The Election That Forgot the Environment? Issues, Emos, and the Press in Australia

Home , At Home with Julia, The Bolt Report, The Contrarians

HIJXXX10.1177/1940161214552030The International Journal of Press/PoliticsLester et al. 552030research-article2014

Research Article

The International Journal of Press/Politics 2015, Vol. 20(1) 3–25 The Election that Forgot the © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: Environment? Issues, EMOs, sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161214552030 and the Press in Australia ijpp.sagepub.com

Libby Lester1, Lyn McGaurr1, and Bruce Tranter1

Abstract The 2013 Australian federal election campaign has been described as the campaign that “forgot the environment.” We test this claim by comparing the news representation of the environment and environmental movement organizations (EMOs) in Australian federal elections from 1990 to 2013, and consider how coverage of environmental issues and organizations has changed over time. We also analyze the intensity and range of coverage of EMOs and environmental issues during the 2013 election campaign in relation to behind-the-scenes media practices of EMOs, including the circulation of media releases and other campaign material, and levels of activity on social media and organization Web sites. We find that this activity did not translate into high visibility in news media for EMOs. We offer tentative evidence of a link between the dominance of climate change coverage and the poor visibility of EMOs and other environmental issues.

Keywords environmental movement organizations, Australian election campaigns, climate change coverage, mediated visibility, mediated environmental conflict

Introduction Every Prime Minister for the last 17 years has made it to the top job with a little bit of environmental promise; a little bit of green flair, a nod to our collective love of our wide brown land. But don’t expect to see any of that in 2013. This will be the election that forgot the environment. (Phillips 2013)

1University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia Corresponding Author: Libby Lester, School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 22, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia. Email: [email protected] 4 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

The 2013 Australian federal election was a disappointment for the nation’s environment movement. Following a period of unprecedented political influence during which the Greens held the balance of power in the nation’s Senate and won state Cabinet positions, the party’s primary vote fell in the 2013 federal poll by 3.3 percent nationally. It fell by 8.7 percent in its traditional stronghold, the island state of Tasmania. During the campaign, journalists, broadcasters, and opinion writers suggested that environmental issues other than climate change were largely absent. The sentences quoted above are illustrative of this widespread commentary. They come five paragraphs into an article bookended by a lead that situates major political parties as primary definers of what is at issue for Australia and internationally, and a conclusion that dismisses environmental movement organizations (EMOs) as impotent. EMOs and their range of concerns are essentially written out of the story. Our research analyzes press coverage of environmental issues during the past nine Australian federal elections (our longitudinal, comparable sample) and material published on EMO Web sites and social media during the 2013 campaign (our in- depth sample of recent media-related activity). We find that environmental issues were most strongly evident during the elections of 1990, 2004, 2007, and 2010. The peak in total articles mentioning environmental issues occurred during the 2010 campaign, driven by references to climate change. This correlates with longitudinal studies of media interest in environmental issues in other countries (Hansen 2010). However, our study also shows that EMO presence in coverage, while never high, declined in 2010. In the latest election in 2013, the environment was less visible, although references to issues associated with climate change ensured it was still more prominent than in elections from 1993 to 2001, and EMO visibility fell even further, this time to the lowest level in our study. Our online monitoring provides evidence of vigorous EMO public relations and campaign activity in some quarters in the last weeks of the 2013 campaign, but this activity did not translate into high visibility in news coverage for EMOs. Overall, our research is interested in the shifting dynamics of movement politics, news media reporting during periods of formal electoral activity, and the advocacy and visibility of a range of issues that have come to be loosely termed as “environmental” but often remain framed as political or economic (Waisbord and Peruzzotti 2009). That our research covers the period of “extreme politics” playing out in Australia over the regulation of carbon emissions provides additional analytical value: While prime ministers and other political leaders lost their jobs in part over carbon policies, environmental issues and EMO claims-makers were less visible than ever. As such, our data allow us to offer comparative and contemporary evidence about the capacity of EMOs to gain sustained and effective media access and the conditions under which this access might now be operating, and some tentative conclusions about the impact of climate change politics and its coverage on the presence in the news of environmental issues and their advocates more broadly. We also suggest avenues for further inquiry. Lester et al. 5

Environment, Media, and Movement The late 1980s were years of rising media interest in environmental issues in many Western countries. In Australia, the election of 1990 is widely regarded as the first national poll in which “the environment” may have been decisive (Bean et al. 1990). This development, as with similar rises in the United Kingdom and the United States, has been associated with preceding growth in press coverage, with some suggesting media played an agenda-setting role (Pakulski and Crook 1998). Others argue that the rise in environmental news in the same period was driven by priorities established in nonmedia arenas: in the United Kingdom by Margaret Thatcher’s appropriation of environmental concern (Hansen 2010, 2011) and in the United States by events such as a severe drought, an address to Congress by climate scientist James Hansen, and the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; J. Hall 2001; McComas and Shanahan 1999; Trumbo 1996). In all three countries, these peaks in environmental news were soon followed by significant declines, suggesting the emergence of a rec- ognizable pattern in environmental news media coverage (Hansen 2010; Lester 2010). Although we are wary of “confusing the media-career of a social issue with the socio/political (or public opinion) career of issues” (Hansen 2010: 21, emphasis in original), it is important to acknowledge Anthony Downs’s (1972) theory of issue– attention cycles and its prescience regarding the peaks and troughs in environmental news. Downs described social problems as having fairly predictable careers that begin when claims-makers such as politicians, scientists, or interest groups first identify concerns. Problems then move through defined stages, from widespread public alarm combined with optimism that solutions will be found to a decline in attention as the costs and complexity of addressing the concerns become apparent. Downs considered environmental problems highly susceptible to rises and falls in public attention because the suffering they cause is unequally distributed, powerful sectors of society derive benefit from the activities that create the problems, and the problems themselves are rarely intrinsically exciting. The last of these attributes is especially relevant to the ability of problems to gain access to the news, which Downs regarded as important in building public concern. In discussing the need for problems to be exciting to stand out from the plethora of potential news items considered by journalists for coverage every day, Downs briefly introduced the notion of competition to his otherwise linear approach. This was subsequently expanded by Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) in their Public Arenas Model. Here, “interactions among problems are central to the process of collective definition” and competition takes place in a variety of arenas, with success not necessarily related to the validity of claims or their urgency (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 55). In modern news arenas, for example, a diminishing number of reporters have increasingly limited time for research and writing. Such constraints lead to struggles for problem recognition and more intense competition for control over the way they are framed. Only a small number of potential social problems ever grow to “‘celebrity’ status, the dominant topics of political and social discourse” (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 57). These two elements—peaks and troughs, and competition between issues—remain the basis for 6 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) understanding the presence of environmental issues across various international and media settings (see, for example, Beck 2009; Boykoff 2014). A third key element recognized in these studies is the continued struggle of EMOs to feature prominently in environmental news coverage.1 Hansen (2011: 12) notes that “numerous studies have shown media reporting on environmental issues to be typically authority-oriented, with prominent use of scientists and government sources and a generally much lower profile for NGOs and environmental pressure groups” (see also Lester and Cottle 2009). This is partly a result of the gatekeeping role played by media, as journalists and editors engage in the processes of culling and selection that determine which issues, sources and messages find their way into the news (Lester 2013). Within these production routines, there is a second level of gatekeeping, as some sources attain the status of “arbiters,” while others are relegated to the category of “advocates” (Deacon and Golding 1994). Arbiters are influential because they help “establish the (ostensibly nonpartisan) criteria by which certain ‘advocates’ will be granted access to be heard on matters of controversy and, moreover, what aspect of the topic they will be encouraged to address” (Allan 2004: 73; cf. S. Hall et al. 1978). EMOs are advocates for the environment, but many also strive to position themselves as trustworthy sources of reliable information “more likely to be cited by official sources and brought into the media frame” (Anderson 1997: 203). Other groups continue to rely on activism “to overcome routine exclusion from the news media” (Lester 2010: 110), to recruit supporters, and to maintain member enthu- siasm (Tranter 2010). Although spectacular protests and imaginative stunts have, on occasion, achieved impressive publicity for EMOs and their causes, the news media have grown skeptical of such strategies and often frame them in ways that weaken their political influence (DeLuca 2005; Lester and Cottle 2011). EMOs can be loosely divided into those whose focus on societal transformation leads them to favor protest and others whose interest in conservation finds expression in lobbying, education, and remediation activities, sometimes subsidized by public funds. In Australia, The Wilderness Society (TWS) and Greenpeace are more likely to favor protest-based tactics than the more conservative Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF; Tranter 2010). The Climate Institute, established in 2005, is a lobbying organization, producing and communicating research rather than engaging in protest action. Within these broad parameters, however, there is evidence that some EMOs that have traditionally favored protest, such as TWS, have moved toward a greater reliance on lobbying and negotiation, sometimes even adopting strategies designed to avoid media attention to achieve political end (Lester and Hutchins 2012; Tranter 2009). Prior to the last Australian election, for example, several EMOs joined in protracted negotiations with representatives of the forest industry to create a land- mark but vulnerable “peace agreement” to end decades of conflict over logging. Associated with a loose division between protest and nonprotest environmental groups is a rough categorization of environmental issues into “brown” and “green” clusters. Brown issues include sewage disposal and air and water pollution, while green issues include old-growth logging and the destruction of wildlife. Protest- focused EMOs have an affinity for green issues (Tranter 2014). Although climate Lester et al. 7 change as a macro issue has proved capable of sustaining periods of intensive media coverage, it does not often generate the kind of protests associated with green issues. According to social and political surveys in Australia, the shift since 1990 in public concern related to the environment has been from the brown issue of pollution to the associated brown issue of climate change, rather than from brown issues to green (Tranter 2014). Changing EMO demographics and access to digital technology affect activities: Older members of EMOs appear to be more comfortable with physical activism than younger members (Tranter 2010), and campaigns are integrated across a range of media platforms and physical settings (see, for example, Collins 2013; Lockwood 2013). EMOs and their leaders must also accommodate the cosmopolitanization of environmental issues (Lester 2014; Thrall et al. 2014). Protest actions may be well suited to some local issues, but activists increasingly must “achieve symbolic gains that cross local and national boundaries, and interact with other national and transnational politics and publics” (Lester 2010: 123). This can be as valuable for protests against old-growth logging in geopolitically remote places such as Tasmania as for actions aimed at raising awareness of the global causes and risks of climate change. The selection of activists of different nationalities can attract international media with audiences of corporate or political elites capable of bringing commercial or diplomatic pressure to bear on local decision makers from vast distances (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005). This suggests that although EMOs need to establish themselves as legitimate and authoritative news sources, protest actions cannot be disregarded by scholars investigating the construction of environmental concerns. The emergence of successful green political candidates and parties in recent decades has drawn environmental issues into mainstream politics, and the environment is now routinely included in the platforms of major parties. Green politicians and parties have become important sources for journalists seeking the views of environmental advocates, further blurring boundaries within the movement (van Vuuren 2013). As green political parties have continued to rely on EMOs for support but expanded their areas of interest beyond the environment, there have sometimes been tensions between the two, with strategic federal government funding of nonprotest-oriented EMOs having the effect of “influencing [the] mainstream environmental agenda, and placating less radical environmentalists” (Tranter 2009: 721). Election campaigns are now times of heightened risk as well as opportunity for EMOs, as they strive to represent themselves as credible and, in some cases, nonpartisan; influence the outcome of the poll; and gain vital publicity for their causes without alienating citizens whose voting decisions might be swayed by environmental concerns.

Method The research we present in this paper—part of a three-year Australian Research Council–funded project—focuses on two weeks in each Australian federal election campaign, usually held every three years, from 1990 to 2013.2 Election campaigns are useful points of departure for more detailed analysis of the construction of 8 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) environmental concerns because they are critical discourse moments—periods that “entail a potential for transformation in understandings of a problematique and constitute a test for ‘established’ discursive positions” (Carvalho and Burgess 2005: 1462). We chose the third and second last weeks before election days because we judged campaigning would be well under way by then with news routines unlikely to be as disrupted as they might become closer to the poll. Our principal source of printed articles for our longitudinal analysis is Fairfax’s Sydney Morning Herald (SMH). Established in 1831, the SMH is a moderately progressive publication aimed at an educated readership. It was published as a broadsheet during the first eight election campaigns we investigated but has since moved to a format it describes as “compact.” We chose the metropolitan SMH rather than Australia’s only national generalist newspaper, News Ltd.’s Australian, because Fairfax’s News Store online searchable database of its printed editions starts in the 1980s, more than a decade earlier than most other Australian news organizations. To trace the importance of the environment in many of its manifestations across all federal elections since 1990, we began by searching for approximately sixty words/ phrases (and their extensions) associated with environmental issues. With reference to previous studies of environmental news texts (e.g., Cox 2012), surveys of public opinion on environmental issues, and statements by environmental advocates, we ensured our sample was both comprehensive and able to accommodate changes to issue visibility, labeling or dominant discourses across our sample period—for example, the shift from “global warming” to “climate change” in public discourse (Leiserowitz et al. 2014; see also Dryzek 2013).3 During our searches, we downloaded and scanned articles containing these words to cull duplicates, articles in advertising or community supplements, most articles in sections such as motoring, real estate and sport, and other articles that did not contain references to environmental issues (e.g., those that only contained constructions such as “economic environment” or “retail environment”). We included letters to the editor. We then uploaded these articles to the soft- ware platform Nvivo and used its text search facility to determine trends in a range of specific issues we wished to trace from year to year. Our next task was to determine trends in the visibility of EMOs in the 1990–2013 SMH sample in relation to any environmental issue. First, we undertook a snowball search for prominent EMOs, analogous to snowball sampling techniques applied in qualitative interviewing (Ezzy 2002). We searched our sample for articles containing references to four large EMOs that were well established nationally—WWF, Greenpeace, TWS, and ACF—and the more recently established Climate Institute, which describes itself as “an independent, nonpartisan research and communications organization focused on highlighting the impacts of climate change and finding solutions” (The Climate Institute 2013). Each time we came across the name of a previously unidentified EMO in these articles, we searched the sample again for references to this newly identified organization. We continued this process until no new EMOs appeared in articles returned. This process allowed us to identify thirty-two EMOs. We then followed the five major EMOs—WWF, Greenpeace, ACF, TWS, and the Climate Institute—in more newspapers as we were interested to know whether the Lester et al. 9

250

200

150 1. total items 2. climate change etc. 100 3. carbon tax etc. (subset of 2)

0 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

Figure 1. SMH articles referring to environmental issues: election campaign fortnights 1990–2013 (some articles referring to climate change also mention other environmental issues). Note. SMH = Sydney Morning Herald. visibility of these EMOs differed from state to state. For this information, we turned to the Newsbank database, as this enabled the use of a single database to search both Fairfax and News Ltd. newspapers from a variety of states, although only back to the 2001 election for all six newspapers selected—the Australian (national), the Courier Mail (Brisbane, Queensland), the SMH (Sydney, New South Wales), the Age (Melbourne, Victoria), the Mercury (Hobart, Tasmania), and the Advertiser (Adelaide, South Australia). Again we searched the third last and second last weeks of the campaigns.4 Finally, to develop an appreciation of EMO priorities during the 2013 election and better understand how EMO activity was reflected in the coverage of environmental issues appearing in our sample, we monitored the Web sites and social media of the selected EMOs for approximately two hours a day for the final three weeks of the 2013 campaign. We gathered copies of online news, promotional material, and reports (text, audio, and video) that EMOs passed on to their members and other followers, as well as media releases and social media posts. We also recorded linked online material, including online news articles and blogs. By comparing this content and its discourse features, including images, framing, and word use, with our expanded six-newspaper sample from the 2013 campaign, we were able to assess and trace the production and flow of EMO promotional media activity across platforms, including printed news.

Results Occurrence of References to Environmental Issues Our SMH data (Figure 1) show rises and falls in the environment as an issue of media interest in Australia, with a notable decline following the “Green election” of 1990 and 10 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) rising again in 1996. Interestingly, until 2001, the word “environment” is likely to be associated with the full gamut of environmental issues or to be used generically. After 2001, it is less likely to appear in articles referring to environmental issues. Detailed searches within our sample for terms related to the issues of climate change, uranium/ nuclear energy, forestry, sewage, mining, and drought suggest that no single issue was overwhelmingly responsible for rises and falls from 1990 to 2001. However, by 2007, climate change and related policy debates and controversies were contributing significantly to total environmental coverage. In 2010, articles that referred to a carbon price or emissions trading scheme made a large contribution to the total number of articles mentioning our search terms associated with climate change. Although the total number of climate change articles peaked in the 2010 campaign and then declined in 2013, the “carbon tax/emissions trading scheme” subset of that search continued to rise in 2013. In some of these articles, the phrase “carbon tax” was the only reference to an environmental issue. A number of other issues showed notable increases and declines from one election to another between 1990 and 2013. In 2004, articles containing forestry-related groups of search terms reached a peak that was higher than the peak of any of the other groups of search terms in our comparison over the nine elections except climate change. Sewage search terms peaked in 1990, nuclear in 1998 (only slightly higher than in 1990) and mining in 2013.

Occurrence of References to EMOs The snowball search for EMO presence in the SMH sample identified thirty-two EMOs but very low representation for any single organization compared with the overall numbers of articles referring to environmental issues. There were fewer than ten articles for any of the EMOs in any single election fortnight searched, and in many instances only one. As some articles referred to more than one EMO, the total number of articles in each election campaign containing at least one of the thirty-two EMOs identified in the snowball search comprised only a very small proportion of all articles in the SMH sample (see Figure 2). In view of reductions in pages of printed newspapers in recent years as a consequence of decreases in print advertising, we decided it would be more revealing to express EMO presence as a percentage of total articles mentioning environmental issues. The results show falls in the proportion of articles mentioning at least one of the identified EMOs from 2004 to a historical low of 4 percent in 2013 as the proportion of articles referring to climate change rose (see Figure 3). When we looked more closely at the articles in our SMH sample that mentioned EMOs, we found they were often quoted or paraphrased when referenced, but they tended to be introduced in the body or closing paragraphs of articles. In all nine election samples, EMOs or their leaders rarely appeared in headlines and were almost never authors of opinion pieces. Countering this, the environment was a primary or important concern of many of the articles referring to EMOs, whereas a large proportion of total articles in the sample included an environmental issue that was a Lester et al. 11

250

200

150 TOTAL ITEMS

100 TOTAL ITEMS REFERRING TO EMOS

0 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

Figure 2. Total articles referring to identified EMOs in SMH sample: election campaign fortnights 1990–2013. Note. EMOs = environmental movement organizations; SMH = Sydney Morning Herald. subsidiary interest or the subject of a passing comment. One of the exceptions to the tendency for journalists to relegate references to EMOs to the body or end of articles was the 1990 issue of EMOs supporting particular political parties, which was responsible for most coverage of TWS and ACF for that year. In these articles, the pivotal role of the EMOs ensured they were given greater prominence in the text and also resulted in a number of references in headlines to “greenies,” “green groups,” or the “green lobby.” In the 2013 election campaign fortnight, the SMH search identified only one article mentioning TWS, one mentioning Greenpeace, and three mentioning the Climate Institute. The single-paragraph article that mentioned TWS (Dumas 2013) was about Youth Climate Coalition members dressing up as clown fish, described by the newspaper as “the new Wilderness Society koalas.” The single-paragraph article mentioning Greenpeace (SMH 2013) referred to the EMO’s decision to call off a protest against Russian oil exploration in the Arctic. The three articles mentioning the Climate Institute referred to research on climate change commissioned by the organization. Our search for articles mentioning the five EMOs—TWS, ACF, WWF, Greenpeace, and the Climate Institute—in the Australian and one newspaper from each of five states for election fortnights from 2001 to 2013 allowed us to conduct a more robust comparison of the print media presence of each EMO (see Figure 4) and to determine whether state issues influenced press news coverage of EMOs. By adding the results for each organization from the six newspapers, we identified election years of higher and lower coverage, at least in the populous metropolitan east of the country. The most notable feature of these results is the dramatic decline in total articles mentioning at least one of the five tracked EMOs after 2007. The increase from 2004 to 2007 was influenced by the inclusion for the first time of articles mentioning the Climate 12 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

60 250

50 TOTAL ITEMS 200

40 150 PERCENTAGE OF 30 TOTAL ITEMS 100 MENTIONING AT

20 Number of items LEAST ONE EMO

Percentage of total items PERCENTAGE OF 50 10 TOTAL ITEMS MENTIONING CLIMATE CHANGE 0 0 1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013

Figure 3. Percentage of total SMH items referring to environmental issues that mention at least one identified EMO or climate change. Note. SMH = Sydney Morning Herald; EMOs = environmental movement organizations.

Institute, which was established in 2005, while part of the subsequent decline is likely to be due to a reduction in the size of printed newspapers over recent years (see above). Nevertheless, the (relatively) very high presence of the ACF in 2001 and TWS in 2004, the surprisingly low representation of the Climate Institute in 2010, and the very low representation of the ACF, WWF, and Greenpeace in 2013 are all noteworthy results of this part of our research. By giving greater attention to instances where a single newspaper published more than ten articles mentioning one of the five EMOs, we determined that nuclear/uranium issues and issues associated with the Murray River in Adelaide’s Advertiser made a significant contribution to the high level of coverage of the ACF in 2001, forestry issues in Hobart’s Mercury contributed significantly to the high level of coverage of TWS in 2004, and references to the ACF in Melbourne’s Age on a range of environmental issues, including climate change, boosted that organization’s representation in 2007. The Climate Institute’s poor showing in 2010 (see Figure 4) warrants further investigation, in view of the strength of the climate change issue in that campaign fortnight in the SMH (see Figure 1). In view of our interest in the 2013 election campaign, we also looked more closely at the twenty-three articles for that year returned in our six-newspaper search. TWS and the Climate Institute were present in the Australian and three state newspapers in our sample from that campaign fortnight—a geographical breadth of coverage that eluded the other three EMOs we tracked (see Figure 5). The Climate Institute’s commissioned economic modeling of the then Opposition’s “direct action” policy on climate change was responsible for that organization’s presence in nine of the eleven articles in which it appeared. It is also notable that among the twenty-three Lester et al. 13

90 80 70 All arcles 60 TWS 50 ACF 40 wwf 30 Greenpeace 20 Climate Instute 10 0 2001 2004 2007 20102013

Figure 4. Total articles mentioning each EMO in six newspapers in five states: election campaign fortnights 2001–2013 (some articles mention more than one EMO). Note. EMOs = environmental movement organizations; TWS = The Wilderness Society; ACF = Australian Conservation Foundation; WWF = World Wildlife Fund.

10 Adverser Age 8 SMH 6 Mercury 4 Courier Mail 2 Australian

0 Total TWSACF wwfGreenpeace Climate Instute

Figure 5. Articles mentioning individual EMOs in six newspapers in five states in 2013 election fortnight (some articles may mention more than one EMO). Note. EMOs = environmental movement organizations; SMH = Sydney Morning Herald; TWS = The Wilderness Society; ACF = Australian Conservation Foundation; WWF = World Wildlife Fund. items from 2013 returned in this search, there were three opinion pieces by EMOs. One in the Advertiser by the ACF (Maries 2013) was about climate change’s potential effect on the Murray River; a second in the Australian jointly authored by the ACF, the Climate Institute, and others (Kearney et al. 2013) was about climate change and poverty; and a third in the Australian by TWS (Schneiders 2013) discussed the wider implications for environmental regulation and federal–state relations of a Supreme Court decision against Western Australian state government approval for a gas-processing hub. 14 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Table 1. Environmental Issues Promoted by Five Selected EMOs in 2013.

Climate change (including solar energy and renewables) Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Areas Vulnerable species Arctic drilling Tarkine Plans for a gas hub at James Price Point on the Kimberley Coast The environment in federal–state relations Coal seam and shale gas exploration Sand mining on Stradbroke Island Clean water, air, and soil Indigenous rangers Forestry Pollution Recycling Nuclear

EMO Activity and News Presence in the 2013 Campaign On the Web sites and in the social media of EMOs during the second and third last weeks of the 2013 election campaign, the environmental issues listed in Table 1. were among the range of concerns that received attention. Most of these issues appeared in at least one of the twenty-three articles returned in our search for five EMOs in six printed newspapers in the 2013 election campaign fortnight (see above), but only articles about climate change were prominent in number. There were many examples of climate change being promoted by EMOs in combination with other issues, such as vulnerable species or the Great Barrier Reef. For example, WWF’s “I Am Real” campaign (WWF Australia 2013) featured actors Bryan Brown, Leah Purcell, Miriam Margolyes, and John Bell representing a koala, a marine turtle, the Great Barrier Reef, or the Earth. The campaign aimed to make the impacts of climate change comprehensible, immediate, emotionally engaging, and vote worthy. Advertisements ended with words such as “I am planet Earth and I do not have a vote, but you do. Please, think about the climate when you cast yours” (WWF Australia, n.d.). The campaign was promoted on WWF’s Web site and social media, and advertisements appeared on YouTube, radio, television, the Guardian Australia Web site, and elsewhere. Negative forecasts in leaked draft sections of an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report were circulated by a number of the EMOs, but coverage of the leaked information in our sample of printed SMH articles from the Newstore database did not include references to any of the five EMOs we monitored, and the leak did not appear in our six-newspaper sample of articles mentioning the five selected EMOs. Large Australian protests were rare in the last three weeks of the 2013 election campaign, one exception being the Rally for the Reef in Brisbane on August 25 (see Lester et al. 15 below), but Greenpeace used its Web site and social media to publicize its international protests. These included stunts at the Formula 1 Shell Belgian Grand Prix on August 25 to draw attention to Shell’s Arctic drilling (see, for example, Greenpeace Australia Pacific, n.d.-b and Taube 2013) and action in early September against the Margiris supertrawler in Chile, which it linked to earlier action against the vessel in Australia (Greenpeace Australia Pacific, n.d.-a). Greenpeace also promoted the release of films about mining and coal seam gas exploration by the Lock the Gate Alliance—Fractured Country: An Unconventional Invasion and Undermining Australia: Coal vs Communities. The Rally for the Reef in Brisbane on August 25 was organized by six EMOs, including Greenpeace, to protest against “industrial coal-port developments, dredg- ing, shipping and climate change” (Greenpeace Australia Pacific 2013). The rally attracted approximately one thousand people, and coverage included ABC TV News Queensland (Withey 2013) and online news sites such as the Australian (Australian Associated Press [AAP] 2013b), the Courier Mail (AAP 2013c), and the Brisbane Times (AAP 2013a), often mentioning the attendance at the rally of seventy- two-year-old grandmother June Norman, already recognized in the media for earlier trekking 1,200 kilometers from Cairns to Gladstone with a group of “Save the Reef” walkers. The rally was not reported in any of the articles returned by our search of print editions of Brisbane’s Courier Mail, Sydney’s SMH, or Melbourne’s Age but was reported in very small items in the print editions of Adelaide’s Advertiser (2013) and the Australian (2013). Earlier in the election campaign, online news site Crikey had devoted an article to the reef issue, headed by a photograph of Greenpeace activists writing “Reef in danger” on the side of a ship and also referring to the trek from Cairns to Gladstone by June Norman and the other “Save the Reef” walkers (Mikkelsen 2013). EMOs had some success at gaining access to online news sites via opinion pieces and also by promoting the results of comparisons and evaluations of all parties’ environmental policies. There was online news coverage (Business Spectator 2013) of the Climate Institute’s “Pollute-O-Meter” evaluating the policies of the main political parties and independents, while the release of WWF’s environmental Scorecard was covered by ABC News Radio (Tchilinguirian 2013). ACF produced a comparative table, using infographics of live and dead koalas to indicate the environmental value of each party’s policies (ACF 2014), but even so, the tactic proved problematic for the organization when it was revealed to have mistakenly endorsed Labor candidate Kelvin Thomson, despite promoting itself as nonpartisan (Crikey 2013). ACF also used its Web site and social media to encourage its followers to engage in more traditional practices, such as writing letters to the editor of newspapers and news Web sites, and signing online petitions.

Discussion Our preliminary results suggest a familiar but evolving story about environmental issues, EMOs, and media during election campaigns. The most striking features are 16 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

1. the variability in news attention to environmental issues, compared with the consistently low visibility of EMOs in SMH election coverage; 2. the historically low presence of EMOs in press news in the sampled weeks in 2013; and 3. the proportional reduction in EMO presence in the peak years of climate change visibility in the SMH.

This research suggests that although print news attention to environmental issues rose and fell periodically between 1990 and 2013, it is unlikely that EMOs were ever highly visible. The number of articles referring to EMOs at such times may not give an accurate indication of their press news presence outside those periods, because election coverage reduces the space available to voices other than those of the major political parties. Nevertheless, our research indicates that 2013 was a very low point in modern Australian election history for EMO representation in printed newspapers. This is to an extent supported by data from the Australian Election Study (McAllister and Cameron 2013). When asked to nominate the most important election issue, the proportion of Australian adults sampled who chose “the environment” or “global warming” each fell between 2007 and 2013, suggesting these issues are of declining political significance in Australia. As noted earlier in this paper, other studies have already established that EMOs often do not feature prominently at times when the environment achieves sustained recognition in the news (Hansen 2011: 12). A low level of EMO sources in articles about climate change policy is also not surprising (Bacon 2011).5 What the longitudinal research reported in this paper adds to existing knowledge is evidence that policy debates over climate change may actually contribute to a reduction in news media visibility of generalist EMOs, as explained below. In 1999, Tranter observed that routinization of the environment would be evident in its appropriation by major parties, which might then relegate it to the status of a sec- ondary issue. This appears to have been the case following the 1990 election, but in the 2004 campaign both forestry and climate change issues were relatively prominent. In our SMH content analysis, a rising trend in EMO presence from 2001 to 2004 correlates with a rising trend in all articles, and in the number and proportion of those articles mentioning climate change but this correlation did not endure. Events between the 2004 and 2007 elections were highly conducive to increasing public concern about climate change. In 2005, Australian academic and science communicator Tim Flannery published a book exploring humanity’s responsibility for global warming, The Weather Makers, which was widely discussed in the Australian media; in 2006, Al Gore’s documentary on the scientific evidence for climate change, An Inconvenient Truth, became a box office hit and the Stern Report drew widespread attention to the likely economic impact of global warming; and early in 2007, the fourth assessment report of the IPCC announced increasing certainty about the human contribution to rising levels of CO2 in the atmosphere, and there was bipartisan support in the 2007 election for an emissions trading scheme. But although the issue invigorated the environmental movement (Tranter 2010), the cost of action soon Lester et al. 17 became a subject of bitter political conflict between the major Australian political parties increasingly associated with technical debates about carbon pricing (McGaurr et al. 2013), and people’s willingness to take strong action to mitigate it declined (see, for example, Hanson 2012; Tranter 2014). By the 2010 election, party–political conflict about competing policy responses to the issue had reached fever pitch, correlating with peaks in total articles and the number containing references to climate change search terms in our 2010 SMH sample. Yet despite this, the proportion of articles in our SMH sample referring to EMOs in relation to any environmental issue declined in 2007 and 2010. In 2013, generalist EMOs attempting to communicate a sense of urgency, severity, and comprehensible consequences of climate change—and perhaps also hoping to turn climate change to their strategic advantage—developed promotional material that infused this “brown” issue with the affective attributes of “green” concerns such as endangered species, but the electoral outcome suggests the strategy had limited success. Despite the reduced level of coverage of the environment in the SMH in the 2013 campaign fortnight, climate change remained the most visible environmental issue. Even so, the proportion of our SMH sample mentioning EMOs fell again. Thus, we argue that the challenge climate change poses for EMOs during election campaigns is its potential to reduce generalist EMO access to the news media and perhaps thereby also exacerbate the potential for other environmental issues they sponsor to be overlooked. Comparing 1993 and 2013 adds weight to this argument: In both campaigns, the major parties largely dropped the environment from their election platforms (see Pakulski and Crook 1998 in regard to the earlier campaign), but in 1993, when climate change was hardly visible, the proportion of articles in our SMH sample mentioning EMOs rose, whereas in 2013, the proportion fell (see Figure 3). Despite the above findings, our study demonstrates that state issues can bolster the regional news presence of Australian EMOs during particular federal election campaigns, and protest action can still secure some news access, even during campaigns that largely ignore environmental issues. In addition, protest actions providing strong human-interest angles, such as Grandmother June Norman’s long walk for the reef, are a viable strategy for attracting media attention. However, the speed of the contemporary news cycle brought about by the internet means that protests that secure online visibility immediately will quickly be pushed down Web pages and social media feeds by other news and, having been covered online already, may never make it into the printed newspaper edition. Events other than protests, such as court rulings against development, can also cut through election noise to secure coverage for EMOs associated with the issues concerned. Conversely, our research indicates that transnational EMOs do not ignore international environmental concerns during national elections. In the weeks monitored in 2013, the Australian election did not obscure overseas issues on the Web sites and in the social media of Greenpeace and WWF. Whether attention to international concerns diluted the strength of these EMOs’ electoral influence requires further investigation, but the interest evident on their Facebook posts and Twitter feeds suggests that being able to follow developments related to protests and activism, and possibly participate 18 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) in them, may still be important for building and maintaining a sense of purpose among EMO members and followers. Our press and online monitoring in 2013 indicates that contemporary EMOs are reasonably adept at deploying opinion pieces, which have the advantage of enabling them to harness the audience penetration of mainstream news without losing control of their message. Promoted via Web sites, Facebook and Twitter, opinion pieces are also a form of internal communication—evidence for members and followers that the organization is effective in the public sphere. Detailed analyses of the policies of political parties are another important product of EMO activity that can secure media access and contribute to the EMO’s authority as a credible source of environmental information. Thus, election campaigns appear to provide important public relations opportunities for some EMOs that may yield organizational benefits in the longer term, even in years when their lobbying activities do not result in the environmental policies or election outcomes they desire. In contemporary newsrooms, environmental coverage expands and contracts according to journalists’ and their editors’ perceptions of public interest and mood (Lester 2013) —all part of the complex interaction between the media and other issues arenas that collectively determine the fate of many social and political issues. These perceptions of the environment at a particular time will influence how many journalists are available to write environmental stories, which media releases they read, who they approach for information, how much time they spend investigating and explaining technical details, and how much space their articles command. To these pressures must be added the upheavals currently disrupting traditional news outlets as they struggle to adjust to the challenges imposed and opportunities afforded by the Internet. By using digital technology strategically, providing informative, well-crafted information subsidies and finding ways to accommodate journalists’ enduring need for authoritative information, EMOs can sometimes take advantage of the very news routines, practices, and pressures that so often block their path to effective publicity. Clearly, however, these tactics will not be enough to sway a nation if the environment is struggling in multiple issues arenas: Opinion pieces get lost in busy news Web sites, Web links delivered by social media may never reach the uncommitted, and protests or research costing EMO resources sometimes makes news for no more than a day, or fails to appear. To these challenges our research adds evidence that climate change itself can be an obstacle to EMOs seeking publicity for themselves and other issues— one they are still struggling to negotiate.

Conclusion The results of our study to date mostly capture only the overt public relations activities and news media presence of EMOs and environmental issues. Out of view are count- less interactions that may never yield a quote or a photo opportunity but have the potential to influence the construction of environmental concern profoundly. EMOs, for example, increasingly seek to gain access via directing journalists to a range of information relevant to their particular issues, such as Web links to parliamentary Lester et al. 19 reports or scientific papers (Lester 2013: 224). Our analysis of Web sites and published news also tells us little about the strategic efforts of EMOs and their leaders to shape environmental policy away from public scrutiny (Lester and Hutchins 2012), the tensions that can sometimes arise between and within EMOs (Tranter 2009), or the still evolving relationship between EMOs and the parliamentary Greens. Frame analyses and interviews with environmental leaders and journalists in our further research will help flesh out the discussion opened here. News access and political visibility have long been core to the concerns of media scholars (Cottle 2000; Couldry 2010; Schlesinger 1990; Thompson 2005). The debate over how a plurality of voices are raised and messages circulated to potentially influence individual decision making and policy making is now well rehearsed. Scholarship on the relationship between media and environmental issues and their advocates has contributed richly to these debates, given its attempts to untangle how complex issues and concerns, rarely palatable to dominant economic or political ambition, are promoted and travel through a landscape of changing media technologies and practices, institutional and political power, and public anxieties and opinion. Our study contributes in that it confirms that despite the magnitude of some shifts within media and public arenas, EMOs continue to struggle at the margins of news visibility. More importantly, it shows that this already limited visibility can decline even further. We are not in a position in this article to make definitive claims about EMO capacity (i.e., power or lack thereof) to influence environmental decision making. We are aware, for example, of evidence and scholarship that points to increasing complexity in how and to what extent environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) gain news access (Waisbord 2011), to a stronger environmental presence in elite decision- making forums away from media (see Brockington 2013; Lester and Hutchins 2012), and to the emergence of new forms of social movements that exist online and seek to circumvent the gatekeeping functions of news media (Castells 2013). We also know that reporting on environmental issues and EMO access may shift during formal campaign periods, with evidence that “loaded language” and EMO actors, accepted despite their perceived lack of authority and credibility during nonelection periods, become less visible in more scrutinized and formal campaign reporting (Lester 2005). However, we are also aware that news media visibility remains an important ambition for EMOs seeking sustained social change (Waisbord 2013) and that EMOs ignore news media roles in political debate and policy formation at their peril. Here, we need only point to events in Australia following the election of the new Abbott government in 2013: the collapse of the “forests peace agreement” in Tasmania; the approval of massive coal developments, including the expansion of shipping facilities near the Great Barrier Reef; the attempt to delist seventy-four thousand hectares of forests from World Heritage; and the roll back of a tax on carbon. Current proposals, both state and federal, include mandatory jail sentences for direct action environmental protesters and the removal of exemptions so as to outlaw environmental campaigns that promote corporate boycotts, whether via news media or direct online campaigning. While the Australian public did not entirely “forget” the environment at the 2013 Australian election,6 its news coverage and the aftermath have been disappointing for 20 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

EMOs. Does this signal the general inability of Australian EMO to influence political outcomes via mass media? Our tentative conclusion is that EMOs have a modest influence upon politics at best, at least during national election campaigns. An important reason is apparent in the deep-seated political divisions over environmental issues between progressive and conservative parties, particularly climate change and the “carbon tax” in Australia (Tranter 2011), echoing the environmental divide between Democrats and Republicans in the United States (McCright and Dunlap 2011). Divisive issues such as climate change are easily exploited by political opponents and may therefore be ignored or downplayed during elections, attenuating the influence of EMO. Further research is required to establish the ability of EMOs to promulgate and politicize environmental issues, both beyond the cauldron of election campaigns and in other advanced industrialized countries.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article: This research has been conducted as part of an Australian Research Council–funded project “Leadership and the Construction of Environmental Concerns in Australia” 2013–2015 (DP103102154).

