World Bank Document

Document of The World Bank

Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR3030

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-92979 TF-92980)

ON A GRANT

Public Disclosure Authorized FROM THE

FOOD PRICE CRISIS RESPONSE TRUST FUND

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 5 MILLION

TO THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU

FOR AN

Public Disclosure Authorized EMERGENCY FOOD SECURITY RESPONSE PROJECT

April 28, 2014

Agriculture and Rural Development Public Disclosure Authorized Country Department AFCF1 Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective July 31, 2008)

Currency Unit = CFA franc (CFAF) US$ 1.00 = CFAF 413.85

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CBMP Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project CBO Community-based organization CFA Communauté Financière Africaine CFAF CFA franc CSB Corn-soya blend EC European Commission EFSSP Emergency Food Security Support Project (EU and WB funding) EPP Emergency Project Paper ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework EU European Union EUFRRF European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility FCRP Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund g Grams GDP Gross domestic product GEF Global Environment Facility GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program ha Hectare INPA Instituto Nacional da Pesquisa Agraria National Agricultural Research Institute ISN Interim Strategy Note ISR Implementation Status Report kg Kilogram km Kilometer L Liter m Meter M Million MADR Ministerio de Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development) M&E Monitoring and evaluation NGO Nongovernmental organization NPK Nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium PDO Program Development Objectives PNIA Programa Nacional de Investimento Agrícola National Agricultural Investment Program PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper t Metric ton

TCU Technical Coordination Unit TF Trust Fund TTL Task Team Leader UN United Nations WFP World Food Programme

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Vera Songwe Sector Manager: Martien van Nieuwkoop Project Team Leader: Aniceto Timoteo Bila ICR Team Leader: Jane C. Hopkins

THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU Emergency Food Security Support Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 17

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 23 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 25 6. Lessons Learned...... 28 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners...... 29 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 30 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...... 31 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 36 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 40 Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 42 Annex 6. Supporting Documents ...... 49 Map ...... 51

A. Basic Information

Guinea Bissau--Food Country: Guinea-Bissau Project Name: Price Crisis Response Program Project ID: P113468 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-92979,TF-92980 ICR Date: 04/28/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: GUINEA BISSAU Original Total USD 5.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 5.00M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 5.00M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: World Food Programme (WFP) PIU - MARD Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: Effectiveness: 10/13/2008 02/10/2009 Appraisal: 08/07/2008 Restructuring(s): Approval: 09/22/2008 Mid-term Review: 03/31/2010 Closing: 09/30/2011 08/31/2013

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status:

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Crops 60 60 Other social services 20 20 Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry 20 20

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Global food crisis response 100 100

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Vera Songwe Antonella Bassani Sector Manager: Martien Van Nieuwkoop Karen Mcconnell Brooks Project Team Leader: Aniceto Timoteo Bila Aniceto Timoteo Bila ICR Team Leader: Jane C. Hopkins ICR Primary Author: Rachel Wilder Bingham

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of this project is to improve food security for the most vulnerable population, including children, and increase smallholder rice production in project areas.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Number of students receiving one meals a day Value quantitative or 0 14,000 14,102 Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 101% achieved achievement) Number of days of work-days (rations distributed to rural producers) in food-for- Indicator 2 : work activities Value quantitative or 0 160,000 285,000 Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 130% achieved achievement) Indicator 3 : Quantity of rice produced in the new rehabilitated areas under the project (tons) Value quantitative or 0 7,500 9,378 Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 125% achieved achievement)

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1 : Hectares of mangrove rice rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 2,000 2,741 or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 137% achieved achievement) Indicator 2 : Hectares of lowland rice rehabilitated Value 0 3,000 2,880

(quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 96% achieved achievement) Indicator 3 : Number of farmer groups with access to agricultural inputs Value (quantitative 0 500 534 or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 Comments (incl. % 107% achieved achievement) Indicator 4 : Number of sub-projects approved and under implementation Value (quantitative 0 300 267 or Qualitative) Date achieved 09/23/2008 09/23/2008 08/31/2013 89% achieved. Note that this indicator captures only the post-harvest micro- Comments projects. The previous indicator (number of farmer groups with access to (incl. % agricultural inputs) captures the production micro-projects. The total number of achievement) micro-projects was 801.

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 05/29/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.86 2 12/21/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.58 3 06/09/2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.90 4 10/11/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.00 5 10/20/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.43 6 05/28/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.43 7 01/02/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.43 8 09/11/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.00

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design

1. The Emergency Food Security Response Project was financed by a US$ 5.0 million grant from the Global Food Crisis Response Program Trust Fund (FCRP-TF) under the Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP), which was endorsed by the Board on May 29, 2008. The operation supported the strategy of the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau to maintain and enhance food security by mitigating the short- and medium-term impacts of the sharp rise in global food prices that began in 2008. The project was fully consistent with the GFRP’s objectives, which were to: (i) reduce the negative impact of high and volatile food prices on the lives of the poor in a timely way; (ii) support governments in the design of sustainable policies that mitigate the adverse impacts of high and more volatile food prices on poverty while minimizing the creation of long-term market distortions; and (iii) support broad-based growth in productivity and market participation in agriculture to ensure an adequate and sustainable food supply response.

1.1 Context at Appraisal

2. Country context. Over the past decade, Guinea-Bissau invariably has appeared near the bottom of the annual Human Development Index issued by the United Nations Development Programme; it ranked 176th of 186 countries in the 2012 index. Since the civil war of 1998, which is estimated to have cut national income by 20 percent, economic growth has barely exceeded population growth: Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012 is estimated at about US$ 520. Chronic poverty is deep; even more worrisome, it has only deepened in the last decade. The poverty rate climbed from 65 percent in 2002 to 69 percent in 2010, and preliminary estimates indicate that by 2013 it had reached 75 percent. Levels of extreme poverty followed the same pattern, rising from 22 percent in 2002 to 33 percent by 2010 and to an estimated 45 percent at present. The achievement of most Millennium Development Goals will remain out of reach well beyond the 2015 horizon.1

3. Emerging food crisis. At appraisal, the country’s 12-month inflation rate was rapidly increasing; it climbed from 3.2 percent at the end of 2006 to 9.3 percent by the end of 2007, driven mainly by a 14 percent rise in food prices in 2007 and a 15.5 percent increase in 2008. Consumer prices for rice, the most important and preferred staple food, nearly doubled in international markets between 2007 and 2008. Similarly, in Guinea- Bissau the price of rice reportedly rose from CFAF 250 per kilogram (US$ 0.61, at the current exchange rate) to CFAF 430 per kilogram (US$ 1.05) during the summer of 2008. The inflationary trend is likely to persist over the medium term. Most recent statistics indicate that Bissau-Guineans spend roughly 65 percent of their income on food, leaving them extremely vulnerable to increased food prices.2 At the national level, the fiscal costs

1 Interim Strategy Note (FY2014–2015) for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Draft, Dec. 16, 2013. 2 Vulnerability Assessment Analysis and Mapping, 2005, World Food Programme.

of tariff reductions granted for imports of rice and fuel in March 2008 were estimated at US$ 7.3 million.3

4. Poverty and agriculture. At the time of appraisal, Guinea-Bissau ranked 175th of 177 countries on the Human Development Index. It was unlikely to reach any of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 without peace and significant donor support. An estimated 60 percent of its population lived in poverty, 4 while 80 percent were subsistence farmers. Despite a favorable environment for agriculture, the country’s impoverished agricultural population was able to meet only 60 percent of the national demand for rice in 2007/08. An important consideration is that most of the rural poor are involved in producing cashews, the country’s primary export crop; in 2008, cashews accounted for 98 percent of export revenues and 17 percent of government revenues. Traditionally cashews are bartered at harvest for imported rice, but the cashew price has not kept pace with rapidly rising price of rice.

5. Institutional and capacity issues. Guinea-Bissau’s weak institutional capacity is a product of its history. At independence in 1974, the literacy rate was 1 percent, and the country had 60 kilometers of paved road. Almost none of its citizens were educated, and they had been systematically excluded from participation in all aspects of colonial public administration. The past four decades have been roiled by intense political instability, often marked by the intrusion of the military on the political scene, which has undermined law and order. These circumstances have prevented the formation of stable, accountable institutions and frequently rendered successive governments incapable of providing essential public services and infrastructure. The World Bank’s first and last intervention in the agricultural sector prior to the Emergency Food Security Response Project closed in 1995. Although the earlier project focused specifically on establishing and building capacity within the Ministry of Rural Development and Agriculture (MADR), 5 it operated in a vacuum of government policy and disjointed international support for agriculture. Its achievements quickly dissipated.6

6. Alignment with strategies of Guinea-Bissau and the World Bank. The Emergency Food Security Response Project’s strategy of responding to urgent shortages of staple crops was aligned with both pillars of the Interim Strategy Note (ISN) FY2009– 2010: (i) strengthening economic management and laying the foundations for improvements in the productive sectors and (ii) increasing access to basic services, especially in rural areas. 7 The emergency project’s focus on the provision of seed, production tools, fertilizer, and small equipment was also well aligned with the Government of Guinea-Bissau’s Emergency Plan for the Agricultural Campaign of 2008– 2010.8

3 Rice imports pay only taxes related to the West African Economic and Monetary Union (at a rate of about 2.5 percent). 4 World Bank (AFTP4), Integrated Poverty and Social Assessment (IPSA), Vol. II: Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau (May 2006). 5 Ministerio de Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural (MADR). 6 Implementation Completion Report, Agriculture Services Project, June 1995 (approved 1987). 7 World Bank, Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (FY09–FY10), Report No. 48466-GW (May 20, 2009). 8 Guinea-Bissau’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper was drafted at the end of 2011.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) and Key Indicators (as approved)

7. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to improve food security for the most vulnerable population, including children, and increase smallholder rice production in project areas.

8. Key Project Outcome Indicators selected for measuring and monitoring progress toward achieving the PDO included:

• Number of students in targeted schools receiving one meal daily. • Number of days of work-days in food-for-work activities (rations distributed to rural producers). • Quantity of rice produced in the new rehabilitated areas under the project (tons).

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

9. Neither the PDO nor key indicators were formally revised.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

10. The principal beneficiaries targeted by the Emergency Food Security Response Project and the benefits they were meant to receive included:

• Component 1: Support for the Most Vulnerable Population (US$ 1.5 million). Primary-school children (grades 1–6) were expected to benefit from meals provided at school, and girls in grades 4–6 with good attendance were also to benefit from take-home rations. Male and female agricultural producers, their families, and their organizations were expected to benefit from the provision of rations in exchange for work to rehabilitate land used to grow rice. • Component 2: Support for Increasing Food Production (US$ 3.0 million). Male and female agricultural producers, their associations, and their families were expected to benefit from increased agricultural production made possible through the distribution of inputs and technical training. MADR was expected to benefit from technical and project management training. • Component 3: Program Coordination, Monitoring, and Evaluation (US$ 0.5 million). MADR, particularly its Department of Rural Engineering, was expected to benefit from project management training and basic improvements in working conditions through the distribution of computer equipment and software and the renovation of offices.

11. Secondary beneficiaries included: (i) families of students receiving school meals and take-home rations, and households participating in food-for-work activities, who

experienced reduced pressure on household food and financial resources; (ii) communities in proximity to newly rehabilitated land, which benefitted from increased production of rice and vegetables; (iii) families of producers receiving inputs and training; (iv) national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) recruited and trained by the World Food Programme (WFP) and MADR in project management and technical topics; and (v) rural civil servants of MADR, who received technical training and on-the- job managerial training provided by consultants, the project’s Technical Coordination Unit (TCU), and national NGOs.

12. Five of eight regions in Guinea-Bissau received support from the project—Bafata, Biombo, Bissau, Cacheu, Gabu, and Oio—as well as the Autonomous Sector of Bissau.

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

13. Component 1: Support for the Most Vulnerable Population (US$ 1.5 million). Component 1 was designed to support the most vulnerable population through: (i) a school feeding program and (ii) a food-for-work program to rehabilitate land under rice. WFP implemented this component through a specific Grant Agreement with the World Bank. The school feeding program (Subcomponent 1.1) was expected to be implemented over one year (October 20, 2008 to September 20, 2009), and the food-for work program (Subcomponent 1.2) over two years (October 2008 to September 2010). The component was expected to serve 14,000 students one hot meal per day and supply roughly 930 metric tons (t) of food for both programs (school feeding and food-for-work). In addition, the school feeding program was expected to provide take-home rations for female students who had an attendance rate of 80 percent. The food basket was to contain cereals, corn-soya blend (CSB) food, pulses, vitamin A-enriched vegetable oil, sugar, and iodized salt. The food-for-work activities were intended to rehabilitate rice land by building dikes for mangrove rice on about 2,000 hectares and drainage channels and anti-erosion banks for lowland rice (about 3,000 hectares). The 180,000 beneficiaries of this program were expected to work on rehabilitation activities in exchange for food rations generating roughly 160,000 workdays. The school feeding program targeted five regions (Bafata, Biombo, Cacheu, Gabu, and Oio), while the food-for-work program targeted the same five as well as the Autonomous Sector of Bissau.

14. Component 2: Support for Increasing Rice Production (US$ 3.0 million). Component 2 was designed to deliver immediate benefits to food-insecure rural communities through the distribution of inputs, tools, other equipment, and training while also creating a foundation for sustainable production increases. This component provided matching grants to groups of smallholder farmers to pursue activities that would increase food production and their access to markets (Subcomponent 2.1); at the same time, it provided training to MADR to strengthen its technical capacity to assist smallholders and their organizations (Subcomponent 2.2). While the project would support diversification and production of all food crops, the main focus was to increase rice production.

