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Handbook on Immunity Handbook DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS' RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS LEGAL AFFAIRS Handbook on the incompatibilities and immunity of the Members of the European Parliament August 2014 STUDY Abstract Upon request by the Legal Affairs Committee, this handbook describes the national rules on the composition of the governments and parliaments of each of the Member States of the European Union and provides an overview of the national rules on parliamentary immunities. It further lists the national authorities that are competent to request the waiver of MEPs immunity, as identified after consultation with the Member States. This text will be updated regularly, on the basis of information received; please hold as reference the date of edition. PE 493.029 EN DOCUMENT REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR Ms Rosa RAFFAELLI Policy Department C - Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs European Parliament B-1047 Brussels E-mail: [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSIONS Original: EN ABOUT THE EDITOR Policy Departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over EU internal policies. To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its monthly newsletter please write to: [email protected] European Parliament, manuscript completed in August 2014. © European Union, Brussels, 2014. This document is available on the Internet at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies DISCLAIMER The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy. Handbook on the incompatibilities and immunity of the Members of the European Parliament – August 2014 ____________________________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTORY REMARKS This handbook aims at providing the Committee on Legal Affairs with a tool to simplify its tasks when verifying the credentials of the newly elected Members of the European Parliament, when ruling on the validity of their mandate or when considering the requests for the waiver or defence of parliamentary immunity. The first part of the handbook briefly recalls the legal framework governing the verification of the credentials and the immunities of the Members of the European Parliament. The second part of the handbook is based on national reports summarising, for each EU Member State, the relevant national provisions regulating those national offices which are incompatible with the office of a MEP, according to Article 7(1) and (2) of the Act concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, as well as the national parliamentary immunities' systems. Each national report is therefore divided into two chapters: the first chapter reports the legal provisions on the composition of the national governments and parliaments, the denomination of their respective members as well as the date of the beginning of their term of office; the second chapter provides an overview of the national rules on parliamentary immunities and identifies the national authorities that are competent to request the waiver of MEPs immunity. At the end of the handbook, two annexes contain the lists of respectively the national authorities which are entitled to notify the names of the newly elected Members to the European Parliament and the national authorities which are competent to request the waiver of a Member's immunity. Both lists have been drawn up by DG Presidency on the basis of official letters sent by the Permanent Representations of the Member States to the European Union. Some Member States have not communicated the name of their competent national authorities yet. This text will be updated regularly, on the basis of information received from the Permanent Representations of the Member States to the European Union and other sources. Please hold as reference the date of edition and check with Policy Department C whether the version you are reading is the latest version. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This handbook is the result of a successful cooperation between various services of the European Parliament and of national Parliaments (through the ECPRD - European Centre for Parliamentary Research & Documentation). In particular, the Legal Service and the Presidency provided their valuable contributions to the drafting and the revision of the national reports. 3 Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs ____________________________________________________________________________________ CONTENTS PART I: LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AND IMMUNITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ................................................................................ 9 1. INCOMPATIBILITIES WITH THE OFFICE OF MEMBER OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ................................................................................................ 9 2. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY............................................................................ 9 PART II: NATIONAL REPORTS .......................................................................................... 11 BELGIUM .................................................................................... 12 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 12 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 16 BULGARIA .................................................................................. 18 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 18 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 21 CZECH REPUBLIC ........................................................................ 24 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 24 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 27 DENMARK ................................................................................... 29 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 29 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 31 GERMANY ................................................................................... 33 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 33 4 Handbook on the incompatibilities and immunity of the Members of the European Parliament – August 2014 ____________________________________________________________________________________ 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 36 ESTONIA .................................................................................... 39 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 39 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 41 IRELAND .................................................................................... 43 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES AS REFERRED TO BY THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND BY ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ........................................................ 43 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .......................... 47 GREECE....................................................................................... 49 1. NATIONAL LEGAL PROVISIONS DETERMINING THE SCOPE AND THE CONTENT OF THE INCOMPATIBILITIES REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST INDENT OF ARTICLE 7(1) AND ARTICLE 7(2) OF THE 1976 ACT ............................................................. 49 2. NATIONAL IMMUNITIES AS REFERRED TO BY ARTICLE 9(A) OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .........................
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