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Transparency International PNG

Domestic Observation of the Kandep By-Election

Preliminary Report

15th-19th November 2009

George Butler and Katherine Wheen

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...... 4 INTRODUCTION...... 7 METHODS ...... 7 THE OBSERVATION TEAM ...... 8 POLLING PLACES OBSERVED ...... 8 BACKGROUND TO THE KANDEP BY-ELECTION...... 11 ABOUT KANDEP DISTRICT ...... 11 RECENT ELECTIONS IN KANDEP...... 11 PRE-POLLING PERIOD ...... 15 THE CANDIDATES ...... 15 APPOINTMENT AND PREPAREDNESS OF POLLING OFFICERS ...... 16 CANDIDATES' BRIEFING...... 16 ONGOING CROWD CONCERNS...... 18 READINESS OF OFFICIALS AND MATERIALS ...... 18 BALLOT PAPER SCRUTINY ...... 18 READINESS OF POLICE ...... 19 POLLING DAY ...... 20 STAFFING OF POLLING PLACES AND THE DISMISSAL OF APOS AND POLLING CLERKS ...... 20 LOGISTICS ON THE MORNING OF THE POLL ...... 20 TIMING OF POLLS ...... 21 SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT POLLING STATIONS ...... 21 LOCATIONS OF POLLING STATIONS ...... 21 SET UP OF POLLING PLACES...... 22 PROCEDURE OF OPENING ...... 23 CONDUCT OF POLLING...... 23 THE ELECTORAL ROLL ...... 24 VOTER IDENTIFICATION ...... 24 USE OF INK...... 26 ASSISTED VOTING ...... 27 UNDERSTANDING OF LPV ...... 27 IMPACT OF LPV...... 28 GIFTING...... 29 ROLE OF SCRUTINEERS, CANDIDATES AND SUPPORTERS ...... 29 CUSTODY OF BALLOT BOXES...... 30 WEAPONS, VIOLATIONS AND DISTURBANCES ...... 30 CLOSE OF POLLS ...... 31 TIMING OF POLLS ...... 31 MANAGEMENT OF UNUSED BALLOT PAPERS ...... 31 CLOSING PROCEDURES ...... 32 CUSTODY AND TRANSPORT OF BALLOT BOXES POST-POLLING ...... 32 RETURNS AND RECONCILIATION OF POLLING ...... 33

3 WRAP UP OF POLLING...... 33 NUMBER OF DAYS POLLED ...... 33 NUMBER OF WARDS POLLED...... 34 REASONS GIVEN FOR NOT POLLING AT TARAPIS, MUYEN & SAWI 2...... 34 POST POLLING...... 35 COUNTING OF BALLOTS ...... 35 DEPARTURE FROM KANDEP STATION ...... 36 SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS ...... 36 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE ...... 37 WHAT WORKED WELL ...... 37 WHAT COULD BE THE FOCUS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS ...... 37 REFLECTIONS ON UNDERTAKING ELECTIONS OBSERVATIONS ...... 41

4 Executive Summary

Kandep was always going to be a difficult By-election for all involved. With poor communication facilities, bad road conditions, difficult and variable weather, generator supplied electricity and some very remote polling places, Kandep District itself posed major – but not unexpected – challenges to overcome.

In addition, the conduct of the 2007 National General Election was perhaps one of the most poorly conducted polls in terms of partisan officials, lack of security, major disruptions, and abuse of the polling and counting procedures. Therefore the people of Kandep have not had a recent experience of good practice at election time. They were also exceptionally politicized. The entire district appeared drawn into this electoral contest through kinship and alliance.

The public perception is that the Kandep By-election descended into chaos and disaster. Indeed the security situation deteriorated sharply the day after the polls closed. However it has been less commented in the press that the polling period itself was more or less safely conducted with limited outbreaks of violence.

The use of 74 well-trained and, most importantly, ‘outsider’ Presiding Officers from around the country was very well regarded. This may not be entirely possible in the event of a national election, but certainly desirable wherever it is possible.

In addition, there were at least six times as many police officers in Kandep in 2009 compared to 2007. In our view this was sufficient police and resources. However the focus appeared simply the security of the poll itself and not the security of the district as a whole.

The team did not see weapons in the vicinity of polling areas or being used to directly influence the conduct of a poll. We were aware that weapons were circulating in the district.

In addition, the scrutiny of ballot papers, distribution to ballot boxes, and the security of ballot papers and ballot boxes in transit were very good in the period we observed. This meant that the chief cause of electoral fraud in 2007 – hijacking and stuffing of ballot boxes – was eliminated. The team regrets not being able to observe the removal of inner seals at the counting centre so that we could confirm our observation that the integrity of police and electoral officials in this respect was very good, as we are aware the ballot boxes have been moved several times since our departure from Kandep.

However we also believe it was not in the interests of candidates and supporters to attempt to corrupt the election by hijacking boxes. No candidate would benefit from going back to the courts. Thus we believe that the electoral strategies of candidates focused more on influencing the outcome of the election in other ways.

Voters and supporters (from all prominent candidates) were able to influence the course of elections by taking advantage of under-manned polling stations, coordinating block votes or negotiating their supporters to mark ballots in the

5 manner they had decided beforehand. This was common practise at the majority of polling places.

This is certainly fraudulent in relation to legal procedures, but not completely undemocratic. However at any polling station it has the effect of magnifying the influence of the supporters present who were in the majority over the result, and minimising the influence of the minority.

The team did not observe one instance of a properly conducted poll. The coordination of block votes and the disruption of proper procedure across the district were achieved not because polling officials or police were corruptible or corrupted, but because they were understaffed, most often pressed for time and keen to conduct the vote as quickly as possible. This benefited all candidates in their stronghold areas.

Unorthodox or illegal voting behaviour also occurred and police did not seem to have instructions to intervene in order to prevent it. In the very small instances where police tried to intervene, this was on an ad hoc basis. Rather, the task of police seemed simply to ensure the safety and security of officials and the ballots. This put police under particular pressure to conduct the ballot as rapidly as possible. This is problematic because with polling officials dismissed, the police also were performing key functions such as managing the roll, applying the ink and in many cases assisting to mark ballots.

We also believe that there was simply no enabling apparatus for a well conducted poll. That is, the planning seemed to have been focused on 'getting the poll done' safely, rather than explicit consideration of what resources and planning would be required to conduct a free and fair election.

An additional challenge was the lack of an effective means of voter identification and any working methods of detecting multiple voters. Even when indelible ink was used, it was simply reapplied without question to people voting multiple times. The visual proof of having already voted counted for nothing at the gate of a polling area.

The main means of voter identification available to gatekeepers was gauging the response of the crowd as to whether the voter named was in fact the voter who responded and attempted to vote. This occurred in the small number of instances where there were attempts to use the roll to manage voters. This form of voter identification appeared to catch many – but not all – multiple voters. It is certainly not a scientific manner of identifying voters and clearly vulnerable to fraud.

The team was also interested to note that whilst multiple voting is common, most people – voters, officials and security – will admit that it is wrong. Proxy voting for absent family members, by contrast, appears completely acceptable to voters and to gatekeepers.

The team believes there are also problems with the accuracy of the list of voters on each ward. Our population and roll figures (given below) suggest that there is a significant degree of over-enrolment in Kandep. However there were so few instances where the roll was used that it was impossible to use this by-election

6 to audit the roll.

The lack of a secret ballot was the norm. It was rarely attempted, and with the dismissal of all but one polling official per polling place, it was an impossible task. The provision of only one cardboard booth to each polling station appeared to be a tacit advance acknowledgement that a secret ballot would not be achieved.

Without a secret ballot it will be impossible to truly understand the impact of the new voting system.

In regards to LPV, the team was not in a position to observe the awareness programs undertaken. However we are aware that awareness was conducted in the weeks before polling by Caritas PNG, the Saint Philomena Foundation, and the Laiagam Porgera HIV Theatre Troupe.

In the small pockets of reasonable good polling procedure, where we saw neutral assistance being given to voters, all but a few voters seemed aware of the need to point out three preferences in descending order. Women and the elderly seemed to be aware of the need to give three preferences. We were not in a position to judge how many voters would have needed assistance to actually mark a ballot, as assistance tended to be given to everyone. However we suspect it would be a high number. Police in particular were observed to give very good, neutral (albeit not secret) assistance to voters.

We also observed some candidates clearly forming alliances to try and get their joint primary vote to be enough to push the count into exclusions and reallocation of preferences. This is exactly the kind of behaviour that the new LVP voting system is intended to develop. However the problem is that it is not voters marking ballots, but rather supporters of candidates, who engineer the allotment of votes and preferences. Therefore we are unsure if this flow of preferences would be reflected in a scenario where all voters marked their choices freely.

Finally, we acknowledge that the security situation declined sharply on the day following the close of polls and we give some assessment as to the cause of that decline, based on our observation and experience in Kandep. No amount of hindsight can lead to clear recommendations as to how that very serious security situation could be avoided, however we do believe there are still valuable lessons that can be learned from the polling period in Kandep. These are listed on page 37.

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Introduction

This observation of the Kandep By-election was conducted between Sunday November 15th and Friday November 19th 2009.

This project was narrower in scope and in timeframe than many past observations of national elections and by-elections. Transparency International PNG (TIPNG) was asked to assemble a team to observe the polling period, and, if it fell within the allocated timeframe, the preparedness for and conduct of the count. This arrangement did not allow the team to observe the campaigning and nomination period, the conduct of any awareness or training, or finally the conduct of the count, which progresses as this report is being written. However where we are confident in the validity of reports on these aspects of the by- election, we have included some reference to them.

The objectives of the observation were:

1. To conduct observation of the Kandep By-election on November 16th 2009, as well as the subsequent assembly of ballots and initial counting phase from November 17th – 19th; 2. To observe, record and report aspects of voter behaviour during the by- election; 3. To observe, record and report aspects of polling, including the conduct and adherence to procedure by polling officials and security officers, the subsequent assembly of ballots, and the initial counting phase; 4. To survey voters and key informants on their perceptions and experiences of the conduct of the by-election; 5. To focus observation on the polling places identified in the National Court Ruling as having been the site of proven allegations of electoral fraud or misconduct in the 2007 National Elections.

Methods

The observation team utilised methods field-tested in the 2007 National Election by both the TIPNG Domestic Observation Team1 and the National Research Institute Domestic Observation Team2.

This involved developing a handbook to focus observation on relevant procedures during the pre-polling, polling and post-polling period in a way that was systematic and comparable from observer to observer. This handbook drew on both the 2007 TIPNG and NRI Domestic Observation handbooks. It is attached in the appendix.

This handbook was intended to capture the adherence to electoral procedures set out in the Organic Law on National & Local Level Government Elections (OLNLLGE) and the Elections Regulations 2007. It also guided observers to

1 Report on TIPNG Civil Society Observation Project, 2007, Transparency International PNG 2 Haley and Anere, Papua New Guinea National General Elections Domestic Observation Report, National Research Institute Special Publication No. 52, 2009.

8 systematically capture key aspects of voter behaviour: the behaviour of crowds, the incidence of multiple voting, the incidence of assisted voting, the behaviour of candidates and the nature of the security situation.

The handbook had separate sections for the observation of: • The Pre-Polling Period • The Opening of Polling • General Polling Day Observations • The Closing of Polling • The Post-Polling Period.

We are particularly indebted to Marcus Pelto, Emily George Taule and Simon Jenkins (of the TIPNG 2007 Observation Team), Dr Nicole Haley and Dr Ray Anere (of the 2007 NRI Observation Team) and Dr Bill Standish (who has conducted a number of elections observations in PNG) for their willingness to help this observation by providing both input into the handbook and insights from previous observation experiences.

In addition to observations, all team members where necessary and appropriate interviewed Electoral Commission officials and security officials to verify information and clarify any questions. These interviews were not designed to elicit qualitative data on the conduct of elections, but rather as a means of verifying our own observations.

The team did intend to survey equal numbers of male and female voters on their experiences and perceptions of the conduct of polling day. This was planned in order to meet objective four (listed above) for this project. A survey tool was developed with advice from a number of the persons listed above. It was also translated so that it could be administered in Tok Pisin. It is included as an appendix for its potential future value to election observations.

However, we have not used the limited data gained due to our belief that, for a range of reasons, it did not generate valid data. These reasons are elaborated in the Reflections on Observations section of this report.

