CONTROVERY, COMPROMISE, and RECONCENTRATION in AGRARIAN REFORM IMPLEMENTATION: The Case of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac Province, Philippines
A Field Studies Paper Submitted to The Graduate School of University of the Philippines Los Banos
In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND DEVELOPMENT Major in Agrarian and Rurban Studies
by
GIL I. ESPENIDO
May 2016
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APPROVAL SHEET
This Field Study entitled the CONTROVERSY, COMPROMISE, and RECONCENTRATION in Agrarian Reform Implementation: The Case of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac Province, Philippines
prepared and submitted by Gil I. Espenido as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Public Affairs and Development major in Agrarian and Rurban Development Studies.
Accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Masters in Public Affairs and Development major in Agrarian and Rurban Development Studies.
______Prof. Rolando T. Bello Chair
______Dr. Merlyne M. Paunlagui Dr. Bing C. Brillo Member Member
______Date
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ABSTRACT
The farmworkers were short-changed three times.
The peso loan for the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita in 1957 (completed in 1958) from Don Antonio Lopez Y Lopez by the Cojuanco’s was financed by the Government Service Insurance System(GSIS) on condition that Jose Cojuanco (Pnoy’s grandfather) will distribute the whole hacienda to the tenants after ten years, or in 1967. The Central Bank also facilitated a dollar loan through the Manufactuers Trust Company in New York for the purchase of the sugar mill on a similar condition. 1967 came and passed but the hacienda was never distributed to the farmers.
During the campaign for the snap election in 1985, then presidential candidate Corazon “Cory” Aquino, promised to make land reform as the center-piece of her administration. After she assumed the presidency, Cory also promised to subject Hacienda Luisita under agrarian reform. After the enactment of RA 6657 in 1988, a new mode surfaced which helped corporate farm owners evade actual land distribution through the onerous Stock Distribution Option (SDO). This new scheme designated the possession and control of agricultural land to corporations while depriving the farmworkers ownership over the land. This scheme was vigorously implemented by the Cory administration in Hacienda Luisita, breaking Cory’s promises.
The final and executory resolution of the Supreme Court on the Hacienda Luisita, Inc. case in 2011 instructed the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to facilitate the transfer of land ownership of agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita to qualified farmworkers all within a period of one year.
The DAR land distribution scheme in Hacienda Luisita is a typical program of a state-led land reform within a highly stratified society like the Philippines. Its implementation is marred with dubious irregularities that rendered the supposed beneficiaries disenfranchised and swindled through: (a) inserting questionable names into the masterlist of beneficiaries; (b) procuring a dubious and overpriced land survey; (c) exclusion of hundreds of hectares of agricultural land from distribution; (d) imposition of compulsory signing of promissory notes to ensure amortization payments; (e) grant of overpriced landlord compensation to the HLI / Cojuangco- Aquinos; (f) inept facilitation of the audit of HLI and CHI assets; and (g) passionate justification of Cojuangco-Aquino claims over agricultural lands in Tarlac City; (h) inaction on farmworkers’ appeal for revocation of conversion order on 500 hectares (RCBC/LIPCO); and (i) imposition and promotion of block farming scheme “as support service” to serve landlord interest.
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All these happened while majority of these contested lands were already pawned to the middlemen since 2002. This has created a tragic situation wherein the lands distributed are now effectively in the hands of the middlemen. Effectively, the system of arriendo has institutionalized a subtle way of dislodging the farmworker from his awarded land. Private security forces and state military and police personnel are no longer needed to evict farmworkers from the land. Since the illegal transaction is consciously entered into by the farmworker, his dislocation from his means of production is easily consummated.
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Table of Contents
Page Abstract
Chapter I Introduction 7
Statement of the Problem 8 Objectives of the Study 9 Significance of the Study 9
Chapter II Methodology and Data Sources 9 Locale of the Study 9 Data Sources 10 Instruments Used 10 Definition of Terms 11 Limitation of the study 12
Chapter III Background of the Study (Historical Context 13 Of Hacienda Luisita)
Chapter IV CARP (The Stock Distribution Option) 16
Chapter V The Journey From SDO to Land Reform Distribution 18 and the 2013- 2014 Land Distribution Implementation The Struggle to Nullify the Stock Distribution Option 19 The 2013-2014 Land Distribution Implementation 25 The Fluidity of the Masterlist 25 The Irregularity of the Land Survey 29 The Contentious 500-hectare “converted land” 34 TADECO’s Resurrected Claim 36 Lot Allocation Through Raffle 38 Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) Distribution 43 Cojuangco’s Milking the Government by Being Paid in 46 Millions
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Chapter VI Land Reconcentration 49
State-led Reconcentration 49 Block Farming and the Passage of Sugarcane Industry Development Act of 2015 Private-led Reconcentration 53 Two types of Arrienda System 55 Increasing Transactions of Outright Sale of Lots Awarded 57 Creeping Ejections of Individual Beneficiaries from the 58 Land
Chapter VII Conclusions and Recommendations 59
References 61
Appendices 64
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I. Introduction
The huge size of Hacienda Luisita together with the landed estates in Negros as well as in other provinces are living testimonies of how ruling families in the past were able to accumulate large tracts of land. But through the decades, large and old provinces had been subdivided into new provinces to become fiefdoms of landlords and/or warlords, and cities had to accommodate geographical changes in their boundaries. Yet, Hacienda Luisita is among of those estates that were able to retain its large expanse of land. In fact, the hacienda is bigger than some cities in Metro Manila that are densely populated.
Source: 2013 HL National Fact Finding Mission
These vestiges of feudalism graphically show how skewed land ownership is in our country. Researches using the political economy framework have empirically established the various feudal and semi-feudal relations and operations of such estates. Former Chief Justice Corona puts it sharply that “Hacienda Luisita has always been viewed as a litmus test of genuine reform program.” This is especially true since two presidents (the so-called icon of democracy, Cory Aquino and the current president, Noynoy (who claims that the masses are his bosses) come from the family that owned Hacienda Luisita.
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Hacienda Luisita symbolizes the hacienda system that ties the country and the rural population to underdevelopment and perennial crisis. The Cojuangcos have been relentless in their maneuvers and schemes to retain its monopoly over the hacienda and prevent its distribution to the farmworkers.
On the 24th of April, 2012, as the impeachment trial of SC Chief Justice Renato Corona was taking place in the Senate, the Supreme Court “ruled in finality” through its resolution no. 171101, confirming their November 24 ,2011, decision that the land be distributed to the farmers with compensation at November 21, 1989, prices (OFW Blogger, 2013).
Agrarian reform is popularly defined as “the distribution of public and private agricultural lands, regardless of produce and tenurial arrangement, to landless farmers and regular farm workers, to include support services” (AFA & AsiaDHRRA, 2005). But in a society like the Philippines where class stratification is highly pronounced, agrarian reform is an attempt to change class relations within the confinement of a system dominated by the ruling class. That is why it is called an agrarian reform program.
Statement of the Problem
On April 23, 2012, a day before the Supreme Court released its landmark decision, former University of the Philippines School of Labor and Industrial Relations (SOLAIR) Dean Rene E. Ofreneo said that addressing the system of arriendo was one of the many hurdles that the government could face in implementing the Court’s decision (PCIJ, 2012).
This paper aims to help in the discourse on agrarian reform implementation by studying and analyzing the position and the roles played by arriendadors in the agrarian reform implementation in Hacienda Luisita.
Objectives of the Study
This paper aims to do the following:
1. outline the saga of land reform, the maze of tales and yarns, laws and deception, legal, extra-legal, meta-legal and illegal maneuvering in Hacienda Luisita; 2. uncover the arriendo system and how the government has significantly failed to address this system inside Hacienda Luisita; 3. present the processes where the agrarian reform beneficiaries are driven from their awarded land; and 4. make some recommendations to avert the seemingly inevitable failure of agrarian reform in Hacieda Luisita.
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Significance of the Study
The centrality of land to man’s life like a typical farmworker in Hacienda Luisista is a historical fact. Land supports all forms of lives and other factors of production (Kiita, 2010). An American economist and philosopher, emphasized the importance of land and remarked “so man not only lives off land, levying on it for its materials and forces, but he also lives on land. His very life depends on land. Land is the habitation of man, the store-house upon which he must draw for all his needs, the material to which his labour must be applied for the supply of all his desires; for even the products of the sea cannot be taken, the light of the sun enjoyed, or any of the forces of nature utilized, without the use of land or its products. On the land we are born, from it we live, to it we return again - children of the soil as truly as is the blade of grass or the flower of the field. Take away from man all that belongs to land and he is but a disembodied spirit” (Henry, 1871).
And yet, the land question is not simply an economic question. According to Nikita Sud, land is a metaphor for power, wealth and status. More importantly, the land question is also a political question. In the Philippines, an archipelagic country with a nature-based economy, land and natural resources are highly politicized. Thus, control over land and resources is always a strategy for maintaining political control; traditional politics are oriented toward maintaining elite control over the nation’s land and other resources (USAID paper).
Indeed, Hacienda Luisita is an outstanding case to study the results of agrarian reform after a two year implementation. An unclassified but sensitive US diplomatic cable published by anti- secrecy group Wikileaks has said that the implications of the Hacienda Luisita case to the landholdings of other wealthy families in the Philippines who have avoided land reform would be far ranging and would have a deep social impact (An uncomplicatedmind.blogspot.com, 2012).
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
Locale of the Study
Hacienda Luisita is a 6,453-hectare sugar estate covering 11 villages in three towns of Tarlac province. Most of the original farmworkers reside in 10 villages – Barangays Balete, Cutcut (or Sta. Catalina), Lourdes (formerly Texas), Mapalacsiao (formerly Luisita), Asturias, and Bantog in Tarlac City; Barangay Motrico in La Paz town; and Barangays Parang (formerly San Sebastian), Mabilog (formerly Pasajes) and Pando in Concepcion town. The original estate includes the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT) sugar mill and a golf course. The eleventh village is Barangay Central in Tarlac City which houses the CAT sugar mill, the St. Martin de Porres Hospital and the Our Lady of Lourdes Church.
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Data Sources
The study made use of survey data already gathered/being gathered by other individuals, non- government organizations (NGOs) as well as advocates groups for Hacienda Luisita farmworkers. These will be complemented by data coming from administrative reports and other secondary data.
Instruments Used
Since the focus of the field study is a potential social problem with multiple layers of nuiances and complexities, the author employs qualitative methods to get at different questions to illicit quality answers. It is aimed to surface and understand “data and useful insights about the lived experiences of the farmworkers, the reasons for their protests (unspoken or articulated), the decisions they make, and the impact their actions and decisions will have on them.
The first instrument used was focused group discussion(FGD). This is a discussion-based interview that “produces a particular type of qualitative data, involving the simultaneous use of multiple responses to generate data”.
The FGD for this study drew on the “Focused Conversation” techniques developed by the Canadian Institute for Cultural Affairs (ICA). ICA was founded in 1962 to implement community development and training programs and conduct policy research. The Focused Conversation was developed to facilitate group interactions where collaborative decisions and plans are an expected output. The premise of the technique is that posing the right questions is critical to fostering meaningful and productive interaction and decision-making. Focused Conversation (also called the ORID Method) involves four levels of questions (Guerrero, 2002):
Objective level: questions about facts and external reality that people take in with their senses,
Reflective level: questions to call forth immediate personal reaction to the data, an internal response, sometimes emotions or feelings, hidden images and people’s past associations with the facts,
Interpretative level: questions to draw out meaning, values, significance, and implications for the individual or group by building on the data from the objective level plus the associations form the reflective level, and
Decision level: questions to elicit resolution, enable the individual or group to make a decision in response to the event or about the future (Stanfield in PACAP, 2008).
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The second instrument used was the interview of key informants. The key informant interview were conducted with people who have first hand knowledge about the issues of the agrarian reform implementation, knew a great deal about an important event or organization or played a central roles in the agrarian reform implemention in Hacienda Luisita like leaders of the ARBO, FARM, and key DAR provincial officials.
Like the FDGs, the interview of key informants followed the ORID method, with the following questions (Guerrero, 2002):
O: What are the accomplishments of the agrarian reform implementation? How did the implementation proceed? In addressing the arriendo system? In ensuring that the lot allocation is fair? farmworkers’ wellbeing?
R: Which of the results do you feel are the most significant, whether the positive and the negative results? Why are they significant? What lessons and insights did you learn from the implementation? What are the farmworkers perceptions, opinions, beliefs and attitudes toward the processes on how the land distribution was done?
I: What changes did the implementation bring to your life? How do you think the implementation has changed the lives of the farmworkers?
D: What are the plans of the organization? How do you see the future of the implementation?
The third instrument is the oral histories of few individual overlapped with intensive interviewing. The oral history has illicited recollections of events, processes, and even protests in the past.
Definition of Terms
Agrarian reform - in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA 6657), agrarian reform is defined to mean the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to include the totally of factors and support services designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.
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Landed estates - former haciendas or landholdings or private individuals or corporations which have been acquired by the government under different laws, for redistribution and resale to deserving tenants and landless farmers
Stock distribution option - (non-land transfer program of CARP), the farmers become stock owners, meaning, they are given rights to purchase capital stocks, equities or shares from the corporate landowners and association. Having acquired shares of stocks, dividend and other financial benefits and representation in the seat of the board of directors; they also acquire management rights in the corporate farm concerned. (Section 31-Corporate Landowners, RA 6657). In a production and profit sharing scheme, there is a distribution of shares of production and profit for the farmworkers who are awaiting the eventual transfer of land ownership to them. (Section 32 of RA 6657).
