seed for ethnic, religious and regional divides impregnated with corruption was sown in the country. Although, I hate to be a harbinger of sad news, but the reality is that corruption is now endemic in Nigeria, intricately woven into every sector and layer of the Nigerian society. And, despite the hype about the anti-corruption crusade of the President Buhari-led administration, 186 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria there has not been any significant change in our corruption ranking. It remains 136 of the 176 countries ranked. The only difference is that while it scored 27% in 2014, 26% was recorded in 2015, the year Buhari took over governance, while the country recorded 28% in 2016. That there has not been any remarkable change in the corruption status of Nigeria leads back to the earlier assertion that before a problem can be resolved, there must first be a good grasp of its nature. Thus, before the problem of corruption can be effectively tackled in Nigeria (or anywhere), its character and diverse manifestations must be fully understood. Thus, we are back to the question: what is the true nature of corruption?

THE NATURE OF CORRUPTION The phenomenon of corruption by its complex and multi-dimensional character, has taken on the character of a hydra-headed monster that does not afford a simple explanation or solution. Indeed, there is no silver bullet for the beast called corruption. Nonetheless, it seems that there is the need to interrogate the concept of corruption in a way that will enhance its understanding as well as the capacity to undermine its malaise. Corruption, in literal terms, connotes putrefactive decay, rottenness, perversion or deformation of the nature of a thing. It refers to a condition of filth, pollution or contamination (www.businessdictionary). However, when employed within the context of human social relations, it takes on a very strong moral connotation to refer to any form of dishonesty leading to or manifesting in an abuse or illegitimate use of bestowed power or position or official capacity to acquire a personal benefit. It might be rightly described as a form of moral depravity, debasement or perversion of integrity. That acts of corruption are morally improper is shown in the mere fact that both the perpetrators and beneficiaries of corrupt actions usually want to keep their activities secret (2015dictionary, on line) That is, they will normally want to veil the improper nature of this ugly exchange relationship. An interesting account of the notion of corruption offered by Petrus van Duyne (2001:73-98), describes it as “an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in which a decision-maker consents to deviate or demands deviation from the criterion which should rule his or her decision-making, in exchange for a reward or for the promise or expectation of a reward, while these motives influencing his or her decision-making cannot be part of the justification of the decision.” As such, corruption, according to Ruzindana (in Oyinola, 2011) is a social and contagious (Gbenga, 2008) problem involving a routine deviation from established standards and norms by public officials and parties with whom they interact. It is usually criminal in nature. However, it is very important to note that all human decisions and activities are essentially determined and driven by values and moral standards. It is in this regard that we need to appreciate the psychological dimension of corruption. It begins with a mindset characterised by the readiness and willingness to deviate from what is the proper and ideal standard of decision making and behaviour. No doubt, psychological, socio-political and socio-economic factors influence and determine how we think, the values we uphold and, in the final analysis, what we do. Within the context of our discourse on corruption, they determine the extent to which people will be disposed to corrupt practices. An instance of each of these factors will be highlighted below: The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 187

i. Psychological: Basic human trait tinkers with rules: There is the human tendency not to obey rules or conform to what is considered standard behaviour. If we think back to the biblical account of Adam, Eve and the serpent in the garden of Eden, it should be appreciated that there is something in human nature that tends to flout rules, regulations and established standards, especially when there is a perceived gain and good prospects of avoidance of detection and punishment. ii. Socio-Political Leadership: Just like fish that starts to rot from the head downwards, corruption frequently (but not always) develops gradually as a top-down disease. When leaders in society are corrupt, they become bad examples, and erode standards for proper decision making, and this will most likely encourage followers and members of society to also become corrupt. Thus, defective leadership provides a viable top-down explanation of how corruption festers into a societal disease (Petrus Van Duyen, 2001:89). iii. Poverty/Socio-economic facts of income and subsistence: Economic history has shown that people tend to resort to diverse forms of corrupt practices when income is grossly below what is required for subsistence. Simply put, there is what is called poverty-induced corruption. This is exacerbated by the wide economic inequality between the ruling elites who have corruptly amassed great wealth from public funds, and the bulk of the population that is grossly underpaid and forced to live beneath the poverty line.

SCALES OF CORRUPTION Corruption occurs at virtually all levels of social existence and in different forms. For our present purpose, I will discuss three major levels of corruption. a. Petty/|Small Corruption: This manifests at a small scale, usually at the level of the execution of public services, when public officers interact directly with the public. It is common at the level of junior and middle level officers, who are usually significantly underpaid. It involves, for instance, an exchange of little or small improper gifts, which may be in cash or kind, or when people employ their personal connections or positions to obtain favours or to expedite a routine government procedure. A lot of this goes on in the public service and private sector services. b. Grand/Major Corruption: This occurs at the highest level of private and public organisations and involves a significant subversion of the economic, political and legal systems. This is the level at which high ranking political defence, security and business elites perpetuate corruption. Some ministers, military Generals, bank managers, etc have been found to have stolen from the national commonwealth. A lot of funds meant for arms purchase to fight Boko Haram elements in the North East were stolen by some Generals and their civilian accomplices, while the enemy took Nigeria’s territory, killing, maiming, raping, and burning houses! 188 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

c. Systemic Corruption: This is also called endemic corruption and it thrives basically on the inadequacies of existing political, economic and legal institutions or the internal weaknesses of an organisation. It is the form of corruption that has been woven into the very fabric of society and its major institutions in ways that it has become part and parcel of the essence of the society (https//en.m.wikipedia). It should be noted that systemic corruption provides a platform for both grand and petty corruption to thrive such that wherever it exists, corruption would also blossom at both the grand and petty levels. When corruption gets to this level, it becomes accepted as the norm with no serious attempt to veil its nature or keep it secret.

FORMS AND METHODS OF CORRUPTION Forms of Corruption Corruption takes different forms in society to include abuse of discretion, favouritism, nepotism and clientelism borrowing from Gashinbaki: a. Abuse of discretion consists of any misuse of authority or decision-making powers to illegitimately benefit oneself or any other party, directly or indirectly. This occurs, for instance, when a judge perverts the course of justice or when, as is common in Nigeria, custom officials allow certain imported products to be cleared at entry ports without proper documentation and appropriate fees paid. b. Favouritism, nepotism and clientelism refer to actions designed to unduly or illegitimately benefit an undeserving person or group to which the corrupt actor is related. This may be a friend (favouritism), member of family (nepotism), member of an ethnic group (ethnicity) or member of an association (clientelism).

Methods of Corruption Acts of corruption are carried out using diverse methods that include: • Embezzlement and theft consist in a person having access to some public funds or assets illegitimately converting such to his or her own personal benefit. • Fraud involves the use of deception to convince a person or group to give an unauthorised party access to some funds or assets. • Bribery consists of using some inducement, which may be in cash or kind, to achieve some illegitimate ends. • Extortion and blackmail employ the threat of violence to get certain individuals or parties to give up money or assets to the extortionists or blackmailers. • Money laundering is the process of “washing” money acquired through illegal and corrupt means to cleanse it. It is a process by which illegitimately acquired money is passed through The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 189

legitimate channels to give it an appearance of legitimacy. By its nature, money laundering presupposes corruption and facilitates it.

POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A MAJOR GLOBAL/NIGERIAN CHALLENGE No doubt, corruption takes place in virtually all social sectors: the judicial, educational, political, military, security, economic, health, non-governmental and others. However, corruption in the political sector has a more devastating effect on society due to the ripple effect it has on virtually all other social sectors as well as its negative implications for the much-desired social development. In this regard, Oyinlola (2011) affirmed: “the growing corruption in Nigeria can be traced to people holding power at the federal, state, and local government levels”. He, however, recognises that the problem has spread from the principal actors in the political arena to include people in both private and public positions and even traditional rulers. Described simply, political corruption involves the abuse, misuse or illegitimate use of a political office, power, or resources, by (elected) government officials either for personal gain or to unduly benefit any other party. Methods employed to perpetrate political corruption can be embezzlement, fraud, outright theft, bribery, extortion, blackmail or money laundering. With the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria’s political sector and its spread to virtually all other sectors, the general opinion in recent times is that corruption is a major bane of socio-economic and infrastructural development in Nigeria (Ogundiya, 2009). This is a deadly threat to human and national security. Following the same line of thought expressed above, the welcome statement on the ICPC website is that corruption in Nigeria, especially in its political arena and governmental circles,

undermines democratic institutions, retards economic development and contributes to government instability. Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting the rule of law, and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existence is the soliciting of bribes.

Other grievous effects of corruption on social and economic development and in building a nation as noted by Oyinlola (2011) include: • Diversion of defence and security resources to personal pockets. • Diversion of development resources for private gain • Misallocation of talent • Lost tax revenue • Negative impact on quality of infrastructure and public services • Slowing of economic growth. 190 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

CONCLUSION: THE URGENT NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA The above suggests that the core of corruption in Nigeria is in the political arena and governmental circles. This being so, it appears quite reasonable to hold that addressing the problem of corruption at this sphere of our social existence would go a long way in addressing it in all other social sectors. The present government under the leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari claims to be radically anti-corruption. Indeed, one of the most touted ideals of President Buhari and a cardinal promise of his regime is that of zero-tolerance for corruption. However, the extent to which the present regime in Nigeria has been faithful to this ideal and promise will have to be carefully determined. It is hoped and prayed that his government succeeds in this war on corruption which needs total national mobilisation. As rightly noted by Nwolise (2015), government fights battles, but the entire nation fight wars.” No doubt, for the diverse and seemingly complicated socio-economic, political and security problems besetting Nigeria to be effectively addressed, and for our dear country, Nigeria, to be firmly positioned on the path of holistic and sustainable development, the hydra-headed monster of corruption, especially political corruption, often manifesting in economic and financial crimes, must be tackled decisively. This requires: a clear understanding of what needs to be done; what should not be done; how to do what should be done; and firm and consistent political will and determination to effectively combat the monster. It was stated earlier that because of its complex nature, the problem of corruption does not seem to have a silver bullet to kill it. Hydra-headed problems require hydra-headed solutions. The following are some viable steps towards the resolution of the corruption problem in Nigeria. First, sweeping the stairs from the top: if corruption, as indicated earlier in this paper, is largely a leadership problem, its resolution must begin with the leadership. The war against corruption must begin with the legal, moral and practical entrenchment of the principles of transparency and accountability in politics and governance. There must also be in place adequate deterrent structures that will discourage corruption. However, we must realise that the problem is not primarily the lack of principles, rules and structures to check corruption, but their systematic neglect and the lack of political will to insist on them. Second, Attitudinal Change: There must be an attitudinal change in the society from one that condones and accepts corruption to a radical rejection of all manifestations of corruption. This can be facilitated by an intensive moral re-orientation project across all spheres of social existence and levels of educational structure. Citizens must be ready to question illegal wealth. Third, Systematic Interference with Basic Human Tendencies: As legal principles and judicial structures are put in place to discourage corruption, there should also be a robust moral re-orientation programme directed at undermining the basic human tendency to flout rules and regulations. Legal cum judicial structures should be such that ensure that offenders are not only promptly apprehended, but also promptly tried and punished. Fourth, Poverty Alleviation: poverty alleviation and elimination programmes as well as the goals of sustainable development must be vigorously pursued. The more people are empowered economically, the less will be the tendency to resort to corruption. Governments and private organisations can not owe workers salaries or pay them peanuts in the name of salaries in a period of war against corruption. It does not add up. The Monster Called Corruption: Any Silver Bullet to Kill this Threat to National Security and... 191

The following questions are pertinent as this paper is concluded: Do we really want to kill the monster called corruption? Do we have the will and determination to fight the monster? As is hyped in recent times, if we do not kill corruption, it will eventually kill us as a nation and will, in literal terms, kill many of us as individuals. As Nigerians, as moral agents, as rational agents, the choice is ours. However, what is clear is that several silver bullets fired with the greatest strength of the nation are today required to kill corruption to save the people and the nation and catalyse its national security and development.

REFERENCES

Dictionary.com, 2015, LLC. Duyne. Petrus C. van, (2001), “Will Caligula go transparent? Corruption in acts & attitudes”. Forum on Crime and Society. Vol. 1, No. 2: 73-98 Gashinbaki. Iliyasu, B., Anti-corruption: An evaluation of strategies, legislations and systems in Nigeria. www.commentary.com/nigeria.htm. Accessed on 12 August 2017 Gbenga, O. A. (2008), Service Delivery Surveys: Applying the Sentinel Community Surveillance Methodology, Country Overviews, EDI. London: Sage Publications https//en.m.wikipedia. org.wiki.corruption. Herbert O. (1999), “Small Arms, Demand Reduction and Human Security”, Ploughshares Briefing. Imobighe T. (1998), The Management of National Security, Inaugural Lecture, Edo State University, Ekpoma. McNamara R. (1968), The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, New York, Harper and Row. Morgenthau H. (1960), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York. Nwolise OBC (2009), “Peace and Security”, in I. O. Albert (ed), Praxis of Political Concepts and Cliches in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Ibadan, Bookcraft. Nwolise OBC (2015), Nigeria Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Combating Corruption in President Buhari’s Era of Change: Input To Strategy, Ibadan, Gold Press Ltd. Ogundiya, Ilufoye S., (2009), Corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives and Some Explanations. Anthropologist. 11 (4): 281-292. Oyinola Oluwagmamiga Ayobami. (2011) Corruption Eradication in Nigeria: An Appraisal.http:// unllib.unl.edu/LPP/Library Philosophy and Practice. www.businessdictionary.com/definition/corruption.html#ixzz3oRabANVv and http://www.your dictionary.com/corruption#mxuyDSAf6VrUSR2H.99. Retrieved on 18/10/2015 See www. Gfintegrity.org.or www.opinion.prermiumtimesng.com/tag/global-financial-integrity-report- 2014 See www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION IN THE FACE OF CONTEMPORARY ASYMMETRIC SECURITY CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE WORLD

by

Femi Olufunmilade, Ph.D. Head, Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Igbinedion University, Okada, Edo State. Email: [email protected]

ABSTRACT

This author examines the changing face of foreign intelligence in the international system. In the cold-war era and immediately thereafter, nations pursued foreign intelligence on a competitive basis. The emergence of asymmetric security challenges today is changing this to cooperation and collaboration. This is because terrorism has become a world-wide threat, requiring a collective response of world nations since no one nation can combat it alone.

Key words: Foreign Intelligence, Competition, Cooperation, Asymmetric Security Challenges.