Notes 1. EMOs are social movement organizations (SMOs) specific to the environmental movement. For McCarthy and Zald (1977), an SMO is “a complex, or formal, organisation which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.” 2. This research has been conducted as part of an Australian Research Council–funded project “Leadership and the Construction of Environmental Concerns in Australia” 2013–2015 (DP103102154). 3. We did not conduct separate searches for extreme weather events—bushfires, drought, flood—because the most relevant articles related to these issues were captured by our searches for versions of “environment” or “climate change.” We also did not search separately for “coal,” assuming relevant articles would be captured under our searches for versions of “mining,” “gas,” “environment,” “climate change,” and “carbon.” We retained articles that included references to environmental issues whether or not these issues were related to political conflict and whether or not the issues were Australian. However, we excluded articles about the Greens political party or green political candidates that did not refer to environmental issues, and we excluded articles about preference deals that did not also refer specifically either to the natural environment or an EMO. We also excluded articles about nuclear testing or nuclear weapons that we judged did not touch on environmental concerns. We retained articles that only mentioned a carbon tax but removed articles that only mentioned a mining tax, as the latter was not related to environmental concerns. We retained all articles about uranium mining but generally culled articles about other kinds of mining or drilling that did not refer to environmental issues. Lester et al. 21

4. We included Sunday newspapers associated with the weekly editions. Duplicates in each newspaper were excluded. Because the environment was these organizations’ raison d’etre and we were interested in their overall visibility, we counted any articles in which their names appeared, regardless of context. 5. In a large study of coverage of climate change in ten Australian newspapers from February to July 2011, Bacon (2011) found nongovernment organizations accounted for 2 percent of the first three sources quoted, activists for 1 percent, and think tanks for 1 percent. This compared with 28 percent for the government of the day, 23 percent for business, 18 percent for the Opposition, and 5 percent for the Greens party. 6. Public support for action on climate change has waned, although prior to the 2013 election 58 percent felt “Australia should be a leader in finding solutions” to global warming— increasing 6 percent from 2012 (Stefanova 2013: 4).

References AAP. 2013a. “More than 1000 Rally for Barrier Reef.” Brisbane Times, August 25. http://www. brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/more-than-1000-rally-for-barrier-reef-20130825-2sjdg. html (accessed February 20, 2014). AAP. 2013b. “More than 1000 Rally for Reef in Brisbane.” Australian, August 25. http://www. theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/more-than-1000-rally-for-reef-in-brisbane/story- fn3dxiwe-1226703639778 (accessed April 4, 2014). AAP. 2013c. “More than 1000 Rally for Reef in Brisbane.” Courier Mail, August 25. http:// www.couriermail.com.au/news/breaking-news/more-than-1000-rally-for-reef-in-brisbane/ story-fnihsfrf-1226703639778 (accessed April 4, 2014). Advertiser. 2013. “Thousands Rally for Reef.” August 26, 12. Allan, Stuart. 2004. News Culture. 2nd Edition. Berkshire, UK: Open University Press. Anderson, Alison. 1997. Media, Culture and Environment. London: Routledge. Australian. 2013. “Your State: Rally Calls for Boost to Reef Protection.” Queensland Country Edition, August 26, 2. Australian Conservation Foundation. 2014. Election 2013: Our Environment, Your Call. http:// www.acfonline.org.au/be-informed/election-2013 (accessed February 20, 2014). Bacon, Wendy. 2011. A Sceptical Climate: Media Coverage of Climate Change in Australia 2011: Part 1—Climate Change Policy. Sydney: Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, University of New South Wales. http://sceptical-climate.investigate.org.au/ (accessed April 13, 2014). Bean, Clive, Ian McAllister, and John Warhurst. eds. 1990. The Greening of Australian Politics. Melbourne, Australia: Longman Cheshire. Beck, Ulrich. 2009. World at Risk. Cambridge: Polity. Boykoff, Maxwell T. 2014. “Media Discourse on the Climate Slowdown.” Nature Climate Change 4 (3): 156–58. Boykoff, Maxwell T., and Jules M. Boykoff. 2007. “Climate Change and Journalistic Norms: A Case-Study of US Mass-Media Coverage.” Geoforum 38 (6): 1190–204. Brockington, Daniel. 2013. “Celebrity, Environmentalism and Conservation.” In Environmental Conflict and the Media, ed. Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins, 139-152. New York: Peter Lang. Business Spectator. 2013. “Wilkie Gains in Climate Ranking.” August 27. http://www.busi- nessspectator.com.au/news/2013/8/27/climate/wilkie-gains-climate-ranking-0?utm_ source=exact (accessed February 20, 2014). 22 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Carvalho, Anabela, and Jacquelin Burgess. 2005. “Cultural Circuits of Climate Change in U.K. Broadsheet Newspapers, 1985–2003.” Risk Analysis 25 (6): 1457–69. Castells, Manuel. 2013. Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. Cambridge: Polity. Collins, Catherine. 2013. “Clear Cuts on Clearcutting: YouTube, Activist Videos and Narrative Strategies.” In Environmental Conflict and the Media, ed. Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins, 51-74. New York: Peter Lang. Cottle, Simon. 2000. “Rethinking News Access.” Journalism Studies 1 (3): 427–48. Couldry, Nick. 2010. Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism. London: Sage. Cox, Robert. 2012. Environmental Communication and the Public Sphere. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Crikey. 2013. “ACF Confused over Election Endorsements.” September 2. http://www.crikey. com.au/2013/09/02/tips-and-rumours-956/ (accessed February 20, 2014). Deacon, David, and Peter Golding. 1994. Taxation and Representation : The Media, Political Communication and the Poll Tax. London: John Libbey. della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow. 2005. Transnational Protest and Global Activism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. DeLuca, Kevin Michael. 2005. Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum. Downs, Anthony. 1972. “Up and Down with Ecology—The ‘Issue-Attention Cycle.’” The Public Interest 28: 38–50. Dryzek, John S. 2013. The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Dumas, D. 2013. “Well Schooled.” Sydney Morning Herald, August 30, 14. Ezzy, Douglas. 2002. Qualitative Analysis: Practice and Innovation. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin. Greenpeace Australia Pacific. 2013. “Photos: Thousands Rally to Save the Reef.” August 26. http://www.greenpeace.org/australia/en/photosandvideos/photos/slideshows/Photos- thousands-rally-to-save-the-reef/ (accessed February 20, 2014). Greenpeace Australia Pacific. n.d.-a. “Not Here, Not Anywhere.” http://www.greenpeace.org/ australia/en/news/oceans/Not-here-Not-anywhere/ (accessed February 20, 2014). Greenpeace Australia Pacific. n.d.-b. “Shell’s Priceless Grand Prix Moment.” http://www. greenpeace.org/australia/en/news/climate/Shells-priceless-Grand-Prix-moment/ (accessed February 20, 2014). Hall, J. 2001. “How the Environmental Beat Got its Groove Back.” Columbia Journalism Review 40 (2): 10. Hall, Stuart, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts. 1978. Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order. New York: Holmes & Meier. Hansen, Anders. 2010. Environment, Media and Communication. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Hansen, Anders. 2011. “Communication, Media and Environment: Towards Reconnecting Research on the Production, Content and Social Implications of Environmental Communication.” International Communication Gazette 73 (1–2): 7–25. Hanson, Fergus. 2012. The Lowy Institute Poll 2012: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. The Lowy Institute for International Policy. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/lowy_ poll_2012_web3.pdf (accessed March 13, 2014). Hilgartner, Stephen, and Charles L. Bosk. 1988. “The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public Arenas Model.” American Journal of Sociology 94 (1): 53–78. Lester et al. 23

Kearney, Ged, Cassandra Goldie, Don Henry, and John Connor. 2013. “Efficient Power for the Poor.” Australian, August, 21, 14. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/ opinion/efficient-power-for-poor/story-e6frgd0x-1226700873923# (accessed February 20, 2014). Leiserowitz, Anthony, Geoff Feinberg, Seth Rosenthal, Nicholas Smith, Ashley Anderson, Connie Roser-Renouf, and Edward Maibach. 2014. What’s in a Name? Global Warming vs Climate Change. Yale Project on Climate Change Communication. http://environment. yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Global_Warming_vs_Climate_Change_Report.pdf (accessed July 15, 2014). Lester, Libby. 2005. “Wilderness and the Loaded Language of News.” Media International Australia 115: 123–34. Lester, Libby. 2010. Media and Environment: Conflict, Politics and the News. Cambridge: Polity. Lester, Libby. 2013. “On Flak, Balance and Activism, the Ups and Downs of Environmental Journalism.” In Journalism Research and Investigation in a Digital World, ed. Stuart Tanner and Nick Richardson, 221-231. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press. Lester, Libby. 2014. “Transnational Publics and Environmental Conflict in the Asian Century.” Media International Australia 150: 67–78. Lester, Libby, and Simon Cottle. 2009. “Visualising Climate Change: TV News and Ecological Citizenship.” International Journal of Communication 3: 920–36. Lester, Libby, and Simon Cottle. 2011. “Transnational Protests and the Media: Toward Global Civil Society.” In Transnational Protests and the Media, ed. Simon Cottle and Libby Lester, 287-291. New York: Peter Lang. Lester, Libby, and Brett Hutchins. 2012. “The Power of the Unseen: Environmental Conflict, the Media and Invisibility.” Media, Culture & Society 34 (7): 847–63. Lockwood, Alex. 2013. “Affecting Environments: Mobilizing Emotion and Twitter in the UK Save Our Forests Campaign.” In Environmental Conflict and the Media, ed. Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins, 49-60. New York: Peter Lang. Maries, C. 2013. “Could SA’s Lifeblood Run Dry.” Advertiser, August 30, 22. McAllister, Ian, and Sarah Cameron. 2013. Trends in Australian Political Opinion: Results from the Australian Election Study, 1987-2013. Canberra: School of Politics & International Relations, Australian National University. McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 82: 1212–41. McComas, Katherine, and James Shanahan. 1999. “Telling Stories about Global Climate Change: Measuring the Impact of Narratives on Issue Cycles.” Communicating Research 26 (1): 30–57. McCright, Aaron, and Riley Dunlap. 2011. “The Politicization of Climate Change and Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming 2001-2010.” The Sociological Quarterly 52: 155–94. McGaurr, Lyn, Libby Lester, and James Painter. 2013. “Risk, Uncertainty and Opportunity in Climate Change Coverage: Australia Compared.” Australian Journalism Review 35 (2): 21–34. Mikkelsen, John. 2013. “Battle for the Reef Rages below the Poll Surface.” Crikey, August 19. http://www.crikey.com.au/2013/08/19/battle-for-the-reef-rages-below-the-poll-surface/ (accessed February 20, 2014). Pakulski, Jan, and Stephen Crook. 1998. “The Environment in Australian Print Media, 1982– 1996.” In The Ebbing of the Green Tide? Environmentalism, Public Opinion and the Media 24 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

in Australia, ed. Jan Pakulski and Stephen Crook, 70-84. Occasional Paper Series No 5. Hobart, Australia: School of Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania. Phillips, Sarah. 2013. “The Election that Forgot the Environment.” Environment Blog, ABC, August 16. http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2013/08/16/3826412.htm (accessed February 3, 2014). Schlesinger, Philip. 1990. “Rethinking the Sociology of Journalism: Source Strategies and the Limits of Media-Centrism.” In Public Communication: The New Imperatives, ed. M. Ferguson, 61-83. London: Sage. Schneiders, Lyndon. 2013. “Fox in Charge of Chooks.” Australian, August 23, 12. Stefanova, K. 2013. Climate of the Nation 2013: Australian Attitudes on Climate Change. The Climate Institute. http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/TCI_ ClimateOfTheNation2013_web.pdf (accessed April 11, 2014). Sydney Morning Herald. 2013. “Threatened Protest Ship Leaves Arctic.” August 28, 17. Taube, Aaron. 2013. “Greenpeace Ruined Shell’s PR Moment with This Brilliant Prank.” Business Insider Australia, August 29. http://www.businessinsider.com.au/greenpeace- ruins-shells-formula-one-pr-moment-2013-8 (accessed February 20, 2014). Tchilinguirian, L. 2013. “WWF Australia Has Released an Environmental Scorecard of the Main Political Parties.” Interview with WWF CEO Dermott O’Gorman, News Radio, ABC, September 4. http://www.abc.net.au/newsradio/content/s3841170.htm (accessed February 20, 2014). The Climate Institute. 2013. Pollute-O-Meter: How Do the Parties’ Climate Policies Stack Up? http://www.2013pollute-o-meter.org.au/ (accessed February 20, 2014). Thompson, John B. 2005. “The New Visibility.” Theory, Culture & Society 22 (6): 31–51. Thrall, Trevor A., Dominik Stecular, and Diana Sweet. 2014. “May We Have Your Attention Please? Human-Rights NGOs and the Problem of Global Communications.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 19 (2): 135–59. Tranter, Bruce. 2009. “Leadership and Change in the Tasmanian Environment Movement.” The Leadership Quarterly 20 (5): 708–24. Tranter, Bruce. 2010. “Environmental Activists and Non-active Environmentalists in Australia.” Environmental Politics 19 (3): 413–29. Tranter, Bruce. 2011. “Political Divisions over Climate Change.” Environmental Politics 20 (1): 78–96. Tranter, Bruce. 2014. “Social and Political Influences on Environmentalism in Australia.” Journal of Sociology 50 (3): 331-348. Trumbo, Craig. 1996. “Constructing Climate Change: Claims and Frames in US News Coverage of an Environmental Issue.” Public Understanding of Science 5 (3): 269–83. van Vuuren, Kitty. 2013. “Online Media, Flak and Local Environmental Politics.” In Environmental Conflict and the Media, ed. Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins, 125-138. New York: Peter Lang. Waisbord, Silvio. 2011. “Can NGOs Change the News?” International Journal of Communication 5: 24. Waisbord, Silvio. 2013. “Contesting Extractivism: Media and Environmental Citizenship in Latin America.” In Environmental Conflict and the Media, ed. Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins, 105-124. New York: Peter Lang. Waisbord, Silvio, and Enrique Peruzzotti. 2009. “The Environmental Story that Wasn’t: Advocacy, Journalism and the Asambleísmo Movement in Argentina.” Media, Culture & Society 31 (5): 691–709. Lester et al. 25

Withey, A. 2013. “Protesters March in Brisbane over Coal Shipments Out of Barrier Reef.” 7 pm TV News ABC, August 25. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-25/great-barrier-reef- on-protesters-voting-agenda/4911138?section=qld (accessed February 20, 2014). WWF Australia. 2013. Australian Actors Hit Small Screen for Climate Change: WWF Launches “I AM REAL” AD CAMPAIGN. WWF Australia. http://www.wwf.org.au/?7760/ Australian-actors-hit-small-screen-for-climate-change (accessed February 20, 2014). WWF Australia. n.d. “I am Real: I am Planet Earth.” YouTube. http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=hP8awfydawE (accessed February 20, 2014).

Author Biographies Libby Lester is a professor and head of journalism, media and communications at the University of Tasmania. Among her books are Media and Environment: Conflict, Politics and the News (Polity 2010) and the co-edited collection, Transnational Protests and the Media (Peter Lang 2011, with Simon Cottle). Lyn McGaurr is a research associate in the University of Tasmania’s School of Social Sciences, Australia. Her publications include chapters in Environmental Conflict and the Media (Peter Lang 2013) and Travel Journalism: Exploring Production, Impact and Culture (Palgrave Macmillan in press). She is currently working on a book titled Travel Journalism and Environmental Communication for Routledge. Bruce Tranter is a professor of sociology in the School of Social Sciences, University of Tasmania. He has published widely on national identity, environmental leadership, and the social and political bases of (in)action toward climate change. HIJXXX10.1177/1940161214556513The International Journal of Press/PoliticsLaursen and Valentini 556513research-article2014

Research Article

The International Journal of Press/Politics 2015, Vol. 20(1) 26–44 Mediatization and © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: Government Communication: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161214556513 Press Work in the European ijpp.sagepub.com Parliament

Bo Laursen1 and Chiara Valentini1

Abstract Social actors see exposure in the news media as attractive for publicity purposes and are under pressure to adapt their press work to a “media logic” to be attractive sources for journalists and editors. This article investigates the European Parliament’s press officers’ professional practices in the light of mediatization and government communication theories. Without one pan-European public sphere, the European Parliament, like the other European Union (EU) institutions, competes with national actors for the news media’s attention in the EU’s twenty-eight national public spheres, where EU affairs do not tend to get a media coverage that matches the EU’s considerable influence on European citizens’ daily lives. This study, which is based on in-depth interviews with European Parliament press officers, concludes that these professionals are indeed attuned to a “media logic” in their communication efforts, and that they face a daily professional challenge as they attempt to promote the European Parliament and its activities to the news media in a way that will not compromise their credibility as government sources. The study provides new insights into communicative aspects of EU governance, and particularly into the thinking that guides the efforts of these European Parliament officials to increase European citizens’ awareness of, and support for, the European Parliament that is meant to voice the citizens’ concerns in political processes at the EU level.

Keywords governance, government, state–media relations, agenda-setting, parliament, sources

1Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Corresponding Author: Bo Laursen, Aarhus University, Department of Business Communication, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 2-3, DK- 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. Email: [email protected] Laursen and Valentini 27

Introduction In present day Western democratic societies, most citizens rely on the news media for information and debates about the society they belong to. Social actors, such as political parties, candidates for public office, interest groups, corporations, and government institutions therefore see the news media as an efficient channel to influence public opinion. One of the implications of the increasing mediatization of Western societies (Hjarvard 2013; Strömbäck 2008) is that actors in search of media coverage seek to make themselves attractive to journalists and editors by adapting their efforts to “media logic” (Altheide and Snow 1979). This article investigates the strategic thinking behind the European Parliament’s (EP’s) press work in the light of mediatization and government communication theories. The three big EU institutions, that is, the European Commission, the Council, and EP, hardly have a reputation as frontrunners when it comes to external communication. In the decades following the creation in 1957 of the European Economic Community (which later developed into the European Union [EU]), the polity’s political processes by and large took place behind closed doors, and its institutions did not interact much with the news media.1 However, the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 sparked the EU institutions to put a stronger focus on external communication as a means of increasing their popular support and legitimacy among European citizens (Laursen 2012). Since the mid-1990s, the EU institutions’ external communication effort has therefore become broader and more proactive (Curtin 2007) in an attempt by the institutions to overcome the EU’s alleged “communication deficit” (Anderson and McLeod 2004; Meyer 1999). Today, EU executives see media coverage as essential for the institutions’ image among European citizens,2 and each of the three big institutions has its own press office with considerable numbers of civil servant personnel dedicated to interacting with journalists.3 This development can be seen as the EU institutions’ organizational adaptions to the increasing mediatization of society. However, as the three big EU institutions’ media communication is underresearched (Reckling, Weiß, and Müller 2014), knowledge about the degree to which these institutions have also adapted their day-to-day communication practices to media logic is limited. Nothing seems to be known about EP in this respect, and the few studies of the European Commission’s and the Council’s routine media communication efforts (for a brief overview, see Valentini and Laursen 2012) hardly indicate communication strategies adapted to a mediatized reality. This explorative and mainly inductive study heeds the call for more empirically based insights into EU institutions’ interactions with the media (Martins, Lecheler, and De vreese 2012) by shedding light on EP press officers’ (POs’) professional practices as perceived by the POs themselves. On the basis of interviews with EP POs, we seek insights into the logics that guide these communicators’ media relations efforts. The article is structured as follows. First, we review the relevant literature and account in more detail for our focus. This first part is followed by a presentation of our methodological considerations and our main findings. We round the article off by discussing our findings and providing some suggestions for further research. 28 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Mediatization, Government Communicators, and the News Media The concept of mediatization refers to processes whereby the logic and institutionalized norms of the media affect the behavior of actors and institutions belonging to other societal subsystems (Hjarvard 2013; Strömbäck and Esser 2014; Strömbäck and Van Aelst 2013). According to this strand of research, social actors have become increasingly dependent on the news media and have reacted by adapting to the logic of the news media in various ways. This logic is defined by Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) as “the institutional, technological, and sociological characteristics of the news media, including their format characteristics, production and dissemination routines, norms, and needs, standards of newsworthiness, and . . . the formal and informal rules that govern news media” (p. 373). Social actors’ adaptions to mediatization processes include organizational measures such as the hiring of increasing numbers of staff who have an intimate knowledge of how the news media work and who are therefore in a position to strategically manage the actors’ relationships with the media (Manning 2001; Negrine 2008). In their theoretical study of how political parties adapt to news media logics, Strömbäck and Van Aelst (2013) found that adaption processes take place not only at the organizational level but also at the level of routine communication practices. Through their interactions with the news media, political parties thus seek to “proactively shape the media agenda and promote their issues and frames through the media” (p. 344); adapt their messages to fit the media’s standards of newsworthiness, for example, in the form of “information subsidies” (press releases, press conferences, or other events) “designed to attract the media and provide information in forms and scheduled at times that conform to the media’s production routines” (p. 345); and establish personal relationships with journalists “by meeting in formal and informal settings, and by providing journalists with exclusive information” (p. 345). The increasing mediatization of society is a significant aspect of the context in which EP POs operate. So is the fact that, as civil servants in EP’s Secretariat, the POs are embedded in a “formal organization in the public sector” (Christensen, Roness, and Røvik 2007: 8). While private-sector organizations exist to generate a profit to their owners, public-sector organizations exist to serve the public interest (Rainey 2009). Civil servant government communicators engage in external communication activities because their tax financed institutions have a democratic and ethical obliga- tion to inform about their activities (Christensen, Roness, and Røvik 2007; Édes 2000; Neeley and Stewart 2012; Viteritti 1997).4 Public-sector organizations in Western democratic societies vary a lot (within and across countries) when it comes to structures and tasks, but their common denominator is that they are the result of democratic political decisions; that is, they are “instruments of elected bodies in carrying out public policies” (Wæraas and Byrkjeflot 2012: 188). Therefore, they are obligated to “emphasize wider and often conflicting . . . values and interests” (Wæraas 2008: 210). Government organizations and their civil servant staff furthermore tend to be held to high standards of honesty, openness, and objectivity, including when it comes to Laursen and Valentini 29 communicating about the organizations’ activities (Christensen, Roness, and Røvik 2007; Mulgan 2007; Rainey 2009). Government communicators’ efforts help to provide “the foundation for deliberative democracy and for the exercise of rational choice between competing political positions” (McNair 2007: 96). They are generally expected to act as reliable information sources and to engage in external communication that is sober, balanced, concise, and truthful (Édes 2000; Gelders and Ihlen 2010; Sanders, Crespo, and Holtz-Bacha 2011). Their practices have been characterized as “apolitical” and “non-partisan” (Glenny 2008: 153) as well as “rational” (McNair 2007: 96). Other scholars have argued convincingly that the dissemination of impartial information for the sake of the common good is not government communicators’ only concern and that they also seek to gain public support for and legitimize their institutions (Lee 2012; Liu et al. 2012; Sadow 2012). Mediatization processes and public-sector ethos together form the backdrop against which government communicators negotiate their relationship with journalists. The news media play a central democratic role in Western societies and relay information to citizens about “government actions, problems, issues, and politics affecting the public” (Christians et al. 2009: 144). Government communicators are important sources for journalists (Butler 1998; Strömbäck et al. 2013; VanSlyke Turk 1986), and the two professions together play an essential role for the way in which politics is socially constructed (Davis 2010). The relationship between sources and journalists is based on an exchange of resources: Journalists control access to the media but need information from government sources, who, in turn, control this information, which they offer journalists in exchange for media exposure. The framing of politics in the news can therefore be seen as “a coproduction of news sources and journalists” (Strömbäck et al. 2013: 34), and the interaction between the two parties has been conceptualized as a collaboration between parties with mutual interests, where each party seeks to further its own interests (Cook 1989; Larsson 2009; Strömbäck et al. 2013). There is scholarly disagreement as to which of the two parties holds the upper hand (Davis 2010). The increasing mediatization of society might suggest that the balance of power is tipping in favor of the journalists but research indicates that social actors can play a substantial role in shaping the news media’s agendas (Larsson 2009; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). Besides influencing media agendas, social actors’ concerns include “reach[ing] the mass public . . ., influenc[ing] the media framing . . . build[ing] public support that can put pressure on other political actors . . ., and, ultimately, influenc[ing] public opinion formation processes” (Strömbäck et al. 2013: 32)

The EU Institutions’ Press Work With a few exceptions (Martins, Lecheler, and De vreese 2012; Meyer 1999), scholars have investigated the relationship between reporters and the EU institutions from the point of view of one of the two parties. In this review, we focus on the institutional side of the relationship. Meyer (1999) as well as Anderson and McLeod (2004) focused on managerial and organizational aspects of the Commission’s and EP’s press work, respectively, and criticized these institutions’ media communication performances. 30 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Both studies blame the lack of communication expertise, and EP communicators were found unable to attract journalists’ attention because they were “ignor[ant] of key basic principles of a successful press and public relations strategy” (Anderson and McLeod: 916). Lack of communication expertise on the part of the Commission may also explain why national media’s uptake of the Commission’s press releases is limited and why the media’s coverage of issues raised in that institution’s information subsidies often does not reflect the Commission’s angle (Bijsmans and Altides 2007). Other findings suggest that the Commission’s media communication to some degree (low to moderate) is adjusted to the logic of the news media (Meyer 2009), and that this is more the case for the institution’s oral than its written communication (Balcytiene et al. 2007). Finally, Spanier (2010) found that the Commission’s spokespersons tend to focus on a community of Brussels-based transnational experts as well as the specialist press, while ignoring broader audiences such as national news media. The Council seems to not have adapted its press work to media logic in any notice- able way. This institution’s POs take a more reactive than proactive approach to their work and see themselves as non-partisan communicators who provide objective information to journalists (Laursen 2012; Laursen and Valentini 2013). In-depth scholarly insights into EP’s routine press work seem to be non-existing. Our main aim is to fill this void by investigating the logics that guide EP POs’ professional practices. We also seek insights into how these communicators handle two specific challenges they face in their daily work and which are linked to the increased mediatization of society. We refer to these two challenges as the civil servant challenge and the national media challenge. EP’s POs are employed as European civil servants, and the civil servant challenge concerns the tension that exists between the media’s news criteria and the POs’ status as civil servants. Playing by the rules of the media implies among other things adapting messages to fit the media’s institutionalized news criteria, such as timeliness, identification, sensation, conflict, relevance, and so forth (Schultz 2007). This is likely to involve trimming the institution’s messages in various ways, such as presenting facts in a particular light to fit specific news criteria as well as selecting certain facts and omitting certain others to ensure that the messages are in keeping with current media agendas. Such selective strategic communicative behavior may lead to biased messages that violate key principles and values traditionally associated with professional Western public-sector organizations (Richards and Smith 2000). We seek to shed light on how EP’s POs handle the tension between media logic and public-sector values. The national media challenge is a consequence of the heterogeneity of the European market for EU news. The news media serve as public spheres for debates between societal actors, but scholars have pointed out that a supranational European public sphere, understood as shared mediated spaces where citizens and social actors from the twenty-eight EU member states exchange views on the basis of converging news agendas, has still not emerged and may never emerge (Schlesinger 2007; Trenz 2008, 2012). This implies that, by and large, European citizens receive their information about the EU from their national media outlets. This is not only a democratic problem (Magnette 2003) but also a major challenge for EP’s press Laursen and Valentini 31 work. The problem for EP is that editors and journalists assess the relevance and newsworthiness of EU news on the basis of their perceptions of the national contexts in which their media outlets are embedded. The existence of twenty-eight different public spheres therefore implies that an EU issue that hits the front pages in one member state may be deemed irrelevant by the news media in another. How do EP POs address the problem that national media provide the main link between EP and European citizens? In summary, this explorative study has the following three focus points: EP POs’ communication logics, their handling of the civil servant challenge, and their handling of the national media challenge.

Method Our study is phenomenological and interpretivist in nature as it focuses on the perceptions of individuals in a particular organizational setting (Bryman 2012; Daymon and Holloway 2011). Through the use of qualitative research methods, we seek to provide a rich description of how EP’s POs make sense of their own day-to-day professional realities. This focus involves investigating the behavioral, emotive, and social meanings that these government communicators attribute to their own and others’ actions (Guest, Namey, and Mitchell 2013; Kvale 1996). Our findings are based on semi-structured interviews with nine Brussels-based EP POs, including one of the press unit’s three press coordinators, and on a number of internal and external documents produced by EP’s Press Service. Interviewing took place in February 2012. As EP POs are organized according to the policy areas they cover and their member state of origin, we made sure that our sample of interviewees reflected an appropriate variety in these respects. Our interviewees furthermore varied in terms of educational background (all nine had university degrees, five in journalism or public relations and four in other fields), seniority in the EP press service (between six months and seven years with an average of around four years), and previous professional experience (more than half had previously worked as journalists or public relations practitioners and several had held other positions in EU institutions, for example, as translators and assistants to Members of EP [MEPs]). The nine semi-structured interviews lasted approximately sixty minutes each and consisted of open-ended questions organized around the following five themes: tasks, goals, and tools, selection of topics for and framing of information subsidies, transparency, interactions with journalists, and internal/external collaboration partners. To provide internal validity, copies of transcripts of the audio files were sent to the interviewees for approval and comments (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Inductive thematic analysis was used to analyze and make sense of the transcripts to elicit “the stories and experiences voiced by study participants as accurately and comprehensively as possible” (Guest, MacQueen, and Namey 2012: 16). The process consisted of a close reading of the textual data with a view to identifying and coding themes, followed by an interpretation of the content of the themes (Guest, Namey, and Mitchell 2013).5 32 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Findings Our interviews focused on gaining insights into key logics that guide the POs’ professional practices but also provided us with important insights into organizational dimensions of EP’s press work. These insights are crucial for understanding the POs’ communication logics and furthermore shed light on the two major challenges described in the literature review. We first present findings related to the organizational aspects and later proceed with findings directly related to the POs’ communication logics. We address the POs’ handling of the two challenges in the “Discussion and Conclusion” section.

Organization of the POs’ Work Legislative processes in EP take place at two levels. The bulk of EP’s legislative work takes place in the twenty standing parliamentary committees that are organized according to policy areas. In each committee, forty to sixty MEPs discuss legislative proposals submitted by the Commission and draw up a report that may include suggested amendments to the proposal. The report is submitted to the second parliamentary level, the plenary, where all 766 MEPs formally adopt EP’s final position on the proposal.6 Five different EP sources provide information to journalists about the institution’s activities: the president’s press service, the political groups’ press offices, individual MEPs and their staff, EP’s information offices based in the twenty-eight capitals, and EP’s central Brussels-based press office. This paper focuses exclusively on the last EP source. EP’s Brussels-based press office is part of EP’s Media Directorate, which is one of four directorates in the Directorate-General Communication of EP’s Secretariat. EP’s Secretariat has a staff of some four thousand officials. In the press service, a team of 24 civil servant POs provides journalists with information about EP’s activities.7 Officially, the information provided is “objective, factual and trustworthy” (European Parliament 2010: 5). One of the official aims of EP’s press service is to ensure “the largest possible press coverage of the European Parliament and its decisions at the plenary and committee levels” (European Parliament 2010: 6). All interviewed POs stated that they follow EP’s work in general and the proceedings in one or two committees in particular. Therefore, they are familiar with the major debates and decisions in the institution and furthermore have a precise knowledge of what goes on in “their” committee(s). Besides the policy area specialization, most POs also specialize in one official language and/or member state. This organization of the press work mirrors the heterogeneity of the POs’ “clientele.” Our interviewees reported that they serve very well-informed reporters, who are permanently based in Brussels, specialize in EU affairs, and follow the EU/EP’s work on a daily basis, some of them with a particular focus on a limited number of policy areas. The POs also serve less well-informed reporters, who are based in a member state, follow EU affairs on a more irregular basis, and go to Brussels only when there are major EU events to cover. Laursen and Valentini 33

According to most interviewees, the POs’ specialist knowledge is particularly valued by the group of well-informed, specialized EU reporters, with whom the POs communicate in English, whereas the less well-informed and often member state–based journalists tend to prefer to approach the POs in their native language and to seek national and regional angles on EP’s work. A significant part of the POs’ communication activities are supervised by an “editorial committee,” which is a unit in the press office that establishes strategic guidelines for EP’s press work and decides when and on which topics the POs should communicate. The POs reported that they can also suggest communication initiatives themselves, but that their own initiatives are subject to approval by the committee. Being able to suggest initiatives was found by the interviewees to be particularly relevant when it comes to communicating national angles on EP issues or otherwise adapting to specific circumstances.

The POs’ Communication Logics In this section, we present findings that indicate how EP POs make sense of their work practices. Our data suggest that the POs see themselves as impartial information providers and as publicists.8

Impartial Information Providers The POs see themselves as being at the service of journalists covering EU affairs. One interviewee describes the essence of his work as “making life easier for journalists.” This role primarily implies providing written information to journalists about EP’s ongoing legislative activities and having dialogues with individual journalists face-to- face or by telephone/email. Furthermore, it implies providing assistance to journalists in their research processes. The bulk of the POs’ work is to inform about EP’s legislative work. When an EP committee has adopted a report as a result of its discussions of a legislative proposal from the Commission, the PO covering the committee issues a press release stating, for example, that the committee rejected or endorsed (elements of) the Commission’s proposal, and/or that it suggested amendments to the proposal. Our interviewees indicated that reporting from committee meetings can be delicate. Unanimity among the committee’s MEPs makes the PO’s job easier, but when MEPs in political groups disagree, the PO must be careful to provide a balanced account. Besides stating the main points of the Commission’s proposal and the substance of the committee’s position, the PO generally also, to some degree, accounts for the different political positions represented in the committee. Interviewees’ accounts of how they handle this delicate reporting task differ. One interviewee saw it as his job to give “a kind of overall view of the majority vote in the committee,” whereas others reported that that they devote more attention to also accounting for dissent. When the legislative dossier has been finalized at the committee level, it moves to plenary. After the plenary, the PO writes a press release accounting for the political outcome along the lines described above. 34 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Our data indicate that when POs report from committees and plenaries, they seek to strike a balance between the perspective of the media and that of the institution. Some interviewees mentioned that they would be able to increase media interest significantly by focusing more on what separates the MEPs than on what they agree on and thus accommodate journalists’ appetite for political debate and conflict. However, the vast majority of our interviewees reported that, as EP officials, they need to provide an institutional and more consensual account that is acceptable to all MEPs and political groups. EP’s POs see themselves as EP’s institutional voice. Therefore, they communicate in the name of the institution and not in the name of EP’s political actors (political groups and individual MEPs): “We are neutral in our information to the journalists. We’re impartial, so we don’t give preference to, for example, the socialist viewpoint” (interviewee). Several interviewees pointed out that this rationale is in complete contrast to that of EP’s political groups and individual MEPs, who tend to communicate to make themselves attractive to their electorates and to position themselves in political battles. Most interviewees strongly underlined that in their professional practices, they seek to give politically unbiased accounts of what goes on in EP, and that this particular aspect of their communication is valued by the journalists, who often come to the institution’s POs to get the facts:

When they [journalists] get a message from a political group and then a different one from another political group, they come to us and ask: “ok, what is in the [legislative] text? What does the directive, regulation, or whatever, say exactly?”