“Arriendo” system - a land reform beneficiary who has no capital needed to make his hacienda land productive, lease out his farm to an “arriendaor” for a specific amount a year for a three- year period.
Block farming – an arrangement that allows a farm manager to control 30 to 60 hectares of individually –titled farmlots. So-called farmer beneficiaries would have to place their lots as their share in a block. Under this scheme, farmworkers will have practically no control over their lots in block farm and will lose their right to till.
Limitation of the Study
Since the DAR is now into building a case against those beneficiaries who have mortgaged or sold their lands, no beneficiary would accept that he has indeed mortgaged or sold his lot since this is a violation of the law and he knows the consequences of this act. Getting any simple document to the effect that this farmer leased or sold his land to this person is very hard.
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III. Background of the Study (Historical Context of Hacienda Luisita)
In 1882, Don Antonio Lopez Y Lopez, the most successful and influential Spanish businessman of the 19th Century, acquired more than 12,000 hectares of prime agricultural land in Tarlac, Central Luzon, on behalf of his newly formed company, the Compania General de Tobacos de Filipinas, known as the “Tabacalera”. This acquisition was achieved by means of a Royal Grant from the Spanish Crown, which held a self appointed claim to the lands of the Philippines as colonial overlords. He named the property Hacienda Luisita, after his wife, Luisa Bru Y Lassus (Saguing, 2013).
Tobacco used to be the main crop planted in Luisita but the dominance of sugar industry on the economy started by 1850-1860. The intensification of sugar production from sugarcane was made possible when centrifugal sugar mills replaced the stream-driven mills in practically every hacienda in 1902-1929 (KPD paper, 2001). Expectedly, the Spaniards shifted to sugar in the 1920s (Dychiu, The HL Story, Part 1, 2010). Sugar production had become more profitable when the US market ensured the quota system and preferential treatment of sugar coming from the Philippines. The Spaniards built the sugar mill Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT) to accompany their sugarcane plantation (Dychiu, 2010).
In the early 1950ʹs, the Spanish owners of the Tabacalera, decided to sell Hacienda Luisita and the CAT, due to concerns over Hukbalahap (communist) insurgencies in the area (Saguing, 2013).
The wealthy Lopez family of Iloilo moved to purchase the CAT, but this purchase was vetoed by President Ramon Magsaysay, reportedly due to concerns that the Lopez clan, who already owned Meralco, Negros Navigation, The Manila Chronicle, ABS-CBN, substantial agricultural holdings in the Western Visayas’ and the nearby Pampanga Sugar Mill (PASUMIL) consortium in Pampanga which they had purchased from the Americans, would become too powerful (Saguing, 2013).
Instead, Pres. Magsaysay brokered a deal with his political prodigy Benigno “Ninoy” S Aquino Jr, for whom Magsaysay had acted as Ninong (primary sponsor) of his wedding to Corazon Cojuangco, to offer the property exclusively to Ninoy’s father-in-law Jose “Don Pepe” Cojuangco Sr. The Cojuangcos at the time were already the largest land owners in Central Luzon, but while wealthy in Peso and bank holdings, had no substantial holdings in US dollars (Saguing, 2013).
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When the family of Jose Cojuangco, Sr. acquired Hacienda Luisita in the 1950s, they received significant preferential treatment and assistance from the government to facilitate their takeover of Hacienda Luisita and CAT in 1957 (Dychiu, 2010).
To acquire a controlling interest in CAT, Jose Cojuangco, Sr. had to pay the Spaniards in dollars. He turned to the Manufacturer’s Trust Company in New York for a 10-year, $2.1 million loan. Dollars were tightly regulated in those times. To ease the flow of foreign exchange for Cojuangco’s loan, the Central Bank of the Philippines deposited part of the country’s international reserves with the Manufacturer’s Trust Company in New York (Dychiu, 2010).
The Central Bank did this on the condition that Cojuangco would simultaneously purchase the 6,443-hectare Hacienda Luisita, “with a view to distributing this hacienda to small farmers in line with the administration’s social justice program." (Central Bank Monetary Board Resolution No. 1240, August 27, 1957).
To finance the purchase of Hacienda Luisita, Cojuangco turned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). His application for a P7 million loan said that 4,000 hectares of the hacienda would be made available to bonafide sugar planters, while the balance 2,453 hectares would be distributed to barrio residents who will pay for them on installment (Dychiu, 2010).
The GSIS approved a P5.9 million loan, on the condition that Hacienda Luisita would be “subdivided among the tenants who shall pay the cost thereof under reasonable terms and conditions". (GSIS Resolution No. 1085, May 7, 1957; GSIS Resolution No. 3202, November 25, 1957).
Later, Jose Cojuangco, Sr. requested that the phrase be amended to “. . . shall be sold at cost to tenants, should there be any" (GSIS Resolution No. 356, February 5, 1958). This phrase would be cited later on as justification not to distribute the hacienda’s land.
On April 8, 1958, Jose Cojuangco, Sr.’s company, the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), became the new owner of Hacienda Luisita and CAT. Ninoy Aquino was appointed the hacienda’s first administrator.
When 1967 came and went, with no land distribution taking place, the farm workers began to organize themselves to uphold their cause.
On June 22, 1978, Demetria Cojuangco, widow of the late Jose Cojuangco, Sr., wrote to Ernesto Valdez, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. In this letter, she said that it was “extremely unwarranted to make us account for the fulfillment of a condition that cannot be enforced”, furthermore that “there are no tenants in Hacienda Luisita”, adding that “the Central Bank resolution does not indicate small farmers” and that “the Hacienda is outside the
Page 14 of 83 scope of any land reform program of the Government” and that “there is no agrarian unrest in Hacienda Luisita.” (Saguing, 2013).
The Cojuangcos’ disputed hold over Hacienda Luisita had been tolerated by Marcos even at the height of his dictatorship. It was only on May 7, 1980, when Ninoy Aquino and his family were leaving for exile in the US, Marcos government filed a case against Jose Cojuangco and his heirs before the Manila Regional Court to force the Cojuangco-owned TADECO into surrendering Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, so land could be distributed to the farmers at cost. This was in accordance with the terms of the government loans given in 1957-1958 to the late Jose Cojuangco, Sr., who died in 1976 (Republic of the Philippines vs. TADECO, Civil Case No. 131654, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIII).
The Marcos government filed this case after written follow-ups sent to the Cojuangcos over a period of eleven years did not result in land distribution. The Cojuangcos always replied that the loan terms were unenforceable because there were no tenants on the hacienda. (Dychiu, The HL Story, Part 1, 2010) The government’s first follow-up letter was written by Conrado Estrella of the Land Authority on March 2, 1967. Another letter was written by Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros on May 5, 1977. Another letter was written by Agrarian Reform Deputy Minister Ernesto Valdez on May 23, 1978 (Dychiu, 2010).
In their January 10, 1981 response to the government’s complaint, the Cojuangcos again said that the Central Bank and GSIS resolutions were unenforceable because there were no tenants on Hacienda Luisita. They further asserted that there was no agrarian unrest in Luisita, and existing Marcos land reform legislation exempted sugar lands. Further, they asserted that the government’s claim on Luisita had already expired since no litigation was undertaken since 1967 (Dychiu, 2010).
The government pursued its case against the Cojuangcos, and by December 2, 1985, the Manila Regional Trial Court ordered TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The Cojuangcos elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals G.R. 08634).
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IV. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Stock Distribution Option)
Cory Aquino officially announced her candidacy on December 3, 1985. Land reform was one of the pillars of her campaign. Farmers were told by the Cojuangco family members managing the hacienda during this time that if Cory became president, Hacienda Luisita would once and for all be distributed to the farmers through her land reform program. They said this promise was made to motivate them to vote for Cory and join the jeepney-loads of people being sent to Manila from Tarlac to attend her rallies (Dychiu, 2010).
On January 6, 1986, Aquino delivered the first policy speech of her campaign in Makati and said, “We are determined to implement a genuine land reform program . . . to enable [beneficiaries] to become self-reliant and prosperous farmers." Ten days later, on January 16, 1986, Aquino delivered her second major speech in Davao and said, “Land-to-the-tiller must become a reality, instead of an empty slogan." In the same speech, Aquino also said, “You will probably ask me: Will I also apply it to my family’s Hacienda Luisita? My answer is yes." (Dychiu, 2010).
The snap elections took place on February 7, 1986. Marcos was declared winner, but was ousted by the people power revolution. Cory Aquino was sworn in as President on February 25, 1986. A month later, Aquino issued Presidential Proclamation No. 3 declaring a revolutionary government and dissolving the 1973 Constitution.
On January 22, 1987, eleven months into the Aquino administration, the Mendiola massacre happened. Aquino fast-tracked the passage of the land reform law. The new 1987 Constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, and on July 22, 1987, Aquino issued Presidential Proclamation 131 and Executive Order No. 229 outlining her land reform program. She expanded its coverage to include sugar and coconut lands (Dychiu, 2010).
Her outline also included a provision for the Stock Distribution Option (SDO), a mode of complying with the land reform law that did not require actual transfer of land to the tiller.
On May 18, 1988, the Court of Appeals dismissed the case filed in 1980 by the Philippine government—under Marcos—against the Cojuangco company TADECO to compel the handover of Hacienda Luisita. It was the Philippine government itself—under Aquino—that filed the motion to dismiss its own case against TADECO, saying the lands of Hacienda Luisita were going to be distributed anyway through the new agrarian reform law (Dychiu, 2010).
The Department of Agrarian Reform and the GSIS, now headed by Aquino appointees Philip Juico and Feliciano “Sonny" Belmonte respectively, posed no objection to the motion to dismiss
Page 16 of 83 the case. The motion to dismiss was filed by Solicitor General Frank Chavez, also an Aquino appointee. The Central Bank, headed by Marcos appointee Jose B. Fernandez, said it would have no objection if, as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform, the distribution of Hacienda Luisita to small farmers would be achieved under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [CARP) (Dychiu, 2010).
A month after the case was dismissed, on June 10, 1988, Aquino signed the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Earlier, Cory Aquino gave herself power through Executive Order No. 229 to preside over the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), the body that would approve stock distribution programs, including the one for Hacienda Luisita under the Freedom Constitution (provisional constitution after a successful people power revolution). The Freedom Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 until it was replaced by the new 1987 Constitution approved by the people through a plebiscite.
Soon after, Hacienda Luisita was put under the Stock Distribution Option (SDO) that Aquino included in the law. Through the SDO, landlords could comply with the land reform law without giving land to farmers. Cojuangcos had taken advantage of the powers of the presidency to circumvent land reform and stay in control of Hacienda Luisita (Dychiu, 2010).
The legislature back then was dominated by landlords, including President Aquino’s brother, Tarlac Rep. Jose “Peping" Cojuangco, Jr., the top decision-maker in Hacienda Luisita. Cojuangco was “at the head of the landlord juggernaut" in Congress (Nieva, 1993).
The carefully worded proposal on the stock distribution option made by TADECO, in effect, assured of (Brion, 2011):
1. Distribution of shares of stocks over a number of years among the qualified beneficiaries at no cost to them; 2. Allowing the farmworkers to continue to work on the land as such and receive the wages and other benefits provided for by his collective bargaining agreement with the corporate landowner’ 3. Entitling him to receive dividends, whether in cash or in stock, on the shares already distributed to him and benefit from whatever appreciation in value that the said shares may gain as the corporation becomes profitable; 4. Qualifying him to become the recipient of whatever income-augmenting and benefit- improving schemes that the spin-off corporation may establish, such as the payment of the guaranteed three (3%) percent of gross sales every year and the free residential or homelots to be allotted to family beneficiaries of the plan; and 5. Keeping the agricultural and intac and unfragmented, to maintain the viability of the sugar operation involving the farm as a single unit and thus, warrant to be
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acknowledged farmworker-beneficiaries, hand-in-hand with their acquisition of the shares of the capital stock of the corporation owning the land, a continuing and stable source of income.
The law allowed an existing corporate farm to establish a ‘spin-off’ corporation for purposes of stock distribution (Putzel, 1992). The Cojuangco’s established Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI on August 1, 1988, just one month after CARP was passed. It was the newest of a string of Cojuangco companies set up to profit from the formerly Tabacalera-owned properties in Tarlac (Putzel, 1992) . These included: the Central Azucarera de Tarlac; Tarlac Distillery Corporation; Luisita Marketing; Central Azucarera de Tarlac Reality Corporation; Luisita Realty Corporation; Luisita Golf and Country Club; the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), by which sat atop all the others and had a management contract with each of the sister companies (Putzel, 1992).
Only of the 4,914 hectares of the original 6,431 hectare property were transferred to HLI from TADECO at the time that the new corporation was established. The most questionable aspect of the deal was the determination of HLI’s non-land assets, which made up two-thirds of the company’s total assets (Putzel, 1992).
By September 1990, DAR had received applications for corporate stock distribution from only 83 corporations (Putzel, 1992). By early 1991, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council was ready to approve just six of these (Putzel, 1992).
Corporate landowners also sought to exempt their lands from CARP coverage by applying for a ten-year deferment granted to those producing high-value export crops. Landowners hoped that before this period expired, the law would be changed either to extend considerably the period of deferment, or to exempt properties permanently (Putzel, 1992). These corporations, and others awaiting coverage under other aspects of the law, were required to engage in production and profit sharing with their workers if their annual sales exceeded P5 million per year. The law required that they pay their employees three percent (Putzel, 1992).
IV. The Journey From SDO to Land Reform Distribution
The relevant Constitutional provision being cited for the SDO is Article XIII, Section 4. “The state shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.”