INTRODUCTION The importance of timely and accurate intelligence to security operations cannot be overemphasised, especially in a world where emerging threats are complex in nature and the task of surmounting them calls for innovative approaches. Having a well-equipped military and police is no longer enough to secure or defend any country. This was the lesson a shocked world was jolted to learn with the 9/11

192 Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 193 attack on the United States in 2001. Prior to this time, except, perhaps, with the use of an intercontinental ballistic missile primed to defy detection by the most sophisticated anti-missile asset of the US, a successful aerial attack on the US, a country that possesses a redoubtable air defence system, was difficult to imagine. Yet, over 3,000 lives, in addition to properties worth billions of dollars, were lost to an al- Qaeda terrorist attack that converted passenger aircrafts to bombs of sorts right within the US homeland. This attack was unconventional both in conception and execution. There were no noticeable movement of troops or arms and ammunition to any theatre of war that could have been intercepted. Until the moment of attack when the terrorists who had purchased their flight tickets and had boarded their respective passenger aircraft hijacked the planes and redirected them to the World Trade Centre, among other targets, nobody, except the terrorists and their sponsors, knew those planes would soon be deployed to cause deaths and destruction on a scale that could only be linked to war scenario bombing in the movies or anyone’s imagination. Worse still, that was just one out of many possible unconventional terrorist modes of attack, including suicide bombing. This development has underscored the point that real time intelligence holds the key to effectual counterterrorism strategy. Unless intelligence is available and used in real time to nip terrorist attacks and their horrendous consequences in the bud, possession of an intimidating fighting force with state-of-the-art arms and ammunition will not avail much. However, the intelligence required is not confined within the borders of any nation under the threat of terrorism. This is a threat that is cross-border in nature and, in fact, intercontinental in its reach. 9/11 was only executed in the United States but it was conceived and planned in Afghanistan by al- Qaeda, working in cahoots with the Taliban, thousands of miles away. In essence, the type of intelligence required to pre-empt al-Qaeda’s attacks by the United States is foreign in nature as al-Qaeda has its operational headquarters outside American shores. This situation then compels a special attention to what we may call Foreign Intelligence. Traditionally, typologies of intelligence are anchored on two distinctive features: sector and method. Sector has to do with the field of human endeavour about which intelligence is sought. This may range from security or defence to economy, politics to technology; hence, we are conversant with intelligence being qualified with such terms as security, defence, economic, political, and scientific/technological. Method is about the mode of intelligence collection: human intelligence (HUMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and of recent Strategic Spiritual Intelligence (SSI) as espoused by Nwolise (2009, 2012, 2013, 2016). It is indeed rare to find intelligence being categorised in terms of its location. But with the advent of global terrorism, this is a categorisation that is inevitable largely because intelligence on the motives, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and plans of a terrorist organisation with international networks cannot be obtained within one nation. Two broad strands of intel are needed: local and foreign. Thus, the basic question about intelligence collection in this era can be framed as follows: Is it locally collected or externally sourced? If it is local, it means it is obtained within the territorial jurisdiction of the government of a nation that utilises it and we may call it Local Intelligence (LOCINT). If, on the other hand, it is sourced from another nation or a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes Foreign Intelligence (FORINT). FORINT, if novel conceptually, has long been in engagement in praxis. In the Bible, when Moses sent spies to Jericho to spy out the land 194 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria against a planned invasion of the city, it was an exercise in FORINT gathering. Also, albeit bearing a different label, FORINT has been in the corpus of intelligence literature since classical times. Sun Tzu in the section of his classical masterwork, The Art of War, titled “The Use of Spies”, identifies five categories of human intelligence (HUMINT), namely: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. The second category – inward spies – refers to spies recruited from within the ranks of a rival nation’s officials, while the third category – converted spies or intelligence operatives of other nations, who, for reasons which may range from the pecuniary to the ideological, agree to be double agents for a rival nation. Both categories are recruited for the purpose of collecting and transmitting FORINT. There are at least three characteristics that distinguish FORINT from LOCINT, depending on the context. First, as we have earlier noted, is location: one is undertaken locally, and the latter abroad. This engenders the other features. Second, is illegality. In other words, intelligence collection in a foreign jurisdiction, albeit authorised by a government, is illegal inasmuch as it is undertaken secretly with the knowledge that the host government will criminalise the incursion in the event of exposure. In this regard, embassies constitute veritable hideouts of spies operating abroad under diplomatic cover as defence attaches, consular officers, ambassadors and so on. Third is the personnel. Whereas, LOCINT is, invariably, undertaken in all ramifications, from collection to utilisation, by the local intelligence personnel of the country in whose jurisdiction the intelligence is being sourced, FORINT can be undertaken either by intelligence operatives deployed into a foreign jurisdiction or by the personnel of a country from whose jurisdiction intelligence is needed. The latter instance could be the case through an intelligence cooperation between two nations or more. For example, Pakistan’s ISI could furnish America’s CIA with vital intelligence on the activities of an al-Qaeda cell domiciled in Pakistan and plotting against America’s interest. This then makes FORINT to be of two kinds. The type we have thus described, having three distinguishing characteristics – location, illegality, and personnel – which we may call Clandestine FORINT, and the one obtained through intelligence cooperation that could be labelled Cooperative FORINT, which does not share the characteristic of illegality with the former but does in terms of location because it is collected from a foreign territory and personnel; the collectors could be operatives of the host nation acting unilaterally or in concert with their counterparts from another nation which, perhaps, is allowed to participate because of their special skills or advanced technology. While global terrorism makes the collection of FORINT imperative for nations combating terrorism, we should not erroneously confine the importance of FORINT to counterterrorism. Its utility certainly goes beyond security or defence to encompass other pursuits a nation might construe as an element of its national interest, which has to be advanced in foreign jurisdictions. FORINT can be geared towards the protection or promotion of economic, political, scientific/ technological interests. It is a common refrain among development experts in the developing world that no country donates technology to another but rather the way to acquire technology is either through research and development (R and D) or by stealing same from advanced nations. Stealing technology from other nations is a form of FORINT collection. Having made this clarification, the scope of this article is FORINT in relation to combating global terrorism. The main problem for interrogation is ascertaining the extent of intelligence accessed Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 195 by nations engaged in the fight against global terrorism, having asserted at the outset that the key to effectual counterterrorism is access to intelligence in real time. In this connection, we proceed from the premise that FORINT is accessed clandestinely and through cooperation with foreign governments. The first salient question we pose is: how effective has been Clandestine FORINT by state actors in the fight against terrorism? Next we ask: how widespread and effective is Cooperative FORINT among nations fighting terrorism? And, finally, which is the most suitable option in counterterrorism? The rest of the article is divided into two sections. The first section furnishes a theoretical explanation that undergirds Clandestine FORINT and assesses the effectiveness of clandestine collection, while the second discusses the extent of the popularity and effectiveness of Cooperative FORINT in the fight against terrorism.

REALISM, CLANDESTINE FORINT AND COUNTER-TERRORISM OPERATIONS

Whereas, the United Nations Charter to which most nations are signatories enjoins the inviolability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of member nations of the world body, nations consciously and deliberately do cross their respective borders into the territories of sister nations to perpetrate acts that amount to violation of the letter and spirit of the Charter. One area that has become a recurring decimal in this regard is clandestine intelligence activities undertaken without approval by nations in one another’s jurisdiction. This fact underscores the mutual distrust and antagonism that persist among nations in an era when the United Nations, established in 1945 as an interactive forum among nations for the promotion of peace and security, is expected to eliminate the kind of communication disconnect that provided a fertile ground from which both the first and second world wars sprouted. The unrelenting pursuit of power, according to realists, is the factor responsible for clandestine intelligence. Power, for the realists, is the currency of international politics. The more power a nation has, the more secure it becomes and vice versa. Power remains a dominant quest for nations generally because there is no supra-national government to enforce such international laws as could guarantee a peaceful, war-free world. International laws can be broken by powerful nations and even smaller ones like Israel that enjoy the protection of a powerful nation – the United States. Israel for example has violated several UN resolutions on Palestine to no consequence, while the United States has invaded sovereign states like Panama, Iraq, and Vietnam without the imprimatur of the UN and without any sanction following save the usual denunciation by a couple of nations and the Secretary General of the United Nations. In this anarchic international system where might is right, realists are of the strong persuasion that the best defence of its sovereignty a nation could muster is power of such magnitude redoubtable enough to deter a potential adversary nation from attacking its interests. This is the position of those Mearsheimer (2006) has classified as Defensive Realists. On the other side of the pole are those he described as Offensive Realists. For this category of realists, a nation having the capacity to defend itself against external adversaries is not enough guarantee of security. In any case, what is considered enough to deter may suffer from error of miscalculation of one’s power on the one hand and the enemy’s on the other. A better approach therefore is to amass such power as would put one at an advantage in the event of an offensive engagement of an adversary. In other words, 196 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria it is better to err on the side of caution. The basis of the pursuit of power by nations is aptly summarised by Mearsheimer (2006) as follows:

…States can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to change it (status quo states). The problem, however, is that it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intentions with a high degree of certainty. Unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern…But even if one could determine another state’s intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is impossible to know who will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is not to say that states can be certain that their neighbours have or will have revisionist goals. Instead, the argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are dealing with a revisionist or status quo state.

What Mearsheimer did not add to his submission is the fact that nations do make serious attempts to unravel the intentions and capabilities of other nations in their quest for power. This is done through foreign intelligence. In fact, the fulcrum of the pursuit of power by competing nations is Clandestine FORINT. It is on the basis of such intelligence that a nation is able to have estimates of the military capabilities of rival nations and the intentions of their leaders as a prerequisite to acquiring such military capabilities as would dwarf the latter’s as well as thwart their hostile plots. This leads us to an interesting paradox. Clandestine FORINT - albeit illegal, immoral, and unacceptable by international law, as well as norms and mores of inter-state relations – is not strictly a covert endeavour anymore. The importance attached to it is such that nations overtly establish agencies for its collection. The table below furnishes a list of foreign intelligence agencies of nations we reckon to be the most powerful in their respective regions. Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 197

Table 1 Selected Forint Agencies

S/N REGION/ AGENCY SCOPE OF YEAR COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE FOUNDED North America 1. USA Central Intelligence Foreign 18 Sept. 1947 Agency (CIA) 2. Canada Intelligence Branch Local/ Foreign 1982 (Canadian Forces) 3. Mexico Centre for Research and Foreign 13 Feb. 1989 National Security South America 4. Brazil Brazilian Intelligence Local/Foreign 7 Dec. 1999 Agency 5. Argentina Federal Intelligence Local/Foreign 5 March 2015 Agency 6. Chile National Intelligence Local 2004 Agency Europe 7. Russia Foreign Intelligence Foreign Dec. 1991 Service (successor to KGB) 8. UK Secret Intelligence Service Foreign 1909 (SIS) or (MI6) 9. France Directorate-General for Foreign 2 April 1982 External Security (DGSE) Asia 10. China Ministry of State Security Foreign July 1983 (MSS) 11. India Research and Analysis Foreign 21 Sept. 1968 Wing (RAW) 12. Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Foreign 1 Jan. 1948 (ISI) Africa 13. Nigeria National intelligence Foreign 5 June 1986 Agency (NIA) 14. South Africa State Security Agency Local/Foreign 2009 15. Egypt General Intelligence Local/Foreign 1954 Directorate (GID) 198 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Middle East 16. Israel Mossad Foreign 13 Dec. 1949 17. Iran Ministry of Intelligence of Local/Foreign 18 August the Islamic Republic of 1984 Iran (VAJA) 18. Saudi Arabia General Intelligence Local/Foreign 1955 Presidency Australasia 19. Australia Australian Secret Foreign 1952 Intelligence Service (ASIS) 20. New Zealand New Zealand Security Local/ Foreign 1956 Intelligence Service 21. Papua New National Intelligence Local/Foreign 1984 Guinea Organisation (NIO)

Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_intelligence_agencies

The above table comprises extracts from an online database with 117 countries and their respective intelligence agencies. There are countries, like Cyprus, Tanzania and Qatar, that have just one intelligence agency listed for them while some, like India, US, and Iran have 23, 17, and 11 respectively. In this database, the listed intelligence agencies vary in scope, including those focused on local and foreign intelligence collection, and subject, ranging from those specialised in security intelligence to those whose mandate is strictly economic intelligence. What all these underscore is the point that intelligence activity is a global endeavour that involve small and great nations alike. Whereas, some limit their interest to LOCINT, perhaps, because they do not reckon themselves prone to external threats to warrant establishing a foreign intelligence agency or they simply lack the resources to do that, some have their interests straddling both the local and foreign environments. And, while some give dual mandates of local and foreign intelligence to one agency, others like the United States and Nigeria have established agencies specialised in foreign intelligence collection. It is possible that the database in view is not exhaustive. For purposes of effectiveness, the element of secrecy so crucial to clandestine operations may have impelled some nations to keep their foreign intelligence agencies away from public knowledge or, if their concern is limited to security, leaving Clandestine FORINT collection entirely to their military forces, which, normally, would have their respective intelligence units. Yet, it stands to reason that any agency that would undertake large scale foreign intelligence activities on a continuous basis like the MI6, the CIA, and the Mossad cannot be kept secret on account of their huge annual budgets, especially in liberal democratic systems where the legislature is involved in budget approvals. For example, the CIA, as of 2013, had an annual budget of Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 199

15 billion US dollars (BBC, 2013) while the MI6 in the financial year 2014-2015 had a budget of 2.6 billion British pounds (House of Commons, 2016). In spite of their existence being public or global knowledge, no FORINT agency operates openly. Their operatives hide their identity under a cover. In most cases, they are posted abroad to the embassies of their countries as diplomats. Using diplomatic cover for espionage not only affords intelligence operatives in foreign jurisdictions some measure of secrecy in their clandestine work, it also protects them from facing the sanctions of the laws of their host countries in the event of exposure because, as diplomats, they enjoy immunity. The worst treatment they are likely to get when caught in the act is expulsion to their home country. But there is a flip side to this. There is a pervasive and general assumption globally that diplomats are spies. Thus, every diplomat is a suspect in his host country. The degree of suspicion is invariably a function of the threat perception of a host country in relation to specific countries. It is this limitation of diplomatic cover that makes non- official covers attractive options or complement in foreign intelligence-gathering. In this regard, intelligence operatives can work in host countries as company executives, visiting scholars, students, tourists and so on. Inevitably, tracking suspected foreign spies has become an inseparable component of host countries’ intelligence preoccupation under the rubric of counter-intelligence. Of all the elements of national interests that a nation might want to promote or safeguard through Clandestine FORINT, protecting the homeland from terrorist attacks poses a unique challenge. The uniqueness lies in the fact that terrorists and terrorist organisations are non-state actors. Though, there have been allegations of state-sponsored terrorism, terrorism as a global security menace is trans- border and migratory. It does not have a fixed territory. Terrorism being a form of asymmetric warfare, requires incessant shifting of operational base. Tracking terrorists thus poses dual risks of apprehension by host nations that are not in the know of the purpose of intelligence-gathering by operatives of another nation and counter-intelligence actions of the terrorists being tracked. In essence, the “struggle for power”, to employ Morgenthau’s phrase, is no longer the exclusive preserve of states, non-state terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have joined the fray. Both al- Qaeda and ISIS share similar radical Islamic ideologies whose goal is the establishment of a Caliphate with trans-national authority, and the attainment of which is pursued through Jihad i.e. religious war. The Boko Haram Islamic sect that began its onslaught in Nigeria in 2010 is similarly disposed in terms of goal and method. Regardless of the fact that terrorists lack fixed territories, their nefarious activities have to be tracked in whatever foreign territories they may choose as their base of operation, even if it is temporary. Given this scenario, what then has been the state of Clandestine FORINT collection in aid of counterterrorism? We proceed by classifying tradecraft into two broad categories: technical and human or HUMINT. The former category is the latest obtrusive as, in most cases, its deployment does not require physical invasion of the territory of another nation. In this respect, geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is most common. GEOINT can be deployed by any country with satellites or drones specifically designed for intelligence collection. Usually, the collected intelligence begins with aerial images taken of military facilities, buildings, infrastructure, installations, human beings etc before they are subjected to processing and 200 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria analysis. In addition to this, other means of technical collection include ELINT, SIGINT, which entails wire-tapping. Since all these are deployed covertly it is difficult to discuss their effectiveness or otherwise. Same applies to HUMINT. Being all clandestine, it is not easy to even guesstimate the effectiveness of technical or human intelligence collections, let alone making an accurate assessment. Nevertheless, it is possible to extrapolate from developments that are in the public domain in major theatres of counterterrorism. Two countries will be interrogated on this score: Nigeria and the United States.