The Observation Team

The team, coordinated by Transparency International PNG, consisted of four Port Moresby-based researchers: George Butler (TIPNG), Katherine Wheen and Mathlina Somo (National Research Institute) and Brian Waffi, a recent graduate of Law at the University of Papua New Guinea. That team also engaged four Wabag-based civil society representatives from Caritas PNG and the St. Philomena Foundation: Jacob Pos, Jenny Tangula, Andrew Aipi and Kenneth Peter. The local knowledge of our driver, Philip Nosine, was also invaluable.

Polling Places Observed

As stated in our objectives, the team made every effort to visit as many ‘hot spots’ from the 2007 Election as possible. These were identified from the

9 National Court Decision delivered on 14th August 2009. Unfortunately the uncertainty of the logistics and mobilisation on the day before and during polling made it difficult to confirm when polling teams were departing. Some improvisation was required just in order to get our teams out to polling stations at all. The list of the ‘hot spots’ observed in this by-election is copied below.

Table 1: Key ‘Hot Spots’ Identified from the National Court Decision Polling Place Votes Grounds of Allegation Visited in 2009 Affected Kolopa 1 541 Ballot stuffing / no polling Yes Kolopa 2 481 Ballot stuffing / no polling Yes Kambia 3 No polling took place, however no Not a polling illegal practices were proven place in 2009 Kambia 2 380 Ballot stuffing / no polling Yes Kambia 1 236 Ballot stuffing / no polling No Winja 2 634 Ballot stuffing No Wasa/Sawi 384 Ballot stuffing No Kokas 2 696 Ballot stuffing/ failure of poll Yes Poketamanda 2 346 Ballot stuffing Yes Lyumbi Island 496 Ballot stuffing Yes Kenean 683 Ballot stuffing/ marking of papers No Laguni 920 Ballot stuffing/ marking of papers Yes Imipiaka 643 Ballot stuffing/ marking of papers No Titip 1046 Ballot stuffing/ marking of papers No

All polling places visited by the team are listed below. Wherever possible it was our intention to spend no less than an hour observing polling places, where it was possible to move between them. In remote areas there was no choice but to remain in one polling place all day. Ideally teams travelled in groups of two, though where we were reliably informed that the security situation was acceptable, some members travelled by themselves to observe polling places. In addition to trying to visit ‘hot-spots’ the team also made an attempt to visit polling places known to be strongholds of different candidates.

Table 2: Polling Places Observed and Timing of Observations. Ward Polling Place LLG Opening General Closing of of Poll Polling Poll 1 Wert 1 Kandep Yes Yes Yes 4 Supi 1 Kandep Yes Yes No 6 Gini 1 Kandep Yes Yes Yes 8 Imali 1 Kandep Yes Yes No 9 Pindak 1 Kandep Yes Yes No 12 Kolopa 1 Kandep No Yes No 22 Yapum Kandep Yes Yes Yes 25 Lyumbi Island Kandep No Yes Yes 26 Porgeramanda Kandep Yes Yes No 27 Kokas 1 Kandep No Yes Yes 31 Wert 2 Kandep Yes Yes Yes 34 Supi 2 Kandep Yes Yes No 35 Gini 2 Kandep Yes Yes Yes

10 Ward Polling Place LLG Opening General Closing of of Poll Polling Poll 36 Komboros 2 Kandep Yes Yes Yes 40 Kambia 2 Kandep No Yes Yes 41 Kolopa 2 Kandep No Yes Yes 48 Kokas 2 Kandep No Yes No 55 Maru Wage Yes Yes Yes 61 Kinkuli Wage Yes Yes Yes 62 Laguni Wage Yes Yes Yes Table 2 continued...

Prior to the observation, the team requested a copy of the Form 66A from the 2007 Elections in order to examine the outcome of the counting of each of the polling places. This was deemed important in that it would develop a good picture of some of the factors that would influence the conduct of polls in each polling place in the by-election and help us decide the key places to send observers. We are told that this form could not be supplied due to the form being held by the PNGEC’s lawyers.

The following report is divided into a background to the Kandep By-election, an observation section and section on lessons for future elections.

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Background to the Kandep By-election

About Kandep District3

Kandep District is the southern-most district in Enga Province. It includes the Wage Valley, the Kandep Basin and surrounding mountains. Roads link Kandep to Laiagam in the north and to the Southern Highlands Province in the south, however travel from this district to the provincial capital Wabag requires at least three hours. Some roads are being improved in the district at present; however most of the district has very poor quality roads, especially for travel in the direction of Mendi.

Agricultural production centres on subsistence kaukau and potato production however the land potential is mostly poor. The district is dominated by swamplands. Food security is vulnerable to both frosts and drought and incomes are low throughout the district.

According the NEFC’s 2004 District Development Index, Kandep is ranked the 19th least developed district out of 85 rural districts not including the urban districts of NCD and Lae4.

The total population of Kandep in the 2000 census was 47,400 (51.1% male and 48.9% female), and in 2009, using a 2.7% national growth rate, the population can be estimated at around 60,244.

The voting age population in the 2000 Census was 25,054, and with the same growth rate applied, the estimated population in 2009 would be around 31,843. The number of names on the 2007 Electoral Roll for the Kandep District, which was the roll used in the by-election, was calculated by this team to be 42,3175.

Recent Elections in Kandep

Don Polye, of the National Alliance Party, has been the sitting member since 2002 when he won a close election against the former sitting member Jimson Sauk (see 2002 results below).

Don Polye, an engineer by profession, has come to national prominence, becoming the Deputy Prime Minister in the 2002-07 Parliament and serving most recently as the Minister for Transport, Civil Aviation and Works.

Enga Province itself has an interesting political dynamic with four of the five District MPs being National Alliance Party members. These members have often had public political disagreements with the Enga Provincial Member and Governor Peter Ipatas, of the People’s Party. Ipatas voted for Somare to

3 This section is sourced from the National Research Institute District and Provincial Profiles Project. 4 National Economic and Fiscal Commission, Review of Intergovernmental Financing Arrangements (RIGFA), District Development Index, March 2004. 5 This figure was calculated by determining the total number of ballot papers through the sequential serial numbers, and deducting the additional two ballot papers per polling place.

12 become the Prime Minister in 2007 but is not a close coalition partner. These tensions were obvious most recently at the June 2009 meeting of the National Executive Council in Wabag, where there was conflict over whether it would be the provincial government or the district administrations who would distribute K142 million in electoral funds6.

The results of the 2007 Election, as posted on the PNGEC Website in 2007, were as follows:

Table 3: Declared Results 2007 Ballot Final Percent Name Party Order Count Don Pomb Polye (sitting 68.99% 26 National Alliance 21,820 member) 16 Loya Luke Alfred Manase United Party 3,149 9.96% 18 Herman Lyamugi Anep Independent 1,730 5.47% 14 Jimson Sauk People's Party 1,437 4.54% 13 Michael Marabe Independent 1,135 3.59% 17 James Tubin Akalyanda People’s Progress Party 836 2.64% 24 Kenneth Yonge Andrew Independent 481 1.52% 22 Peter Mision Yaki PANGU Party 475 1.50% 12 Be Pepo New Generation Party 452 1.43% 19 India Rasta Pupakai Independent 80 0.25% 23 Philip Pelepa Pamono Independent 21 0.07% 25 Lesri Mose Yaka Independent 9 0.03% 20 Win Amos Lian Independent 2 0.01% 21 Paul Itiogen Isaro Independent 1 0.00% 10 Leo Limbao Independent 0 0.00% 11 Kunda Lea Independent 0 0.00% 15 Buka Piri Independent 0 0.00% Total Allowable Ballots: 31,628 Informal Ballots: 99

As can be seen above, the total allowable ballots were far fewer than the number of names on the roll. This was not a feature of poor voter turnout, but a feature of candidates successfully petitioning to exclude entire ballot boxes from the count. This fact is recorded in the National Court decision.

Table 4: Declared Results 2002 Ballot Final Percent Name Party Order Count 7 Don Pomb Pullie Polye National Alliance 13,599 36.40% 5 Jimson Sauk (sitting People’s Democratic 11,763 31.50% member) Movement 6 James A. Tubin Independent 3,473 9.30% 8 Peter Mision Yaki United Party 2,806 7.50% 11 Joseph Karapai Kai People’s Labour Party 2,080 5.60% 10 Sam Rau PNG National Party 1,481 4.00% 3 Philip Pelepa Pamono Melanesian People’s Party 1,321 3.50% 2 Elvis Nakubin Paraki Independent 801 2.10%

6 David Muri, ‘Ipatas, MPs clash outside Mt Hagen court’, The National, 21st June 2009.

13 4 Kii Nom Independent 10 0.00% 9 John Lakai Independent 4 0.00% 1 Ben Itiok Yalan PNG Integrity Party 2 0.00% Total Allowable Ballots: 37,340 Informal Ballots: 112

The by-election for Kandep District was the result of a protracted court process. Soon after the election both Don Polye and his closest rival, Alfred Manase traded accusations and counter-accusations in the media accusing each other of using fraudulent means to disrupt the election. Alfred Manase brought a petition to the courts and eventually 31 of the 37 grounds presented went to trial.

The National Court Decision of Justice Lay7 was brought down on the 14th of August 2009. It ruled that the First Respondent Don Pomb Polye was not duly elected, and the 2007 Election was thus void.

Don Polye had polled a total of 21,820 votes out of 31,546 formal ballots. This represented 69% of the vote, the largest primary vote of any elected member in the 2007 Elections. This result constituted a winning margin of 6,047, meaning that Don Polye polled 6,047 more votes than what was required for a majority of the primary vote, that is 15,774 (50% + 1).

The court then found that the total number of votes subject to illegal practices, which was ruled to be 7,562 votes, exceeded the winning margin.

The Lay Decision states that most of these grounds fell under five key themes:

1. The hijacking of ballot boxes and ballot papers, completing them and inserting them into ballot boxes, that is ‘stuffing’ the ballot boxes; 2. Officials marking ballots contrary to the wishes of the voter; 3. Complete destruction of ballot papers through the deliberate interference of members of the public, caused in most instances by ballots being marked against a voters wish; 4. Electoral Officials mistakenly sending ballot boxes to incorrect locations, resulting in too few or too many votes being available at certain polling places; 5. Manipulation of the counting of ballot papers by refusal to count the contents of ballot boxes for unlawful reasons.

Of the grounds that went to trial, thirteen involved ballot boxes from places where the First Respondent, Mr Polye received 100% of the vote. Justice Lay used this as a determining factor in terms of believing one body of evidence over another, arguing that in such instances as one candidate receiving 100% of the vote, it would indicate some occurrence of wrongdoing. Justice Lay reflected that misinformation, deliberate lying and imperfect recollections of witnesses on both sides made this a very difficult decision. Certain electoral officials have also been referred for criminal proceedings.

In one example, the polling places of Kambia 1,2 and 3 and Kolopa 1 and 2, the judge accepted evidence that the filled boxes arrived back at Kandep Station at

7 Papua New Guinea National Court of Justice, EP No. 3 of 2007, 14th August 2009

14 10:00am on the morning of polling, suggesting that not enough time had passed for normal polling to take place. As a consequence, it was accepted that the ballot boxes, all of which registered a 100% vote for the First Respondent, fell into the custody of unauthorised persons during the night and were illegally stuffed before the polls opened.

Aside from the specific illegal practices that were found in the court decision, it was also noted in the decision that four more general issues had affected the poll:

• There were a little over 50 combined police and army personnel deployed in Kandep, along with an unknown number of reserve police. The court reflected that in order to provide just two personnel per polling place, a total force of 222 security personnel would be required; • The transportation of ballots was also undertaken late in the afternoon and at night at an unacceptably high level of risk and with no security escort; • That scrutineers were placed in an area where they were able to closely observe voters in contravention of the law; • That there were unacceptably high levels of assisted voting, and that polling officials appeared to have no knowledge of the procedures for assisted voting.

The former sitting member, Don Polye opted not to appeal the decision, and therefore a by-election was called. Section 226 of the OLNLLGE states that if an election is declared absolutely void by the court, a new election must be called as soon as practicable.

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Pre-Polling Period

The observation team arrived at Kandep Station at 11:00am on November 15th and effectively commenced the observation immediately. A large crowd of supporters aligned with the various candidates were assembled around the district buildings at this time.

Although at times slightly unruly, the assembled people were not behaving in a threatening or violent manner, and no weapons outside of the occasional bush knife could be seen.

The major concern of the assembled candidates and their supporters as the team arrived was the appointment of polling officials, which had just been publicised that morning.

The Candidates

Fifteen candidates contested the by-election (see table below). The candidates appeared to coalesce into two groups: those aligned with the former member and those aligned in opposition to the former member.