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The Struggle to Nullify the Stock Distribution Option
The SDO gravely damaged the potential of land reform to deliver social justice to scores of rural poor, whose votes had ironically been courted by President Aquino in 1986 by promising land reform.
In 1989, the Cojuangcos justified Luisita’s SDO by saying it was impractical to divide the hacienda’s 4,915.75 hectares of land among 6,296 farm workers, as this would result in less than one hectare each (0.78). A study by the private group Center for Research & Communication (now University of Asia & the Pacific) was cited to support this claim (Dychiu, 2010).
The claim was contradicted by a study of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), which stated that the farm workers could still earn more with 0.78 hectares of land each than stocks. But the NEDA study was ignored by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council [PARC] (Tadem, 1989).
In 2005, after its investigation into the Luisita massacre, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) also debunked the claim that economies of scale justified Luisita’s SDO. The DAR said the issue of economies of scale could have been addressed under Section 29 of CARP, which states that workers’ cooperatives should be created in cases where dividing land was not feasible (Dychiu, 2010).
On May 9, 1989, Luisita’s farm workers were asked to choose between stocks or land in a referendum. The SDO won 92.9% of the vote. A second referendum and information campaign were held on October 14, 1989, and again the SDO won, this time by a 96.75% vote. The outcome of the vote was entirely predictable. The balance of power in the country favored families like the Cojuangcos. The problem was not really that the farm workers were denied the right to choose . . . it was rather that they were denied an environment that would allow them to identify what their choices were (Putzel, 1992).
Even before the second referendum was held, the SDO was inconsistent with the Constitution (Bernas, 1989). The SDO is a loophole because it does not support the Constitution’s desire that the right of farmers to become owners of the land they till should be promoted by government (Bernas, 1989).
A year after, another legal institution also called Luisita’s SDO illegal in a paper it submitted to the Senate Committee on Agrarian Reform in June 1990 (UP Center of Law). The paper questioned the morality, propriety, and constitutionality of a plan that allowed the landlord to retain controlling interest at the expense of farmer beneficiaries. The Department of Justice then issued a legal opinion affirming the constitutionality of the SDO, saying an act of the
Page 19 of 83 legislature, approved by the executive, was presumed valid within the limits of the Constitution unless nullified in court.
Hacienda Luisita, Inc (HLI), the company formed by the Cojuangcos to operationalize Luisita’s SDO, was incorporated in August 1988—nine months before the farm workers were first asked to choose between stocks or land in May 1989 (Putzel, 1992). The farm workers’ ownership of Hacienda Luisita was pegged at 33% while 67% was retained by the Cojuangcos. The stocks representing the farm workers’ share were not transferred to them in 1989, but were spread over a period of 30 years (Putzel, 1992). .
Luisita’s SDO agreement spelled a 30-year schedule for transferring stock to the farm workers:
“At the end of each fiscal year, for a period of 30 years, the SECOND PARTY (HLI) shall arrange with the FIRST PARTY (TADECO) the acquisition and distribution to the THIRD PARTY (farm workers) on the basis of number of days worked and at no cost to them of one-thirtieth (1/30) of 118,391,976.85 shares of the capital stock of the SECOND PARTY (HLI) that are presently owned and held by the FIRST PARTY (TADECO), until such time as the entire block of 118,391,976.85 shares shall have been completely acquired and distributed to the THIRD PARTY (farm workers)."
The impact of this provision was far-reaching.
The stocks representing the farm workers’ full 33% share were not transferred to them in 1989, but were spread over “a period of 30 years" with only “one-thirtieth (1/30)" released every year. At this rate, it would take until 2019 for the farm-worker beneficiaries to receive their complete set of stocks. While their shares remained undistributed, these were “owned and held" by the Cojuangco company TADECO. Thus, the common belief that 33% of Hacienda Luisita has been owned by farm workers since CARP was implemented in 1989 is not entirely accurate, because the full transfer of stocks did not happen in 1989 (Dychiu, 2010).
The farm workers also had to continuously render labor to receive shares, because distribution was based “on the number of days worked". If a worker quit or if management fired him, he no longer got the undistributed portion of his shares. If management cut work days, distribution of shares was also affected (Dychiu, 2010).
Complicating things further was a separate provision that set the annual payroll as the basis for deciding who could get shares at the end of each year. As names on the payroll changed every year when workers left or joined the company, the list of shareholders grew longer and longer, diluting the entitlement of the original beneficiaries. In 1989, there were 6,296 farm-worker beneficiaries in Luisita. By 2005, there were 11,955 names on the HLI stockholder list. Not all of
Page 20 of 83 the 11,955 remained employed with HLI, or were part of the original 6,296 beneficiaries (Dychiu, 2010).
After the November 2004 massacre and subsequent investigation by the DAR, HLI announced on June 9, 2005 that it had given out all undistributed stocks “in one supreme act of good faith," about 15 years ahead of the 30-year schedule. It is believed this was done because the 30-year distribution period was a loophole. The 30-year distribution period seemed without basis in the law (Riedinger, 1995). Section 11 of the DAR Administrative Order No. 10, Series of 1988 states that stocks should be transferred to beneficiaries within 60 days after the SDO is implemented. HLI had not yet been issued a Certificate of Compliance by the DAR since 1989 because the full transfer of stocks had not happened.
Like Father Bernas in 1989 and the UP Center of Law in 1990, Riedinger also said the SDO “appears to violate the constitutional mandate that ownership of agricultural lands be redistributed to the regular farm workers cultivating them."
Under the SDO, Luisita’s farm workers were entitled to two new perks: they were allotted a 3% share in the gross production output of the hacienda, and some were given home lots inside the plantation. The farm workers make clear, however, that these were mandated by law under Section 30 and Section 32 of CARP, not voluntary acts of generosity of the Cojuangcos. The 3% production share never went beyond P1,120 per farm worker per year. The titles of the home lots also have problems (Dychiu, 2010).
About five years after the SDO was implemented, management began to claim that HLI was losing money. The farm workers’ wages were frozen and their work days were cut (Dychiu, 2010).
It was also in 1992 that Pedro Cojuangco, Don Pepe’s eldest son and administrator of the Hacienda, with tenure secured by the stock distribution option, attempted to bring Luisita up to a point of profit. He initially attempted a variety of austerity measures, all to little avail, as a sugar producing entity the Hacienda and the CAT would fail to record a profit until 2009, and then only due to the temporary unreliability of the Brazilian sugar market (Saguing, 2013).
It was apparent that diversification may be the key to the survival of Hacienda Luisita and on the 1st of September, 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tarlac (Provincial Board of Tarlac), under the leadership of the Governor of Tarlac Province, Margarita “Tingting” Cojuangco, the wife of Jose “Peping” Cojuangco Jr., passed a resolution that reclassified 3,290 out of Hacienda Luisita’s viable 4,915 hectares, from agricultural to commercial, industrial, and residential land (Saguing, 2013).
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The Department of Agrarian Reform approved for conversion 500 hectares of the Luisita land on the 14th of August 1996 (Saguing, 2013).
As land was being converted, the area left for farming grew smaller and smaller. More work days were cut, and wages were practically frozen. Mechanization also reduced the need for manual labor.
Then, a master plan commissioned in 1998 by the Luisita Realty Corporation, a subsidiary of Jose Cojuangco and Sons, was unearthed (Dychiu, 2010). It showed the company’s long-term intention to convert the hacienda into a business and residential hub, with no areas left for agriculture. That land use plan from 1998 already contained the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway or SCTEx, which was completed in 2007 (Dychiu, 2010). In 2009, the government paid HLI an inflated amount of P83 million for the right of way and assumed the cost of building a P170 million interchange to connect the Central Techno Park inside the Cojuangco family hacienda to the SCTEx (Remulla, 2009). The 94-kilometer SCTEx is presently the longest highway in the country. It connects the Subic Bay Freeport, the Clark Freeport, and Tarlac City (Dychiu, 2010). The construction led to the loss of large track of the hacienda’s land to non-agricultural use.
By 2003, the farm workers’ daily wage was down to P194.50 and work days were down to one per week. They also finally saw the futility of having four board seats against management’s seven (the SDO agreement allotted 4 board seats to the farm workers ahead of the 30-year waiting period for their stocks). They were always going to be outvoted. They realized that the SDO had to go.
The union leaders put together a petition to revoke the SDO and stop land conversion in Luisita. It was signed by 5,339 farm workers and filed at the Department of Agrarian Reform on December 4, 2003.
On November 22, 2004, then DAR secretary Rene C. villa issued Special Order No. 789, series of 2004, which created the Special Task Force on Hacienda Luisita, Inc. Stock Distribution Option Plan (Brion, 2011). This task force was convened primarily to review the SDP and evaluate HLIs compliance with its terms and conditions.
The Task Force was later renamed Task Force Luisita. The DAR’s Task Force Luisita conducted an investigation and focus group discussions among the farm workers, between the 25th of November 2004 and the 22nd of February, 2005 (Saguing, 2013).
Based on the parties pleadings and ocular inspections conducted, the Special Task Force issued a Terminal Report on September 22, 2005, which found that the HLI did not comply with its obligations under the law implementing the SDP (Brion 2011). There is yet no Certificate of Compliance issued.
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The basis is simple. Despite the lapse of sixteen (16 years), from the time the SDP was approved in November 1989, by resolution of the PARC, the objective and policy of CARP, i.e., acquisition and distribution (herein under the SDP, only shares of stocks) is yet to be fully implemented; the FWBs, instead of the promised/envisioned better life under the CARP (herein, as corporate owner), do still live in want, in abject poverty, highlighted by the resulting loss of lives in their vain/futile attempt to be financially restored at least to where they were before the CARP was implemented (Brion, 2011).
In July 2004, the union tried to negotiate a wage increase to P225 per day. They also asked for an increase in work days to 2-3 days per week. Management said no, saying the company was losing money. Management then issued notices retrenching 327 farm workers effective October 1, 2004. A month later came the workers’ strike, then the massacre.
On November 10, 2004, four days after the strike started, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) declared an Assumption of Jurisdiction. Labor Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas announced that quelling the strike was a matter of national interest because Luisita was one of the Country’s major sugar producers. The Assumption of Jurisdiction legally cleared the way to use government troops to stop the strike. The picketers were ordered to vacate within five days, or else be removed by force (Saguing, 2013).
On November 15, 2004, 700 policemen, 17 truckloads of soldiers in full battle gear, two tanks equipped with heavy weapons, a payloader, four fire trucks with water cannons and snipers positioned in at least five strategic places were mobilized to disperse the 4,000 protesters. 1,000 rounds of ammunition were used (Dychiu, 2010).
The resistance put up by the strikers resulted in the death of seven strikers and wounding of 36 others. 100 policemen and soldiers were injured and 111 civilians were arrested. The slain workers were not residents of Tarlac nor employees of Hacienda Luisita (Dychiu, 2010).
The Aquinos broke ties with Arroyo in July 2005, the same month the DAR’s Task Force Luisita submitted the findings and recommendations of its investigation. This formed the basis for the government’s decision a few months later to revoke Luisita’s Stock Distribution Option (SDO) and order the distribution of the hacienda’s land to the farmers.
A special legal team was formed by the DAR in August 2005, to review the report submitted by Task Force Luisita. On September the 22nd, 2005, Task Force Luisita recommended the revocation of the SDOA forged in May 1989, saying the SDO failed to fulfill the objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) in regard to promoting social justice and improving the lives of the farmers. So on the 22nd of December, 2005, PARC issued Resolution No. 2005- 32-01, ordering the revocation of Luisita’s SDO agreement and the distribution of the Hacienda’s land to farmer beneficiaries. In response to that ruling, HLI petitioned the Supreme
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Court (SC) to prevent the PARC from enforcing the resolution on the 1st of February, 2006. The SC granted HLI’s petition and issued a temporary restraining order, preventing the PARC from canceling the SDO agreement in June of that year (Saguing, 2013).
On the 18th of August, 2010, for the first time since the dispute was elevated to the SC in 2006, oral arguments on the Hacienda Luisita case were heard. The SC, in a landmark decision on July the 5th, 2011, upheld the PARC’s order revoking HLI’s 1989 stock distribution plan. The SC did not rule on the constitutionality of the SDO but revoked the SDO on grounds that it did not benefit the farmer-beneficiaries.
Under the plan is the stock distribution option agreement that allowed farmers to pick between shares of stock and land. The SC also ordered the DAR to administer the conduct of another referendum in which the 6,296 qualified farm worker beneficiaries can vote whether they want to remain HLI stockholders or receive actual land (Saguing, 2013).
The SC said that while the stock distribution plan is nullified, the qualified farmer beneficiaries must still be given the option to choose if they want to remain as stockholders or not.
In summation the SC said, “While the assailed PARC resolutions effectively nullifying the Hacienda Luisita SDP are upheld, the revocation must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified FWBs to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or not. The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that in 1989, 93% of the FWBs agreed to the SDOA, which became the basis of the SDP approved by PARC.”
On the 20th of July, Alyansa ng mga Manggagwang Bukid sa Asyenda Luisita (AMBALA) filed a motion for reconsideration, on the Supreme Court decision ordering the Department of Agrarian Reform to hold a referendum in Hacienda Luisita and allow the farmers to choose between owning shares of stocks or land parcels (OFW Blogger, 2013). In asking the SC to reverse its decision, the AMBALA said, “there is no reason for the Court to declare that the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) was not revoked and that it was only the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) resolution approving it that was canceled.”
On the 24th of November the SC released its decision on the farmers petition for reconsideration. Voting 14-0, the SC granted their petition and unanimously ordered the distribution of 4,916 hectares of Hacienda Luisita lands to the original 4,296 original farmworker beneficiaries (FWBs). It modified its July 5, 2011 ruling ordering the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to hold a referendum to let the Luisita farmers choose between owning shares of stocks in Hacienda Luisita Inc. or getting portions of the more than 6,000-hectare estate (Saguing, 2013).