15. More specifically, roughly 500 smallholder farmer groups were expected to increase food production and productivity through the use of improved seed and other

agricultural inputs supplied under this component, which aimed to reduce the national rice deficit by 10 percent through the production of an additional 10,000 tons of paddy rice. Under a demand-driven matching grant approach, which had proven successful in other projects in Guinea-Bissau,9 farmer organizations in six regions (Bafata, Biombo, Bissau, Cacheu, Gabu, and Oio) requested grants for particular micro-projects to enhance productivity. MADR coordinated these activities with the help of a selected group of national NGOs that had been trained to support communities’ requests for and implementation of matching grants.10

16. Component 3: Project Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation (US$ 0.5 million). Component 3 was designed to ensure adequate administrative systems to support implementation and facilitate achievement of the PDO. To that end, Component 3 supported (i) the coordination, management, and oversight functions of the TCU set up within the Department of Rural Engineering in MADR and (ii) the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Section and information management system to be set up within the TCU.

17. A multifaceted approach to achieve the PDO. In summary, Component 1 was designed to use WFP expertise to respond immediately to food insecurity in two vulnerable populations. The first consisted of rural children participating in the school feeding program and the female students who received take-home rations (without which they may not otherwise have attended school). The second vulnerable population consisted of unemployed and landless rural laborers, who received daily rations through the food-for-work program. Aside from achieving near-term results, both components laid the groundwork for medium-term impacts. Component 1 was designed to foster improvements in the food supply in the medium term through the production and productivity gains ensuing from land rehabilitated under the food-for-work program. Similarly, Component 2 aimed not only to stimulate a rapid supply response but to build the capacity of rural households and MADR to maintain production increases over the medium term.

1.6 Revised Components

18. The components were not revised during implementation.

1.7 Other significant changes

19. The design, scope, scale, and implementation arrangements for the project did not change during its implementation, although the project completed five Level Two Restructurings, for a total extension of 23 months from the original closing date. Each restructuring requested an extension of the closing date, and the first also requested a reallocation of funds between components and subcomponents. The closing date extensions were requested to: (i) mitigate delays in the procurement and distribution of Component 2 goods; (ii) allow completion of activities after political instability caused a

9 Specified in Section 2.1. 10 Smallholder farmer groups were expected to contribute 10 percent of the total micro-project cost in-kind.

nine month suspension of funds from April to December 2012; and (iii) facilitate the preparation of an Additional Financing, which had been envisioned but is only now being prepared as a separate GFRP-financed project.

20. As the project got underway in 2009, parallel funding from the EU Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility (EUFRRF) became available to complement and scale up the project’s activities.11 The parallel funding made it possible to: (i) increase the school feeding program from 14,000 to 28,000 beneficiaries; (ii) promote food production through the distribution of improved seed and fertilizer; (iii) provide matching grants to groups of smallholder farmers to finance micro-projects related to small-scale agricultural infrastructure, production, processing, and marketing; (iv) strengthen MADR’s technical capacity to assist smallholders and their organizations; and (v) rehabilitate 300 kilometers of rural roads in the five regions covered by the project under a food-for-work program to facilitate the flow of agricultural products to markets in residential and commercial centers. Table 1 indicates the complementarity and value-added of the parallel financing.

Table 1: Activities Supported through Parallel Funding from the European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility to Complement and Scale up Activities under the Emergency Food Security Response Project

Emergency Food Security Response Project European Union Food Crisis Rapid Activity (Food Price Crisis Response Trust Fund) Response Facility P113468 P120214 School feeding Provide one meal daily to 14,000 students Provide one meal daily to an additional 14,000 students Food for work Under a food-for-work program, rehabilitate Under a food-for-work program, 5,000 ha of rice land to increase food rehabilitate 300 km of rural roads to production facilitate flow of agricultural products Distribution of Distribute seed, tools, equipment, and training Provide seed and other inputs through 64 technology packages through 800 micro-projects to produce 7,500 t micro-projects to produce 1,000 t of rice of rice per year and improve post-harvest processing Management and Support WFP-managed school feeding and Same, with additional emphasis on coordination food-for-work interventions; support TCU at visibility and communication MADR to oversee input provision, micro- projects, and coordination

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

Soundness of background analysis

21. The Emergency Project Paper (EPP) adequately described the country context and the Government of Guinea-Bissau’s emergency sector strategy by emphasizing the negative impact that rising food prices, particularly rice prices, could have on government receipts and rural poverty. The EPP’s sound and compelling justification for an emergency operation pointed to the steep price increases in imported foods, the

11 Implementation Completion Report (No. ICR 00002317) for a grant in the amount of € 2.87 million under the European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility Trust Fund (TF096347, TF 096348), June 28, 2012, page 1.

decreasing competitiveness of the country’s largest export (cashews), and the capacity of its land resources to support growth in agricultural production and productivity.

22. In 2008, the World Bank was under great pressure to respond rapidly to worsening conditions in Guinea-Bissau as the global food price crisis gathered momentum and fuel prices continued to rise; for that reason, it elected to develop the project under OP/BP 8.0. A Bank team composed of agricultural experts and economists visited Guinea-Bissau to discuss the proposed project with the local stakeholders.12 A Concept Note was prepared expeditiously and submitted to a Regional Review Committee; the final review was conducted via a virtual meeting. Background data used in designing the project included WFP surveys and analyses of food insecurity and malnutrition, documentation for the Coastal and Biodiversity Management Project (CBMP), and the analysis that the government had undertaken for the Emergency Action Plan for Agricultural Campaign 2008–2010. The project was prepared in less than two months from the date of the initial Concept Note review on July 27, 2008 to the Board’s approval on September 22, 2008.

Assessment of project design

23. Although preparation and appraisal took place under challenging conditions, the design was substantially sound. It was relevant to Guinea-Bissau’s priorities for the agricultural sector and to its economic realities and aligned with the draft ISN. The project also had clear components and appropriate implementation arrangements.

24. Relevance to Guinea-Bissau’s agricultural sector priorities and economic realities. The PDO responded adequately to national circumstances and development priorities. Component 1 addressed an immediate financing need and allowed the critical school feeding and food-for-work programs implemented by WFP to continue through the worst of the food price increases. Components 1.2 and 2 attacked the main agricultural supply constraints outlined in sector strategy documents by rehabilitating essential rice production land, injecting urgently needed production inputs into smallholders’ production systems, and effectively starting to fill the technology void that severely inhibits food production in Guinea-Bissau.

25. Alignment with the ISN. The activities to be supported under the project were well aligned with the ISN for FY2009–FY2010. That document identified increased rice production as a key outcome indicator under its first pillar: strengthening economic management and laying the foundations for improvements in the productive sectors.

26. Clear components. As discussed in Section 1.5, the project’s components were focused clearly on a set of distinct, urgently needed activities that were in keeping with the GFRP Trust Fund mandate to mitigate the short- and medium-term impacts of the food crisis.

12 Interview with Task Team Leader, Aniceto Bila, January 22, 2014.

27. Appropriate implementation arrangements. The implementation arrangements proposed were appropriate and relevant. In general, the outsourcing of Component 1 activities to WFP, while maintaining a coordination unit within MADR, acknowledged the government’s implementation capacity constraints along with the need to foster Guinea-Bissau’s ownership of its rural development investments. Direct contracting with WFP for the school feeding and food-for-work programs was based on earlier experiences in Liberia, where similar grants to WFP had been implemented successfully, and it gave this experienced organization the autonomy to carry on its successful Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) without unnecessary complications.

28. As mentioned, the matching grant model used to implement Subcomponent 2.1 was adapted from successful community-based development projects. They included completed projects in Angola and Nigeria and three on-going projects in Guinea-Bissau: the CBMP, funded by the World Bank, Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the European Commission (EC); the Projecto de Reabilitação Social do Sector Agrario,13 funded by the African Development Bank; and the Community Support Program funded by the EC. Experience at appraisal indicated that this model was appropriate and well accepted by beneficiaries.

29. Project management arrangements recognized the recipient’s commitment to the project while addressing relevant capacity concerns through: (i) the establishment of a TCU within the Department of Rural Engineering at MADR, as this department had shown itself to be fully engaged in the project’s rapid preparation and design; (ii) delegation of fiduciary management at start-up to the on-going satisfactory CBMP project; and (iii) including a training program for fiduciary specialists within MADR.

30. In sum, the project was highly relevant and its implementation arrangements were appropriate for an emergency response project. Inevitably, the accelerated (60-day) preparation timeline resulted in some moderate shortcomings in design: (i) Beneficiary targeting. The Regional Review Committee requested an indication of the criteria for selecting areas and beneficiaries for the school feeding and food-for-work programs. 14 The criteria, although probably appropriate in the context of an emergency operation, could have been defined more rigorously if more time had been available to do so. For example, beneficiaries of the food-for- work (land rehabilitation) activities were identified based on information available from Vulnerability Assessment Mapping and Food Security Assessments. These analyses, carried out at the regional level, did not permit the project to target specific plots, although project documents indicate that land rehabilitation was to target fields of producers who were unable to produce and therefore likely to be more vulnerable than others. Because no data were available to identify such producers objectively, targeting was based on MADR staff knowledge of the area which, while significant, risked being somewhat subjective.

13 Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Project. 14 Minutes of Regional Review Committee (RRC) Meeting of July 27, 2008 and virtual RRC review of August 8-12, 2008.

(ii) Implementation timeline. The proposed implementation timeline for Component 2 proved optimistic, given the time that was ultimately required to recruit project staff, prepare an operations manual and Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), assemble baseline data, and train and equip national NGOs to assist groups of smallholders in preparing and implementing micro-projects under the matching grant program.15 (iii) Coordination mechanisms. Implementation arrangements and communication would have benefited from a specific mechanism for coordinating activities across the TCU, WFP, and Project Steering Committee.16

31. For the most part, major risks were identified correctly during preparation. They included country-level risks related to: (i) exogenous economic shocks, (ii) the political fallout from delayed elections, (iii) weak local capacity for implementation, and (iv) governance risks. Project-level risks identified at preparation included: (i) technical/design risks resulting from inadequate oversight and limited availability of inputs, (ii) limited implementation capacity, (iii) elite capture of matching grants, and (iv) potentially inadequate fiduciary management available from the CBMP. The measures proposed to mitigate those risks were generally appropriate and adequate.

32. The Quality Assurance Group did not assess Quality at Entry.

2.2 Implementation

Component 1: Support for the Most Vulnerable Population (US$ 1.5 million)

33. Component 1 was implemented according to schedule, despite some initial issues (see the next paragraph). The Grant Agreement was signed three weeks after the expected effectiveness date and became effective the same day. The component was fully disbursed by July 2009 for the procurement and associated distribution costs of 1,585 tons 17 of food.

34. As anticipated, 290.34 tons of food were distributed during one school year under the school feeding program through once-daily meals for students from first through sixth grade and take-home rations for girls from fourth through sixth grade who had an 80 percent attendance record. The school feeding program had anticipated starting in January 2009, yet late signing of the Grant Agreement in mid-October 2008 delayed the arrival of internationally procured rations. Thanks to WFP’s extensive experience, the school feeding program still started four months after effectiveness, as planned; the first tranche of the program was executed between March and July 2009, and the second from October to December of the same year.

15 See Annex 6 of the EPP (Report No. 44941-GW), September 9, 2008. 16 Interviews with WFP, Bank, and TCU staff, December 2013. 17 Including 509 tons for the school feeding program and 1,076 for the food-for-work program.

35. An unforeseen positive consequence of that delay was that the project was able to fill the gap between Bank financing and the parallel EU financing with the remaining 218.66 tons of rations between January and March 2010. Consequently, the original 14,000 students fed under the FCRP suffered no break in school meals, while the additional 14,000 students targeted under EUFRRF began receiving meals as planned.

36. Unfortunately, supply issues affected the rations supplied to a portion of students during the 2009 school year (Table 2). For example, during the first tranche, the take- home ration for girls experienced a decrease in quantity (as well as nutritional quality) when rice was substituted for maize. During the second tranche, supply issues caused the size of the school meal ration to decrease. 18 The project organized beneficiary communities to contribute rice and sugar whenever possible to assure a nutritionally balanced ration.

Table 2: Rations Supplied to Students during the 2009 School Year

Decline in Program Original Ration Changed Ration Quantity of Ration Take-home ration for girls, grades 4–6, with 208 g maize meal 167 g rice 20% 80% attendance School meal ration for students, grades 1–6 120 g CSB 100 g CSB 17% 20 g oil 10 g oil 50% 15 g sugar 8 g sugar 47%

37. Throughout implementation, WFP placed heavy emphasis on building local ownership of the school feeding program. With the help of project funds, WFP teams trained local staff of the Ministry of Education and members of Parent-Teacher Associations to manage food stocks, coordinate and distribute meals, and monitor results. Strong local ownership improved the quality of oversight on the ground and ensured appropriate use of project resources. In communities where local management capacity was weak or community engagement was modest, field partners (international and national NGOs) were enlisted to support the school feeding activities, which noticeably improved performance.