Table 5: Candidates in the 2009 By-election Ballot Name Party Order 10 Peter Mision Yaki Independent 11 Win Amos Independent 12 Luke Alfred Manase Independent 13 Kenneth Yonge Andrew Independent 14 Lesri Mose Yaka Independent 15 Don Pomb Polye National Alliance 16 Buka Piri Independent 17 Be Pepo Independent 18 Kunda Lea Independent 19 Moses Wage Liu Independent 20 India Rasta Pupakai Independent 21 Depo Danny Kaundu Independent 22 Leo Limbo Independent 23 Robin Kurum Aipi Independent 24 Herman Lyamugi Anep Independent

The National Alliance candidate, Don Pomb Polye was the only candidate affiliated with a political party. Many candidates who were nominated by political parties in 2007 re-contested in 2009 as independents.

We were informed that other political parties were reluctant to openly contest this by-election, and were perhaps reluctant to lend a party's reputation to candidates that they did not expect to succeed. This unwillingness by other parties to contest does not give hope for the evolution of a range of strong political parties in PNG politics. Anecdotal sources indicated however that some

16 parties were supporting certain candidates in a tacit or 'behind the scenes' fashion.

Observers were reliably informed that campaign rallies were held by many of the candidates in the lead up to the polls, and that the Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare himself was present at one rally at Kandep Station in support of the National Alliance. Observers also heard reports of large rallies in Hagen, where National Alliance members gave their support to their candidate, Don Polye. These rallies were not incident-free, and two were reportedly disrupted due to tear-gas being thrown into assembled crowds of supporters.

Appointment and Preparedness of Polling Officers

From the lists displayed that morning, four people were initially appointed to each polling place: the Presiding Officer (PO), an Assistant Presiding Officer (APO) and two poll clerks.

All 74 POs were recruited from outside Enga Province. They included Election Managers from around the country as well as Electoral Commission staff from Madang, Momase and Hela Provinces.

The observation team understands that all Presiding Officers underwent a ‘Train the Trainers’ workshop in the days before the by-election, designed to ‘cascade’ their skills and training to the local polling officers. The team did not observe this training, but observed a number of presiding officers in possession of the 2007 Polling Officials Manual.

Whilst the POs generally seemed to be well regarded and considered by all candidates to be both neutral and experienced, the appointment of other polling officials proved contentious with a large number of gathered candidates and supporters. Their concerns related to the engagement of those who had also worked as officials during the 2007 National Election (discussed below).

Candidates' Briefing

A briefing was conducted between the candidates, the Returning Officer (RO) Mr Tore Porevare (Election Manager for Central Province), the two Assistant Returning Officers (AROs) Kila Egaba (Election Manager for Oro Province) and Kila Ralai (Election Manager for Madang Province), and senior police officials Special Operations Commander Supt. Joseph Morehari and Highlands Region Police Commander Simon Kaupa on November 15th, starting at about 11:50am. After being addressed by officials and police the candidates had an opportunity to raise concerns.

The four main issues were: • Grievances with the local polling officials appointed for the by-election; • The location of the counting centre; • The necessity of one day or staggered polling; • General security concerns.

17 Appointment of Polling Officials

Several candidates raised concerns with the Returning Officer that the Assistant Presiding Officers and other polling officials were largely the same as those employed during the 2007 National Elections. The concerns were that many of these polling officials were aligned with specific candidates and were allegedly complicit with the proven cases of electoral fraud that led to the voiding of the 2007 Election result by the National Court.

The Returning Officer informed the candidates that any objections to particular polling officials would be handled on a case-by-case basis. During the course of the afternoon, certain officials were struck from the list according to objections made to the RO.

Location of the Counting Centre

Some candidates raised concerns about the security of the counting of ballots at Kandep Station. Approximately half appeared in favour of the count remaining in Kandep. The other half had concerns that security would be compromised. There was no indication given by the Returning Officer that he was considering an alternative venue for the counting of votes at this stage.

One Day Polling

The most divisive issue among candidates during the briefing was the issue of one day polling versus staggered polling. Again, one group of aligned candidates spoke strongly in favour of polling being conducted over a number of days. They cited logistical and security concerns as their main reasons for requesting a staggered poll. Another group of aligned candidates were strongly in favour of a one day poll, arguing that it was the best way to control multiple voting.

The Returning Officer reiterated his commitment to one day polling as per the original plan. He added however that were was a good amount of flexibility in the planning and hence, if necessary, polling could be extended if the situation required.

Security

The police informed all candidates that armed bodyguards would not be tolerated by the police and would be arrested by security personnel. There was no dissent from candidates to this. After that point observers did not witness candidates being escorted by armed bodyguards (some of whom had arrived with visibly armed escorts). Some candidates also took this opportunity to accuse each other of arming their supporters.

In addition to these four main concerns, there was also some consternation that the briefing for candidates was being held on the day immediately prior to the election, which some considered too late.

18

Ongoing Crowd Concerns

Towards the end of the day another crowd marched to the gate of the District Treasury Building, where most Electoral Commission staff and the Presiding Officers were gathering with their allotted teams of polling officials. This crowd effectively prevented movement both in and out of this area for a short time. Tensions were raised briefly by an attempt by police to disperse the crowd by driving a vehicle into it.

This group was angry that the impartiality of polling officials had not been resolved. The leaders of this group indicated that they would maintain their blockade of the gate until their demands regarding the removal of these officials were met. This did not eventuate and people were allowed to move in and out again after a short period of time, however these concerns simmered overnight.

Readiness of Officials and Materials

All Presiding Officers and most other PNG Electoral Commission staff, including the Returning Officer, Assistant Returning Officers and polling officials, were already present at Kandep Station when the observation period began.

These officials were given their team & ward allotment by the AROs in the afternoon of the 15th. Presiding Officers were given their allotted equipment (polling booths, stationery, ink, copies of the roll) the same afternoon. By late afternoon all 74 teams had gathered and were in possession of the polling materials with the exception of the ballot papers.

Ballot Paper Scrutiny

All ballot papers were examined on the day before the polls opened by official scrutineers and some candidates. The ballot papers were removed from the sealed boxes by Electoral Commission staff. They had already been counted and packaged ready for distribution to individual polling places. The assembled people were informed that each packet contained the number of ballots required per ward as per the details on the electoral roll, plus an additional two ballot papers. Each packet was clearly labelled with the ward number, ward name, the number of ballot papers enclosed, and the serial number range. These details were read aloud in order of ward number to those assembled, who had ample time to record the details. At no time were the individual packages of ballot papers opened during this process.

When this procedure was complete, the ballot papers were re-sealed within their containers until the next morning.

The total number of ballot papers issued for Kandep LLG was 26,755, representing ballot paper numbers 00000001 through to 00026755. The total number of ballot papers issued for Wage LLG was 15,711, representing ballot paper numbers 00034290 through to 00050000. The ballot papers numbered

19 00026756 through to 00034289 were not present.

Readiness of Police

The observation team was not aware of the operational planning of the security forces. However the team was in a position to make the following observations regarding security arrangements:

• The Police had a large presence at the commencement of the observation period, and while the total number deployed is not known we were reliably informed that the police had sufficient personnel to have five to six officers simultaneously mobilised to each of the 74 polling places. • The number of police mobilised, and the organisational aspects of their deployment, appeared sufficient to protect polling officials before, during and after their duties were carried out. The police appeared well organised to support the commencement of polling and were ready to deploy early in the morning of November 16th. • Police did not appear to make a concerted attempt to pacify or exert control over the Kandep district as a whole. Their security arrangements appeared exclusively focused on the maintenance of a safe and orderly poll, protection of ballot boxes, and the protection of polling officials and other civilians present (media, observers, and others). • The police were able to conduct regular patrols along the main roads leading in and out of Kandep Station, and other roads in the district. Police movement was mainly in four-wheel-drive vehicles. However police mobility was impeded by road conditions and weather. On polling days a large number of police were inserted into and extracted from polling places by helicopter. • Almost all police officers performing duties at polling places were openly armed. In non-polling situations, approximately 70-80% of police openly carried weapons. • Most of Kandep District is without mobile phone coverage. The police remained in contact through the use of satellite phones and two-way radios, however communications in the district remained a challenge, particularly in very remote areas and between the police and Electoral Commission staff. • Due to the dismissal of all but one polling official for each polling station, the police role on polling day was quite unorthodox, and police performed many crucial polling functions including managing the use of the roll, gate keeping, the application of ink, the supervision of the ballot box, and in many instances the marking of ballot papers. This will be discussed below.

20 Polling Day

Staffing of Polling Places and the Dismissal of APOs and Polling Clerks

The morning of polling (Monday 16th) began with the early arrival of a candidate who blockaded the gate of the district administration building and continued to express his grievance over the perceived partisan bias of polling officials. In response, the Returning Officer announced before 8:00am that all polling officials (poll clerks and Assistant Presiding Officers) would be dismissed, and that the polling would be conducted in each polling place by one Presiding Officer and an estimated five to six security officials.

This decision was made to provide confidence that polling officials, and the election process, would be unbiased and neutral. Regardless of the decision's success in this regard, a clear consequence was that all polling booths in the Kandep By-election were seriously understaffed. As it became clear that one day polling would not be practicable, POs from places that were not polling on the first day were sent to assist in other polling places. This meant that the number of polling officials ranged between one and two at all polling places.

It was also apparent that in some cases the polling officials who had been dismissed (marked by the fact they were wearing their white LPV shirts) continued to serve some ad hoc functions on polling day. In some instances this involved assisting the set up of polling places, and in other instances these officials were clearly an unauthorised and partisan presence in the polling area.

The distribution of ballot papers by the two Assistant Returning Officers to the various ballot boxes and the attaching of internal seals commenced at approximately 8:30 on the morning of polling, after the polling clerks had been dismissed. This lengthy process, along with the overall uncertainty in regards to the wards that would actually be polled on the day, contributed a late start of polling.

Logistics on the Morning of the Poll

A number of decisions regarding logistics were made and changed on the beginning of polling day. They were influenced by: • the delays caused in the previous afternoon and morning; • the concern for the weather and whether helicopters would be available; • continual petitioning by candidates.

It was initially announced that the entire Wage LLG would not poll on Monday. Then it was reported that all locations in both Kandep and Wage LLG that required helicopter support would not poll on Monday.

In the end, the majority of polling stations accessible by road in both Kandep and Wage LLGs went to the polls on the 16th. The first polling teams departed Kandep Station at 9:30am with the ballot boxes and travelled to polling stations

21 accessible by road. A small number of helicopter sorties commenced at 11.10am to insert polling teams and ballot boxes in some remote areas.

At least twelve helicopter locations in Wage LLG and more than 20 in Kandep LLG did not poll on Monday. A small amount of polling stations that were accessible by road also did not poll on Monday.

Timing of Polls

No polling commenced in the Kandep By-election according to the Organic Law’s mandated time of 8:00am (s.130). Of the ten observations of the opening of polling stations that the team made, no stations opened before 11:00am, with the first voters generally receiving their ballot papers closer to 12:00 noon.

Security Arrangements at Polling Stations

Security arrangements at polling stations were generally good. Once one day polling had been abandoned, and on the second and third polling days, police were deploying between eight to ten (certainly no less than six officers) to polling stations.

At three locations – Pindak, Komboros 2 and Kokos 2 – observers visited polling stations that had no security presence at the time of our visit. These appeared to be locations which conducted a block vote for one candidate, who lived in or had a relative from the village. Of the other polling places visited the security presence was typically four to six officers on Monday, six to eight on Tuesday, and eight to ten on Wednesday.

Unlike what seemed to be the last minute organisation and deployment of polling officials, police appeared to know where they were going and were often forced to wait for the deployment of polling officials and ballot boxes.

Initially, it was planned that police were to secure most polling stations travelling by road, with helicopters inserting and extracting ballot papers and polling officials once the area had been secured. Due to a combination of road conditions and changes of planning, more police would be transported by helicopter, increasing the number of helicopter sorties that needed to be made to remote locations.

Observers were aware of some instances where poor communication between the polling teams and the security saw some polling locations secured by police, only to have the ballot boxes not arrive by helicopter that day. By the Tuesday there seemed to be much better coordination between police, transport and polling officials.

Locations of Polling Stations

A number of polling places were set up in locations that did not correspond with the actual gazetted location.

22

On the 16th of November Komboros 1 and 2 polled in the same location, near the village of Konda. This was done because an unresolved tribal fight threatened to spill over into the actual gazetted locations.

At Lyumbi Island, where polling was conducted on the 17th, the polling place was moved to the highway due to difficulties accessing the gazetted location, which lacked road access.