To avoid accusations of being biased in their communication, the POs stick to texts that have been formally adopted by EP and generally avoid controversial information and political speculations. When they include MEP quotes from the political debates, the POs are very careful not to favor particular political positions. As one interviewee said, “If you quote one, you have to quote the other. So the balance, you have to get it right.” Necessary input to journalists’ coverage of political processes in EP includes insights into both the substance under discussion (e.g., legislative proposals) and the political groups’ and individual MEPs’ political views on the substance. The POs can help journalists to get access to this journalistic raw material by providing facts, numbers, dates, names, access to reports, minutes from meetings and other substance- specific and non-confidential information, and by establishing contact between journalists and MEPs for interviews. EP POs therefore sometimes play important roles in key journalistic research processes, especially in situations where journalists are working under time pressure and the amount of available information on the issue is overwhelming. Interviewees reported that in such situations, journalists do not have much time to do their own research and therefore see the POs as a convenient source of assistance. One interviewee was very blunt: “We are doing half of their job.” More specifically, the POs are often asked by journalists in need of time to summarize, prioritize, and select issues and topics. Laursen and Valentini 35

Publicists Our data indicate that EP POs do not knowingly disseminate inaccurate and politically biased information because that would compromise their trustworthiness and reputation among both MEPs and journalists. However, telling the truth is not the same as giving the full picture, and not having specific agendas to push. Indeed, all interviewees were very aware that they are in the business of strategic communication, and that their objectives include increasing EP’s visibility in the media and shaping EP’s image. One interviewee said that “Our aim, after all, is to sell the institution.” The POs’ professional practices are guided by a logic according to which, the more attractive and relevant journalists perceive the POs’ communication to be, the more likely it is that they will make use of it and thereby increase EP’s media exposure: “I should try to get Parliament presented in the press, so I have to pick out things where I think we could get some coverage.” However, as they are their institution’s official voice, the POs must be cautious not to “oversell things or give them too much spin” (interviewee). Most interviewees have previous work experience as journalists and/or public relations practitioners and therefore have a very good understanding of how the news media function. They are familiar with journalists’ working conditions (e.g., deadlines and editorial guidelines) and the rationale that guides journalistic work processes (e.g., news selection criteria, research and drafting processes, tailoring and framing of news stories to various audience types). Their insights into media logic allows the POs to tailor their communication to the needs and preferences of the journalists and thus to “get them on the hook”, as one interviewee put it. As described below, media logic guides the POs’ communication in several ways.

Selection of Topics. The POs stressed that they do not simply write a summary of every decision the EP has made. They make what one interviewee referred to as “editorial decisions,” that is, they are very selective when it comes to their own “coverage” of EP’s activities. They down-tone “boring” (interviewee) matters of legal procedure and focus on issues and aspects that they believe to be attractive to journalists, and do not seek to provide a balanced overview of the dossiers. One interviewee observed that “In a legislative report of maybe 100 pages with just two pages about animal testing, we may choose to focus on those two pages because we think they are of most interest to the media.” The media agenda is essential, but it is not the only concern when the POs and the editorial committee select their issues. The institutional agenda also plays a role. Some issues and occasions lend themselves better to promoting the EP perspective than others, and the POs are instructed by their management to take these opportunities to make their institution’s voice heard, and if possible at the expense of those of the Commission and the Council, which are seen by the POs as EP’s competitors in the fight for visibility and public support. “When Parliament has really obtained a victory because it felt that what the Council wanted was unacceptable, and it succeeded in the negotiations with Council in obtaining what Parliament wanted, then clearly we’re going to communicate that,” said an interviewee. 36 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

The institutional agenda is a permanent concern, and the POs always have their communicative focus on EP’s amendments rather than on the Commission’s proposals. One interviewee described this aspect of her work as “giving specific examples of where Parliament plays a role and how important it is in the negotiation process with Council and Commission.” This focus may lead POs to highlight issues that are of minor importance in the bigger EU picture and may thus result in communication that gives a skewed picture of the overall EU legislative processes. The institutional agenda and EP’s institutional power are at their highest when the MEPs approve or reject the EU budget and the composition of the European Commission. EP’s POs thus seem to have their focus on EP and not to care much about the legitimacy and reputation of the EU as such. Contacts with Commission and Council POs are rare, and there is no formal inter-institutional collaboration at the level of the POs. Although one interviewee recognized that “in a way” EP’s POs are always representing the whole of the EU, she made it clear that “we are representing and defending Parliament’s position . . . and it’s the Council’s POs’ job to represent Council’s position.”

Presentation. As EP press releases have official status, they should be written in a pol- ished, neutral, and trustworthy style. However, by using a lively and appealing writing style, the POs do what they can to make their texts appealing to journalists without compromising the texts’ “official” flavor. They avoid “bureaucratic” language and seek to follow the internal guideline rec- ommending them to include direct quotes from MEPs in their texts because quotes “make it [the text] more authentic” (interviewee), and because journalists like to reuse the quotes in their own articles.

A Focus on “Multipliers”. Several interviewees reported that they have a focus on a particular type of journalists that they refer to as “multipliers.” These are trusted niche journalists from influential media who are renowned by other journalists for their competence and who therefore serve as sources for other journalists. If a PO wants a message to spread among Brussels-based EU reporters, a multiplier can be a more efficient means than a press release placed on EP’s Web site. The same logic governs the selection of journalists to be invited to so-called press breakfasts, which are “unofficial, small-scale press conferences” (interviewee). At these occasions, and to raise interest and obtain coverage for EP, the PO responsible for a particular policy area usually invites six to ten multipliers to a breakfast where they get the opportunity to meet key MEPs in an informal setting.

Discussion and Conclusion The overall aim of this study was to investigate the logics that guide EP POs’ communication practices. We start by summarizing these logics and then turn to discussing how the POs handle the two major challenges identified in the literature review. Laursen and Valentini 37

Communication Logics Our findings, systematized and summarized in Table 1, suggest that EP POs see themselves as performing two roles: as publicists and as providers of impartial information (first column).

Table 1. EP Press Officers’ Communication Logics.

Professional roles Concerns Tactics Required knowledge Publicist Increase EP’s visibility Make it easy and Media logic in the media attractive for Current media agendas journalists to cover EP Shape EP’s image Highlight EP’s victories, EU institutional power, and influence framework and current agendas of all three big EU institutions Impartial Protect own source Provide impartial, Public-sector values information attractiveness correct, and credible Political processes in EP provider information and their outcomes

Note. EP = European Parliament; EU = European Union.

The first role is linked to concerns about EP’s media visibility and image, whereas the second role is linked to concerns about the POs’ own attractiveness as sources for journalists (second column). Columns 3 and 4 account for the tactics used and the knowledge required to perform the two roles and to address the three concerns. To increase EP’s visibility in the media (concern), the POs draw on their knowledge of media logic and current media agendas (required knowledge) to make it easy and attractive for journalists to cover EP issues (tactic). When they highlight EP’s victories, power, and influence (tactic), the POs tend to do so with the intent to shape EP’s image (concern). As this tactic sometimes involves bolstering EP at the expense of the two other big EU institutions, the POs need insights into all three institutions’ characteristics and current agendas (required knowledge). Finally, the POs protect their own source attractiveness (concern) by always seeking to provide impartial, correct, and credible information (tactic). This requires access to updated information about political processes and decisions in EP (required knowledge). Our findings suggest that the POs’ communication logics mirror the mediatization of society in significant ways, and, as it appears from Table 1, that their insights into journalists’ needs, professional standards, and work processes (media logic) is a key asset when they perform their role as publicists.

The Civil Servant Challenge Our findings confirm that EP’s press officers do indeed find themselves in a professional dilemma because of their status as civil servants. By upholding public-sector 38 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) values such as credibility and impartiality, they seek to protect and increase their attractiveness as sources for journalists. And by promoting their institution and its agendas, they risk to compromise the very same values and thereby their own attractiveness as news sources, because such behavior could lead journalists to see them more as publicists than as impartial information providers. In their daily work, the POs seek to balance the two sides of their work. The government context in which EP’s POs operate may imply both strategic limitations and opportunities. EP’s stated focus on the impartial and factual nature of its press communication is in line with what is generally expected of Western government communication, although expectations may vary from one country to another. The fact that our interviewees see themselves as impartial information providers and are concerned about their attractiveness as sources for journalists suggests that EP’s POs seek to act in line with these expectations. At first sight, these context-specific moral expectations may be seen as limiting the POs’ room for strategic communicative maneuvering compared with politically committed communicators, such as MEPs and non-government communicators, who are likely to be held to less strict moral standards by the public when it comes to impartiality, complete- ness, and credibility (Mulgan 2007). However, government communicators’ limited room for communicative maneuvering does not seem to reduce their attractiveness as sources for journalistic news production; on the contrary, several studies have found that civil servants dominate political news coverage (Bennett 1990; Cook 1998; Strömbäck et al. 2013; Thrall 2006), and Davis (2000) has suggested that this source type’s authoritative status is “‘structurally determined’ by routine practices and values of journalists” (p. 47). Journalists’ tendency to see civil servant communicators as a particularly attractive source type is confirmed in the EU context. Morgan (1995) and Statham (2008) found that the EU institutions’ own POs are among EU reporters’ most important sources. In the same vein, our interviewees reported that they are regularly consulted by journalists who seek confirmation of information obtained from other sources perceived by journalists as less credible, and POs in the Council were found to play a similar role (Laursen and Valentini 2013). Together these findings suggest that the EU institutions’ POs are generally perceived by journalists to be highly credible sources. The government context and the POs’ reputation as credible sources, which seems to be linked to that particular context, may be seen as an asset and a lever for generating news coverage and shaping the institution’s image because sources that are perceived by journalists as credible are more likely to get media coverage than sources that journalists perceive to be less credible (Thrall 2006). Source credibility seems to make journalists weaken their defenses and to spur them to “construct news stories more quickly and with greater confidence in their accuracy and relevance” (Thrall 2006: 409). EP POs’ high credibility may therefore help them to perform their publicist role and occasionally allow them to get away with putting a spin on their messages—getting elements and perspectives from the institutional agendas on to the media agendas, particularly in situations where busy journalists use them as research assistants, for example, by asking them to select, prioritize, and summarize EP news Laursen and Valentini 39 items. However, such “covert” publicist behavior is delicate because it inevitably involves the risk of undermining the POs’ attractiveness as sources.

The National Media Challenge EP and its POs handle the non-existence of one single European public sphere with a shared news agenda by devoting considerable attention to national angles on EP news. This constant and institutionalized sensitivity to national contexts seems appropriate for publicity purposes because it is fully in line with what is known about patterns of national news media’s coverage of EU affairs. Several scholars found a significant variation in the coverage of EU affairs in general across member states. This suggests that sensitivity to the twenty-eight different national contexts is essential for successful EU press work. National influences shaping the coverage include national political parties’ positions toward the EU (Boomgaarden et al. 2013; Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Schuck et al. 2011) and levels of public satisfaction with national democratic systems (Peter and De Vreese 2004). When it comes to the coverage of EP and its activities, knowledge is scarce, and most of what is known concerns the coverage of EP during election times and not during routine periods, which is our focus. However, Gattermann’s (2013) work is an exception. She studied the coverage of EU parliamentary affairs in six member states during a routine period of decision making and found that developments in the national contexts influence the way national newspapers cover EP. More specifically, she found that “public support for the EU increases the number of reports about the European Parliament” (p. 436), and that “higher levels of party political contestation over the EU and trust towards the national parliament lead to lower coverage” (p. 436). Gattermann’s findings thus confirm the patterns of coverage of EU affairs in general. They furthermore suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach to communication with European journalists is insufficient, and that information subsidies tailored to national contexts (in terms of, for example, language and/or selection and framing of EP news items) are likely to be more attractive in the eyes of many journalists and therefore more efficient for publicity purposes.

Theoretical Implications and Future Research The mediatization literature has been used by political communication scholars as a framework for investigating politicians’ behavior. This study shows that central tenets of this literature can also shed light on civil servants’ professional behavior (cf. also Sanders, Crespo, and Holtz-Bacha 2011; Schillemans 2012). Our findings support the idea that mediated politics is constructed through the interaction between journalists and their sources, and that sources can have a considerable influence on the co-construction process (Davis 2010; Larsson 2009; Strömbäck et al. 2013). The exact mechanisms of this process, and in particular the role played by the organizational setting in the process, are not fully understood. This study provides 40 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) insights into how the government context shapes civil servants’ contribution to the co-construction process. We found that POs contribute to the co-construction of politics as EP’s institutional voice. More specifically, we found that, besides the media logic, a civil servant logic shapes EP POs’ professional behavior and is at the root of some of the communication dilemmas that these communicators face. Although our study focuses on EP’s institutional actors and only peripherally sheds light on the institution’s political actors, remarks from our interviewees nevertheless suggest that this political arena’s political actors are guided by concerns and tactics that differ significantly from the POs’ civil servant logic. Political actors’ exchanges with journalists seem to be guided by a political logic (Strömbäck and Esser 2014). Further research should provide more insights into this concept. EP resembles many other regional, national, and international political arenas in Western democratic societies in significant ways. In and around Western political arenas, three important actor types interact to co-construct the news media’s picture of politics that citizens rely on to form their opinions, namely, civil servants, political actors, and journalists. Knowledge about the general communicative dynamism between these actors in this specific type of organizational setting is scarce, but our findings provide a good point of departure for future research on this topic. As public-sector values, such as credibility and impartiality, play a role in most Western government institutions, we hypothesize that civil servant government communicators in other political arenas in mediatized Western societies face similar dilemmas and therefore contribute to the co-construction process in similar ways. Future research should investigate whether this is the case, and should furthermore shed light on, for example, political actors’ influences on institutional actors’ communication and vice versa, journalists’ perceptions of the contributions of the two source types, and the effects of the two source types’ efforts to influence the co-construction process.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes 1. In 1962, only two staff members were responsible for the Council’s communication with the press (information provided by the Council’s press service, 2014). 2. Interview with EP Spokesman and Director of EP’s Media Directorate, Jaume Duch Guillot, 2013 (http://www.ep-webeditors.eu/2013/07/a-coffee-with-ep-spokesman-jaume-duch-2/). 3. In 2014, the Council and EP employed, respectively, 21 and 35 Brussels-based staff with Laursen and Valentini 41

the title of “press officer” (information provided by the Council’s and EP’s press offices, 2014). 4. We suggest to distinguish between civil servant government communicators, whose task is to serve society at large, and politically appointed government communicators (“spin doctors”), who work to win support for individual holders of public office (presidents, ministers, etc.), and whose contracts can be terminated by these office holders. Our focus is on government communicators of the former type. 5. The coded themes are available on request. 6. For further information about the workings of EP, see, for example, Nugent (2010). 7. Who’s Who, EP Press Service, February 2012. 8. Naturally, the nine interviewees held differing views on some issues. We account for significant tendencies in our data and supplement them with illustrative quotes.

References Altheide, D. L., and R. P. Snow. (1979). Media Logic. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Anderson, P. J., and A. McLeod. (2004). “The Great Non-communicator? The Mass Communication Deficit of the European Parliament and Its Press Directorate.” Journal of Common Market Studies 42 (5): 897–917. Balcytiene, A., K. Raeymaeckers, E. De Bens, A. Vincuniene, and R. Schröder. (2007). “Understanding the Complexity of EU Communication: The Spokespersons’ Perspective.” In Understanding the Logic of EU Reporting from Brussels, ed. A. I. M. R. Consortium. Bochum, Germany: Projekt Verlag, pp. 151–162. Bennett, W. L. (1990). “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States.” Journal of Communication 40 (2): 103–27. Bijsmans, P., and C. Altides. (2007). “‘Bridging the Gap’ between EU Politics and Citizens? The European Commission, National Media and EU Affairs in the Public Sphere.” Journal of European Integration 29 (3): 323–40. Boomgaarden, H. G., C. H. De Vreese, A. R. Schuck, R. Azrout, M. Elenbaas, J. H. Van Spanje, and R. Vliegenthart. (2013). “Across Time and Space: Explaining Variation in News Coverage of the European Union.” European Journal of Political Research 52 (5): 608–29. Boomgaarden, H. G., R. Vliegenthart, C. H. de Vreese, and A. R. Schuck. (2010). “News on the Move: Exogenous Events and News Coverage of the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 17 (4): 506–26. Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods. 4th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press. Butler, B.-A. (1998). “Information Subsidies, Journalism Routines and the Australian Media: Market Liberalization versus Marketplace of Ideas.” Prometheus 16 (1): 27–45. Christensen, T. L., P. G. Roness, and K. A. Røvik. (2007). Organization Theory and the Public Sector. Oxford: Routledge. Christians, C. G., T. L. Glasser, D. McQuail, K. Nordenstreng, and R. A. White. (2009). Normative Theories of the Media. Journalism in Democratic Societies. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Cook, T. E. (1989). Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the US House of Representatives. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. Cook, T. E. (1998). Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Curtin, D. D. (2007). “Transparency, Audiences and the Evolving Role of the EU Council of Ministers.” In The European Union and the Public Sphere: A Communicative Space in the Making?, ed. J. E. Fossum and P. Schlesinger. London: Routledge, pp. 246–258. 42 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Davis, A. (2000). “Public Relations, News Production and Changing Patterns of Source Access in the British National Media.” Media, Culture & Society 22 (1): 39–59. Davis, A. (2010). Political Communication and Social Theory. London: Routledge. Daymon, C., and I. Holloway. (2011). Qualitative Research Methods in Public Relations and Marketing Communications. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge. Édes, B. B. W. (2000). “The Role of Government Information Officers.” Journal of Government Information 27 (4): 455–69. European Parliament. (2010). A Presentation of the EP Press Service. Brussels: Directorate for the Media, DG Communication, European Parliament. Gattermann, K. (2013). “News about the European Parliament: Patterns and External Drivers of Broadsheet Coverage.” European Union Politics 14 (3): 436–57. Gelders, D., and Ø. Ihlen. (2010). “Government Communication about Potential Policies: Public Relations, Propaganda or Both?” Public Relations Review 36 (1): 59–62. Glenny, L. L. (2008). “Perspectives of Communication in the Australian Public Sector.” Journal of Communication Management 12 (2): 152–68. Guest, G., K. MacQueen, and E. E. Namey. (2012). Applied Thematic Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Guest, G., E. E. Namey, and M. L. Mitchell. (2013). Collecting Qualitative Data: A Field Manual for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Hjarvard, S. (2013). The Mediatization of Culture and Society. Oxon, UK: Routledge. Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. Larsson, L. (2009). “PR and the Media: A Collaborative Relationship?” Nordicom Review 30 (1): 131–47. Laursen, B. (2012). “Transparency in the Council of the European Union—Why Journalists Don’t Get the Full Picture.” Journalism 14 (6): 771–89. Laursen, B., and C. Valentini. (2013). “Media Relations in the Council of the European Union: Insights into the Council Press Officers’ Professional Practices.” Journal of Public Affairs 13 (3): 230–38. Lee, M. M. (2012). “Government Public Relations: What Is It Good for?” In The Practice of Government Public Relations, ed. M. M. Lee, G. Neeley and K. Stewart. Boca Raton: CRC Press, pp. 9–25. Lincoln, Y. S., and E. G. Guba. (1985). Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverley Hills, CA: Sage. Liu, B. F., J. S. Horsley, and K. Yang. (2012). “Overcoming Negative Media Coverage: Does Government Communication Matter?” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22 (3): 597–21. Magnette, P. (2003). “European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship?” Political studies 51 (1): 144–60. Manning, P. (2001). News and News Sources: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. Martins, A. I., S. Lecheler, and C. H. De vreese. (2012). “Information Flow and Communication Deficit: Perceptions of Brussels-Based Correspondents and EU Officials.” Journal of European Integration 34 (4): 305–22. McNair, B. (2007). “Theories of Government Communication and Trends in the UK.” In Government Communication in Australia, ed. S. Young. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–109. Meyer, C. (1999). “Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s Communication Deficit.” Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (4): 617–39. Laursen and Valentini 43

Meyer, C. (2009). “Does European Union Politics Become Mediatized? The Case of the European Commission.” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (7): 1047–64. Morgan, D. (1995). “British Media and European Union News: The Brussels News Beat and Its Problems.” European Journal of Communication 10 (3): 321–43. Mulgan, R. (2007). “Truth in Government and the Politicization of Public Service Advice.” Public Administration 85 (3): 569–86. Neeley, G., and K. Stewart. (2012). “Introduction.” In The Practice of Government Public Relations, ed. M. M. Lee, G. Neeley and K. Stewart. Boca Raton: CRC Press, pp. 1–7. Negrine, R. (2008). The Transformation of Political Communication: Continuities and Changes in Media and Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Nugent, N. (2010). The Government and Politics of the European Parliament. 7th Edition. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Peter, J., and C. H. De Vreese. (2004). “In Search of Europe: A Cross-national Comparative Study of the European Union in National Television News.” The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 9 (4): 3–24. Rainey, H. G. (2009). Understanding and Managing Public Organizations. 4th Edition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Reckling, T., A. Weiß, and M. Müller. (2014). “Introduction—Communicating European Integration: A Historical Perspective.” Journal of Contemporary European Research 10 (1): 4–11. Richards, D., and M. J. Smith. (2000). “The Public Service Ethos and the Role of the British Civil Service. West European Politics 23 (3): 45–66. Sadow, J. (2012). “Media Relations.” In The Practice of Government Public Relations, ed. M. M. Lee, G. Neeley and K. Stewart. Boca Raton: CRC Press, pp. 29–50. Sanders, K., M. J. C. Crespo, and C. Holtz-Bacha. (2011). “Communicating Governments: A Three-Country Comparison of How Governments Communicate with Citizens.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 16 (4): 523–47. Schillemans, T. (2012). Mediatization of Public Services: How Organizations Adapt to News Media. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Schlesinger, P. (2007). “A Fragile Cosmopolitanism: On the Unresolved Ambiguities of the European Public Sphere.” In The European Union and the Public Sphere: A Communicative Space in the Making?, ed. P. J. E. S. Fossum. London: Routledge, pp. 65–83. Schuck, A. R., G. Xezonakis, M. Elenbaas, S. A. Banducci, and C. H. de Vreese. (2011). “Party contestation and Europe on the News Agenda: The 2009 European Parliamentary Elections.” Electoral Studies 30 (1): 41–52. Schultz, I. (2007). “The Journalistic Gut Feeling: Journalistic Doxa, News Habitus and Orthodox News Values.” Journalism Practice 1 (2): 190–207. Spanier, B. (2010). “Trying to Square the Circle—The Challenges of Being an EU Commission Spokesperson.” In Public Communication in the European Union: History, Perspectives and Challenges, ed. C. Valentini and G. Nesti. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 191–216. Statham, P. P. (2008). “Making Europe News: How Journalists View Their Role and Media Performance.” Journalism 9 (4): 398–422. Strömbäck, J. (2008). “Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13 (3): 228–46. Strömbäck, J., and F. Esser. (2014). “Introduction Making Sense of the Mediatization of Politics.” Journalism Practice 8 (3): 245–57. 44 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Strömbäck, J., R. Negrine, D. N. Hopmann, C. Jalali, R. Berganza, G. U. Seeber, A. Seceleanug, J. Volekh, B. Dobek-Ostrowskai, J. Mykkänenj, M. Belluatik, and M. Maierl. (2013). “Sourcing the News: Comparing Source Use and Media Framing of the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections.” Journal of Political Marketing 12 (1): 29–52. Strömbäck, J., and P. Van Aelst. (2013). “Why Political Parties Adapt to the Media Exploring the Fourth Dimension of Mediatization.” International Communication Gazette 75 (4): 341–58. Thrall, T. (2006). “The Myth of the Outside Strategy: Mass Media News Coverage of Interest Groups.” Political Communication 23 (4): 407–20. Trenz, H.-J. (2008). “Measuring the Europeanisation of Public Communication: The Question of Standards.” European Political Science 7 (3): 273–84. Trenz, H.-J. (2012). “The European Public Sphere in Times of Crisis: Disentangling the Debate: Introductory Remarks.” Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations/Revista românã de Comunicare ºi Relaþii Publice 14:7. Valentini, C., and B. Laursen. (2012). “The Mass Media: A Privileged Channel for the EU’s Political Communication.” In The European Public Sphere. From Critical Thinking to Responsible Action, ed. L. Morganti and L. Bekemans. Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, pp. 129–146. VanSlyke Turk, J. (1986). “Information Subsidies and Media Content: A Study of Public Relations Influence on the News.” Journalism Monographs 100:101–12. Viteritti, J. P. (1997). “The Environmental Context of Communication: Public Sector Organizations.” Public Administration and Public Policy 63:79–100. Wæraas, A. (2008). “Can Public Sector Organizations Be Coherent Corporate Brands?” Marketing Theory 8 (2): 205–21. Wæraas, A., and H. Byrkjeflot. (2012). “Public Sector Organizations and Reputation Management: Five Problems.” International Public Management Journal 15 (2): 186–206. Walgrave, S., and P. Van Aelst. (2006). “The Contingency of the Mass Media’s Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory.” Journal of Communication 56 (1): 88–109.

Author Biographies Bo Laursen, PhD, worked as a civil servant in the the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2009, first as a translator and later as a press officer. He is now an Associate Professor in Strategic Communication at Aarhus University, Denmark. His current research interests are public relations, public affairs, political communication, and the European Union. Chiara Valentini, PhD, is an Associate Professor at Aarhus University, Denmark, where she teaches courses in stakeholder relations, public affairs and political communication. Dr. Valentini has written and co-written over 30 peer-reviewed publications, as well as 4 books in public relations, social media, political communication, crisis communication, and the European Union. HIJXXX10.1177/1940161214556710The International Journal of Press/PoliticsNardis 556710research-article2014

Research Article

The International Journal of Press/Politics 2015, Vol. 20(1) 45–66 News, Trust in the European © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: Parliament, and EP Election sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161214556710 Voting: Moderated-Mediation ijpp.sagepub.com Model Investigating Voting in Established and New Member States

Yioryos Nardis1

Abstract This article examines the role of news exposure and political trust in the decision to vote in European Parliament (EP) elections in established (EU-15) and new member states of the 2004/2007 enlargement. News coverage of EP elections tends to differ among established and new member states. News in new members contains more coverage of EP elections and the European Union (EU) and tends to also be more positive than in established members. The difference in coverage may play a role in how European institutions are trusted, and ultimately, in election participation. A moderated mediation model is proposed to test whether trust in the EP mediates the relationship between news exposure and voting in EP elections, and whether the relationship between news exposure and trust is stronger among new member states. Using two methods, an experiment conducted in four EU states and a structural equation model of 2004 European Election Studies survey data, support is found for the model. The results also suggest that while European-level considerations account for some of the variance in voting, they cannot be a substitute for national-level considerations.

Keywords media effects, parliament, news reporting, voting behavior, political psychology

1University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA Corresponding Author: Yioryos Nardis, University of Michigan, 5344 North Quad, 105 S. State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA. Email: [email protected] 46 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Elections to the European Parliament (EP) are perhaps the most important European Union (EU) political process that EU citizens can participate in. However, voter turnout for these elections tends to be significantly lower than in national elections, with abstention exceeding 70 percent in some member states. Apathy toward these elections is problematic for the EU, as participation would offer at least tacit evidence of citizen engagement in European integration, especially given the substantial changes brought about by eastward enlargement and the Lisbon Treaty. Turnout was particularly low for the new member states of the 2004/2007 enlargement wave. In the 2004 elections, 45 percent of eligible voters across the EU went to the polls—27 percent in new and 49 percent in established states (i.e., EU-15; “European Parliament – DG Communications 2009). Turnout was quite similar in the 2009 and 2014 elections. One of the reasons given for low turnout in new member states is the lack of trust in national institutions that pervades post-communist countries (Rose 2004a). The reasoning behind this is that due to the legacy of authoritarianism and one-party rule, people in post-communist countries tend to distrust their national institutions, and this deters them from voting at EP elections. However, citizens often differentiate between political entities and institutions when evaluating political systems (Norris 1999; Warren 1999), and deciding whether to vote in national elections (Grönlund and Setälä 2007). It is therefore possible for Europeans to also differentiate between national and EU political entities when voting in EP elections. Therefore, trust in EU institutions should also be relevant when explaining voting at EP elections. News coverage is expected to play an essential role in this process as it has the ability to foster trust in European institutions (Norris 2000). Given that most people do not have direct contact with the EU, and because it is an abstract and complex institution, they rely on the media for relevant information. This is likely to be more pertinent for citizens of new member states, which have had less experience and interaction with the EU. In fact, content analyses indicate that there is more news coverage of EP elections in new member states, and it tends to be more favorable toward the EU (de Vreese et al. 2006; Schuck et al. 2011). This difference in coverage may play a role in how European institutions in established and new member states are trusted, and ultimately, in election participation. The article proceeds by defining political trust and discussing the three literatures involved: the role of the news media in fostering trust in government and institutions, how the EP elections are covered in the news, and the relationship between political trust and voting. A moderated mediation model is proposed to consider how these relationships may differ between established and new member states.

Theoretical Framework Political Trust Political trust is defined as an evaluative component of political systems—the belief that one can rely on another party, as it has good intentions and will act with one’s best Nardis 47 interests in mind (Easton 1965). Political trust therefore is an individual relationship dealing with system support that influences approval of political leaders and government (Norris 1999). Miller and Listhaug (1990: 381) define it as “a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny.” Trust in government then, is a fairly well-reasoned evaluation of government based on normative beliefs of how it should perform (Miller 1974; Stokes 1962). Easton’s (1965) “system theory” of politics argues that trust in government reflects the legitimacy of a country’s political system. Trust connects citizens to their institutions, enhancing the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic governance. Even though some distrust can serve a constructive purpose by reminding politicians that they can be held accountable, the relationship between constituents and representatives must be built on trust if it is to work well (Dalton 2008; Hetherington 1998). If constituents are generally trusting of their representatives, then they can be expected to work in their best interests. Legitimacy can be threatened when high distrust occurs for long periods of time (Erber and Lau 1990), as it leads to higher acceptance of ille- gal behavior and law disobedience within a society (Marien and Hooghe 2011). Scholars have stressed the need to distinguish the various components of political trust, as evidence shows that the public often differentiates between political entities when determining system support (Norris 1999; Warren 1999). This assumption follows Eason’s classification of political systems into “regimes,” the institutions of government, and “authorities,” its elected officials. Trust in political institutions refers to government and its branches, such as parliaments and court systems, whereas trust in political actors entails presidents, politicians and parties (Grönlund and Setälä 2007). Trust in institutions and political actors are often distinguished from each other, as people may disapprove of an elected politician’s performance but still trust the electoral process and democratic principles.

News Exposure and Political Trust For the majority of the public, trust in politics is not based on personal familiarity and experience with government. People typically learn about and evaluate government through the media, and news coverage makes trust a likely heuristic through which to evaluate the political system (Hetherington 1996; Newton 1999). By determining the information available to the public, the media are able to make certain issues appear more salient and important. In fact, trends in political trust are shown to reflect changes in the information environment (Hetherington 2006). Therefore, as the factors which the public may be expected to evaluate the government change, so does the level of trust in government. The potential for the media to foster trust in European institutions comes from the increased awareness associated with coverage of its affairs. In her study of the role of news exposure on political engagement, Norris (2000) found that people who con- sume the most news demonstrated the most positive attitudes toward the EU political system. Using survey data collected during both EP campaign and non-campaign periods, the study finds that regular users of the news are more trusting of European 48 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) institutions. It examined the extent to which people can rely on the EU as a whole, as well as three specific EU institutions: the EP, the European Commission, and the Council of Ministers. In all cases, consuming more news, whether through newspapers, television, or radio, was associated with more institutional confidence. Norris suggests that this occurs because consuming news about the EP elections and the EU in general, helps encourage greater awareness, understanding and ultimately trust in the EU. On the other hand, people who read or view modest amounts of European news are likely to have less understanding of the EU and its work, and therefore less likely to believe that European institutions and leaders can be trusted. Even though Norris’ work points to a positive relationship between the news media and institutional trust, this argument has been fiercely debated. Past studies claimed that news coverage actually decreases institutional trust (Miller et al. 1979; Patterson 1996; Robinson 1976), and evidence of no association has also been put forth (Bennett et al. 1999). Early studies from the United States argued that the media were responsible for civic disillusionment that increased from the 1960s onward. The “videomalaise” thesis claims that negative news coverage and a focus on problems with government lead to a populace more cynical of government and less willing to participate in civic and political activities (Miller et al. 1979; Robinson 1976). Although empirical evidence from these studies provided partial support for the “videomalaise” thesis, more recent work from both American and European contexts contradicts this. In a series of studies, Norris and colleagues significantly challenged the “videomalaise” thesis methodologically and theoretically, arguing that past research used inade- quate measures of media use and political trust, and often did not distinguish between entertainment and news-related media use (Norris 1996, 2000; Norris et al. 1999). Her systematic examination of the role of political communication in Europe and the United States found that attention to newspapers and television news is positively related to political engagement (Norris 2000). Multiple individual-level analyses did not find any evidence of a negative impact on an array of engagement outcomes, including trust in government, voter turnout, campaign participation, political discussion and political knowledge. The relationships between news exposure and these political indicators were consistently positive, and in a few cases null, but no negative relationships were found in both European and American contexts. Similar conclusions were reached in German (Holtz-Bacha 1990) and British contexts (Newton 1997).

News Coverage of EP Elections In addition to the quantity of news consumption, it is necessary to also consider news content in drawing conclusions about the role of the media in fostering trust toward the EU. Coverage of European affairs becomes particularly pertinent during EP election campaign periods where its visibility in national news coverage increases substantially (Boomgaarden et al. 2010). Content analyses show that while coverage exhibits cross- national variation, general trends can be discerned. First, the amount of coverage devoted to EP elections has increased over time in nearly all countries (Schuck et al. 2011). Second, and more important for this study, news coverage of the EU tends to Nardis 49 differ among established and new member states and does so in two ways: in terms of the amount and tone of coverage. News in new member states contains more coverage of EP elections and the EU, and tends to also be more positive than in established member states (de Vreese et al. 2006; Schuck et al. 2011). During the 2004 EP campaign, the majority of television news and newspaper coverage of the EU was neutral but, when evaluative, was most negative in nine of the ten established member states (de Vreese et al. 2006). On the other hand, news coverage in seven of the ten new members had the most positive orientations toward the EU. These trends hold up across all media outlets examined but one. The average tone of news coverage in broadsheet newspapers, tabloid newspapers and public television was more positive in new member states. The only exception was commercial television, where coverage was slightly more positive in established member states. Similar differences between established and new members were also found for news coverage of the 2009 EP elections (Schuck et al. 2011). On average, news coverage tends to differ both quantitatively and qualitatively among established and new member states. Therefore, citizens in these countries receive different news about the EU. Equal amounts of news consumption are likely to include more EU news and contain more positive evaluations in new member states. Citizens of new member states have also been in the EU for less time and participated in fewer EP elections than their counterparts in established member states, and might therefore rely on information from the news media more when it comes to forming opinions about the EU. Given these differences, one can expect different individual- level relationships between news exposure and political trust for established and new member states. In line with the findings of Norris’s (2000) work, news users in new member states are expected to be more trusting and in general more supportive of EU institutions than news users in established member states. A link between news exposure and institutional trust becomes more important given that the latter is related to voting. Distrust is believed to make people abstain from politics and can account for individual and national-level differences in voting; if people have low confidence in political institutions, then they are less likely to vote on election day (Mattila 2003; Rose 2004b). If a person consumes European news with a predominantly positive orientation, as is more likely to happen in new member states, then her trust in EU institutions and ultimately likelihood to vote at EP elections are likely to increase.