The Case of Nigeria Nigeria will be interrogated in relation to its fight against Boko Haram while the US will be juxtaposed with al-Qaeda. In Nigeria’s case, the war against Boko Haram terror began in 2010 but no significant success was recorded until 2016. The sect was able to transform its asymmetric warfare from terrorism to insurgency between 2010 and 2015 such that some major cities in the North Eastern zone of Nigeria were under its control. They included Gwoza (the location of the training college of Nigeria’s mobile police), Bama, Madagali and so on. Boko Haram’s resilience while confronted by the might of the Nigerian military that has a reputation globally as a highly effective force, whose role in the restoration of peace to countries embroiled in civil wars like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and so on has been decisive, is, among other factors, due to its cross-border reach. Its recruitment and training bases as well as sources of arms and encompass such contiguous neighbours of Nigeria as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The fact that the sect could not be defeated for five full years and, in fact, was able to seize parts of Nigeria’s territory was indicative of the failure of foreign intelligence-gathering. In other words, the Nigerian military appeared not to have been in possession of such intelligence as could enable it cut off the external lifelines of the sect in the areas of recruitment of fighters, their training, and arms procurement, among other logistics. On the other hand, even if it had such intelligence, it could not act on it by way of covert action that inevitably would entail crossing the Nigerian border into neighbouring countries to fight the terrorists. “Collaboration across borders had long been seen as key to ending Boko Haram insurgency, which started in Nigeria but has since spread through the country’s porous borders into neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon” (www.globalsecurity.org). It was against this background that upon his assumption of power as President and Commander-in-Chief of Nigerian armed forces on 29 May, 2015, Muhammadu Buhari’s immediate priority was negotiation of the creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) including troops from Nigeria and all its neighbouring countries, namely, Niger, Chad, Cameroun, and Benin Republic. The MJTF enabled Nigerian troops to cross the Nigerian border to fight the terrorists in concert with troops of allied nations, leading to the dislodgement of the terrorists from their territorial bases. A quick lesson to be drawn from this is that Clandestine FORINT on its own may be of no consequence if there is no enabling environment to act on it through covert action. In the Nigeria’s case, covert action would entail a full-scale war against the terrorist in other nations’ territories, which was not a feasible option as it would amount to an act of war against affected nations. It is then safe to conclude that Clandestine FORINT did not avail much in Nigeria’s Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 201 counterterrorism. The country has satellites in space but it is unclear if they were deployed towards intelligence-gathering against Boko Haram or towards any security purposes at all.

The Case of the United States The killing of al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden, by US Navy Seal 6 Unit offers a good case for the assessment of the superpower’s deployment of Clandestine FORINT in its war on terror. Both technical and human tradecraft were deployed in this instance. According to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Report (2012), the plot to apprehend Bin Laden in Abbottabad, a Pakistani town, actually began with intelligence picked by the CIA through the interception of a telephone call placed to a close lieutenant of Bin Laden called Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti. The CIA was able to use his phone number to track him to the compound in Abbottabad where he lived. The BBC report is worth quoting at length at this juncture as a section of it encapsulates the diversity of tradecraft deployed into apprehending Bin Laden:

US intelligence soon began an intensive period of surveillance. While satellites watched from the sky, a CIA safe house was set up nearby. From the safe house, agents were able to observe the comings and goings from the compound in order to establish a “pattern of life” at the building some details of how they tried to obtain key information about the building have emerged. Locals told the BBC that in the weeks leading up to the raid, people in “simple, plain clothes” knocked on doors in the neighbourhood posing as prospective buyers. They would admire the homes and ask for any architectural plans, saying that they wanted to build something similar. One of the men even went to Bin Laden’s compound, they said. The CIA also employed a sophisticated stealth drone that could float high about the compound without detection by the Pakistani authorities. With its distinctive bat-winged shape, the RQ170 sentinel is capable of flying undetected at high altitude taking photographs and sending real time video. The aircraft can also capture images shot at an angle. This has the advantage of not having to fly directly over its target.

The foregoing deployment of assortments of tradecraft set the prelude for covert action. Here we see a difference from the Nigerian effort which drew a line at the point where waging a war against Boko Haram on the territory of its neighbours seemed to be inevitable if its anti-terror campaign would be consequential. The US, in its determination to put Bin Laden out of action, launched a raid on his compound by its special forces that flew 192 kilometres into Pakistan from Afghanistan, killed the target and made away with his body, which they claimed was buried in the Islamic way sea-deep. Though the BBC report (2012) quoted a source as saying the Pakistani authorities were informed just as the raid was commencing and that explained why Pakistan’s airforce unscrambling of some of its fleet for defensive 202 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria attack was stood down, the description of the action as “an act of war” by the Pakistanis (Strange, 2013) made the claim of prior warning suspect. The critical issue here is that while Clandestine FORINT had recorded remarkable success in the US case, acting on it was bedevilled by the risk of what could have been a catastrophic counterintelligence action by the Pakistanis.

COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION In spite of the struggle for power among nations that remains a major basis for investment in FORINT, the global menace of terrorism has become a force compelling nations to move in the direction of intelligence cooperation. This represents a validation of the critics of realism who posit that complex interdependence exist among nations and just as nations compete for power, there are factors that impel them to cooperate (Keohane and Nye: 1977). Adapting this thesis to the issue of FORINT and counter-terrorism, cooperation is at multilateral and bilateral levels. Multilateral cooperation takes place among a group of nations with common adversaries in one or more terrorist organisations. Similarly, bilateral cooperation takes place between two nations that have common adversaries in one terrorist group or the other. While there are diverse multilateral platforms for intelligence cooperation, suffice it we cite four here. First is the International Police Organisation (INTERPOL) that was established on 7 September, 1923, in Lyon, France, to tackle crimes such as illegal trading in arms and narcotics that had similarly warranted inter-state security cooperation. While the INTERPOL has, over the years, tackled a wide range of trans-border crimes, it has lately accorded counter-terrorism a special focus. It has set up a Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centre (CTF) which investigates the organisational hierarchies, training, financing, methods and motives of terrorist groups (INTERPOL: 2017a). More important is the fact that INTERPOL collects, processes, and shares intelligence with member nations on terrorism and other threats:

INTERPOL circulates alerts and warnings on terrorists, dangerous criminals and weapons threats to police in member countries… Additionally, the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council Special notice is used to alert member countries to individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as listed by the 1267 Committee of the UN security council, and to help countries implement the freezing assets, travel bans and arms embargo…(INTERPOL: 2017b).

A second multilateral initiative towards intelligence sharing as part of counter-terrorism strategy similar to the INTERPOL’s was the launch of the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol in January 2016. A major stimulus towards this initiative was the attack on Charlie Hebdo newspaper in France in January 2015, which signalled the emergence of “a broader strategy of Jihadist terrorism and the so-called IS (Islamic State) in particular, to intimidate western countries with successive terror attacks across Europe” (www.europol.europe.eu). It is noted that “the function of the ECTC as a hub to exchange information, conduct analysis, and coordinate operational support is being exploited by EU member states and relevant third parties, indicating a significant trust and awareness across Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 203 national counter-terrorism authorities concerning Europol’s support services” (www.europol.europe.eu). The third is in Africa, a continent that has also suffered severely from terrorist groups – ranging from Al- Shabab to Boko Haram, jihadists of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) to al-Qaeda – where the Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa, under the auspices of the African Union (AU), has deemed it necessary to establish an organisation called Committee of Intelligence and Security Service in Africa (CISSA). The CISSA is mandated to discharge the following duties: • Strategic intelligence analysis on all threats (including terrorism) to peace and security on the continent; • Collection/acquisition, processing, analysis and transmission of intelligence through the Secretariat; • Facilitate capacity building interventions; • Harmonise approaches to common security threats (including terrorism); • Coordinate strategies to provide advice on appropriate course of action on matters within its mandate; • Promote the development of an African endogenous intelligence and security doctrine; • Any other function as may be assigned by the CISSA Conference. (cissau.org)

Currently 51 intelligence and security services are signatories to the Constitutive Memorandum of Understanding of CISS and, ipso facto, its members (cissau.org/members). Perhaps, it would not be incorrect to add the counter-terrorism efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) earlier mentioned as a fourth illustration of intelligence cooperation on a multilateral level. It is a known fact that intelligence gathering about the enemy is a crucial and constant element of military operations. Hence, we can reach the deduction that intelligence sharing among the troops of the five countries that made up the MJTF is a form of active FORINT-sharing in aid of a major counter- terrorism operation in West Africa. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Cooperative FORINT is indeed widespread. Out of 54 nations on the African continent only three are yet to join the CISSA. We have also seen a near continent- wide platform in Europe under the auspices of ECTC for Cooperative FORINT in aid of counterterrorism. Aside these are bilateral intelligence cooperation. The next question is: how effective are these platforms in relation to fighting terrorism? The point to note is that Cooperative FORINT is geared more towards preventive action than the offensive. A regime of intelligence-sharing pre-empts terrorist attacks. It is therefore difficult to be exact in measuring the level of effectiveness unless it is possible to have a catalogue of attacks that would have occurred but for Cooperative FORINT. But in terms of offensive action, again, the performance of the MJTF in West Africa is a testimony to the fact that when nations pull their intelligence resources together to fight terrorists, better outcomes are recorded. In the offensive campaigns of the MJTF, countries like the US, France and Britain have been supportive with their 204 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria intelligence expertise. The outcome has been the degrading of the Boko Haram sect (“Boko Haram Degraded”, 2017). At the bilateral level, the utility of Cooperative FORINT was underscored by the efforts the US made to preserve its intelligence cooperation with the UAE when the latter threatened to jettison the cooperation if some Americans were allowed to sue its government over the 9/11 attacks on the untenable allegation that its banks were complicit in the attack because they were the channels through which funds were channelled to the attackers (Malnick and Heighton, 2017). The US has intelligence cooperation with such countries as Pakistan, UAE, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Britain and so on.

CONCLUSION In the final analysis, owing to the dangers of possible exposure, Clandestine FORINT is not advisable as an option in combating terrorism except in cases where cooperating with authorities in whose territories FORINT is being sought is absolutely impossible. Cooperative FORINT is the best approach as it enables nations to pull their intelligence resources together to fight terrorists who are their common enemies rather than dissipate energy on infiltrating one another’s territories to obtain what can be done through negotiated cooperation in intelligence-sharing.

REFERENCES

“Boko Haram Degraded, FG Assures Global Community”, (Vanguard, 16 September, 2017). British Broadcasting Corporation (2012). “Osama Bin Laden: How it Happened”, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-south-asia-13257330 Committee of Intelligence and Security Service of Africa, cissau.org EUROPOL (2017). “Information Sharing on Counter-Terrorism in the EU has Reached an All-Time High”, Press Release, 30 January 2017, www.europol.europa.eu GlobalSecurity.org (2016). “Multinational Joint Task Force”,www.globalsecurity.org INTERPOL (2017a). “Counter-Terrorism Fusion Center”, www.interpol.int ———— (2017b) “Terrorism”, www.interpol.int Keohane, R.O. & Nye, J.S. (1997). “Interdependence in World Politics.” In Crane, G.T. & Amawi, A., The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A reader. New York: Oxford University Press. Malnick E. and Heighton L. (2017), “UAE warned US it could end intelligence cooperation over 9/11 victims claims”, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/21/uae-warned-us-could-end- intelligence-cooperation-911-victims/ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2006). “Structural Realism”, mearsheimer.uchicago.edu>pdfs Foreign Intelligence: Competition or Cooperation in the Face of Contemporary Asymmetric ... 205

Nwolise OBC (2009), “Peace and Security”, in Isaac Albert, Praxis of Political Concepts and Clichés in Nigeria Fourth Republic, Ibadan, Bookcraft. Nwolise OBC (2012), “Spiritual Dimensions of Human and National Security”, Ibadan, Faculty of the Social Sciences. Nwolise OBC (2013), Is Physical Security Alone Enough for the Survival, Progress, and Happiness of Man, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press. Nwolise OBC (2016), “Forensics and Human Security in Nigeria: The Place of Strategic Spiritual Intelligence”, Strategic Periscope, Ibadan, Exotic Dezines. Stange Hannah, (2013), “US Raid That Killed Bin Laden was an Act of War” says Pakistani Report”. The Telegraph (UK), July 9. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION, CRUDE OIL THEFT AND NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Anne U. Ibobo-Eze Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Abuja. and Chukwuemeka Jaja Nwanegbo Department of Political Science Federal University Wukari, Wukari Nigeria

ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the nature and scope of crude oil theft in Nigeria; identifies the political economy of crude oil theft in Nigeria; examines the significant impact of crude oil theft on Nigeria’s National Security and evaluates the intervention of EFCC in the areas of investigation, prosecution and obtaining conviction. Using expo-facto research design, with the random sampling method of data collection, the study finds that the little impact made by the EFCC in fighting crude oil theft are through effective collaboration and domestic cooperation with the other Law enforcement agencies. Secondly, that there is a significant relationship between crude oil theft and National Security as crude oil theft with negative impact on government generated revenue and resources, negatively affects peace and security in the Niger Delta and on the socio-economic status of the Nigerian state. The study also establishes that tackling crude oil theft must be accompanied by actions against other vices like money laundering, even though the delay/ineffectiveness of the judicial system in handling crude oil theft cases and lack of modern technological equipment serve as major challenges faced by the EFCC in their fight against crude oil theft in Nigeria. Key words: Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude oil theft, Nigeria’s National security. 206 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 207