At Yapum, where polling was held on the 16th, the gazetted location was abandoned in favour of the local parish, as this was deemed a more neutral location. The police agreed to this change on the advice of the ward councillor.

A number of polling places that should have been set up some distance apart were set up in the same location. This happened at Wert 1 and Wert 2 on the 16th, Gini 1 and Gini 2 on the 16th, Supi 1 and Supi 2 on the 16th, and Kolopa 1 and Kolopa 2 on the 17th. Typically these polling places were set up on the same field or open area, with no more than 25 metres (usually less) separating them.

At Imali 1, where polling took place on the 16th, a local ward councillor and other members of the community attempted to have the polling relocated to a non- gazetted location. This attempt was not successful, however did cause some confusion as a number of voters had already proceeded to the alternate place of polling.

There appeared to be three prevailing motivations behind the relocation of polling places from gazetted locations: • security concerns, or concerns regarding the neutrality of a gazetted location; • relocation in order to deliver advantage to one candidate over the other, for example through closer proximity to supporter's villages; • in the case of two polling places being set up in close proximity, to facilitate the ease of movement of voters between the polling places.

At times it was difficult to ascertain which of these motivations were applicable, and indeed in many cases more than one may have been the cause of relocation.

Set Up of Polling Places

All polling places observed during the Kandep By-election were set up outside, even in instances where buildings were available.

Polling officials were deployed with one cardboard polling booth, one tarpaulin and one ball of string for the set up of a polling booth. Where possible, ward councillors or other local people supplied bush materials and tables. In some instances tables were fashioned from any materials which could be found in the vicinity.

Though the cardboard booths tended to be mostly superfluous to the voting in

23 the Kandep By-election, it would nonetheless have been impossible to poll 400 to 1,000 voters in a polling place using a single booth, even in instances where a secret ballot could be sustained.

Polling booths were either set up and simply not used, or set up in a way where many people could crowd around them. In most polling places that did not witness a block vote, once people received their ballot papers they were marshalled into two lines to cast their votes. This would suggest that at least two booths would have been ideal.

The time to set up a polling station (the time between the arrival of the polling team and the time when the first voter received their ballot) varied between half an hour to one hour and 45 minutes. The longest delays were caused by the need to procure or build a table to use. In some instances this compounded upon the other delays, creating greater pressure to complete polling swiftly.

Procedure of Opening

The procedures for opening the polling were very good. In all observed instances, the inner seal was read out and removed, the ballot box was displayed as empty, the numbered series of ballots read to an audience and the new inner tag was applied. This worked like clockwork.

In all observed cases, the Presiding Officer also gave a reasonably comprehensible explanation of the voting in Tok Pisin to the assembled crowd, in some cases with a local translating into the Engan language.

Conduct of Polling

The observation team was present at 20 out of the 71 polling places that voted during the three days of polling. The polling team did not observe one incidence of properly conducted poll, that is, a poll that conformed to the OLNLLGE and the Election Regulations. It was reported to observers that one small polling station, located near Kandep Station and managed by a very experienced female election manager, was managed according to procedure.

The conduct varied widely from polling place to polling place, and even between two polling places in the same location. Voting conduct included and at times combined: • lain up voting, where voters simply lined up and received ballots with no use of the roll; • man-meri voting, where voters lined up according to gender, and as the roll was called the next woman or the next man in line would proceed; • block voting, where the community would dictate the number of votes (including preferences) to go to each candidate, usually before the start of polling.

A best case scenario was seen at Lyumbi Island, which involved a reasonable use of the roll, albeit with no watertight control of double voting and complete tolerance of proxy voting on behalf of family members. Voters appeared to be

24 freely able to make their choice, although without a secret ballot, by giving their choices to a security officer who marked the ballot within sight and earshot of scrutineers.

Typically polling stations might establish one procedure working well, only to have this compromised by other procedures in the polling station working poorly.

For instance, at Kokas 1 there were genuine attempts to use the roll to ensure only eligible people were voting, however voters were then seen handing their empty ballot paper to an ‘appointed’ community member (a supporter of one candidate) to be filled out. On the other hand, at Kinkuli the gate keeper’s role was compromised by two candidate supporters, who were shepherding their own people through to vote multiple times. Nonetheless a security official was successful in ensuring a secret ballot took place.

The Electoral Roll

The electoral roll did not feature prominently in the Kandep By-election.

The by-election was not conducted in a manner that allowed observers to make any judgements on the accuracy and integrity of the roll across the district, due to the very high instance of lain-up voting, man-meri voting, tainim-tebol voting and block voting.

In the few instances where the roll was used some administrative problems were detected. For instance, approximately half the voters from Wert 1 found themselves on Wert 2 roll, and visa versa, leading to much confusion. In Yapum, people complained that names on the roll were supposed to be listed by clan, however they turned out to be listed in alphabetical order by surname.

Unfortunately, due to the extent of unorthodox practises, it was impossible to make any further reflections on the quality of the roll except that, as indicated by figures given above, there appears to be significant over-enrolment in the district.

The electoral roll contained a column for the occupation of voters, which seemed a more or less redundant piece of information to identify voters, whereas the names of parents would have been much more useful had this data been recorded on the roll.

Voter Identification

Occasions were observed where gatekeepers (who were often security officials), when attempting to use the roll properly, had to rely on the response of the crowd to detect whether the right voter was proceeding to collect their ballot paper.

Again, Lyumbi Island was a best case scenario, however it reflects the major challenges faced with voter identification. In this instance a police officer was

25 stationed at the gate, calling names from the roll. Around him a crowd of more than 300 were gathered. The crowd was rowdy and was consistently kept back from the polling gate by police brandishing sticks. As each name was called from the roll, the police officer attempted to determine (through judging the crowd's reaction) whether the correct voter came forward.

In this manner many attempts to double vote were prevented, despite the presence of a number of people hovering around the gate who would attempt to run in and collect ballot papers when absentee names were called. However proxy voting (family members voting for absentees) was permitted by the gatekeeper where the crowd insisted the proxy was a relative of the absent voter.

The number of ballot papers ran out when the gatekeeper was about 30 names from the end of the roll, suggesting that, if present, almost all voters had a good chance of being able to vote. However it was clear that many people were able to vote under other peoples' names, both by trying to dash through the gate undetected or by being recognised as a family member of the voter listed on the roll.

Polling at Yapum was another example of an attempted use of the roll, however proxy and multiple voting appeared easy to get away with. Remarkably, voting ended with 35 ballot papers to spare. This was unlike most other places that the team observed, where voting continued until all the ballots were finished, however we suspect that the polls closed due to general fatigue, the late afternoon hour and the perception that multiple voting had become commonplace.

The manner in which the roll was used during the Kandep By-election falls under three broad categories:

1. Names were called from the roll and a person responded by moving forward to collect ballot papers, however it was clear that the person was not the correct voter. This constituted either lain up voting, man meri voting or simply supporters hustling as many of their own people into the gate as possible. This was the case in Gini 1 and Gini 2, Kokas 2, Maru, Kinkuli, Kolopa 2, and Wert 2. These instances occurred mostly in areas where there was one dominant candidate, with everyone appearing to vote according to prior instruction.

2. Instances where the roll was used and some attempt was made to ensure the ‘real voter’ could vote. This occurred at Lyumbi Island, Yapum, Kokas 1, and Laguni. This was attempted with varying degrees of success, and people were tolerant of proxy voting. At Kokas 1 voters then handed their empty ballot paper to a candidate supporter who marked all the votes during the time of observation, however in other locations people were observed to be freely voting for whoever they chose, albeit without a secret ballot.

3. No use of the roll due to a block vote. This occurred in Kambia 2, Porgeramanda, Kolopa 1, Supi 1, Supi 2, Komboros 2, and Wert 1.

26 In the instance of a block vote, the roll was only useful insofar as it gave the total number of votes available. Knowing this total, decisions were then made by the assembled crowd on how many votes would be given to each candidate (six votes to one, 80 to another, 300 to another etc.). Once this was decided the ballots allocated to each of the candidates, including preferences, were marked identically by the PO or appointed community members.

Similar decisions were made at Kambia 2 and at Wert 1, where it was decided to halve the ballots between two candidates. These decisions appeared to have been made as a means of avoiding conflict between rival supporters. Presiding Officers, even with the full support of security, would have certainly put themselves at great risk if they had disallowed these block votes.

Desire to maintain the peace was the prevailing motivation of the assembled parties at some polling places. This was elegantly exemplified at Kambia 2, where an odd number of ballots caused much disquiet amongst supporters of the two candidates who had negotiated to split the vote in half. This was resolved with the intervention of the ward councillor who instructed the supporters to play a card game to decide the winner of the final vote.

In many polling places that were strongholds for particular candidates, a similar pattern was observed where a small amount of opposition voters (usually no more than 50) were allowed to vote first. Once this had finished, a block vote for the local candidate would then commence with an appointed person (varying from a candidate supporter to the Presiding Officer or police officer) would mark the rest of the ballots. This was the case in Supi 1, Supi 2, and Kolopa 1.

In these situations, opposing candidates' supporters often complained that they were not given enough ballot papers for the numbers they had present. These complaints did not end in violence but were simply resolved by the outnumbered supporters having to quietly acknowledge their numerical disadvantage and accept their share of the ballots as allotted by the larger group.

Broadly, when the effort was made by security officers to use the roll appropriately, polling was much more rowdy and the atmosphere more frenetic. However most observers reported that polling was more or less under control in all observed locations. Polling seemed to become a kind of point-scoring game for many assembled community members.

The observer team was however made aware that a number of other non- observed polling stations closed early due to security concerns, or were disrupted for long periods when groups of supporters or partisan local level government officials were attempting to influence the manner of voting.

Use of Ink

In the instances of a block vote, indelible ink was not used at all. At Porgeramanda the crowd rapidly dispersed once the block vote was agreed and very few people remained once the polls opened. When questioned, members of the crowd said they were then going to another polling station. A similar

27 situation was observed at Kolopa 1.

In instances where voters were passing through a polling station, the use of the ink to mark each voter was reasonably consistent. However in scheme of things this was a redundant exercise, as it was very rare to see voters being checked for ink.

At Kinkuli, observers noted people voting more than ten times, with the ink faithfully applied to the voter's finger every time that they voted. At Supi 1 observers noted that ink was initially used, then abandoned, then used again as the day progressed.

Assisted Voting

Assisted voting was the norm in Kandep District.

On only two instances was a secret ballot observed. In one case the completed ballot paper was handed to a man who read out the vote to scrutineers, while in the other instance the same voters were being recycled through the polling station in groups of ten, making the exercise of a secret ballot redundant.

Setting aside the lack of a secret ballot, there was a very small number of polling places where polling officials, security, and scrutineers accepted the wishes of people to make their own choice when casting their votes. This choice was however always made in a public manner.

However in most other places voters had no choice but to hand their empty ballot over to an appointed community member. Very rarely did this situation appear to be forced on an unwilling community. Rather, this process seemed to be met with ambivalence on the part of most voters, including women. This was particularly the case if the marking of ballot papers was pre-arranged in order to avoid conflict.

Understanding of LPV

Kandep offered very few opportunities to observe the overall understanding of LPV or the capacity of voters to mark a ballot correctly. These are indeed two separate issues.

In the words of one observer: "I saw about 2000 votes being cast in three days and I saw about 20 people mark their own ballot paper". Therefore, even without knowing the total number of informal votes, it is a reasonable conclusion that they would not give us any valuable information about whether voters were correctly able to mark their ballot.

Nonetheless, some polling places afforded a limited opportunity to observe the understanding of LPV voting. These places were Lyumbi Island, Yapum, and early voting at Kinkuli.

In these cases the vast majority of voters, including women and the elderly,

28 seemed to be aware that they needed to make three choices based on the photos of candidates presented in front of them. However at Yapum observers noticed that some elderly people were reluctant to vote in case they accidentally made a mistake and spoiled their ballot paper.

At Lyumbi Island and Kinkuli observers saw very good assistance being given by police and polling officials to help confused voters make their choices. About ten to twenty voters needed an official to take time to explain how they needed to indicate their choices. However with a candidate poster in front of them, all voters were able to point out their three selections and have their ballot marked by a police officer.

The observer team did not observe an occasion where a voter expressed their wishes clearly only to have that ballot marked contrary to their wishes. Rather, it was more likely that opposing supporters were simply less able to get into the gates of the polling place to cast their vote.

At no stage during the observation was a Presiding Officer or police officer observed taking a deliberately partisan approach to assisted voting. Rather, they tended to follow the power dynamics and the consensus of the surrounding crowd.