Political Trust and Voting Insights on the relationship between political trust and turnout can be garnered from national and supranational contexts. Findings from both contexts demonstrate that trust in EU institutions is likely to have a positive association with turning out to vote at EP elections. A scholarly dispute concerns the extent to which political trust influences turnout in national elections. Most early work from U.S. contexts reported a weak relationship between political trust and turnout. Miller (1974) first argued that political distrust 50 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) could be related to turnout, because trusting was more likely to turn out and vote in the 1972 presidential election. Conversely, Citrin (1974) maintained that there actually was not enough evidence to conclude that disillusionment with politics could explain turnout at elections. When divided into three groups, it appeared that people with high trust in government were only slightly more likely than those with low trust to report that they voted in U.S. elections. In fact, those most likely to vote had intermediate levels of trust. A subsequent analysis of four presidential elections divided respondents into five groups and reported that in three of the four years the most trustful were more likely to turn out, even though in a multivariate framework the relationship was weak (Shaffer 1981). Later work maintained that there was in fact no link between trust and turnout because trust had no significant effect after socio-demographic factors were controlled for (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). However, studies from non-U.S. contexts increasingly show that it matters for voting. A study of Belgian voters, where compulsory voting keeps abstention low, found that those with little political trust tend to make greater use of blank or invalid votes (Hooghe et al. 2011). Given compulsory voting, casting a blank or deliberately invali- dating a ballot can represent a way of abstaining from election processes. The least trusting respondents were also more likely to state that they would not vote if compulsory voting laws were abolished. Evidence from Canadian and Dutch elections also indicates that distrust of government is linked to abstention (Bèlanger and Nadeau 2005; Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2006). Furthermore, recent research also challenges the American conclusions on a methodological basis, arguing that past studies were too broad in their operationalization of political trust and grouped together too many variables, and argues for additional conceptual distinctions (Norris 2000). In fact, surveys show that the public distinguishes between various political institutions and actors, and tends to judge them separately (Dalton 2008; Mishler and Rose 1997). By distinguishing between trust toward various institutions in analyses of voting behavior, differential effects emerge. An examination of individual-level data on national parliamentary elections from twenty European nations illustrates the value of differentiating between institutions (Grönlund and Setälä 2007). It distinguishes between trust toward the national parliament and trust toward politicians and finds that the former was positively related to voting in national parliamentary elections, whereas the latter had no relationship. The study argues that features of democratic systems prompt the distinction. Citizens can hold incumbent governments or politicians responsible and replace them through elections. A person may not trust a certain elected representative but might still trust the parliament as an institution and would therefore want to vote to have that representative replaced. Given that trust in national institutions can affect turnout in national elections, it is likely that trust toward the EU and its institutions can affect EP election voting. Individual-level research on the supranational context is complemented by findings from aggregate-level work on turnout differences between countries. Individual-level studies that inform our knowledge on the role of trust in citizens’ propensity to vote in EP elections are descriptive in nature. Open-ended responses Nardis 51

Table 1. Trust in the EU.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Established member states 50.2 44.8 47.7 48.5 48.3 47.8 New member states 56.1 51.5 57.2 58.9 66.7 56.3

Note. Cells represent percentage of respondents who tend to trust the EU. Eurobarometer surveys 62, 64.2, 65.2, 68.1, 70.1, 71.3. EU = European Union.

from a 1994 EP post-election survey indicate that voluntary abstention was related to political trust. Distrust of politics, and dissatisfaction with the EP electoral system and candidates, were two of the main reasons given for electoral abstention from citizens of non-compulsory voting countries (Blondel et al. 1997; Sinnott 2000). Similarly, an analysis of 2004 Eurobarometer data found that around half of non-voters abstained due to a lack of trust in European institutions and their representatives (Muxel 2005). Aggregate-level studies corroborate these results. A study of the 1999 and 2004 EP elections found EP trust to be positively correlated with EP turnout (Cox 2003; Flickinger and Studlar 2007).

Political Trust in New Member States When discussing how political trust may differ between established and new member states, it is important to note that while the majority of new member states have a post- communist legacy, Cyprus and Malta do not. In some respects Cyprus and Malta are similar to established, and in others, to post-communist members. They resemble established member states in that they have a longer history of democratic governance, never experienced communist rule and have higher national election turnout. However, Cyprus and Malta joined the EU at the same time as the post-communist countries and underwent similar political and legal changes in fulfilling membership criteria. Moreover, and important for this study, content analyses indicate that news coverage of EP elections tends to be similar in post-communist members, Cyprus and Malta. Therefore, they are considered jointly in this study. Trust toward national and European institutions differs consistently between established and new member states. Eurobarometer surveys show that trust in the EU is considerably higher among new than established member states (Table 1). Malta and Cyprus were unique in that their populations were trusting of both national and European institutions during this time period. Among post-communist countries though, the discrepancy between trust in national and European institutions is quite substantial (Figure 1). Similar evidence comes from a study of vote intention prior to the 2004 EP elections suggesting that post-communist nations tended to trust the EP more than their national parliament (Grönlund and Setälä 2007). News exposure may contribute to the high trust in the EU among new member states. It is positively related to confidence in EU institutions (Norris 2000), and coverage of EU affairs tends to be more visible and more positive in post-communist 52 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Figure 1. Political trust in post-communist EU member states. Note. Eurobarometer surveys 62, 64.2, 65.2, 68.1, 70.1, 71.3. states (de Vreese et al. 2006; Schuck et al. 2011). The more positive coverage in new members might foster greater trust in the EU and might explain why EU institutions are trusted more than national institutions. The relationship between trust and turnout is highlighted in Rose’s (2004a) study of the 2004 EP elections. The study argues that the low trust in national institutions explains why post-communist countries had the lowest turnout in those elections. By presenting bivariate correlations between aggregate-level indicators of trust in national institutions and turnout, it contends that the low turnout in post-communist states was primarily due to low levels of trust in national parties and the national government. However, correlations based on such a small sample (N = 25) should be interpreted with caution. Conclusions based on these bivariate correlations might be due to spuri- ous findings that disappear in multivariate models or when other factors are controlled for. The analysis also uses dichotomous measures of institutional trust (i.e., “tend to trust or tend to distrust”) from Eurobarometer surveys, which do not capture the various degrees of trust one may feel. European Election Studies (EES) surveys measure trust with more suitable 5- or 10-point scales.

News, Trust in the EP, and Voting in EP Elections The current study investigates individual-level determinants of voting at EP elections. It is necessary to explore whether trust in the EP is related to voting, as research shows that the public often differentiates between political entities when determining system support (Norris 1999; Warren 1999), and that this affects the decision of Nardis 53

Figure 2. Moderated mediation model predicting EP election voting. whether or not to vote in national contexts (Grönlund and Setälä 2007). It is therefore possible for Europeans to also differentiate between national and EU political entities when voting in EU contexts, and studies have suggested this through bivariate correlations of aggregate-level data (Cox 2003; Flickinger and Studlar 2007). Examining trust toward the EP as an individual-level determinant of EP voting can determine whether it remains predictive in a multivariate framework and whether European- level considerations are distinguished from national-level considerations. Moreover, it is necessary to examine whether trust in national institutions is also related to voting in EP elections, given that past research has also made this claim with aggregate- level evidence (Rose 2004a). A framework for examining how news, trust, and voting are related is offered by Kleinnijenhuis et al.’s (2006) study on Dutch national elections, which found that negative news increased distrust in party leaders, which in turn decreased turnout. While not explicitly stated or tested, the study implies a mediation process, where news affects voting indirectly though political trust. A moderated mediation model is therefore proposed to examine this at the supranational level. That is, if news exposure is related to voting in EP elections by first affecting trust in the EP (Figure 2). Given that news in new member states contains more coverage about the EU and is more positive, it is likely that news exposure helps foster greater trust in the EP among these citizens. The following hypotheses speak to a set of relationships between news exposure, EP trust, and the likelihood of voting in EP elections:

Hypothesis 1: Trust in the EP will mediate the relationship between news exposure and voting in EP elections. Hypothesis 2: The relationship between news exposure and trust in the EP will be stronger among citizens of new member states.

Trust in EU institutions is expected to be associated with voting in EP elections. Due to prior research (Rose 2004a), it also investigates the extent to which trust in national institutions is associated with voting. 54 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Research Question 1: Is trust in national institutions related to the likelihood of voting in EP elections?

Method Two studies are conducted to investigate the relationships between news exposure, trust in the EP and voting in EP elections. The proposed moderated mediation model is tested in two stages. An experimental design first manipulates the tone of EP news coverage to examine if trust in the EP mediates the relationship between news exposure and intention to vote. This process is also tested using EES survey data to establish whether the relationships hold when using EU-wide data. Furthermore, using data from all EU states can also help determine whether the relationship between news exposure and trust is indeed moderated by member state status.

Study 1: Survey Experiment Data and procedure. To test the mediating role of trust in the EP, a between-subjects experimental design with random assignment is used. Participants were recruited from an online panel maintained by the survey firm Qualtrics in June 2013. The company draws a panel using stratified quota sampling. Panelists receive rewards in exchange for participating in studies. The experiment was embedded in an online survey conducted in four countries that provide a good cross-section of the variations in geogra- phy, economic development, and democratic traditions that can be found in the EU today1: the United Kingdom (N = 336), Germany (N = 334), Greece (N = 343) and Poland (N = 341). The survey and stimulus material were translated professionally into German, Greek and Polish. The samples are quite representative of each country’s demographic characteristics (Appendix A). In the last section of the survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. In two of the conditions, they were asked to read one news article about the EP. Participants in the third condition did not read an article and served as a control group. All participants subsequently answered several post-test questions, including filler questions, and trust in the EP and if they intend to vote in the upcoming 2014 EP election on 7-point scales.

Stimulus material. The stimulus material consisted of one pair of news articles about the role of the EP in an EU decision-making process (Appendix B). The news article deals with the extent to which the EP facilitates the functioning of the EU. That is, whether the EP works efficiently and effectively with other EU institutions in dealing with common goals. The pair of articles contains an alternate negative and positive valence version. To ensure ecological validity, the structure of the manipulation was based on an article edited for the purposes of the study. It is presented as an article from Euronews. The manipulation concerns the role of the EP in dealing with proposed amendments to the existing Agreement on the free movement of persons. The Agreement abolished internal border controls and allows persons to move and reside Nardis 55

freely within the EU. The proposed legislation was designed to allow member states to reinstate their own border controls in certain circumstances, and the article discusses the potential effects of such changes on travel for EU citizens. The topic was chosen because it is not as salient as other EU issues such as the financial crisis, where people might already have formed attitudes. The positively worded version portrays the EP as assisting EU institutions and facilitating progress of the proposed legislation, and the negatively worded version as hindering EU institutions and the policy process. Both articles contain the same number of sentence-level manipulations to enhance the ability to compare experimental conditions.

Results. To ascertain how news coverage can affect trust in the EP and, in turn, the likelihood of voting, the impact of negative and positive news is examined separately. The results indicate that the positively worded experimental condition is most powerful in affecting trust in the EP. Participants in the news condition where the EP facili-

tates the functioning of the EU have significantly higher trust in the EP (Mtrust = 3.64, SD = 1.57) than those in the control condition (Mtrust = 3.27, SD =1.52; t = 2.83, p < .01). They also express higher intention to vote (Mvote = 5.25, SD = 1.85) than participants in the control group (Mvote = 5.08, SD =1.96; t = 1.07, p < .1). However, in the negatively worded condition, trust levels (Mtrust = 3.43, SD = 1.68; t = 1.16, p > .1) and intentions to vote (Mvote = 5.21, SD = 1.91; t = 1.22, p > .1) do not differ significantly from the control group. A mediation analysis is then conducted to investigate whether positive news coverage affects intentions to vote by first fostering trust in the EP. A bootstrapped confidence interval for the indirect effect was obtained using procedures described by Preacher and Hayes (2008). Bootstrapping is the recommended procedure for testing indirect effects. It is a resampling process where the sample is considered a pseudo-population representing the wider population from which the sample originated. The sampling distribution of a statistic of interest is calculating using multiple resamples of the data. When the confidence interval does not include zero, an indirect effect is considered significant. Table 2 presents the unstandardized coefficients and 95 percent bias-corrected confidence intervals for a mediation test using ten thousand bootstrapped samples. The confidence interval does not include zero (CI = [0.03, 0.19]), confirming that participants in the positive news condition report a greater likelihood of voting due to higher trust in the EP compared with those in the control condition. Given that trust levels did not differ significantly between the negative news and control conditions, no other mediation analyses were performed. The final analysis compares whether the magnitude of the relationship between positive news coverage and trust varies across the four countries examined. Two models are used to evaluate this relationship across countries. A path that does not vary across countries suggests that news content has similar effects in all four countries. In the first model, the causal path from news coverage to trust is constrained to be equal across countries, χ2 (3) = 3.82, p > .1. The second model allows the causal path to vary 56 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Table 2. Mediation Analysis Predicting EP Election Voting.

News exposure conditions X → M M → Y X → Y1 X → Y2 CI EP facilitates functioning of .18** .27*** .04 .09 [.03, .19] EU vs. control

Note. Cells are unstandardized coefficients. CI is bias-corrected 95 percent confidence interval for the indirect effect of news exposure on intention to vote with trust as mediator in the model. X = News exposure condition (EP facilitates functioning of EU condition coded +1, control condition coded −1); M = Trust in the EP; Y = Intention to vote; Y1 = Direct effect of news exposure on intention to vote with mediator in the model; Y2 = Direct effect of news exposure on intention to vote without mediator in the model. EP = European Parliament; CI = confidence interval; EU = European Union. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. across the four countries, χ2 (0) = 0, p = .0. The difference in the chi-square results of the two models tests whether the paths are equal. A non-significant chi-square difference in the fit of the two models, Δχ2 (3) = 3.82, p > .1, indicates that the path from news coverage to trust in the EP does not differ across the four countries.

Discussion. The results provide partial support for the mediation hypothesis (Hypoth- esis 1). They suggest that favorable news coverage of the EP can engage people and encourage them to vote, and it does so by first fostering trust in the EP. Unfavorable news coverage, however, is not related to trust. That unfavorable news does not lead to lower levels of trust might seem counterintuitive, but this finding in fact fits with existing explanations provided by past research. Pippa Norris’ (2000) study on political engagement argues that news coverage of the EU has a positive to benign influence on civic life, including trust in EU institutions. Exposure to news, and in particular positive news, has the ability to foster trust in European institutions by increasing awareness of the EU and its work. The argument further posits that negative news about the EU does not have much of an effect on trust, because it nonetheless still functions to increase people’s awareness and understanding of the EU and its activities. The invariance of the path from news coverage to trust in the EP across the four countries suggests that that news content has similar effects on Europeans irrespective of country. This provides reason to consider that differential relationships between news use and trust among established and new member states can occur due to differences in news content. The fact that there tends to be more positive news coverage of the EP in new members indicates that this may affect their trust more than in established members. The next section pursues this by analyzing EU-wide data.

Study 2: Survey To increase confidence in the proposed causal process, the relationships outlined in the mediation model are now tested with existing survey data from the wider EU. Importantly, this also allows us to test whether member state status moderates the relationship between news use and trust. Nardis 57

Data. Data from the 2004 EES are used. These data are part of a study series conducted in member states immediately following EP elections and draw samples of about 1,000 respondents per country.2

Measures EP Election Voting. A dichotomous variable is created from a question asking respondents whether they voted at the EP elections (0 = did not vote, 1 = voted). News Exposure. Two questions ask respondents how frequently they came across news about the European elections through television, and newspapers, in the three or four weeks before election day (0 = never, 1 = sometimes, 2 = often). These are combined to form one news use variable ranging from 0 to 4. Political Trust. Trust in the EP, European Commission, national parliament and national government are measured on ten-point scales. Member State Status. A dummy variable represents established (coded 0) and new (coded 1) member states. Interaction term. An interaction variable between news use and member state status is created to examine Hypothesis 2.

Analytic strategy. The hypotheses are tested simultaneously in a structural equation model using Stata. Following Andrew Hayes’s (2013) recommendation, the paths are estimated using the entire data set as opposed to separate analyses for each country group. The interaction term is used to test for moderation, as it allows the paths to differ across the two groups. Given the hierarchical nature of the data, dependence is accounted for by using cluster-based standard errors. Individuals are clustered within countries. The model accounts for alternative explanations of trust and voting. It controls for demographic and attitudinal predictors of EP trust [evaluations of the economy (Catterberg and Moreno 2005) and satisfaction with the EU (van der Eijk and Schmitt 2009)]. Structural and individual-level factors that affect EP election turnout are controlled for. The structural factors are compulsory voting and concurrent elections.3 Individual-level factors are demographic, and attitudinal predictors of voting through party attachment, union membership and interest in the elections (Blumler 1984; Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991; Schmitt and van der Eijk 2008; van der Eijk and Schmitt 2009). Moreover, Research Question 1 is examined by including trust in national institutions as predictors of EP election voting. Data from three countries are not included in the analysis. Respondents from Malta were not surveyed at all in the 2004 EES. Moreover, the Swedish version of the survey did not include questions regarding European election media use, and the Lithuanian version did not include questions on media use or institutional trust. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest.

Results. With no moderator in the model, the indirect relationship between news use and EP voting through trust was found to be significant (β = .21, 95 percent CI = [0.16, 0.26]) and considerably stronger than the direct relationship between news use and voting (β = .03, 95 percent CI = [0.02, 0.05]). The direction of the path coefficients and 58 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics.

All EU Member Established Member New Member States States States

M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) Voted in EP election 63.3% 73.2% 45.6% Trust in European Parliament 4.6 (2.4) 4.4 (2.3) 5.0 (2.5) Trust in European Commission 4.9 (2.3) 4.8 (2.2) 5.2 (2.4) Trust in national parliament 5.3 (2.4) 5.8 (2.3) 4.5 (2.4) Trust in national government 5.1 (2.6) 5.4 (2.6) 4.6 (2.5) TV news use 1.8 (0.7) 1.8 (0.7) 1.9 (0.7) Newspaper use 1.8 (0.7) 1.9 (0.7) 1.73 (0.7) Age 47.6 (17) 48.1 (16.9) 46.5 (17.2) Sex (male) 47.9% 49.5% 44.8% N (individuals/countries) 15,285/22 10,794/14 4,491/8

Note. EU = European Union; EP = European Parliament. the indirect effect are consistent with the hypothesis that news use increases trust in the EP, which in turn increases the likelihood of voting. The coefficients of a moderated mediation model where the path between news use and trust is moderated by member state status are then estimated (Table 4). The interaction variable between news use and member state status is added to the structural model and is statistically significant (β = .10, p < .05), indicating that the relationship between news use and EP trust is stronger for citizens of new member states. In fact, the relationship is about 1.5 times stronger in new members (βnew = .27; βestablished = .17). The two hypotheses are therefore confirmed. Turning to whether trust in national institutions predict EP election voting (Research Question 1), the results suggest that trust in the national parliament is also related. In fact, it is of similar predictive strength to trust in the EP. Trust in the European Commission and trust in the national government are not related to voting.

Discussion. The goals of this second study were to test the mediation model outlined in the experiment with survey data from a wider range of countries, and to determine whether the relationships differ between established and new member states. The study shows that expectations were met, as news consumption is positively related to trust in the EP, which in turn is positively related to voting. Moreover, given that news coverage exhibited variation in valence between the two groups of countries during the 2004 elections, member state group was expected to moderate the relationship between news and trust. The results indicate that the relationship with news use is in fact stronger in new members due to the more favorable coverage of EP elections and the EU that is typically found in these countries. Study two also considered the relationship between political trust and voting, and re-examined how arguments based on aggregate-level analysis fared when tested at Nardis 59

Table 4. Structural Model Predicting EP Trust and Election Voting.

European Parliament EP Election Trust Voting

B (SE) B (SE) Compulsory voting — 0.17** (.06) Concurrent elections — 0.20** (.06) Age −0.00 (.00) 0.00*** (.00) Gender (male)a −0.22** (.06) −0.01 (.01) Education 0.01 (.01) 0.00** (.00) Financial satisfaction 0.22** (.08) — EU satisfaction 1.07*** (.15) — New member statea 0.01 (.27) — News use 0.18*** (.04) 0.03*** (.01) News use × New member state 0.10* (.04) — Party attachment 0.05*** (.01) Union membershipa 0.02* (.01) Interest in EP elections 0.10*** (.01) Trust in EP 0.01*** (.00) Trust in national parliament 0.01*** (.00) Trust in European Commission −0.00 (.00) Trust in national government 0.00 (.00) Equation-level R2 .16 .20 Overall R2 .32 N (individuals/countries) 11,294/22

Note. Entries are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors adjusted for clusters in country. News use variables refer to news about the EP elections. Model fit statistics are sensitive to large sample sizes, non-significant control variables, and logistic outcomes. The model contains these properties and therefore fit statistics are rather low. EP = European Parliament. a. Dummy-coded variables. Given that model was fit with cluster-based standard errors, only two model fit statistics available: Standardized Root Mean Square Residual = .06; Coefficient of Determination = .32. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

the individual-level. Trust in the EP and national parliament was found to similarly predict voting. This suggests a complementary explanation to that given by Rose (2004a). Furthermore, trust in the national government, the second most important reason Rose’s (2004a) study gives for abstention in the 2004 EP elections, and trust in the European Commission are found to not be factors at the individual level. While this indicates national-level considerations might still account for some of the variance in voting, they cannot be a substitute for EU-level considerations. By examining each political entity separately, and in accordance with past work (Grönlund and Setälä 2007), these findings underscore the importance of distinguishing between trust in different political entities when studying effects on political behavior. Some limitations must be acknowledged. First, self-reports of voting behavior must be interpreted with caution given that surveys tend to contain vote over-reports. 60 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Results based on self-reported measures of voting are not as precise as those using validated votes (Bernstein et al. 2001; Cassel 2003). Furthermore, the model could not be replicated for the 2009 EP elections. Even though voter surveys were conducted in 2009, trust in multiple political entities was not measured.

Conclusion Turnout in EP elections is perhaps the most visible indicator of engagement with EU politics. One of the reasons direct elections were implemented was to increase citizens’ participation with EU politics and to provide a means through which they could influence its actions. However, overall turnout has consistently declined since the first elections of 1979. Due to low turnout, the European Commission has sought to increase awareness and media coverage of future elections with the hope that citizen engagement in European integration and turnout will increase. It aims to do this, in part, by better informing citizens about the elections and issues relevant to them through the media (EU Citizenship Newsroom 2013). The results suggest that showing the EP as a facilitator of EU processes instills greater institutional confidence. In fact, satisfaction with policy outputs is a powerful determinant of institutional trust (Grönlund and Setälä 2011). The EU could try to highlight such cases and show its citizens that the EP is meaningful and central to the work of the EU. The study aims to expand the literature on European integration by linking media effects on public opinion to voting behavior. Combining experimental work with survey data was particularly useful in allowing the proposed causal process to be explicitly tested and also in increasing the generalizability of the results. This work shares similarities and differences to research on national contexts, particularly Kleinnijenhuis and colleagues’ (2006) study on the relationship between news, trust, and voting. While their work finds a negative relationship between negative news, trust, and national election voting, the current findings from both the experiment and survey support Norris’s (2000) argument that unfavorable news coverage does not negatively affect trust in EU institutions. Norris’ work suggests that consuming news about the EU, irrespective of valence, helps encourage greater awareness and ultimately trust in the EU, and argues that at worst, negative news has a negligible impact on trust. The experiment conducted in this study supports this reasoning, as negatively framed news about the EP was not related to trust, whereas positively framed news increased trust. Similarly, news use was positively related to trust in the wider survey data. This contrast suggests that causal mechanisms differ between national and supranational contexts. Nonetheless, the role of the media in fostering or discouraging institutional trust should be further examined as the EU and economic contexts between member states continue to change. Experiments can be used to further examine specific effects of news content on trust and other attitudinal indicators of support for the EU and its policies. In addition to valence, the topic of coverage is particularly important. Further experiments can reveal how coverage of other salient topics, such as the state of EU Nardis 61 democracy and whether the EU is beneficial or disadvantageous for respective member states (Schuck et al. 2011), affect audience perceptions. Taken together, this work suggests that people become more trusting of the EP as news coverage becomes more favorable. However, high trust in the EU among new, particularly post-communist member states, might of course also be partially attributed to positive views related to the democratic stability of the EU and the economic superiority of its established members. Distrust of national institutions is prevalent among post-communist countries, as surveys indicate that trust in both political and social institutions is low (Mishler and Rose 2001) and tends to be notably higher among Western Europeans (Rose 2004a). Trust in parliament and political parties is particularly low in post-communist nations, and this is attributed to the legacy of authoritarianism and one-party rule. Coercive systems designed to ensure that citizens adhered to official policy gave rise to distrust, and even though the communist polities are now gone and younger generations never directly experienced their rule, in some countries, the systems that replaced them have yet to become full democracies capable of fostering institutional confidence Rose (2004b). Distrust in political institutions increases when people feel that politicians do not care about their views (Craig 1979). Some post-communist EU states tend to have less transparent electoral processes and less competent, more corrupt governments than established member states (The Economist 2013), and therefore encourage feelings of national distrust among their citizens. Institutional trust is associated with the perception that public officials act honestly (Grönlund and Setälä 2011), suggesting that people in new member states view EU officials as more honest than national officials. News coverage could rein- force or strengthen the trust associated with EU institutions, and these results indicate that this may well be the case, as news exposure had stronger relationships with trust among people in new member states. Lastly, the positive coverage among new member states was quite consistent between the 2004 and 2009 EP election campaigns (Schuck et al. 2011). Content analyses carried out by the EES program are planned for the 2014 EP election, and will allow us to see whether trends in news coverage will again differ between established and new members. After the 2014 EP elections, detailed data of news coverage from three elections will exist and allow the study of how trends in news coverage coincide with trends in voting to continue. This also presents an opportunity to further test the proposed moderated mediation model and instill confidence in its applicability.

Appendix A Country Samples and Corresponding Official National Statistics Age, gender, income, and education figures for each country’s sample and corresponding official national statistics. The main discrepancies between the sample and official national statistics are that income in the Greek sample is about €1,000 a month higher than the national average, and in the Greek and Polish samples about twice as many respondents have a university degree than their respective national averages. 62 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

The United Kingdom Germany Greece Poland

Sample Official Sample Official Sample Official Sample Official Statistics National Statistics National Statistics National Statistics National (M) Statistics (M) Statistics (M) Statistics (M) Statistics Age 48 38 34 45 35 42 31 38 Gender 50 — 47 — 44 — 46 — Income 2,038 2,618 2,624 2,814 2,739 1,703 2,841 3,394 Education 37 39 24 28 57 26 46 24

Source. Official national statistics from 2011 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development statistics. Note. Gender: percentage female; income: monthly wage in national currency units; education: percentage with university degree.

Appendix B News Article in Alternate Forms (Negative and Positive [in Parentheses] Conditions) European Parliament Delays European Union Action on Future of Agreement on Free Movement of Persons (European Parliament Facilitates European Union Action on Future of Agreement on Free Movement of Persons)

European Union institutions have begun debating proposed amendments to the agreement on the free movement of persons, which outlines how Europe’s borders function. The European Parliament has held up (moved) the process (forward) and as a result, the outcome is still uncertain (all but certain). The European Parliament is the institution often held responsible for instances when the European Union demonstrates inac- tion (effective action) or responds slowly (promptly) to an emergent issue. The European Union represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed and member States have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border. Sweden has backed France’s bid for member states to overrule this agreement in special circumstances. France has called for changes to allow countries to reinstate temporary border controls when their frontiers come under external pressure, such as an influx of people seeking refuge due to natural disasters or fleeing war zones. The European Parliament is also debating the proposal, as any decision made by European leaders must be ratified by the European Parliament to take effect. Even though the European Commission and member states are in full agreement regarding the proposed changes, (and) the process has been delayed (advanced) due to the European Parliament’s inefficient (efficient) deliberative processes. The European Parliament often slows down (speeds up) EU decision making due to its legislative procedures. Nardis 63

José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, yesterday urged (thanked) the European Parliament to (for) not delay (delaying) the process further and vote (for agreeing to vote) on the proposed amendments before the legislature goes into recess at the end of this week. He accused (congratulated) the European Parliament of not heeding (for heeding) to calls by member states and the Commission to quickly resolve the issue. The European Parliament has called for a fourth (final) special meeting to be held later this week and more (no more) talks are expected in the future.

Acknowledgment I would like to thank Nojin Kwak, Richard P. Bagozzi, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Fabian G. Neuner for feedback on an earlier version of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article: This study was supported by a grant from the Marsh Research Fund.

Notes 1. Germany is an established democracy and founding member state. The United Kingdom is also an established democracy but, unlike Germany, tends to be skeptical of further European. Poland is the largest post-communist state in the bloc and Greece is a Mediterranean state receiving considerable financial assistance. 2. Information on data collection methods and response rates is available in the 2004 European Election Study (EES) technical document. 3. Belgium and Luxembourg stipulate compulsory voting and concurrent national elections. Ireland had a national referendum, and many parts of Italy had regional elections on the same day as the 2004 EP election.

References Bèlanger, Éric, and Richard Nadeau. 2005. “Political Trust and the Vote in Multiparty Elections: The Canadian Case.” European Journal of Political Research 44:121–46. Bennett, Stephen E., Staci L. Rhine, Richard S. Flickinger, and Linda L. M. Bennett. 1999. “Videomalaise Revisited: Public Trust in the Media and Government.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 4:8–23. Bernstein, Robert, Anita Chadha, and Robert Montjoy. 2001. “Overreporting Voting Why It Happens and Why It Matters.” Public Opinion Quarterly 65:22–44. Blondel, Jean, Richard Sinnott, and Palle Svensson. 1997. “Representation and Voter Participation.” European Journal of Political Research 32:243–72. Blumler, Jay G. 1984. “European Voters’ Responses to the First Community Elections.” In European Elections 1979/81 and 1984, ed. Karlheinz Reif. Berlin: Quorum. 64 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Boomgaarden, Hajo G., Rens Vliegenthart, Claes H. de Vreese, and Andreas R. T. Schuck. 2010. “News on the Move: Exogenous Events and News Coverage of the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 17:506–26. Cassel, Carol A. 2003. “Overreporting and Electoral Participation Research.” American Politics Research 41:81–92. Catterberg, Gabriela, and Alejandro Moreno. 2005. “The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 18:31–48. Citrin, Jack. 1974. “Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government.” American Political Science Review 68:973–88. Cox, Michaelene. 2003. “When Trust Matters: Explaining Differences in Voter Turnout.” Journal of Common Market Studies 41:757–70. Craig, Stephen C. 1979. “Efficacy, Trust and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual Dilemma.” American Politics Quarterly 7:225–39. Dalton, Russell J. 2008. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. de Vreese, Claes H., Susan Banducci, Holli A. Semetko, and Hajo A. Boomgaarden. 2006. “The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries.” European Union Politics 7:477–504. Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley. Erber, Ralph, and Richard R. Lau. 1990. “Political Cynicism Revisited: An Information- Processing Reconciliation of Policy-Based and Incumbency-Based Interpretations of Changes in Trust in Government.” American Journal of Political Science 34:263–53. EU Citizenship Newsroom. 2013. “Commission Recommendations for 2014 European Parliament Elections.” March 12. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/citizen/news/130312_en.htm. European Parliament - DG Communication. 2009. “European Elections 1979–2009”. 1-290. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/elections_results/review.pdf. Flickinger, Richard S., and Donley T. Studlar. 2007. “One Europe, Many Electorates? Models of Turnout in European Parliament Elections after 2004.” Comparative Political Studies 40:383–404. Grönlund, Kimmo, and Maija Setälä. 2007. “Political Trust, Satisfaction and Voter Turnout.” Comparative European Politics 4:400–22. Grönlund, Kimmo, and Maija Setälä. 2011. “In Honest Officials We Trust: Institutional Confidence in Europe.” American Review of Public Administration 42:523–42. Hayes, Andrew F. 2013. Introduction to Mediation, Moderation, and Conditional Process Analysis. New York: Guilford Press. Hetherington, Marc J. 1996. “The Media’s Role in Forming Voters’ National Economic Evaluations in 1992.” American Journal of Political Science 40:372–95. Hetherington, Marc J. 1998. “The Political Relevance of Political Trust.” American Political Science Review 92:791–808. Hetherington, Marc J. 2006. Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Holtz-Bacha, Christina. 1990. “Videomalaise Revisited: Media Exposure and Political Alienation in West Germany.” European Journal of Communication 5:73–85. Hooghe, Marc, Sofie Marien, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. “Where Do Distrusting Voters Turn if There Is No Viable Exit or Voice Option? The Impact of Political Trust on Electoral Behaviour in the Belgian Regional Elections of June 2009.” Government and Opposition 46:245–73. Nardis 65

Kleinnijenhuis, Jan, Anita M. J. van Hoof, and Dirk Oegema. 2006. “Negative News and the Sleeper Effect of Distrust.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 11:86–104. Marien, Sofie, and Marc Hooghe. 2011. “Does Political Trust Matter? An Empirical Investigation into the Relation between Political Trust and Support for Law Compliance.” European Journal of Political Research 50:267–91. Mattila, Mikko. 2003. “Why Bother? Determinants of Turnout in the European Elections.” Electoral Studies 22:449–68. Miller, Arthur H. 1974. “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970.” American Political Science Review 68:951–72. Miller, Arthur H., Edie H. Goldenberg, and Lutz Erbring. 1979. “Type-set Politics: The Impact of Newspapers on Public Confidence.” American Political Science Review 73:67–84. Miller, Arthur H., and Ola Listhaug. 1990. “Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States.” British Journal of Political Science 20:357–86. Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 1997. “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies.” Journal of Politics 59:418–51. Mishler, William, and Richard Rose. 2001. “What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies.” Comparative Political Studies, 34: 30-62. Muxel, Anne. 2005. “Les Abstentionnistes: Le Premier Parti Europeen (Abstainers: The Main European Party).” In Le Vote Européen 2004–2005: De L’élargissement au Référendum Français (The European Vote 2004-2005: The French Referendum on Enlargement), ed. Pascal Perrineau. Paris: Sciences Po. Newton, Kenneth. 1997. “Politics and the News Media: Mobilization or Videomalaise?” In British Social Attitudes: The 14th Report, ed. Roger Jowell, John Curtice, Alison Park, Katarina Thomson and Lindsay Brook. Ashgate: Aldershot. Newton, Kenneth. 1999. “Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies.” In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, Pippa. 1996. “Does Television Erode Social Capital? A Reply to Putnam.” PS: Political Science & Politics 29:474–80. Norris, Pippa. 1999. “Institutional Explanations for Political Support.” In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government, ed. Pippa Norris. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Norris, Pippa. 2000. A Virtuous Circle? Political Communications in Post-industrial Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris, Pippa, John Curtice, David Sanders, Margaret Scammell, and Holli Semetko. 1999. On Message: Communicating the Campaign. London: Sage. Patterson, Thomas E. 1996. “Bad News, Bad Governance.” ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 546:97–108. Preacher, Kristopher J., and Andrew F. Hayes. 2008. “Asymptotic and Resampling Strategies for Assessing and Comparing Indirect Effects in Multiple Mediator Models.” Behavior Research Methods 40:879–91. Robinson, Michael J. 1976. “Public Affairs Television and Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of ‘The Selling of the Pentagon.’” American Political Science Review 70:409–32. Rose, Richard. 2004a. Europe Expands, Turnout Falls: The Significance of the 2004 European Parliament Election. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 66 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Rose, Richard. 2004b. “Political Trust, Turnout and Governance Capital.” In Studies in Public Policy No. 386. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. Rosenstone, Steven J., and John M. Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan. Schmitt, Hermann, and Renato Mannheimer. 1991. “About Voting and Non-voting in the European Elections of June 1989.” European Journal of Political Research 19:31–54. Schmitt, Hermann, and Cees van der Eijk. 2008. “There Is Not Much Eurosceptic Non-voting in European Parliament Elections.” In Opposing Europe: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Aleks Szczcerbiak and Paul Taggart. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schuck, Andreas R. T., Rachid Azrout, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Matthijs Elenbaas, Joost van Spanje, Rens Vliegenthart, and Claes H. de Vreese. 2011. “Media Visibility and Framing of the European Parliamentary Elections 2009: A Media Content Analysis in 27 Countries.” In Political Communication in European Parliamentary Elections, ed. Michaela Maier, Jesper Strömbäck, and Lynda L. Kaid. Farnham, UK: Ashgate. Shaffer, Stephen D. 1981. “A multivariate explanation of decreasing turnout in presidential elections, 1960-1976.” American Journal of Political Science, 25: 68-95. Sinnott, Richard. 2000. “European Parliament Elections: Institutions, Attitudes, and Participation.” In Citizen Participation in European Politics, ed. Hans Ange, Cees van der Eijk, Brigid Laffan, Britta Lejon, Pippa Norris, Hermann Schmitt, and Richard Sinnott. Stockholm: Statens Offentliga Utredningar. Stokes, Donald E. 1962. “Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment.” In Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military, ed. Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Harper & Brothers. The Economist. 2013. “Democracy Index 2012: Democracy at a Standstill.” 1-42. http://www. eiu.com/democracy2012. van der Eijk, Cees, and Hermann Schmitt. 2009. “Legitimacy and Electoral Abstention in European Parliament Elections.” In The Legitimacy of the European Union after Enlargement, ed. Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Warren, Mark E. 1999. “Democratic Theory and Trust.” In Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Author Biography Yioryos Nardis’ research interests are in political communication from a comparative perspective. His current focus is on citizen engagement in European Union politics. HIJXXX10.1177/1940161214558125The International Journal of Press/PoliticsMellado and Humanes research-article5581252014

Research Article

The International Journal of Press/Politics 2015, Vol. 20(1) 67–84 The Use of Objective and © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: Analytical Reporting as a sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161214558125 Method of Professional Work: ijpp.sagepub.com A Cross-Longitudinal Study of Chilean Political Coverage

Claudia Mellado1 and María Luisa Humanes2

Abstract Based on a cross-longitudinal content analysis of 3,624 political news stories published by Chilean national newspapers between 1990 and 2010, this study analyzes the changes and patterns in the reporting styles of the political press by examining the value of objective and analytical reporting used by professional journalists. The study presents empirical evidence on how journalists justify truth claims in political news and how journalistic performance has evolved in a post-dictatorial regime setting. The results show that objective reporting is more common than analytical reporting for both the popular and the elite press. However, although the Chilean traditional press assume objectivity as a criterion of good journalism, they reinterpret its meaning in practice. Specifically, the findings show that the use of analytical reporting has significantly increased in political coverage. The absence of formal separation between facts and opinions in the Chilean case confirms the global tendency toward more partisan journalism, especially in journalistic contexts closer to the “polarized pluralist” model. The differences in the use of objective and analytical reporting between the popular and the elite press do not show a clear pattern.