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On the 24th of April, 2012, as the impeachment trial of SC Chief Justice Renato Corona was taking place in the Senate, the SC “ruled in finality” through its resolution no. 171101, confirming their November 24 ,2011, decision that the land be distributed to the farmers with compensation at November 21, 1989, prices (Saguing, 2013).
The 2013-2014 Land Distribution Implementation
Looking back, the Supreme Court, on 24 April 2012, issued a final and executory resolution in the case Hacienda Luisita Incorporated (HLI) versus Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee (PARC), et al, to (1) revoke the Stock Distribution Option (SDO); (2) for the DAR to distribute 4,335 hectares of land plus those that the DAR would find to be agricultural in use to 6,296 qualified FWBs. Each of the qualified FWBs should receive not less than 6,886 square meters; (3) for HLI to issue, for free, 18,804 shares of stocks to 4.026 non-qualified FWBs who will remain as stockholders of HLI; (4) for DAR to respect and for HLI to account the proceeds of the sale of 500 hectares to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO) and 80 hectares used for Subic Clark Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX); (5) to pay HLI just compensation at the price prevailing in November 1989 when SDO was implemented and (6) to pay HLI the value of 240 square meters homelots; DAR was also directed to engage an independent accounting firm to account the proceeds of the sale of the 580 hectares and return to the FWBs 1,333Billion pesos as their share in the sale of the 580 hectares (Pahilga, 2013).
In the second half of 2012, DAR declared that land reform in Hacienda Luisita is an anchor program of the department, meaning its flagship program. Some sections took this as P’noy willingness to abide by the Supreme Court decision and truly subject the vast track of Hacienda Luisita to distribution. The pressure furthermore in beating the deadline in 2014 for the completion of CARPER’s land reform targets, according to DAR, can only make land distribution in Hacienda Luisita more expeditious (FARM organizer).
The Fluidity of the Masterlist
A qualified Farmworker Beneficiary (FWB) is defined by the SC decision as one who was a worker in the hacienda in 1989 when the SDO was adopted. An FWB therefore was supposed to have been eligible to own land had actual land distribution been implemented in the said year instead of the SDO. A nonqualified FWB, meanwhile, is someone who became a worker in the hacienda only after the SDO scheme had been in effect. He or she therefore is not entitled to land distribution but to shares of stock of HLI (Interview with FARM officer).
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The 1989 MOA masterlist is the most reliable documented reference to check for original farmworker beneficiaries. Immediately, the difficulty of identifying the legal successors of those dead farmworker beneficiaries (PCIJ, 2012). It must be recalled, however, that this same list had been used by HLI to gain leverage over the opponents of its policies among the farmworkers. Those who staunchly asserted their right to land in 1989 were automatically stricken off this list. Later, in a 2003 petition, AMBALA accused the HLI management of bloating the number of workers under the payroll (interview with AMBALA officers).
In 2010, the HLI management submitted to the SC 10,502 names which the former identified as Hacienda Luisita FWBs.
The DAR released an initial masterlist of FWBs in October 30, 2012 comprised of 5,365 farmworkers, and an accompanying provisional list containing names of 1,221 individuals purportedly lacking in requisite documents to prove their qualifications as FWBs. (See Table 1 and Table 2.)
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Table 1. Breakdown of Initial Master List
Preliminary List No. Provisional List BARANGAY of FWBs No. of PFWBs
ASTURIAS 370 86
BALETE 664 107
BANTOG 375 88
CUTCUT 542 173
LOURDES 534 93
MABILOG 547 124
MAPALACSIAO 701 104
MOTRICO 578 134
PANDO 504 150
PARANG 550 162
Grand Total 5365 1221
Source: DAR
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Table 2. Submission of Additional Documents Summary of PFWBs in the Provisional List
Preliminary List No. Provisional List BARANGAY of FWBs No. of PFWBs
ASTURIAS 42 44
BALETE 58 49
BANTOG 37 49
CUTCUT 112 62
LOURDES 51 42
MABILOG 103 25
MAPALACSIAO 63 41
MOTRICO 98 41
PANDO 102 47
PARANG 116 39
Total 782 439
Source: DAR
The DAR announced their elaborate verification process which mobilized hundreds of its personnel for rounds of interviews and collection of documentary evidence from nearly 10,000 FWB applicants.
Kilusang Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP), a national peasant organization criticized the DAR for sowing confusion, disunity, and chaos when it padded the original number of 6,296 FWBs to 8,482. Increasing the number of beneficiaries by considering Cojuangcos’ could only reduce the size of land for individual distribution down to a pitiful garden plot, and thus justify once more the age-old Cojuangcos’ alibi of the impracticability of subdividing an extremely vast estate like Hacienda Luisita (2013 HL FFM).
AMBALA’s fears however would be realized in February 2013 when the DAR finally released its official masterlist of 6,212 beneficiaries. Some of the oldest farmworker families, most
Page 28 of 83 prominent union and farmworkers’ leaders and activists, and kins of victims of the Hacienda Luisita massacre and subsequent killings were nowhere to be found in the list. Meanwhile, nearly a thousand questionable names were included, some belonging to the Cojuangcos’ most rabid agents, supervisors and so-called “yellow army.” (Interview with Motrico ARBO officers).
The Irregularity of the Land Survey
In July of 2013, the DAR announced that FF Cruz & Co., Inc., the survey firm that the Department hired, found only 4,099.92 hectares of agricultural land for distribution from the original 6,453-hectare property. Each of the 6,212 FWBs could thus expect to receive a 6,600- sq.meter farm lot (.66 hectares) or more than half a hectare of land (DAR).
The DAR-FF Cruz survey based its summary on 5,149 hectares which supposedly covers three land titles found in Tarlac City, La Paz and Concepcion towns that TADECO ceded to HLI in 1989 and placed under the SDO scheme. According to public records, the total agricultural land covered in the SDO is equal to 4,915.75 hectares, which should make only around 234 hectares in these three towns to be non-agricultural. With this formula, the survey has glaringly left more than 1,300 hectares of Hacienda Luisita property unaccounted for (2013 HL FFM).
These figures show how the DAR came up with only 4,099.92 hectare– out of 4,335 hectares decreed by the SC or out of the 6,453 original land area of Hacienda Luisita – for distribution to farmworkers. It also justifies the exclusion of nearly 300 hectares of land as “new roads, creeks and irrigation, railroads, a cemetery, firebreaks, buffer zones, lagoons, fishponds, and additional eroded areas.” (Interviewed provincial DAR staff).
Farmworkers insist that it is impossible for 300 hectares of these so-called “common areas” to simply “disappear.” In contrast, the visibly vast expanse of the SCTEX over Hacienda Luisita covers only 80.5 hectares. Below is a comparison of figures from a 1989 report by former Solicitor-General Frank Chavez and the DAR’s latest summary:
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Table 3. Hacienda Luisita Land Classification in 1989 and 2013
HACIENDA LUISITA IN LAND CLASSIFICATION 1989 2013
(IN HECTARES)
AGRICULTURAL LAND (UNDER LAND REFORM) 4,915.75 4,099.92
ROADS, CREEKS 265.75 140.29
FARMWORKERS’ HOMELOTS 120.92
AGRO-FOREST 158.85
RESIDENTIAL 652.43 56.12
NEW DEDUCTIONS BY DAR
FIREBREAKS, FISHPOND, NEWROADS, ETC. 260.59
CEMETERY/SCTEX ACCESS ROAD 12.13
CONVERTED AREA 500
SCTEX 80.51
UNACCOUNTED 339.3 1,303.44
ORIGINAL TOTAL LAND AREA 6,453.00 6,453.00
Source: Manila Bulletin & DAR
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Table 4. 2013 Hacienda Luisita Survey by DAR and FF Cruz
LAND SUMMARY OF HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. Updated summary as of July 12, 2013
LA PAZ TARLAC CONCEPTION TOTAL
Original Titles T-236740 T-236741 T-236742
Area covered by Titles of HLI 1,434.4829 1,783.7684 1,931.3068 5149.5581
LESS (DEDUCTED IN 1989):
Roads 10.0653 19.5641 6.1821 35.8115
Canals 22.3791 26.1796 15.3719 63.9306
Eroded 4.0702 21.4215 12.5685 38.0602
Legal Easement 2.4815
Residential 6.3668 38.1366 11.6206 56.124
TOTAL (TO BE DEDUCTED) 45.3629 105.3018 45.7431 196.4078
BALANCE 1,389.1200 1,678.4666 1,885.5637 4,953.1503
LESS (PER SUPREME COURT DIRECIVE):
BCDA (SCTEX) 47.9313 5.9715 26.6087 80.5115
Converted Areas 500.000 500.000
TOTAL (TO BE DEDUCTED) 47.9313 505.9715 26.6087 580.5115
BALANCE 1,341.1887 1,172.4951 1,858.9550 4,372.6388
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LESS (NOT COVERABLE):
Cemetery 2.1603 2.1603
SCTEX 1.5936 7.0827 1.3424 10.0187
TOTAL (TO BE DEDUCTED) 3.6999 7.0827 1.3424 12.1250
BALANCE 1,337.4888 1,165.4124 1,857.6126 4,360.5138
ADD (DEDUCTED IN 1989 BUT TO BE ACQUIRED AS COMMON AREAS OF FWBS)
Roads 10.0653 19.5641 6.1821 35.8115
Canals 22.3791 26.1796 15.3719 63.9306
Eroded 4.0702 21.4215 12.5685 38.0602
Legal Easement 2.4815 2.4815
TOTAL (TO BE ADDED) 38.9961 67.1652 34.1225 140.2838
TOTAL AREA 1376.4849 1232.5776 1891.7351 4500.7976
(TO BE ACQUIRED)
LESS (TO BE RETAINED BY RP [NOT E RP [NOT DISTRIBUTED] AS COMMON AREAS OF FWBS)
Concrete Structure 0.0155 0.0155
Add. Eroded 2.7425 2.7425
Creeks/Irrigation 0.9031 0.9813 4.5736 6.4580
New Roads 4.3400 2.1417 9.9466 16.4283
Fishpond 14.1317 7.3715 32.5872 54.0904
Lagoon 2.2315 2.2315
Railroad 3.7194 3.7194
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Firebreaks 63.5341 39.0121 71.5298 174.0760
Buffer Zone 0.3768 0.2836 0.1719 0.8323
Roads 10.0653 19.5641 6.1821 35.8115
Canals 22.3791 26.1796 15.3719 63.9306
Eroded 4.0702 21.4215 12.5685 38.0602
Legal Easement 2.4815 2.4815
TOTAL (TO DEDUCTED) 122.2818 125.6643 152.9316 400.8777 CTED)
TOTAL NET 1254.2031 1106.9133 1738.8035 4099.9199
DISTRIBUTABLE AREA
Source: DAR
Chavez noted that the large portion described as residential land in the 1989 data is a reserve that will also be distributed to farmworkers if the allocated home lots were inadequate.
Ahead of Cory Aquino’s land reform program, the Cojuangcos, through the Luisita Realty Corporation (LRC), converted certain portions of Luisita for commercial, residential and industrial use. Based on 1989 and 2013 information, it is still unclear however, if these famous Hacienda Luisita landmarks belong to the “residential” or to the “unaccounted” section.
Furthermore, the DAR-FF Cruz survey is anomalous not only by its blatant exclusion of vast agricultural lands that the Cojuangco-Aquino clan wishes to retain. Concerned DAR employees have pointed out that the FF Cruz survey itself was overpriced by as much as Php 6 million. Based on DAR records, the acquisition survey for lands planted to sugarcane is pegged at Php 2,516 per hectare or a total of around Php 12.9 million for the 5,149 hectares that the FF Cruz firm surveyed in Hacienda Luisita. The FF Cruz firm was paid Php 19 million in public funds for this questionable survey (2013 HL national FFM).
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The contentious 500-hectare “converted land”
Furthermore, the DAR has excluded the 500 hectares of “converted area” from the Tarlac City title (T-236741) which the department has claimed to be entirely situated in Brgy. Balete, contrary to the 1996 order which stated that only 341.45 hectares from this land title had been approved for conversion. However, there are also discrepancies between the total number of hectares declared in 1996 (1,594.2 has) and 2013 (1,783.8 has.) for this Tarlac land title, making declarations based on these purported original titles highly questionable unless directly opened to public scrutiny (2013 HL national FFM).
Table 5. 500-hectare Area Approved by DAR for Conversion in 1996 (in hectares)
AREA PER TITLE AREA PER TITLE AREA APPROVED by LAND TITLE (based on 1996 DAR (based on 2013 DAR DAR for conversion in order) summary) 1996
T-240197 8.7763 NO DATA 8.7763
T-258791 149.773 NO DATA 149.773
T-236741 1,594.2008 1,783.7684 341.4507
TOTAL 500.0003
Source: 2013 HL National Fact Finding Mission
HLI’s conversion application in October 1995 stated that 300 hectares were to be used for an industrial estate, 100 hectares for medium-cost housing, and another 100 for low-cost housing. According to DAR’s conversion order, the 500-hectare property is found in sitios San Miguel, Luisita and Bantug, Barangay Ungot in Tarlac City, the original villages declared in the 1907 TABACALERA owned land titles.
The 500-hectare “converted area” has been a bone of contention between the Cojuangcos and the farmwokers in the villages of Tarlac City, especially in Barangay Balete where, according to DAR, the entire 500-hectare area is found. After the approval of the conversion, HLI ceded 300 hectares to another Cojuangco firm, Centennary Holdings, Inc. (CHI) which in turn sold the property to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO). A few days after the Hacienda Luisita Massacre in 2004, LIPCO sold 184 hectares of the property to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).