In regards to LPV, the team was not in a position to observe the awareness programs undertaken. However we are aware that awareness was conducted in the weeks before polling by Caritas PNG, the Saint Philomena Foundation, and the Laiagam Porgera HIV Theatre Troupe.

Civil society team members who were part of the observation were also involved in the LPV awareness activities. They described their attempts to particularly focus on hot spots, and their use of mock elections and mock counting, to raise awareness of LPV prior to the by-election. They also stated their belief in the effectiveness of these methods. LPV awareness was conducted during the fortnight before the by-election and the civil society team members reflected that this may have been somewhat late as they had to compete for attention with rallies held by candidates.

Impact of LPV

The impact of the new voting system on the election is difficult to say as this team did not observe and is not at this stage privy to the results of the count. However one difference we observed was the formation of apparent broad alliances of two groups of candidates, something that would have been improbable under First Past the Post voting.

One group of candidates, centered on Alfred Manase, Peter Mision Yaki, Andrew Kenneth Yonge and Be Pepo (and perhaps others), appear to have coordinated their preferences so that twos and threes would flow to Manase. Their strategy appeared to be focused on having the combined total of their primary vote be sufficient to send the count to the exclusions process.

Don Polye’s strategy appeared two fold. In the first place, it was to aim

29 principally for an absolute majority. However Polye also appeared to be closely aligned with six other candidates, who would have polled a very small primary vote, but whose votes early in the exclusion process would flow to Polye. People voting for Don Polye were also instructed to give their second preference to whomever they preferred amongst his allies. This would not have been a successful tactic due to the unlikelihood of Polye being excluded from the count, and suggests that this aspect of use of preferences was not well understood.

This is an assessment of apparent trends. However, in the event of the count going to exclusions, greater certainly in candidates' strategies could be deduced by analysing forms 66A and 66B. If a candidate wins by a majority then these forms will not be as useful in this sense as they will not record the trends of preferences.

Gifting

Due to the limited nature of the observation period (five days), it is impossible to determine the extent of gifting and vote buying. We can only say that no explicit gifting or vote buying was observed on the three polling days.

It was reported on a number of occasions that large amounts of money were flowing into the district, from national political players keen to support the campaigns of different candidates. Put differently, regional and national power struggles were known to be one dynamic of the pre-polling period, but the observer team is not aware of the extent of this influence.

Another variation of a gifting strategy was also reported to observers on a few occasions, this being a pledge given by a candidate to repay peoples' debts should they be elected.

Observers were not in a position to determine whether money, promises, intimidation, violence, wantok and church connections or other reasons were the principle motivating factors for voters – especially in the areas outside the strongholds of key candidates.

A well conducted voter survey may have been able to elicit this information, however as discussed in our methods section, this survey proved very difficult to administer and would not have produced viable data in the situation we found ourselves in in Kandep.

Role of Scrutineers, Candidates and Supporters

In most polling places observed, the scrutineers were asked by Presiding Officers for their appointment notice and at the commencement of polling were in a fenced off area. During the conduct of polling all scrutineers were able to hear choices being made or watch ballots being marked.

Scrutineers appeared to understand their role much better than other community representatives such as ward councillors and candidate supporters.

30 Whilst scrutineers were obedient and understood their role when asked, they typically took every opportunity to get as close to the polling as possible when their behaviour was not monitored.

In contrast, other candidate supporters, partisan ward councillors, or other community leaders were very difficult for security and polling officers to control. Their demands and overall incomprehension of polling procedure were often the cause of delays or early closure of polling places. For example, one local leader at Kinkuli was utterly confounded when informed that he could not watch people vote, and did not appear to believe that it was in any way inappropriate to closely scrutinise people as they completed their ballots. At Supi 1, a community leader was overheard encouraging people to wash the ink from their finger in order to come back to vote again.

Custody of Ballot Boxes

With the exception of one unusual incident (described below) we were not aware of ballot boxes at any time being in the custody of unauthorised persons.

Overall it appeared that supporters had no intention of taking custody of ballot boxes, most sides possibly realising that this would constitute grounds to exclude the results from their polling place and undermine the success of their candidate.

Weapons, Violations and Disturbances

Much has been written in the media about the extent of violence in the Kandep By-election. Most reports did not acknowledge that during the three polling days there was relative calm and indeed a strong focus on conflict resolution and avoiding the repetition of conflict that arose in 2007.

Given that this aspect is prone to rumour and sensationalism, the following summary of the observation of weapons, violations and disturbances during the polling is offered:

• Some disturbances occurred between rival supporters to the point that polling had to be abandoned, closed early or delayed. This occurred at what we believe was a small minority of polling places. • In many areas of potential conflict, communities seemed anxious to ensure that there would not be violence by negotiating in advance the distribution of block votes. • Away from the polling places, and usually in the evenings, it was clear that incidents of violent conflict were taking place between rival supporters. • Though observers did not see firearms in civilian hands during the polling period, they were heard being fired and were described by community members. • It did not seem that bush knives were being carried on polling day for use as weapons. Very few bush knives were observed in the vicinity of polling places on the three days of polling.

31 • Some stone throwing occurred between groups of supporters near the counting centre, however supporters seemed to be more or less controlled by police and the influence of the candidates themselves. • It was community consensus and community pressure, not the overt use of weapons that was the main means for influencing polling officials and police to abandon official procedure.

Unfortunately, the violence escalated on the day after the polls closed to an extent that nobody had expected. On the Thursday morning the atmosphere had noticeably changed, and as events would demonstrate, the situation was on the verge of sharply deteriorating.

One noted concern that we judge to have contributed to this deterioration was the anger on the part of some candidates and their supporters that polling had not been conducted at Tarapis, Muyen and Sawi 2. Another contributing factor was the death of a young man who had been a supporter of a candidate, who was violently murdered on the night of the 17th.

Close of Polls

Timing of Polls

Of the twelve polling places observed at closure of polls, none closed at 6:00pm. Polling closed in these places over a wide range of times. The earliest observed closure was at Kokas 1 at 2:15pm. The latest observed closure of a polling place was at Yapum, at 4:15pm.

By 6:00pm on all polling days the majority of ballot boxes had been returned to Kandep Station.

Of the twelve polling places observed at closure of polls, all except one, Yapum, closed when all ballot papers had run out.

Of these polling places, four polling places did not use the two extra ballot papers allotted to each ward. In the remaining polling places all ballot papers, with the exception of the occasional spoiled ballot paper, were used.

In no observed cases did polling close due to violence or disruption. However the observer team was aware that other polling places were closed early due to these reasons.

Management of Unused Ballot Papers

In the cases where the two extra ballot papers were unused, the management of unused papers were mostly in accordance with reconciliation procedures, where the ballot papers are secured, recorded in the official documents of the polling officer, and returned. One exception was at Gini 1 on the first day of

32 polling, where the gathered people persuaded the Presiding Officer to tear the unused papers into pieces.

Closing Procedures

Opportunity for Electors to Cast their Vote

In most polling places there were people assembled who were willing to cast votes as the polling closed, and who most certainly would have tried to vote if the ballots had not been finished by that point. The deciding factor in these cases was not eligibility, but the number of ballot papers available - they simply could not vote because there were no more ballots left.

There was a general feeling of ambivalence if voters were not able to vote at the close of polls. At none of the polling places observed at closure of polls, including Lyumbi Island, were disturbances or arguments reported due to people not being permitted to cast their vote at the close of the polls.

Closing of Ballot Boxes and Fastening of Outer Tags

Presiding Officers were scrupulous in displaying, closing, fastening and sealing the ballot boxes before members of the public when polling was complete. This was the case at all polling places observed at the closure of polls.

Custody and Transport of Ballot Boxes Post-polling

Of the eleven polling places observed in the post-polling phase, ten observed no loss of custody of ballot boxes to unauthorised people, or attempts to interfere with the ballot boxes.

The only incident where the police and Presiding Officers lost control of the ballot boxes was at Kolopa 1 and Kolopa 2. Helicopter transport arrived to extract the two ballot boxes and the Presiding Officers approximately 30 minutes after the close of polls. At this point approximately 40 people moved forward and seized the ballot boxes, refusing to allow them to be loaded onto the helicopter. It soon emerged that they believed that the pilot was aligned to a candidate. After a few minutes the helicopter pilot took off without anyone on board.

The boxes were loaded onto a privately owned vehicle, but eventually, after the arrival of a candidate and the cooling of tempers, the ballot boxes were returned to police custody with no visible evidence of being tampered with. In addition to apologising, the supporters of one of the candidates offered to provide an escort. The ballot boxes were then transported to Kandep Station by road in a police vehicle containing nine police officers, two Presiding Officers and one observer, escorted by vehicles belonging to candidate supporters.

33 Most polling places observed at the close of polls did not experience extensive delays in transporting the ballot boxes back to Kandep Station.

At Komboros 2 and Pindak 1, where polling was conducted on the first day, there were transport delays that arose due to an absence of vehicles or security personnel. In both of these places there were no police present at the close of polls, and no transport immediately available. Presiding Officers at both places had to wait for transport and security to arrive before returning to Kandep Station. There was not, however, any time when the polling officials lost custody of the ballot boxes in these places, nor were there any reported attempts to interfere with the ballot boxes.

Returns and Reconciliation of Polling

As already stated, almost all polling places exhausted their ballot papers. This made the reconciliation of ballot papers a simple task.

Observing the reconciliation and returns was a difficult undertaking because the apparent motivation of Presiding Officers and security personnel was ensuring a swift and safe departure. While observers were able to confirm in a number of locations that reconciliation and returns were carried out, in other places observers found it difficult to verify if reconciliation and returns were carried out hastily before departure, carried out on the journey back to the counting centre, or not done at all. There was no opportunity to discover whether the returns from all polling places were made available at the counting centre.

The broad view of the observer team is that all Presiding Officers appeared to be clear on their responsibilities during the course of the day.

Wrap up of Polling

Number of Days Polled

In the end, polling continued into the 17th then the 18th of November, for a total of three days. The main delays contributing towards extended polling were:

• disorganisation of logistics, partly influenced by ad hoc decisions made in response to insistent petitioning by candidates; • unfavourable weather, and the fact that the helicopters could not fly at early times of the day due to low cloud cover, thus reducing the number of air sorties overall.

A hugely significant influence on the eventual staggered polling was the logistical scale of the operation. Put simply, conducting polling at 74 polling places in one day, with many places accessible only by air or by poorly maintained dirt roads, would have required very favourable weather (no clouds whatsoever), a greater number of polling officials, and probably more helicopters. Furthermore, due to security concerns in many outlying polling places, teams of police had to be inserted by helicopter before polling officials

34 were allowed to proceed. This consumed more time and greatly increased the number of helicopter sorties required from Kandep Station. This was most apparent on the second day of polling, when the number of required helicopter sorties roughly doubled due to the need to insert police prior to the transportation of polling officials. This also resulted in observers not being allowed on many sorties.

Number of Wards Polled

73 wards were scheduled for polling. Wards 1 to 52 were located in the Kandep LLG area, while 53 to 73 were located in the Wage LLG area. There were a total of 74 polling places. Each ward had one polling place, with the exception of ward 73 (Karekare), which had two polling places.

By the end of polling on November 18th, polling had been conducted in 70 of the 73 wards. Polling had not been conducted at ward 18 (Muyen), ward 42 (Tarapis), and ward 50 (Sawi 2), in the Kandep LLG.

Late in the afternoon of the 17th, a large group of people assembled in front of the counting station and aired their unhappiness that polling had not taken place in these locations.

During the morning on November 19th, the observer team passed through a large crowd of supporters who had gathered on the road to hear their candidate speak on the issue. The candidate and many of the supporters was unhappy with the fact that polling had not taken place in these locations, and was making accusations of bias towards the Returning Officer. Unlike during polling days, many people were observed carrying bush knives and similar weapons at this time, and the atmosphere was noticeably tense.

Reasons Given for Not Polling at Tarapis, Muyen & Sawi 2

The decision to not conduct polling at Tarapis, Muyen and Sawi 2 proved to be contentious, not only on the day after polling but in subsequent days. The observer team is aware that these places are considered strongholds of a candidate. The decision not to poll was completely unplanned as they were three unrelated incidents, and furthermore was fully supported by the police. The decision would have been exceptionally difficult.

At a meeting conducted with Presiding Officers at approximately 3:00pm on Thursday November 19th, the Returning Officer outlined the reasons why polling had not taken place at Tarapis, Muyen and Sawi 2.

