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1 Transparency International PNG Domestic Observation of the Kandep By-Election Preliminary Report 15th-19th November 2009 George Butler and Katherine Wheen 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................... 4 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................ 7 METHODS ......................................................................................................... 7 THE OBSERVATION TEAM ................................................................................... 8 POLLING PLACES OBSERVED ............................................................................. 8 BACKGROUND TO THE KANDEP BY-ELECTION.........................................11 ABOUT KANDEP DISTRICT .................................................................................11 RECENT ELECTIONS IN KANDEP.........................................................................11 PRE-POLLING PERIOD .................................................................................. 15 THE CANDIDATES ............................................................................................ 15 APPOINTMENT AND PREPAREDNESS OF POLLING OFFICERS ................................ 16 CANDIDATES' BRIEFING.................................................................................... 16 ONGOING CROWD CONCERNS.......................................................................... 18 READINESS OF OFFICIALS AND MATERIALS ........................................................ 18 BALLOT PAPER SCRUTINY ................................................................................ 18 READINESS OF POLICE .................................................................................... 19 POLLING DAY ................................................................................................. 20 STAFFING OF POLLING PLACES AND THE DISMISSAL OF APOS AND POLLING CLERKS ...................................................................................................................... 20 LOGISTICS ON THE MORNING OF THE POLL ........................................................ 20 TIMING OF POLLS ............................................................................................ 21 SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT POLLING STATIONS ............................................. 21 LOCATIONS OF POLLING STATIONS .................................................................... 21 SET UP OF POLLING PLACES............................................................................ 22 PROCEDURE OF OPENING ................................................................................ 23 CONDUCT OF POLLING..................................................................................... 23 THE ELECTORAL ROLL ..................................................................................... 24 VOTER IDENTIFICATION .................................................................................... 24 USE OF INK..................................................................................................... 26 ASSISTED VOTING ........................................................................................... 27 UNDERSTANDING OF LPV ................................................................................ 27 IMPACT OF LPV............................................................................................... 28 GIFTING.......................................................................................................... 29 ROLE OF SCRUTINEERS, CANDIDATES AND SUPPORTERS ................................... 29 CUSTODY OF BALLOT BOXES............................................................................ 30 WEAPONS, VIOLATIONS AND DISTURBANCES ..................................................... 30 CLOSE OF POLLS .......................................................................................... 31 TIMING OF POLLS ............................................................................................ 31 MANAGEMENT OF UNUSED BALLOT PAPERS ...................................................... 31 CLOSING PROCEDURES ................................................................................... 32 CUSTODY AND TRANSPORT OF BALLOT BOXES POST-POLLING ............................ 32 RETURNS AND RECONCILIATION OF POLLING ..................................................... 33 3 WRAP UP OF POLLING.................................................................................. 33 NUMBER OF DAYS POLLED ............................................................................... 33 NUMBER OF WARDS POLLED............................................................................ 34 REASONS GIVEN FOR NOT POLLING AT TARAPIS, MUYEN & SAWI 2...................... 34 POST POLLING............................................................................................... 35 COUNTING OF BALLOTS ................................................................................... 35 DEPARTURE FROM KANDEP STATION ................................................................. 36 SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS ......................................................................... 36 LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE ........................................................................ 37 WHAT WORKED WELL ..................................................................................... 37 WHAT COULD BE THE FOCUS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS .......................................... 37 REFLECTIONS ON UNDERTAKING ELECTIONS OBSERVATIONS ............ 41 4 Executive Summary Kandep was always going to be a difficult By-election for all involved. With poor communication facilities, bad road conditions, difficult and variable weather, generator supplied electricity and some very remote polling places, Kandep District itself posed major – but not unexpected – challenges to overcome. In addition, the conduct of the 2007 National General Election was perhaps one of the most poorly conducted polls in terms of partisan officials, lack of security, major disruptions, and abuse of the polling and counting procedures. Therefore the people of Kandep have not had a recent experience of good practice at election time. They were also exceptionally politicized. The entire district appeared drawn into this electoral contest through kinship and alliance. The public perception is that the Kandep By-election descended into chaos and disaster. Indeed the security situation deteriorated sharply the day after the polls closed. However it has been less commented in the press that the polling period itself was more or less safely conducted with limited outbreaks of violence. The use of 74 well-trained and, most importantly, ‘outsider’ Presiding Officers from around the country was very well regarded. This may not be entirely possible in the event of a national election, but certainly desirable wherever it is possible. In addition, there were at least six times as many police officers in Kandep in 2009 compared to 2007. In our view this was sufficient police and resources. However the focus appeared simply the security of the poll itself and not the security of the district as a whole. The team did not see weapons in the vicinity of polling areas or being used to directly influence the conduct of a poll. We were aware that weapons were circulating in the district. In addition, the scrutiny of ballot papers, distribution to ballot boxes, and the security of ballot papers and ballot boxes in transit were very good in the period we observed. This meant that the chief cause of electoral fraud in 2007 – hijacking and stuffing of ballot boxes – was eliminated. The team regrets not being able to observe the removal of inner seals at the counting centre so that we could confirm our observation that the integrity of police and electoral officials in this respect was very good, as we are aware the ballot boxes have been moved several times since our departure from Kandep. However we also believe it was not in the interests of candidates and supporters to attempt to corrupt the election by hijacking boxes. No candidate would benefit from going back to the courts. Thus we believe that the electoral strategies of candidates focused more on influencing the outcome of the election in other ways. Voters and supporters (from all prominent candidates) were able to influence the course of elections by taking advantage of under-manned polling stations, coordinating block votes or negotiating their supporters to mark ballots in the 5 manner they had decided beforehand. This was common practise at the majority of polling places. This is certainly fraudulent in relation to legal procedures, but not completely undemocratic. However at any polling station it has the effect of magnifying the influence of the supporters present who were in the majority over the result, and minimising the influence of the minority. The team did not observe one instance of a properly conducted poll. The coordination of block votes and the disruption of proper procedure across the district were achieved not because polling officials or police were corruptible or corrupted, but because they were understaffed, most often pressed for time and keen to conduct the vote as quickly as possible. This benefited all candidates in their stronghold areas. Unorthodox or illegal voting behaviour also occurred and police did not seem to have instructions to intervene in order to prevent