38. Several factors limited the effectiveness of feeding programs in some schools. For example, some teachers could not manage the program well, and some communities were not strongly involved. Poor school infrastructure (unsuitable classrooms, inappropriate kitchens, and the absence of a water supply system and latrines) and the lack of adequate educational materials and desks could limit the program’s nutritional and educational impacts. The Ministry of Education lacked the capacity to follow up regularly—including difficulties with transport. Serious mismanagement of food commodities and unacceptable reporting standards in 9 out of 116 schools caused them to be suspended from the school feeding program until their headmasters were replaced by the Ministry of Education.

18 See WFP, Summary Report for Implementation of School Feeding and Land Rehabilitation Activities (WFP Final Report), June 2011, page 5.

39. Food-for-work activities were scheduled to take into account the agricultural calendar. Dike construction and canal dredging/digging started in April, when rains were minimal, and finished in time to establish nurseries in mid-June and transplant seedlings in mid-July. Seven national NGOs were hired and trained to distribute food and monitor activities. Each worker could expect to receive a 3-kilogram take-home ration of rice, oil and salt, but to facilitate and lighten the work day, most communities chose to contribute roughly one-third of that ration to a noontime meal eaten at the work site.

40. WFP’s flexible food-for-work model can be adapted to the local context. The quantity of food supplied is based on the number of days expected to complete the work, not on the number of workers. The number of work-days and quantity of food distributed are inversely related: If more workers arrive, the quantity of food increases and the number of work-days decreases proportionally. Demand for work to rehabilitate water management systems for rice fields was high (understandably, because families depend on the produce of those fields to survive during the year), but no workers were turned away, showing the relevance of this model for the local context.

41. With their knowledge of local customs and efficient organizational methods, the NGOs and their WFP support teams successfully rehabilitated nearly half (2,293 ha) of the planned area of 5,000 hectares between April and July 2009; of this area, 1,802 hectares were cultivated (79 percent). The following year, the same NGOs and support teams facilitated the rehabilitation of an additional 3,328 hectares (of which 2,757 hectares were cultivated). Food-for-work programs also resulted in the rehabilitation of 969,454 meters of dikes and 54,939 meters of canals.19 The NGOs’ personal relationships with many beneficiaries also provided quality control, because they were able to ensure that no family took home more than one ration.

42. Coordination between the TCU, MADR, and WFP played a key role in the successful implementation of the food-for-work component. The TCU and MADR provided the technical knowledge and criteria required to identify sites for work programs; WFP provided its expertise in food distribution and labor organization. WFP supplied 41.8 tons of lowland rice seed, and the TCU supplied 27 tons of mangrove rice seed, for farmers to plant the newly rehabilitated land. Joint assessment missions by WFP, the World Bank, and the TCU were well organized and thorough; the ensuing discussions were constructive and effective, and the clear aide-mémoires served as good guides for adjustments in project implementation.20

Component 2: Support for Increasing Rice Production (US$ 3.00 million)

43. Component 2 experienced delays early in implementation, primarily because of inadequate national capacity to manage the logistical, technical, and administrative challenges of the rapid start-up, not for lack of attention or commitment to the project.

19 WFP, Summary Report for Implementation of School Feeding and Land Rehabilitation Activities (WFP Final Report), June 2011, page 2. 20 WFP, Summary Report for Implementation of School Feeding and Land Rehabilitation Activities (WFP Final Report), June 2011, page 8.

For example, lack of knowledge of the Bank’s procurement rules for consulting services led to confusion over whether government personnel could fill key management positions in the TCU as consultants. Because qualified independent consultants were scarce, and because the Bank’s procurement rules prevented government personnel from working as project consultants owing to potential conflicts of interest, many positions remained open for the first six months of implementation. Critical activities experienced delays, including preparation of the operations manual and ESMF and the hiring and training of national NGOs.21 Fortunately these start-up delays did not affect the overall quality of implementation. If anything, they provided time for the project coordinator and team to learn the rules and establish the details of the implementation arrangements for this component. Once activities began in earnest, they were implemented on schedule, and the level of technical quality was high. For example:

• The TCU maintained a sharp focus on problem-solving and improving the quality of operations. When it was learned that 21 percent of the land rehabilitated under the food-for-work program in the first year (2009) could not be cultivated because the new dikes washed out in the first rainy season, the TCU identified the technical issue causing the problem. The narrow, hand-made drainage openings at the base of the dikes were at fault; these traditional openings could not resist the pressure of outflowing tidal waters, and the dikes collapsed around them, particularly in the mangrove areas. For the next planting season, all dike construction was completed using PVC pipe for drainage, and the proportion of rehabilitated land that could be cultivated increased by 4 percent.22 Another example of problem-solving occurred when the WFP food-for-work teams pointed out the lack of small tools, fertilizers, pesticides, and protective gear to improve production performance on rehabilitated land. The TCU prioritized these items in micro-project support to farmers whose land had been rehabilitated.

• National NGOs were hired and trained to support implementation of production activities from conception to evaluation. While the hiring and training of local NGOs delayed disbursements in Component 2, the training ensured that the quality of implementation was high. The NGOs’ contracts included a number of specific responsibilities and tasks, such as identifying beneficiaries and participatory activities; rehabilitating land; distributing food; developing, implementing, and monitoring micro-projects; training smallholder beneficiaries; and monitoring and evaluating all relevant results indicators. The training that the TCU provided to these NGOs led to relevant, detailed, and results-focused micro- project proposals. For their part, the NGOs’ knowledge of the local context and commitment to beneficiary communities (which were in many cases their own communities) facilitated rapid implementation of micro-projects. The NGOs’ knowledge also ensured that the most vulnerable individuals would participate and thus helped to guard against elite capture.

21 The operations manual was completed in November 2009 and tested and finalized by February 2010 (EUFRRF Emergency Project Paper, Report No. 51266-GW, February 22, 2010, page 17). 22 WFP, Summary Report for Implementation of School Feeding and Land Rehabilitation Activities (WFP Final Report), June 2011.

Component 3: Program Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation (US$ 0.5 million)

44. Component 3 supported two main sets of activities: (i) the coordination, management, and oversight functions of the TCU and (ii) the Monitoring and Evaluation Section and information management system set up within the TCU.

45. The government’s commitment to achieving the results of this project has been evident since the preparation mission in 2008 and has been reflected in the continuity of project leadership and the TCU’s consistent efforts to improve implementation. The rapid preparation phase left the TCU at a disadvantage for rapid implementation. The project coordinator worked alone for a significant portion of the first year of implementation to navigate World Bank procurement rules, hire staff, and at the same time prepare an operations manual and ESMF. The project coordinator’s dedication to quality programming through detailed action plans and costing of activities,23 ability to react rapidly to incorporate the lessons emerging during implementation, and effective staff management all contributed significantly to successful implementation. Quarterly reports were informative and produced on time.

46. Program management would have been better, however, if the TCU and WFP had developed formal coordination mechanisms. Their respective roles and responsibilities for overseeing, planning, and coordinating activities were not always clear, leading to frustration and minor technical weaknesses.

Extensions

47. As noted, the project requested five extensions of the closing date to complete Component 2 activities and prepare an Additional Financing (which was envisioned, but did not materialize). These extensions highlight an inherent weakness of emergency operations: Rapid preparation does not always allow for proper sequencing of interventions, so delays arise in implementation. For instance, the original closing date fell in the middle of the agricultural season, preventing the project from fully supporting farmers and capturing results during the 2011/12 season.

48. The second, third, and fourth extensions resulted primarily from the Bank’s suspension of activities in Guinea-Bissau following the April 2012 coup d’état. The extensions enabled appropriate wrap-up activities and impact analysis to take place. The end result of the restructuring was high achievement rates for all indicators.

Mid-term Review

49. A mid-term review was originally scheduled for March 2010, but due to delays in start-up of Component 2 activities it was rescheduled for the first half of 2011. At that time, Component 1 had closed and Component 2 was off to a good start, and the team judged that an MTR was not necessary.24 It may have served to streamline and clarify

23 As evidenced in TCU annual and quarterly reports. 24 Implementation Status Report (ISR) #6, and interview with TTL Aniceto Bila, January 22, 2014.

indicators, however, and strengthen the capacity to manage M&E for Component 2, as discussed in the next sections.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

M&E system design

50. In keeping with the project’s emergency nature, the Results Framework included simple and straightforward performance indicators that were intended to be relevant, quantifiable, and easily measurable. The speed of preparation meant that of necessity the detailed design of an M&E system (referred to as the “Management Information System” in the EPP) would be left for implementation.

51. The links between interventions and the PDO were clear, and adequate indicators were identified to monitor progress. The first part of the PDO—improve food security for the most vulnerable population, including children—would be achieved under Component 1 with the school feeding and food-for-work programs, which would provide food directly to the beneficiaries. The number of children fed and number of work-days completed were quantifiable, measurable indicators to show progress toward improved food security for the vulnerable populations in those programs. The second part of the PDO—increased smallholder rice production in project areas—would be achieved under Component 2 through newly rehabilitated and cultivated land and input distribution. Related indicators of hectares rehabilitated, number of farmer groups with access to inputs, number of micro-projects, and the amount of rice produced permitted appropriate monitoring of progress. While the need for both land rehabilitation and input distribution (in other words, the need for multiple interventions from multiple components) to achieve the PDO was not explicitly stated in the EPP, the implementation of micro-projects in areas where land was rehabilitated assured strong links between activities and outcomes.

52. The M&E design strove to mitigate known weaknesses in local capacity by assigning responsibility for collecting data on Component 1 indicators to WFP and its partner NGOs. The NGOs supporting implementation of Component 2 were also responsible for collecting raw data. The functions of compilation, analysis, and presentation of results remained with MADR.

53. Minor weaknesses in the M&E system, as described in the EPP, did not critically affect the monitoring of progress toward the PDO. For example, the food production indicator was variously defined as an annual target and a cumulative target. A performance indicator for Component 3 (“level of project implementation according to annual plan”) was not included in the final version of the EPP,25 although it would have been an efficient, objective means of monitoring MADR capacity improvements and clearly identifying implementation challenges. Quarterly reports from the TCU indicate familiarity with annual plans as a management tool, however, and in practice Bank supervision staff used these plans to monitor progress. The project would have benefited from a better approach for calculating the total number of direct project beneficiaries, as

25 Interview with TTL Aniceto Bila, January 22, 2014.

the same beneficiaries could have received support for land rehabilitation and also received support through micro-projects to improve production on that land.

M&E implementation

54. Data collection and reporting. NGOs participating in the implementation of school feeding and food-for-work programs, as well as WFP staff, collected project data regularly (monthly for school feeding and daily for food-for-work). As agreed in the Grant Agreement, this information was presented on an annual basis in WFP’s Standard Project Reports. Upon request, WFP also provided the Bank supervision teams with intermediate updates for Implementation and Status Reports (ISRs). WFP also produced two project completion reports summarizing the specific achievements under GFRP financing. The data collection methodology was clear and sufficient to monitor implementation.

55. Information to measure progress against the performance indicators for production, micro-projects, and training was collected during World Bank supervision missions and for TCU quarterly and final reports. As is common in emergency projects, especially when some components are managed by a capable implementing agency that gets off to a strong start, the overall quality of project M&E varied. WFP’s monitoring of Component 1 was moderately satisfactory, but M&E for Component 2 was challenging because few M&E specialists were available in the government or private sector to work for the project. Upon termination of the M&E specialist’s contract, the management of the M&E system devolved to the project coordinator when a replacement could not be found. Data collection, compilation, and analysis improved under his management. This experience demonstrates the importance of ensuring that the government has the capacity to capture project impacts through a relevant, efficient data collection system that is managed effectively. The ICR mission confirmed that MADR is committed to strengthening this aspect of project implementation in future interventions.

56. Baseline studies. Due to the emergency nature of the project, no baseline field studies were carried out; all indicators relied on secondary data. Data on poverty and food insecurity for activities implemented through WFP were obtained from regular surveys, such as WFP’s Vulnerability Assessment Mapping and the Food Security and Vulnerability in Rural Households Survey, as well as the Ministry of Education’s statistical department and previous PRRO reports. These sources could not provide production or post-harvest data for evaluating the supply response, however, which complicated the impact evaluation, as noted in the TCU’s final project report.

M&E utilization

57. The project may have lacked an M&E system that could be used as a management tool, but it succeeded in collecting a significant quantity of data to inform the project indicators and design of follow-up activities. WFP has used the data from the school feeding and food-for-work programs implemented under the project to demonstrate the importance of school feeding for improving educational gains in Guinea-Bissau; in this

way, WFP was able to encourage such programs to be funded. The M&E data from activities implemented by MADR have already been used to design a follow-on project.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Safeguards Compliance

58. Subcomponent 1.1 triggered no safeguards policies; Subcomponent 1.2 and Component 2 triggered three: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.04 (Natural Habitats), and OP 4.09 (Pest Management). Since the project was prepared as an emergency operation using the expedited procedures allowed under OP 8.00, the preparation and public disclosure of safeguards instruments were not required until 120 days after effectiveness. An Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework (ESSF) was prepared and disclosed after some delay.26

59. Safeguards compliance was Highly Satisfactory. Public disclosure events were conducted via forums, radio programs, and brochures in the capital and in each region where the project operated. The project established a complaint management system and completed a Pest Management Plan prior to distributing pesticides, insecticides, and fungicides under Component 2. NGOs supporting project beneficiaries in each region were trained in safe pest management techniques, and an environmental safeguards checklist accompanied each micro-project application.