INTRODUCTION Over the years, especially since the advent of the current civilian dispensation in 1999, records have shown that there are increases in crude oil production which do not show commensurate record with the official crude oil export and government generated revenue. Wilson (2014) explained that the disparity in the figure are sufficient proofs that not all the crude oil produced in the Niger Delta region are utilised and accounted for by the Nigerian State, and the inaccuracy in oil figure and revenue is as a result of oil theft in the region. Illegal oil bunkering has been identified as the main source of stealing crude oil in the region for both domestic and export consumption. Explaining further, Ayanruoh (2013) posits that Nigeria losses over $3.65 million annually to oil theft and that these activities are carried out at small scale level for the local markets and at larger scales involving international marketers through the excess lifting of crude oil beyond the licensed amount. Crude oil theft in the context of this paper means any activity relating to illicit tapping of crude oil from pipelines, barges, tankers by individuals or group through the form of illegal bunkering and pipeline vandalism which is usually done at the detriment of the nation. Economic crimes like oil theft, money laundering, illegal bunkering, and pipeline vandalism, are acts that threaten national security. Beyond challenging the security integrity of the country, they deny the country the use of a reasonable percentage of its revenue which derives majorly from oil with the enormous implication on the capacity of the state to fulfil its basic responsibilities and hence creating problems for governance. It also has direct effect on its budgetary implementation capacity and increases the cost of maintaining national security. Nigerian government, at one time or the other has made aggressive efforts to fight crude oil theft basically because of its negative impact on the country’s major source of revenue (crude oil). According to Boris, (2015:569): ... the successive Nigerian governments have undertaken some policy measures in response to tackling the menace of oil theft over the years. The government has equally sought to address escalating oil theft through the establishment of a special security outfit and mobilisation of the Niger Delta region, increased enforcement measures against the maritime trade in stolen oil which involved the Nigerian Navy being tasked with the responsibility for registration of vessels in Nigerian waters. Closing markets for illegal oil, a hotline for reporting oil theft, introduction of the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI), enforcement and public education efforts against artisanal refining and granting of amnesty to the Niger Delta militants. In order to put a stop to oil theft and illegal oil bunkering, the Nigerian government equally increased its military presence in the Niger Delta region in 2003; this culminated in the deployment of a Joint Task Force (JTF) in 2008. The JTF with the mandate to curb and possibly put an end to illegal oil bunkering in the oil-rich Niger Delta Region (Boris, 2015). As Social Action (2014) reports, in addressing illegal oil bunkering and artisanal refineries, government mainly takes action through the military Joint Task Force drawn from the Nigerian Army, Navy, Air force, Police, NSCDC and the State Security Service (SSS). The JTF is particularly concerned with ensuring the security of the area, including discouraging oil theft, illegal refining and tampering with pipelines. In the respective opinions of Ugwuanyi (2013) and Mernyi (2014), despite all the efforts of the Federal Government to curtail the illegal diversion of oil in the Niger Delta by increasing its security 208 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria spending in recent years and devoting millions of naira annually to hire private security firms as well as equipping men and officers of the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) and other law enforcement agencies, incessant destruction of pipelines and other oil facilities across the country as well as trade in stolen oil by criminal cartels with international connections have continued unabated. This must have informed Dalby’s (2014) position that the Nigerian economy is in a precarious situation (facing an economic emergency) unprecedented among the oil producers of the world and that something urgent needs to be done to reverse the ugly trend. Crude oil theft is a challenge that threatens the foundation of the Nigerian oil industry and national security. Some of the negative impact of crude oil theft on national security are government loss of revenue and resources; environmental degradation; insecurity; arms proliferation to mention a few. As Boris (2015) affirms, factors engendering the persistent thriving of oil theft activities in the Niger Delta include: poverty, ignorance, greed, lack of care for national economic survival, get-rich-quick syndrome, lack of gainful employment, exploitation of the loopholes in the criminal justice system to circumvent the law, evolving culture of impunity from the wrong perception that some people are above the law, weak institutional structure to checkmate criminals, malice and bad governance. Others are the high level of involvement of oil company representatives, oil foreign trade shippers, youths in the host community, top government officials, politicians, serving and retired security officers in crude oil theft trade. As Ufuoma and Omoruyi (2014) maintains, it is indeed only locales that cannot be involved in illegal oil bunkering as “militants, gangs, pirates” from the Niger Delta are directly involved” and that has the capacity to keep locals away. Crude oil theft is a form of economic crime of which the typology of crimes fall mainly under EFCC mandate and to some extent other conventional law enforcement agencies (LEAs) as their functions range from investigation, prosecution, and raising awareness and consciousness of the populist to these economic crimes. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), an anti-graft agency created in 2003 has the responsibility of prevention, investigation and prosecution of economic and financial crimes (EFCC Annual Report, 2013). The Commission is also empowered to cause investigation to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body, or organisation has committed any offence under the act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes under Section 7 Subsection 1 (a) of the EFCC Establishment Act 2004. The EFCC intervention on crude oil theft is therefore in line with the Commission’s mandate to ensure that any person(s) or group involved in any form of economic sabotage (including crude oil theft) are properly investigated and prosecuted. Its duties span through very many fronts that bother on or that affect the integrity of government or state business and or challenges national security. National security on the other hand is a nation’s effort to protect and preserve the State, its institutions and well-being of its citizens. This connotes deliberate measures to identify and ward off perceived, potential and real threat to the nation-state (Jonah, 2010). In the context of this paper, national security could be understood to mean the ability of the nation-state to protect and preserve its resources, dominant of which in Nigeria comes from oil resources. Understanding the configuration of Nigerian economy, it can be seen that whatever threatens the country’s oil activities or oil revenue is indeed at the nerve of the country’s existence and survival. Hence, it is a national security matter. Matter of do or die. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 209

Bearing in mind the enormity of the challenges the Federal Government is having in restraining crude oil theft and being aware of the overt fight by the military and other paramilitary bodies which have still not taken the fight to good end, and being aware of the mandates of EFCC in such fight against economic sabotage; this study commits itself to finding out the extent the EFCC activities have contributed in the whole fight against crude oil theft in Nigeria. It seeks to find out if EFCC has been able to record some measure of success, despite the multifarious challenges bedevilling the oil sector. This paper focuses on crude oil theft (in the area of illegal oil bunkering and pipeline vandalism) in Nigeria and its implication for national security, evaluating the intervention processes of the EFCC within the period of 2010-2015. Only the statistics of cases prosecuted and conviction obtained are included in this study, cases that were withdrawn out of court or EFCC investigation are not part of the work due to inability to access the data. For ease of presentation and understanding, this paper is divided into five parts. Part one is this introduction, part two focuses on the conceptual and theoretical discourses. Part three explains the methods employed in annexing and analysing data for the work. Part four discusses data presentation, analysis and interpretation. Part five contains the summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE

Crude oil theft is the act of stealing Crude. It takes from the general meaning of theft, which is the action or crime of stealing. Crude oil theft encompasses any activity relating to the theft or sabotage of crude oil in form of illegal bunkering and pipeline vandalism. Bunkering on the other hand is the transference of crude oil from one tanker/ship to another with legal government licensed document/approval. Illegal oil bunkering is a form of crude oil theft that involves the direct tapping/transferring of crude oil product either from pipelines or tanker/ship without a licensed document/approval from the Government regulatory body. As the Nigerian Navy (2013) posits, though oil bunkering is a necessity for maritime shipping within the maritime sector, it becomes an illegal oil bunkering when it is carried out without requisite statutory licenses or valid documents, or in violation of the Nigerian Maritime Sector and the guidelines made by the statutory institutions regarding it. While crude oil theft has been a delicate crime all over the world, it is easy to perpetrate in the Niger Delta because different actors have special roles to play at several levels of its operation. While the small-scale level is coordinated by the restive youths (both former and current militants) and security forces, the larger-scale cannot be successful without the high involvement of top government officials, politician’s and international cartels to mention a few. This must have informed the Social Action (2014)’s statement that crude oil theft is being carried out: first, on large scale by syndicates connected to the highest level of officials in transnational oil companies, government establishments and security agencies; and second, through illegal bunkering involving, lifting or siphoning of crude oil without valid license issued by the Nigerian Federal Government. Omoyibo (2014) posit that there is likelihood that illegal oil bunkering is conveniently the most profitable private business in present-day Nigeria. Of all the challenges of crude oil bunkering, the greatest of the worries should be on the implication 210 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria of the act to national security. This is because of the level of concern any one should have about its security and indeed the different but serious attentions that nation states have shown on anything that threatens its existence as a corporate existence. While the word security means the total protection of individual/group in every aspect of life and endeavour, the basis upon which nation-states exist, national security is the totality of measures put in place by a nation-state to protect and preserve its citizens and resources (including crude oil, etc) from harm and all forms of defencelessness. As Shinkaiye (2004) states, security means the sum total of actions and measures, including legislative and operational procedures, adopted to ensure peace, stability, and general well-being of a nation and its citizens. This indicates that indeed, security is a very vast concept but limited to certain activities. Perhaps what distinguishes national security is the focus and particular concern of the security and what is achievable there from. This probably informs the confirmation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) that national security is the safekeeping of a nation that entails both national defence and the protection of a series of geopolitical, economic, and other interests. National security in a short but deep manner is the protection and preservation of territory, sovereignty, and stability of a country from threats. It means that National security can and does exist in two domains; the internal and the external security. The internal security of a country is affected from within by a considerable number of political, economic, and social factors like political strives, the state of the economy, intra and inter-ethnic animosities, the conduct of government affairs, the issue of resource allocation and management, all acts on the equilibrium of the state, while the external domain has to do with how the country’s security is affected by its foreign policy and the nature of the geo-political circumstances surrounding it. In his explanation, Alemika (2015) rightly identifies, as the prerequisites for sustainable national security:

democratic governance (social democratic countries are more secured than liberal democratic systems), strong and accountable government, public services, cohesive communities in territorial and associational dimension governed by democratic principles, personal security and public order (armed forces, intelligence agencies safety regulations agencies), economic security, social security (agencies responsible for ensuring access to adequate food, health care, shelter, education, water etc) and political security (human rights enforcement agencies, credible electoral management bodies, democratic electoral system and process, efficient judiciary).

National security is an ensemble of two broad focal elements: state security and human security, which entails the preservation of the safety of (Nigerian) citizens, at home and abroad, the protection of the sovereignty of the country and the integrity of its assets. Mbachu & Eze (2009:7) reiterates that there are more realistic and comprehensive approach to national security, which includes economic strength, internal cohesion, and technological ability. Drawing from above, whatever hinders any of the country’s economic conditions or distorts its internal cohesion, even hinders its potential for advancement or tries to disorganise the ability of the country to solve its problems through innate capacity (technology) affects the country’s national security. What it implies is that the economic sabotage of crude oil theft that costs The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 211 the country huge loss in oil revenue (even with oil as the major contributor to the country’s economy) is a major threat to national security. As has been established, its implication to national security can be outlined as follows: a. Environmental degradation/impact Among the many factors responsible for the degradation of the environment, include oil spillage resulting from oil theft especially the hacking of pipelines and the activities of illegal refineries, which is responsible for the uncontrolled emission of carbon into the atmosphere. The entire process generates huge oil spills and waste, dumped in the environment. It is estimated that in illegal oil refining, only 30% of the refined oil is recovered, while the remaining 70% is spilled in the environment (Assi, Amah & Edeke, 2016). Oil spills result in Ground Water Poisoning, destruction of agricultural land, fishery and livestock and fast disappearing mangrove forests (Nigerian Navy, 2013). As Onuoha (2012) conceives that acts of vandalising oil pipelines and illegal refining of crude oil are as hazardous as they are illegal. Explosions from the illegal activities have often resulted in the loss of lives, fracturing family ties, and destroying the local environment. Ogbeni (2012) opines that the brazen destruction of illegal refineries by the JTF also adds to the level of environmental degradation. It has led to massive crude oil spillages and pollutions in the region, destroying host communities farm lands, vegetation, polluting rivers and thus destroying the people’s means of livelihood (see also Wilson, 2014). b. Loss of human and material resources Many persons and groups of people benefit from the activities and proceeds of the oil theft in the region. Also too, many are affected by the activities in the illegal operation. This includes both the actors and non-actors, even as many (including individuals and the state) suffer losses from the oil theft. People lost their lives and properties worth fortunes to oil theft activities, either during a gun battle between a host community youths militants and state security agents while siphoning the crude oil from the oil pipelines and well heads, or in a fire disaster during the local refinery work by the local criminals. Casualties include the militants, the youths, the properties of the natives of the host communities, security agents, and oil company personnel and installation (see Wilson, 2014). c. Decrease in Nigerian oil revenue Oil theft results in heavy loss of revenue to the country. As captured in the “informed” press release of Nigerian former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani Allison-Madueke, Nigeria loses 180,000 barrels of crude oil per day, valued at $7 billion yearly due to oil theft activities in the region (Mernyi, 2014). Others have also explained the depth of losses of revenue and effect of crude oil theft in Nigerian economy (see Dalby, 2015; Onoja, 2013; Nigeria Navy, 2013; Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala in Premium Times, 2012, etc). In addition to that, the country loses a huge amount of resources on provision of security to the oil facilities. According to Nasir Imodage, Nigeria has lost over #8billion on providing security for oil personnel and installations, and environmental clean-up arising from oil theft activities in the Niger Delta region between 2009 and 2012. d. Arms proliferation Crude oil theft has been the major cause of violent conflict in the Niger Delta. As a result, small and 212 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria heavy arms are proliferated thereby compounding the state of insecurity in the region; leading to kidnapping, hostage taking, etc (Assi, Katsouris, and Sayne, 2013). It has been established that most oil thieves exchange crude oil for heavy arms at the high sea, while others use the proceed to import sophisticated arms into the regions, with the principal aim of using the arms for attacks and counter attacks from any gang or groups and military or security agents (Amah, & Edeke, 2016) to enable them remain in the business. As Onuoha (2012) reported, proceeds from illegal bunkering have enabled militants operating in the Niger Delta to procure weapons that are more sophisticated, technological gadgets and speedboats. In turn, this has helped the militants to expand their range of attacks on security personnel and critical offshore energy infrastructure. e. Threat to national and regional peace and security As Wilson (2014) explained, larger part of oil theft is carried out in high seas and oil export terminals, and this has increased the activities of the sea pirates in the sub-region. The sea pirates serve dual purposes, as they are on one hand used as non-state security agents to secure oil vessels carrying illegal crude oil, and on the other hand used as agent to offshore oil workers and attack oil vessels carrying legitimate crude oil along the high sea with the aim of stealing the oil. In their opinion, the sea pirates benefit from oil theft, bridge free movement of goods and services in the sub-region, and escalate violence as they attack and are attacked by state security agents. This violence perpetuated by oil theft actors and sea pirates is threatening the peace and security of the West African states, particularly those along the coastal areas, where the oil vessels pass through to Europe, America, and Asia. f. Socio-economic implications Crude oil theft and militancy constitute major inhibitors to the socio-economic development of Nigeria and the Niger Delta. As a result the responsibility towards the area has been largely neglected by administrations, organisations and companies. Another worrisome trend is the increasing percentages of school aged children who are denied access to formal education and aspiration by the various militant groups who see them as potential recruits for their illegal trade thus initiating them into a criminal lifestyle characterised by violence and restiveness, teenage parenthood and anti-societal tendencies (Nigerian Navy, 2013). All the above listed vices convincingly constitute challenges to national security. Hence, the contribution of EFCC in the fight is seen as a contribution towards national security. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DISCOURSE A number of theories have been developed by scholars in the explanation of criminal act of concurrent crude oil theft and its negative impact on national security in Nigeria. For the purpose of this study, the Queer Ladder Theory (QLT) is adopted. The Queer Ladder Theory was influenced by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1919-2011), who coined the idea of “queer ladder” in an attempt to explain the functional significance of organised crime as a desperate tactic for socio-economic empowerment and social climbing. This analytical construct has since fertilised into a popular theoretical framework widely used in contemporary crime studies (Assi, Amah & Edeke, 2016). The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 213

The Queer Ladder Theory has three basic assumptions: i. Organised crime is an instrumental behaviour/practice; it is a means to an end. ii. It is an instrument of social climbing, fame and socio-economic advancement. iii. It is a means to accumulate wealth and build power (Mallory, 2007).