At both Tarapis and Sawi 2 fighting had been taking place in the vicinity of the polling places on the planned day of polling. At Tarapis the helicopter had landed near the polling place but had been forced to take off rapidly due to obvious unrest in the area. The Returning Officer said that, while some candidates had insisted the location identified as the gazetted location for Tarapis was incorrect, he had confidence in the expertise of the local guide who accompanied the helicopter pilots.

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At Sawi, police were asked by villagers to not allow polling at the gazetted location due to fears of violence. It was proposed to the Presiding Officer that polling be held at Kandep Station instead. This was not allowed by the Returning Officer as this was not the gazetted location.

At Muyen, it was reported by the Returning Officer that the helicopter was turned back by local people shortly after landing. There had been some objection to the intended polling place, and some effort had been made by people to have the polling place relocated to a main road. The Returning Officer did not allow this relocation, due to the fact that the proposed new location was not a gazetted polling place. This issue remained unresolved.

The Returning Officer concluded by stating that polling at these places would now be impossible because security was a major ongoing concern in these places. The risk would be exacerbated by the fact that the helicopter transport schedule had finished, and hence air transport was unavailable. Therefore he had made the decision that polling would not be conducted in Tarapis, Muyen and Sawi 2.

Post Polling

Counting of Ballots

Readiness for the Count & Electronic Counting

Electoral Commission staff appeared to be well prepared to begin the count once the polling was complete. Their equipment had been set up and tested during the polling. The counting centre had been constructed as an open-faced annexe to the police station within fenced-off grounds, and also had been equipped with benches and work tables for the counting itself. The counting centre was powered by a diesel generator.

The Kandep By-election was also intended to be an opportunity to trial the use of an electronic ballot counting system. Electronic counting has been trialled in re-count situations however this would be the first real election test.

However by the morning of Thursday November 19th the security situation had deteriorated, such that there was no indication that counting would commence.

One contributing factor to the count not beginning on the 19th was the alleged unwillingness of counting staff to travel from their accommodation to the counting station due to security concerns.

Overall, security concerns played the greatest role in the delay of the count and its eventual relocation. As events would demonstrate this concern was not misplaced.

36 Decisions Made in Regards to the Counting Location

A meeting was held between the Returning Officer and most candidates at approximately 2:00pm on Thursday 19th November. Also in attendance at this meeting were members of the police command, the Assistant Returning Officers, and other Electoral Commission organisers. Media personnel and observers requested access to this meeting but were refused. An observer reported that all candidates were asked by police to surrender their firearms before entering the meeting. Two candidates surrendered pistols, along with accompanying sidearm licences.

This meeting concluded at approximately 2:45pm. At approximately 3:00pm a senior Electoral Commission official and the Returning Officer addressed all Electoral Commission officials who had been assembled at the counting centre.

The RO outlined his reasons for not returning to Muyen, Tarapis and Sawi 2. The Returning Officer then outlined his concerns regarding the security of the district and his resulting decision to have the counting moved from Kandep Station to Mount Hagen.

Departure from Kandep Station

Gunshots were heard from the hill above the counting centre at almost the exact same moment that the information regarding the count relocation was divulged. Within minutes all assembled polling officials were advised to pack their belongings and equipment and prepare for departure, as the maintenance of security was becoming rapidly untenable. Gunshots and the sounds of fighting were frequently heard during this time. The observer team departed with Electoral Commission vehicles at approximately 3:30pm, and witnessed the smoke from burning houses and goods on the hilltops above the station.

The departure of the team at this point was effectively the end of the observation period.

Subsequent Developments

The following week, Electoral Commissioner announced his directive that polling teams return to Kandep in order to conduct polling at Tarapis, Muyen and Sawi 2. This announcement was swiftly followed by reports that Electoral Commission staff and polling officials were refusing to return to Kandep due to security concerns and ongoing reports of unrest in the district.

To date no polling has been conducted in these locations.

Other subsequent events, such as the removal of counting to Goroka from Mount Hagen, and revelations of further violence in Kandep, have been extensively reported by the media and will not be repeated here.

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Lessons for the Future

There are still useful lessons for the future in the Kandep By-election, despite the reputation that it was a disastrous situation. Although polling was thoroughly unorthodox, it was conducted in a situation that was much less violent than the reports of subsequent developments have suggested.

Based on the above observations this section identifies a number of areas that could guide future planning of national elections and by-elections.

What Worked Well

Transportation and Custody of Ballot Papers

In the 2007 National Election the transportation of ballot boxes was clearly influenced by partisan interests and ballot boxes had, in many instances, been stuffed prior to polling. However the scrutiny and secure transportation of ballot papers and boxes constituted a qualitative difference and substantial improvement between this by-election and the 2007 National Election. This was the finding of our limited observation. We are aware however that subsequently the ballot boxes were moved several times and in tense circumstances. We cannot verify their security at these times.

Neutral Presiding Officers

The engagement of Presiding Officers from outside the district was a popular decision. The majority of observations suggested that POs were well aware of proper procedure. The use of ‘outsiders’ may not be entirely possible in the case of a national general election however some consideration could be given to changing election scheduling to allow outside election staff to be heavily involved.

Size and Organisation of Security Mobilisation

The numbers of security officials available (approximately five or six per polling place) in Kandep appeared sufficient to conduct the polling and police appeared well organised and ready to deploy.

What could be the Focus in Future Elections

Timing

The overall lateness of the opening of polls, due to the large amount of time taken to distribute ballots, coordinate vehicles and helicopters, and deal with

38 candidates petitions, was a major contributing factor to the decline of polling procedure. The time pressure to complete polling quickly was, in the opinion of this report, one major factor in the abandonment of proper polling procedure.

Whilst acknowledging the great challenges the electoral officials faced, the original schedule for the insertion of all ballot papers for all 74 polling places planned for 7:00am on the Monday morning was a thoroughly unrealistic plan.

Though one-day-polling is ideal, where it is unfeasible it should not be attempted. This report is unequivocal in its judgement that one day polling was an untenable plan for the Kandep By-election.

Decision Making

With reference to the above, it is when unrealistic plans unravel that the scope for accusations of bias grows. As each new decision of the Returning Officer is made, however well justified it may be, it then becomes vulnerable to complaints, counter complaints, and accusations of political motivation.

Though some of the challenges and resulting delays may have been unavoidable, others were not unexpected. Many improvised decisions could have been avoided by having an achievable schedule for polling from the outset.

Set Up and Staffing of Polling Booths

The nature of wide community involvement in elections, and the fact that supporters deeply distrust what they cannot see, probably dictates that polling booths need to be set up outside where all voters can see what is going on, even though indoor locations would ideally be much easier to secure, less exposed to the weather, and less vulnerable to unwelcome intrusion and observation.

However outdoor polling places are vulnerable and need more officials and police to conduct a fair poll. At least six officials would be necessary to manage the roll, perform gate keeping duties, manage the handing out of ballot papers, ensure a secret ballot, and manage the placing of ballots into a secure box.

The provision of one booth per polling place could almost be an admission that good conduct would not be achieved. Under ideal circumstances where voters cast an unimpeded and private ballot, it would be impossible to get between 400 and 1,000 voters through the booth during a single day of polling.

The Electoral Roll

The electoral roll is not trusted or respected as a vehicle that helps to make elections fair. It is instead an inconvenient obstacle to be overcome by candidate supporters at any polling place. In many instances its only function is to indicate the total number of ballots available.

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The total number of the ballot papers (calculated using serial numbers) was 42,465. With two extra for each polling station, it follows that the number of names on the roll was 42,317. As stated above, this is much higher than the estimated eligible voting population of 31,843.

This negative public perception of the integrity of the roll can only be shifted by people experiencing a fair voter registration process and at the same time being exposed to awareness exercises that generate expectations of fair use of the roll on polling day.

Voter Identification

The only way voters were correctly identified by gatekeepers is by listening to the community about whether it is the right voter or not. This is clearly not a scientific or reliable manner of identification and open to massive abuse.

The electoral roll contained a column for the occupation of voters, which seemed a more or less redundant piece of information to identify voters, whereas the names of parents would have been much more useful.

Indelible ink, if used correctly, may well be a good procedure and give visual evidence of multiple voting, however the ink mark is not sufficient to prevent people from voting. Put differently, ink is applied to voters again and again without questioning. We are sceptical that simply training officials to use the ink better could work in a polling zone like Kandep. Rather, a more effective means of identifying that people have voted once only should be a long term goal.

Style of Voting

Though this can be considered speculative, it appeared that most voters seemed to acknowledge that serial voting - deliberately trying to vote as many times and in as many locations as possible - is wrong, even if they were attempting it themselves.

Proxy voting by contrast seems to be considered completely appropriate. This perception on the part of voters will be an enormous obstacle even if good voter identification could be achieved, as people appear to feel that a family name on the roll is something that must be defended as a vote for their candidate.

Assisted Voting

Assisted voting in somewhere like Kandep is the norm rather than the exception, therefore consideration could be made in terms of planning that anticipates a large need for voter assistance and manages it accordingly. Police may even play a useful role here in terms of impartial assistance as their assistance to voters was observed to be very good and very neutral.

40 Impact of LPV

We also observed (and were informed by people during our observations) that one group of aligned candidates focussed their strategy on directing preferences to each other, in the hope that their combined primary vote would be sufficient to see the count go to the exclusion process. This is more or less exactly how the LPV system is intended to be used by candidates.

This constitutes strong evidence of new political strategies emerging with the new system, however the prevalence of block voting means that it is dominant supporters making these decisions about preferences and not the voters themselves.

Security

Whilst the level of security was excellent and the capacity to undertake the job of keeping the polling day secure was well executed, there remains a need to reconsider and perhaps expand the roll of police, so that they have clear instructions not just to ensure the safety of polling officials but to play a specific role in helping a polling place maintain procedure – especially focussing on gate keeping, ensuring a secret ballot, and ensuring the crowd will accept a proper polling procedure before the polls open.

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Reflections on Undertaking Elections Observations

The Role of Observers

There will always be a tension between the observer as an invisible witness to the election process, and the fact that observers themselves influence the course of electoral events. However this influence is usually for the better in terms of the conduct of voters, officials, candidates and the police.

That said there were some minor incidents that reflect that the role of observers is not yet well understood. As outsiders, observers' movements and actions were often closely scrutinised by people at polling places. This situation was also caused, particularly in remote areas, by the fact that two of the observers were expatriates.

Situations confronted by observers included: • observers reported that they had been approached by community members, who were concerned that instances of block voting, non-usage of the electoral roll, and other violations would be recorded. This is a particularly delicate situation for an observer to address in the field; • an observer was asked to address the concerns of people regarding a supposedly missing ballot box in a nearby location; • an observer was asked to mark the ballots for a block vote after the security official refused. The observer politely declined the invitation.

A valuable body of literature is now being built through the conduct of observations in Papua New Guinea. The benefit of the systematic collection of data is obvious, and in the future may lead to comparable data being collected from different elections. This could involve more collaboration between previous observation teams in terms of lessons learned and the development of a common framework.

The biggest help that this team received was the advice of past observers, so as to avoid having to ‘reinvent the wheel’.

While good research practise is important, it will generally be the case that non- researchers will conduct election observations. This is indeed desirable, as maximising the participation of civil society is a large contributing factor in terms of bringing elections closer to the people.

There is no data on the impact of observers, however, as stated above many members of the team felt that the presence of ‘outside observers’ was something of a moderating influence upon the behaviour of people at a number of polling places during the Kandep By-election.

Gradual expansion of the role of observation should be a goal; this is not simply a research exercise, but something that can make a valuable contribution to the good conduct of polling. This expansion may happen over several elections and would need additional funds. A team of, say, 20 or 30 well-prepared observers per district could make a very significant contribution.

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Shortcomings & Difficulties

In terms of guiding future observations, we believe two things are worth noting:

• Short preparation timeframes will diminish quality of the observation itself, by not allowing teams enough time to prepare and train. • Clear flows of information on polling day also assist. Although all key officials were very cooperative, the team had no liaison person from the Electoral Commission through whom we could clarify information and who could brief others on the roll of observation.

Voter Surveys

As noted above, a survey tool was developed, but ultimately the data gathered has not been used. We choose to be up-front about this because gathering quantitative data comes with responsibilities, in terms of how it can be used as evidence, and we believe the data captured in the survey is simply not accurate.

The extent of unorthodox practises in Kandep created some confusion over what were thought to be unproblematic questions. For instance, the seemingly simple questions "did you vote" and "how many times did you vote?" was actually quite complicated. In the instances of a block vote some voters took this to mean that they had personally cast their ballot, whilst others did not.