Financial management

60. The project’s financial management function is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The three audits conducted over the life of the project were submitted to the Bank with considerable delays, but all confirmed that the fiduciary management of the project was adequate. One audit flagged a number of ineligible expenditures, which the government reimbursed in full, albeit with some delay.

Procurement

61. The project’s procurement function is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Ex ante and ex post procurement reviews turned up no major shortcomings. Even so, ISRs and aide- mémoires filed by the Bank’s supervision teams noted persistent weaknesses in file management and archives.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

62. A new GFRP-financed operation is being prepared to follow this project and will reinforce its sustainability. The proposed design builds on the experience of this project and includes the same components and implementing agencies.

26 Publication was expected in May 2010 and completed in August 2010.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

63. The project’s objectives, design, and implementation of activities for mitigating high food prices in Guinea-Bissau are as relevant today as they were in 2008. The market price of rice continues to rise faster than the cashew price, exacerbating the already unequal terms of trade. Fiscally unsustainable import taxes on rice have been reinstated. On the whole, WFP estimates that rural food insecurity continues to rise. The share of rural households with less than a month’s supply of food increased from 65 percent to 92 percent between June 2012 and June 2013.27 Poverty levels have also continued to rise; as discussed, they were 69.3 percent in 2010, compared to 64.7 percent in 2002.28 In parallel, the percentage of income spent on food increased from 65 percent in 2005 to 85 percent in 2013.

64. Component 1’s objectives and design directly support the third and fourth core areas of Guinea-Bissau’s second-generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2011–2015 (“Promote inclusive, sustainable economic development” and “Raise the level of human capital development”).29 WFP’s objectives under Component 1 of increasing school enrolment and attendance in the country’s most vulnerable areas, especially among girls, exemplify this alignment with national priorities. Other examples are WFP’s efforts to improve household food security through “the rehabilitation of lands and creation of community assets”30 and to increase the capacity of the government and local NGOs to establish and manage food-assistance and hunger-reduction programs. In 2010, the government showed its continued prioritization of school feeding by passing the School Feeding Law. That law creates national, regional, and local structures to support the implementation and management of school feeding programs.31

65. The rations provided for school children and workers under Subcomponents 1.1 and 1.2 created a safety net, both for landless and jobless rural inhabitants subsisting on food purchased in the market and for households whose persistently low agricultural production continues to restrict food intake to one meal per day. Note that school canteens do not provide nutritional support during the period in which children are most vulnerable to nutritional deficiencies—defined as the 1,000 days between a woman’s pregnancy and her child’s second birthday. Had they done so, the project would have been even more relevant to national health and food security priorities. The extent of malnutrition among this 1,000-day cohort is not well documented in national statistics, however, and the most recent Vulnerability Assessment Mapping done by WFP in 2011 did not look at this group.

66. The objectives and design of activities under Subcomponents 1.2, 2.1, and 2.2 to rehabilitate land and build capacity to increase production are aligned with the

27 WFP Rapid Food Assessment, June 2012 and June 2013. 28 Guinea-Bissau Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2011–2015. 29 Guinea-Bissau Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2011–2015. 30 EPP excerpt regarding WFP’s PRRO objectives. 31 As per interviews with WFP staff, December 2013.

government’s National Agricultural Investment Program (Programa Nacional de Investimento Agrícola, PNIA) for the next 15 years and second pillar of the World Bank’s ISN, “Launching economic recovery in productive sectors.” Increased production of food, particularly rice, will reduce dependence on expensive rice imports and shift bargaining power into the hands of smallholder producers during the annual rice-for- cashews barter.

67. Finally, the project’s design and objectives were entirely consistent with the broader objectives of the Bank’s GFRP, which were to: (i) reduce the negative impact of high and volatile food prices on the poor in a timely way; (ii) support governments in the design of sustainable policies that mitigate the impact of high and volatile food prices on poverty while minimizing the creation of long-term distortions in the market; and (iii) support broad-based growth in productivity and market participation in agriculture to ensure an adequate and sustainable food supply response.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

68. Overall the project was quite successful in achieving its development objective, as measured by the key performance indicators. Given the challenging transitional context and limited capacity present in Guinea-Bissau, this achievement is considerable.

69. The first part of the development objective (“improve food security for the most vulnerable population, including children”) sought to respond as rapidly as possible to the food crisis by establishing a school canteen program and providing food in exchange for works to rehabilitate rice land. Two key outcome indicators—the number of primary students in target areas receiving one meal daily and the number of work-days (rations) for rural producers in food-for-work activities—measured achievement of this objective.

70. At the time of closing, the number of primary students receiving one meal daily was 14,102 against a target of 14,000 students (101 percent achieved). Of these students, 1,411 girls from fourth to sixth grade received take-home rations based on their high attendance rates. The project distributed 291 tons of food in 116 schools.

71. In all 116 participating schools, students received one hot meal per day32 for 126 days during 2009. Initially 170 feeding days were planned for January–June and October–December 2009; owing to the late signing of the Grant Agreement, however, rations did not arrive in Bissau until April. Anticipating delays, WFP initiated the school feeding program in March 2009 with rations provided on loan through other financing. Due to the shortened time period (126 versus 170 days), only 291 tons of the 509 tons procured were distributed in 2009; the balance (218 tons) was distributed under the parallel EU financing in January-March 2010.

72. It is likely that the guarantee of a daily meal, plus a take-home ration for a subset of female students, contributed to the high pass rates in WFP schools and reduced

32 Canteens actually served two meals per day, because students attended school in either the morning or afternoon shift. Each set of students received the same ration once per day.

dropout rates—outcomes that will have long-lasting effects. Without the project, financing shortfalls would have barred WFP from continuing the school feeding and food-for-work programs. Students would not have had adequate food, girls may have dropped out, and laborers would have had neither a daily ration for their work nor the promise of producing their own food on newly rehabilitated land. In sum, without Component 1, the effects of the food crisis would have been magnified, and without the food-for-work program, Component 2 benefits would have been compromised, as the land on which beneficiaries undertook micro-projects would not have been rehabilitated.

73. The food-for-work program distributed 865.63 tons of food to approximately 29,598 beneficiaries for a total of 285,000 working days (130 percent of the target) over two years (2009 and 2010). Women made up more than 50 percent of the workforce for rehabilitating lowland fields, but only 10 percent of the workforce for rehabilitating mangrove rice fields, owing to cultural preferences as well as the difficulty of working with the very heavy clay soils common in mangrove rice areas. The ration recommended by WFP for each day of work by each participating head of the household was 3 kilograms of rice, 0.250 kilograms of vegetable oil, and 0.035 kilograms of salt. Actual amounts of oil and salt distributed in 2009 and 2010 were somewhat lower than the recommended level (see Table 2 in section 2.1); in some cases, rice alone was distributed. As with the school feeding program, after this component came to an end, the remaining food stocks (210 t) were distributed in the first quarter of 2011 under food-for-work activities in the feeder roads component of the EU parallel financing.

74. The second part of the development objective sought to mitigate the effects of the food crisis in the medium term through community-identified micro-projects and technical assistance to MADR to “increase smallholder rice production.” The achievement of this objective is evaluated in terms of one PDO indicator (tons of rice produced in the newly rehabilitated areas under the project) and two intermediate results indicators (hectares of lowland and mangrove rice fields rehabilitated). Tons of rice produced were calculated based on data for average yields and cultivated area collected by MADR’s Department of Agricultural Statistics.

75. In total, 969,454 meters of dikes were built and 54,939 meters of canals were dug, rehabilitating 2,880 hectares of lowland fields and 2,741 hectares of mangrove rice fields (96 and 137 percent of the targets, respectively) for a total 5,621 hectares of newly rehabilitated land. Yields of lowland rice doubled, rising from 1.1 tons per hectare beforehand to 2.1 tons per hectare on average by 2012. Yields for mangrove rice increased from 1.6 tons per hectare to 1.7 tons per hectare. Total production for 2009–11 on land rehabilitated by the project reached 9,378 tons by the end of the third season (125 percent of the target).

76. The project was the first in Guinea-Bissau to use participatory diagnostic methods to help producers identify their individual needs and formulate those needs into production or post-harvest micro-projects under the matching grant scheme in Subcomponent 2.1. In total, 788 micro-projects were approved and implemented (534

micro-projects focused on improving production, and 267 on post-harvest handling and processing) by the end of the third year of implementation.

77. Production micro-projects benefitted 13,934 producers through the acquisition and distribution of NPK fertilizer (115,002 kilograms), urea (70,089 kilograms), rope for delimiting parcels (30,446 meters), lowland rice seed (62,355 kilograms), vegetable seed (370 kilograms), and power tillers (13) with fuel (20,700 liters), among other items.

78. Post-harvest micro-projects benefitted 7,072 producers through the acquisition and distribution of rice hullers (52), materials (cement, nails, roofing supplies, and so on) for building warehouses and shelters for post-harvest processing machinery, sacks (8,400), and machines to puree tomatoes (5), among others.

79. Constraints in the data consolidation function of the M&E system prevented some results from being captured in project reports and aide-mémoires. The national NGOs selected to support beneficiaries in developing and implementing micro-projects under Subcomponent 2.1 not only trained communities in the participatory appraisal of community needs but provided consistent on-the-job training for the duration of the project and beyond. Although capacity building was not a specified activity in their contracts, it was an integral part of their activities (see the list of training activities and beneficiaries in Annex 2).

80. At the start of the project, WFP and MADR anticipated the need to provide seed to producers on newly rehabilitated land and procured 60 tons of lowland rice seed and 27 tons of mangrove seed. An added benefit was that the seed procured by WFP was produced in Guinea-Bissau from two seed-producing associations supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization. Mangrove rice seed was imported from Senegal. In the following season, the parallel EU financing ensured continued results through the distribution of 60 tons of seed to 200 farmers to cover an additional 1,000 hectares, as well as 50 tons of fertilizer to farmers cultivating approximately 600 additional hectares in lowland areas. Parallel financing also supported the construction of 170 kilometers of feeder roads in the project area to facilitate the marketing of agricultural products.33

81. Training and capacity building for MADR surpassed targets thanks to cost-saving decisions and innovations in training by the TCU. Over the life of the project, 131 producers and MADR staff received technical and project management training (202 percent of the target). Cost savings were gained by revising the training plan to bring international experts to Guinea-Bissau for extended periods, allowing them to train many more beneficiaries than could have been trained outside the country as originally planned. Training planned for Europe was switched to regional locations, further stretching the original budget.

82. In sum, the project over-achieved its PDO targets (number of students receiving one meal a day; number of work-days in food-for-work activities; and quantity of rcien

33 Implementation Status Report (ISR) #6 for a grant in the amount of € 2.87 million under the European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility Trust Fund (TF096347, TF 096348).

produced in newly rehabilitated areas) by 101, 130, and 125 percent, respectively. All intermediate results indicators were exceeded, except for the hectares of lowland rice fields rehabilitated (96 percent of target) and the number of farmer groups with access to agricultural inputs (93 percent of target). Annex 2 presents a detailed review of the project’s outputs.

3.3 Efficiency

83. Component 1 provided support to vulnerable populations. It had three types of economic impacts—a food security impact, an employment impact, and a rice production impact—and clearly demonstrates an efficient use of project funds. The benefit-cost ratios for investment in rice production on the land rehabilitated under the food-for-work program were very high: 3.5 and 3.9 under two price scenarios (see Annex 3). This impact stands alongside the other two impacts of the food-for-work program (increased food security for workers and their families, and employment for rural workers).

84. Component 2 provided support for increasing food production and also had a substantial impact on the rural population in the project areas. As detailed in Annex 3, the four types of impacts achieved through this component—improved knowledge and capacity, increased farm income, increased employment, and increased rice production— also clearly demonstrate an efficient use of project funds. Estimated benefit/cost ratios as well as returns to investment in improved rice seed, fertilizer, and farmer training in agricultural practices are quite high. Benefit/cost ratios vary from 1.64 to 2.74 under different scenarios (see Annex 3).

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

85. The overall outcome rating is Satisfactory, based on the substantial relevance of the development objectives and design, the satisfactory achievement of the development objectives, and the relatively high efficiency as evidenced by the analysis presented in Annex 3. The project made a significant contribution to food security and smallholder rice production in Guinea-Bissau. More importantly, it improved the lives of households in the project areas by making agriculture (the main source of their livelihood) more productive and sustainable over time.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

86. Lower-than-average pupil dropout rates, as well as higher-than-average pass rates in 2009 and 2010, reveal the impact of school meals for poor and vulnerable groups in WFP-assisted schools. Annex 2 describes these impacts in detail.

87. As intended by the EPP, activities under both components specifically sought to support women and girls. At schools supported by WFP, men and women were equally represented in management committees and positions of leadership, and take-home rations were provided to girls with superior attendance rates, thus reducing the burden of their absence on their families. The rehabilitation of lowland fields through the food-for- work program primarily targeted women farmers, thus valuing their critical role in food production. The micro-projects implemented under Component 2 effectively targeted women through support to market gardens and post-harvest processing; the majority of the 267 post-harvest micro-projects supported women’s activities.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

88. Increased country ownership of the school feeding program. Under this project, WFP strengthened the capacity of local communities and government authorities to administer and monitor school feeding programs. The School Feeding Law, passed in the final year of the operation, formalized civil and government participation in (and commitment to) school feeding programs.