The QLT assumes that organised crime thrives in context where the government’s capacity to dictate and sanction abnormality and crime is poor, where public corruption is endemic and where legitimate livelihood opportunities are slim (Nwoye, 2000; Lyman, 2007). Under these circumstances, the incentive to indulge in life of crime is high, while deterrence from criminal living is low (Okoli, Chukwuma and Orinya, 2013). The Queer Ladder theory helps us to locate the occurrence of illegitimate act and organised and other forms of criminality in Niger Delta to poverty, unemployment, corruption more so, to the weakness in the capacity of the government and its security agencies to track them because of some other complex web of activities that vitiates the effort. Most established of them being the sabotage to the effort by the officers of the state themselves and the greed to multiply acquisition of wealth and power. This is rooted in weak socio-political culture in the society. Owing to this, it is noted that incidence of crude oil theft as it affects national security has been driven by rat race for material enlargement at the detriment of the development and well being of the people of Niger Delta and Nigeria as a nation. Those in government support others in the cabal outside the system to make wealth. Worst still, they collaborate. Otherwise, how do we explain the government action of handing over security of the oil installations in the Niger- Delta region to militant warlords or “ex-militants” as they refer to them, who themselves run the cartel for oil theft. This has been made worse by the prevailing socio-economic depression and related livelihood crisis in the region. The notion of “ladder” in Queer Ladder theory signifies social climbing or mobility. The aggrieved and deprived people of the region results to illegal oil bunkering/vandalism etc as warmly called in order to advance their socio-economic status in the society prevalent with palpable poverty. Hence, those who take to crude oil theft as a means of social climbing (mobility) are thought to be toeing the awkward, unconventional (queer) path and government is unable to curb the situation. The adoption of this theory for this study is informed by its analytical utility in providing insights into the sociological foundations of organised crime in developing nations like Nigeria. This study employed the positivist research approach, which lays emphasis on measurement and evaluation of phenomena to arrive at rational explanation for such phenomenon. Thus, based on numerical strength, the approach applied attempted establishing causal links and relationships between the different elements (or variables) of the subject in this study, and as well, relate them to theories, its applicability and practices. The study was an expo-facto research as it is an “… investigation of possible cause and effect relationship by observing existing state of affairs and researching back in time for plausible causal factors” (Mangal, & Mangal, 2015:143). Primary and secondary methods of data collection were used. Primary data was generated through observation, questionnaire, and site visits. Secondary data, on the other 214 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria hand, were derived from academic literatures, published local and international journals; materials received from the EFCC archive, other LEA such as the NSCDC, JTF as well as internet sources. The study mainly covers the activities of EFCC with an extension to the support advancing activities of National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). The study thus revolved around EFCC and NSCDC office in Abuja and Port Harcourt. More attention was focused on the investigators and prosecutors at the EFCC operation and legal sections who are more directly involved in handling the cases, Directorate of Legal and Prosecution, as well as the operatives at the NSCDC Oil and Gas Department (OGD) and its Legal department (LD). The population of EFCC staff is 1,989. This population is distributed among its operations, Legal and Prosecutions, Administration and Public Enlightenment Directorate, departments scattered around the two geographical locations (Port Harcourt and Abuja). The focus populations are the senior and junior staff of EFCC and NSCDC. Numerically, distribution of EFCC in terms of management, senior and junior cadres from EFCC Annual Report, (2013) are as follows: management level 39; senior cadre 1,165 and junior cadre 785. The sample size drawn for the study population was 120 samples using random sampling selection from the total population. In determining an appropriate sample size for this study, the study took into consideration the importance of representativeness, accuracy, and precision. Structured questionnaire, applying linked scale method were used to collect the primary data. This questionnaire was subjected to rigorous peer review to raise its reliability and validity before deployment and administered to the samples drawn from the study population. The collected data were statistically analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. THE EFCC AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CRUDE OIL THEFT: CONTEXT AND CHALLENGES A study of the EFCC Act reveals that the commission is empowered to investigate, prevent, detect, arrest, and prosecute persons alleged to have indulged in corrupt practices and most importantly, coordinate the activities of other agencies charged with the responsibility of fighting corruption and economic crimes (Zabadi and Sampson, 2009). Under an amendment to its enabling law passed in 2004, EFCC is mandated to investigate and prosecute matters such as Advanced Free Fraud, money laundering, embezzlement, tax evasion or fraud, illegal oil bunkering, illegal arms dealing, illegal mining, counterfeiting, illegal charge and transfers, future market fraud, bank fraud, foreign exchange malpractices, computer credit card fraud, all cybercrimes, contract scam and terrorism. The key responsibilities of the commission under section 6 and 7 of the Establishment Act are as follows: Section 6(c) coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions conferred on any other person or authority; 6(h) the examination and investigation of all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups involved; 6(m) taking charge of, supervising, controlling, coordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to current investigation The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 215

and prosecution of all offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes; 7(a) Cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organisation has committed any offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes 7(b) Cause investigations to be conducted into the properties of any person if it appears to the commission that the person’s lifestyle and extent of the properties are not justified by his source of income. (see EFCC Zero Tolerance, 2008; Social Action, 2014; The EFCC Annual Report, 2013). Specifically, Section 7 subsection 2a-f of the Establishment Act 2004, charged the Commission with the responsibility of enforcing the provisions of 2(a) The Money Laundering Act 2004; 2003 No. 7 1995 No. 13 (b) and host of other offences related to economic and financial crimes, including the criminal code of penal code. According to the EFCC Annual Report (2013), the commission has not been fighting the war alone. It states inter alia;

We have continued to benefit from the collaborative efforts of our partners in the public and private sectors, locally and internationally. The spirit of collaboration is reflected on our partnerships with the Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria Customs Service, the Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Corporate Affairs Commission, the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Department of State Services, the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, the Central Bank of Nigeria, the Security and Exchange Commission, the Banking Sector, and other private sector.

Even at this, a lot of challenges are still faced by the Commission in performing its own functions towards fighting the crude oil theft in Niger-Delta. Primary among them is that the volatile nature of the Niger Delta region makes it difficult for EFCC operatives to visit the scene of the crimes. This is in addition to the threats EFCC operative receive from the militants that are into illegal bunkering in the area (see EFCC Zero Tolerance, 2008). Bureaucratic bottlenecks in the oil companies (delay in replying to letters) is also a vital challenge that affects investigations and some of the arresting officers especially from oil companies that shy away from coming to testify in court matters, thereby restraining the successful prosecution of a case in court (ibid). While Social Action (2014) submits that despite the fact that the EFCC is required to collaborate with key society and industry stakeholders to curb artisanal mining and illegal crude oil bunkering all of which come under the rubric of economic sabotage, duplicity and lack of efficient coordination in the enforcement functions among state agencies also make effective collaboration difficult to attain. Legal bottlenecks which ensure that arrests, especially those connected to powerful sponsors operating behind the scenes, did not achieve legal accountability. Social Action (2014) reiterates that the entire political and social infrastructure of production in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region aids and abets corruption, crude oil theft and artisanal crude oil refining in the region due to lack of effective law enforcement and weak regulatory framework which incentivises corruption and large- 216 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria scale resource theft. Criminal activities thrive as their perpetrators realise they are unlikely to face legal retribution for their actions. As the international spotlight beams on Nigeria due to the various activities of crude oil theft and illegal bunkering, as government faces the challenge of protecting its credibility and reputation. The illegal activities and coercive operations against them have the potentials of threatening Foreign Direct Investment into the various sectors of the economy (Asuni, 2009; Uwotu, 2013).

Data Presentation, Analysis and Interpretation Aggregate issue Response Analysis This section elicits responses on specific issues concerning the activities of the EFCC in relation to other LEAs in the fight against crude oil theft. This section has 16 questions (Q) in all. Q1 – 4 investigates the methods employed by EFCC in the fight against crude oil theft. Q5 – 8 evaluates various crude oil theft threats to National Security. Q9 – 12 examines the extent to which EFCC activities have reduced crude oil theft in Nigeria and Q13 – 16 ascertains the challenges recorded by EFCC in the fight against crude oil theft. Responses were structured along Likert format. Table 5 in the appendix shows the summary of the responses on the sixty-three questionnaire that returned from the field survey conducted. Along the line of our objective in this paper, the analysis centres on four main issues which are also mirrored in section B of the questionnaire as stated earlier. While the first showed the method of fighting crude oil theft by basically other LEAs including of course EFCC, the second section looked at the identified implication of the crude oil theft to national security. The third part of the analysis centres on the critical assessment of the activities of EFCC and its impact on the reduction of otherwise of crude oil theft. Challenges faced by EFCC in the fight were subjected to test in part four of the analysis.

Methodology of Fighting Crude Oil Theft Essentially, the study identified and focused on four methods used by EFCC in the fight against crude oil theft. These range from employing the EFCC Establishment Acts 2004, collaborative efforts of EFCC with LEAs, diligent investigation and prosecution as well as the use of modern technology. The EFCC Establishment Act 2004 in Section 6 states that the commission shall be responsible for: 6(h) the examination and investigation of all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups involved; 6(m) taking charge of, supervising, controlling, coordinating all the responsibilities, functions and activities relating to current investigation and prosecution of all offences connected with or relating to economic and financial crimes. Furthermore, Section 7 subsections 1(a) states that the commission has power to: cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organisation who has committed any offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes. It is on the provision of this Act that EFCC relies on to fight against crude oil theft in Nigeria. Understanding the nature of the activities of the cartels that run the illegal oil businesses in the Niger Delta and the makeup of staff of EFCC, it could be seen that the kind of face-off that would be involved in controlling them cannot be fought overtly by the The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 217

EFCC. It becomes potent for EFCC to engage in collaborative exercises with other LEAs in order to make the needed impact. The functioning of that activity was attested to by the respondents. A total of 56 (88.89%) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that EFCC collaborative methods with other LEAs in the fight against crude oil theft assists the commission to achieve significant result. However, 5 (7.94%) fairly agree, as a simple minority of 2 (3.17%) respondents disagree with the above assertion. Figure 1 below represents a bar chart of the above-interpreted data of the respondent’s responses on percentage bases on the methods employed by EFCC in fighting crude oil theft. It was noted further that in spite of its shortcomings, the method of diligent investigation and prosecution of cases have yielded positive result in the EFCC fight against crude oil theft. 31(49.2%) agreed and strongly agreed with the question, 26 (41.3%) were biased or fairly agreed while, 6 (9.5%) disagreed and strongly disagreed. Theft is a traditional crime, but crude oil theft is a modern crime and should be fought with relevant modern technological intelligence gadgets/tool to win the war (EFCC Annual Report, 2013). Bearing in mind the calibre of persons (top government officials, politicians, oil trade shippers, bankers, both retired and serving security operative and so on) involved in the trade, the struggle is a tough one and need to be fought, properly equipped. In spite of this, it was observed that the commission and even the

Figure 1: Methods employed by the EFCC in the fight against crude oil theft 218 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria collaborative agencies are barely equipped to fight the war. The case is widely acknowledged by the operatives themselves in their responses to the question on the preparedness of the commission to do the work. As can be seen in the Table 5 in the appendix, EFCC operatives are adequately equipped with modern technology to fight crude oil related cases. 16 (25.4%) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed to this; 26 (41.27%) fairly agreed while 21(33.33%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with this assertion that the EFCC is properly equipped. Table 1 below shows clearly, the main actors and their roles in crude oil theft activities in Nigeria.

Table 1 Actors and their roles

S/No Main actors Nationality (Alleged) roles and activities

1. Militant leaders Mainly Niger Delimit or control territories for Deltans cold/hot-tapping into oil pipes

2. Youths (especially Mainly Niger Tap into pipes to steal oil as well as former militants) Deltans escort oil barges to the high seas

3. Shipping Lines Mainly Provide ships for the transportation foreigners of stolen oil conveyed in barges to

the high seas or destination of sale 4. State Security Mainly Collect ‘passage fees’ to allow forces Nigerians militants and other oil cartels to siphon oil. 5. Government/NNPC Mainly Forge official receipts and officials Nigerians documents for lifting oil illegally, and provide skills on hot-tapping

into bunkers 6. International Mainly Provide arms or money to oil cartels foreigners thieves in exchange for stolen oil, and sell the stolen oil on the

international market or in the destination state 7. Politicians Nigerians Provide militant leaders and other bunkers political coverage from

prosecution when apprehended

Source: Research Summary (Onuoha, 2012:15) The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 219

Crude Oil Theft and National Security From all manner of aggregations, crude oil theft was accepted as constituting a major threat to national security. As earlier alluded to in the literature, crude oil theft is a big programme to the security of Nigerian nation. From the informed responses of the population surveyed, it was a major basis of money laundering in Nigeria and of course, cannot be won without tackling organised crime like money laundering. There is a strong connection between crude oil theft and acquisition of assets by oil thieves. It has a negative impact on government generated revenue. To establish the level of agreement to the above assertion, none of the respondents disagreed to the question on whether it impacts negatively on government revenue. While 52 (82.54%) agreed and strongly agreed that crude oil theft has negative impact on government generated revenue 11 (17.46%) fairly agreed. Perhaps, one of the most affected places is the socio-economic situation of the Niger Delta region and Nigeria in general. Figures 2 and 3 below clearly present the negative implications of oil theft to the country’s socio-economic situation through the losses incurred on other crude oil product and revenue from 2006 – 2013.

Figure 2: Cash equivalent of other petroleum products lost from 2006 – 2013 220 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Source: International Institute for Petroleum, Energy Law and Policy (IIPELP)

Figure 3: Cash equivalent of crude oil lost from 2006 – 2013

Taking from the above, it could be inferred that the activities of oil theft has very negative impact on some fundamental attributes of national security, especially in the country’s capacity to sustain its revenue. As contained in Table 2 and Figure 4 below, the implication of these are quite obvious corroborating with the basis of national security defined by Federal Republic of Nigeria (2006) as the safekeeping of a nation that entails both national defence and the protection of a series of geopolitical, economic, and other interests. Crude oil theft negatively affects the economic interest of the country and hence bother on national security; the security of the country. Table 2 below highlights some of the negative effects of oil theft to Nigerian National Security. Table 2: Negative implications of Nigerian oil theft on National Security IMPLICATIONS NIGERIAN OIL THEFT

Value of the oil The estimated annual value of oil stolen from Nigeria is between $3 billion and $8 theft billion.

Direct casualties There has been an estimated 1,000 deaths each year as a result of conflict in the Niger Delta Region – though not all of these would be directly related to oil theft.

Public cost of oil The Nigerian Government was estimated to have lost revenue worth several billions theft of dollars. The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation spent $2.3 billion on pipeline security and repairs from 2010 - 2012. Environmental cost As a result of oil theft in the Niger Delta Region, there have been pollution of water and soil which also have secondary impacts on human health, livelihoods, food and food stuffs Source: Assi V.E, Amah O.I. & Edeke S.O. (2016:74) The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 221

Figure 4 below represents a bar chart of the above-interpreted data of the respondent’s responses on percentage bases on the negative impacts of crude oil theft on national security.

Source: Compiled by the researchers from field survey. Figure 4: Negative impact of crude oil theft on national security

EFCC’s Activities and Reduction in Crude Oil Theft Perhaps, the area where the functioning of EFCC and its activities has been felt most is in providing additional impetus to the commission’s activities by the activities of other LEAs operating in the Niger- Delta. Considering the inhibitions on the commission, it makes valid contributions through its investigation and prosecutions and through that strengthening the hands of the other agencies involved in enforcement. The operatives sampled attested to that in their responses (see Table 5 in the appendix). If not for any other thing, it has increased domestic cooperation among LEAs in the Niger Delta and with such cooperation, the performance of those other agencies have been appreciable, even though it is equally dwindling. Such manifest successes of the cooperation as attested to by the operatives and even some of the NSCDC interacted with was attributed to the information extracted by the agencies working together and from suspects during some EFCC operations in the crude oil theft activities. 222 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Whereas Figure 5 below represents a bar chart of the above-interpreted data of the respondent’s opinion on percentage bases on EFCC activities and reduction in crude oil theft, Table 3 below, shows a summary report of the NSCDC anti-vandalism and bunkering activities (oil pipelines/gas Installations) in Nigeria from 2010-Jan 2016.