Keywords objectivity, analytical reporting, reporting style, political news, cross-longitudinal analysis

1Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile 2Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain Corresponding Author: Claudia Mellado, School of Journalism, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso (PUCV), Campus Curauma, Valparaíso, Chile. Email: [email protected] 68 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Introduction The academic literature has dealt with journalistic objectivity in two senses: as a philosophical standard and as a reporting method. In the philosophical sense, objectivity is related to reality free of value judgment (Muñoz-Torres 2012). Objectivity, as a reporting method, is defined as a set of strategies to produce information that allow journalists to develop the truth of their assertions and to legitimize themselves toward their audience and their superiors (Tuchman 1972). Both of these perspectives have been subjected to criticism. In philosophical terms, rendering an exact representation of reality through the presentation of facts is regarded as impossible. Meanwhile, criticism directed toward objectivity as a method posits that the strategies of objective reporting guarantee neither that the truth will be revealed nor that they will avoid bias. Furthermore, objectivity is also related to the political functions of the media as one of the basic principles of the objective method is the impartial and balanced presentation of events and their protagonists. Therefore, objectivity is an indicator that serves to differentiate the characteristics of journalism in different media systems (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Theoretically, the objective method is characteristic of the liberal media system in the English-speaking world and is less common in “polarized pluralist” systems. In other words, journalistic objectivity would weaken the political parallelism and instru- mentalization of the media by political and/or economic powers. In this sense, several authors have dealt with the Americanization thesis in political journalism practice, meaning the incorporation of characteristics of the liberal model into other national/cultural contexts (Hallin and Mancini 2004). However, the evidence is inconclusive. While some studies in Western countries (Donsbach and Patterson 2004; Skovsgaard et al. 2012) discuss the decline of objective journalism, others such as Umbricht and Esser (2014) show that the use of objective reporting resources has increased. In the Latin American context, Waisbord (2006) highlights that “neither the model of partisan journalism nor the model of ‘objective’ reporting . . . became hegemonic” (p. 68) as the political and economic differences among media outlets as well as the lack of interest among journalists have hampered the consolidation of common professional standards. Based on a cross-longitudinal content analysis of reporting styles in Chilean national newspapers, this study analyzes trends and changes in the types of journalistic strategies used by the political press in a post-dictatorship democratic system. Specifically, it examines whether the press chooses strategies of objective reporting to justify the truth of their assertions or, in contrast, it opts for other strategies that encom- pass the use of analytical resources closer to analysis and subjectivism. At the same time, it addresses the influence of the media type (elite and popular press) in the implementation of objective and analytical methods in political reporting. Also, this analysis allows us to examine whether the classical conception of objectivity way informs the presentation of news in nonwestern contexts. Mellado and Humanes 69

The Chilean Case The Chilean case is relevant for studying these issues as it offers the possibility of observing the changes in the use of objective and analytical reporting in the political coverage in a fairly stable democracy after a brutal seventeen-year period of dictatorship. The current political system in Chile may be considered to be a reasonable approach to a working democracy. Legal impediments to press criticism of the military have gradually been dismantled; however, the power structure may be viewed as approaching the oligarchic, as it has the highest concentration of media ownership in Latin America. Furthermore, this is set within the context of the high political parallelism that exists in the country, where the media, political parties, and economic powers are closely linked (Fox and Waisbord 2002; Valenzuela and Arriagada 2011). The concentration of media ownership is evidenced in the case of the press by El Mercurio (the Edwards family) and Copesa (Alvaro Saieh), both strongly related to the country’s political right. Chilean media performance may readily be interpreted in light of the country’s political history. Following the 1973 coup and Pinochet’s dictatorial control over society and censorship of the press, Chile is today one of the most competitive and stable democracies in Latin America (Mellado et al. 2012). The transition to democracy was achieved quite peacefully. Nevertheless, the smoothness of the transition was, in part, only achieved by compromises struck with the military and right-wing partisan allies on reforms originally instituted by the defunct dictatorship. Indeed, a set of constitutional reforms that the dictatorship proposed were approved in a plebiscite in mid- 1989, just before the military handover, which has been seen as the agreement that the democratic opposition made with the military and the right wing to end the dictatorship (Navia 2010). Pinochet relinquished the Presidency in 1990 but remained chief of the military until 1998, when he took a lifetime seat in the Senate. During the time in office of the first governments of La Concertación (1989–2000), laws affecting the press, which had been in force during the dictatorship and permitted control over news media to be maintained, were pursued vigorously. At the same time, neoliberal measures led to the closure of several media outlets. Pinochet and the military forces remained undoubtedly strong figures. Nevertheless, several events toward the second half of the 1990s signaled the final chapter of the transition. Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 on charges of crimes against humanity committed during his time in power and was sent back to Chile on violations of humanitarian rights. His arrest stimulated a revival of independent journalism, especially weeklies and magazines (Bresnahan 2003). In 2001, President Lagos signed the Law on Freedom of Opinion and Information and Journalistic Practice, generally known as the Press Law, which eliminated many of the legal weapons the dictatorship had wielded against the opposition press. In addition, a set of constitutional reforms passed under President Lagos in 2005 eliminated most of the remaining authoritarian enclaves (Navia 2010). An upsurge of protests 70 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) following the first Bachelet administration of 2006 also led to the articulation of a new range of policy initiatives and demands made both on the streets and in the media (Navia 2010). As we are interested in finding out how these transformations have affected journalistic performance (Mellado 2014) in political coverage, we adopt a longitudinal analysis perspective to examine the extent to which the use of the objectivity model compared with analytical reporting has become consolidated as a strategy to legitimize a more independent form of political journalism in the new Chilean democratic system. The results of this analysis have important implications in terms of understanding how Chilean journalists face the challenge of reporting on political reality, and how the political and media contexts influence the way in which the methods of producing information are interpreted.

Conceptual Framework Objectivity is one of the foundations of professional journalism (Schiller 1979; Schudson 2001; Tuchman 1972). For Lippmann (1922), the objective method was the most suitable because it enabled journalists to verify events and provide citizens with an exact version of them, thus allowing the latter to form their own opinions. In this sense, the best way for journalism to serve democracy was to apply the objective method. However, objectivity has also been one of the most debated concepts among journalism scholars and professionals. The discussion has focused on two approaches to objectivity: as a philosophical concept and as a method or strategy of news production. Although this study focuses on the presence of objective and analytical reporting in the Chilean political press, it is important to bear in mind the controversies surrounding the epistemological aspects of objectivity, as they help understand this debate from a broader perspective. One of the recurrent criticisms of objectivity is that it is impossible to put it into practice because the journalist lacks the ability to eliminate subjectivity when producing information (Muñoz-Torres 2012). Those who support objective journalism have adopted the idea that the facts speak for themselves and that journalists should not tinge the presentation of reality, in the form of news, with their opinions or value judgments. Thus, objectivity guarantees neutrality, avoiding the ideological bias (Fico et al. 2006). Still, as Muñoz-Torres (2012) points out, the dichotomy that opposes facts and values is false for three reasons. The first is the difficulty for any person to present facts without considering their prior ideas about reality. The second is related to the selection of facts, which is influenced by values. The third reason is the positivist ambition that an objective knowledge of reality must be free of opinion. In this sense, Zelizer (1993) argues that “practicing reporters rarely admit the practice of usage of construction of reality, seen among critical observer as a common way of presenting the news” (p. 221). Likewise, Mindich (1998) asserts that “journalists should not assume that objectivity equals a correct picture of reality” (p. 143). Mellado and Humanes 71

Difficulties solving these epistemological issues have driven scholars to avoid defining objectivity in terms of some core essence. Instead, studies have broken objectivity into constituent parts, that is, a group of strategies to produce information, such as referring to all the parties to a conflict, presenting empirical evidence, using quotes, applying the inverted pyramid and the five Ws (what, who, when, where, why), and separating facts and opinions (Kaplan 2006; Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007; Mindich 1998; Tuchman 1972; Waisbord 2006). Various authors have empirically analyzed the different characteristics of objectivity as a reporting method. Ward (1999) understands factuality as the combination of the use of quotes and the presence of verifiable information, documentation, and reliable sources, while impartiality is understood as the idea of balance and fair reporting. Esser and Umbricht (2013) identify five variables to recognize a piece of information as objective: presentation of antagonistic standpoints, employment of experts, use of quotes, hard-facts–first structure, and formal separation of facts and opinion. A news item that complies with these strategies would show the public different views on facts, based on evidence and without favoring either side. In the American journalistic model, objectivity as a “strategic ritual” (Tuchman 1972) has been used to distinguish professional from amateur journalism. As Schudson (1978) states, objectivity has been largely rooted in skepticism, where reporters followed procedures of objectivity because reality was contested and because facts were manipulated by politicians and public relations (PR) agencies, among other reference groups. However, its acceptance has been questioned within the American model and in other journalistic contexts, thus dismissing the idea that there is a universal definition of objectivity as there are difficulties for assigning the same meaning to different reporting methods in different contexts. Donsbach and Klett (1993) surveyed European and American political journalists, who were asked to associate the concept of good journalism with four specific practices (no subjectivity, fair representation, fair skepticism, and hard facts). They found that over 80 percent of respondents in all of the countries analyzed regard objectivity as the most important concept, although their definitions of the concept differ. American and British journalists relate it to fair representation, while Italians and Germans relate it to hard facts. More recent research such as that of Donsbach and Patterson (2004) and Skovsgaard et al. (2012) shows that objectivity as a news production method is not necessarily the predominant value in political journalistic practice, even in western contexts, particularly in countries that fall within the polarized pluralist model. Hallin and Mancini (2004) point out that European journalists theoretically defend the values of objectivity but, in daily practice, steer away from them. The international literature offers at least two interpretations to explain a possible trend toward increasingly using a more interpretive style. On one hand, the interpretive style is an indicator of the major independence of journalists with regard to the political system (Patterson 2000). On the other hand, the interpretive style is also a consequence of the increasing commercialization and competition in the media market (McNair 2000). 72 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Although little empirical research that has analyzed the thesis of Americanization in nonwestern contexts (Hallin and Mancini 2004), it does point in the same direction. In Latin America, Waisbord (2006) outlines the fragmentation of journalistic models. A consequence of this has been the development of journalistic practices that are guided by two different strategies: the professional one and the ideological one. The first leads to the “journalism of information,” which bases credibility on the journalist’s expert knowledge to reveal the facts by means of objective reporting. The second strategy, “journalism of opinion,” does not require the use of these reporting methods to show the truth and gain credibility. Journalists just need to explicitly demonstrate their affiliation to a certain ideology. Waisbord (2006) points out that political and economic changes in the Latin American context have weakened the partisan press model. As a result, some social and political groups that used to intervene in the press are no longer able to do so. However, these transformations have not given rise to a consolidation of common journalistic practices and standards among professionals. In the Brazilian case, De Alburquerque (2012) asserts that journalism has adopted the American professional model since the 1950s, adjusting it to the social and cultural conditions of the country. Journalists do not consider that supporting the Anglo-American liberal journalistic model is incompatible with political affiliation or the polarized pluralist model. In Mexico, Márquez (2012) discusses conflicting professional models, since although political journalists use the rhetoric of objectivity and impartiality, their practices are better reflected by the model of mobilization. Mellado et al. (2012) draw similar conclusions when comparing the epistemological orientation of Chilean, Mexican, and Brazilian journalists. All three groups agree that neutrality is important, as is publishing verified information in professional practice, but they differ in the importance they place on the other dimensions of objectivity. If we consider the evidence showing that objective reporting has not necessarily become the only predominant value in journalistic practice in countries that deviate from the liberal model, political journalists in other political and social contexts might then assume objectivity as a criterion of good journalism, but they reinterpret its meaning in practice. In practical terms, the way in which political journalism justifies the truth of its assertions about reality could therefore be established by a mix of objective and more analytical reporting strategies, which are not necessarily linked to the classical principles of neutrality. Chilean political and economic conditioning factors undoubtedly have consequences for the implementation of objective journalism. In its traditional conception, objective methods served as a way for journalists to distance themselves from partisan and editorial interests, therefore turning the press into a body that was distinct from the political system (Benson 2006; Kaplan 2006). Hallin (1985) states that objectivity caused journalists to consider themselves to be professionals who were detached from political conflict. However, in the 1950s, this model began to be questioned, even in the United States. According to Schudson (1978), journalists began to question the notion of objectivity when political bodies began generating their own information aided by PR techniques. Journalists realized that delivering facts was not enough, as it Mellado and Humanes 73 was also important to explain what facts meant (Hallin 1985). Glasser (1983) observes that the strategy of objectivity distanced journalism from keeping a check on or watch- ing over democratic systems, thereby maintaining the status quo and failing to promote critical thinking among the audience. The analysis of objectivity as a reporting method manifested in political news content is virtually absent in the Chilean context. With the exception of a few empirical studies (e.g., Pellegrini and Mujica 2006), there is no longitudinal work that allows us to make hypothetical assumptions about the prevalence of more objective compared with more subjective reporting methods. Consequently, we pose research questions rather than hypotheses. We first address if the way in which Chilean political journalists legitimize their independence from the political system is closer to the classical definition of objectivity or if, in contrast, political journalism incorporates more analytical methods into journalistic practice. Consequently, we pose our first research question:

Research Question 1: How did objective and analytical reporting methods change over time in the coverage of Chilean politics between 1990 and 2010?

Besides its political-economic parallelism, the Chilean media system is characterized by strong privatization and liberalization. In the views of some authors, commercialization has led to the rise of more entertainment-oriented journalism, disconnected from public service (Waisbord 2000). These journalistic tendencies can be found in both the popular and the elite press, although they could differ in their level of presence. In the Chilean case, the popular press has a distinctive cultural logic that is different from the elite press. The main difference is their respective target audiences: The popular press is associated more with the lower classes and the elite press with the well- to-do. Sunkel (2001) asserts that readers of the popular press tend to assimilate objectivity to realism, although a realistic account of events does not mean—for such readers—that the narrator of the events has no subjective involvement. Although based on surveys or in-depth interviews with journalists, international studies have also highlighted the existence of differences among news professionals working in both the popular and the elite press regarding the importance placed on the standard of objectivity and its interpretation in journalistic practice. Focusing on political coverage, Brants (1998) distinguishes “tabloid” treatment from “serious” treatment, characterized by

more factual content aspects such as stories about party manifestos, policy, issues and party political disagreements, while with regard to journalistic style politicians would be addressed with respect to their expertise or political involvement, as policy-maker or expert, serious, from a certain professional distance, meant to inform and with a tone of objectivity. (p. 327)

Regarding the professional value of objectivity, Deuze (2005) studies the definition of the professional ideology among journalists of the popular press and finds that 74 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) although they say that the methods of news gathering are similar to those used by the elite press, the use of concepts such as journalistic truth results from a utilitarian strategy to gain advantage over the competition and not from the premise of objective reporting. For example, in the tabloid press, expressions such as “it could be that” are common, substituting empirical evidence to show facts. Skovsgaard et al. (2012), when considering the distinction between the popular and the elite press as a variable that explains the importance placed on objective reporting, find that political journalists working in the popular press regard strategies associated with the objective method as less important than their colleagues in the elite press. They also appreciate the presence of value judgments. The distinction between the popular and the elite press is useful to understand the role of the journalist when addressing the audience. We therefore pose our second research question:

Research Question 2: Are there significant differences between the popular and the elite press in the use of the objective compared with analytical reporting methods in the coverage of Chilean politics between 1990 and 2010?

Method Sampling The data reported in this study come from a cross-longitudinal quantitative content analysis of the Chilean national political press between April 1990 and December 2010. We specifically selected five years as an interval basis to analyze change over time: 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010. As Pinochet relinquished power in March 1990, we deliberately omitted from the analysis all news articles published before April 1990. A content analysis was performed on five general-interest Chilean print media outlets with national circulation: El Mercurio, La Tercera, Las Últimas Noticias, La Cuarta, and La Nación. El Mercurio and La Tercera are the country’s two main elite newspapers. These newspapers were chosen because they represent different audience orientation, the two conglomerates that dominate print press in Chile, as well as the only national state-owned newspaper. El Mercurio is a conservative newspaper, associated with the Chilean elite, while La Tercera—which belongs to Copesa—has tried to set itself apart by being more liberal. La Nación was an elite newspaper primarily owned by the government. It maintained a pro-government characteristic until its demise in late 2010. However, Las Últimas Noticias and La Cuarta (which belong to El Mercurio and Copesa, respectively) are popular newspapers with a strong commercial model. In the Chilean case, there is competition between the same types of newspapers, only differentiated by their audiences. By using the constructed week method, a stratified-systematic sample of each newspaper was selected. Specifically, two constructed news weeks were sampled per year, per newspaper. The unit of analysis was the news item. A news item was understood as the group of continuous verbal and visual elements that refer to the same topic. Within Mellado and Humanes 75

Table 1. Operationalization of the Variables.

Reporting Methods (Indicators) Operationalization Balance Presence of different sources and points of view with the same or different weighting (Kα = .73) Verified evidence Hard facts and verifiable data; information that can be verified by a third party and that does not correspond to either the journalists’ or the sources’ subjective thoughts, feelings, or opinions (Kα = .81) Quotes Inclusion of any statement given by a source that is transferred literally in the news article, whose main punctuation characteristic is quotation marks (Kα = .82) Hard-facts–first The news item starts with factual information based on the structure five Ws (Kα = .84) Argumentation Use of reasoning or logic within the news item to prove or show a proposal, or to provide a convincing argument about what the journalist states or denies, without immediate empirical basis (Kα = .75) Conditional form The journalist uses verbs in the conditional form (e.g., It could be . . .; Kα = .78) Partisanship Absence of formal separation between facts and opinions (Kα = .77)

each selected sample, all stories dealing with national politics were considered. In total, 3,624 news items were coded. The elite press accounts for 72 percent of the news that form a part of this study, and the popular (tabloid) press for only 28 percent. This imbal- ance is because the Chilean popular press contains fewer news items per issue. Ten independent coders were trained in the application of a common codebook. Different coder-trainer tests were performed to ensure that they had a similar understanding of the codebook. After the coding was finished, a new coding on a randomly selected 10 percent of the total sample was carried out to determine intercoder reliability. Based on Krippendorf’s alpha formula, the overall intercoder reliability was .78 (see the intercoder reliability of each indicator in Table 1).

Measures To analyze the different reporting methods used by the Chilean press, we measured seven specific indicators: balance, verified evidence, quotes, hard-facts–first structure, argumentation, conditional form, and partisanship. The operational definition of each indicator was inspired by previous research on the use of objective and more analytical reporting methods (Esser and Umbricht 2013; Tuchman 1972; Ward 1999). Albeit at the expense of more valid measures, each indicator was coded on a presence/absence basis to increase intercoder reliability. For each of these indicators, we coded for manifest rather than latent-meaning content (see the 76 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) operationalization of the variables in Table 1). Each news story was also coded for newspaper type (elite or popular).

Data Analysis To find out whether the different strategies used by journalists to justify the truth of their assertions could be reduced to specific reporting dimensions, we carried out several preliminary analyses. As a first step, we performed different exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) using Mplus 7.0.1 We expected that these seven indicators would form a two-dimensional structure, so that we could then transform our data into two indices of reporting methods: one associated with objective reporting and the other associated with more analytical methods. We first conducted an EFA by using all of our data, and we found that the two-factor solution best described the data with a sat- isfactory model fit.2 However, when we calculated this EFA by each year separately, the picture changed. In fact, in some years, the configuration of the dimensions was different. For example, in 1990 and in 1995, balance was part of a more analytical approach, while the result changed from 2000. At the same time, the loading of indicators in each factor was quite different throughout the years. The premise of validity in cross-longitudinal research requires that test scores from different years should measure the same construct by the same metric. In other words, score comparison requires construct comparability. Only under such circumstances can score differences from different years be a true representation of the discrepancies and the task of explaining variation by group be meaningful (Wu et al. 2007). Of course, news stories do not necessarily contain just one of the indicators; they may contain several of these variables at the same time because they overlap in practice. However, as we found that the comparability of dimensions of objective/analytical reporting methods over the years was technically incorrect due to the problem of measurement invariance, we focused on the analysis of each of the seven indicators separately, rather than analyzing the degree of objectivity of each story. In this regard, a possible scale could neutralize the different interpretations of each indicator over the years, bearing in mind the recent history of Chile. To test the evolution over time of the presence of each of the objective and analytical indicators considered by this study (Research Question 1), we performed bivariate analysis by using crosstab tables and an analysis of the adjusted standardized residuals. The same analyses were performed for Research Question 2, on the differences in the use of the objective and analytical methods by the elite and the popular political press.

Findings Presence of Objective versus Analytical Reporting Methods Regarding our first research question, which deals with how objective and analytical reporting changed in the coverage of Chilean politics between 1990 and 2010, we found that, overall, the use of objective reporting strategies was predominant in Mellado and Humanes 77 political news. Nevertheless, not all indicators typical of objective reporting showed the same behavioral pattern over time. First, the data showed that balance was not a dominant characteristic in the Chilean political press. Nevertheless, the value and sign of the residuals showed an unsurpris- ing systematic increase (from 13.2 to 39.3 percent) in its presence (see Table 2). The low score for balance in 1990 and 1995 may be explained by a relatively grad- ual transition toward democracy in those years. This increase might be explained by the fact that a journalist has the possibility to expose different points of view, especially after being forced to ignore opposition voices during the dictatorship. Regarding verified evidence, the data showed that six out of every ten news items included more nonverified evidence than verified evidence, a characteristic that remained stable between 1990 and 2010. The use of quotes, however, was prominent. Nevertheless, the residual analysis showed a systematic decrease in the use of quotes in the coverage of politics. In this sense, the data supported the tendency toward a decrease in the presence of direct speech from politicians in the press, as has been analyzed in studies in other national contexts (Bucy and Grabe 2007; Esser 2008). A similar situation was found in the use of the hard-facts–first structure. The data showed that out of ten political news items, nine used a hard-facts–first structure, although that figure significantly decreased over the years, especially between 2005 and 2010. These data could be related to the fact that readers did not need to wait for the print newspaper to arrive to find out the hard facts, which they were able to access by means of online media. The traditional press therefore had to re-engage the audience by delivering more opinions and interpretations of reality. However, analytical reporting in political coverage significantly increased after the end of the dictatorship, although its presence was much lower than that of strategies traditionally associated with objective journalism methods. Specifically, the data showed that although the conditional form is not the most common reporting method used by political journalists in their writing of news stories, its presence tended to increase over the years. This increase is associated with journalists aiming to introduce their own hypotheses on particular events, or on the intentions of political actors. We found that the use of arguments was rare in the Chilean political press. Nevertheless, the data showed a significant increase (from 1.6 to 8.7 percent) in the presence of argumentation in the coverage of Chilean politics. The data also showed a very similar picture in the case of the presence of partisanship in the news. Although mostly absent, we observed a significant increase in its presence, which might be product of the evident parallelism between the Chilean press and economic and political powers (Mellado and Humanes 2012). As Hallin and Mancini (2004) point out, higher levels of political parallelism correspond to a more instrumentalized and partisan model of journalism.

Difference between the Elite and the Popular Press Our second research question asks whether there are significant differences in the use of the objective compared with the analytical reporting method between the popular 78 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Table 2. Evolution of Objective and Analytical Reporting in Chilean Political News Coverage between 1990 and 2010 (Percentage and Adjusted Standardized Residuals).

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Objective methods Balance (χ2 = 168.4; p ≤ .001) 12.1 17.8. 30.6 34.0 39.3 − 10.0 − 4.4 5.8 5.9 6.4 Verified evidence (χ2 = 28.5; 41.1 49.5 48.9 40.8 41.4 p ≤ .001) −2.5 2.7 2.4 − 2.5 − 2.1 Quotes (χ2 = 45.5; p ≤ .001) 73.0 67.4 67.9 65.4 64.3 2.8 −1.6 −1.3 −2.8 −2.9 Hard-facts–first structure 94.0 93.8 93.3 87.4 74.2 (χ2 = 133.3; p ≤ 0.001) 3.8 3.0 2.6 −4.6 −15.3 Analytical methods Argumentation (χ2 = 43.4; 1.6 2.6 5.6 4.6 8.7 p ≤ .001) − 6.3 −6.1 2.2 −1.9 3.5 Conditional form (χ2 = 81.1; 11.2 12.2 20.2 24.2 21.4 p ≤ .001) −5.8 −4.4 3.0 6.2 3.1 Partisanship (χ2 = 55.9; 6.6 5.6 8.2 12.6 13.0 p ≤ .001) −3.0 −3.8 − 1.6 4.0 4.2

Note. Values for statistical tests of association are set in parentheses. and the elite political press in Chile. Overall, the difference in their use does not show a clear pattern. In terms of the use of objective methods, the trend in the analyzed time period was generally similar for both types of press. Specifically, regarding the presence of balance in political news, the data showed significant differences between the popular and the elite press in some points of the two analyzed decades (see Table 3). The popular press included less balance in their news stories published in 1995, 2000, and 2010. As for verified evidence, we only found significant differences between the popular and the elite press in 1995, with the former including more verified evidence in their news stories. Concerning the other two indicators (hard-facts–first structure and quotes), no significant differences between the two types of press could be found. However, the data showed that while some strategies associated with analytical reporting were more present over time in the popular press, others were more present in the elite press. The use of argumentation, which was characteristic of the elite press until 2005, was similar for both types of press by the end of the period. The greatest differences, particularly in the latter years, were found in the use of the conditional form and partisanship. The increase in the presence of partisanship was greater in the case of the popular press for the entire analyzed period. The data also showed that the presence of the conditional form tended to be used by the elite press much more than by the popular press. Mellado and Humanes 79

Table 3. Objective and Analytical Reporting in the Popular and Elite Political Press between 1990 and 2010 (Percentage and Adjusted Standardized Residuals).

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Elite Press Popular Press Objective methods Balance (χ2 = 27.1; 11.5 24.7 33.1 30.7 34.4 13.8 10.5 25.0 34.3 32.1 p ≤ .001) −10.5 −0.6 4.8 3.0 4.7 −2.0 −4.7 3.6 3.7 3.6 Verified evidence 40.5 43.9 48.7 40.2 40.5 42.9 55.6 49.3 46.3 46.4 (χ2 = 5.8; n.s.) −1.3 0.0 2.8 −2.0 −1.6 −2.4 3.1 −0.1 −0.5 −0.6 Quotes (χ2 = 11.2; 70.4 72.9 70.2 64.2 71.1 80.7 61.5 62.5 82.1 84.5 p ≤ .05) 0.5 1.6 0.4 −3.1 0.8 5.0 −4.7 −3.1 2.2 3.0 Hard-facts–first 93.9 91.4 94.7 94.2 73.5 94.5 96.3 90.2 95.5 78.6 structure 3.7 0.5 3.8 3.2 −14.3 1.2 3.9 −1.4 1.0 −4.8 (χ2 = 2.6; n.s.) Analytical methods Argumentation 3.5 2.5 17.1 5.1 8.6 1.2 0.7 12.3 0.0 2.4 (χ2 = 17.3; p ≤ .05) −4.8 −4.2 10.7 −2.3 1.3 −2.9 −3.9 8.8 −1.6 −0.6 Conditional form 10.4 15.8 28.2 21.8 21.6 13.8 8.3 14.9 17.9 10.7 (χ2 = 29.9; p ≤ −7.1 −1.9 6.5 1.8 1.5 1.0 −3.2 1.4 1.4 −0.5 .001) Partisanship (χ2 = 6.0 4.8 14.4 12.6 7.4 8.3 6.6 8.0 16.4 13.1 38; p ≤ .05) −3.5 −3.5 5.2 3.3 −1.4 0.0 −1.6 −0.3 2.4 1.6

Note. Values for statistical tests of association are set in parentheses.

Discussion This study analyzed the changes in the use of different reporting methods in political coverage by the Chilean press between 1990 and 2010. Specifically, it addressed whether the way in which political journalists have legitimized their independence from the political system is closer to the classical definition of objectivity or if, in contrast, Chilean journalism has incorporated more analytical reporting in their practice. Traditionally, objectivity as a method has been considered to be a way of legitimiz- ing the work of journalists when faced with the political system, their superiors in the media organization, and the audience. The use of objective methods of reporting is associated with professional journalism, or good journalism, as opposed to other reporting styles far from the standard of objectivity, and thus far from the other criteria of professionalism, too. This way of distinguishing professional from amateur journalism is typical of the American journalistic model and, at least at the normative level, it has been assimilated into other contexts. However, various authors have questioned its adoption in other journalistic contexts that are distant from the liberal model without reinterpreting it and adapting it to the circumstances of each country. Moreover, 80 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) various scholars have asserted that objectivity is neither the only nor the best way in which to report on reality and have suggested that journalistic truth can be demonstrated by means of other strategies (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2007). The results of our analysis showed that in the Chilean case, the use of reporting methods closer to the classical definition of objectivity was generally more common than analytical reporting. Verified evidence, quotes, and a hard-facts–first structure were predominant, while balance was not a dominant characteristic of the Chilean political press. Nevertheless, while verified evidence and quotes tended to decrease, balance increased over time. Differences and changes in the presence of different indicators of objective reporting showed specific patterns in the use of reporting methods in a Latin American context. The use of quotes, verified evidence, and a hard-facts–first structure was com- patible with the type of journalism controlled by the political system during the dictatorship (hence its greater presence in the early years of democracy), raising the question of whether objective techniques may actually work as part of a system of press control, or the depoliticization of the press. In turn, the idea of balance was the most difficult resource of objective reporting to incorporate into the context of a dictatorial regime, especially in political coverage. Consequently, it is logical to find that the objective method incorporated a greater use of balance to earn trust and legitimization among readers in the democratic system, especially after the early years of the transition. Second, after the end of the dictatorship, the presence of analytical reporting significantly increased in political coverage. Out of the three indicators found in the literature to measure analytical reporting methods, the most frequently present one was the use of the conditional form. In addition, the greater absence of formal separation between fact and opinion during the latter years of the analysis confirmed the overall tendency toward a more partisan form of journalism in the Chilean case. The interest in analyzing the Chilean case focused on whether changes in the media system affected the decision of political journalism to use one reporting strategy over the other. The data suggested that balance and partisanship were primarily affected. The fact that balance was the least common objective method indicator (though it did increase the most in the analyzed period) and that partisanship increased appear to be the result of a media system with strong commercialization and ownership concentration along with a high level of parallelism between the political, economic, and media systems. The results of this work showed that Chilean political journalists began to get closer to more analytical reporting and that the objective method was increasingly supported by the balanced presence of different points of view in the news. However, it is still necessary, by means of future research, to determine how Chilean journalists interpret the use of each reporting method in daily journalistic practice. The distinction between professional orientation, which is characterized by a work logic based on interests that are exclusively journalistic in nature, and a sacerdotal orientation, which adapts news production methods to the interests of the political system (Mazzoleni 2010), could be useful to explain the implications of sustaining the coverage of political reality by one reporting method or another. Given the characteristics of the Chilean media system, Mellado and Humanes 81 both methods can be considered to be a strategy for acting politically and representing other reference groups. This study also sought to analyze whether there were any significant differences in the use of reporting methods in both the elite and the popular press in Chile in the past two decades. The difference between the two types of press did not show a clear pattern. Regarding the use of objective reporting, significant differences were found only for balance and verified evidence for some of the analyzed years. For example, the presence of balance was more apparent in the elite press in 1995, 2000, and 2010 and, conversely, the use of verified evidence was more present in the popular press in 1995. Therefore, the results do not enable us to conclude that media orientation is a determining factor for the case of Chilean political journalism in the use of objective methods. As for the use of more analytical methods, the greatest differences between the elite and the popular press are related to the presence of partisanship and the use of the conditional form. While partisanship was more common in the popular press, the use of the conditional form was more frequent in the elite press. Some limitations to this study need to be highlighted. First, the analysis is limited to just print newspapers, and the conclusions drawn herein are not generalizable to all political news coverage in Chile. Therefore, future studies should corroborate whether the differences in the use of objective compared with analytical reporting over time are equally large in broadcast and online political news. Second, as we measured the presence/absence of objective and analytical reporting when reporting on politics by using a dichotomous scale, further studies should be able to gauge an overall degree of objective/analytical strategies in the news to obtain more precise interpretations. Third, as a mono-cultural study, the sample only includes one country. In this sense, future studies in other Latin American contexts should replicate the analysis to see whether the changes and patterns in political reporting styles have evolved in the same way in countries with similar democratic traditions. Indeed, the methodological design proposed by this study is an interesting starting point that can be applied to other nonwestern countries or countries undergoing a political transition process to test the thesis of the adoption (or lack thereof) of the objective method and its manifestation in news reporting. Moreover, future cross-national studies need to be performed to analyze how different economic, political, organizational, and professional factors explain differences in the use of different reporting methods in political journalism.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Research for this study received funding from Fondecyt (Chile) (Grant 1110009). 82 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Notes 1. Considering the dichotomous scale on which our individual indicators were measured, the data were analyzed by using WLSM as the estimation method. We also used Geomin as an oblique rotation method. 2. χ2/df = 2.07; root mean square error of approximation = 0.016 (90 percent CI [0.004, 0.027]); comparative fit index = 0.995, Tucker–Lewis index = 0.987; standardized root mean square residual = 0.024.

References Benson, Randy. 2006. “News Media as a ‘Journalistic Field’: What Bourdieu Adds to New Institutionalism, and Vice Versa.” Political Communication 23 (2): 187–202. Brants, Kees. 1998. “Who’s Afraid of Infotainment?” European Journal of Communication 13 (3): 315–35. Bresnahan, Rosalind. 2003. “The Media and the Neoliberal Transition in Chile: Democratic Promise Unfulfilled.” Latin American Perspectives, 30 (6): 39–68. Bucy, Eric, and María Elizabeth Grabe. 2007. “Taking Television Seriously: A Sound and Image Bite Analysis of Presidential Campaign Coverage, 1992–2004.” Journal of Communication 57 (4): 652–75. De Alburquerque, Alfonso. 2012. “On Models and Margins: Comparative Media Models Viewed from a Brazilian Perspective.” In Comparing Media Systems beyond the Western World, ed. Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini, 72–95. New York: Cambridge University Press. Deuze, Mark. 2005. “Popular Journalism and Professional Ideology: Tabloid Reporters and Editors Speak Out.” Media, Culture and Society 27(6): 861–82. Donsbach, Wolfgang, and Bettina Klett. 1993. “Subjective Objectivity. How Journalists in Four Countries Define a Key Term of Their Profession.” International Communication Gazette 51 (1): 53–83. Donsbach, Wolfgang, and Thomas Patterson. 2004. “Political News Journalists.” In Comparing Political Communication: Theories, Cases, and Challenges, ed. Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch, 251–270. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Esser, Frank. 2008. “Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13 (4): 401–28. Esser, Frank, and Andrea Umbricht. 2013. “Competing Models of Journalism? Political Affairs Coverage in US, British, German, Swiss, French and Italian Newspapers.” Journalism 14 (8): 989–1007. Fico, Frederick, Eric Freedman, and Brad Love. 2006. “Partisan and Structural Balance in Newspaper Coverage of US Senate Races in 2004 with Female Nominees.” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 83 (1): 43–57. Fox, Elizabeth, and Silvio Waisbord, eds. 2002. Latin Politics, Global Media. Austin: University of Texas Press. Glasser, Theodore. 1983. Objectivity and the Ideology of News. Washington, DC: Distributed by ERIC Clearinghouse. Hallin, Daniel. 1985. “The American News Media: A Critical Theory Perspective.” In Critical Theory and Public Life, ed. John Forester, 121–46. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hallin, Daniel, and Paolo Mancini. 2004. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mellado and Humanes 83

Kaplan, Richard. 2006. “The News about New Institutionalism: Journalism’s Ethic of Objectivity and Its Political Origins.” Political Communication 23 (2): 173–85. Kovach, Bill, and Tom Rosenstiel. 2007. The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know and the Public Should Expect. New York: Random House. Lippmann, Walter. 1922. Public Opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Márquez, Mireya. 2012. “Valores Normativos y Prácticas de Reporteo en Tensión: Percepciones Profesionales de Periodistas en México” (Normative Values and Reporting Practices in Tension: Professional Perceptions of Journalists in Mexico). Cuadernos de Información 30: 97–110. Mazzoleni, Gianpietro. 2010. La Comunicación Política (Political Communication). Madrid: Alianza. McNair, Brian. 2000. Journalism and Democracy – An Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere. London: Routledge. Mellado, Claudia. 2014. “Professional Roles in News Content. Six Dimensions of Journalistic Role Performance.” Journalism Studies. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/146 1670X.2014.922276#.U7MEyXMc_NU. Mellado, Claudia, and María Luisa Humanes. 2012. “Modeling Perceived Professional Autonomy in Chilean Journalism.” Journalism 13 (8): 985–1003. Mellado, Claudia, Sonia Moreira, Claudia Lagos, and María Elena Hernández. 2012. “Comparing Journalism Cultures in Latin America the case of Chile, Brazil and Mexico.” International Communication Gazette 74 (1): 60–77. Mindich, David. 1998. Just the Facts: How Objectivity Came to Define American Journalism. New York: New York University Press. Muñoz-Torres, Juan Ramón. 2012. “Truth and Objectivity in Journalism: Anatomy of an Endless Misunderstanding.” Journalism Studies 13 (4): 566–82. Navia, Patricio. 2010. “Living in Actually Existing Democracies: Democracy to the Extent Possible in Chile.” Latin American Research Review 45 (4): 298–328. Patterson, Thomas. 2000. “The United States: News in a Free Market Society.” In Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan, 241–65. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pellegrini, Silvia, and Constanza Mujica. 2006. “Valor Agregado Periodístico (VAP): La Calidad Periodística Como un Factor Productivo en un Entorno Medial Complejo.” (Journalistic Value Added: Journalistic quality as a productive factor in a complex media environment) Palabra Clave 9 (1): 11–28. Schiller, Dan. 1979. “An Historical Approach to Objectivity and Professionalism in American News Reporting.” Journal of Communication 29 (4): 46–57. Schudson, Michael. 1978. Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers. New York: Basic Books. Schudson, Michael. 2001. “The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism.” Journalism 2 (2): 149–70. Skovsgaard, Morten, Erick Albæk, Peter Bro, and Claes de Vreese. 2012. “A Reality Check: How Journalists’ Role Perceptions Impact Their Implementation of the Objectivity Norm.” Journalism 14 (1): 22–42. Sunkel, Guillermo. 2001. “Modos de leer en sectores populares: Un caso de recepción.” (Manners of reading in popular sectors: a reception case) Nueva Sociedad 175: 143–54. Tuchman, Gaye. 1972. “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity.” American Journal of Sociology 77 (4): 660–79. 84 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Umbricht, Andrea, and Frank Esser. 2014. “Changing Political News? Long-Term Trends in American, British, French, Italian, German and Swiss Press Reporting.” In Political Journalism in Transition: Western Europe in a Comparative Perspective, 195–218 ed. Raymond Kuhn and Rasmus Nielsen Kleis. London: IB Tauris. Valenzuela, Sebastián, and Arturo Arriagada. 2011. “Politics without Citizens? Public Opinion, Television News, the President, and Real-World Factors in Chile, 2000-2005.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 16 (3): 357–81. Waisbord, Silvio. 2000. Watchdog Journalism in South America: News, Accountability and Democracy. New York: Columbia University Press. Waisbord, Silvio. 2006. “In Journalism We Trust? Credibility and Fragmented Journalism in Latin America.” In Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies, 64–77 ed. Katrin Voltmer. London: Routledge. Ward, Stephen. 1999. Pragmatic News Objectivity: Objectivity with a Human Face. Cambridge, MA: Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Wu, Amery, Li Zhen, and Bruno Zumbo. 2007. “Decoding the Meaning of Factorial Invariance and Updating the Practice of Multi-group Confirmatory Factor Analysis: A Demonstration with TIMSS Data.” Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation 12 (3): 1–26. Zelizer, Barbie. 1993. “Journalists as Interpretive Communities.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 10 (3): 219–37.