89. Increased capacity in MADR. Critical training in project management and technical areas for MADR’s central and regional staff and producers increased the skills required to manage projects and bring about sustained improvements in production and productivity. Challenges in M&E implementation and utilization demonstrated the urgent need for a relevant, efficient, and well-managed data collection system; MADR is committed to strengthening this aspect of project implementation in future interventions.

90. Increased capacity in national NGOs. WFP’s and MADR’s contracts with national NGOs yielded a positive unintended impact as those organizations gained stronger capacity in project management, implementation, and evaluation.

91. Increased capacity in farmer organizations. Each of the 788 micro-projects included not only equipment but significant capacity building to improve agricultural techniques and organizational management. NGOs helped farmer groups establish management committees and trained those committees in the participatory analysis of community needs and effective group management. Group members also received training in numerous technical areas, including pest management, equipment use and maintenance, planting techniques, harvest methods, post-harvest preservation of vegetables, proper storage, and seed selection.

92. None.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

93. Data collection for the ICR started at the end of Component 1 in September 2010. At that time, the Task Team Leader (TTL) produced a technical review of Component 1

that was used in preparing this ICR. The ICR mission conducted interviews with the TTL, team specialists, the client, WFP, and national NGOs. These interviews helped to understand the context in which the project operated, clarify relationships among stakeholders, and identify impacts that were not otherwise documented. Informal interviews with direct beneficiaries occurred during missions to the project areas. A half- day stakeholder workshop also took place during the ICR mission.

94. Stakeholders and beneficiaries generally expressed satisfaction with the project. The school feeding program increased enrolment and helped female students stay in school. Beneficiaries especially appreciated the food-for-work program, because the ration enabled them to eat one meal at the work site and take food home on a daily basis, while their labor contributed to future food production and earnings. Given that most of these producers eat only one meal per day, this activity had a significant impact. Despite the challenging context, project impacts were substantial, bringing thousands of hectares of rice fields back into production and increasing access to critical basic production inputs (seed, tools, and training) that had been unavailable locally.

95. Stakeholders expressed some frustration, however, with the intensity of World Bank and EU supervision and requests for information. While supervision missions were often helpful and needed in in view of weak institutional capacity and provided guidance to the TCU, the TCU spent nearly 60 days per year accompanying missions.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: High

96. The Risk to Development Outcomes is rated High. The key risks underlying this rating are noted below. The high political risk and high institutional risk were important determinants of the overall risk rating.

97. Political risk to development outcome is High. In parallel with the challenging macroeconomic environment in Guinea-Bissau, the last four decades have been a period of intense political instability, often marked by the intrusion of the military on the political scene, which has undermined law and order. This context prevents stable and accountable institutions from developing and creates a hostile environment for private investment, further hindering prospects for growth. Low growth has translated into a lack of state revenues, severely limiting the capacity of successive governments to provide essential public services and infrastructure. Their provision remains entirely dependent on donors.

98. Government ownership/commitment risk to development outcome is Moderate. Prior to the April 2012 coup d’état, the government’s commitment to addressing food security issues was high, thanks to support from the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and associated donors. At the time of the coup, the government had been in power for three years, longer than any government since 1997 and long enough to establish some legitimacy and gain traction on political issues. The PNIA was developed

and integrated into the second-generation PRSP completed in September 2011. With the subsequent change in government, the political commitment to food security issues appeared to wane as the government redirected its attention to the April 2014 presidential elections. It must be emphasized, however, that the commitment of MADR’s technical staff during the project stands in sharp contrast to the current political attitude. The TCU staff (particularly the coordinator) worked tirelessly to achieve and disseminate results, despite delays in paying government salaries, and even after the project closed.

99. Institutional risk to development outcome is High. Training provided under Component 2 directly increased the capacity of MADR’s technicians and other staff members to carry out their extension, advisory, and project implementation roles. Given the extremely tight national budget, however, MADR departments are unable to function without donor support. Personnel are officially present in the field, but they lack operational budgets, equipment, transportation, renewal training, and adequate support personnel; donors finance nearly all operations. There is no expectation that school feeding and food-for-work programs will be taken on by government institutions rather than donors in the near future.

100. Technical risk to development outcome is Significant. The sustainability of project-supported activities is likely to vary by component. For future school feeding programs, management committees that received training under the project can be expected to continue to bring their new knowledge to bear in a useful way. With respect to Component 2, however, the lack of improved inputs (seed, tools, and small production and post-harvest equipment) in Guinea-Bissau jeopardizes the improved production rates and certainly threatens any future growth in production. These threats to sustainability and development outcomes will likely differ in magnitude across intervention areas based on the strength of community management and organizational capacity. In some areas, small equipment provided to farmer associations in 2010 remains in good condition owing to significant training and the commitment of users to manage their productive resources cooperatively. In other areas, less training or a local culture that does not favor cooperative management jeopardizes the development outcomes.

101. Financial risk to development outcome is Significant. As known from the outset, WFP faces funding challenges each year as it advocates for its key programs. Financial risks that the supply response will not be sustained are many, as inputs are either not available or are extremely expensive, and dikes and canals take time and money to maintain. These risks may be mitigated in the medium term by additional GFRP funding for a new operation that builds on the project’s experiences and continues school feeding, land rehabilitation, and micro-projects, albeit on a lesser scale. Another consideration is that high rice prices, while hurting consumers, benefit producers. Continued training for MADR staff will most certainly be circumscribed without donor support.

102. Social risk to development outcome is Moderate. Group cohesion in Guinea- Bissau varies across the population, but on the whole Bissau-Guineans are comfortable in situations that call for cooperative management, as shown by the continued functioning of much of the small equipment distributed three years ago. In addition, the ownership

developed over project goods in the process of implementing micro-projects is likely to strengthen tendencies to cooperate.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

103. The project’s design was substantially sound. The main interventions addressed urgent food security needs of vulnerable groups and struck an appropriate balance between providing emergency relief in the short run and building the foundation for a sustained agricultural supply response over the medium to long run. A key design feature, the matching grant scheme, was adapted successfully from other projects to become the backbone of support to farmers. The implementation arrangements deliberately sought to compensate for known weaknesses in local capacity by delegating responsibility for implementing aspects of the work to WFP, incorporating national NGOs with significant operational experience into the implementation, and providing essential technical and project management training for the TCU and key producers. Fiduciary management was initially supported by the CBMP until TCU staff could take it on.

104. A few shortcomings detracted from quality at entry. Management’s emphasis on exceptionally rapid preparation (a 60-day deadline) was understandable, given the scope of the emergency, but at the same time compromised implementation readiness. Most of the design weaknesses that emerged, especially during early implementation, stemmed directly from the accelerated preparation timeline. An identification or preparation mission met with stakeholders to formulate implementation arrangements, yet insufficient time was available to develop critical implementation tools, such as those related to M&E, recruitment, and procurement. Subsequently, Component 2, managed by MADR, experienced a slow, laborious start.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

105. Field supervision missions were carried out regularly during the life of the project and involved specialists in community development, fiduciary management, safeguards, and economics, among other areas of expertise relevant to the project. Aide-mémoires always thoroughly examined achievements and administrative and technical implementation issues, and they were always reviewed with stakeholders at the end of each mission. ISRs appropriately summarized progress, assigned ratings, and identified issues requiring management’s attention. The project remained under the leadership of the same TTL from preparation to closing, providing continuity, strengthening

institutional memory, and providing strong assurances that the lessons from the project would be identified and learned.

106. Minor shortcomings in supervision did not affect overall achievement of the PDO, but they should be specified for the record. Early in the life of the project, delays in filing ISRs prevented management’s timely follow-up of emerging concerns with implementation. The lack of a mid-term review delayed identification of emerging M&E challenges related to Component 2.

Rating: Satisfactory

107. The Bank’s overall performance is judged to be Satisfactory, given that minor shortcomings in quality at entry due to the accelerated preparation timetable were compensated by proactivity during supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

108. The government’s performance rating is based on the performance of: (i) MADR in its role as policy maker and facilitator of development programs; (ii) the Project Steering Committee in its oversight role; and (iii) the TCU, which were the main government agencies coordinating the project and implementing Components 2 and 3.

109. In response to the Bank’s request during preparation, the MADR chose the Director of MADR’s Department of Rural Engineering to work with the Bank team in designing the project. The timely and appropriate appointment of this individual contributed significantly to the technical design of the project as well as the structure of implementation arrangements. His extensive knowledge of rural development in Guinea- Bissau and his enthusiasm, honesty, and passion for agricultural development were evident from the start, significantly contributing to quality at entry. After effectiveness, MADR did much to encourage qualified government staff to accept positions with the project; it assured government salaries for staff working under the project and appointed the Director of MADR’s Department of Rural Engineering as the Coordinator of the TCU.

110. The Project Steering Committee, which included representatives from five ministries, was created in a timely fashion but met only once over the course of the project. In practice, critical functions of the Project Steering Committee, such as technical reviews and budget approvals, were performed by the TCU in collaboration with the Minister of Agriculture.

111. The Department of Rural Engineering was given responsibility for coordinating all project activities and implementing Components 2 and 3, based on the operational nature of its mandate and the skills and enthusiasm of its director.

112. Within the TCU, better knowledge of Bank procedures would have reduced delays at start-up, and a stronger emphasis on M&E system design and utilization would have more fully and rapidly captured and documented the project’s results. The TCU’s strengths included its history of rural operations and deep knowledge of rural realities and community needs, skills, and aptitudes. The staff’s rapid mastery and application of the Bank’s fiduciary management mechanisms in project implementation was an asset, in addition to the satisfactory implementation of routine management activities such as processing procurement requests, narrative reporting, paying service providers on time, filing financial reports, and organizing supervision missions.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

113. The Implementing Agencies performance rating is based on the performance of: (i) WFP, the agency responsible for day-to-day management and implementation of Component 1, and (ii) the national NGOs directly responsible for implementing activities supported through Component 2.

114. Overall, WFP’s performance was satisfactory. WFP was thoroughly prepared for implementation (Component 1 was 100 percent disbursed by July 2009); consulted amply with beneficiaries and involved them through training; resolved implementation issues in a timely way (supply issues and logistical delays, for example); and coordinated and collaborated fully with other donors and stakeholders.

115. Minor shortcomings in fiduciary management (financial reporting delays) arose, as WFP found it very difficult to align the Bank’s reporting requirements with WFP corporate procedures and mandate. WFP’s project reporting system, as approved and decided by its Executive Board, establishes the Standard Project Report as the reporting tool for all donors to WFP, but this format was not agreed prior to signing the Grant Agreement.

116. Under Component 1, national NGOs fulfilled a critical M&E function with precision and diligence and mitigated the risks of corruption and double-dipping in ration distribution. Under Component 2, national NGOs performed satisfactorily across the board. Their commitment to achieving the development objective was clear throughout the project design stage, negotiations, and implementation. The relevance, depth of detail, and comprehensive nature of the micro-projects prepared under Component 2 attested to the NGOs’ excellent facilitation of participatory preparation of proposals. Furthermore, their continued presence on the ground and shepherding of beneficiary communities significantly improved the sustainability of the results, even for an emergency project such as this one. The ICR field mission saw plentiful evidence that equipment and tools

distributed during the project had been well maintained and continued to provide results for the targeted communities. Any delays occasioned by training farmer groups were more than compensated by the rapid and high-quality implementation that ensued.

Rating: Satisfactory

117. Guinea-Bissau performed well in meeting its obligations to the project, especially considering the domestic context of political unrest and the limited resources at the government’s disposal. In areas where government performance was weak—such as knowledge of Bank procurement rules—significant effort was made to learn and improve. The satisfactory performance of WFP and national NGOs as the implementing entities complemented the government’s efforts to meet the development objectives.

6. Lessons Learned

118. Country ownership ensures achievement of development objectives, particularly in fragile countries where government leadership is lacking. Ownership was demonstrated by the critical role played by the Director of the Department of Rural Engineering (the project coordinator) in implementation. His dedication to excellence ensured strong links between project activities and the PDO, ensured that results were documented despite weaknesses in the M&E system, and structured implementation support to ensure sustainability (through the presence of national NGOs, for example).

119. Community participation enhances the sustainability of impacts. One result of strong community contributions to the design and implementation of micro-projects was that equipment distributed by the project has been relatively well maintained. The December 2013 ICR mission confirmed that threshers, milling machines, and power tillers distributed in 2010 to many communities were still functioning and benefiting the population. The involvement of national NGOs in providing technical assistance and on- the-job training to producer groups increases the likelihood of continued capacity building and guarantees that new development management skills stay in the communities that need them most.

120. Capacity constraints in fragile countries are persistent; they often negatively affect results and must be properly mitigated during design—not just implementation. Even if a country has on-going projects yielding satisfactory results, Bank teams must not simply assume that the recipient is familiar with Bank methods and procedures, especially for accounting and procurement. A thorough analysis of local capacity for all aspects of project management must be a priority during preparation—even during the rapid preparation and formulation process for an emergency operation—and preparation teams must plan for training to mitigate weaknesses at start-up, as needed. 34 The

34 ICR, Agriculture Services Project (Credit 1799-GUB), June 1995.

persistent capacity weaknesses in Guinea-Bissau, particularly in M&E, were noted as long ago as the first Agriculture Support Project in the 1990s.35

121. The GFRP Trust Fund facilitated the Bank’s reengagement in agriculture in Guinea-Bissau. The project has not only responded to an urgent need but has reintroduced the Bank team to the reality of operations in Guinea-Bissau. It has served as a stepping-stone on which to rebuild agricultural investment by the International Development Association and provided valuable lessons for new operations. The new GFRP project, currently being formulated, has taken under advisement the lessons related to persistent weak capacity and will rely heavily on WFP for implementation, M&E, and fiduciary management.