Source: Compiled by the researcher from field survey.

Figure 5: The EFCC Activities and Reduction in Crude Oil Theft

The success and accomplishment of high number of illegal refineries destroyed, boats and barges seized on anti-vandalism and bunkering activities was achieved even though through NSCDCs effectiveness, but more so, through domestic cooperation (sharing of intelligence, information trading and so on) with the Joint Task Force (JTF) and other LEAs. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 223

Table 3 Report on NSCDC Anti-vandalism and Anti-bunkering activities (pipeline and gas installation) in Nigeria 2010 – Jan 2016

JAN. 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total Number of Arrests 150 225 1069 1062 693 641 186 Total number of Prosecution 123 200 1020 1020 634 634 161 Total number of Convicted 27 25 49 42 3 7 25 Total number of Vehicles/ Trucks/Motorcycles recovered 245 130 240 96 177 262 45 Total number of illegal Refineries destroyed 245 256 305 43 364 391 69 Total number of Drums of PMS/AGO 2500 6500 8500 2323 1387 7038 5348 Total number of Kegs of PMS/AGO 3000 6200 10200 72534 1635 2296 6361 Total number of Boats recovered 15 10 62 105 129 242 24 Total number of Barges recovered 6 5 13 26 8 127 3 Total number of Tanks (AGO/PMS) 95 5072 695 69 Total number of AGO in (Litres) Recovered 821220 1142060 98665 Total number of PMS in (Litres) Recovered 326000 181000 99000 Total number of Litres of Kerosene recovered 45000 45000 45000 1250 1250 Total number of Kegs of Kerosene recovered 50 221 Drums of crude oil recovered 12 Crude oil in litres recovered 156000 435000 Cash Recovered 400000 602050

Total number of empty drums recovered 36000 2064 297 Total number of Vessels Recovered 4 3 Total number of Empty Tanks recovered 26 86

Source: Derived by the researcher from NSCDC Headquarters Abuja. 224 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Figures 6 and 7 below show the bar chart summary of the total number of illegal refineries destroyed, as well as boats and barges seized between 2010-Jan 2016 by NSCDC.

Total number of illegal Refinaries destroyed

Source: NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja

Figure 6: Total number of illegal refineries destroyed from 2014- Jan 2016 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 225

Total Number of Boats and Barges Seized

Source: NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja

Figure 7: Total number of boats and barges seized from 2010 – Jan 2016

EFCC’s Challenges in Fighting Crude Oil Theft EFCC intervention processes on crude oil theft appear not to have recorded the expected successes from 2010 – 2015 and this is rooted in the fact that a lot of factors combine to work against the Commissions operation on the crude oil theft war. Primary among them is the ineffectiveness of the Nigerian judicial system in the handling of crude oil theft cases. The non-supportive posture of the judiciary has commensurate effects on almost all agencies involved in arrest and prosecution, especially EFCC and NSCDC. The consequence is that the fear of repercussion is taking away from the actors strengthening up the activities of the crude oil thieves and weakening the security operations and operates. The responses of the respondents on the delay from the judiciary in attending to Crude oil theft cases correlates with figure 8 and 9 analyses below. Figure 8 shows the ineffectiveness of the judiciary from the disparity in the number of arrests, prosecution, and judgments secured in oil theft cases by NSCDC from 2010-Jan 2016 as follows: Total no. of arrests = 4,026, total no. of prosecution (filed court cases) = 3,792, total no. of conviction secured = 178, total no. of pending cases in court = 3,614. 226 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Figure 9 indicates the huge gap between the number of economic and financial crimes cases filed in the court by EFCC and the number of convictions secured from 2010-2014 as follows: Total no. of cases filed in court = 1,998; total no. of conviction secured = 465; total no. of pending cases in court = 1,533.

Total Arrest, Prosecution and Conviction Secured from 2010 – January 2016 by NSCDC

Total Number of Arrest Total Number of Prosecution Total Number of Conviction

Source: Derived by the researcher from NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja

Figure 8: Total number of arrests, prosecution, and conviction secured from 2010 – Jan 2016 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 227

Cases Filed in Court and Conviction Secured from 2010 – 2014 by EFCC

Source: EFCC Annual Report 2014

Figure 9: Total number of EFCC filed financial crimes court cases and conviction secured from 2010 – 2014 228 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

CONCLUSION From the study the following findings were made: First, it was clearly established that the EFCC Establishment Acts 2004 empowers the commission to intervene in economic and financial crimes which includes crude oil theft as seen under section 6 (h & m) and section 7 subsections 1(a & b). Second is that the most impactful technique employed by the EFCC to achieve significant result on the intervention processes (investigation, prosecution, and securing conviction) is through effective collaboration and domestic cooperation with LEAs. EFCC Annual Report (2013) backs up the claim by stating that the war against economic and financial crimes has a wide stake holding, and the commission has continued to benefit from the collaborative efforts of partners in the public and private sectors, locally and internationally, and that the spirit of collaboration is reflected on EFCC partnerships with the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Navy (NCS), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Department of State Services (DSS), Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (MITI), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Banking Sector, and other private sectors. Third, from the field interaction we found that the EFCC is not satisfactorily equipped with modern technological equipment to fight crude oil theft bearing in mind the level of persons/groups involved in the illicit trade. Fourth, there appears to be a reasonable connection between the fight against crude oil theft and the fight against money laundering in Nigeria, as crude oil theft activities cannot be defeated without dealing with organised crime like money laundering. Asuni (2009) confirms that crude oil theft cannot be dealt with alone: efforts against it must be accompanied by actions against other evils that go hand-in-hand with it like corruption, illegal arms importation, and money laundering. Fifth, it is generally accepted that crude oil theft has a negative impact on government’s revenue. Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) annual report indicates that Nigeria lost a total of $10.9 billion to oil theft between 2009 and 2011 (Onoja, 2013). Sixth, crude oil theft has negative effect on the socio-economy of the Niger Delta region as high unemployment rate amongst the youths giving rise to restiveness and with serious implications on national security. Even as Social Action, (2014) adds that crude oil theft is a devastating threat to the socio- economic well-being of the majority of Nigerians who still live in poverty and destitution. Seven, it was also gathered that EFCC activities have increased the effectiveness and domestic cooperation among LEAs in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. The intervention processes empowers the commission to advance in recovering government revenue and resources from crude oil thieves. Finally, it was found that the judiciary has not been effective in handling crude oil theft cases, thereby causing delay in the intervention processes of the EFCC prosecutors, as a result, restricting the EFCC from recording successes as expected. Table 4 below, shows that out of 1,998 cases filed in court from 2010 – 2014, only 465 conviction were secured, leaving about 1,533 pending economic and financial crimes cases in the judiciary. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 229

Table 4 Comparison of Conviction (2010-2014)

Year Cases Filed Conviction Percentage in Court Secured Changes 2014 388 126 0 2013 485 117 7.14 2012 502 87 30.95 2011 417 67 46.83 2010 206 68 46.03

Source: EFCC 2014 Annual Report.

Consequently, evaluating Table 4 above and juxtaposing it with Figure 8, the outcome points out that crude oil theft criminality will continue to grow stronger by day due to ineffectiveness/delay from the judicial system. This must have informed Osaneku (2013) statement that the inability/weakness of the Nigerian legal framework to create enabling opportunity for oil theft cases in the region to scale through plays out in the lacunas of arrests and prosecution process of the oil theft suspects. In most cases, the arrested crude oil suspects by the joint task force and/or NSCDC are released by the judiciary on intervention of their political masters, without adequate prosecution. This has multiplied effects of attracting more participants and continuity of oil theft in the state/nation. The paper recommends that the Nigerian Government should: First, adequately empower the EFCC and LEAs with modern technological surveillance equipment to monitor the oil pipelines/installation, both in the sea, and at the creeks where the pipelines crisscross. They should also introduce the use of Technology Tracking System for crude oil vessels and money laundering outlets bearing in mind the calibre of persons or groups involved in the illicit trade. Second, as part of methods of resources and revenue recovery, and fighting crude oil theft activities, government should seek for international assistance and collaboration from countries where crude oil stolen from Nigeria are sold. As Assuni (2009) states that government is well placed to offer carrots as well as sticks, and can set up legitimate oil export contracts with countries such as Côte d’Ivoire that have previously benefited from the receipt of stolen crude. Third, to win the war against crude oil theft in Nigeria, government must tackle money laundering, as the fight to end crude oil theft is to accompany actions against money laundering and acquisition of assets by oil thieves in Nigeria. Fourth, government should proceed towards a speedy development of the Niger Delta region to pacify its inhabitants for the marginalisation done to them over the years. In Adeboboye, Duru and Ogodo (2013), the Chief of Naval Staff, Nigerian Navy, advocated for constant review of corporate 230 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria social responsibilities of oil major host communities and improve opportunities for the restive youths as well as massive environmental resuscitation of crude oil products available to the people of the Niger Delta in order to give them a sense of belonging. Fifth, special courts for oil theft cases should be created to enable swift prosecution and obtaining conviction of oil criminals and their backers. This process will enable the successful arrests, prosecution, and conviction of high-profile key players and send out a powerful message to the world that Nigerian Government is out to fight and conquer oil theft activities.

REFERENCES

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Duru, A. E. (2013), Addressing oil theft, illegal bunkering in Niger Delta, in O.H. Boris, (Eds.), The Upsurge of Oil Theft Bunkering in the Nigeria Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out?, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy. EFCC Establishment Act, (2004) Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, http://www.vertic.org/ media/National%20Legislation/Nigeria/NG_Nigerian_MaritimeAdmin_Act_2007.pdf, accessed 28th June, 2016. “EFCC Zero Tolerance, (2008) Criminal Economy of Oil Thieves,” The Magazine of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, pp 25-25, ISSN 0795-2457. EFCC Annual Report, (2013) Pipeline Vandalism and Illegal Bunkering, Federal Republic of Nigeria, EFCC Headquarters’, No. 5 Fomella Street, Wuse II, Abuja, Siddwell Production. EFCC Annual Report, (2014) Legal practice, Federal Republic of Nigeria, EFCC Headquarters’, No. 5 Fomella street, Wuse II, Abuja, Siddwell production. Ejiofor, A. (2012) Fiscal Crisis Looms as Oil Theft Ravages Niger Delta, in K.U. Omoyibo (Eds.) Political Economic Diagnosis of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria: The Way Forward, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, Vol. 5, No. 2. Federal Republic of Nigeria, (2006) National defense policy, in F. C. Onuorah, (Eds.), Oil Pipeline Sabotage in Nigeria: Dimensions, Actors and Implications for National Security, African Security Review, 2008. Gaiya, A. B. (2013) Economic Dimensions of National Security in Nigeria, Africa Peace Review Journal of Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Nigeria, Vol. 11-12, No.1. Jonah, G.J. (2010) Maritime Dimension of Nigeria’s National Security: Challenges for Nigeria, Constructive Engagement, Journal of Alumni Association of National Defence College Nigeria, Vol. 1, No. 2. Katsouris, C., & Sayne, A.(2013) Nigeria’s criminal crude: International options to combat the Export of stolen oil, in V.E. Assi, O.I. Amah, & S.O. Edeke (Eds.), Oil Theft and Corruption: Pathways to underdevelopment in the Niger Delta. Research on Humanities and social sciences, ISSN: 2224-5766, vol.6, No.3. also published in the Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Vol. 16, No.1, 2014, pp 75), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, and Pennsylvania. Lippmann, W. (1943), “U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic,” in O. Mbachu and C. M. Eze (Eds.) Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Medus Academic Publishers. Lyman, P.M.G. (2007) Organised Crime, Prentice-Hall Person Education Inc. Mallory, (2007) Theories on the Continued Existence of Organised Crime, Sudbury Massachusetts, Jones and Bartlet Publishers. 232 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Mbachu, O., & Eze, C. M.(2009) Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Medusa Academic Publishers. Mangal, S.K.,& Mangal, S. (2015) Research Methodology in Behavioural Science, PHI learning private Limited, Published by Asoke, K. Ghosh, Rimjhim House, 111, Patparganj Industrial Estate, Delhi- 110092, and New Delhi-110020. Menyi, D. (2014) “Crude Oil Theft, Pipeline Vandalism Cross Over”, in V.E. Assi, O.I. Amah, & S.O. Edeke, (eds.), Oil Theft and Corruption: Pathways to Underdevelopment in the Niger Delta, Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, ISSN (paper) 2224-5766, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2016, pp 74. Also published in the Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 16, No.1, 2014, pp 76), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, and Pennsylvania. NAN, (2014) Oil theft: EFCC recovers 11 vessels, 16 trucks from suspects, The News,http://thenews nigeria.com.ng/2014/06/oil-theft-efcc-recovers-11-vessels-16-trucks-from-suspects/, assessed 27 June, 2016. NSCDC, (2016) Summary of anti-vandalism activities (oil pipeline/gas installations) 2010- Jan 2016, NSCDC Report, NSCDC Headquarters, Abuja. Nigerian Navy, (2013) No Crude Oil theft, http://www.cot.navy.mil.ng/crude-oil-theft#. V4WyLtIrLI Uassessed 13th July, 2016. Nwoye, K. (2000) Corruption, Leadership, and Dialectics of Development in Africa, Enugu Associated Printers Ogbeni, O.O. (2012) Fuel Pipeline Vandalism in Nigeria, in A.C. Okoli, & S, Orinya, (Eds.) Oil Pipeline Vandalism and National Security, Global Journal of Human Social Science and Political Science, Vol. 13, Issues 5, Version 10, pp 67, Global Journals Inc. USA. Ogodo, D. (2013) Oil Bunkering in the Niger Delta Nigeria’s Oil & Gas, in O.H. Boris, (Eds.), The Upsurge of Oil Theft Bunkering in the Nigeria Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out?, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome, Italy. Okoli, A. C. & Orinya, S. (2013) Oil Pipeline Vandalism and National Security, Global Journal of Human Social Science and Political Science, Vol. 13, Issues 5, Version 10, pp 67, Global Journals Inc. USA. Omoyibo, K. U. (2014) Political Economic Diagnosis of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria: The Way Forward, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy, Vol. 5, No. 2. Onoja, N. (2013) Niger Loses $11bn to Oil Theft, Vandalism-NEITI, in A.C. Okoli, & S. Orinya, (Eds.). Oil Pipeline Vandalism and National Security, Global Journal of Human Social Science and Political Science Inc, Vol. 13, Issues 5, Version 10, USA. Onuoha, F. C. (2012) Illegal oil bunkering: Nigerian Context and Transnational Ramifications for the Gulf of Guinea, Articles, Politeia Vol. 31, No. 2, Unisa Press. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 233