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These “converted areas” failed to undergo any kind of development and remain agricultural up to the present. The gate of the Luisita Industrial Park II Complex leads to a vast expanse of idle land. However, at the height of the Hacienda Luisita strike and AMBALA’s bungkalan campaign and other local residents initiatives in 2005 – or 10 years since the HLI applied for land use conversion – farmworkers took it upon themselves to cultivate part of the contested RCBC property for food crops.
AMBALA through its counsel SENTRA has challenged RCBC in court. AMBALA contends that within the bounds of law, an area approved for conversion should undergo development within five years. Failure to do so forfeits the conversion order. Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended (CARPER) stipulates the following:
“Failure to implement the conversion plan within five (5) years from the approval of such conversion plan or any violation of the conditions of the conversion order due to the fault of the applicant shall cause the land to automatically be covered by CARP.”
That these areas were never covered by any kind of development after nearly two decades uncovered the scheme that the Cojuangcos had all along been using spin-off corporations to dodge land reform and to benefit financially through deception and landgrabbing. The DAR has been issuing several technical and bureaucratic excuses for its ineptitude –in effect, favoring the Cojuangcos and the RCBC – on the land conversion issue (2013 HL national FFM).
By the time DAR started its land allocation activities in July 2013, RCBC had installed several watchtowers manned by armed personnel, extensive concrete fences and layers of fortification around the contested property.
According to some leaders, the 500-hectare “converted area” could not have possibly been chopped off from Brgy. Balete given that the declared area of the said barangay in the Tarlac City title is only around 101 hectares.
Instead, according to its records, the DAR has excluded from distribution a whopping 526 hectares in Brgy. Lourdes, a village adjacent to Balete. It could be assumed this time that the 500-hectare “converted area” had been slashed off from Lourdes.
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Table 6. Land Area of Hacienda Luisita in Tarlac (in Hectares)
LAND AREA OF HACIENDA LUISITA PROPERTY IN TARLAC CITY
(IN HECTARES)
BARANGAY TOTAL AREA ALLOCATED EXCLUDED
(VILLAGE) BASED ON 1989 BY DAR TO BY DAR FROM BENEFICIARIES VIA DISTRIBUTION HLI LAND TITLE RAFFLE
Cutcut 364.9736 345.84 19.1336
Bantog 164.497 155.76 8.737
Balete 101.124 57.42 43.704
Lourdes 732.0936 205.92 526.1786
Asturias 271.5172 254.1 17.4172
Mapalacsiao 149.558 110.22 39.338
TOTAL 1,783.7684 1,129.26 654.5084
*CONSISTENT WITH *INCONSISTENT WITH *INCONSISTENT W/ FF CRUZ REPORT OF DAR SURVEY OF DAR DEDUCTIONS OF 2013 HLI SURVEY 1,106.91 HECTARES 676.8 HAS
Source: DAR
TADECO’s Resurrected Claim
From July to August 2013, residents began to notice from DAR tarpaulin maps on display that certain portions in Barangays Balete, Cutcut and Mapalacsiao have been excluded from distribution. DAR personnel told residents that certain areas were yet to be surveyed.
Around this time, the Cojuangcos suddenly revived the Luisita claim of their firm TADECO. Vast tracts of agricultural land – more than 200 hectares in Balete and 100 hectares in Cutcut were declared “TADECO private property” and were cordoned off from farmers through aggressive installation of watchtowers, guardhouses and armed personnel. TADECO also sent eviction letters to hundreds of residents and farmers who are supposed to be beneficiaries of land reform in these two villages. The letter signed by TADECO lawyer Eufrocinio dela Merced
Page 36 of 83 asserted that farmworkers have encroached on lands owned by TADECO and should vacate the lots within 15 days upon receipt of notice or face legal action. TADECO, as stated in the SC decision has no longer any legal claims to lands covered by Hacienda Luisita:
“The stock distribution scheme appeared to be TADECO’s preferred option in complying with the CARP when it organized HLI as its spin-off corporation in order to facilitate stock acquisition by the FWBs. For this purpose, TADECO assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita, set at 4,915.75 hectares, among others. These agricultural lands constituted as the capital contribution of the FWBs in HLI. In effect, TADECO deprived itself of the ownership over these lands when it transferred the same to HLI.”
Source: 2013 HL National Fact Finding Mission
The tracts of land aggressively claimed by TADECO are considered prime lots – those in Balete and Mapalacsiao are very near the SCTEX, while the Cutcut area is also adjacent to the newly- opened Tarlac-Pangasinan-La Union Expressway (TPLEX) operated by San Miguel Corporation, a company owned by another Cojuangco landlord and business magnate, Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, Jr., cousin of Cory Aquino.
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Through several formal correspondences, documented dialogues, personal follow-ups and an omnibus motion before the SC, AMBALA has repeatedly requested the DAR and its local offices to furnish them a copy of the new Luisita subdivision plan based on the survey conducted by FF Cruz. Portions of the whole subdivision plan were viewed by residents during the lottery activities, but still the DAR ignored AMBALA’s request to furnish the group with complete maps and other documents pertaining to the most recent land survey. Through its July 23 omnibus motion, AMBALA has urged the SC to appoint a geodetic engineer, or an independent survey to validate the survey conducted by the DAR.
By withholding the survey from AMBALA and by consistently and openly defending the TADECO’s claims to these agricultural lands in its recent media pronouncements, the DAR is in effect being complicit to any attempts by any party to go against the SC decision. It is the position of farmworkers leaders that the DAR is practically aiding the Cojuangco-Aquino clan in the latter’s aggressive bid to retain ownership of choice prime lots, particularly in Tarlac City (2013 HL national FFM).
The DAR must show the public a complete survey of Hacienda Luisita to ensure that ALL agricultural land in Luisita is covered by land distribution. Granting the exclusion of the 500- hectare “converted area” and another 500 plus hectares of Hacienda Luisita landmarks such as the golf course and existing residential and industrial areas, there is still a discrepancy of nearly a thousand hectares that the Cojuangco-Aquino clan and the DAR should clearly and truthfully account for. Still, owing to its agricultural nature and potential, it is but just that the 500- hectare area which the RCBC and LIPCO failed to develop for industrial use must also be distributed to farmworkers.
The SC ordered the DAR to immediately distribute to FWBs agricultural land put under the SDO scheme. But the DAR is also mandated, not only by this specific SC ruling but by its very nature as a government line agency in charge of agrarian reform, to distribute all land that it may find to be agricultural.
Lot Allocation Through a Raffle
The DAR carried out the distribution of Lot Allocation Certificates (LAC ) to listed FWBs in all of the 10 barangays of Hacienda Luisita through a rather unorthodox mode: raffle. This prompted AMBALA, through its legal counsel SENTRA to file an omnibus motion before the Supreme Court on July 23, questioning the “anomalous” land distribution scheme being implemented by the DAR.
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In all barangays, residents reported the presence of DAR personnel months before the scheduled lottery. These people were welcomed by barangay officials and held house-to-house information campaigns regarding the DAR’s land distribution scheme. These employees explained to farmworkers that the DAR land distribution scheme is “good” and will be “for the benefit of all.” But they also qualified that “only those who will sign the Application to Purchase and Farmers’ Undertaking (APFU) will be given land.”
DAR officials, even in their press releases have always stressed that the APFU is a mandatory requirement for the generation and registration of the beneficiary’s Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA ), a land reform document or title.
But some farmworkers related instances of deception and disinformation perpetrated by DAR personnel and persons believed to be under the payroll of the Cojuangcos, months before the DAR’s lottery activities (Interview with some Motrico AMBALA members).
In Barangays Balete, Cutcut and Mapalacsiao, farmworkers were made to believe that signing the APFU is a prerequisite for the beneficiary to avail of the Cojuangcos’ supposed offer to buy their farmlots at Php 1 million per hectare. In Barangay Cutcut, many FWBs attended the raffle proceedings with the belief that they will be instantly awarded the promised cash during the DAR lottery.
In many villages, financier-agents of the Luisita Estate Management (LEM) of the Cojuangcos urged farmworkers to sign the APFU to serve as a sort of collateral before cash-strapped farmworkers can avail of illicit loans and leasehold agreements. Many farmworkers have complained that the distant location of many farm lots discourages them to even plan on tilling the land, thus their “choice” to enter illicit lease agreements for easy cash.
AMBALA decried the DAR’s actions compelling farmworkers to sign a document which states that they are willing to buy the land which is essentially theirs, at a price which was not expressedly stated in the document and could be easily manipulated to favor the Cojuangcos. SENTRA maintains that the threat of the DAR to disqualify the FWBs who fail or refuse to sign the AFPU has no basis in fact and in law.
If signing the APFU was implemented to protect the interests of FWBs, the DAR has also erred by issuing a unique APFU for Hacienda Luisita FWBs that excluded a certain clause which asks the FWB of their preferred mode of ownership – individual or collective. This clause is found in regular DAR APFUs but not in the APFUs issued in Hacienda Luisita (2013 HL national FFM).
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Table 7. Results of DAR’s Lot Allocation Thru a Raffle in Tarlac City
LAND LAND AREA FWBs TOTAL FWBs FWBs BARANGAY AREA ALLOCATED RESIDENTS LAND AREA ALLOCATED ALLOCATED (based on ALLOCATED LOTS TOTAL LOTS LOTS IN 1989 HUI ALLOCATED TO NON- OUTSIDE FWBs TO RESIDENTS WITHIN ADJACENT (VILLAGE) (2010) TITLE, in TARLAC RESIDENTS VILLAGE VILLAGES hectares) CITY
CUTCUT 6,890 364.9736 345.18 .66 523 3 119 645
BANTOG 1,926 164.497 153.78 1.98 233 0 202 435
BALETE 4,819 101.124 57.42 0 87 30 618 735
LOURDES 2,365 732.0986 186.12 19.8 282 127 177 586
ASTURIAS 1,359 271.5172 173.58 80.52 263 0 179 442
MAPALACS 4,980 149.558 107.58 2.64 163 65** 582 810 IAO
TOTAL 22,339 1783.768 1023.66 105.6 1,551 225 1,877 3,653 4
FARMERS IN TARLAC CITY TO BE DISLOCATED BY DAR ‘S LOT ALLOCATION THRU RAFFLE : 1.877 to 2.102 individuals – 30 to 34% or 1/3 of all Hacienda Luisita beneficiaries
**outside Tarlac City but village adjacent to Malapacsiao
Source: DAR and NSCB
Before the lottery, the DAR instead announced that interested FWBs must show their intent to have their farmlots allocated adjacent to other FWBs, most likely their spouses or other family members, by filing notarized manifestations before the DAR Provincial Office during a two- month period from April to May 2013. Please see Table 8 on number of farmworkers who ascribed their names to the manifesto.
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Table 8. Summary of FWBs with Tabi-tabi Manifesto
BARANGAY No. of Groups No. of FWBs
ASTURIAS 16 98
BALETE 57 342
BANTOG 39 224
CUTCUT 67 344
LOURDES 54 345
MABILOG 103 548
MAPALACSIAO 63 374
MOTRICO 83 451
PANDO 94 524
PARANG 113 554
Grand Total 689 3,804
Source: DAR
When the lot allocation scheme was done through lottery, the DAR report implied that 3,804 FWBs were to be allocated lots in 689 groups.
The lottery is a very uncommon way of allocating land. It evades the correct process of truthfully consulting with the FWBs and studying the long history of exploitation within Luisita so as to exact social justice. Land allocation must consider the fact that since 2005, a considerable number of farmers have already cultivated plots and positioned themselves in areas that are naturally near their places of abode (2013 HL national FFM).
The DAR has continued to ignore the fact that almost a thousand hectares, a very sizable portion of the agricultural land it is tasked to distribute, are now ricefields and foodcrop areas developed by the farmworkers. The DAR’s publicists even photograph and film these vast rice plantations for its media campaigns to project prosperity in Hacienda Luisita (Interview with an FWB leader).
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In Mapalacsiao, only 163 lots or 107.58 hectares of land were allocated by the DAR for distribution to 810 beneficiaries. This means that majority, or 647 out of 810 FWBs from Mapalacsiao will not get farmlots within, or near their places of residence. Twenty-one (21) FWBs in Mapalacsiao were allocated lots in Mabilog, 60 in Pando and 65 in Parang all in Concepcion town, while the majority of 500 FWBs were allocated lots in Motrico, La Paz (2013 HL national FFM).
If FWBs chose to tend to these lots by living in farmhuts, there would be a virtual exodus of the population. Mapalacsiao residents also complained that a beneficiary awarded a farm lot in Barangay Motrico in La Paz town sought to survey the farmlot allocated by DAR only to be told by the Barangay Captain that her name and lot number were nowhere in the official DAR survey of Barangay Motrico (2013 HL national FFM).
In Barangay Cutcut, 119 FWBs were allocated lots more than 10 kilometers away in Motrico village in La Paz town. Residents also questioned the exclusion of around 100 hectares of agricultural land from the DAR survey, notably the farmlots which are part of the AMBALA’s bungkalan (2013 HL national FFM).
In other Tarlac City villages, significant number of FWBs were allocated lots in La Paz town, owing to the reduced distributable land area within the city. In Barangay Bantog, 202 out of 435 FWBs were allocated lots in Motrico, La Paz. The same is true for 179 FWBs in Barangay Asturias and 177 FWBs in Barangay Lourdes (2013 HL national FFM).