Author Biographies Claudia Mellado is an associate professor in the School of Journalism at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, Chile. Her research focuses on the study of journalism cultures, journalistic performance, and comparative Studies. She has led and collaborated in important journalism research projects at national and international levels, such as Journalistic Role Performance around the Globe Project, Journalism Students across the Globe, Worlds of Journalism, and Global Report on the Status of Women in the News Media. María Luisa Humanes is an associate professor in the Department of Communication II at Rey Juan Carlos University, Spain. Her research focuses on the study of political news and journalistic cultures HIJXXX10.1177/1940161214558748The International Journal of Press/PoliticsMeltzer 558748research-article2014

Research Article

The International Journal of Press/Politics 2015, Vol. 20(1) 85–107 Journalistic Concern about © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: Uncivil Political Talk in Digital sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161214558748 News Media: Responsibility, ijpp.sagepub.com Credibility, and Academic Influence

Kimberly Meltzer1

Abstract Many academics, politicians, and journalists have spoken and written about civility in public discourse and what they think should be done about it. This article investigates what journalists perceive as the forces affecting uncivil, opinionated commentary in news, what their perceptions are of the effects of this shift on audiences and political culture, and how journalists think uncivil political talk affects journalists’ roles and authority in society. This is accomplished through a qualitative textual analysis of intramedia discussion on journalism organizations’ Web sites, journalism blogs, and news Web sites from the past decade. The analysis revealed that most, but not all, of the journalistic writing examined about civility and incivility expressed concern for incivility, a need for improvement, and a belief that journalists or their organizations are responsible for keeping things civil on their own sites. Analysis of journalists’ articles also revealed interest in academic research about civility, and some of the many ways journalists are dealing with incivility online are based on academic research. The study’s findings provide evidence of journalists’ perceptions of civility in digital news, which inform the arguments put forth by advocates for interventions to improve the quality of public political discourse.

Keywords civil discourse, political talk, online news, digital journalism, civility

1Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA Corresponding Author: Kimberly Meltzer, Communication, Culture & Technology, Georgetown University, 3520 Prospect Street NW, Suite 311, Washington, DC 20057, USA. Email: [email protected] 86 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

As American journalism continues to evolve in conjunction with changes in the technological, political, and cultural environment, research confirms that unpackaged, unproduced “talk” in news and opinionated journalism are growing (Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism 2013). Some of that talk has been called uncivil. In a recent nationally representative survey (Weber Shandwick and KRC Research 2013), the government was considered the most uncivil aspect of American life (69 percent) followed by the American public (63 percent) and the media (63 percent).1 Fifty-nine percent of respondents said online news article comments are uncivil, and 47 percent said blogs are uncivil. Fifty-nine percent of respondents cited the Internet and social media as one of the leading causes of incivility. The concern about civility in public discourse, including media discourse, is not new. There are contemporary examples that date back to the 1990s and earlier (Tannen 1998). Some would argue that incivility in public discourse, and the concern about it, has always been around (Herbst 2010; Papacharissi 2004). They trace incivility in politics and media back to the founding of the country and the first presses (Daniel, in Boylan 2009). But uncivil speech today has more outlets, can be highly public, and travels and spreads faster; its impact can be greater, and strategies for dealing with it are still being tested. This latest reincarnation of the concern about civility in news and politics has particular characteristics and is shaped by several key events. These events include the gridlock in federal government amid an economic recession, which led to a government shutdown in October 2013 due to an inability to pass a new budget (Associated Press 2013); the inflammatory rhetoric surrounding the Affordable Care Act; the rhetoric of public figures, including Rush Limbaugh’s verbal attack on Georgetown law student Sandra Fluke for her Congressional testimony on access to contraception (Farhi 2012); Martin Bashir’s resignation from MSNBC after making “coarse” and “graphic” remarks about Sarah Palin in 2013 (Bauder 2013; Collins 2013); and finally, incivility in online reader comments on news sites and elsewhere. Another key event—the shootings of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and fourteen other people in Tucson, Arizona—prompted the founding of civility initiatives across the country.2 President Obama called for civility (Cooper and Zeleny 2011), and there were attempts to revive the Congressional Civility Caucus (Cohn 2012). This study contributes to the growing body of scholarship about what the people working in journalism think about the increase in opinionated, sometimes uncivil, political commentary in digital news media. It analyzes what a group of journalists— primarily those who participate in professional and trade venues—have written about uncivil commentary online, what their perceptions are of the effects of this shift on audiences and political culture, and how journalists think uncivil political talk affects journalists’ roles and authority in society.

Definitions of Civility Civility and incivility have many definitions that have been laid out over centuries (Herbst 2010). Some of the most striking ones include “a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should Meltzer 87 reasonably be made” (Rawls 1993: 217 in Ben-Porath 2007) and “an agreement on how to disagree and the exercise of self-control” (Peck 1996, in Ben-Porath 2007). The list of uncivil characteristics is long: name calling; lack of respect (Brooks and Geer 2007); “aspersion, hyperbole pejorative words, vulgarity and non-cooperation” (Jamieson and Falk 1998, in Ben-Porath 2007); “character attacks, competence attacks, insults, maledictions, teasing and ridicule” (Infante and Wigley 1986, in Ben-Porath 2007). Evident in these works is a spectrum of aggressiveness measures, ranging from probing to confrontational, adversarial, attacking, and uncivil. Sobieraj and Berry (2011) differentiate between “incivility” and “outrage,” writing that “outrage is incivility writ large.” Whereas incivility involves “gratuitous asides that show a lack of respect and/or frustration with the opposition” (Mutz and Reeves 2005, in Sobieraj and Berry 2011), outrage is the term they give to “more dramatic types of political incivility.” But Papacharissi (2004) asserted that it is important to differentiate between mere rudeness and incivility. Heated discussions, she argues, may be central to democratic discourse. According to Papacharissi (2004: 267), incivility “can then be opera- tionalized as the set of behaviors that threaten democracy,” and only when a behavior affects the common good, rather than isolated individuals, such as when a social group is attacked, should it be termed uncivil. Recent work by Stryker et al. (2014) and Muddiman (2014a, 2014b) has made progress in identifying specific dimensions of speech and behavior that lead people to characterize political discussion as uncivil. These include “insulting utterances, deception, and behaviors tending to shut down or detract from inclusive ongoing deliberation” (Stryker et al. 2014). They also found that different groups of people have different levels of tolerance for political incivility. Muddiman (2014a: 1) found that younger people are more accepting of incivility than others, and partisans are more accepting of uncivil behaviors when they originate from their own party. What these definitions of civility and incivility make clear is that there is a fine line between opinion, disagreement, and incivility. Although they are often related concepts, there is an important distinction between opinion and civility (Meltzer and Hoover 2014). Throughout the history of American journalism, expressions of opinion have been accepted by the journalistic community when they are designated as such. Prior to the late 1940s, the American press operated as a partisan press system (Pickard 2010). Even during the objective age of journalism, editorials, opinion columns, and the new or literary journalism and advocacy journalism movements (Pauly 1990) all involved the journalists’ opinions and perspectives in stories. What’s at issue in this study is not the mere expression of opinion, but journalists’ thoughts about when the expression becomes uncivil.

Research about Civility, Politics, and Journalism Many scholars of deliberative democracy “presume either explicitly or implicitly that civility is required for genuine, successful deliberation” (Stryker et al. 2014). Research finds that the civil delivery of opposing political views is more likely to lead audience members to consider the rationale for the opposing views legitimate (Mutz 2007), and 88 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) the civility of online discussants affected readers’ perceptions of source credibility and dominance (Ng and Detenber 2005). Uncivil political discourse adversely affects people’s trust in government (Mutz and Reeves 2005). While Papacharissi (2004) found that most messages posted on political newsgroups were civil, Coe et al. (2014) found that incivility in newspaper Web site comments occurs frequently and that frequent commenters are more civil than infrequent ones. Vraga et al. (2012: 5) found that journalists acting as neutral moderators of political discussion, versus as “comic” hosts or “combatant” hosts, increase perceptions of informational value, enhance host and program credibility, and reduce erosion of media trust. Feldman (2011), however, found that people can learn as much from opinionated news as from traditional, objective news. Anderson et al. (2014) found that exposure to uncivil blog comments can polarize user perceptions of the issue covered in the news article, and Santana (2014) found that anonymous comments are more likely to be uncivil than nonanonymous comments. Journalists and audiences have been found to have different ideas of what consti- tutes being uncivil. For example, Ben-Porath (2007) found a disconnect between journalists’ justification of overly aggressive—or uncivil—interviewing techniques as exemplifying their democratic watchdog role and the audience’s perception of these techniques as distasteful, leading to less regard for and trust of particular journalists and the institution in general. Reader (2012) found that “journalists and audiences” have very different conceptualizations about “civility and the role of anonymity in civil discourse” in online comment forums. Other researchers have investigated journalists’ views about online comment forums in particular. Meyer and Carey (2014) found that journalists’ views of their papers’ community comment forums were at odds with those of participants in those forums. While participants were more likely to post if they noticed moderation by journalists, the journalists were more likely to view their audience negatively when more comments were posted. Nielsen (2014) found that “journalistic norms and con- ceptions of expertise prevent journalists from engaging with readers” in using online reader comments to shape their news content. Loke (2012, as cited in Stroud 2013, also see specific report on “Journalist Involvement in Comment Sections”) and Diakopoulos and Naaman (2011, as cited in Stroud 2013) found that journalists expressed concern that uncivil online reader comments could harm their brand, reputation, and ability to get information from sources in the future. This seems particularly salient in light of data which show a further decline in credibility ratings for most news organizations (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2012). McElroy (2013) bridges the divide between newer online comment forums and letters to the editor in her examination of the process by which newspaper editors selected online comments from readers for publication in the printed version of the paper. McElroy found that editors allowed for anonymity of commenters and a “wider rhetorical range” than traditional letters to the editor, but editors altered online comments that were selected for publication in the printed newspaper to meet the more traditional standards and style of letters to the editor. Older research found that editors were reluctant to reject letters that contributed to public debate even if they violated the principle of civility (Wahl-Jorgensen 2004: 102). Meltzer 89

Most of these findings lead to an argument for more civil discourse in news commentary. There are, however, scholars and others who justify incivility and argue its merits. Bennett (2011) explains that incivility may be necessary at times: “When the other side declares those differences to be irreconcilable, civility becomes a losing strategy. Indeed, when facing stark absolutism, civility seems to entirely miss the point” (p. 1) . . . “Incivility is a winning strategy for an underdog determined to defend fundamental principles and win the political game at any cost” (p. 3) . . . “A public that is largely turned off to politics is hard to reach with logic and reason . . . it is not news to observe that the media feed on spectacle” (p. 5). Herbst (2010) suggests incivility may be viewed as but one rhetorical strategy among many that a speaker or author may choose to advance his cause, rather than a state of society (p. 133). Other observers have also noticed that the discussion of civility in political discourse has been robust in recent years. Roy Peter Clark (2007), Senior Scholar and Vice President at the Poynter Institute, observed that people who discuss civility do so in particular ways. Clark cataloged the five “frames of incivility” that are employed by those who talk about it: (1) The Freedom Frame: valuing freedom of expression, adherents to this frame assert that civility can be, and has been, used to oppress by censoring speech and ideas; (2) The Responsibility Frame: values responsibility over unfettered free speech; (3) The Business Frame: values profitabil- ity for news sites above all else. Legal and financial reasons limit the ability of news organizations to police comments, although some controls are needed; (4) The Journalism Frame: concerned with values in the practice of journalism and their sur- vival in the digital age, civil discourse should be “encouraged and enforced” online; (5) The Self-Policing Frame: believes in the power of self-policing online communities to shape the valuable practices of journalism online and democratize the process. In the research for this study, we found that Clark’s categorization of civility frames is consistent with several of the themes we also detected. Although we did not perform our analysis through this particular lens, we do map our findings onto Clark’s frames when appropriate. While a growing body of research focuses on the effects of incivility on audiences and their participation, and another burgeoning body of research looks at journalists’ views and actions specifically in regard to audience feedback, this study aimed to provide a broader picture of what a group of journalists—namely those who have written about civility in media discourse in professional journalism venues—have expressed about the increase in opinion and incivility in news media. In pursuing this goal, our study sought to address the following research questions:

Research Question 1: What is the perspective of journalists who have written in professional journalism venues about civility, the increase in opinion and commentary online? Research Question 2: What are their perceptions of the effects of this shift on audiences and political culture? Research Question 3: How do these journalists think uncivil political talk affects journalists’ roles and authority in society? 90 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Theoretical Framework This study examines intramedia discussion—the discussion among and between journalists. We employ the theoretical framework of viewing journalists as interpretive communities (Zelizer 1993). This conceptualization describes communities of journalists who discursively articulate, negotiate, and maintain the norms, values, and boundaries of their craft. Through the written and oral discourse of journalists in both public and intrajournalism venues, they maintain their collective autonomy and authority through self-evaluation, adaptation, and self-control against changing external circumstances. Other work on the news media’s self-criticism is discussed as “self- reflexive news media reporting” (Bishop 2001: 23; Haas 2006: 351), “journalistic metacoverage” (Haas 2006: 352), or “boundary work” and “self-coverage” (Bishop 1999, 2001). Bishop (2001: 23) suggests that journalistic self-examination is a kind of ritual sacrifice, performed in the hope that it persuades the audience to regain its faith in journalism and to sustain ratings and readership. This supports Zelizer’s (1997: 17) contention that journalistic self-reflection is also designed to deflect potential external criticism and distrust.

Method According to the interpretive community framework, journalists articulate, negotiate, and maintain the norms, values, and boundaries of their craft through public discourse in popular and trade venues. This is why we looked to these venues for evidence of journalists’ thoughts. We performed qualitative textual analysis on the materials in which journalists discussed their thoughts about civility and opinion in media discourse. This analysis employed a grounded theory approach to identify themes present in the articles and blog entries written by journalists across these sites (Lindlof and Taylor 2011: 250–52; Glaser and Strauss 1967, as discussed in Holton 2008). We searched the Web sites of journalism organizations, journalism blogs, and online news Web sites to see what journalists have said about civility and incivility and how they’re dealing with it. The Web sites searched were those of the American Journalism Review (AJR), Columbia Journalism Review (CJR), Nieman Journalism Lab, Poynter.org (The Poynter Institute’s Web site), Google Blog searches, Google News searches, and regular Google searches for the following search terms: “civility,” “civility in news,” “civility in news discourse,” “civility AND news,” “civility AND media,” “media news AND opinionated journalism,” “media news AND opinion news.” EBSCO was also searched to retrieve results from AJR and CJR, but those searches returned very few results. The search dates for Google News spanned a ten-year period between February 2004 and March 2014. The searches of the organizational Web sites set no date limits and considered all articles that were returned. The oldest articles returned from the organizational sites were from the early nineties. The decision to include items older than ten years was made to show that journalistic conversation about opinion and civility stretches farther back. We considered all items returned in searches of the AJR, CJR, Neiman Lab, and Poynter sites, through Google News searches using Meltzer 91 the terms “civility in news discourse,” and through Google blogs. The regular Google search for “civility in news discourse” returned thousands of results, so relevant items were retrieved from links in the first ten pages of Google search results. The two researchers met periodically to discuss the criteria for selecting and saving returned items to the database that was created. Items had to involve a journalist expressing a view about opinion, civility, or news commentary to be saved for analysis. Approximately 230 items were analyzed. Both researchers engaged in open coding (Strauss 1987, in Lindlof and Taylor 2011: 250) in which they read the saved articles and took notes on themes present related to the research questions. The constant comparative method (Lindlof and Taylor 2011: 250) was then used to further develop and refine the themes. When it was agreed that theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967, in Lindlof and Taylor 2011: 252) had been reached, four key themes were identified in the articles. These key themes were then connected to examples from individual articles that illustrated them, which are presented in the following analysis. As the study examined mostly professional/trade venues where journalists and academics are the audience, and where the authors and readers are particularly interested in these sorts of issues, our findings may not be representative of the perspectives of all journalists. In addition, the analysis was of what has been published, and those journalists and media observers mentioned here may hold different views today and into the future.

Analysis Our analysis identified four main themes in journalists’ writing about civility, opinion, and commentary in digital news media, which relate to our three research questions. These themes are

1. Concern, or lack thereof, about uncivil mediated discourse through digital news media. This theme relates to all three research questions. 2. The causes of an increase in opinion and incivility. This theme also relates to R1. 3. Awareness of academic research about opinion and civility in news and reader comments. This theme relates to Research Questions 1, 2, and 3. 4. How journalists are dealing with the increase in opinion and incivility in online political news discourse. This theme relates to Research Questions 1, 2, and 3.

We will describe each of these themes in detail and provide examples.

Theme 1. Concern, or Lack Thereof, about Uncivil Mediated Discourse through Digital News Media Of the articles analyzed in which journalists wrote about civility or incivility, the vast majority indicated a concern with civility and belief that journalists should act to improve the state of things. Several of these articles date back to as early as 1993. In one such article in AJR, the author described and reported on the AJR conference and 92 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) report, “Public Perspectives on the Press” (Cleghorn 1993; Pagano 1993). What is striking about this conference report is that the issues being raised in 1993 were some of the same ones being raised today—participants complaining about incivility of the press. Another 1993 article, “The Right Stuff” (Kaufman 1993), was about the Wall Street Journal Editorial Page and its lack of civility, and again in 2004, journalists were calling politics uncivil (Stranahan 2004). There are also recent examples. In one article, Bob Steele, the Nelson Poynter Scholar for Journalism Values at the Poynter Institute and a former journalist-turned academic, was quoted as saying that,

As media professionals and journalists we certainly have a responsibility for the quality of the content we produce. It is about civics and it’s about the civility of the discourse. I believe respect is a linchpin value in a healthy society. When respect diminishes or disappears, the society corrodes from within. This is also about ethics, of course. We have a responsibility to use wisely the tools we have at our disposal. (Ward 2007)

The Association of Opinion Journalists (Formerly the National Conference of Editorial Writers) launched a Civility Project in 2011, which was then renamed Civilitas, and PBS aired the documentary, “Out of Order: Civility in Politics” in February 2013, which interviewed Bob Schieffer among other journalists, academics, and elected officials (KPBS 2013). These examples illustrate the “responsibility frame” in discussions of civility that has been identified by Clark (2007).

Theme 2: The Causes of an Increase in Opinion and Incivility Journalists whose writing expressed a concern with civility attributed a decline in civility to many different causes. Frank Partsch, the Project Director for the Association of Opinion Journalists’ Civility Project, wrote, “The incivility of the era cannot be realistically discussed without considering the culture of irresponsible anonymity that the Internet not only facilitates but, in some instances, encourages” (Partsch 2011). Others cited online user comments as a source of incivility (Kennedy 2012). In addition to anonymity enabled by the Internet, Partsch also identified campaign rhetoric and the audience’s lack of ability as causes of incivility (Partsch 2011):

NCEW recognizes that more than one factor have conditioned society for the occurrence of incivility in public discourse. One is the simplistic rhetoric of modern campaigning, in which ideological assertion is substituted for appeals based on fact and logic. The adversary is presented as not merely philosophically opposite but morally flawed, its representatives regarded with contempt and its ideas distorted so as to present them in the worst possible light. This situation is abetted by a lamentable lack of analytical ability on the part of some audiences. Politicians sling mud, as has been said, because mud-slinging works . . . The audience must develop the skills to avoid being bamboozled.

Thomas Kunkel, former dean of the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at the University of Maryland and former president of AJR, also blamed “media partisans of every stripe” for having been “enablers in the current plague of public gridlock and Meltzer 93 incivility” (Kunkel 2004). Others also attributed incivility to journalists and the media: “The anger and the hatred and the sniping, that is, the loss of civility in public discourse” all began with James Kilpatrick and Shana Alexander on “60 Minutes.” “Jim and Shana no doubt were just trying to introduce a bit of a spark to involve people in the important subjects of the day. Who knew it would descend to ‘Spark this, you treasonous loser’” (Bluhm 2004). Another AJR article connected civility and incivility to patriotic coverage after 9/11 in that although there was shift toward civility right after 9/11, the sensitivity wasn’t lasting, and humor and political criticism soon went back to their usual levels (Tugend 2002). In a CJR interview by James Marcus (2009) with New Yorker film critic David Denby, who wrote a book in 2009 about “snark” (a close cousin of incivility), Denby attributes snark to journalists’ insecurity about their own future:

Marcus: You write that one of the optimum cultural conditions for snark occurs when “a dying class of the powerful, or would-be powerful, struggles to keep the barbarians from entering the hallowed halls.” Are traditional journalists such an embattled class? Denby: I think so. I just feel this tremendous collective anxiety among established journalists that somehow they’ll be left out. There will be a game of musical chairs and they’re not going to get a chair. So one way of seeming to embrace new media, one way of staying in the game, is to get snippy and sarcastic and snarky. They’re certainly not encouraged to be more analytic, more intelligent.

Theme 1. Concern, or Lack Thereof, about Uncivil Mediated Discourse through Digital News Media Returning to Theme 1, although the majority of the items analyzed for this theme indicated a concern with, and interest in, improving civility, there were some articles (ten) that instead questioned the outcry for and focus on civility. In the CJR article “Giffords Analysis Machine in Overdrive,” the author questioned the connection between the Arizona shootings and political rhetoric that others were so quick to make (Meares 2011). In a Time.com article, another author wrote that civility has been “fetishized” (Liu 2012)3:

Focusing on civility makes us pay disproportionate attention to the part of politics that’s rational. Which is tiny . . . It’s right to want to convert that combative instinct into nonviolent expressions like legislative action. But it’s wrong to imagine that the instinct itself can be legislated out of existence. The Constitution our framers gave us did not ask that we be mild or moderate; it anticipated and channeled our immoderation . . . The danger with pushing for more civility is that it can make politics seem denatured, cut off from why we even have politics . . . a virtue isn’t to have more polite arguments but to have less superficial ones.

Some of these concerns expressed over the rallying around the cause of civility are similar to those put forth by Bennett (2011) and Herbst (2010), and others reflect Clark’s (2007) “freedom frame.” In contrast to a previous AJR article discussed here about 94 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) returning to lower levels of civility after 9/11, in a 2004 CJR article on George Bush titled “A Summer of Lies,” the author wrote that journalists won’t question the government because of a “misplaced notion of civility” stemming from patriotism after 9/11. More broadly, some journalists wrote that the movement toward opinionated commentary in the place of news is a logical and perhaps necessary reaction to threats and impingements on more traditional social responsibility journalism from newer technologies and news venues. While they were not explicitly defending uncivil journalism, several journalists pointed to what they saw as a natural evolution toward opinion news as a strategy for maintaining audiences and the careers of individual journalists. As NPR’s Ira Glass said, “Opinion in all its forms is kicking the ass of journalism” (Glass 2010). Glass explained that “commentary is trouncing fact-based reporting” because of its “casual, approachable style.” “One way the opinion guys kick our ass and appeal to an audience is that they talk like normal people, not like news robots speaking their stentorian news-speak” (Glass in Myers 2011). This assertion is supported by findings from a 2010 Pew study, “Fewer Journalists Stand Out in Fragmented News Universe” (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2010). And in a Poynter article describing the report “Post-Industrial Journalism: Adapting to the Present,” from Columbia’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism, the author wrote that

The wide-ranging essay calls for journalists to change ‘not just tactics, but also self- conception.’ The authors can foresee a world where 90 percent of news reports are written by computer algorithms that convert data into narrative structures and where many newsworthy events are first described by connected citizens rather than journalists. The result: ‘The journalist has not been replaced but displaced, moved higher up the editorial chain from the production of initial observations to a role that emphasizes verification and interpretation . . . a journalist is able to have most effect, by serving as an investigator, a translator, a storyteller. (Sonderman 2012)

The concern about civility in media discourse is not limited to online. Most cases described thus far demonstrate that journalists have expressed concern about regular people (nonjournalists) posting uncivil comments to news articles online. But other cases show concern about public figures and other professional journalists/pundits saying uncivil things on TV, radio, newspapers, and through social media. All the way back in 1994, Reese Cleghorn, former AJR president and former Dean of the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at the University of Maryland, wrote about Paul Duke leaving PBS “Washington Week in Review,” about his civility, and the lack of civility by others on TV (Cleghorn 1994). He was lamenting the state of civility in media twenty years ago:

Amid the strident opinionatedness that often now characterizes journalists’ analysis of public issues, he [Duke] had been a moderator in the best sense of the word: not moderate as in milquetoast, because he sometimes was visibly restraining some private passion . . . but reasoned and mannered. Moderation and restraint are not now hallmarks of journalists’ analysis on television. Opinions tend to be torrid rather than tempered. Meltzer 95

There are also recent cases of journalists expressing concern about civility in television in particular. A 2012 Poynter article (Moos 2012) summarizes two segments on “Rock Center,” where Ted Koppel spoke with Bill O’Reilly, Ann Coulter, and David Carr about the business of broadcasting hate. In the segments, as reported by Moos (2012), Koppel said, “The bar for civility on cable television and talk radio has fallen so low . . . that by comparison [Bill] O’Reilly seems almost reasonable.” O’Reilly agreed,

You can make money by assassinating people that differ from you. There’s a success that wants everybody to come into the tent and watch. That’s me. And then there’s the success where you make money speaking to the choir, the haters. So if you’re a liberal, they hate George W. Bush. They hate him, so you smash him every single day. Same thing on the other side. They hate President Obama . . . You look for ways to smash him. You don’t really care what the truth is, you just want to smash him. You can make a lot of money doing that, especially if you do it loud enough and vicious enough. And that’s what happened once cable news went up. You had some of those people come in. Some of them have washed up, but some of them haven’t. And it’s nasty.

This excerpt of the conversation reveals that some television journalists themselves—even those who are involved in the so-called uncivil discourse—find it problematic, while acknowledging that in the commercial marketplace, it can be a successful strategy in terms of ratings and revenue. Commenting on this exchange, and the difference between broadcast television news and its cable counterpart, which has been much more criticized, Greta Van Susteren pointed out the difference between performance style and opinionated content. She wrote,

Broadcast news people may have deluded themselves into thinking that they are pure because they often show no passion in their voices or volume in the talk. A modulated voice and soft volume does not mean no bias. It only means modulated voice and soft volume. They THINK their bias is not shown (or even that they have none) and therein lies their self delusion. (Gretawire 2012)

There are also examples from radio, such as the canceling of Tavis Smiley’s show by four stations who felt that his advocacy journalism was too political for public radio (Powell 2012). He was even compared to Bill O’Reilly (Powell 2012). Examples from online and print news include the suspension of Joe Williams, White House correspondent at Politico, for remarks he made on Martin Bashir’s MSNBC show about Mitt Romney and comments he posted on Twitter about Ann Romney (Beaujon 2012). The coverage of Williams’ Twitter comments (Wemple 2012) shows that journalists are also concerned about their fellow journalists’ posts through social media. Williams’ comments through social media were made on his “protected” Twitter account, “which means that only ‘confirmed followers’ have a view of what he’s tweeting” (Wemple 2012), but according to a memo by Politico’s top editors, they compromised Williams’ journalistic responsibility and failed to meet Politico’s “standards for fairness and judgment.” 96 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Theme 3: Awareness of Academic Research about Opinion and Civility in News and Reader Comments Several articles provide evidence that some news organizations have actually made changes and decisions based on academic research, specifically about anonymous posts and moderating comments. Based on research from the Engaging News Project (Stroud 2013) about the use of a “respect” button on news Web sites versus a “like” button, the Tampa Bay Times and Huffington Post now feature other buttons on their sites (such as important, inspiring, sad, amazing). The project found that having a journalist moderate reader discussion leads to more civil comments, and the “Respect” button leads to more consideration than “Like” or “Recommend” buttons. Another such case was when the publication Popular Science decided to get rid of comments on its site completely, citing, among other things, the study in the Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, “The ‘Nasty Effect:’ Online Incivility and Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies” (Anderson et al. 2014), which suggested that uncivil comments skewed people’s understanding of an article (H.G. 2014). These are not the first cases where journalists made decisions based on academic work. In the 1990s, journalists took up the public journalism charge outlined by academics, and Tenenboim-Weinblatt (2009) found that the journalistic community’s eventual acceptance of Jon Stewart as a quasi-journalist or new kind of journalist was aided by political communication scholarship that legitimated him as an educating source of political and news information. It is important to note that the journalists who have written about opinion and civility for the professional journalism organizations (CJR, AJR, Nieman, and Poynter), where discussion of academic research about journalism is part of the standard fare, likely pay closer attention to academic research than other journalists who do not participate on these sites. These journalists are also more likely to make use of services such as Journalist’s Resource (JR) featured on Nieman Lab’s site, which provides ongoing updates about the top academic articles published on social media research and other topics of interest to journalists (Wihbey 2013, 2014). JR is a project of the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics, and Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School. A Brookings Institution report suggests that “Media organizations should consider partnerships with universities and nonprofit organizations and leverage their expertise” (West and Stone 2014). In addition, two CJR articles focused on the relationship between journalists and academics. The first, “Embrace the Wonk” (Marx 2010), mentioned The Monkey Cage, the blog by several political science professors that is now part of the Washington Post. A more recent article, “Political Science and Journalism: BFFs?” (Nyhan 2014) mentioned several academics who have been hired as columnists or contributors to news sites.4 The latter article also discussed how journalists are increasingly more open to and interested in academic research and that academics are getting better at connecting their work and making it known to the real world. Meltzer 97

Theme 4: How Journalists Are Dealing with the Increase in Opinion and Incivility in Online Political News Discourse Articles turned up in this study’s searches discussed many of the ways in which journalists are dealing with incivility online. These include requiring identification of commenters or requiring that commenters link to their own Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, or other profiles to verify identification. For example, USA Today/Gannett switched to Facebook for reader comments to require identity of posters (Ebner 2011), and The Portland Press Herald uses Facebook Connect, Twitter, and WordPress logins (Ellis 2010). Some news sites, such as the New York Times, use a two-tiered approach of verified and unverified comments (verified may be those with a history of high- quality contributions, motivating those labeled “verified” to remain high quality so that their comments are posted directly and without moderation); crowdsourcing the review of comments and using ratings systems for comments, which some research has shown to be effective (Lampe et al. 2014) and placing reader comments directly next to the content on which they are commenting, thus encouraging commenters to read before sharing an opinion (H.G. 2014). Other sites, such as the LA Times, use automated filters (Edgar 2011). Other approaches include providing etiquette guidelines for comments, such as the political discussion Web site Politix, which has its own “Engagement Etiquette,” for- bidding “the use of profanity, personal attacks or off-topic commentary” and spam (Bond 2012). Yet another approach is having journalists and nonjournalists police comments. AOL and Yahoo! have hired journalists to create original content and to police the comment sections on their articles to maintain civility (Shiver 2010). Gawker Media has created a separate commenting platform, Kinja, that users control. Kinja “gives readers the ability to initiate discussions surrounding a particular Gawker article through their Kinja account and then manage them with tools like reply, dis- miss, share, follow, or even ‘heart’” (H.G. 2014). However, news sites still face challenges in choosing and executing these strategies. As a 2008 AJR article describes, there are different thresholds for crude language at different news organizations (Macy 2008). Furthermore, newspapers have grappled with where to draw the line vis-à-vis coarse language “in the digital world, where almost any- thing goes” (Macy 2008). Questions also remain about not allowing anonymity. While some argue that anonymity creates an environment for bad behavior, others say “anonymity has value because it encourages honesty and empowers creativity” (Ingram 2014). In addition, “Although news organizations can employ moderators to remove uncivil comments from these online forums, the practice can be both time-consuming and expen- sive,” so the Engaging News Project (Stroud 2013) promotes preemptively moderating comments and posing questions to readers to increase civility on the front end.5 While these examples illustrate the many different ways news sites have dealt with reader comments, there has been some blowback in the recent cases, with news sites deleting and controlling comments in ways that turn readers off. For example, one Nieman Lab article (Phelps 2011) told the story of WHYY Philadelphia, whose 98 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) commenting system was so good at keeping out trolls and flamers that hardly anyone commented. They overcorrected for the problem (Phelps 2011). As a result, WHYY’s “The Speak Easy blog will bring a new comments system with no registration wall, and blog host Eric Walter will serve as sergeant-at-arms until the community (hope- fully) becomes too big to manage.” When that happens, they will recruit volunteers from community users. Another example of negative results from dealing with user comments in heavy handed ways is an incident at the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, where an editor observed that extremely vulgar comments originated from a local school’s IP address and informed the school, which eventually resulted in the resignation of the employee who made the posts (Peters 2010). When the editor posted the account on the paper’s Web site, he received hundreds of comments from upset readers who felt he overstepped his role. Still other examples, such as the “NewsTrust Baltimore” experiment, which let readers critique its stories in civil ways raised the question of whether civility is sus- tainable (Wallace 2011).

Unable to get continued foundation support, and not close to being commercially viable, the project finished without hinting at a workable business model. And the relatively small number of articles that sparked robust discussion suggests that there are limits to how deep news consumers want to get in the newscritiquing business. (Wallace 2011)

The project localized the online social networking/media watchdogging tools developed by the national nonprofit NewsTrust. Other news organizations, such as The New Haven Independent, a nonprofit site launched in 2005, have decided to sus- pend all user comments (see Kennedy 2012). In discussing how journalists are dealing with incivility and opinion, it should be noted that many, although not all, of these examples come from what may be considered “elite” media, which tend to have more resources available for handling large volumes of feedback than other news outlets. Smaller media outlets may receive more manageable volumes of online comments that can be handled more like traditional letters to the editor with regard to prescreening and rejection.