Osaneku, M. (2013) Crude oil theft: Crime against the Economy, in G. Wilson, (Eds.), The Nigerian State and Oil Theft in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Vol. 16, No.1, pp 72), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, and Pennsylvania. Premium Times, (2012) Nigeria Loses @155bn Monday to Oil Theft, Others, http:www. premiumtimesng.comassessed 28 June 2016. Shinkaiye, J. K. (2004) National Security and Challenges of the 21st Century, in O. Mbachu, & C.M. Eze, (Eds.), Democracy and National Security: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Medus Academic Publishers, 2004. Social Action, (2012) Crude Oil Business: Oil Theft, Communities, and poverty in Nigeria, Social Development Integrated Centre pp 1-4 & 21-57. Ufuoma, K.O. & Omoruyi, O. (2014) Political Economy Diagnosis of Crude Oil Theft in Nigeria: The Way Forward, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol.5, No. 2, pp 300, MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy. Uwotu, K. (2013) Does Nigerian Government Have the Political Will to Combat Oil Theft?, in O.H. Boris, (Edition), The Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There a Way Out? Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 2015. Wilson, G. (2014). The Nigerian State and Oil Theft in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa (Volume 16, No.1, 2014, pp 69), ISSN: 1520-5509, Clarion University of Pennsylvania, Clarion, and Pennsylvania. Zabadi, I. S, & Sampson I. T, (2009) Modalities for Coordinating Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Strategies, Constructive Engagement, Journal of Alumni Association of National Defence College Nigeria, Vol. 1, No. 1. 234 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Appendix Table 5: Total Response Pattern to Specific Issues and Percentage Distribution of Respondents (No. 63)

Question Response Count Percentage Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 9 14.3% Q1. The EFCC Establishment Act adequately empowered Fairly Agree 10 15.9% the commission to fight crude Agree 23 36.5% oil theft. Strongly agree 21 33.3% Total 63 100.0% Q2. Effective collaboration Strongly disagree 0 0.0% with other LEAs has impacted Disagree 2 3.2% on EFCC fight against crude oil theft. Fairly Agree 5 7.9% Agree 37 58.7% Strongly agree 19 30.2%

Total 63 100.0%

Strongly disagree 1 1.6% Q3. Diligent investigation Disagree 5 7.9% and prosecution of cases have yielded positive result in the Fairly Agree 26 41.3% EFCC fight against crude oil Agree 23 36.5% theft. Strongly agree 8 12.7%

Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 2 3.2% Disagree 19 30.2% Q4. EFCC operatives are adequately equipped with Fairly Agree 26 41.3% modern technology to fight Agree 15 23.8% crude oil related cases. Strongly agree 1 1.6% Total 63 100.0%

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 235

Strongly disagree 1 1.6% Disagree 10 15.9% Q5. The fight against crude Fairly Agree 15 23.8% oil theft is the fight against money laundering in Nigeria. Agree 34 54.0% Strongly agree 3 4.8% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 2 3.2% Q6.There is a connection between crude oil theft and Fairly Agree 19 30.2% acquisition of assets by oil Agree 24 38.1%% thieves. Strongly agree 18 28.6% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 0 0.0% Q7.Crude oil theft has a Fairly Agree 11 17.5% negative impact on Government generated Agree 15 23.8% Revenue. Strongly agree 37 58.7% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Q8.Crude oil theft has a Disagree 2 3.2% negative effect on the socio- Fairly Agree 10 15.9% economy of the Niger Delta Region and Nigeria. Agree 21 33.3% Strongly agree 30 47.6% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 2 3.2% Disagree 20 31.7% Q9. EFCC activities on Fairly Agree 19 30.2% crude oil have reduced illegal oil bunkering in the Agree 21 33.3% Niger Delta area of Nigeria. Strongly agree 1 1.6% Total 63 100.0% 236 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

Q10. EFCC activities have Strongly disagree 0 0.0% improved government Disagree 6 9.5% revenue generation base. Fairly Agree 20 31.7% Agree 18 28.6% Strongly agree 19 30.2% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 0 0.0% Disagree 3 4.8% Q11. EFCC activities have Fairly Agree 15 23.8% increased the effectiveness of LEAs in Nigeria. Agree 28 44.4% Strongly agree 17 27.0% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 2 3.2 Disagree 3 4.8 Q12. EFCC activities on oil Fairly Agree 22 34.9 theft have increased domestic cooperation among Agree 33 52.4 LEAs in Nigeria. Strongly agree 3 4.8 Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 7 11.1% Q13.EFCC intervention Disagree 18 28.6% processes on crude oil theft Fairly Agree 16 25.4% have not recorded many successes between 2010 to Agree 13 20.6% 2015 Strongly agree 9 14.3% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 3 4.8% Q14.Nigerian judicial Disagree 9 14.3% system has not been so Fairly Agree 17 27.0% effective in the handling of crude oil theft cases. Agree 22 34.9% Strongly agree 12 19.0% Total 63 100.0%

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Crude Oil Theft and Nigeria’s National Security 237

Strongly disagree 3 4.8% Q15.The delays from Disagree 25 39.7% Judiciary were as a result of Fairly Agree 23 36.5% inadequate investigation of crude oil cases by the EFCC. Agree 7 11.1% Strongly agree 5 7.9% Total 63 100.0% Strongly disagree 4 6.3% Q16. The delays from Disagree 31 49.2% Judiciary on crude oil theft Fairly Agree 12 19.0% cases have been because of inadequate prosecution by Agree 11 17.5% EFCC prosecutors. Strongly agree 5 7.9% Total 63 100.0%

Source: Compiled by the researcher from the field survey The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

CONTEMPORARY LOGISTICS SUPPORT CHALLENGES IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

by

Brig Gen Adekunle Adeyinka Directing Staff Army War College Nigeria, Abuja

ABSTRACT

Peace Support Operations have become effective tools in the maintenance of international peace and security, and resolution of violent conflicts between and within nations. These operations require logistics support to achieve their goals. This piece interrogates the issue of logistics support challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations. It identifies gaps in the Union’s logistics planning which limits its capacity to sustain its forces for a long period. The paper recommends logistics training support programme, and the adoption of force logistics support group model to ensure prompt and safe logistics support for the Union’s peace operations personnel.

Key words: Contemporary, Logistics Support Challenges, African Union, Peace Support Operations.

I. INTRODUCTION The security environment in Africa remains characterised with several conflict situations. These widespread conflicts attract the attention and response of the AU at the continental level and regional mechanisms at the regional level. On its part, the international community, led by the UN, has increasingly referred to the AU and regional mechanisms as first responders and subsequently anchored the international response on the continental effort. This trend highlights the increasing importance and relevance of AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in addressing and managing conflicts on the continent.

238 Contemporary Logistics Support Challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations 239

The severity of the conflicts in some African countries has necessitated the deployment of continental and regional PSOs as a precursor to the deployment of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Despite the achievements of the AU PSOs, the experiences in Somalia and Sudan and more recently in Mali and Central African Republic (CAR) highlight significant logistics support challenges. These experiences reveal salient gaps in the ability of the AU to effectively plan, deploy, manage and sustain as well as efficiently and effectively support troops in the field. These capacity and capability challenges have had significant impacts on the operational effectiveness of AU missions and their ability to effectively deliver on their mandates. Notwithstanding, it is pertinent to appreciate that there have been significant improvements in mission support. However, much is still required in light of the evolving operating environment and the realities of contemporary PSOs. This paper therefore seeks to appraise the current approach to planning and delivery of logistics support in AU PSOs with a view to proposing suggestions on the way forward. Consequently, it will begin with a conceptual discourse and provide an overview of logistics support and contemporary PSO environment in Africa. The paper will thereafter highlight the current realities of logistic support in AU PSOs and thereafter propose an alternative logistics support model for AU PSOs. The paper will focus on lessons drawn by the author from experiences garnered on recent AU missions in Mali and CAR as well as the ongoing AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The rationale is to ensure adequate logistics support for all future AU PSOs to facilitate successful implementation of the mission mandate.

CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE As a background, it will be useful to establish a conceptual basis for the major concepts in this paper. Accordingly, the concepts of logistics and PSO will be subsequently discussed.

(a) Logistics Logistics is not a new idea and has been defined in several ways depending on the context and viewpoint of the author. It can be simply described as the ‘art of moving armies’ as well as ‘the science of planning the movement and maintenance of a force’. Although these definitions give credence to its military origin, logistics has increasingly gained wider attention, especially within the business community, as a concept for managing organisational efficiency and competitiveness. We could therefore consider a more complex description of logistics as ‘the process of strategically managing the procurement, movement and storage of materials, parts and finished inventory through the organisation and its marketing channels in such a way that current and future profitability are maximised through the cost-effective fulfilment of orders’. Essentially, these definitions highlight the critical attributes of supporting organisational goals as well as promoting organisational efficiency and competitiveness through the integration of activities involving a wide array of stakeholders. These attributes are aptly captured in the definition that succinctly encapsulates logistics as positioning of resources at the right time, in the right place, at the right cost and right quantity. This perspective is equally relevant to understanding logistics support in PSOs which seeks to ensure that the ‘peacekeepers’ and all other stakeholders receive what is required for effective 240 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria mandate implementation at the right time and in the right quantity. This definition will be adopted in this paper.

(b) Peace Support Operations PSOs have evolved from the cold war era peacekeeping concept. The traditional peacekeeping model was conceptualised to monitor ceasefires and buffer zones by inter-positioning between belligerents as well as observe, verify and report on adherence to or violations of agreements. This approach was hugely static in posture and anchored on the UN principles of consent, impartiality/neutrality and non- use of force, except in self-defense. The British Joint Warfare Publication conceptualises PSO as multi-functional operations involving military forces, diplomatic and humanitarian agencies designed to achieve humanitarian goals or a long- term political settlement conducted impartially in support of an appropriate mandate. This broad view encompasses all the major areas of action including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement (where necessary), peacebuilding and humanitarian operations, in the pursuance of peace. It affords a comprehensive multi-dimensional approach to addressing the complexities of contemporary conflicts and efforts to reform and rebuild a nation. This wide-ranging perspective espoused by the AU and regional mechanisms will be adopted in this paper.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND THE CONTEMPORARY PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA The current PSO environment is generally more hostile with wide-ranging threats including terrorism, transnational organised crime and poor local infrastructure. The operating environment is also increasingly asymmetric in nature thus necessitating offensive and mobile operations with the attendant consequence of extended Lines of Communication (LoCs). This reality raises critical questions on the ability of the hugely static PSO logistics framework to effectively and timely support the implementation of PSO mission mandates. The current framework prescribes the establishment of static logistics support bases with fixed support frameworks that cannot cope with the increase in in-theatre administrative and operational movements. This strain is compounded by the limited availability of aviation assets and rail infrastructure that would have been used to augment the regular road movements. Consequently, AU PSOs are heavily reliant on road networks as the primary and in most instances, the only means of resupply. The increased road movements, present attractive targets for hostile elements thus highlighting an additional challenge of insecurity along the already extended LOCs. These constraints, particularly, the security concerns have hugely restricted the interest and availability of commercial contractors for in-theatre logistics support in AU PSOs. For instance, some AU PSOs such as AMISOM experience significant Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks with substantial impact on the supply chain. Similarly, UN Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali lost 23 and 25 personnel in 2015 and 2016 respectively from IED attacks. The fatal and adverse impact of these attacks underlines the growing complexity of the PSO environment Contemporary Logistics Support Challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations 241 in Africa. These realities raise critical questions on the suitability of contractors/civil logistics capabilities in preference to the more expensive military second and third line logistics support enabling units.

CURRENT REALITIES OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT IN AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS The development of timely, detailed and robust logistics plans is crucial to the delivery of effective and efficient logistics support to AU PSOs. The AU Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) is responsible for planning, deploying, managing and liquidating AU PSOs. Within the division, the Mission Support Unit (MSU) is tasked with addressing logistics support and related issues. The MSU, like most units within the AU PSOD, remains grossly understaffed to effectively provide strategic level support across the spectrum of planning, deploying, managing and liquidating AU missions. This situation is further compounded in the field by the difficulties in timely recruitment of mission logistics planning and operation officers, most of whom are civilians. These capacity gaps negatively impact on the ability of the AU mission support elements to plan and coordinate the efficient and effective delivery of logistics support to AU missions. In its recent PSOs in Mali and CAR, the AU took over missions from the regional forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The transition in both situations revealed a huge capacity gap in logistics planning. Although, expertise generally existed in functional areas such as supply, engineering and transport, limited capacities could be observed in strategic and to some extent, operational level logistics planning. Unfortunately, these gaps cut across the AU and regional planning elements as well as the Troop/Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs). This situation has significantly limited the capacity of the AU, regional mechanisms and T/PCCs to effectively sustain forces over long periods, especially under a wet lease arrangement. It would thus be necessary to focus logistics training support programmes at developing requisite continental planning capacities at the strategic and operational levels. These efforts could begin with an initial focus on the planning elements at the AU and regional mechanisms. Most of the AU PSOs are heavily dependent on donor support, either financially, materially or otherwise. These donations are highly unpredictable in terms of redemption period, usage and sometimes type and quality, especially in case of donated equipment. In many instances, the funding provided by partners are caveated which gives the AU little or no room for flexibility in expenditure. Another negative impact of the inability of the AU to fund its operations, is the lack of clear understanding of the financial requirements for its missions right from the initial planning stages. This results in unrealistic budgets that fall short of requirements in the field. These uncertainties make it difficult to develop clear, concise and concrete logistics support plans. This reality has to a large extent institutionalised an unsustainable ad- hoc approach to logistics planning with its obvious complications. A more predictable funding mechanism especially at mission start-up will have to be developed to ensure that definite plans and support mechanisms can be put in place for the initial period of about six months, while donations are being harmonised and put together for use in an organised manner. Similarly, the AU could request that donations are made with minimal caveats, redeemed timely and provided in line with AU needs. 242 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

The current approach to mission support planning within the AU encourages “stove piping” within the supply chain rather than having an integrated system with necessary visibility and cooperation amongst all the stakeholders. For instance, delays in the activities of stakeholders such as procurement and human resources have sometimes impeded the successful implementation of logistics support plans. It will be necessary to carry along all supply chain stakeholders early enough whilst also counting on the committed involvement of these stakeholders in the successful attainment of set goals. To this end, it will be useful to ensure that partners that would support future AU missions are brought into the AU planning process early enough to ensure that they have the required visibility of the AU initiative and how best to provide support. In the same vein, working policies and guidance documents of other supporting AU departments and divisions, outside PSOD, will have to be reviewed to enable and guarantee timely and effective support to AU PSOs. The current challenges that T/PCCs face with securing reimbursements under AU PSOs remains a major disincentive to the generation of the logistics enabling capacities and deployment of adequate Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) to the missions. For instance, the reimbursements to T/PCCs for the AU missions in Mali and CAR has not been concluded. Consequently, most of these T/PCCs, as was observed in Mali, become more willing to provide the required COE under the banner of a UN mission rather than an AU mission. The non-deployment of requisite COE obviously has a negative impact on the capacity of the T/PCCs to effectively achieve their mandates and the absence of the enabling capabilities further compounds the capacity of the AU to effectively sustain and manage the forces. It is therefore expedient that the T/PCCs participating in AU missions have access to similar reimbursement conditions as those operating under the UN missions to encourage effective participation. Similarly, the peculiarities and sometimes more hazardous operating conditions should be adequately considered in the compensation package to the T/PCCs. The AU will therefore need to develop clear guidelines that will address the peculiarities of its missions, such as COE issues, with a view to engendering effective T/PCC participation and mandate implementation.