In some cases, the respondent was prepared to answer questions in a manner that was clearly contrary to actual events. For example, one respondent reported that people were able to cast their vote by themselves, without interference and in secret. Only two metres away, voters were clearly being ushered through the polling station and handing their empty ballots to single community member who was filling them out.

Finally, we could not control the sample of voters. Given that different polling places experienced widely different polling procedures, sampling too many voters in stronghold areas would have skewed data in terms of motivations for voting and allocating preferences.

A well conducted survey would require very detailed prior knowledge of the area, as well as a larger and exceptionally well trained team, to ensure it is administered in a way that can generate viable data.

The voter survey is attached as an appendix for its potential value to future observation.

APPENDIX

1. Observation Handbook Page a. Pre-polling 42 b. Opening the Polling 44 c. General Polling Questions 47 d. Close of Polling 51 e. Post-Polling 53

2. Voter Surveys a. English Version 56 b. Tok Pisin Version 59 SECTION 1: PRE-POLLING

If there is time, please record the impressions of the readiness for polling at Kandep Station. If information was not observed by you, but related to you by someone, please record the type of informant, but not their name.

Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 1. When was the extra security personnel deployed to the province?

2. When was security personnel deployed to their respective polling places?

3. During the pre-polling period did the police and PNGEC appear to Yes No Not be working well together? Sure 4. If no, what wasn’t working?

5. Who chose the polling officials? 6. Were polling officials provided with any training during the pre- Yes No Not polling period? Sure

6. If yes, give details:

7. Were polling officials provided with copies of the latest training Yes No Not manual – 2007 version? Sure 8. When did the ballot boxes and papers arrive in the electorate?

9. When were the ballot boxes and papers transported to the respective LLGs?

10. When were the ballot boxes and papers transported to the respective Polling Stations?

11. Were security personnel in place prior to the ballot papers Yes No Not Sure arriving in the province/electorate?

12. Were security personnel on the ground to secure the ballot Yes No Not Sure papers when they arrived in the LLG?

13. How and where were the ballot papers secured?

Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 14. At any point, prior to polling were the ballot papers moved Yes No Not without a security escort? Sure

15. If yes, please tell what happened?

16. When did the presiding officers take custody of their ballot boxes and papers? [______] days before the scheduled polling day [______] the day before polling [______] early on polling day

17. Were the ballot papers sealed within the ballot boxes and secured (with tag numbers recorded) on the eve of polling? [ ] Yes [ ] No, the papers were left unsecured in the custody of the ARO [ ] No, the papers were left unsecured in the custody of the presiding officer [ ] No, the papers were left unsecured in the custody of ______

18. If this varied, please tell us what happened?

(Section 2: Opening the Polling Station) Page 1 of 2 SECTION 2: OPENING THE POLLING STATION

Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 1. Number of names on the roll for this polling station:

2. Did the polling commence at 8.00am? (s130 of OLNLLGE)

3. What time did the first voter receive their ballot paper?

4. If polling did not commence on time, why was it delayed?

(Who reported this information?) 5.Did the polling take place at the proper gazetted location, as per the polling schedule?

Actual Polling Location: Gazetted Polling Location: 6. If not in official location, why was polling moved?

(Who reported this information?) 7. When polling commenced was the polling station properly set Yes No Not out to the standard polling booth layout? Sure

8. How many polling compartments were provided?

9. Were the compartments positioned to ensure a secret ballot? Yes No Not (s121) Sure

10. Were there separate polling compartments for men and Yes No Not women? Sure

11. Was there a marked area for scrutineers? Yes No Not Sure 12. Could the scrutineers see into the polling compartments from Yes No Not their enclosure? (s121) Sure

13. Did all the scrutineers have a signed appointment notice? Yes No Not Sure 14. Were the candidate posters showing all candidates for seat Yes No Not clearly displayed? (s125) Sure

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 2: Opening the Polling Station) Page 2 of 2 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 15. Did anyone explain the voting process prior to polling?

IIf yes – who? 16. Was the number of ballots recorded Yes No Not Sure 17. What was the series of serial numbers for the ballots at this polling Station?

18. Was the ballot-box exhibited empty prior to polling? (s130) Yes No Not Sure 19. Was it then securely fastened with an inner tag? (s130) Yes No Not Sure 20. What was the box number for the ballot box?

21. When polling started, how many men were present in the crowd?

22. When polling started how many women were present in the crowd?

23. When polling started how many children were present crowd?

24. When polling commenced was it orderly?

25. When voting commenced how were people voting?

[ ] voters formed an orderly queue and voted in order of arrival [ ] voters’ names were called alphabetically from the electoral roll [ ] household heads papers for their haus-lain/family [ ] lain-up voting [ ] “next” voting [ ] man-meri voting [ ] tanim tebol 26. When voting commenced was ink being applied to voter’s Yes No Not fingers? Sure

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 3: General Polling Day Questions) Page 1 of 5 SECTION 3: GENERAL POLLING DAY QUESTIONS

Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 1. Were you able to freely observe without interference? Yes No Not Sure 2. Please explain any difficulties?

3. Did you have adequate access and the cooperation of Polling Station staff?

4. Did the Polling Station have enough: Pens Y N Booths Y N Candidate posters Y N Ballot papers Y N Ink Y N Staff Y N 5. How many polling officials were present? 6. How many of the polling officials were women? 7. How many security personnel were present? 8. How many of the security personnel were women? 9. Were the security personnel armed? Yes No Not Sure 10. Approximately how many voters were present? 11. Approximately how many of the voters were women? 12. Were any candidates present at the polling place? Yes No Not Sure 13. If yes, which candidate/s?

14. Did they try to interfere with/influence voters in any way? Yes No Not Sure 15. Were any campaign managers or party officials present at the Yes No Not polling place? Sure 16. If yes, who?

17. Did they try to interfere with/influence voters in any way? Yes No Not Sure 18. Any other observations?

19. As the voting progressed during the day how were people voting? [ ] voters formed an orderly queue and voted in order of arrival [ ] voters names were called alphabetically from the electoral roll [ ] household heads were given an allocation of papers for their haus-lain/family [ ] lain-up voting [ ] “next” voting [ ] man-meri voting [ ] tanim tebol

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 3: General Polling Day Questions) Page 2 of 5 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 20. As the voting progressed were voters fingers checked for ink as Yes No Some- the voter entered the polling station? times 21. As the voting progressed was ink being applied to voter’s Yes No Some- fingers? times 22. Which statement best describes the way the indelible ink was being used? [ ] ink was appropriately applied to each and every voter [ ] ink was used intermittently (on and off) throughout the day [ ] ink was used initially but later abandoned [ ] ink was not used at all

23. Did the gatekeeper/polling officials check voters’ fingers properly? [ ] yes, they checked and only people with no ink were permitted to vote [ ] no, they didn’t check people’s fingers [ ] no, they did check but people with ink were re-inked and voted again 24. Did the polling officials have difficulty locating names on the Yes No Some- alphabetical electoral roll? times 25. Did you see any attempts to influence or interfere with voters seeking to cast their votes? [ ] No [ ] Yes, I saw a candidate or supporter buying/soliciting votes (s192) [ ] Yes, I saw a candidate or supporter intimidating voters [ ] Yes, I saw a scrutineer intimidating voters (s128) [ ] Yes, I saw a polling official intimidating voters [ ] Yes, I saw a police officer intimidating voters [ ] Yes, I saw a candidate or supporter trying to influence voters (s192) [ ] Yes, I saw a scrutineer trying to influence voters (s128) [ ] Yes, I saw a polling official trying to influence voters [ ] Yes, I saw a police officer trying to influence voters [ ] Yes, “assistance” was being forced upon voters [ ] Yes, the presiding officer insisted on filling out voter’s ballot papers [ ] Not sure 26. Did the presiding officer, question people to establish their Yes No Not identity and eligibility to vote? (s134) Sure 27. Did the presiding officer always sign or initial the back of the Yes No Not ballot paper before giving it to the voter? (s126) Sure 28. Did you see the presiding officer mark the front, that is fill in or Yes No Not complete a ballot paper on a voter’s behalf? Sure 29. If yes, did this happen at the voter’s request? Yes No Not Sure 30. When the PO filled out the ballot paper did he or she do so Yes No Not according to the voter’s wishes or instructions? Sure 31. Approximately how many ballot papers did you see the presiding officer fill in on behalf of voters? 32. Were all voters who wanted to cast their own vote permitted to Yes No Not do so? Sure 33. Did you see “assistance” forced upon voters who did not Yes No Not themselves directly request assistance? (s140) Sure TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 3: General Polling Day Questions) Page 3 of 5 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 34. Which statement best reflects the level of assisted voting at this polling station? [ ] “assistance” was forced upon voters even those who didn’t request it [ ] the vast majority of voters required and requested assistance [ ] about half of the voters required and requested assistance [ ] about a quarter (1 in 4) voters required and requested assistance [ ] just a few people required and requested assistance [ ] no-one required or requested assistance 35. When assistance was provided, who gave the assistance? [ ] presiding officer [ ] candidate supporter [ ] police officer [ ] local youth [ ] own family member [ ] other ______36. Did the same person “assist” multiple voters? Yes No Not Sure 37. What kinds of people was “assistance” forced upon? [ ] everyone [ ] women [ ] children [ ] old people [ ] illiterate people 38. Was “assistance” forced upon women more than men? Yes No Not Sure 39. Were all voters permitted to vote in private (i.e. to have a secret Yes No Not ballot? (s138) Sure 40. If not, why not? (Several of the following might apply) [ ] voting compartments were not used – voting took place in public [ ] polling booth layout forced voters to vote in view of the scrutineers [ ] voters were required to indicate their votes verbally – people could hear [ ]campaign managers and supporters were allowed inside the polling area [ ] wantoks and other clan members were allowed inside the polling area [ ] other ______41. Did the presiding officer, allow anyone not on the roll to vote? Yes No Not Sure 42. If so, How many? 43. Did the presiding officer, allow any unauthorised people access Yes No Not to the polling station? (s129) Sure 44. If so, who? 45. Was the presiding officer pressured to do this or did he/she Yes No Not appear to do so willingly? Sure 46. Did you see any evidence of bias towards a particular candidate Yes No Not on the part of the presiding officer? Sure 47. At any point in the day did the polling officer lose control of the Yes No Not polling station? Sure 48. What caused the PO to lose control of the polling station?

49. If the PO lost control of the polling station did he or she at any Yes No Not time lose custody of the ballot-box? Sure TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 3: General Polling Day Questions) Page 4 of 5 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 50. Was poor voter behaviour a problem at this polling station? Yes No Not Sure 51. Did women vote separately using the women-only voting Yes No Some- compartments? times 52. Were men allowed to “assist” or observe in the women-only Yes No Some- voting compartments? times 53. Did you see anyone vote more than once at this polling station? Yes No (s191) [multiple voting] 54. How many times did you see this happen?

55. Did you see anyone vote more than once by voting at different Yes No polling stations? (s191) [serial voting]

56. How many times did you see this happen?

57. Did you see any children (under 18 years) voting? [underage Yes No voting]

58. How many times did you see this happen?

59. Did you see anyone make a false declaration in order to get a Yes No ballot paper? (s191) 60. Did you see anyone obtain a ballot paper and vote on behalf of Yes No another family/clan member? [proxy voting] 61. How many times did you see this happen? 62. Did you see anyone who is qualified to enroll in another Yes No electorate vote in this electorate? (s203) [outside voting]. 63. Did you see anyone canvassing for votes in the polling area? Yes No 64. Did you see anyone buying votes at this polling station? Yes No 65. Did you see any direct evidence of gifting to secure votes? Yes No 66. When electoral offences were committed, did the police Yes No Not apprehend the people responsible? Sure 67. Did you see any evidence of bias towards a particular candidate Yes No Not on the part of the police? Sure 68. Overall how would you rate the overall conduct of voting at this polling station? [ ] no violations [ ] some minor violations [ ] some serious violations [ ] many serious violations 69. Did you see any weapons at all (in civilian hands) while moving Yes No around on polling day? 70. Did you actually see any weapons (in civilian hands) at the Yes No polling place?

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 3: General Polling Day Questions) Page 5 of 5 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time:

71. Were these weapons being used to influence voting? Yes No Not Sure 72. Were the weapons being used to maintain law & order? Yes No Not Sure 73. Were these weapons being used to protect the ballot- boxes & Yes No Not papers from the supporters of rival candidates? Sure 74. Were there any minor disturbances during polling? Yes No 75. Were there any violent altercations at the polling place? Yes No 76. Did anyone threaten or intimidate polling officials (s178)? Yes No Not Sure 77. Did anyone actually assault a polling official (s178)? Yes No Not Sure 78. Did you at any time feel unsafe while observing polling? Yes No Not Sure 79. Did the police help or facilitate your observations? Yes No Not Sure 78. Please tell us what they did to help or hinder you?