In Barangay Balete, only 87 lots or a paltry 57.42 hectares were allocated for distribution. This means that majority, or 618 FWBs out of 735 Balete FWBs will not get farmlots within, or near their places of residence. Of the 735 FWBs in Balete, 30 were allocated lots in the adjacent barangay Lourdes. The rest, however were allocated lots in Concepcion town, approximately 10-15 kilometers away from Balete – 307 were allocated lots in Barangay Mabilogwhile 311 were allocated lots in Pando. To be able to tend to their supposed farmlots in these barangays, a Balete resident must travel about 20 kilometers back and forth and must spend as much as Php 300 a day for transportation (2013 HL national FFM).
In Barangays Bantog and Balete, residents complained that because of the raffle, spouses and family members have been split up through the allocation of lots that were several kilometers, or several villages apart.
Farmworker leaders interviewed implied that the lottery system was not at all random as it had already been pre-programmed to impose land allocation based on the DAR’s anomalous survey. The DAR insists that only a small percentage – about 10% -- of all FWBs are to be awarded lots that are far from their original residences. The DAR points out Barangay Balete as
Page 42 of 83 the only community affected, as the entire 500-hectare “converted area” is supposedly located in this village (2013 HL national FFM).
However, six out of ten Luisita barangays are situated in Tarlac City where distributable land has been reduced by a minimum of 677 hectares, based solely on the problematic FF Cruz survey. Based on the DAR’s own figures, 3,653 individuals or almost 60% of the total Hacienda Luisita FWBs are from Tarlac City. Walking or riding a bicycle to tend a farmlot even within one’s own village has now become difficult if the lot is located on the other side of the SCTEX. Yet even DAR’s own data attest that 2,102 FWBs who reside in the six Tarlac City villages were allocated farmlots outside of this city. This is 34% or more than 1/3 of all FWBs in Hacienda Luisita – and not a mere 10% as the DAR stubbornly insists. These figures have yet to take into account deserving beneficiaries unduly discredited by the DAR master list (2013 HL national FFM).
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) Distribution
Only a month after these lot allocation activities, the DAR announced that it was ready to distribute photocopies of their CLOA s to thousands of FWBs . After the lot allocations, majority of the beneficiaries signed the APFU signifying their intention to enter into the payment scheme with the Land Bank. Initially some 300 or 400 plus beneficiaries belonging to AMBALA did not sign the application with the argument that they would not pay for the land since they had already paid for it through their labor power rendered in the past years (this is coming from the framework of an genuine agrarian reform program). But by February 15, 2014 only 125 did not sign the form from the original 300 or 400 plus (Interview with provincial DAR officer).
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Table 9. Summary of CLOA Generation and Registration as of July 3, 2014
Registered For Registration BARANGAY No. of FWBs No. of CLOAs No. of FWBs No. of CLOAs
PANDO 603 664
MOTRICO 666 719 3 3
LOURDES 586 652
PARANG 642 719 1 1
MABILOG 635 707 3 4
BANTOG 379 432 50 55
CUTCUT 574 628 9 10
ASTURIAS 400 453 25 29
BALETE 674 729 11 11
MAPALACSIAO 751 852 23 28
Total 5910 6555 125 141
Source: DAR
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Table 10. Summary of CLOA Titles Distribution as of July 3, 2014
No. of CLOAs No. of CLOA DISTRIBUTED BARANGAY UNDISTRIBUTED FWBs CLOAs FWBs CLOAs
PANDO 603 664 0 0
MOTRICO 665 718 1 1
LOURDES 585 652 1 1
PARANG 641 717 1 2
MABILOG 635 707 0 0
BANTOG 378 431 1 1
CUTCUT 567 618 7 10
ASTURIAS 396 448 4 5
BALETE 648 703 26 26
MAPALACSIAO 737 834 14 18
Total 5855 6491 55 64
Source: DAR
Similar to other land areas where CLOAs were distributed, the original owner’s copies of the CLOA are with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and will not be released to the FWB until they pay the full amortization over a span of another 30 years. The value of farmlots amount to almost Php 80,000 per hectare.
According to Sec. Delos Reyes: “For the first three years, Hacienda Luisita beneficiaries will pay only P730 per year or about P61.00 per month. For the 4th and 5th year, they will pay more or less P1,410.00 per year or P118.00 per month. And from the 6th to the 30th year, they will pay more or less P2,770 per year or P230.00 per month.”
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Cojuangcos’ Milking the Government by Being Paid in Millions
Luisita farmworkers, according to AMBALA, should not be treated like any ordinary claimants of government land reform benefits. They have long been in fact the rightful, original Luisita landowners whom the Cojuangcos, through decades of swindle and terror, have severely disenfranchised. AMBALA maintains therefore that the Cojuangcos, in finally relinquishing claim over Hacienda Luisita, deserve not a single peso.
The Cojuangcos, however, as any landlord whose land is subject to land reform, shall be awarded by the government, through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) an amount which current agrarian law has chosen to call “just compensation.” As far as Hacienda Luisita is concerned, such remuneration, according to the SC ruling shall be pegged at the estate’s 1989 value, or about Php 40,000 per hectare. With the landlord prerogative, however, to actively take part in the valuation process (which includes the right to appeal to the SC) very much recognized by the CARPER, “just compensation” for the Cojuangco-Aquinos is not unlikely to shoot up to the millions?
HLI spokesperson Antonio Ligon admitted that the Cojuangco-Aquinos found the 1989 valuation very low. The most logical recourse then for his bosses, Ligon offered, was to make sure that interest rates would generously be considered. This was corroborated by the DAR secretary himself, Virgilio delos Reyes, when he revealed in August 2013 during a congressional budget hearing, that, after factoring in 12% interest incurred by the Luisita property since 1989, “just compensation” for the Cojungco-Aquino may well reach a little over a hundred thousand pesos per hectare, or easily more than double the value initially prescribed by the SC.
At another budget hearing in September 2013, Committee on Appropriations Vice Chairman Rep. Henry Pryde Teves disclosed that the DAR in fact had already paid the HLI a total of Php 471,501,417.98, Php 304,033,138.20 million of which is the actual cost of the land property while the remaining amount is the cash equivalent of matured 10-year LBP bonds computed using the prevailing 91-day T-bill rates from 1989 to 1999.
The same lucrative transaction between the government and the Cojuangcos is recorded in a July 2013 report of the LBP. What is alarming with this LBP report, is that the LBP may have paid the Cojuangcos for land titles that are, oddly enough, completely different from the ones that, according to the DAR, represent the distributable Luisita land (2013 HL national FFM).
According to the report (see Table 11)) around 510 hectares of the distributable land belong not to the three (3) original titles of Luisita land in Tarlac City, La Paz and Concepcion but to 18 altogether different titles. The said three titles have a total area of only 3,990.88 hectares according to the LBP report from which DAR’s has further deducted 400.88 hectares supposedly for new roads, firebreaks, easements and others reduces the distributable land from these
Page 46 of 83 titles to only 3,590 hectares. Thus, a total of 910.88 hectares of land -- 510 hectares “padded” and 400.88 unduly deducted – is now under question. The mysterious 910.88 hectares match Luisita farmworkers’ observations and estimates that nearly a thousand hectares are “missing” or have been chopped off from land distribution (2013 HL national FFM).
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Table 11. Land Acquistion & Compensation by Government Based on Land Bank Report
LAND TITLE LOCATION AMOUNT AREA AREA TO BE TOTAL TOTAL AREA PAID BY LBP PER ACQUIRED ACQUIRED AREA ACQUIRED Cojuangco- TITLE (in BY LBP ACQUIRED based on DAR Aquino (in hectares) based on survey payments PH pesos)
TCT – 236740 LA PAZ 74,176,407. 1,434.48 1,093.56 56.27 1,149.83 1,376.48 37
TCT – 236742 CONCEPTI 122,418,506 1,931.31 1,804.98 5.80 1,810.79 1,891.74 ON .00
TCT – 236741 TARLAC 68,520,712. 1,783.77 1,030.26 0 1,030.26 1,232.56 CITY 04
SUBTOTAL 265,115,625 5,149.54 3,928.80 62.07 3,990.88 4500.80 .41
PLUS ACQUISITIONS BY LBP UNDECLARED IN DAR LAND SUMMARY
4 OTHER LA PAZ (available data indicated only total) 11.93 (total) 0 TITLES
11 OTHER TARLAC (available data indicated only total) 0 (total) 0 TITLES CITY
3 OTHER CONCEPTI (available data indicated only total) 0 (total) 0 TITLES ON
TOTAL 34,053,361. 497.99 497.99 11.93 509.92 0.00 23
299,167,486 5,647.54 4,426.79 74.00 4,500.80 4,500.80 .54
Source: DAR
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Related to the compensation issue is the delay in the auditing process of HLI and Centennary Holdings, Inc (CHI) assets caused by the actions of the DAR itself. The DAR was also directed by the SC ruling to appoint a reputable accounting firm to audit the books of HLI and CHI on the sale of 580.51 hectares of Hacienda Luisita. Opening the books of the HLI will further expose how the Cojuangco-Aquinos swindled farmworkers during the 16-year implementation of the SDO scheme. Five of the six parties to the SC case had already chosen an auditing firm, but DAR refused to accede due to opposition from the HLI. Instead of upholding the majority decision, the DAR practically subverted the auditing process by referring the issue back to the SC (2013 HL national FFM).
V. Land Reconcentration
State-led Reconcentration
Sugar Industry Development Act of 2015) RA 10659
Sugar block farming is being vigorously encouraged by DAR inside Hacienda Luisita (Cervantes, 2014). This new type of sugar production is legally buttressed by Sugarcane Industry Development Act of 2015, a recently signed law by Pres. Noynoy last April 5, 2015. The law specifically lays down the conditions for the maximization of the country’s sugarcane resources (Valencia, 2015).
The Block Farm started in 2013 under the Convergence Initiative of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Agrarian Reform, and Sugar Regulatory Administration [SRA] (Martin, 2015).
The Sugarcane Act, through the Block Farm Program, provides assistance to small farmers with farm sizes of less than 5 hectares who make up about 80% of all sugarcane farmers in the country. Small farmers do not have the financial capability to cultivate their farms to its fullest potential, hence, small farms generally have lower productivity. The Block Farm Program consolidates small farms to a minimum of 30 hectares in order to be more cost-effective in the delivery of services such as farm inputs and equipment. The individual ownership of the farms are preserved but farm activities are planned together and synchronized to improve their production efficiency through the economies of scale (Martin, 2015).
A block farm is conceptualized to be an “agribusiness unit” in a milling district, (Martin, 2015). The Block Farm Program aims at improving the productivity of at least 1,000 hectares of sugarcane farms per year (or 10,000 hectares in 10 years) with a projected annual increase in income of farmers at no less than P40,000.00/hectare (Martin, 2015).
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Based on SRA data, farms of 10 Hectares and below produce an average of 98.5 bags while farms of 25 to 50 hectares can produce 129.3 bags per hectare, or 31% increase by consolidation, and another 10% by using HYVs (Martin, 2015).
The law also mandates the Department of Budget and Management to include in the program of expenditures annually an amount of P2 billion, starting 2016, for the sugarcane industry and to be allocated as follows (Reyes 2015):
• 15% for the Block Farm Program
• 15% for socialized credit
• 15% for research and development, and capability building programs
• 5% for scholarship grants
• 50% for infrastructure support programs
This is now a classic case of how the objectives of social justice in an agrarian land reform is subsumed to the dictates of globalization wherein the country is a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Block farming is to correct the inadequate government assistance for the sugar industry in the face of the implementation of the tariff reduction of sugar imports on January 1, 2015 under the Asean Free Trade Agreement (Doronilla, 2014). The reduction in tariff inevitably exposes the industry—its producers and workers—to unfair competition from Thailand, the world’s second- largest sugar exporter (behind Brazil) and largest producer and exporter in Asia (Doronilla, 2014).
The DAR has introduced “diversified sugar cane block farming” as its major support service to FWBs in an elaborate information drive even before its lot allocation activities. The farmworkers simply understand a block farm as an aggregation of several farmlots into a 30-60 hectare sugarcane plantation administered by a farm manager (2013 HL national FFM) .
The farmer-leaders interviewed vehemently opposed this block farming measures. Instead, they wanted to shift from sugarcane production to vegetable and rice productions. Both crops do have shorter production cycles.
At the ground level, block farming will contribute to the strengthening of the status quo. It is still the Cojuangcos inasmuch as they are the owners of CAT, who decides what crop to plant, when to plant and when to harvest the sugarcane. Block farming allows a farm manager to control 30 to 60 hectares of individually-titled farm lots. The so-called beneficiaries would have to place their lots as their share in a block (Cervantes, 2014). Under this scheme, the
Page 50 of 83 beneficiaries will have practically no control over their lots in the block farm and will lose their right to till (Cervantes, 2014). Essentially, the block farm will contribute to the steady supply of sugarcane to the requirement of targeted production of CAT.
Block farming is essentially a pro-landlord program clothed with a nationalist fervor that no imported sugar will flood the local market.
While there is a national push for block farming, there is now a gradual shifting of crop production. Within the 4,915 hectares distributed land, 446.9 hectares are already devoted to rice production as of 2014, 100 hectares devoted to vegetable production (as of 2014) and the rest is still tied up with sugar cane production.