122. Clarify the roles of each actor. WFP regarded the role of the TCU as very unclear throughout implementation, particularly with respect to managing school feeding activities, which fell under the purview of the Ministry of Education (not MADR).

123. A minimum set of project “readiness conditions,” coupled with intense implementation support, is necessary for emergency operations to succeed. The flexibility allowed in preparing emergency operations facilitates rapid preparation, effectiveness, and initial disbursement, but it may compromise the quality of implementation and jeopardize the sustainability of impacts if minimal implementation arrangements and conditions are not in place. These arrangements and conditions include: (i) a clear, appropriate action plan for start-up; (ii) intense Bank supervision and “hand- holding” following effectiveness, including on-the-ground procurement and M&E support; and (iii) a rapid baseline survey or equivalent information gathering to ensure appropriate targeting. It bears repeating that it is extremely difficult to ensure these conditions when pressure to respond to a crisis limits preparation time to only a few weeks.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

124. Annex 5 summarizes Guinea-Bissau’s final evaluation report.

(b) Cofinanciers

125. NA

126. NA

35 ICR, Agriculture Services Project (Credit 1799-GUB), June 1995.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in US$ M equivalent)

Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Component Estimate Estimate Appraisal (US$ M) (US$ M)

Component 1: Support for the Most

Vulnerable Population Subcomponent 2.1: School Feeding 1.0 1.0 100% Program Subcomponent 2.2: Food-for-Work 0.5 0.5 100% Program Component 2: Support for Increasing

Food Production Subcomponent 2.1: Matching Grants for 2.5 2.0 80% Food Production Subcomponent 2.2: Technical Support 0.5 0.3 60% Component 3: Program Coordination, 0.5 1.2 125% Monitoring, and Evaluation Total Project Costs 5.0 5.0 100%

(b) Financing

Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate Appraisal (US$ M) (US$ M) Borrower 0.00 0.00 .00 Special Financing (FCRP) 5.00 5.00 100%

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Support for the Most Vulnerable Population

1. Component 1 included two subcomponents—School Feeding Activities (US$ 0.5 million) and Food-for-Work to Increase Food Production (US$ 1.0 million), both implemented by WFP. The component was effective on October 10, 2008 and closed on December 31, 2010.

2. Subcomponent 1.1: School Feeding. WFP’s school feeding program achieved highly satisfactory results across the life of the project (Table A2.1). The lower achievement value of 13,812 at the end of July 2009 resulted primarily from the high number of dropouts during the intensive cashew harvest in May–June. Even with this temporary loss of students, the project achieved 99 percent of the target during this period. In early 2010, the original targeted beneficiaries, plus an additional 14,000 individuals, received meals for 43 days that they would not otherwise have received during that initial period due to a delay in the implementation of the EUFRRF.

Table A2.1: Performance Indicators for Subcomponent 1.1 (School Feeding) 2008/09 2009/10 2009/10 School Year School Year School Year Support to EUFRRF PDO Indicator Targets (Mar.–July 2009) (Oct.–Dec. 2009) (Jan.–March 2010) (Subcomponent 1.1) in EPP Actual Achieved Actual Achieved Actual Achieved Number of students receiving one meal a 14,000 13,812 99% 14,102 101% 28,000 a day Female beneficiaries NA 47% NA NA (%) a/ Rations remaining under the WFP contract (218 tons) were used to provide one meal a day to 28,000 students for 43 days between January and March 2010, before the EUFRRF-procured food became available.

3. WFP’s results analysis also shows that schools with WFP feeding programs performed significantly better than those without in 2009. National statistics estimate an average dropout rate of 14 percent and an exam pass-rate of 65 percent. In contrast, WFP schools achieved pass-rates of 79 percent (boys) and 86 percent (girls) against drop-out rates of 7 percent (boys) and 4 percent (girls)—significant achievements in the local fight against poverty.

4. Subcomponent 1.2: Food for Work. WFP’s food-for-work program achieved highly satisfactory results by the time it closed at the end of 2010. By the end of the first year, the program had achieved nearly 50 percent of the targeted number of work-days and had rehabilitated nearly half of the planned area. Production figures grew by 42 percent from the first year to the second and were well on their way to achieving the target of 7,500 tons annually by the third year of the project (2011). By closing, all indicators had been satisfactorily achieved (Table A2.2).

Table A2.2: Performance Indicators and Intermediate Output Indicators for Subcomponent 1.2 (Food for Work) and Component 2 (Support for Increasing Production)

Target Actual PDO Indicators (Components 1.2 and 2) in EPP 2009 2010 2011 Total Achieved Number of work-days in food-for-work activities 160,000 77,000 208,000 – 285,000 130% (rations distributed to rural producers) Beneficiaries of food-for-work program (number) NA 9,633 19,965 – 29,598 NA Quantity of rice produced in newly rehabilitated areas 7,500 3,876 5,502 – 9,378 a 125% (t)

Intermediate Indicators (Components 1.2 and 2)

Subcomponent 1.2: Food for Work Number of hectares of mangrove rice land 2,000 1,304 1,437 0 2,741 137% rehabilitated Number of hectares of lowland rice land rehabilitated 3,000 989 1,891 – 2,880 96% Total number of hectares rehabilitated 5,000 2,293 2,707 – 5,621 112% Component 2: Support for Increasing Food Production Number of farmer groups with access to agricultural 500 0 313 221 534 107% inputs Number of post-harvest subprojects (i.e., post- harvest micro-projects) approved and under 300 0 152 115 267 89% implementation b Number of subprojects (i.e., micro-projects) 800 0 465 336 801 100% approved and under implementation a/ The total production figure reported here and the data in in Table A2.3 come from the WFP final report. b/ Given the one-to one correspondence between the number of farmer groups with access to inputs and the number of production micro-projects, it was thought (and confirmed by the TTL) that this indicator (and target of 300) was meant to capture the number of post-harvest micro-projects. Figures for both post-harvest micro-projects and total are therefore reported

5. Table A2.3 shows the area cultivated and rice production levels on the newly rehabilitated land by region. Farmers who were unable to produce rice before the project grew an additional 9,378 tons of rice on newly rehabilitated land (125 percent of the original target of 7,500 tons).

Table A2.3: Area Cultivated and Production Levels on Newly Rehabilitated Land by Region, 2009–10

2009 2010 Total Region Lowland Mangrove Lowland Mangrove Area Produc- Area Produc- Area Produc- Area Produc- Area Produc- (ha) tion (t) (ha) tion (t) (ha) tion (t) (ha) tion (t) (ha) tion (t) Bafata 250 638 30 39 593 1,265 0 0 873 1,941 Biombo 45 91 402 704 0 0 353 705 800 1,499 Cacheu 200 398 184 423 195 312 306 458 885 1,592 Gabu 250 670 0 0 511 1,248 0 0 761 1,918 Oio 141 343 150 311 343 677 330 545 964 1,876 Bissau 30 55 120 205 41 81 86 210 277 551 Total 916 2,194 886 1,681 1,683 3,583 1,075 1,919 4,560 9,378

Component 2: Support for Increasing Food Production

6. Component 2 included two subcomponents: Matching Grants for Food Production (US$ 2.5 million) and Technical Support (US$ 0.5 million). The results of Subcomponent 2.1 were linked to the completion of land rehabilitation activities in Subcomponent 1.2.

7. Subcomponent 2.1: Matching Grants for Food Production. Access to agricultural inputs for 534 farmer groups was facilitated through the implementation of 534 demand- driven micro-projects, and 267 micro-projects provided support to post-harvest activities.

8. Details on the kind of production and processing support provided are shown in Table A2.4. The table does not present an exhaustive list of items distributed; rather, it presents a sample of beneficiary preferences and types of support requested. Briefly:

• Beneficiaries preferred simple tools (machetes, hoes, rakes, spades). • The importance of fertilizer, seed, and insecticide is clear. Those regions not requesting lowland seed were mangrove areas, which received seed from the project in 2009. • Post-harvest needs were diverse and clearly tailored to the particular needs of each community. • Despite the project’s focus on rice cultivation, vegetable production was also an eligible activity, and micro-projects for vegetable production were in high demand among female beneficiaries.

9. Under Subcomponent 2.1, yields were also expected to increase. After the WFP project closed at the end of 2010, production was estimated by farmers themselves and the Department of Agricultural Statistics in MADR in January 2012. They based their calculations on actual hectares cultivated and a sample of 61 randomly selected yield subplots (carrés de rendement). Surface area calculations are a common statistic gathered annually by female farmers. At the beginning of the season, using long pieces of rope of a specific length, they measure the length and width of their field(s) and estimate production levels for the season. These calculations were verified by the Department of Agricultural Statistics (using the same method) just prior to taking their yield samples. (Hence the approximately 30,000 meters of rope requested under Subcomponent 2.1’s matching grant program; see Table A2.4). Sample yield subplots were set up in 35 group fields and 26 individual fields (samples from two group fields and two individual fields in each county in each region where the project operated).36

10. Table A2.5 shows rice production levels over the life of the project. Farmers benefitting from improved water management and technology packages from the production micro-projects were able to produce a total of 19,487 tons of rice on the newly rehabilitated land between 2009 and 2011. Annex 3 discusses the economic impacts of this additional production.

36 Final Report. Department of Statistics. Ministry of Agriculture.

Table A2.4: Examples of Support Provided for Production and Processing under Subcomponent 2.1: Matching Grants for Food Production Production Micro-projects (534 total) Processing Micro-projects (267 total) Type of Equipment/input Unit Quantity Type of Equipment/input Unit Quantity Tools Machines Machete # 5,745 Rice huller # 52 Hoe # 8,329 Maize mill # 35 Iron plow # 1,999 Electric mill # 1 Rake # 1,401 Tomato puree machine # 5 Spade # 4,725 Diesel generator (5 KVA) # 4 Pick # 972 Freezer # 1 Pitchfork # 958 Processing equipment Scythe # 270 Scale (50 kg) # 7 Seed Bags (empty) # 8,400 Lowland rice seed kg 62,355 Plastic sealing machine # 3 Vegetable seed kg 370 Tools Fertilizer/insecticide/herbicide Hoe # 410 NPK kg 115,002 Spade # 50 Urea kg 70,089 Machete # 25 Herbicides L 219 Watering can # 410 Fungicide kg 8 Inputs Insecticide L 561 Vegetable seed kg 77 Equipment NPK kg 1,800 Sprayer # 176 Urea kg 1,800 Watering can # 1,650 Furadan kg 18 Buckets (10-liter) # 1,309 Transport equipment Plastic bucket (20–30 liter) # 236 Push cart # 37 Big buckets (bayons) # 124 Donkey cart # 72 Carinhas de mão # 1,120 Construction equipment PVC pipe m 538 Tin roofing panels # 5,708 Rope m 30,446 Cement (50-kg bags) # 1,534 Rolls of wire mesh for fencing # 610 Tubing # 70 Power tillers # 13 Stoves # 95 Planter # 5 Roofing joists # 1,340 Operational inputs Iron doors # 6 Gasoline L 20,070 Iron grills # 6 Oil L 100 Iron grills for doors # 36 Transport implements Iron grills for windows # 48 Donkey carts # 9 Rakes # 20 Carts # 34 Harvester # 3 Sieves (aluminum) # 98

Table A2.5: Rice Production Levels under the Project, 2009–11

Year Mangrove rice Lowland rice Total Average Total Area Yield Production Area Yield Production area yield production b (ha) (t/ha)a (t) (ha) (t/ha) (t) (ha) (t/ha) (t) 2009 886 1.83 1,618 916 2.25 2,063 1,802 2.04 3,674 2010 1,075 1.90 2,044 1,683 2.02 3,406 2,758 1.96 5,414 2011 1,960 1.70 3,332 3,661 2.00 7,322 5,621 1.85 10,399 Total additional tons of rice produced 19,487 a/ Data from WFP's final report; yields for 2011 calculated by Department of Agricultural Statistics in January 2012. b/ The WFP contract ended in December 2010. For 2011, the total area under cultivation on rehabilitated land was assumed to equal the total number of hectares rehabilitated.

12. Subcomponent 2.2: Technical Support. More beneficiaries and MADR staff benefitted from training than the TCU originally targeted, thanks to cost efficiencies resulting from a revision of the training model. International consultants were brought to Guinea-Bissau to train beneficiaries over a longer period instead of sending a few beneficiaries abroad for the same training. For example, 115 project staff, government personnel, farmers, and NGO staff were trained to produce rice and seed of good quality over a two-month period rather than sending 40 persons to Europe for a week, as originally budgeted. Table A2.6 summarizes those training efforts.

