ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY “THE USE OF HISTORY IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA” JAMES C. PEARCE AUGUST 2018 Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Anglia Ruskin University for awarding a departmental bursary and fee waiver, which made undertaking this PhD possible. In addition, a thank you to the British Association of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies (BASEES) for awarding the candidate the postgraduate research prize to assist with his field research costs in the Russian Federation. Following on from this, a special thank you to all of those who agreed to be interviewed, took part in the study and assisted in liaisons; all of whom made this research possible. Finally, to Jonathan Davis and Sean Lang who gave the candidate invaluable support and feedback throughout the process, and without whom this thesis would never have been written. ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY ABSTRACT FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY “THE USE OF HISTORY IN PUTIN’S RUSSIA” JAMES C. PEARCE This thesis is an examination of the past’s current situation in Russia and analysis of how the Russian state uses history to create a broad coalition of consensus and forge a new national identity. History is central to issues of governance and national identity, and is therefore used for the purpose of state building and reviving Russia’s national consciousness in the twenty first century. In assessing how history mediates the complex relationship between state and population, this thesis analyses the selection process of constructing a preferred historical narrative in Russia to create loyal patriotic citizens and aid modernisation. This research critically analyses history in different spheres of Russian life, such as culture, politics, education and anniversaries. The research involves an in depth analysis of these spaces where the past is used for modernisation. An analysis of speeches, official documents and the media is conducted. This thesis also uses original semi-structured interviews conducted in the Russian Federation with history teachers. This includes the first with trainee teachers as well as an assessment of newer school textbooks, exams, homework tasks, historical monuments, public celebrations and events. Many paradoxes exist with history in contemporary Russia. While the majority of the population favour a patriotic past, the narrative is often passively rejected. The ‘preferred’ narrative is packed with inconsistencies, yet the aim is to prevent falsifications. While the past is used it to promote national unity, many episodes expose deep divisions in society. It must be equally rigid, attractive and malleable to the needs of a growing civil society to stand the test of time. History is not only a state matter, but it is a top socio-political issue to tackle in order to modernise the country as a whole. Keywords: Consensus, Continuity, Education, History, Identity, Narrative, Patriotism, State. 2 CONTENTS List of Abbreviations…………………………………………………………...v List of Transliterations………………………………………………………….v List of Diagrams………………………………………………………………..vi List of Tables…………………………………………………………………...vi List of Figures…………………………………………………………………..vi Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 1 Chapter One The Problems of History in Putin’s Russia……………………………………29 Chapter Two Russia and Russianness: a multi-history………………………………………45 Chapter Three The Politics of History in Putin’s Russia………………………………………67 Chapter Four The Russian Education System: modified patriotism in a continued system….95 Chapter Five Teaching Patriotism and History in Putin’s Russia………………...................114 Chapter Six Anniversaries and Memorabilia in Putin’s Russia …………………………………….……………………………………………144 Conclusion Wet Cement in a New Wine Bottle…………………………………………….173 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………184 Appendix………………………………………………………………………..203 3 COPYRIGHT DECLARATION I hereby declare that the work in this thesis is my own work and that to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at Anglia Ruskin University or any other educational institution. I also declare that the intellectual content of the thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. James Pearce 09/08/2018 Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with (i) Anglia Ruskin University for one year and thereafter with (ii) James Pearce This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is bound by copyright. 4 List of Abbreviations CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States COE- Council of Europe EU – European Union EEU – Eurasian Economic Union FOM – Public Monetary Fund (English) KPRF – Communist Party of the Russian Federation LDPR- Liberal Democratic Party of Russia NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OSCE- Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PARNAS – Party of People’s Freedom RUR – Russian Ruble(s) UK – United Kingdom UR – United Russia Party US – United States USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VTsIOM – Russian Public Opinon Research Center (English) Russian-English Transliterations Е – ye Ё - yo Ж - zh И – i Й - iy Ч - ch Ц- ts Ш - sh Щ - shch Ь/Ъ – will both be replaced with an apostrophe (‘) Ы – y Э – e Ю – yu Я – ya All other letters are replaced with their Latin and or English equivalents. 5 List of Diagrams Diagram 1: ‘The Putin Formula’…………………………………………………………........76 List of Tables Table 1: Group One participants, qualified teachers……………………………..20 Table 2: Group Two, trainee teachers………………………………………………………….21 List of Figures Figure 1: Mark of approval from the Ministry of Education and Science……………………38 Figure 2: Anniversary of Stalin’s Death, Moscow 2014…………………………………….170 6 Introduction At his State of the Federation address 2012, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, proclaimed: In order to revive national consciousness we need to link historical eras and get back to understanding the simple truth that Russia did not begin in 1917, or even in 1991, but rather, that we have a common, continuous history spanning over one thousand years and we must rely on it to find inner strength and purpose in our national development.1 For the Russian nation to modernise in its own unique fashion, reacquainting with its past is essential. Since 1991, Russian history has been as uncertain as its future at the best of times. To build a modern state and national identity surrounding it, a narrative depicting successes and glory is sought after. A narrative that is in line with traditions and supported by figures, events and myths that underpin success act as a model of how to construct a new Russia out of the old. Complimentary to this, the past can also serve as an example of what to avoid. The ‘newness’ of Boris Yeltsin’s national idea and symbols of Russia were shallow and meaningless, but more importantly, did not create a sense of historical development in line with traditions that could explain the current situation.2 Yeltsin’s new Russia was polarising because it rejected the experience of the USSR as the country dove into chaos. This ‘decade without patriotism’ was symbolic of the deep pessimism and lack of hope. Russia had not defined its past, therefore, it could not map out a successful future. In other words, the past must be compatible with the current situation to define what Russia is and ‘should’ be. This thesis is an examination of the past and its contemporary relevance to state policy and construction of a national identity. This will henceforth be referred to as the ‘Putin Agenda’, which Russia’s president sets out to achieve national unity and stability. It will be referred to as the Putin Agenda because, as the prior paragraph sets out, the state under his leadership now has 1 President V.V. Putin State of the Federation Address, 2012 2 Edwin Bacon, Contemporary Russia, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), p.179 7 a clear idea of what Russia is and should be. This idea is rooted in the past but borrows from it where appropriate. This agenda stresses the need for continuity of the Russian state, tradition, culture and the necessity of Russia’s great power status. This requires a greater role and presence in geopolitics, enhanced security and a new national idea. All of the aforementioned must be based on success stories in the Putin Agenda. In addition, symbols are a commitment to this unity, assume many forms (textbooks, youth groups or monuments) and are the ultimate reinforcer of a contemporary Russian identity. The past can supply answers to the present when confusion and disillusionment occurs, often acting as a justification for state policy (see Chapter 2). The Putin Agenda is determined to reconcile with the problematic and unusable past. However, much controversy surrounds its motives and policies concerning an already problematic period that divides the population and ruling elites alike. There are concerns that ignoring the traumatic episodes of the past will be detrimental to Russia’s development and bring great instability to the present. The period under investigation in this thesis (1881-1945) was chosen because it represents two separate Russias (the Imperial and Soviet past) that are filled with grandiose events and continue