Pie-chart on Area Devoted by Type of Crops 2014 (Source DAR)
Area Devoted by Type of Crops
48.77 19.9
446.9
3,584.35
Sugarcane Rice Vegetables Idle Lands
Source: DAR
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Pie-chart on the Breakdown of Rice Production Area by Barangay 2014
RICE PRODUCTION AREA = 446.90 has
5.6 21.74 24.34 15.71 32.75 18.21
28.09 27.96 272.49
CUT-CUT MOTRICO BANTOG ASTURIAS LOURDES
MAPALACSIAO PARANG MABILOG PANDO
Source: DAR
All the existing programs of the provincial DAR like the Agrarian Reform Community Connectivity and Economic Support Services (ARCCESS ); The Community Service Facility (CSF); activities like Experiental Learning on Integrated Vegetable Production, Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Organizaitons (ARBOs) Organizational cum Leadership Training, Appreciation Course on Rice Production, Cross Learning cum Appreciation on Integrated Sugarcane Production and PBD Briefing cum ARBOs Formation in Ten Barangays under the Program Beneficiaries Development (PBD) are geared to help out the beneficiaries not only on the commodity chain but also to farm enterprise development.
Under the Agricultural Production Credit Program (APCP) program an individual CLOA holder can access loan from the Land Bank. The loan facility is Php 24,400 for those who are engaged in rice production, Php 33,000 for vegetable and Php 50,000 for sugarcane production. All the
Page 52 of 83 borrowers should pay the loan within six months. For Barangay Pando, Concepcion, only 57 percent have formal access which has a pass-on interest rate of 15 percent (Gueidon, 2015)
The individual initiative of some beneficiaries who shifted to rice production are slowly proving that such crop production is better than being tied up with sugarcane production. Their Farming Operation Record for Rice shows that a 12,200 square meter engaged in rice production was able to earn a gross income of Php 110,649.6 for a single cropping season. A three cropping season is possible with one year. With a total expenses of Php 32,144.00, the two beneficiaries will share a net income of Php 87,505.6. The beneficiaries were able to achieve this with only a minimal support from the DAR (interview with Motrico farmworkers’ leaders).
Inasmuch as they were used to work in a sugarcane production, these beneficiaries are forced to hire farm labor for the land preparation, planting and harvesting. The expenses for diesel since the source of water is deep well vary between the wet and dry season. During the dry season, they needed 420 liters of diesel and 30 liters of diesel during the wet season (a liter of diesel costs Php 28.00). For their irrigation canal, they use the formerly canal of the hacienda for excess water.
The general sentiment of the farmworkers interviewed is that the DAR support services are mostly catered to the agencies favored ARBOs and village officials and not to all beneficiaries. That is why the beneficiaries are tapping the National Secretariat for Social Action of the Catholic Bishops” Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) and FARM for support services for their agricultural production.
Private-led Reconcentration
The aftermath of the November 15, 2004 massacre was equally devastating. One farmer-leader described it as period of paralyzed sugarcane production. In barangay Pando, Conception, large tracks of lands were leased by Taiwanese businessmen for water melon and honey dew production (Interview with Pando ARBO President).
The initial attempts to go into vegetable and rice farming immediately after the 2004 strike was foiled by the destruction brought about by two consecutive typhoons that hit the area. It created a sense of helplessness among the farmworkers. During this time, 40-50% of the women are either working outside the hacienda or were employed as househelpers. The farmworkers and their families are simply surviving. Thus, when the barangay officials acting upon the instruction of the Rep. Noel Villanueva, offered the system of arrienda among the struggling farmworkers, the affected farmworkers grabbed the offer.
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After the barangay election in 2007, the newly elected barangay council of Pando together with the DAR in the municipality of Concepcion and the Mayor of Concepcion came up with a resolution to assign one family per hectare in order to make the land productive. The assigning of land was not strictly based on the status of being a farmworker. Since it was simply a temporary land occupation to avert potential food crisis among the residents, even residents in the barangay were assigned one hectare land.
This land occupation also happened in Barangay Mabilog, also a barangay of Concepcion, Tarlac. By the following year 2008, land was planted with rice as well as sugarcane. Simultaneously, the farmers’ coalition AMBALA decided to clean the land and make it again productive with rice, vegetables and sugarcane.
The farmworkers in Barangay Parang, Concepcion, Tarlac also wanted to follow suit. But they were vehemently discouraged by ex-barangay captain Nemis and the ex-president of United Luisita Workers Union (ULWU, a leader closely identified with the Cojuangcos.) Both leaders warned the farmworkers that what they were planning was tantamount to land distribution.
By all accounts, this unilateral act from the farmworkers have collectively demonstrated their enormous capacity to effect change in the land as well as in the environment.
By 2008-2009, the big middlemen (arriendadors) slowly set up their operations via the barangay officials. Their entry was to engage again in sugar production since the prices of sugar then was quite high. Strapped without cash and lack of glaring support from the government, farm workers entered into informal contracts with the arriendador and rented out their land, in order to survive. These contracts are highly controversial since they are not only agreed on an informal basis, but also comprise unjust conditions, i.e. the whole property is rented out to the arriendador, thus the farm worker cannot even till some parts of the land with crops for their own needs, nor do they have access to their land, nor do they obtain a profit income share. They only receive a minimal yearly loan of maximum PhP 7,000. Normally, the arriendadors lease land for a minimum of three years so they can be assured of a harvest (Ranada, 2014).
It comes as no surprise that when the land distribution was implemented in 2013, majority of the plots distributed are planted with sugarcane by an arriendador.
The extent of the system of arriendo is alarming. On the 25th anniversary of the CARP (before the land distribution), the Save Agrarian Reform Alliance (SARA) claimed that out of the 6,212 farm workers that were given land, 95% of them have already pawned their lands.
The data from the ground level after the distribution is more telling. For Barangay Pando, Conception alone, out of 602 beneficiaries, only 50 beneficiaries have not rented out their land to the arriendador. Of the 441 hectares of distributed land in Barangay Mortico, La Paz, 60% of
Page 54 of 83 these lands are already in the virtual ownership of the arriendador (Interview with Pando ARBO President). Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM), one of the parties to the controversial Hacienda Luisita case and pushed for land distribution of the estate, said that between 70-80 percent of awarded lands or around 3,000 hectares have already been retaken from the farmworkers through the system of arriendo.
From the point of view of DAR, the mortgaging if not selling of the land can partly be explained that farmworkers do not have deep affinity with the land. For decades, they have been used to simply receiving wages for the labor participation in the sugar cane production in different portions of the hacienda (sharing with provincial DAR officer).
DAR is now into building a case against those beneficiaries who have mortgaged their land. The problem is that nobody talks. Of course, the beneficiary will not accept that he has indeed mortgaged his lot since this is a violation of the law and he knows the consequence of this act. “Our chief legal officer cannot also take the necessary steps. We cannot file any case without hard evidence in our hands. We cannot get any simple document to the effect that this farmer leased his land to this person” (Tarlac Provincial Reform Officer Ileona Pangilinan).
Section 27 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program with Extension and Reforms (CARPER) stipulates that “land acquired by beneficiaries under this Act or other agrarian reform laws shall not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries through the DAR for a period of ten (10) years.”
Two types of Arrienda System
The system of arrienda maintained by small-time arriendador is engaged only in rice and vegetable productions (average of two cropping seasons per year). One of our respondent has control over 15 hectares in Barangay Pando, Concepcion.
The interviewee described it as more of a support system scheme to help a neighbor, relative, or close friend to cope up with the lack of capital for production of the latter. The beneficiary is not displaced from the land. If proven to have the skills, the beneficiary provides the labor for the either rice or vegetable production. If he is being hired daily for specific type of work, he gets P 300.00 a day.
If he works for the whole cycle of production, he gets 12% of the gross. He can avail of loans during emergency. He will pay the arriendador from his share of the gross.
There are cases when the arriendador gives one sack of palay to the beneficiary (who does not participate in the production) after the harvest. There are also arrangements when the
Page 55 of 83 arriendador pays the beneficiary 10,000.00 instead of the 7,000.00 per year as rental of the land.
If the beneficiary wants to till the land on his own, he can negotiate with the arreindador for the land to be returned to him even if the contract is still not consummated.
The system of arrienda maintained by big-time arriendador is quite different. All the lands under this system are used solely for sugar production. James Villanueva, son of Rep. Noel Villanueva is fronting for his father. Rep. Noel Villanueva is a three-term mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac and since he is running unopposed, will be on his second term as a congressman for the third congressional district. He is also the president of the Sugar Planters Association of Region 3. With the hold of politicians on the local government units, it is safe to assert that Cong. Villanueva has enjoyed favored position in accessing DAR support for his sugarcane production since he was a mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac.
Other big arriendadors are an ex-military man is retired Air Force Col. Francisco Cruz, brother- in-law of Rep. Villanueva; Ernesto Cunanan, who is based in Barangay Pando, Concepcion; a certain Turla, a certain Tan (who owns a bodega in brgy. Sta. Cruz, Conception. There are also arriendadors living outside the hacienda (Barangay Paraiso, San Miguel and Tarlac) that have frontmen spread over the ten barangays that comprise the hacienda. Other arriendadors come from the ranks of local government officials and former managers and supervisors of HLI (PCIJ, 2012).
The activities on the land is highly mechanized during the land preparation. Since it involves the use of machines, only highly skilled individuals are hired. A round of plowing the land, the arriendador pays the hired labor operating the machine the amount of P1,800.00. This land preparation activity requires three rounds. The operator that plants the sugar with the machine earns P150.00 a day. Manual planting per hectare costs P5,000.00. Harvesting is P185.00 per ton.
The arriendador does not hire the beneficiary in any activity or point in the sugar production. The beneficiaries who have mortgaged their land work as construction workers outside the hacienda.
It is reported that a contract between the arriendador and the beneficiary is signed with the barangay officials as witnesses. No beneficiary was given a copy of the contract.
It is the big-time arriendador who are ensuring the supply of sugar for the sugar central owned by the Cojuangcos.
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The big-time arriendadors are consistently undermining the operations of the small-time arriendadors. The frontmen of the big-time arriendadors at the barangay level are always on the look-out who among the beneficiaries are into negotiations with the small-time arriendadors. Once they have identified these individuals, they dangle a higher amount compared to the amount offered by the small-time arriendadors. If the small-time arriendador has already paid 7,000.00 a year, they would convince the beneficiary to return the money and instead offer 21,000.00 for the next three years to the beneficiary. This is especially true in those sandwiched lots or those lots planted with vegetable or rice surrounded by lots planted with sugarcane.
The DAR has been encouraging the expansion and continuity of the system of arriendo on the following counts (FARM, 2014): (a) the DAR refuses to file any legal action against the arriendadors for the illegal arriendo system and related violations such as the destruction of land markers during the arriendador’s land preparation activities. Instead of prosecuting the violators, the DAR meekly tried to replace the destroyed land markers. Farm workers also accused the DAR of double standard. For while actual farmworker-occupants were forced to vacate the lands they developed to give way to the DARs lot allotment, the agency refused to act on the illegal arriendo system that clearly violated the law. Letters sent by FARM members to the DAR Secretary to investigate the situation were also ignored. For this reason, FARM leaders believed that local and national DAR officials are conniving with the arriendadors to reconsolidate the land for sugarcane production; (b) many farmworker-beneficiaries do not have their lands yet despite receiving their Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) last year. This slow distribution and installation processes had given the arriendadors the opportunity to continue offering cash-strapped farm workers with easy but cheap cash under the system of arriendo to further expand their control of “reformed” lands; (c) the DAR has not given any form of actual support services for farmworkers to develop their lands, further discouraging the farm workers from holding on to the lands; and (d) the DAR has initiated the organizing of farmworker-beneficiaries, many members of whom are under the arriendo system. FARM members suspect that these organizations will be used by the DAR later on to enter into sugarcane production agreement with the arriendadors as financiers in a private- public partnership for sugarcane to legitimize the arriendo system.
Increasing Transactions of Outright Sale of Lots Awarded
The seemingly temporary transfer of land through mortgage arrangement has been rendered irreversible now.
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Sale of distributed lots is becoming a new phenomenon. The first wave had a selling price of Php 150,000 and the second wave had a selling price of Php 250-280,000.00. Those distributed lots near the road can be bought at Pho 300,000. A commission of Php 50,000.00 goes to the sale agent. This outright sale started as a direct transaction between relatives (middlemen to the farmer beneficiary) and later expanded to non-relatives of the middlemen (Interview with Motrico farmworkers’ leaders).
The absurdity of the whole transaction is the fact that a deed for sale is issued by the barangay officials involved given a provision of land reform which stipulates selling of awarded land is prohibited.
In Barangay Pando, Concepcion, Tarlac, one third of the 602 beneficiaries have already sold their land (Interview with Pando ARBO President). Substantial number of CLOA in barangay Motrico, La Paz are similarly already been sold.
Taking cue from farmlots that are being sold, residential lots adjacent if not within the barangay proper are also being sold to interested new residents of the barangay. Each 240 square meter costs from Php 50,000.00 to Php 75,000.00 (Interview with Motrico farmworkers’ leaders).
Creeping Ejections of Individual Beneficiaries from the Land
A new phenomenon peculiar only in Hacienda Luisita is emerging. This is an offshoot of a land distribution straddled over a production system dictated by the system of arriendo. There are cases where two mortgaged pieces of distributed land sandwiched an unmortgaged piece of land. The two mortaged pieces of distributed land are into sugarcane production since this is what is being promoted by the arriendador and the sandwiched unmortgaged piece of land is into vegetables. When the lands planted to sugarcane were sprayed with 2DR chemical, the vegetables on the unmortgaged land died.
By any practical measure, this set-up led to the financial loss of the cultivator of the vegetable. The awardee eventually entered also into the arriendo system.