THE WAY FORWARD: FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT GROUP MODEL As elucidated above, the AU will have to develop a realistic logistics support model that will address the peculiarities of its missions in the current operating environment. It will also need to address the current logistics support challenges facing AU PSOs such as capacity and capability gaps as well as those imposed by the contemporary operating environment and PSO management practices. This calls for a paradigm shift from the current”Civilian/Contractor Based Model”, to a logistics support model that guarantees improved support to offensive/non-offensive and mobile operations. The Force Logistics Support Group (FLSG) Model is thus suggested as a viable alternative in this regard. The FLSG was originally proposed as the fulcrum of the logistics support concept for the African Standby Force. However, the impetus for a civilian led multi-dimensional approach encouraged the adoption of the UN civilian heavy framework. In the FLSG framework, the AU will provide second and third line support to T/PCCs through military logistics enabling units under the command of a military logistics officer who will also double as Contemporary Logistics Support Challenges in African Union Peace Support Operations 243 the mission Chief Logistics Officer (CLO). In the model, the use of civilian capacities and contractor assets, especially at mission start up, will be hugely minimised. As the operation progresses and the security situation improves these military assets would be gradually replaced with civilian contracted assets. Similarly, the staffing of the logistics support organisation will reflect a gradual corresponding shift from a military heavy entity to a civilian heavy entity. Particularly, the leadership of the mission logistics organisation will move from the CLO to the Head of Mission Support, a civilian. The FLSG Model will align with the cardinal spirit of multi-dimensional civilian led integrated PSOs by allowing enough time for the recruitment of civilians. It will permit the conduct of logistics operations in hostile environments and engender improved security along the LOCs. Consequently, the FLSG will ensure adequate and timely delivered support in the field, especially at the start of operations. To successfully implement the FLSG model, the AU will need to also address the poor logistics support management practices earlier identified. These include facilitating logistics planning capability development programmes with an initial focus on the planning elements at the AU and regional mechanisms. It is also critical that a more predictable funding mechanism is developed and employed for AU PSOs. It is also key to ensure that donations made to the AU for PSOs come with minimal caveats and are timely redeemed in line with AU priorities. Furthermore, the working policies and guidance documents of other AU departments and divisions, outside PSOD, need to be reviewed to enable and guarantee timely and effective support to AU PSOs. Finally, the AU will need to develop clear COE guidelines that take due cognisance of the peculiarities of the AU PSO environment.

CONCLUSION AU PSOs are increasingly characterised by a new operating environment involving the conduct of combat offensive operation to address the ever-increasing challenges of terrorism and other trans- national crimes. This new environment requires better planning, new logistics support models and concepts with probably more use of robust military capabilities and implementation of unique procurement and administrative mechanisms. Undoubtedly, most of the T/PCCs still lack adequate capabilities to provide the necessary enabling units and would require some support in this regard. The lack of predictable funding for AU missions and the over-reliance and over-dependence on partners/donors support will also continue to undermine current efforts aimed at aligning developed strategic plans to missions support activities unless these challenges are also addressed. To this end, the FLSG Model that will ensure the delivery of adequate and timely support in the field, especially at the start of operations is suggested. As, the mission progresses and normalcy returns, the second and third line support would embrace an increased use of civilian contractors in line with the cardinal spirit of multi-dimensional civilian-led integrated PSOs. The successful implementation of the FLSG Model will require detailed attention to the identified poor logistics support management practices such as the COE reimbursement policy. 244 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria

REFERENCES

African Union (2000), Constitutive Act of the African Union. Lome, Togo. http://au.int/en/sites/default/ files/Constitutive Act en 0.htm African Union (2006), Draft ASF Logistics Manual, AU PSOD, Addis Ababa. African Union (2008), ASF Doctrine. http://civilian.peaceau.org/index.php?option= comdocman &task=catview&gid=53&Itemid=61&lang=en.] African Union (2013), Report of Independent Panel of Experts Assessment of the African Standby Force. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-independent-panel-of-experts-assessment-of-the- asf-latest-pdf African Union (2016), Press Release on 4th African Logistics Forum. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ press-release-the-4th-african-logistics-forum-alf-2017-28april.pdf Berdal M (2001), “What is Traditional about Traditional UN Peacekeeping?” in Peace Support Operations: Lessons Learned and Future Perspectives, Oxford, Peter Lang. Christopher M. (2005), Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Creating Value Adding Networks, London. Financial Times Management. Rushton A, Croucher C and Baker P. (2006)., The Handbook of Logistics and Distribution Management, London, Kogan Page Limited. United Nations (2003), Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations. DPKO/Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU). http://www.peacekeeping bsetpractices. unlb.org/library/Handbook on UN PKOs.pdf United Nations (2011), Review of Ten Year Capacity Building Program for the African Union. https:// www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/2nd_triennial_review_rcm15_eng.pdf United Nations (2011), Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/65/19). http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF969 %7D/POC%20A%2065%2019.pdf. United Nations ((2017), Press Release on United Nations Personnel Killed or Deliberately Attacked in Peacekeeping Operations in 2016. https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/org1643.doc.htm The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

BOOK REVIEW

GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR ALAKE BOLANLE AWE

Editors: Isaac O. Albert, Sharon A. Omotoso and Alero Akeredolu Publisher: Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria Pages: viii + 502 Reviewer : Dr. Benjamin A. Aluko Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

TEXT OF REVIEW The twenty-seven chapter well-edited and beautifully-packaged book makes quite interesting reading. In this volume, the contributors attempt what could be referred to as a comprehensive and insightful discourse of an issue that is of tremendous relevance and interest to the global community. The point is that the various topics discussed therein by scholars, policymakers and activists, who obviously are from diverse intellectual backgrounds and ideological orientations, cover a plethora of issues: definitional issues, theoretical frameworks, emerging change in gender role, the intersection of religion, violence and gender, democracy, gender and peacebuilding, legal instruments and gender-based violence, emotional intelligence and its implications for gender relationships. Indeed, the perspectives from which gender- based violence were interrogated in the book are so wide that even the emerging disheartening incidences in Nigeria of spouses killing one another was captured in some of the papers in the volume. One theme that runs through the volume is that women constitute the largest group of victims when it comes to gender-based violence. This comes out very sharply in Chapter one, titled, ‘Contexts of Gender-based Violence’, obviously a synopsis of the book, authored by a world renown scholar in Peace and Conflict Studies, Isaac O. Albert, in his attempt at defining gender-based violence. According to him, “gender-based violence is an umbrella term for any harm that is perpetrated against a person’s will and that results from gender-related power inequities at both public and private spheres”. That the scale of the victims of gender-based violence tilts more to the side of women is captured when he posits:

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“Though this problem is experienced by both the feminine and masculine gender it is more peculiar to women and girls”. It must be emphasised that apart from the fact that all the chapters in the book are obviously products of intense research, their penetrating interrogation of gender-based violence in the context of universal values such as democracy, human rights, globalisation, development and peacebuilding is remarkable. Albert sets the ball rolling with an insightful introduction which, in all intent and purpose, laid bare the central thesis advanced in all the remaining chapters of the book. The second chapter, authored by Eze, Executive Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) provides an insight into the trajectory of the civil society engagement with gender-based violence in the West Africa sub-region. Leveraging on his fertile analytical mind and robust understanding of the relevant normative frameworks in place to address gender-based violence-namely, Beijing + 20 (Agenda 2030) “Violence against Women”; Agenda 2063 “An Agenda of good governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and Rule of Law”; Peaceful and Secure Africa and SDG G16; “Peace and Justice, Strong Institutions”; G9 “ Reduce Inequality”, Eze discusses how these international frameworks can be domesticated to promote effective women participation in addressing gender- based violence and inequality in West Africa. In the third and fourth chapters, the authors discussed the emerging trend of women becoming breadwinners of the family and the implications of this change in gender role on gender relationship. In the fifth chapter, the author provides what could be regarded as a way of managing the challenges thrown up by the change in gender role occasioned by the emergence of women as breadwinners of the family in her exposition on the emotional intelligence status of perpetrators and victims of gender-based violence, where she brilliantly articulates “the need for curriculum integration of emotional intelligence at all levels of the education and incorporation of EQ training into rehabilitation programmes of victims of gender-based violence (GBV).” The imperativeness of reinventing the Nigeria’s educational curriculum towards the promotion of gender equality and equity for mutual respect and harmonious relationship between the two sexes resonates in Odebode’s paper in the twenty-sixth chapter of the book. The paper which takes its bearing from the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995, makes a case for conscientious and systematic mainstreaming of gender issues into the Nigeria’s tertiary educational system. In the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth chapters, the intersection of religion, violence and gender, especially with respect to the Boko Haram crisis in the North-East of Nigeria was examined from two perspectives. While chapters six, seven and nine focus on the various forms of indignities and challenges women are experiencing following the insurgency and counter-insurgency in the affected areas, chapter eight, authored by Albert takes a critical look at the modus operandi of the Ezekwesili led #Bring Back Our Girls# movement and its implications on the nation’s image and the fight against terrorism. It is his contention that the campaigns of the movement for the return of Chibok girls are having negative impact on both the image of the nation and efforts at reining in the insurgents. In chapter ten, the authors call attention to the neglect of the provisions of the various legal instruments – the 1999 Nigerian constitution and the plethora of international conventions on the elimination of all Book Review 247 forms of discrimination against women – in the management of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps created following the humanitarian crisis generated by the Boko Haram insurgency. The authors advance the need for the strengthening of relevant institutions constitutionally saddled with the protection and promotion of individual rights in the nation. Indeed, the chapters in the book provide invaluable insight into understanding the contexts, theories, dynamics, consequences, management and elimination of gender-based violence in contemporary Nigeria. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the book would have enjoyed global appeal if some of the authors of the papers published in the book were drawn from across the globe with a view to reflecting the experiences in other climes. By and large, the book thoroughly presents the various perspectives that define the discourse on gender-based violence. The book should be seen and read as an important contribution to an emerging body of knowledge and as a reference point for further research in the area. The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria Vol. 1 No.1, April 2018

BOOK REVIEW

NIGERIA’S ANTI-TERROR WAR AGAINST BOKO HARAM: THE TURNING POINT AND LESSONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Author: OBC Nwolise Publisher: PYLA – Mark Services, Kaduna. Year of Publication: 2017. No of Chapters: 15. No of Pages: 405. Book Reviewer: Brig Gen Bello A. Tsoho, Director, Department of Research, Innovation and Campaigns, Nigerian Army Resource Centre, Abuja.

FOCUS AND ESSENCE The book focused on the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations of the Armed Forces of Nigeria against the Boko Haram in Nigeria’s North East states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa. It is the first book to recognise the turning point in the anti-terror war in 2016, and document it. It is a publication in honour of the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen TY Buratai who has been the leader and commander of the ground forces that fought gallantly to: first bring about a turning point in the war in 2015, second to degrade the Boko Haram in 2016, and third to defeat the Boko Haram completely in 2018.

THE REVIEW The book opened with a chapter titled “National Security and Its Relevance to National Development”. In this chapter, the author interrogated the concepts of national development and national security, and highlighted the relevance of the latter to the former. From the chapter, the reader will easily comprehend why there can be no meaningful development in Nigeria or any other nation for that matter without peace, security, and stability. The author’s perception and conceptualisation of national security drives it beyond the cold-war era view of state centeredness. He not only focused the understanding of

248 Book Review 249 national security on human security of the contemporary era, but went ahead of other authors to bifurcate human and even national security into physical security and spiritual security. The current upsurge in ritual killings, ritual rape, yahoo-plus (spiritual aspect of yahoo), and cult killings by Badoo, among others justify the author’s novel focus on spiritual dimension of human and national security. Chapter two titled “Terrorism as the Long War: The Siege of the Contemporary World”, conceptualised terrorism, traced its historical roots to the late 18th century and examined its types, before presenting it as the long war. The idea of the long war is meant to alert government and our military that terrorism does not often lend itself to quick termination like conventional warfare. The message is for the nation to either be prepared for a long wrestle with Boko Haram, or vote the resources needed to speedily wipe out all its traces. In chapter three, titled “ Anti-Terror War as a Different Type of Warfare: The Limits of International Humanitarian Law”, (IHL) it is argued that terrorists who do not respect human life, human rights and any law should not expect their rights to be respected. It called for UN revisit of the provisions of IHL in view of the emergence of terrorists waging asymmetric warfare in contemporary times. Chapter four on “Relevance of Media and Public Support in Anti-terror War”, highlights the importance of the media and populace being on the side of the army and government in an anti-terror war, while chapter five is titled “Africa As a New Terrorism Theatre” argues that Africa was not home to terrorism, and that foreign terrorists only pursued their foreign enemies to Africa. In chapter six entitled “Evolution of Terrorism in Nigeria”, the author opines that the seed of terrorism in Nigeria were sown in the 1960s with political thuggery, but Nigerians ignored these early signs. Chapter seven examined “Boko Haram’s Origin, Leadership and Objectives in Nigeria”, focusing on how it commenced and transformed from non-violent group to a war machine; while chapter eight on “Boko Haram’s Full Scale War Against The Nigerian State and The Government’s Response” gave detailed account of the groups battles and destructions. In chapter nine titled “The War on Terror in Nigeria and The Human Rights Question: Amnesty International and Others”, the issue of Amnesty International’s (AI) reports accusing Nigerian Army of abusing human rights was taken. The author highlighted the aims of AI’s, and its good works but queried whether terrorists with their brutality and lawlessness deserve the protection of the law. Chapter ten, titled “The Turning Point in The Anti-Terror War in The North East”, documents vast data on Boko Haram’s atrocious destruction of lives, properties, values and infrastructure in the North East from 2002 to 2017. The chapter also documented “wind” of change that blew with the emergence of the Buhari administration and new Service Chiefs especially the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen TY Buratai whose leadership by example, and new operational, administrative and logistics strategies brought about the turning point in the war in favour of Nigeria. His efforts regenerated the morale and fired the fighting spirit of the troops, aided by the entry of the Multinational Joint Task Force, and Civilian Joint Task Force. Chapter eleven discussed “The Results of the Turning Point”, which included the demystification, and degrading of the Boko Haram and reclamation of occupied territories. Chapter twelve focused on “The Nigerian Media, The Local Populace and The Anti-Terror War”. It examined how our national media handled the anti-terror war, pointing out that the media constitute a force multiplier in warfare, and that this should be done on the side of Nigeria and its armed forces. The local populace did not stand with the Nigerian Army at the beginning of the war in the North East. This situation, the 250 The Journal of the Army War College Nigeria book points out is a lesson for the military as no counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operation ever succeeds without the support of the local populace. Chapter thirteen, “National Recognition: Salute To The Joint Forces and Fallen Heroes”, is an appreciation for the Multinational Joint Task Force, personnel of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, members of the Civilian Joint Task Force, and other personnel that made the supreme sacrifice. Chapter fourteen, “Challenges of Terrorism Today and Strategies for Tomorrow”, examined the problems created by terrorism in the nation, and examined the relief operations going on in the North East. Chapter Fifteen on “Reflections and Conclusion”, concluded the work with feasible recommendations. Overall, the book is well published. The few printer’s devils in it can be taken care of in the next edition.