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 4: Closing the Polling) Page 1 of 2 SECTION 4: CLOSING THE POLLING STATION Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 1. What time did the polling station close?

2. As polling drew to a close (klostu long taim bilong pasim) how were people voting? [ ] voters formed an orderly queue and voted in order of arrival [ ] voters names were called alphabetically from the electoral roll [ ] household heads were given papers for their haus-lain/family [ ] lain-up voting [ ] “next” voting [ ] man-meri voting [ ] tanim tebol 3. As the voting drew to a close were voters fingers checked for ink Yes No Some- as the voter entered the polling station? times 4. As the voting drew to a close was ink being applied to voter’s Yes No Some- fingers? times 5. Did everyone who was entitled to vote get the opportunity to do Yes No Not so? Sure 6. Was everyone who was queued at the polling station at 6.00pm Yes No Not permitted to vote? Sure 7. Were there any unused ballot papers? Yes No Not Sure 8. If yes, how many?

9. What happened to these papers? [ ] they were hurriedly filled out and dumped in the ballot-box [ ] they were burnt [ ] they were returned to the ARO [ ] they were returned, recorded in a register of unused ballot papers and then properly secured 10. At the close of polling was the ballot-box publicly closed, Yes No Not fastened and locked in the presence of the poll clerks and Sure scrutineers? (s130) 11. If yes, what was the outer tag number? 12. If no, what happened?

13. Based upon the Presiding Officers returns, how many votes were cast? 14. How many men voted? 15. How many women voted? 16. How many ballot papers were spoilt? 17. Overall how would you rate the performance of the polling Good Poor officials at this polling place? 18. Did the polling officials manage this polling station well? Yes No Not Sure

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 4: Closing the Polling) Page 2 of 2 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 19. Did the polling officials appear to have been well trained? Yes No Not Sure 20. Did the polling officials seem to properly understand their role? Yes No Not Sure 21. Were voter queues properly controlled throughout the day? Yes No Not Sure 22. Any other observations?

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 5: Post-Polling) Page 1of 2 SECTION 5: POST POLLING

Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 1. Was the reconciliation of used and unused ballot papers Yes No Not performed immediately after polling? Sure 2. If not when did this happen?

3. Did the PO complete their returns immediately at the close of Yes No Not polling? Sure 4. Did the PO require assistance to complete their returns? Yes No Not Sure 5. If so who provided this assistance?

6. Were the ballot boxes transported directly to the LLG Yes No Not distribution point or local police station at the close of polling? Sure 7. If there were delays, why? [ ] disturbance at the polling station [ ] security concerns [ ] no transport [ ] other ______(specify) 8. How were the ballot-boxes transported to the LLG distribution point? [ ] by foot [ ] by vehicle [ ] by air transport 9. Did anyone other than the presiding officer take custody of Yes No Not the ballot-boxes during transportation to the LLG distribution Sure point? 10. Did candidates provide their own security for the ballot- Yes No Not boxes while in transit? Sure 11. Did the RO/ARO maintain a register of unused ballot papers? Yes No Not Sure 12. Did the RO/ARO secure the unused ballot papers? Yes No Not Sure 13. When were the ballot-boxes moved to the counting centre? [ ] at the close of polling on polling day [ ] the day after polling [ ] ______days after polling was completed [ ] they were not transported to the counting centre 14. Were the ballot-boxes well secured up until they were Yes No Not transported to the counting centre? Sure 15. Please tell us how they were secured?

16. Were there any attempts to interfere with the ballot-boxes Yes No Not during this time? Sure

TIPNG Observation Manual (Section 5: Post-Polling) Page 2of 2 Observer: Polling Place: Ward: Arrival Time: Departure Time: 17. If so please tell us what happened?

18. When the boxes were eventually transported to the counting centre, who travelled with them?

19. Were any boxes diverted to somewhere other than the Yes No Not official counting centre? Sure 20. If yes, please tell us what happened?

21. Were all the POs provided with transport to the counting Yes No Not centre? Sure 22. Did you at any time feel unsafe during the post-polling Yes No Not period? Sure 23. If yes, why?

24. Was it safe for people to move around? Yes No Not Sure 25. If not, why not?

26. Did you see any weapons in civilian hands in the immediate Yes No post-polling period? 27. Were these weapons being used to threaten and intimidate Yes No Not people? Sure 28. Were the weapons being used to maintain law & order? Yes No Not Sure 29. Were these weapons being used to protect the ballot- boxes Yes No Not from the supporters of rival candidates? Sure 30. Was there any minor post-election violence? Yes No Not Sure 31. If yes, please describe what happened?

32. Was there any major post-election violence? Yes No Not Sure 33. If yes, please describe what happened?

TIPNG Observation Manual Voter Survey

Observer: Date: Location:

Introduction: I am an election observer from TI PNG. I would like to ask you some questions about the elections. I will not be asking you to tell me who you voted for. I will not be recording your name so you are able to tell me what you think and nobody will be able know that you gave me this information. You are also welcome to stop or not answer any question at any time. NOTE • Try and interview one female and then one male in turn. • If you cannot interview individuals without other adults listening do not try to do this survey.

Sex Age Group Female Male -18 18-24 20-29 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 1 2 1 2 3 3 4 5 6

Ward: (if not get village)

1. Did you vote in this election? Yes No 1 2

2. If not – did you try to vote in the election? Yes No 1 2

3. How many times did you vote? (be sure to clarify if someone says three times this does not simply mean three preferences). Once More than once 1 2

4. Was your name on the electoral roll? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

5. Did the polling officer search for all peoples’ names on the roll? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

6. Did you need any help to write the candidates names or numbers onto your ballot paper? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

7. Did you write on your own ballot paper or did somebody else write on your ballot paper? Voter marked Another party own ballot marked ballot 1 2

8. If somebody else wrote out your ballot paper – who were they? Immediate Family Member Nominated Polling Other (husband, children) community member Official 1 2 3

9. If you wrote on your own ballot, could you vote without anyone seeing who you voted for? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

1 10. Could you vote for the candidate for your number one choice that you wanted or did you have to vote for a candidate that someone else wanted you to vote for.? Own choice Another person’s choice Don’t Know 1 2 3

11. Could you vote for the candidate for your number two and three choice that you wanted or did you have to vote for a candidate that someone else wanted you to vote for.? Own choice Another person’s choice Don’t Know 1 2 3

12. Did any person offer you anything to vote for a particular candidate or party during this campaign? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

13. If YES what sort of thing was offered Money Food/Drink Favours ADD Others HERE 1 2 3

14. Did you observe underage voters being allowed to vote? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

15. Did you observer people who were not from your ward being allowed to vote in your ward? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

16. Did you see people who were able to vote in your ward being prevented from voting? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

17. Did you observe people trying to vote many times? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

18. Did you witness violence and intimidation towards other voters? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

19. Did any person threaten you with violence so as to get you vote in particular way to try to stop you voting at all. Yes No 1 2

20. Did the security/police presence on polling day make you feel safe? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

21. Did you think the security officials did a good job during the polling day or was there a problem? Good problem neither job 1 2 3

22. If there was a problem – what kind of problem?

2 23. Before the polling day, were police talking calmly or were they intimidating to you. Police Police were Don’t behaved intimidating Know calmly 1 2 3

24. Did you think that the polling officials where you voted did a good job during polling day? Mostly Good Neither good nor bad Mostly Bad 1 2 3

25. Did you think that the polling officials were helping particular candidates? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

26. Did the election run smoothly or were there problems? smoothly Some problems neither 1 2 3

27. If there were problems can you tell me more?

28. What was the main reason why you voted for the person who received your number one preference? Good Clansmen Has left Church promises Familiy other person a good mark on area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

29. What was the reason you gave your votes to your number two and number three preferences?

Good Clansmen Has left Church promises Familiy other person a good mark on area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

3 Voter Survey

Observer: Date: Location:

Introduction: Mipela wok long TI, wanpela NGO long Mosbi. Na mipela laik askim yu long dispela eleksin. Ol toktok bilong yu bai stap hait tasol, na tu nem bilong yu. Bai mi no askim lon man yu bin vot long em. Sapos yu no laik long toktok, em i orait tasol. Sapos yu laik stop namel nabaut, pawa em i stap long han bilong yu.

NOTE • Try and interview one female and then one male in turn. • If you cannot interview individuals without other adults listening do not try to do this survey.

Sex Age Group Female Male -18 18-24 20-29 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ 1 2 1 2 3 3 4 5 6

Ward: (if not get village)

1. Yu bin vote long dispela eleksin o nogat? Yes No 1 2

2. Sapos nogat, yu bin traim long vote tu o nogat? Yes No 1 2

3. Taim yu bin vot long LPV yu bin markim tripela kendidet (nem o namba) bilong ol. Tasol mi laik askim hamas ballot pepa yu makim na putim long bokis, wanpela tasol o planti tru? Once More than once 1 2

4. Yu save tu alsem nem bilong yu i stap long roll? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

5. Yu save tu alsem ol opisa i painim ol nem long roll o nogat? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

6. Yu bin laikim sampela halivim long makim vote long 1, 2, 3? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

7. Yu yet raitim long ballot pepa, o narapela man o meri? Voter marked own ballot Another party marked ballot 1 2

8. Sapos narapela i halivim yu long makim pepa bilong yu, em husat? Pamili – Papa, Brata, Wanpela bilong lain Polling narapela Pikinini Ofisa 1 2 3

9. Sapos yu markim ballot pepa bilong yu, inap narapela man o meri lukim wea yu bin markim or em i hait? (hait pasin). Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3 1

10. Mi laik askim, yu makim kandidet long trupela laik bilong yu yet, o narapela tokim yu yu mas vote namba 1 long dispela kendidat? Mi vote lo laik blong mi Mi vote lo laik bilong narapela Don’t Know 1 2 3

11. Na long namba 2 na namba 3 kandidet – yu bin makim laik bilong yu yet o narapela tokim yu husait yu mas vot long ol? Mi vote lo laik blong mi Mi vote lo laik bilong narapela Don’t Know 1 2 3

12. Mi askim, sampela kendidet o sapota givim samting long yu long givim vot long em o kandidet bilong em? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

13. Sapos yes, wanem kain samting ol i givim lo yu?. Kaikai o Promis o Moni Ol narapela samting, raitim long hia drink halivim 1 2 3

14. Yu lukim sampela pikinini o yangpela pikinini ananit long 18 pela krimas ol i vot? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

15. Yu bin lukim sampela bilong narapela ward buk o arasait lain, vot long ples bilong yu? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

16. Yu bin lukim sampela lain long ward buk, ol i blokim na pasim ol long kam na vot? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

17. Yu lukim sampela man o meri vot long planti taim? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

18. Yu lukim sampela man i paitim o poretim man o meri long fosim wei ol i vot? Yes No 1 2

19. ibin gat sampela ol i poretim yu long husat yu mas vot long em? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

20. Taim ol planti polis na security i raun istap. olsem women yu bin pilim safe long ples yu stap na vot? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

21. Lo ting ting blong yu, ol wok bilong polis na security em i gutpela o nogat? Yu bin lukim sampela problem long dei bilong vot tu? gutpela nogat neither 1 2 3

22. Sappos yu bin lukim sampela problem, em wanem kain problem?

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23. Bipo long taim eleksin i stat, ol polis i tok isi isi long yupela o ol i poretim yupela? Tok isi fretim Don’t Know 1 2 3

24. Ol eleksin ofisa ol i wokim gutpela wok long eleksin o nogat? gutpela nogat neither 1 2 3

25. Yu bin lukim olsem sampela ofisa ol i wok long halivim wanpela kendidet tasol o nogat? Yes No Don’t Know 1 2 3

26. Taim elekisin i stat em i ran ‘“gutpla tru’ o igat sampela problem? Gutpla tru Sampela problem neither 1 2 3

27. Sapos i bin gat sampela moa asua or bel hevi , inap you tokaut long dispela?

28. Taim yu bin vot yu yet, wanem em as tingting na yu markim wanpela kendidat olsem namba 1 vot bilong yu? Gutpela Clan lain blong Em Sios promis Pamili o other pasin yu wokim memba haus lain gutpela wok 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

29. Na long namba 2 na 3 vot, wanem em as tingting na yu makim ol? Gutpela Clan lain blong Em Sios promis Pamili o other pasin yu wokim memba haus lain gutpela wok 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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