Table A2.6: Training Supported by the Project Planned Actual Number Type of Training Number of Country Length Notes of Beneficiaries Beneficiaries Production of rice and 40 115 Guinea- 2 months Demonstration fields good-quality seed (MADR (25 MADR Bissau (2011) installed in 6 regions to staff, NGO staff, INPA feature improved rice staff, and staff, NGOs, production techniques farmer and 90 farmers) and used of improved groups) seed. Trainer brought from Senegal to accompany producers and staff instead of sending beneficiaries abroad. Training for project 1 1 Senegal 1 month Completed Procurement Assistant (2010) successfully Study tour for MADR 5 0 7 days Not completed staff Farmer study tour 15 11 Senegal 7 days Completed (2010) successfully Training in project 1 1 Senegal 1 month Completed management and (2011) successfully monitoring Training in 2 2 Senegal 7 days Completed environmental and (2011) successfully social issues Training in financial 1 1 Kenya 10 days Completed management and (2013) successfully disbursement Total trained 65 131

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. This project was small in terms of cost but very large in terms of coverage, both in its geographical coverage and scope of activities. Agriculture is the most important sector of the economy. Almost 80 percent of the population depends on agriculture (directly and indirectly) for their livelihoods. About 70 percent of the population is below the poverty line. On an average, about 65 percent of the household income is spent on food, and food insecurity is a major national problem. Given those harsh realities, the objective of this project was to improve food security for the most vulnerable population, including children, and increase smallholder rice production in the project areas.

2. This project—one of very few donor-funded projects that dealt with improving food security Guinea-Bissau—had an enormous economic impact on the lives of rural people in the areas where it operated. However, it is very difficult to carry out a standard economic and financial analysis for this emergency food security project, given that it had three components and six subcomponents, and each subcomponent involved different activities. In any case, this annex attempts to estimate the project’s likely impacts and, where possible, to provide estimated benefit-cost ratios.

Component 1: Support for the Most Vulnerable Population

3. This component dealt with two programs: the school feeding program (US$ 0.5 million) and the food-for-work program (US$ 1.0 million). This component had three types of major economic impacts and clearly demonstrates a very efficient use of project funds.

4. Food security impact. Under the school feeding program, food was provided to 14,102 students, against a target of 14,000. Students received daily meals for the duration of one school year. In addition, girls received take-home rations. Given Guinea-Bissau’s low education rate, particularly of girls, this subcomponent had a major impact on education among beneficiaries, male and female. Based on a large sample of students covered by the school feeding program, the program caused the dropout rate to decline from 19 percent to 5 percent and the pass-rate to rise from 65 percent to 82 percent. Under the food-for-work program, 29,958 beneficiaries received food for a total of 285,000 days.

5. Employment impact. The food-for-work program created employment for 285,000 person working days for 19,965 rural unemployed, including women. In return for food, these workers rehabilitated 5,621 hectares (against a target of 5,000 hectares) of lowland and mangrove rice fields (specifically, 2,741 hectares of mangrove rice fields and 2,880 hectares of lowland fields). Rehabilitation included the construction of dikes on mangrove rice land to protect it from salt water and the construction of drainage channels and anti-erosion banks for lowland rice fields. The rehabilitated land is ready for rice cultivation during every year in the future, as long as the dikes and drainage channels are maintained. In addition to making it possible to produce more rice, this food-for-work

program created additional employment opportunities for farmers who were given parcels of rehabilitated land for rice cultivation.

6. Rice production impact. In addition to the food security impact and the employment impact, the food-for-work program resulted in a large rice production impact because it rehabilitated 5,621 hectares for rice cultivation. This achievement is critical in a country that is a net importer of rice. Table A3.1 summarizes information on the additional rice produced on land rehabilitated under the food-for-work program.

Table A3.1: Total Rice Production on Rehabilitated Land, 2009–11

Rehabilitated Land Average Paddy Yield Clean Rice Production Year Paddy Production (t) Planted to Rice (ha) (t/ha) (t) 2009 1,802 2.04 3,674 2,462 2010 2,755 1.96 5,414 3,627 2011 5,621 1.85 10,399 6,967 Total 19,487 13,056

7. Since rice is grown on this newly rehabilitated land under low levels of inputs (mainly labor and land, allocated free of cost), the cost of production is estimated to be 40 percent of the value of rice production. Based on this estimation, benefit-cost ratios for rice production under the food-for-work program (total cost US$1 million) are determined under two rice price scenarios (Table A3.2).

Table A3.2: Benefit/Cost Ratios for Rice Production under the Food-for-Work Program

Rice Gross Value of Estimated Net Value of Rice Rice Price Benefit-cost Production Rice Production Production Cost Production (US$/t) ratio (t) (US$ M) (US$ M) (US$ M) 450 13,056 5.875 2.350 3.525 3.5 500 13,056 6.528 2.611 3.917 3.9

8. Clearly, the benefit-cost ratios for investment in rice production on the land rehabilitated under the food-for-work program were very high (3.5 and 3.9 under the two price scenarios). This impact stands alongside the two other impacts of the food-for-work program (namely, improved food security for the workers and their families and additional employment for rural workers).

9. The Guinea-Bissau Rural Community Driven Development Project was approved by the World Bank in August 2009 and is under implementation. That project also involves micro-projects. Among its various types of micro-projects, two deal with activities similar to those implemented under this emergency food security project: the rehabilitation of dikes for lowland rice production and the rehabilitation of dikes for mangrove rice production. The projected internal rate of return to investment for these two types of micro-projects is very high (Table A3.3) and provides additional evidence that returns to investment in rehabilitating land for rice cultivation are high.

Table A3.3: Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for Investment in Rehabilitating Land to Grow Rice

Micro-project type Investment (CFAF) IRR

Rehabilitation of dikes for lowland rice fields 1,970,000 21.17 Rehabilitation of dikes for mangrove rice fields 5,200,000 28.87 Note: US$ 1 = CFAF 475.

Support for Increasing Food Production

10. This project component supports increased food production by providing US$ 2.0 million in matching grants for food production and US$ 0.3 million for technical support to the staff of MADR. Through four major impacts that demonstrated an efficient use of project funds, this component substantially benefited the rural population in project areas, as described next.

11. Improved knowledge and capacity. Technical support and training were provided to MADR staff who, in turn, provided training and information about good agricultural practices to farmers and farmer associations. In addition, NGOs were hired to work directly with farmers and farmer associations to provide support related to the micro- projects. The main impacts of those interventions were: (i) increased capacity in MADR; (ii) increased capacity in local NGOs; (iii) increased capacity in farmer associations; and (iv) increased capacity and knowledge related to good agricultural practices among farmers. While they are extremely important, the impacts of such improvements in capacity and knowledge are also notoriously challenging to quantify.

12. Increased farm income. This project gave 534 farmer groups access to inputs and supported the implementation of 788 micro-projects. Of those 788 micro-projects, 534 dealt with improving production; they increased the adoption of new agricultural technology as well as the production of food crops, particularly rice. The remaining 267 micro-projects dealt with post-harvest agriculture, food processing, and improved access to agricultural markets. The production micro-projects included 13,934 farmers, and the post-harvest micro-projects included 7,072 farmers. The end result was increased food production, reduced food losses, improved shelf life of food, and increased farm income. In other words, this small project changed the lives of over 21,000 farm households.

13. Increased employment. The implementation of this component increased farmers’ direct employment in various project activities and also increased the sustainability of those activities over time. In addition, this component created direct and indirect employment opportunities inside and outside agriculture. For example, experts from the MADR and NGOs were involved in the implementation of various project activities. In addition, indirect employment included input distribution; servicing of rice mills, farm equipment, and tools; and food processing, transportation, and storage. In a country where rural unemployment is very high, this project significantly increased employment opportunities.

14. Rice production. For the micro-projects, the project procured and distributed rice seed, NPK fertilizer, and urea to farmers. Only part of the NPK and urea was used for growing rice, however. About 62.1 tons of rice seed was sufficient to plant 1,035 hectares of lowland rice; 51.75 tons each of NPK and urea were required to apply the recommended levels of fertilizer (50 kilograms per hectare each for NPK and urea) on that area. The total value of these three modern inputs was US$ 113,850 (US$ 62,100 for lowland rice seed, US$ 28,875 for NPK fertilizer, and US$ 28,875 for urea). Table A3.4 presents the benefit-cost ratios estimated under four rice price/yield scenarios.

Table A3.4: Benefit/Cost Ratio for Investment in Modern Inputs for Rice Production

Rice Yield Increase Rice Price 75% over Base Yield 50% over Base Yield US$ 500/t 2.74 1.83 US$ 450/t 2.47 1.64 Note: For lowland rice, base yield is 1.2 t/ha of paddy.

15. Clearly, as indicated by the estimated benefit/cost ratios, returns to investment in improved rice seed, fertilizer, and farmer training in good agricultural practices are very high. The benefit/cost ratios vary from 1.64 to 2.74 under different scenarios. Since base yields are so low, the actual paddy rice yield and hence the benefit/cost ratios could be even higher.

16. Overall, this project contributed significantly to food security and smallholder rice production in Guinea-Bissau. More importantly, it has improved the lives of households in the project areas by making agriculture (their main livelihood) more productive and sustainable over time. In other words, the returns to investment are very likely to be even higher than indicated by the benefit/cost ratios.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Responsibility/ Name Title Unit Specialty Lending Aniceto Timoteo Bila Senior Rural Development Specialist AFTAR TTL, preparation Barbara Weber Senior Operations Officer AFCSN Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Procurement Carmen Pereira Liaison Officer AFCF1 Hoon Sahib Soh Senior Economist AFTP4 Kristine Schwebach Operations Analyst AFTCS Luz Meza-Bartrina Senior Counsel LEGAF Martin Serrano Counsel LEGAF Mohinder Mudahar Consultant Osval R. A. Romao Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Financial Management Patrice Sade Team Assistant AFTAR Renato Nardello Senior Operations Officer AFTAR Sossena Tassew Office Manager AFTAR Soulemane Fofana Operations Officer AFTAR Tanya Yudelman Consultant Tijan Sallah Lead Operations Officer AFTAR Victoria Gyllerup Operations Officer AFTRL Yves Prévost Environmental Specialist AFTEN Supervision/ICR Aniceto Timoteo Bila Senior Rural Development Specialist AFTA2 TTL, supervision Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Mohinder S. Mudahar Consultant Economist Osval Rocha Andrade Romao Financial Management Specialist AFTMW Patrice Sade Program Assistant AFTA2 Cheikh A. T. Sagna Senior Social Development Specialist AFTCS Social Safeguards Cheick Traore Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Sidy Diop Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPW Community-driven Raimundo Caminha Consultant Development specialist Environmental Bienvenu Rajaonson Senior Environmental Specialist safeguards Taleb Ould Sid’ahmed Communications Associate Jane C. Hopkins Senior Agricultural Economist AFTA1 TTL, ICR Racey Bingham Consultant Author ICR Mohamed Khatouri Lead M&E Specialist

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY09 22.95 82.74 Total: 22.95 82.74 Supervision/ICR FY09 10.04 94.42 FY10 22.87 78.80 FY11 15.75 89.89 FY12 12.18 87.69 FY13 8.14 56.97 FY14 3.53 32.86 Total: 72.51 440.64

Annex 5. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Introduction

1. The Government of Guinea-Bissau requested and obtained, on September 9, 2008, a World Bank Credit (International Development Association and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and a subsequent Additional Financing from the European Commission for a total amount of US$ 9 million to finance a Food Security Program through the Emergency Food Security Support Project (EFSSP), to be implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR), hereafter designated as the Ministry of Agriculture.

2. The project initiated activities in October 11, 2008, with the implementation of the procurement plan as well as other activities. Physical execution of activities started in February 10, 2009, with funding from the World Bank and subsequently the EU, on the basis of a clearly defined action plan, as reflected in this final project report for the International Development Association grant only, during the period from October 11, 2008 through August 30, 2013.

Descriptive summary

3. The main objective of the project is to improve the food security of the most vulnerable population, including children, and strengthen smallholders’ ability to produce rice. This objective would be attained through three project components, whose implementation was entrusted to the World Food Programme in Guinea-Bissau (WFP) and the Ministry of Agriculture through a Technical Coordination Unit (TCU) of the project, for a period of three years, in selected areas of the country: the regions of Bafatá, Gabu, Oio, Cacheu, and the Autonomous Sector of Bissau.

4. This final project technical report briefly describes the activities carried out within the framework of the EFSSP implementation, during the period from February 2009 to August 30, 2013. During this period, the TCU's performance featured very important achievements in financial management; procurement of goods, services and works; and in the technical coordination of activities in all project components, to reach the project’s strategic development objectives.

5. Therefore, despite some shortcomings, overall project performance is satisfactory if it is considered that these results were achieved in the context of Guinea-Bissau, reflecting broad national strategies as well as government policies related to the Food Security Support Program. Furthermore, this satisfactory performance reveals the following strengths: (i) operational capability of the project team, backstopped by periodic supervision missions of the World Bank, augmented by a good rural coordination network involving all stakeholders, traditional and local government authorities, regional directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture, and NGOs; (ii) timely achievement of most of the project activities; and (iii) ownership of the project by the community-based organizations (CBOs) and other beneficiaries.

6. In view of the above, the project played a pioneering role in the area of food security, combating hunger and reducing poverty in rural populations. At the same time, it demonstrated good institutional and organizational practices in executing a national project of this size. The success of the project was due to a number of advantages, namely: (i) CBOs’ participation in the choice of project activities, with the materials and equipment of their choosing; (ii) involvement of partner NGOs, Agricultural Regional Directorates, and the regional project coordination units in the selection of beneficiaries; (iii) participation of CBOs, NGOs, and local authorities in the choice of the activities to be held in their respective zones; and (iv) ownership of the project by the beneficiaries.