Discussion In revealing four main themes and several subthemes in journalists’ writing about civility and opinion in digital news media, this study found that most, but not all, of the journalistic writing examined here about civility and incivility expressed concern for the state of things as uncivil. Most, but not all, articles indicated it needs to be improved. And most journalists’ writing indicated that they or their organizations are responsible for keeping things civil on their own sites. The journalists’ writing indicated that they think incivility affects society, the public, political culture, and their own organizations. Analysis of journalists’ articles also revealed interest in academic research about civility, and some of the many ways journalists are dealing with incivility online are based on academic research. Those who did not express a concern for civility wrote Meltzer 99 that it has been “fetishized,” cite the first amendment, and equate calls for civility with attempts to censor certain viewpoints. The indication that journalists and their organizations may be motivated to, at least outwardly, advocate for, and take actions to improve, civility out of a fear of losing favor and credibility with audiences, and consequently audience share and revenue, led us—the researchers—to consider whether it might be appropriate to invoke theoretical concepts about journalism such as paradigm repair, critical incidents, or boundary maintenance (Meltzer 2011). Unlike in paradigm repair (Bennett et al. 1985; Berkowitz 2000; Hindman 2005; Reese 1990), there hasn’t been a specific breach of good and normal practice per se surrounding civility that needs to be restored. And unlike a critical incident (Zelizer 1992, in Tumber 1999: 340–54), there also has not been a singular event or evolution pertaining to civility that has led to the re- examination of journalistic practices. Boundary maintenance (Gieryn 1983; Lewis 2012) may be the best analytical framework available for understanding journalistic discourse and action related to civility, but it, too, is an imperfect explanation. It may be the case here that journalists, as Carlson and Peifer (2013:334) have found, are being forced to reckon with “new—and largely uncomfortable—modes of public discourse operating contra traditional journalism’s institutionalized norms” and “journalists’ responses confronted the emerging heterogeneity of mediated voices participating in the public sphere.” Clearly, journalists of all stripes are grappling with the rapidly changing information environment and new forms and participants. But because the threat to journalism from incivility is happening on all fronts, from both users and journalists, across all types of media, and it is attributed to many causes outside of journalism, none of the above frameworks seem to adequately capture the journalistic quandary and response. Rather journalists are engaging in not just image restoration (Benoit 1995), but in image defense, protection, and maintenance. It is possible that journalists have simply been following the lead of academics, politicians, and policy workers in their calls for efforts to improve the state of civility, but it is difficult to prove with certainty the root source of this latest round of concern and calls for action about civility in public discourse. In addition, as we and others have demonstrated, the roles inhabited by academics, politicians, advocates, and journalists are increasingly blurred. In addition, it is difficult to know whether all of the above named groups are merely paying lip service to the cause of civility or whether their rhetoric and efforts are sincere. Two examples of apparent hypocrisy about civility by journalists and their organizations have raised doubt about the sincerity of these individuals’ and groups’ concerns. One is the 2012 case of Froma Harrop, the former President of the National Conference of Editorial Writers (now AOP), the same journalism organization that launched a Civility Project in 2011. Harrop was called out in a Daily Show interview parody for having used uncivil language in describing members of the Tea Party in one of her syndicated columns (The Daily Show 2012). In another case, CJR, one of the sites of journalistic discourse about civility that was examined for this study, received letters from readers criticizing the magazine for printing the “F” word on its September/October 2013 “Journalism Is” cover (Romenesko 2013). But whether sincere or feigned, journalistic discourse reflecting a 100 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) concern for civility meshes with Bishop’s (2001) and Zelizer’s (1997: 17) contention that journalistic self-reflection is also designed to deflect potential external criticism and distrust. The concern expressed in the journalistic writing analyzed in this study about lack of civility in audience feedback, however, is having real effects on journalism practice, as described.

Limitations, Avenues for Future Research, and Implications This study’s scope was limited to journalists who wrote about opinion and civility in professional and trade journalism venues. Future work could broaden the scope of journalistic perspectives on the increase in opinion and civility through surveys or analyses of a wider range of journalistic texts. In addition, this study was unable to determine exactly what definition of civility was being used by journalists who authored the articles examined here. As discussed, definitions of civility and incivility are many and varied. Future research could complement the work of Stryker et al. (2014) and Muddiman (2014a) and investigate the interpretation of civility and incivility by journalists to further move toward a standardized understanding of civility. As Stryker and Muddiman suggest, it would be useful for research, measurement, and evaluation purposes to have a more unified understanding of civility. It would also be useful in discussions about public political discourse to have a more common understanding of the meaning. In terms of what journalists think, it is less important whether the definition is consistent than knowing what definitions and understandings they have and are using. While this study provided evidence that some journalists are aware of academic research about opinion and civility in mediated discourse, academic research in this area is quickly expanding, and journalistic knowledge is not likely to keep pace with the latest findings. Equally, academic research should continue to consider it important to take into account the perceptions and practices of journalists. Several resources are trying to bridge these different communities, such as Nieman’s Journalist’s Resource, the NICD which has already held sessions with journalists and plans more, and others. A third community that belongs to this conversation is that of educators and media literacy proponents. Going forward, it makes sense to consider the different conversa- tions about civility taking place and to endeavor to bring them together. Finally, future work can envision and plan steps toward action. As Stryker et al. (2014: 2) wrote, “Constitutional protection for free speech precludes establishing legal rules requiring civility, but it does not hinder the adoption of strong social norms favoring civility.” Although regulation is unlikely, social norms can be powerful and influential. What this study can offer is evidence that journalists, too, share in the concern about uncivil mediated discourse in most cases, which may strengthen the arguments put forth by advocates for policy and other types of interventions to improve the quality of public political discourse.

Acknowledgment The author would like to thank Layan Jawdat (MA, Georgetown University, Communication, Culture & Technology) for her research assistance with this article. Meltzer 101

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/ or publication of this article: This work was supported by a faculty research fellowship from Georgetown University. This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes 1. York (2013) suggests that perceptions of political incivility are a function of viewing distinct genres of television news media: “hostile” cable news versus network news. His research attempts to explain the discrepancy between public perceptions of incivility and the Annenberg Public Policy Center’s (APPC) baseline measure of political incivility in Congress which had been relatively flat, as of 2011. 2. The Financial Times, along with other media outlets, published articles blaming their media peers for perpetuating a “viciously partisan tone” of political coverage that some argue set the stage for such violence (Edgecliffe-Johnson, Andrew, and David Gelles. January 11, 2011, “America: Vanquished by Vitriol”). Some of the resulting civility initiatives are the University of Arizona’s National Institute for Civil Discourse; The 2014 Harvard Negotiation Law Review Symposium: Political Dialogue and Civility in an Age of Polarization; A National Symposium on Civility in Public Discourse at Bradley University; a two-day event at DePauw University. 3. Liu, the author of the Time article, may not be considered a journalist by all; the author bio on Time.com says he is the author of several books, was a speechwriter and policy adviser to President Clinton, and that the views expressed are solely his own. His piece appeared in the Viewpoint section. 4. This serves to complete the circle of former journalists-turned academics who frequently appear on journalism sites. 5. A CJR article (Rose 2008) and The Engaging News Project also provide a list of many of these same strategies used by journalists for moderating online reader.

References Anderson, Ashley A., Dominique Brossard, Dietram A. Scheufele, Michael A. Xenos, and Peter Ladwig. 2014. “The ‘Nasty Effect’: Online Incivility and Risk Perceptions of Emerging Technologies.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 19 (3): 373–87. doi:10.1111/jcc4.12009. Associated Press. 2013. “Government Shutdown Timeline: A Look at Congress’ Battle.” October 7. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/07/government-shutdown-timeline_n_4058471.html Bauder, David. 2013. “Martin Bashir’s Sarah Palin Comments Haunting Him Weeks Later.” The Associated Press, November 25. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/martin- bashir-sarah-palin-msnbc_n_4342846.html?ir=Politics Beaujon, Andrew. 2012. “Politico Suspends Joe Williams for Racially Tinged Remarks about Romney.” Poynter, June 22. http://www.poynter.org/mediawire/top-stories/178226/politico- suspends-joe-williams-for-racially-tinged-remarks-about-romney/ 102 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Bennett, W. Lance. 2011. “What’s Wrong with Incivility? Civility as the New Censorship in American Politics.” Paper delivered at the 2011 John Breaux Symposium: “In the Name of Democracy: Leadership, Civility, and Governing in a Polarized Media Environment,” Manship School of Mass Communication, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, March 28–29. Bennett, W. Lance, Lynne A. Gressett, and William Haltom. 1985. “Repairing the News: A Case Study of the News Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 35:50–68. Benoit, William L. 1995. Accounts, Excuses, Apologies: A Theory of Image Restoration Strategies. Albany: State University of New York Press. Ben-Porath, Eran N. May 2007. “The Watchdog’s Bite: Viewer Reactions to Uncivil News Interviews.” Conference Paper, International Communication Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA. Berkowitz, Dan. 2000. “Doing Double Duty: Paradigm Repair and the Princess Diana What-a- Story.” Journalism 1 (August): 125–43. Bishop, Ronald. 1999. “From Behind the Walls: Boundary Work by News Organizations in Their Coverage of Princess Diana’s Death.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 23:91–113. Bishop, Ronald. 2001. “New Media, Heal Thyselves: Sourcing Patterns in News Stories about Media Performance.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 25:22–37. Bluhm, Warren. 2004. Originally Appeared in Green Bay News-Chronicle as “It Turns Out That Hate Works.” Reposted in “Blame ‘60M’ Point/Counterpoint Segment for Loss of Civility” on Poynter.org by Jim Romenesko, Poynter, July 13. http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/ mediawire/24178/blame-60m-pointcounterpoint-segment-for-loss-of-civility/. Bond, Michaelle. 2012. “An Online Political Venue for Conservatives and Liberals.” American Journalism Review, August/September. http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=5371 Boylan, James. 2009. “Brief Encounters.” Review of Scandal & Civility: Journalism and the Birth of American Democracy by Marcus Daniel, Oxford University Press. Columbia Journalism Review. http://www.cjr.org/review/brief_encounters_11.php?page=all. Brooks, Deborah J., and John G. Geer. 2007. “Beyond Negativity: The Effects of Incivility on the Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 51:1–16. Carlson, Matt, and Jason T. Peifer. 2013. “The Impudence of Being Earnest: Jon Stewart and the Boundaries of Discursive Responsibility.” Journal of Communication 63 (2):333–50. Clark, Roy Peter. 2007. “The Frames of Incivility.” Poynter. http://www.poynter.org/how-tos/ community-engagement/dialogue-or-diatribe/82374/the-frames-of-incivility/ Cleghorn, Reese. 1993. “The Public Looks at the Press with AJR.” American Journalism Review, October. http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=951 Cleghorn, Reese. 1994. “Beyond Opinions: Setting the Stage.” American Journalism Review, May. http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=1253 Coe, Kevin, Kate Kenski, and Stephen A. Rains. 2014. “Online and Uncivil? Patterns and Determinants of Incivility in Newspaper Website Comments.” Journal of Communication. http://nicd.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/Online%20and%20Uncivil.pdf. Cohn, Alicia M. 2012. “Lawmakers Re-launch Civility Caucus in Time for Election Day.” The Hill, September 21. http://thehill.com/blogs/twitter-room/other-news/250897-reps-cleaver- capito-want-congress-to-make-nice-with-civility-caucus#ixzz2zYbZNdYm. Collins, Scott. 2013. “Martin Bashir Exits MSNBC in Wake of Sarah Palin Outburst.” Los Angeles Times, December 4. http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/tv/showtracker/la- et-st-martin-bashir-exits-msnbc-in-wake-of-sarah-palin-outburst-20131204,0,3269678. story#ixzz2mdWXrKIG. Columbia Journalism Review. 2004. “A Summer of Lies.” 43 (2): 3. Meltzer 103

Cooper, Helene, and Jeff Zeleny. 2011. “Obama Calls for a New Era of Civility in U.S. Politics.” The New York Times, January 12. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/13obama.html?_r=0. Diakopoulos, Nicholas, and Mor Naaman. 2011. “Towards Quality Discourse in Online News Comments.” In Proceedings of the ACM 2011 conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work, Hangzhou, China, ACM, 133–42. Ebner, Tim. 2011. “Is Facebook the Solution to the Obnoxious Comment Plague?” American Journalism Review, December 2011/January 2012. http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=5213 Edgar, Deirdre. 2011. “Online Comments: ‘Our Goal of Civility Is Falling Short.’” Reader’s Representative Journal, Los Angeles Times, June 10. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/readers/2011/06/online-comments-our-goal-of-civility-is-falling-short.html. Ellis, Justin. 2010. “No Comment: The Portland Press Herald’s About Face.” Nieman Journalism Lab, October 21. http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/10/no-comments-lessons-from-the-portland-press-herald/ Farhi, Paul. 2012. “A Conundrum for Conservative Talk Radio.” The Washington Post, March 18. http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/a-conundrum-for-conservative-talk- radio/2012/03/15/gIQAVbAQLS_story.html Feldman, Lauren. 2011. “The Effects of Journalist Opinionation on Learning from the News.” Journal of Communication 61 (6): 1183–201. Fraser, Nancy. 1999. “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. C. Calhoun, 109–42. Cambridge,Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Gieryn, Thomas F. 1983. “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists.” American Sociological Review 48 (6): 781–95. Glaser, Barney G, and Anselm L. Strauss. 1967. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine. Glass, Ira. 2010. As reported by J. Hamer (2010, August 23) “Ira Glass on Broadcasting’s ‘Failure of Craft.’” Washington News Council. http://wanewscouncil.org/2010/08/23/ira- glass-on-broadcastings-failure-of-craft/. Also featured on Jim Romanesko’s blog on the Poynter site, August 24, 2010. http://www.poynter.org/latest-news/mediawire/105196/ opinion-in-all-its-forms-is-kicking-the-ass-of-journalism/. Gretawire. 2012. “The Self Delusion of Broadcast News and the Danger of ‘Quiet’ Bias.” September 21. http://gretawire.foxnewsinsider.com/2012/09/21/the-self-delusion-of- broadcast-news-and-the-danger-of-quiet-bias-am-i-wrong/. Haas, Tanni. 2006. “Critical Forum: Mainstream News Media Self-criticism: A Proposal for Future Research.” Critical Studies in Media Communication 23 (4): 350–55. Herbst, Susan. 2010. Rude Democracy: Civility and Incivility in American Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. H.G. 2014. “Oversight Online: Comment Section Conundrums.” The Economist, January 30. http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2014/01/oversight-online Hindman, Elizabeth B. 2005. “Jayson Blair, The New York Times, and Paradigm Repair.” Journal of Communication 55 (2): 225–41. Holton, Judith A. 2008. “Grounded Theory as a General Research Methodology.” Grounded Theory Review 7 (2). http://groundedtheoryreview.com/2008/06/30/grounded-theory-as-a- general-research-methodology/. Ingram, Mathew. 2014. “Moot Is Right—We’re a Lot Better Off with Online Anonymity Than We Would be without It.” Gigaom, February 18. http://gigaom.com/2014/02/18/moot-is- right-were-a-lot-better-off-with-online-anonymity-than-we-would-be-without-it/. 104 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Kaufman, Leslie. 1993. “The Right Stuff.” American Journalism Review, December. http:// ajrarchive.org/article_printable.asp?id=1395 Kennedy, Dan. 2012. “In New Haven, a Crisis of Confidence over User Comments.” Nieman Journalism Lab. http://www.niemanlab.org/2012/02/in-new-haven-a-crisis-of-confidence- over-user-comments/ KPBS. 2013. “Out of Order: Civility in Politics.” February 16. http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/ feb/11/out-order-civility-politics/. Kunkel, Thomas. 2004. “Fade Out.” American Journalism Review. August/September, http:// ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=3710 Lampe, Cliff, Paul Zube, Jusil Lee, Chul Hyun Park, and Erik Johnston. 2014. “Crowdsourcing Civility: A Natural Experiment Examining the Effects of Distributed Moderation in Online Forums.” Government Information Quarterly 31 (2): 317–26. Lewis, Seth C. 2012. “The Tension between Professional Control and Open Participation: Journalism and its Boundaries.” Information, Communication & Society 15 (6): 836–66. Lindlof, Thomas R., and Bryan C. Taylor. 2011. Qualitative Communication Research Methods. 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Liu, Eric. 2012. “Viewpoint: Civility Is Overrated: Politics Doesn’t Need to be More Nice; it Needs to be More Real.” Time. http://ideas.time.com/2012/10/16/civility-in-elections-is- overrated/. Loke, Jaime. 2012. “Old Turf, New Neighbors: Journalists’ Perspectives on Their New Shared Space.” Journalism Practice 6:233–49. Macy, Beth. 2008. “Language Barriers.” American Journalism Review, October/November. http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=4609 Marcus, James. 2009. “Sticks and Stones.” Columbia Journalism Review. http://www.cjr.org/ critical_eye/sticks_and_stones_1.php?page=all#sthash.bGEcr52r.dpuf. Marx, Greg. 2010. “Embrace the Wonk.” Columbia Journalism Review. http://www.cjr.org/ feature/embrace_the_wonk_1.php?page=all McElroy, Kathleen. 2013. “Where Old (Gatekeepers) Meets New (Media).” Journalism Practice 7 (6): 755–71. Meares, Joel. 2011. “Giffords Analysis Machine in Overdrive.” Columbia Journalism Review. http://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/giffords_analysis_machine_in_o.php?page=all. Meltzer, Kimberly. 2011. “Comparing Theories of Repair across Communication Research.” Journal of Communications Media Studies 3 (1): 10–25. Meltzer, Kimberly, and Judith D. Hoover. 2014. “Civility in News Discourse: The Case of PBS’ Brooks and Shields.” Electronic News, December. Meyer, Hans K., and Michael Clay Carey. 2014. “In Moderation: Examining How Journalists’ Attitudes toward Online Comments Affect the Creation of Community.” Journalism Practice 8 (2): 213–28. Moos, Julie. 2012. “Hoyer: Today’s Journalists ‘See Their Job Not to Inform but to Incite.’” Poynter, September 21. http://www.poynter.org/mediawire/top-stories/189207/hoyer- todays-journalists-see-their-job-not-to-inform-but-to-incite/ Muddiman, Ashley. 2014a. “Instability of Incivility: How Partisanship and Individual Differences Shape Perceptions and News Coverage of Political Incivility.” Paper presented to the Political Communication Division of the National Communication Association, Chicago, November. Muddiman, Ashley. 2014b. “Two-Dimensional Political Incivility: Clarifying Incivility Using News Frames and Individuals’ Judgments.” Paper presented to the Political Communication Division of the National Communication Association, Chicago, November. Meltzer 105

Mutz, Diana C. 2007. “Effects of ‘In-Your-Face’ Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition.” American Political Science Review 101 (4): 621–35. Mutz, Diana C., and Byron Reeves. 2005. “The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility on Political Trust.” American Political Science Review 99 (1): 1-15. Myers, Steve. 2011. “Ira Glass: Commentary Is Trouncing Fact-based Reporting because of Its Down-to-Earth Style.” Poynter, September 20. http://www.poynter.org/mediawire/top- stories/146547/ira-glass-commentary-is-trouncing-fact-based-reporting-because-of-its- down-to-earth-style/ Ng, Elaine W. J., and Benjamin H. Detenber. 2005. “The Impact of Synchronicity and Civility in Online Political Discussions on Perceptions and Intentions to Participate.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 10 (3). doi: 10.1111/ j.1083-6101.2005.tb00252.x Nielsen, Carolyn E. 2014. “Coproduction or Cohabitation: Are Anonymous Online Comments on Newspaper Websites Shaping News Content?” New Media & Society 16 (3): 470–87. Nyhan, Brendan. 2014. “Political Science and Journalism: BFFs?” Columbia Journalism Review. http://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/nyhan_reflections_political_science_and_jour- nalism.php?page=all Pagano, Penny. 1993. “Public Perspectives on the Press.” American Journalism Review, December. http://ajrarchive.org/article_printable.asp?id=1482 Papacharissi, Zizi. 2004. “Democracy Online: Civility, Politeness, and the Democratic Potential of Online Political Discussion Groups.” New Media & Society 6 (2): 259–83. Partsch, Frank. 2011. “Civility Project Proposal.” Association of Opinion Journalists, March 20, 2014. http://www.opinionjournalists.org/aboutncew/an-aoj-project/ Pauly, John J. 1990. “The Politics of the New Journalism.” In Literary Journalism in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Sims, 110–29. New York: Oxford University Press. Peters, Justin. 2010. “Trust Falls: Lessons from St. Louis on Authority, Credibility, and Online Communications.” Columbia Journalism Review, March 4. http://www.cjr.org/the_news_ frontier/trust_falls.php?page=all Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2010. Fewer Journalists Stand Out in Fragmented News Universe. http://www.people-press.org/2010/10/14/fewer-journalists- stand-out-in-fragmented-news-universe/. Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. 2012. Further Decline in Credibility Ratings for Most News Organizations. http://www.people-press.org/2012/08/16/further-decline-in- credibility-ratings-for-most-news-organizations/. Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism. 2013. The State of the News Media 2013. http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/network-news-a-year-of-change-and-challenge-at-nbc/. Phelps, Andrew. 2011. “RE: FW: NewsWorks: Back-to-the-Future Community News.” Nieman Lab, November 7. http://www.niemanlab.org/2011/11/re-fw-newsworks-back-to-the- future-community-news/. Pickard, Victor. 2010. “Forgotten Lessons for Journalism’s Future.” Communication Currents 5 (6). http://www.natcom.org/CommCurrentsArticle.aspx?id=1006 Powell, Tracie. 2012. “As 4 Stations Cancel His Show, Is Tavis Smiley’s Advocacy Journalism too Political for Public Radio?” Poynter, October 24. http://www.poynter.org/mediawire/ making-sense-of-news/192366/is-tavis-smiley-too-political-for-public-radio/ Reader, Bill. 2012. “Free Press vs. Free Speech? The Rhetoric of “Civility” in Regard to Anonymous Online Comments.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 89 (3): 495–513. 106 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Reese, Stephen D. 1990. “The News Paradigm and the Ideology of Objectivity: A Socialist at the Wall Street Journal.” Special theories of journalism issue. Critical Studies in Mass Communication 7 (4): 390–409. Romenesko, Jim. 2013. “Columbia Journalism Review Hears from Readers Upset about The F-Word on the Cover.” http://jimromenesko.com/2013/11/06/cjr-hears-from-readers- upset-about-the-f-word-on-the-cover/. Rose, Adam. 2008. “Louts Out.” Currents section. Columbia Journalism Review 30: 10–11. http://www.cjr.org/currents/louts_out.php Santana, Arthur D. 2014. “Virtuous or Vitriolic.” Journalism Practice 8 (1): 18–33. Shiver, Jube, Jr. 2010. “Embracing Original Content.” American Journalism Review, September. http://ajrarchive.org/Article.asp?id=4903 Sobieraj, Sarah, and Jeffrey M. Berry. 2011. “From Incivility to Outrage: Political Discourse in Blogs, Talk Radio, and Cable News.” Political Communication 28 (1): 19–41. Sonderman, Jeff. 2012. “‘Just the Facts’ Isn’t Good Enough for Journalists Anymore, Says Tow Center’s Journalism Manifesto.” Poynter, November 28. http://www.poynter.org/ mediawire/top-stories/196457/just-the-facts-isnt-good-enough-for-journalists-anymore- says-tow-centers-journalism-manifesto/ Stranahan, Susan Q. 2004. “Assembling All the Pieces.” Columbia Journalism Review. http:// www.cjr.org/politics/assembling_all_the_pieces.php?page=all&print=true Stroud, Natalie. 2013. Engaging News Project. The Annette Strauss Institute for Civic Life. http://engagingnewsproject.org/ Stryker, Robin, Bethany Conway, and Taylor Danielson. 2014. What Is Political Incivility? http://nicd.arizona.edu/research-report/what-political-incivility. Tannen, Deborah. 1998. The Argument Culture. New York: Random House. Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Keren. 2009. “Jester, Fake Journalist, or the New Walter Lippmann? Recognition Processes of Jon Stewart by the U.S. Journalistic Community.” International Journal of Communication 3:416–39. The Daily Show. 2012. “Civil Disservice.” http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/slfmox/civil- disservice. Tugend, Alina. 2002. “Maybe Not.” American Journalism Review, May. http://ajrarchive.org/ article_printable.asp?id=2521 Tumber, Howard. 1999. News: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vraga, Emily K., Stephanie Edgerly, Leticia Bode, D. Jasun Carr, Mitchell Bard, Courtney N. Johnson, Young Mie Kim, and Dhavan V. Shah. 2012. “The Correspondent, the Comic, and the Combatant: The Consequences of Host Style in Political Talk Shows.” Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 89 (1): 5–22. Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin. 2004. “A ‘Legitimate Beef’ Or ‘Raw Meat?’ Civility, Multiculturalism, and Letters to the Editor.” Communication Review 7 (1): 89–105. Wallace, Bruce. 2011. “NewsTrust Baltimore: An Experiment in Civility.” Columbia Journalism Review. http://www.cjr.org/the_news_frontier/newstrust_baltimore_an_ experim.php?page=all. Ward, Butch. 2007. “Don Imus and the State of Public Discourse.” Poynter, April 9. http://www. poynter.org/latest-news/everyday-ethics/81668/don-imus-and-the-state-of-public-discourse/. Weber Shandwick, Powell Tate, and KRC Research. 2013. Civility in America. http://www. webershandwick.com/uploads/news/files/Civility_in_America_2013_Exec_Summary.pdf. Wemple, Erik. 2012. “Politico Suspends Reporter.” The Washington Post, June 22. http://www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/post/politico-suspends-reporter/2012/06/22/ gJQAvvf8uV_blog.html. Meltzer 107

West, Darrell M., and Beth Stone. 2014. Nudging News Producers and Consumers toward More Thoughtful, Less Polarized Discourse. Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings. edu/research/papers/2014/02/05-news-media-polarization-democracy-west-stone. Wihbey, John. 2013. Interrogating the Network: The Year in Social Media Research. http://www. niemanlab.org/2013/12/interrogating-the-network-the-year-in-social-media-research/. Wihbey, John. 2014. What’s New in Digital and Social Media Research: Linking Helps Save Newspapers and How Multitasking Spikes Arousal. http://www.niemanlab.org/2014/01/ whats-new-in-digital-and-social-media-research-linking-helps-save-newspapers-and-how- multitasking-spikes-arousal/. York, Chance. 2013. “Cultivating Political Incivility: Cable News, Network News, and Public Perceptions.” Electronic News 7 (3): 107–25. Zelizer, Barbie. 1992. “CNN, the Gulf War, and Journalistic Practice.” Journal of Communication 42 (1): 66–81. Zelizer, Barbie. 1993. “Journalists as Interpretive Communities.” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 10:219–37. Zelizer, Barbie. 1997. “Journalism in the Mirror.” The Nation, February 17, 10.

Author Biography Kimberly Meltzer (PhD, University of Pennsylvania) is an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University in the graduate program in Communication, Culture, and Technology. Prior to her academic career, she worked for news organizations including CNN and NBC. She is the author of TV News Anchors and Journalistic Tradition: How Journalists Adapt to Technology (2010, Peter Lang). Her other work on journalism and politics has appeared in Journalism, Journalism Practice, Electronic News, Encyclopedia of Journalism and National Civic Review, as well as in several edited volumes. HIJXXX10.1177/1940161214552500The International Journal of Press/PoliticsFlew and Swift research-article5525002014

Research Article

The International Journal of Press/Politics 2015, Vol. 20(1) 108–128 Engaging, Persuading, © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: and Entertaining Citizens: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1940161214552500 Mediatization and the ijpp.sagepub.com Australian Political Public Sphere

Terry Flew1 and Adam Swift1

Abstract This paper draws upon public sphere theories and the “mediatization of politics” debate to develop a mapping of the Australian political public sphere, with particular reference to television. It discusses the concept of a “political public sphere,” and the contribution of both non-traditional news media genres, such as satirical television and infotainment formats, to an expanded conception of the political public sphere. It considers these questions in the context of two case studies: the Q&A program on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), and its uses of social media and interactive formats to engage citizens, and the comedy program Gruen Nation, also on the ABC, which analyzed the use of political advertising to persuade citizens during the 2013 Australian Federal election.

Keywords public sphere, political participation, television, political advertising, television campaign, broadcasting news

Introduction: Developing a “Media Map” of the Australian Political Public Sphere The relationship of media to citizenship, politics, and governance in democratic societies is one that has been widely analyzed. Political philosophers and reformers such

1Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia Corresponding Author: Terry Flew, Creative Industries Faculty, Queensland University of Technology, Kelvin Grove, Queensland 4059, Australia. Email: [email protected] Flew and Swift 109 as John Locke, Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and J.S. Mill all critically reflected on the status of media to political discourse, and in the twentieth century, Walter Lippmann, John Dewey, Robert Dahl, and Jürgen Habermas, among many others, have “allocated the press and public media a central role in democracy . . . [and] the normative ‘ideal’ media and public communication functions” (Davis 2010: 7). Brian McNair (2011: 18–20) has observed that the minimal functions of the media in liberal democracies are that it:

•• informs citizens of what is occurring in their society and in the world; •• educates citizens as to the meaning and significance of facts and events; •• provides a platform for competing and dissenting opinions, so that an informed public opinion can emerge; •• gives publicity to the actions of governments and political institutions, including critical scrutiny (the “watchdog” function); and •• serves as a channel for the advocacy of competing political viewpoints.

Underlying such observations are a range of questions about the actual performance of various media in relation to citizenship and the democratic process. It also raises issues about which media are being considered in such discussions, because clearly not all media are intended to perform primarily political roles. The most influential normative benchmark that has been adopted for evaluating the performance of different media is that of the public sphere. The public sphere has been defined as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed [and] access is guaranteed to all citizens” (Habermas 1974: 49). As developed by Jürgen Habermas, it is a series of institutional spaces through which “citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of general interest” (Habermas 1974: 49). The media constitute one of a number of institutional spaces through which “private persons could agree about matters of public importance, not simply out of deference to traditional authority, but through the give and take of reasoned discourse” (Johnson 2012: 20), with news journalism “facilitat[ing] the consciousness of a novel public made up of private persons able to inform themselves about matters of importance and able to air and share their concerns with distant others” (Johnson 2012: 21). Habermas’s public sphere concept has for half a century provided a key framework for analyzing the content, style, and democratic functionality of political media. But one of the challenges of public sphere theories is identifying the relationship between the formal institutions of the public sphere—governments, parliaments, courts, state agencies, political parties, and so on.—and the informal institutions, networks, and practices that enable and sustain (or possibly undermine) its ongoing development. Among the questions that have been raised in media and communications studies include 110 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

•• The relationship between “elite” and “popular” media and questions of the perceived quality of different media and their contribution to political discourse (Nolan 2008; Turner 1999, 2005); •• The relationship between commercial and public service media and whether the latter have a privileged role in representing the “public sphere” to the wider citizenry (Garnham 1990; Hendy 2013; Lowe 2009); •• Assessing the contribution of non-news program genres to the political process, including infotainment, satirical media, and so-called “soft news” formats (Baym 2010; Gray et al. 2009; McKee 2005; van Zoonen 2005); and •• Identifying the contribution of the Internet to the media/politics relationship and determining whether new practices such as blogging, citizen journalism, and so on, as well as the opening up of all media to more interactivity and citizen engagement through online discussion forums and social media, have opened up channels of political communication to greater citizen engagement and a more diverse range of contributing voices (Benkler 2006; Bruns et al. 2011; Curran et al. 2012).

In more general terms, there is the issue of whether to think about political media, or the media of the political public sphere, as being distinct from other media, or as part of a continuum with other media. Public sphere theories have often sought to define the institutions and practices of public sphere media as being distinct from, and in opposition to, other media forms: information as compared with entertainment, quality rather than popular, public service versus commercial media, “hard” news rather than “soft news or infotainment,” professional journalism as compared with blogging, and so on. From a media and cultural studies perspective, John Hartley (1996) argued that the public sphere, or the mediated space of formal politics, is only one element of a broader mediasphere, which is in turn shaped by the broader “semio- sphere” or the world as understood through the cultural forms by which it is represented. In Hartley’s account, there is “a two-way, mutually determining relationship between politics and journalism,” but this extends not only to political or “hard news” journalism but also to “journalism as a whole [that] even in its least political components” contributes to “how political questions are acted out and realized socially” (Hartley 1996: 79). In the context of the mediatization of politics, to be discussed below, such work draws attention to the blurred lines between media formats and genres that exist when we attempt to map the political public sphere.

The “Mediatization of Politics” Debate One of the most influential concepts in both media studies and political communications over the last ten to fifteen years, and one that provides insights into the case studies of Q&A and Gruen Nation undertaken in this paper, has been that of the mediatization of politics (Esser and Strömbäck 2014; Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008). Identified as part of a wider mediatization of culture and society (Couldry 2012; Couldry and Hepp 2013; Hepp 2013; Hjarvard 2013; Lundby 2009), the thesis proposes Flew and Swift 111 that the changing structural relations between media and politics have developed to a point where political institutions, leaders, and practices are now increasingly dependent upon media and conform to the logics of media production, distribution, and reception. Hjarvard (2013: 61–62) defines this as a “double-sided development” whereby “the media become integrated into the daily practices of political organizations and serve both internal and external communication tasks for political actors,” such as the setting of political agendas and the generation of public consent for political decisions and actions. In seeking to gain political influence through the media, political actors “have to take into consideration such factors as the news values of journalism, generic conventions of expression, and the typical forms of relationship that the various media constitute vis-à-vis their audiences and users” (Hjarvard 2013: 62). It is important to distinguish mediatization from mediation. Mediation refers to “the process of communication in general . . . [and] how communication has to be understood as involving the ongoing mediation of meaning construction” (Couldry and Hepp 2013: 197). But whereas mediation refers to technologically mediated communication in general, mediatization refers more specifically to processes through which politics “has become dependent in its central functions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 248). In relation to political communication, it marks the difference between what Blumler and Kavanagh (1999) referred to as the “second age” of political communication, marked out by the rise of broadcast television as the primary medium through which political information was circulated, to the “third age” of political communication, where the public sphere itself is increasingly constructed in and through the media. In this third age of political communication,

the major parties have thoroughly absorbed what may be termed the imperatives of the professionalization of political publicity . . . [and] attending to communication through the media is not just an add-on to political decisions but is an integral part of the interrelated processes of campaigning, cultivation of public opinion, policy-making, and government itself. (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 214)

Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) identified five indicators of a growing mediatization of politics:

1. The growing influence of news values or the decision-making processes within media institutions whereby certain events are deemed to be “newsworthy.” This is an influence not only over how politics is received by audiences but also over the conduct of political actors themselves. 2. The degree to which the political agenda, or the shaping of what issues are deemed to be relevant and important, is shaped by media institutions, with political institutions becoming increasingly responsive to the media agenda. 3. Growing recognition on the part of political actors that they compete not only with other political actors, but also with the other priorities of media institutions, to get attention in the media. 112 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

4. Political communication thus becomes an activity undertaken by external experts through the “professionalization of political advocacy” (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 213). It is increasingly driven by market research techniques akin to those used by commercial businesses, and political institutions increasingly approach their dealings with media in an instrumental manner to advance their own aims. 5. How politics comes to be reported by journalists and news outlets is increasingly shaped by commercial calculations. While there is a long history of politically partisan media, this dimension differs in that there are more explicit calculations of the commercial implications of certain ways of communicating politics (e.g., appealing to commercially lucrative target demographics), as distinct from simply being a mouthpiece of owner or political party interests.

While the mediatization of politics thesis tends to be associated with particular leaders, such as Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Silvio Berlusconi, the mediatization of politics is facilitated by wider trends in society and culture, the media, and politics, including,

•• an increasingly competitive media environment; •• the challenge of the Internet to traditional mass media and the “gatekeeper” function of journalists; •• sections of the citizenry becoming increasingly educated and engaged with civic participation, while other sections increasingly withdraw from public engagement; •• a decline in class-based and other forms of “ritual” identification with particular political parties; •• the crisis of membership of political parties; and •• the growing financial costs of political participation continuing to rise in terms of campaign resources and access to media.