Subcomponent 2.1: Matching Grants

7. Within Subcomponent 2.1, of 800 micro-projects planned, all 800 were implemented, of which 534 micro-projects were for production support (mainly rice and horticulture) and 266 were for post-harvest activities (mainly milling equipment for rice and millet), benefiting 800 producer groups of about 20 producers each, or 16,000 direct beneficiaries. The indirect beneficiaries are estimated at 112,000 people. The total area is about 5,436.7 hectares of lowlands used for rice cultivation. Thus, total production before the project interventions (mangrove and lowland rice), based upon an average reference yield of 1.35 tons per hectare estimated by the Department of Agricultural Statistics, was about 7,339 tons of paddy or 4,770 tons of milled rice. With the assistance of the project, the average yield is about 1.85 tons per hectare, for an estimated production of about 10,058 tons of paddy or 6,538 tons of milled rice.

8. Consequently, the additional gains resulting from project interventions providing agricultural inputs, material, and various types of equipment to improve the productivity of 5,436.7 hectares of lowlands is 1,768 tons of milled rice, directly benefiting 9,300 beneficiaries in the regions where the project operated. (See Tables 6 and 7 from the original report.)

9. This positive contribution has increased the consumption of locally produced rice and reduced dependency on the consumption of imported rice in rural communities. Generally, in farmers’ management strategies, local production is divided as follows: One portion is consumed by family members; another is reserved for seed; and the surplus is sold and the revenue combined with revenues from cashew and other rural business activities to meet family needs (medicine and medical care, ceremonies such as weddings, tuition, school supplies, and so on).

10. Moreover, the processing of paddy and other cereals in rural areas made it possible to increase revenues by marketing products of good quality, reducing labor- intensive work by women, and providing them with greater opportunities to diversify their rural activities, production, and agribusinesses.

11. Materials and equipment acquired by CBOs are estimated to be insufficient in quantity but much appreciated for their quality. The distribution criteria established

beforehand for the materials, equipment, and other agricultural inputs provided by the project were fully respected. It is important to state that there was some delay in the final distribution process (year 2012), owing to the “coup d’état” of April 12, which led to suspension of project operations; despite that delay, overall project efficiency was satisfactory.

12. Another important activity under this subcomponent is horticulture (market gardening). The total number of direct beneficiaries involved in horticulture under the project is estimated to be 36,661 women, producing different horticultural crops on 124.06 hectares of land in six regions, for total production estimated at 1,611,250 kilograms (equivalent to CFAF 1,767,637; see Table 8 of the main report). Horticultural activities are highly appreciated and successful in the communities, especially among women. The following impacts should be highlighted:

Technical impacts • All of the women producers have mastered agricultural techniques very well. • They know the full cropping calendars and agricultural cycles of each crop and classify the crops by growing season (rainy season crops such as okra, cucumbers, djacatu, beans, and badjiqui; dry-season crops such as tomatoes, onions, carrots, cabbages, peppers, lettuces, radishes, garlic, and so on). Socioeconomic impacts • Horticultural management committees promote a weekly levy system ranging from CFAF 100 to CFAF 1,000 among the association member groups. This levy ensures the continuity of production, especially during the rainy season, for undertaking enterprises such as groundnut cropping, palm oil production, and the acquisition of small ruminants to increase family incomes. • Similarly, women reserve a portion of their earnings for medical care in case of illness, for supporting children in school, and for improving family diets. Finally, women horticulturists manage everything related to family food security, especially in the East and Autonomous Sector of Bissau. • The associations that are part of Federation of NGO/APALCOF of Contuboel had their own initiatives to sell seed financed within the framework of the project (at a nominal price to Federation members). Revenues are deposited in the bank account of the organization with a view to be used in the next agricultural season to buy seed of horticultural crops in Senegal, in an attempt to create the conditions for sustainability.

Subcomponent 2.2: Technical Support to the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

13. Out of 7 training sessions planned, 6 were executed, benefiting 131 participants from different areas of expertise in the agricultural sector, including:

• 25 technicians from the project and INPA and 90 farmers and members of NGOs were involved in training in rice production systems as well as producing good- quality rice seed.

• 1 procurement specialist and 11 peasants benefited from sub-regional exchange visits. • 1 in the area of technical formulation of projects. • 2 in socio-environmental matters. • 1 in disbursement and financial management.

14. A study visit for MADR staff was not performed due to the complexity of the communication process. Nevertheless, progress toward the PDO within the framework of Subcomponent 2.2 was 86 percent. (See Table 11 from the main report.)

15. It is important to state that 100 percent of the technicians who benefited from this training program have been inserted in different services of the Ministry of Agriculture, thereby upgrading the technical capabilities of the ministry to perform its mandate for the development of agriculture, a vital sector of the national economy. Specifically, some of the activities carried out by the project supported the agricultural statistics service to collect agricultural data for 2011/12.

Main constraints during project implementation

16. The main constraints during the implementation of project activities are summed up as follows. First, the failure to hire personnel (Administrative Assistant, Secretary, Procurement Assistant, and Logistics Assistant) to complete the project staff caused pressures at work and the consequent accumulation of services, occasioning some delays in implementation and the updating of technical and financial data for the project. Second, training in the use of equipment provided by the project was delayed by the temporary suspension of the project. Third, problems arose in assembling equipment. Fourth, partner NGOs did not follow up on activities of micro-projects. Fifth, disruption of the project was linked to cyclical instability in the country. Sixth, inflexible rules and procedures of the World Bank in the process of hiring competent technical personnel in specific areas (to prevent conflicts of interest) are the main factor behind the late start-up of the project. The second and third constraints are directly linked to the events of April 12, 2012. The fourth is directly linked to a lack of funds on the part of the partner NGOs.

Visibility

17. Visibility is an important aspect of the success of any project. Project strategies in public awareness were based on the dissemination of messages through partner NGOs and national and community radio and television. These messages were enhanced by the project’s technical team members in their areas of intervention, who disseminated information on the project’s mission and other information in conjunction with traditional chiefs, notables, religious leaders, and local authorities. Effective project awareness and dissemination in all intervention areas has made the project’s activities well known in rural areas and generated many requests for participation.

Sustainability

18. A project’s sustainability depends on the overall results achieved throughout its implementation. In this context, five results appear to guarantee the project’s sustainability. First, the process for acquiring and distributing material, equipment, and other agricultural inputs to CBOs was transparent and credible. Second, training administered to members of CBOs improved their capacity to manage interventions. Third, another factor likely to promote sustainability is the establishment of management and follow-up committees to maintain the rehabilitated land and horticulture perimeters. Fourth, the management of post-harvest support equipment is ensured by the management committees, particularly through internal financial resources obtained by CBOs for operation and maintenance, and through the promotion of local capabilities for managing communally held goods in support of shared interests. A final factor likely to promote sustainability is the involvement of MADR and local authorities in following up on project activities to ensure that the project’s achievements endure.

Lessons learned

19. A number of lessons learned from implementing EFSSP may serve to inform other phases of the project or similar projects:

• Innovative approaches served the project well. They include CBOs’ freedom to determine what they wanted for their communities, as well as the creation of technical evaluation committees to select sites, conduct socioeconomic and environmental feasibility assessments, and validate which micro-projects were eligible for funding. Those committees, chaired by the Regional Delegate for Agriculture, encompassed regional project coordinators, CBOs, notables, religious leaders, partner NGOs, and local authorities.

• All materials and equipment purchased under the project were properly channeled and distributed in a transparent manner according to pre-established criteria. Transport costs were assumed by the respective communities, contributing to beneficiaries’ accountability.

• Ownership of the project by the beneficiaries is real, despite anomalies observed in some localities (especially in Cacheu and Biombo), as noted in the consultant's report on the impact of micro-projects.

• Participatory project coordination involved all actors in the decision-making process for the project, and project staff regularly followed up on CBOs’ activities.

• Collective performance is maximized by strong involvement of the Coordination Unit and World Bank supervision missions in monitoring, evaluating, and issuing related recommendations.

• NGOs had some difficulty with efficient follow-up, because the financial resources made available to them through contracts signed with the EFSSP to identify, conceive, and follow up on micro-projects were considered to be insufficient.

• Dissemination of messages through partner NGOs on good agricultural practices and actions of the EFSSP is effective and efficient.

• The agricultural statistics service must be involved from the beginning in collecting production data, with and without the participation of the project, facilitating monitoring and impact.

• Inflexible rules and procedures of the World Bank in the hiring of competent technical personnel in specific areas (to prevent conflicts of interest) is the main factor behind the project’s late start.

• It is essential to produce a baseline description of each site, with socio- environmental reference data to facilitate socio-environmental monitoring and impact evaluation for the project.

Recommendations

Recommendations to increase effectiveness and efficiency:

• Recruit and train a full technical coordination team for better project implementation. • Recruit a monitoring and evaluation specialist to improve data collection efficiency. • Reinforce institutional collaboration between partner agencies (NGOs, regional structures of the Ministry Agriculture, and local authorities). • Support partner NGOs with adequate funding for micro-projects to allow them to provide technical support and follow-up and evaluate the activities of the beneficiaries. • Keep promoting lowland and feeder roads to increase rice production and at the same time facilitate marketing. • Reinforce the training for beneficiaries (CBOs) in organization, management, and women’s literacy.

Recommendations to increase the impact of the project:

• Take gender into account when selecting candidates for training in rice production practices, especially in Bafata and Gabu, where women are the main rice producers. • Increase the ceiling of the micro-projects. • Reduce the number of micro-projects.

• Reinforce support to CBOs by providing material, equipment, and spare parts to consolidate the results achieved in the first phase of the project. • Reinforce the water supply for horticulture in proportion to the size of the field to ensure permanent water availability throughout the production cycle. • Supply mechanized pumps and related implements to supply irrigation water to promote year-round production of lowland rice in Bafata and Gabu, specifically the perimeters of Bafata-Campossa, Contuboel, and Sonaco- APALCOF-TESITO. • Supply more power tillers to increase cultivated area and reduce the labor requirement (especially for women, who constitute most of the agricultural labor force for lowland rice production). • Reinforce the supply of herbicides, fertilizers, and good quality seed of rice and horticultural crops. • Promote horticultural crops by supporting producers, including women and youths, in processing and marketing their products.

Annex 6. Supporting Documents

1. WB Docs Project File 2. Implementation Status Reports 1-8 3. Aide-mémoires and BTORs (all available, 2008–12) 4. Emergency Food Security Support Project, Food Price Crisis Trust Fund, Emergency Project Paper, Report No. 44941-GW, September 9, 2008 5. European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility Trust Fund, Emergency Project Paper, Report No. 51266-GW, February 22, 2010 6. Interim Strategy Note (FY2014–2015) for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Draft, December, 16, 2013 7. Implementation Completion and Results Report (TF096347, TF096348) for the Emergency Food Security Support Project under the European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility, Report No. ICR2317, June 28, 2012 8. NGOs Terms of Reference 9. TCU Quarterly Narrative and Financial Reports (all, 2008–12) 10. Standard Project Reports, WFP (all, 2008–10) 11. Summary Report, Implementation of School Feeding and Land Rehabilitation Activities, WFP, June 2011 12. Technical Review of Component 1 (main activities, achievements, and issues), World Bank, August 2010 13. Technical Final Report of the Emergency Food Security Support Project, Main Summary, November 2013 14. AFTOS Assessment of the Likelihood of Projects Closing in FY12 Achieving Stated Objectives (December 2011) 15. Implementation Completion and Results Report Guidelines, OCPS, August 2006 (last updated 10/05/2011) 16. ICR and IEG Evaluations: Lessons and Guidance for AFR 17. Project Extension Packages (5) 18. Stakeholder Interviews, focus groups, workshop, and field visits (NGOs, TCU, TTL, beneficiaries), December 2013 19. Grant Reporting and Monitoring Reports and GFRP Project Status Reports 20. Standard Project Report, WFP, 2009, 2010 21. Implementation Completion Report, Agriculture Services Project, June 1995 (approved 1987) 22. Galloway, R., E. Kristjansson, A. Gelli, U. Meir, F. Espejo, and D. Bundy (2009), “School Feeding: Outcomes and Costs.” Food and Nutrition Bulletin 30(2): 171–82. 23. Résultats de l’Enquête Approfondie sur la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Vulnérabilité des Ménages Ruraux, Mars 2011, Rapport final, Programme Alimentaire Mondiale

24. Présentation des Résultats Préliminaires de l’Evaluation Approfondie de la Sécurité Alimentaire en Situation d’Urgence Guinée Bissau, Programme Alimentaire Mondiale, October 2013 25. Apresentaçao dos Resultatdos Finais, Projecto de Emergencia Apoio a Segurança Alimentar, December 2013 26. Vulnerability Assessment Analysis and Mapping, 2005, World Food Programme 27. Rapid Food Security Assessment, Guinea-Bissau, Biombo, Oio and Quinara Regions, June 2012 28. Minutes of the Rapid Review Committee Meeting, July 27 and August 19, 2008 29. World Bank (AFTP4): Integrated Poverty and Social Assessment (IPSA), Vol. II: Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau, May 2006 30. Guinea-Bissau Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2011–15 31. Implementation Status Report #6. Grant (P120214) for the Emergency Food Security Support Project in the amount of euros 2.87 million from the European Union Food Crisis Rapid Response Facility Trust Fund (TF096347, TF 096348) 32. Rural Community-Driven Development Project (RCDD), Project Appraisal Document, Report No. 49557-GW, August 28, 2009

50 IBRD 33415 N ° 12

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