The case of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom is often taken to be paradigmatic (Langer 2010). The transformation of the U.K. Labour Party under his leadership into the more electorally successful “New Labour” format was linked to the role played by high-profile media managers, such as his Director of Communications and Strategy, Alastair Campbell, and his predecessor in that role, Peter Mandelson. In the Australian context, Kevin Rudd was identified as a celebrity prime minister highly prone to base public policy upon media opportunities, who developed a highly personalized political style, as seen with his posting of “selfies” onto social media sites such as Twitter (Wilson 2011). In the case of both Blair and Rudd, their media management and manipulation of public opinion generated satirical responses through comedy programs such as The Thick of It on the BBC (Tandy 2005–2012) and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s The Hollow Men (Woirking Dog Productions 2008). The mediatization of politics literature and that on the public sphere have to some degree developed in isolation from one another. This is in spite of the observation that Flew and Swift 113 the mediatization of politics, and of society and culture more generally, is only possible in contexts where the media institutions are understood to have their own autono- mous logics, rather than being largely reflective of power relations constructed in other domains, such as politics or economics. Strömbäck and Esser (2014: 21) use the term self-mediatization to interpret the seemingly paradoxical phenomenon whereby “political actors have internalized and adapted to the media’s attention rules, production routines and selection criteria—that is, news media logic—and try to exploit the knowledge to reach different strategic goals.” In so doing,

Politicians may then win the daily battles with the news media, by getting into the news as they wish, but end up losing the war, as standards of newsworthiness begin to become prime criteria to evaluate issues, policies, and politics. (Cook 2005: 163)

Jay Blumler has observed that such a “mediatization of the public sphere”—which is broader than the mediatization of politics—may ultimately be damaging to the Habermasian conception of the public sphere since

The empirical observation that politicians have adapted their game to fit in with the logic of the media raises the question of whether unaccountable media institutions should determine the roles of accountable politicians. (Blumler 2014: 37)

There is also the question of whether the rise of the Internet as an alternative mode of political communication undercuts earlier arguments based primarily upon the experience of broadcast media, by enabling greater horizontal communication and small-group interaction rather than being a top-down, one-to-many communications medium (Bruns et al. 2011; Dahlgren 2013; Strömbäck 2008). Marcinkowski (2014: 8) has referred to this as the proposition that “the news logic of traditional mass media, which is at the core of the mediatization concept, faces a massive loss of importance and impact in the digital age,” as communications channels become more decentral- ized and interactive. Marcinkowski advises caution with regard to over-claiming about the transformative impact of the Internet and social media on political communication, noting that media usage rates for traditional print and broadcast media remain high and that the relationship of Internet use to these is often complementary to these platforms (e.g., Twitter commentary during television programs, the comments sections of online news publications) and that both traditional media and established political organizations have been adapting their practices to the digital environment, rather than being overtaken by it. To the extent that the mediatization of politics has been a reality of recent years, it has also generated a backlash among those involved in the political process. In his farewell speech as Prime Minister of Great Britain, Tony Blair (2007) referred to the rise of a “pack mentality” among media outlets, arguing that more competition for audiences among media outlets, combined with the 24/7 news cycle, had accentuated public cynicism toward governments and the political process. Given that Blair had been so strongly associated with using the media to his own political ends, he seems 114 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) an odd critic of the contemporary mediatization of politics, but his arguments have wider echoes among those engaged with the political process. In the Australian context, the former Labor Finance Minister, Lindsay Tanner, developed an extended critique of the media/politics relationship in his book Sideshow (Tanner 2011). Tanner argued that there was a “dumbing down of democracy” occurring in Australia, as,

Under siege from commercial pressures and technological innovation, the media are retreating into an entertainment frame that has little tolerance for complex social and economic issues. In turn, politicians and parties are adapting their behavior to suit the new rules of the game—to such an extent that the contest of ideas is being supplanted by the contest for laughs. While its outward forms remain in place, the quality of our democracy is being undermined from within. One of its critical components, a free and fearless media, is turning into a carnival sideshow. (Tanner 2011: 1)

The Changing Australian Political Public Sphere Over the course of 2013, we have undertaken a mapping of the Australian political sphere, accounting for which institutional actors and individual talents are most active in representing Australian politics and democracy. In the research we are undertaking into the political public sphere in Australia, it is apparent that a focus on those elements of the media associated with politics in a formal-institutional sense would only capture a subset of what is a much wider range of media. As a result, the study is concerned with comedy and infotainment formats as well as more conventional news and current affairs and with the interaction not only between traditional media forms but also with these forms and social media, as seen with TV formats promoting opinion and participation through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms. The study has been developed across multiple media platforms and takes into account qualitative measures such as broadcast hours, press titles, column space, audience reach and ratings, circulation figures, and online analytics. The media map provides a contemporary snapshot of Australia’s political public sphere, while also providing data for historical comparison.1 In this paper, we focus upon that map as it pertains to broadcast television. If we take the case of Australian television, programs other than formal news broadcasts that engage with news and current affairs are relatively small and are mostly to be found on the ABC public service broadcaster (see Table 1). If we were to take out the various breakfast programs (Sunrise, Today, ABC News Breakfast, Wake Up), which are effectively news/infotainment hybrid programs (Harrington 2014; Wilson 2011), then there are eight significant news and current affairs programs that deal with political news, of which four are on the ABC (7.30 Report, Capitol Hill, Four Corners, Lateline). Of the other programs, Dateline (SBS) primarily deals with international stories, while 60 Minutes (Nine) and Sunday Night (Seven) deal for the most part with stories other than those associated with Australian politics. Figure 1 illustrates the extent to which the availability of programs and the number of broadcasting hours devoted to political news and current affairs in Australia has Other (media analysis program) (indigenous focus) Media Watch

Living Black talkback Participation/ Q&A Opinion/discussion Nation with David Speers, Paul Murray Live, PVO News Hour, Richo, Richo and Jones Insiders, The Drum The Bolt Report Insight The Contrarians, Comedy, satire The Roast, Hamster Decides Mad as Hell, Light Kitchen Cabinet infotainment entertainment/ Gruen Nation, The Project The Feed affairs News and current Breakfast, Capitol Hill, Four Corners, Lateline Today, 60 Minutes 7.30 Report, ABC News Sunrise, Sunday Night Dateline Agenda Australian Television Programs Engaged with the Political Public Sphere, June 2014 (Commercial, Broadcaster, and (commercial broadcast) Corporation (public service broadcast) (commercial broadcast) (commercial broadcast) Service (public service broadcast) (commercial subscription) Nine Network Table 1. Subscription Channels). Australian Broadcasting Seven Network Ten Network Special Broadcasting Sky News Australia

115 116 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

3000

2500

s 2000

Minute 1500

1000 Broadcast

500

0 1996 1998 20012004 2007 2010 2013 Seven Network 60 60 00000 Nine Network 360 180 240 240120 060 Network Ten 125 240606060210 840 ABC Television 1200530 645 590560 2400 2650 SBS Television 240 24065130 140105 300

Figure 1. Political public sphere programs on Australian broadcast television, total for final fortnight of Federal election (excluding election night coverage and news bulletins). declined over the past twenty years. Identifying the number of hours devoted to political news and current affairs on the free-to-air (broadcast) television networks, we see a significant decline in coverage on the two highest rating commercial free-to-air broadcaster (Seven, Nine), an increase on the third commercial broadcaster (Ten), and a slight increase on the second public broadcaster (SBS). The greatest movement shows a 530 percent increase from a low of 530 broadcast hours in 1998 to 2,650 broadcast hours in 2013 for the main public broadcaster, the ABC. The figure for the ABC accelerates sharply from 2010, with the introduction of its twenty-four-hour news channel, ABC News 24, as multichannel broadcasting was introduced on the free-to-air networks. Over the last decade, there has a significant winding back of the engagement of the commercial broadcasters with Australian politics. Programs with a more specifically news and current affairs focus, such as Nine’s Sunday and Ten’s Meet the Press, have been discontinued. The Seven and Nine networks have extended their “newstainment” breakfast programs into the weekends, and Ten replaced Meet the Press by extending the time of The Bolt Report from thirty to sixty minutes. This program, hosted by the Flew and Swift 117 conservative News Limited columnist Andrew Bolt, is certainly focused on Australian politics but is more openly politically partisan, more akin to the programs of U.S. FOX hosts such as Bill O’Reilly and Sean Hannity. The early evening current affairs programs, such as A Current Affair on Nine, and Today Tonight on Seven (canceled at end-2013), no longer made any claims to be dealing with politics or even conventional news, being more focused on various scams, scandals, consumer diet information, and so on (Turner 2005). This has meant that the ABC has come to play a considerably larger role in the Australian political public sphere, as the engagement of commercial broadcasters has been wound back and as the ABC commenced a twenty-four-hour news channel in 2010 (see Figure 1). The other major TV service engaged with the Australian political public sphere is SKY News Australia, which is a twenty-four-hour news channel that has been carried on the FOXTEL subscription broadcasting service since 1996. SKY News is, however, only available to Australian homes that subscribe to FOXTEL (about 30 percent of total Australian homes), and its audience share is estimated to be about 0.2 percent of the total Australian TV audience, as compared with 0.8 percent for ABC NEWS 24, 10.4 percent for ABC TV1, and 22 percent for Seven, which is the highest rating TV network (OzTAM 2014). But the Australian political public sphere is considerably more diverse and vibrant if we consider the range of programs more broadly. Most obviously, we need to consider programs that are based around opinion and commentary on Australian politics. This includes the emblematic ABC program Insiders, the more contentious Bolt Report on Ten, and panel-based programs such as The Drum (ABC), Insight (SBS), and a wide range of programs on the SKY News Australia channel on the FOXTEL subscription TV service. There is also the Q&A program on the ABC, which is panel based and involves a live studio audience but also incorporates social media formats such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to enhance the real-time interactivity of the program. We can also note programs that have a public sphere remit but are targeted to particular sections of the community such as the SBS program Living Black, which deals with indigenous perspectives, and the long-running ABC program Media Watch, which engages in critical commentary on the performance of the Australian media. Finally, we argue that an appropriate mapping of the Australian political public sphere also needs to include light entertainment, “infotainment,” and satirical comedy programs. Interestingly, these are largely to be found on the ABC and include the series Gruen Nation, which critically analyses political advertising, and Kitchen Cabinet, where political journalist Annabel Crabb joins Australian politicians in their homes to cook and share a meal. It includes comedy programs such as Shaun Micaleff’s Mad as Hell, The Roast, and The Hamster Decides, which are all on the ABC. The latter is produced by the “Chaser” comedy team that has produced a number of satirical comedy programs for the ABC, including CNNNN and The Chaser’s War on Everything (Harrington 2014). An interesting news/infotainment hybrid program is The Project (Ten), which has developed a more comedy-oriented format designed to have more appeal to younger audiences who are disengaged form more formal news and current affairs programs. 118 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

In this paper, we have focused upon the forms that an extended model of the Australian political public sphere has taken in television, with particular reference to two programs: the live, panel-based program Q&A, which incorporates elements of real-time interaction through social media into its program format, and the panel- based program Gruen Nation, which critically analyses political advertising during election campaigns, building upon the program The Gruen Transfer, which does this in relation to advertising more generally. While these case studies are part of a larger project that deals with print, radio, and online media, we have focused on television programs in this instance as they provide distinct insights into the “mediatization of politics” as it has been evolving in Australia. The two programs provide important contrasts to one another, as one is within the news and current affairs genre (Q&A) but seeks to extend the concept of a political public sphere (its tagline is “Democracy in action”) in more networked and participatory directions, while the other (Gruen Nation) is notionally a comedy/light entertainment program but is one that generates considerable insight into how Australian political parties and leaders actually engage with the public as voters and citizens. Both programs are broadcast on the national public broadcaster, the ABC, which is a limitation of the study, albeit one necessitated by the relative lack of comparable programs in the Australian commercial free-to-air networks.

Case Studies: Q&A and Gruen Nation In the remainder of this paper, we consider two Australian television programs that engage the political public sphere in original and innovative ways. Both Q&A and Gruen Nation straddle the line between a political public sphere and the mediatization of politics. Q&A seeks to generate a “virtual” public sphere where live audience interaction with politicians and other invited guests is complemented by online engagement through Twitter and Facebook, with a selection of comments being screened live on the TV program: The program’s tagline is “Adventures in Democracy.” Gruen Nation is about political advertising and marketing or what its host, Wil Anderson, has termed “the selling of politics and the politics of selling.” It does not feature current politicians but rather a mix of ex-politicians, political commentators, and advertising executives, who critically analyze the campaign strategies of the political parties. While Gruen Nation is more explicitly concerned with mediated politics, we argue that it engages citizens in the political process very effectively. By contrast, while Q&A promises a less mediated form of political engagement, in reality it is very much framed by the strategies and logics of those political actors who commit to being involved with the program.

Engaging Citizens: Q&A In the Australian political public sphere, the panel discussion program Q&A, on the national public broadcaster the ABC, is an important part of political discussion. Q&A began in 2008 and currently goes to air on Monday nights from 9:30 p.m., where it Flew and Swift 119 follows a series of current affairs programs, including Australian Story and the flagship current affairs programs Four Corners and Media Watch. A distinctive feature of Q&A is that it seeks to deliver a format for political discussion in which the scrutiny of politicians is seen to be more representative than traditionally interrogative one-on- one interview, through direct public participation in live TV studio debate, which generally involves five panelists, chaired by senior journalist Tony Jones. In that respect, the format is similar to the BBC’s Question Time, in enabling members of the public to ask questions of a panel drawn from politics and other spheres of society, such as business, news media, and entertainment. Guests typically include politicians from across the spectrum of parties (including Independents), people with particular expertise in a topical field (economists, environmentalists, etc.), journalists and opinion leaders, and internationally prominent public figures who are visiting Australia. Occasionally, the format involves one-on-one debates, such as the “Treasurers’ debate” between Chris Bowen and Joe Hockey during the 2013 Federal election campaign. The program attracts at least 500,000 viewers per week, making it among the top fifty most viewed weekly programs on Australian television: its highest rating program being a debate on religion and atheism in 2012 between the writer and evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins and Cardinal George Pell, the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, which attracted more than 850,000 viewers. On its program web site, Q & A is described as “energetic and opinionated” and as being “unscripted and unpredictable” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2013). The reality is, however, that to maintain a useful balance between open debate, political talking points, and televised entertainment, the producers and editors of the program must carefully manage panelists and audiences. In promoting the appearance of political balance—and obviating accusations of bias—the program aims to ensure that the in-studio audience comprises a sample of people whose voting intentions (Labor, Liberal-National Party Coalition, Greens, etc.) broadly align with those of the electorate more generally, with the percentage breakdown of the current voting intentions of the studio audience shown up on screen at the start of every edition. In this respect, Q&A seeks to represent the Australian polity, both literally and symbolically, where the studio becomes an agora where the public scrutinize politicians and public figures, question them, and hold them accountable live before the nation. However, members of the audience set the program’s agenda only insofar as the questions asked of panelists are, in the main, preselected from the many provided by the audience in advance of the show’s broadcast (there are occasional spontaneous questions asked from the floor), with most follow-up questions coming from Jones. The range of topics from which audience questions are drawn usually form part of a discussion that—in most instances—has already been rehearsed by people who are comfortable with arguing their case or presenting their side of the debate. Thus, the role of the Q&A live audience rarely extends beyond the asking of questions and the provision of polite applause or muted groans as they sit passively before panelists as they reply to questions and debate with each other on the panel. Audience members have no opportunity to answer back if they feel their own or others’ questions have not been adequately addressed. The live audiences’ politeness owes a deal to executive 120 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1) producer Peter McEvoy who each week carefully briefs audiences about appropriate TV behavior, manners, and respect, telling audiences that “Q&A is about ideas and even passionate debate, but never about who can shout the loudest” (McEvoy 2014). Q&A is intended to be a virtual as well as a physical agora with questions also be set to speakers via e-mail and in video format through YouTube and through the incorporation of an online discussion board. Since 2010, the program has also enabled input from Twitter users adopting the #qanda hashtag, with selected tweets appearing on screen. Q&A producers decided to incorporate Twitter after noticing in early 2008 the #qanda hashtag was receiving dozens of tweets during each weekly program. By the end of 2009, this had grown, in tandem with the rapid growth of Twitter use in Australia, to about two thousand tweets per week (Given and Radywyl 2013). The show now receives in excess of twenty-one thousand tweets on average per episode (Clune 2014). The time-sensitive nature of a live-broadcast Twitter feed means that the eighty to one hundred tweets selected for display each week need to be broadcast within a minute of their posting on Twitter. To assist in a three-stage moderation process, ABC has engaged the services of longtime ABC associate Leslie Nassar’s TweeVee TV (Given and Radywyl 2013). TweeVee TV initially applies algorithmic filters to filter replies, tweets with URLs, and tweets longer than 115 characters, as well as language filters, identity filters (especially for those of known fake politician/ public personality accounts). Screened tweets will then pass through an initial moderator who ensures that, like the live television audience, the Twitter audience is following the “rules” and conventions concerning the posting of tweets that are concise (short); are timely and on topic; are witty and entertaining; add a fresh perspective to the debate; and make a point without getting too personal (ABC 2013). A second moderator then selects tweets for broadcast. In addition, the moderator will automatically receive tweets that are popular within the community (Brookes 2011). In this manner, Twitter users effectively elect the most popular tweets. The incorporation of Twitter means that program producers must effectively cater for three distinct audiences: a live studio audience (including panelists) that has no access to the Twitter feed, a television audience that is witness to behind-the-scenes editorial decisions (e.g., camera shots, selected Twitter feeds), and a second-screening audience that has full access to the live Twitter feed. Of these three audiences, it is the live studio audience that is most disadvantaged as panelists and live audience members have no engagement or conversation with the tweeters, no knowledge of which tweets are being viewed by the home audience, no tangent of the Twitter conversation, and no right of reply to the remarks, challenges, or assertions made. The “liveness” of Q&A, and its combination of broadcasting and social media mean that it can provide an important occasion for staging an action which can in turn frame public debate. On October 25, 2010, a peace activist in the studio audience, Pete Gray, threw his shoes at former Prime Minister John Howard after his response to questions about the Iraq War. By emulating the actions of the Iraqi Muntadhar al-Zaidi, who threw his shoes at U.S. President George W. Bush at a 2008 press conference in Baghdad, the activist gained worldwide news attention as the symbolism of shoe throwing in relation to the Iraq War was internationally understood. The success or Flew and Swift 121 otherwise of an appearance on Q&A can also have wider ramifications for the career of individual politicians. On the July 2, 2012, program, the Shadow Industry Minister, Sophie Mirabella, failed to respond when a panelist alongside her, Simon Sheikh, the Director of activist group GetUp!, collapsed on the panel desk. This generated considerable negative publicity for Mirabella, who was seen as being heartless toward a political critic. This was in contrast to other panel members, such as the Government minister Greg Combet who quickly offered to help. While it is difficult to make a direct correlation, the subsequent hostile commentary on Twitter and the replaying of the incident on various satirical TV programs, consolidated a negative image for Mirabella. In such instances, the events themselves not only become major national news stories but, with the uploading of videos onto sites such as Upworthy, are circulated and discussed worldwide. They also generate a positive “buzz” around politicians who are seen to perform well within the Q&A format, while adverse appearances can affect a candidate’s popularity with voters. Panelists who are seen as doing well on Q&A are those that engage with and perform according to the spirit of the show by choosing not to engage in spin and party politics but to instead speak as independently minded public figures interpreting politics and current events as informed individuals and providing honest answers without being obfuscating. Q&A also provides a forum for the staging of ethical conflict in the public sphere. On September 3, 2013, a Q&A program broadcast during the Federal election campaign saw the Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd made a particularly forthright response to a Brisbane Pastor’s question concerning why he had changed his views on same-sex marriage. Arguing that literal interpretations of the Bible could lead to con- doning slavery, Rudd’s response generated divided commentary, particularly as Rudd had previously presented himself as a devout Christian, whose electoral success in 2007 was due in part to his ability to win over Christian voters who had not been well disposed toward the Australian Labor Party (Smith 2009). Q&A can be understood as attempting to replicate a modern Australian public sphere, albeit one that is mediated by both broadcasting and digital technologies. At the same time, it has developed innovations that suggest going beyond the traditional limitations of the top–down political public sphere, such as the use of Twitter and YouTube videos to enable interactivity, participation, and something more akin to a networked public sphere than the traditional panel discussion show format (Bruns et al. 2011). The inclusion of social media in Q&A could have provided opportunities for a more diverse array of viewpoints and provided innovative ways of communicating with politicians and of organizing debate and discussion, such as the crowdsourcing of questions or the ranking of panelists’ answers. However, the program-makers have integrated broadcast and online content only in the service of animating the television program, offering editorially selected YouTube questions and fragments of online tweets via the one-way, single-channel authority of a live-broadcast television program: seemingly increasing public engagement with politics through entertainment as “a fun way to participate in a live political discussion” (ABC 2013). 122 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Q&A represents the Australian political public sphere in quite paradoxical ways. At one level, it is an alternative to “mediated politics,” as it is built upon the direct engagement of politicians and other panel participants with the citizenry, whether among those in the studio audience or those participating through social media. It provides a forum for agonistic public debate, where ordinary citizens are given the opportunity to voice their concerns directly to their elected representatives, and where the expecta- tion of conflict and disagreement among panel members is built into the program format. At the same time, the interaction is itself highly mediated. Questions that are asked of the politicians go through a multi-stage screening process, and there is a vetting of the studio audience on the basis of voting intentions. Observations of its production also suggest that the producers go to great lengths to ensure that the questions coming from the audience are well rehearsed and worded exactly as approved by producers, suggesting that the politicians are aware of, and thus able to prepare for, the questions that will be put to them. While it aims to replicate a networked public sphere for a transmedia age, there is nonetheless a strong degree to which Q&A furthers the mediatization of politics.

Persuading and Entertaining Citizens: Gruen Nation An important element of the Australian political public sphere in the 2010s has been the television program Gruen Nation. Produced by CJZ and broadcast on the ABC, it is a panel program that has run for four episodes during the 2010 and 2013 Australian Federal elections that critically analyses political campaign advertising. The program is a spin-off of The Gruen Transfer, which has been broadcast on the ABC since 2008 and looks at advertising in general. During the 2010 Federal election, Gruen Nation attracted about 1.5 million viewers and topped its rating timeslot, while the 2013 programs attracted more than 1.2 million viewers. This makes it one of the most watched programs dealing with Australian politics during both campaigns.2 The format of Gruen Nation is that the host Wil Andersen, a well-known Australian comedian, has a mix of advertising industry figures, political analysts, ex-politicians, and political advisers as his regular guests appearing before a live studio audience. At the core of the program format are two regular guests from The Gruen Transfer: Russel Howcroft, the national CEO of the George Patterson Y&R advertising agency, and Todd Sampson, national CEO of the Australian division of international agency Leo Burnett.3 Although both have similar occupational roles, they are positioned quite dif- ferently in the program: Howcroft as the “conservative” on the panel and Sampson as a more politically radical “creative” type. The two distinctive archetypes are used as the basis for the two panelists to stage disagreements about program content. On Gruen Nation in 2013, they were joined by ABC political commentator and program presenter Annabel Crabb, Lachlan Harris, who had previously worked as media advisor to Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, with the fourth panel position shared between John Hewson, who was Liberal Party leader from 1990 to 1994, ABC radio presenter and former Liberal Senator for South Australia (1984–2007) Amanda Vanstone, and veteran Liberal campaigner Toby Ralph. Flew and Swift 123

An important element of the show is that, while Labor and Liberal aligned panel members are sought to ensure the appearance of program balance, they are nonetheless openly critical of the campaigning strategies used by the political parties with which they are associated. Anderson has described the purpose of the program as being that “if the ABC is the national broadcaster, then Gruen Nation is the national bullshit detector” (ABC 2010). It is therefore important that all presenters are skeptical of the parties themselves and that they do not simply repeat their campaigning messages. The program is also not intended to be a platform from which to comment on the policies of the respective parties, but rather on their use of advertising to communicate messages to the public or what Anderson terms “the politics of selling and the selling of politics” (Casimir 2013a). As Anderson also observed in the series,

The Federal election is like a big stocktake sale . . . You won’t hear any policy talk here. We are only interested in how the big brands . . . try and get us to buy. (Gruen Nation 2013a)

At one level, Gruen Nation provides the forms of meta-commentary on advertising and political communication that is familiar to communications and media studies since the pioneering works of Roland Barthes and Judith Williamson (Barthes 1977; Williamson 1978). At the same time, these are also insiders’ accounts of the techniques used to manipulate audiences that are being discussed approvingly rather than critically. In episode 4 (Casimir 2013b), there was discussion of a Labor Party “attack ad” where various people (mothers with children, male workers, schoolchildren, people in wheelchairs) are placed in various “spotlights” against a black background, before it focuses on a single “spotlight” of a boy who—according to the ad—will lose his school bag, hat, and school uniform if the policies of the Liberal-National Party Coalition are adopted. The ensuing discussion notes that the “spotlight” is a familiar feature of negative political advertising as it suggests that the viewer may be another of the “ordinary people” threatened by the other side’s policies should they be elected. But the panelists do not condemn the use of the spotlight as manipulative or deceptive, nor do they question whether this is a realistic representation of the Coalition’s policies. Their purpose is to discuss whether or not this particular use of the “spotlight” technique will have the sought-after effect of causing undecided voters to support the Labor Party. In episode 4, the panelists also discussed the necessity of political leaders appearing on various comedy and “soft news” programs, as well as FM radio programs. Observing that these programs tend to have a younger demographic, as well as a larger number of undecided voters, it is emphasized that politicians need to appear “real” and unscripted in their responses to a very unpredictable range of questions: the biggest turnoff for these audiences is for politicians to appear excessively “on message” and thereby not come across as being “authentic” (Langer 2010). Lachlan Harris notes that this is a challenge, because “Prime Ministers are very busy people. They do not have time to keep up with popular culture” (Casimir 2013b). At the same time, they have to have answers to questions such as who is their favorite band, and Harris recalls that in 2007 124 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Kevin Rudd said his favorite band was the Brisbane band Powderfinger, so part of Harris’s job as a media advisor was to keep Rudd appraised about whether Powderfinger had any new albums out or were touring, in case he was asked on FM radio or on a TV program. Rather than this being seen as manipulative or as devaluing politics or public office, it is clearly seen on Gruen Nation as being as natural a part of contemporary politics as being briefed on foreign policy or developing a budget. As Howcroft con- cluded in relation to Australian politics and popular culture, “If you’re the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Opposition, it’s a media job” (Casimir 2013b).

Conclusion: Engagement and Entertainment in the Australian Political Public Sphere One way of thinking about the two ABC programs under consideration is that Q&A represents the public sphere proper and Gruen Nation is emblematic of the mediatization of politics. Gruen Nation offers an unabashed account of “the politics of selling and the selling of politics,” where advertising executives sit alongside political pundits evaluating the tactics of persuasion used by Australia’s major and minor political parties. It can be said to address the citizen as consumer, albeit a sophisticated, self-aware media consumer who can step back from the relatively unsophisticated tactics of political communication on display with political leaders looking out of airplane windows, angry mothers chopping vegetables while questioning the real intention of these leaders, and children placed in spotlights where losing their school uniform allowance is possibly a precursor of a fate that will be far worse. A clear line is drawn in Gruen Nation between debate about the advertising strategies used to sell particular political leaders and policies and the policies themselves, which are off-limits for panel discussion. In terms of the program’s placement on the ABC, it points to the irony of a program devoted to the discussion of effectiveness in advertising being located on the national public broadcaster, prohibited on the basis of its Charter from carrying commercial advertising. Significantly, it is broadcast on Wednesday nights, which is ear- marked by the ABC as being for comedy and satire, with programs such as The Hamster Wheel, Mad as Hell, and At Home with Julia broadcasting on this night. By contrast, Q&A is a flagship program in the news and current affairs division of the national public broadcaster, and the program understands itself as enabling “democracy in action” for Australian citizens. The program format replicates in a number of respects an “ideal” public sphere, with apparently direct and unmediated interaction between audience members and politicians, and interaction and participation in debates surrounding the program through social media. Yet Q&A also presents mediated politics: The studio audience is intended to be balanced in terms of alle- giance to the major political parties, questions to panel members are checked prior to broadcast, and the Tweets that appear on screen are carefully curated by ABC staff. Politicians clearly view Q&A as another means of reaching the Australian public through the media, albeit by presenting a “self” that appears to engage more “authenti- cally” with the assembled studio audience. Flew and Swift 125

Both Q&A and Gruen Nation can be seen as part of the mediatization of Australian politics, albeit with different relationships to the process. Gruen Nation is premised on the idea that contemporary politics is thoroughly mediatized, to the degree that it is taken as a given that political parties market themselves as brands and products and that the advertising industry are the most appropriate adjudicators of the success of their campaigns. It is premised on the idea that politics needs to entertain if it is to engage and could be seen as promoting the consumerist focus of political communication and what Lindsay Tanner termed the “Sideshow” dimensions of the contemporary media–politics relationship. At the same time, it avoids the “hyper-adversarialism” that concerned Tony Blair in his 2007 Reuters speech: one consequence of viewing politics as selling, rather than as competition over alternative policy visions, is that all parties are essentially seen as participants in the market for votes and where there is no inherent moral superiority. Gruen Nation represents an Australian political public sphere where, as Mazzoleni and Schulz hypothesized, “the language of politics has been married with that of advertising, public relations, and show business” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 251). The case of Q&A is more complex, as it has been developed in part to address criticisms of the media–politics relationship, by requiring politicians to directly engage with members of the public without mediation or spin, while offering them the opportunity to get messages across to the public that are not filtered through the questions asked by political journalists. Moreover, it updates the panel discussion or “Town Hall Meeting” format by encouraging engagement through social media such as Twitter and building this engagement into the live program itself. But it would be somewhat bold to claim that the program is at odds with wider trends toward mediated politics. Rather, it suggests that displays of authenticity provide another element in the ways in which “what counts in the public sphere . . . are communication skills, the style of addressing the public, the ‘look,’ the image” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 251) and how this represents another dimension of the professionalization of politics.

Acknowledgment We acknowledge the support of the Australian Research Council in enabling this research to be undertaken.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Research for this paper was funded through the Australian Research Council Discovery-Projects DP130100705, “Politics, Media and Democracy in Australia: Public and Producer Perceptions of the Political Public Sphere.” 126 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

Notes 1. The full media map data will be presented in a forthcoming book, Politics, Media and Democracy: Perceptions of the Political Sphere in Australia, to be published by Routledge in 2105. 2. The title of the parent program The Gruen Transfer refers to a phenomenon identified by the Austrian architect Victor Gruen, whereby shopping malls are designed in a deliberately confusing manner, so as to disorient the entrant sufficiently to cause them to lose track of their original shopping intention. The result is referred to as “scripted disorientation” where consumers respond by moving in the mall more slowly to get better spatial awareness of their environment. They are also more likely to enter into a wider range of stores than was originally intended (Crawford 2004). 3. Howcroft was also appointed the Executive General Manager of Network Ten in February 2013, meaning that at the time of the 2013 series, he headed a commercial rival to the ABC, which screens Gruen Nation. This is another ironic aspect of a program that deals with advertising but is broadcast on a national public broadcaster that is prevented by law from carrying commercial advertising.

References Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2010. “Gruen Team to Tackle Election.” ABC News, July 6. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2010-07-05/gruen-team-to-tackle-election/892092. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 2013. “Q&A: About the Show.” ABC News. http://www. abc.net.au/tv/qanda/about.htm. Barthes, Roland. 1977. Mythologies. London: Paladin. Baym, Geoffrey. 2010. From Cronkite to Colbert: The Evolution of Broadcast News. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Benkler, Yochai. 2006. The Wealth of Networks. New Haven: Yale University Press. Blair, Tony. 2007. “Lecture by the Prime Minister the Right Honourable Tony Blair MP on Public Life.” Reuters, Canary Wharf, London, June 12. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/06/12/ uk-blair-speech-idUKZWE24585220070612. Blumler, Jay. 2014. “Mediatization and Democracy.” In Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies, ed. Frank Esser and Jesper Strömbäck, 31– 41. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Blumler, Jay, and Dennis Kavanagh. 1999. “The Third Age of Political Communication: Influences and Features.” Political Communication 16 (3): 209–30. Brookes, Stephanie. 2011. “Unscripted and Unpredictable: Communication and Connection in ‘Televised Town Halls,’ Australian Federal Election 2010.” Communication, Politics & Culture 44 (2): 57–75. Bruns, Axel, Jean Burgess, Tim Highfield, Lars Kirchhoff, and Thomas Nicolai. 2011. “Mapping the Australian Networked Public Sphere.” Social Science Computer Review 29 (3): 277–87. Casimir, Jon (executive producer). 2013a. Gruen Nation [Television comedy]. Series 2, Episode 1. August 14. Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Casimir, Jon (executive producer). 2013b. Gruen Nation [Television comedy]. Series, 2, Episode 4. September 4. Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Clune, Bronwyn. 2014. “What Q&A Needs to Do to Improve.” The Guardian, May 12. http:// www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/australia-culture-blog/2014/may/12/what-qa-needs- to-do-to-improve. Flew and Swift 127

Cook, Timothy. 2005. Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Couldry, Nick. 2012. Media, Society, World: Social Theory and Digital Media Practice. Cambridge: Polity. Couldry, Nick, and Andreas Hepp. 2013. “Conceptualizing Mediatization: Contexts, Traditions, Arguments.” Communication Theory 23 (3): 191–202. Crawford, Margaret. 2004. “The World in a Shopping Mall.” In The City Cultures Reader, ed. Malcolm Miles, Tim Hall and Iain Borden, 2nd Edition, 125–40. New York: Routledge. Curran, James, Natalie Fenton, and Des Freedman. 2012. Misunderstanding the Internet. London: Routledge. Dahlgren, Peter. 2013. The Political Web: Participation and Alternative Democracy. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Davis, Aeron. 2010. Political Communication and Social Theory. London: Routledge. Esser, Frank, and Jesper Strömbäck, eds. 2014. Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Garnham, Nicholas. 1990. Capitalism and Communication. London: Sage. Given, Jock, and Natalia Radywyl. 2013. “Questions & Answers & Tweets.” Communication, Politics & Culture 46 (1): 1–21. Gray, Jonathan, Jeffrey Jones, and Ethan Thompson. 2009. Satire TV: Politics and Comedy in the Post-network Age. New York: New York University Press. Habermas, Jürgen. 1974. “The Public Sphere.” New German Critique 3: 49–55. Harrington, Stephen. 2014. Australian TV News: New Forms, Functions, and Futures. Bristol: Intellect. Hartley, John. 1996. Popular Reality: Journalism, Modernity, Popular Culture. London: Arnold. Hendy, David. 2013. Public Service Broadcasting. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hepp, Andreas. 2013. Cultures of Mediatization. Cambridge: Polity. Hjarvard, Stig. 2013. The Mediatization of Culture and Society. London: Routledge. Johnson, Pauline. 2012. Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere. London: Routledge. Langer, Ana Inés. 2010. “The Politicization of Private Persona: Exceptional Leaders or the New Rule? The Case of United Kingdom and the Blair Effect.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 15 (1): 60–76. Lowe, Gregory. 2009. The Public in Public Service Media. Göteburg, Sweden: Nordicom. Lundby, Knut. 2009. “Introduction: ‘Mediatization’ as Key.” In Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences, ed. Knut Lundby, 1–18. New York: Peter Lang. Marcinkowski, Frank. 2014. “Mediatisation of Politics: Reflections on the State of the Concept.” Javnost: The Public 21 (2): 5–22. Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, and Winfried Schulz. 1999. “ ‘Mediatization’ of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?” Political Communication 16 (3): 247–61. McEvoy, Peter. 2014. “Protesters Spoil Chance to Persuade.” The Drum, May 6. http://www. abc.net.au/news/2014-05-06/mcevoy-protesters-spoil-chance-to-persuade/5434460. McKee, Alan. 2005. The Public Sphere: An Introduction. London: Sage. McNair, Brian. 2011. An Introduction to Political Communication. 5th Edition. London: Routledge. Nolan, David. 2008. “Tabloidisation Revisited: The Regeneration of Journalism in Conditions of ‘Advanced Liberalism.’” Communication, Politics & Culture 41 (2): 100–18. 128 The International Journal of Press/Politics 20(1)

OzTAM. 2014. “Consolidated Metropolitan Total TV Share of All Viewing: 5 City Share Report—All Homes, Week 18 2014.” http://www.oztam.com.au/LatestAvailableReports. aspx. Smith, Rodney. 2009. “How Would Jesus Vote? The Churches and the Election of the Rudd Government.” Australian Journal of Political Science 44 (4): 613–37. Strömbäck, Jesper. 2008. “Four Phases of Mediatization: An Analysis of the Mediatization of Politics.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13 (3): 228–46. Strömbäck, Jesper, and Frank Esser. 2014. “Mediatization of Politics: Towards a Theoretical Framework.” In Mediatization of Politics: Understanding the Transformation of Western Democracies, ed. Frank Esser and Jesper Strömbäck, 31–41. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Tandy, Adam (Producer). 2007–2012. The Thick Of It [Television comedy]. London: British Broadcasting Corporation. Tanner, Lindsay. 2011. Sideshow: Dumbing Down Democracy. Melbourne: Scribe Publications. Turner, Graeme. 1999. “Tabloidisation, Journalism and the Possibility of Critique.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 2 (1): 59–76. Turner, Graeme. 2005. Ending the Affair: The Decline of Television Current Affairs in Australia. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. van Zoonen, Leisbet. 2005. Entertaining the Citizen: When Politics and Popular Culture Converge. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Williamson, Judith. 1978. Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising. London: Marion Boyars. Wilson, Jason. 2011. “Sunrise to Sunset: Kevin Rudd as Celebrity in Australia’s Post-Broadcast Democracy.” Celebrity Studies 2 (1): 97–99. Working Dog Productions. 2008. The Hollow Men [Television comedy]. Melbourne: Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Author Biographies Terry Flew is Professor of Media and Communcaition at the Queensland University of Technology. He is the author of New Media: An Introduction (2014), The Creative Industries, Culture and Policy (2012), Global Creative Industries (2013), Understandign Global Media (2007), and Media Economics (2015, forthcoming, co-authored with Stuart Cunningham and Adam Swift). Adam Swift is a Senior Research Associate at the Queensland University of Technology. He is the author of Media Economics (2015, forthcoming, co-authored with Stuart Cunningham and Terry Flew).