In Barangay Pando, there are also cases where the concrete reference point structures (mojons) are also being rammed through by tractors of the arriendadors during the land preparation for sugarcane production. Aggrieved farmworkers took pictures of displaced concrete structures and sent it to DAR in their request for investigation. Such efforts produced no results.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The more than four decades saga of the struggle of the farmworkers in Hacienda Luisita is a history of deceit and greed. The Cojuangcos have been tenacious in their efforts to sabotage land reform in Hacienda Luisita. Similar to other owners of landed estates, their power over state institutions such as the DAR, the PNP, AFP, the local and high courts and other branches of government have accorded them this unprecedented privilege.
Hacienda Luisita stands as a centerpiece of land reform that failed not once but trice. First, the Cojuangcos acquired the estate through loans from the government in 1957 with the condition to distribute land to the farmers after ten years. After so many decades, the Cojuangco family never fulfilled the condition. Second, it failed during the Cory Aquino regime when she adopted and implemented the Stock Distribution Option (SDO) in lieu of land distribution in 1989. The third one was in 2013 when the land reform program straddled on the operations of the well-entrenched lease system of middlemen. Such operation at the ground level made the 2013 land reform program a dismal failure since it promoted and further institutionalized the phenomenon of land reconcentration inside Hacienda Luisita that started since 2004.
The DAR land distribution scheme in Hacienda Luisita is a typical program of a state-led land reform within a highly stratified society like the Philippines. Its implementation is marred with dubious irregularities that rendered the supposed beneficiaries disenfranchised and swindled through: (a) inserting questionable names into the masterlist of beneficiaries; (b) procuring a dubious and overpriced land survey; (c) exclusion of hundreds of hectares of agricultural land from distribution; (d) imposition of compulsory signing of promissory notes to ensure amortization payments; (e) grant of overpriced landlord compensation to the HLI / Cojuangco- Aquinos; (f) inept facilitation of the audit of HLI and CHI assets; and (g) rabid justification of Cojuangco-Aquino claims over agricultural lands in Tarlac City; (h) inaction on farmworkers’ appeal for revocation of conversion order on 500 hectares (RCBC/LIPCO); and (i) imposition and promotion of block farming scheme “as support service” to serve landlord interest.
All these happened while majority of these contested lands were already pawned to the middlemen since 2002. This has created a tragic situation wherein the land distributed are now effectively in the hands of the middlemen. In fact, the system of arriendo has institutionalized a subtle yet effective way of dislodging the farmworker from his awarded land. Private security forces and state military and police personnel are no longer needed to evict farmworkers from the land. Since the illegal transaction is consciously entered into by the farmworker, his dislocation from his means of production is easily consummated.
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Since Congressman Noel Villanueva runs unopposed this coming May election, he will surely clinch his second term as a congressman of the third district of Tarlac. The incoming 17th House of Representatives, through the newly convened Ethics and Privileges Committee should pursue a query of how the congressman dispenses his duties in his congressional district as the most dominant arriendador. By all indications, his acts are inimical to the interests of some of constituents who happen to be farmworkers of Hacienda Luisita. Four of the ten barangays of Hacienda Luisita covered by land reform are within his congressional district.
The incoming 17th House of Representatives, through its newly formed Agrarian Reform Committee since its concerns involve “all matters directly and principally relating to agrarian reform, the resettlement of and other support services for agrarian reform beneficiaries, and the implementation and amendment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law” should conduct a public hearing as to the names and operations of all the middlemen operating inside the Hacienda Luisita. This public hearing will be directed as to graphically come up with a picture on how the middlemen have been subverting the government’s own land reform program and come up with tangible measures to decisively negate and further frustrate the operations of middlemen in a land reform area.
The demand for a free land distribution should be granted inasmuch as it is a just and morally justifiable. The land reform beneficiaries inside Hacienda Luisita possess all the moral, historical and legal rights to the land which the Cojuangco-Aquino clan has ruthlessly denied them for decades.
Former Chief Justice Corona put it sharply that “Hacienda Luisita has always been viewed as a litmus test of genuine reform program.” The new government should form a third party independent body that will make a review and assessment as to how the land reform program in Hacienda Luisita was implemented and come up with corrective measures as to mitigate the effects of a typical defective land reform program. The quest for social justice demands no less.
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REFERENCES
Adriano, Lourdes Saulo, (March 2005). A General Assessment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, AFA (Asian Farmers’ Association for Sustainable Rural Development) and AsiaDHRRA (Asian Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Asia) Issue Paper, Vol. 1 No. 4. An uncomplicatedmind.blogspot.com, (January 23, 2012). The Never Ending Saga of Hacienda Luisita.
Bernas, Fr. Joaquin, (June, 27, 1989) . Column in the Manila Chronicle.
Brion, Arturo D., (July 5, 2011). Supreme Court Associate Justice, Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, G.R. No. 171101 Hacienda Luisita, Inc. as petitioner vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council as respondents.
Central Bank Monetary Board Resolution No. 1240, (August 27, 1957).
Cervantes, Ding, (December 4, 2014). Land Reform Beneficiaries In Luisita Selling Lands.
Doronilla, Amando, (December 22, 2014). Asean Free Trade Looms as Threat to Sugar Industry, the Philippine Inquirer.
Dychiu, Stephanie, (January 18, 2010). The Hacienda Luisita Story, Part 1: Hacienda’s Luisita Haunts Noynoy’s Future.
Dychiu, Stephanie, (January 22, 2010). The Hacienda Luisita Story, Part 2: Cory’s Land Reform Legacy to Test Noynoy’s Political Will.
Dychiu, Stephanie, (January 26, 2010). The Hacienda Luisita Story, Part 3: How a Workers’ Strike Became the Luisita Massacre.
Dychiu, Stephanie, (February 11, 2010). The Hacienda Luisita Story, Part 4: After Luisita Massacre, More Killings Linked to Protest.
Farmworkers Agrarian Reform Movement (FARM), (April 25, 2014). Hacienda Luisita Farmers: Help us Resist Reversal of Agrarian Reform, Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) News,
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Resolution No. 1085, (May 7, 1957).
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Resolution No. 3202, (November 25, 1957).
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Resolution No. 356, (February 5, 1958).
Gueidon, Salome, (March 27, 2015). Philippine Flawed Agrarian Reform Bears a Little Fruit,
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Guerrero, Sylvia, (2002). Gender-Sensitive & Feminist Methodologies, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
Gutierrrez, Natashya, (July 18, 2013). Hacienda Luisita Land Distribution Begins.
Hacienda Luisita National Fact Finding Mission (2013). For land and Justice- The Continuing Agrarian Struggle In Hacienda Luisita.
Henry, George, (1871). Our Land and Land Policy, Doubleday Page & Company, New York.
Johnson, Hank, (2014). What is a Social Movement, Polity Press.
Kiita, Museleku Eratus, (2010). An Investigation into Causes and Effects of Agricultural Land Use Conversions in the Urban Fringes: A Case Study of Nairobi-Kiambu Interface.
Kilusan Para sa Pambansang Demokrasya, (2001). On the Agrarian Question.
Martin, Ma. Regina, Administrator, (April 28, 2015). The Sugarcane Industry Development Act and the Future of the Philippine Sugarcane Industry, Sugar Regulatory Administration.
Pahilga, Jobert Ilarde, (December 24, 2013). What is Cooking in Hacienda Luisita After the Supreme Court Decision?
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), (April 25, 2012). ‘Land Ho!’ or Is it ‘Land No’?
Putzel, James, (1992). A Captive Land, the Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Ranada, Pia, (June 11, 2014). Lack of Support for Farmers Drives Abusive ‘Aryendo’ System.
Remulla, Rep. Crispin, (November, 2009). House of the Representative Investigation into the SCTEX.
Republic of the Philippines vs. TADECO, Civil Case No. 131654, Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIII.
Reyes, Ernie, (April 9, 2015). New Law Ensures No Imported Sugar to Flood Local Market Says Sen. Villa, Interaksyon.com.
Riendinger, Dr. Jeffrey M., (1995). Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform.
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Save Agrarian Reform Alliance (SARA), (June 9, 2013). Threat of Land Reconcentration Looms in Hacienda Luisita; 95% of Lands to be Distributed Pawned Already.
Saguing, Belarmino, (July 15, 2013). A Short History of Hacienda Luisita, OFW Blogger.
Tadem, Eduardo, (October, 20, 1989). Technical working group of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC).
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), (2010). Philippine Country Profile, Property Rights and Resource Governance.
Valencia, Czeriza, (April 5, 2015). Pnoy signs Sugarcane Industry Development Act, the Philippine Star.
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LITERATURE CITED/APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
SAMPLE COPY OF A SIGNED APPLICATION TO PURCHASE AND FARMERS UNDERTAKING (APFU)
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APPENDIX II
SAMPLE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMNT SIGNED BY THE TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TADECO), HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. (HLI), AND THE FARMWOKERS WHO QUALIFY AS BENEFICIARIES OF THECOMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP)
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APPENDIX III
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DAR) 2014 BRIEFING PAPER “HACIENDA LUISITA INC. CARP COVERAGE”
Basis of Coverage
• 1st SC Decision – July 5, 2011 • 2nd SC Decision – November 22, 2011 • April 24, 2012 Decision of Supreme Court on HLI versus PARC Ø Denied the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed HLI and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga, Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and Windsor Andaya Ø Affirmed the SC’s July 5, 2011 Decision as modified by its November 22, 2011 Resolution with the further modification that the government pay HLI just compensation for homelots distributed to FWBs Ø Decision is final and executory (no further pleading to be entertained) Ø Entry of Judgement if the decision made upon time of promulgation (i.e. April 24, 2012) Ø PARC Resolution revoking the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) of HLI was affirmed Ø Only the 4,915.75 hectares that was the subject of the 1989 SDP of HLI (out of the total 6,443 hectare of Hacienda Luisita) is covered by the Decision. Nothing in the decision should prevent the DAR from covering the remaining balance should it deem it covered under CARP Ø From the 4,915.75 hectares, the DAR must segregate the 500-hectare portion that was already sold to Luisita Realty, Inc. and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation and the 80.51-hectare portion that was expropriated for the Subic- Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX)
Profile
Area Per Title 5,149 Has. Area Acquired 4,500 Has Total No. of Titles Transferred To RP 51 Area Transferred to FWBs 4,099 Has Area Retained to RP 401 Has. (Common areas, such as fishponds, access roads, firebreaks, quarried sites, etc) 3 Municipalities Covered Tarlac City, La Paz, Conception,
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10 Total No. of Barangays Covered Asturias, Balete, Bantog, Cutcut, Lourdes, Mapalacsiao for Tarlac City; Motrico for La Paz; and Pando, Parang and Mabilog for Conception
DAR Operational Plan to Implement SC Decision
• Preparation of survey module/bidding of • Conduct of survey services information • Research, projection • Contracting of Campaign and determination of accounting firm • Organizational • Interview of FWB net area for development and • Audit of HLI and CLI applicant distribution records in connection capacity building • Encoding and • Conduct of • Socio-economic with sale of 500 ha Processing perimeter/ mapping or profiling and expropriation of segregation survey 80 ha • Posting of Masterlist • Scoping of FWBs • Subdivision and • Submission of monumenting • Project development compliance report to • Petition for • Preparation of survey the Supreme Court inclusion / exclusion • Posting of Final returns Masterlist of FWBs • Submission to LMS- DENR for approval
• Approval f survey plan by LMS • Allocation of lots CF Documentation • Submission to Land Bank of completed claim folder Completion • Issuance of Memorandum of Valuation to DAR • Issuance of HLI & Posting of Notice of Land Valuation & Acquisition Valuation • Initial payment to HLI and issuance of a Certificate of Deposit • Issuance of RP title by the Register of Deeds • Generation and registration of CLOA Distribution of • Installation of FWBs Land
Major Activities Undertaken
Research and Gathering of Basic Documents e.g tax declarations, titles, ASPs: list of MOA Voter’s list, HLI FWB 6296 list, HLI Stockholders’ list and other vital documents
Database Build-up of HLI FWB 6296 list, MOA Voter’s list and HLI Stockholders’ list as basis for the identification of potential farmworker beneficiaries
Social Preparation
Ø December 19, 2011 – Skills Training for Info-Drive Speakers
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Ø January 16, 2012 – Briefing for Info Drive Speakers on November 22, 2011 SC Decision Ø January 20, 2012 – Final Briefing of 180 DAR Personnel Info Drive Speakers for Massive Info Campaign on November 22, 2011 SC Decision Ø January 21, 2012 – Conduct of Massive Information Campaign on November 22, 2011 SC Decision in 10 Barangays Ø May 9 & 17, 2012 – Orientation of DAR personnel for the Massive Info Campaign on Final SC Decision Ø May 9 & 17, 2012, Distribution of Interview Schedule Stubs Identification, Profiling, Screening and Validation of Potential FWBs
Ø May 22, 2012 – Briefing on the Detailed Instructions prior to the Conduct of Interview Ø May 23 to June 10, 2012 – Interview of Potential Farmworker Beneficiaries
Summary of Interviewed HLI Potential Farmworker Beneficiaries
BARANGAY NAME NO. OF PFWBs ASTURIAS 525 BALETE 966 BANTOG 617 CUTCUT 944 LOURDES 821 MABILOG 822 MAPALACSIAO 1,085 MOTRICO 943 PANDO 830 PARANG 999 Grand Total 8, 552 Ø Digital Scanning, Encoding & Proofreading of ISFs at DARCO Backroom Operations contracted with UBIX Ø Sorting and Coding of Interview Sheet Folders by Barangay at DARPO Ø Posting of tarps and distribution of interviewed PFWBs listings with schedule to barangay leaders & CSOs Ø August 8-10, 2012 – 2nd Round Interview Orientation/Briefing Ø August 13-24, 2012 – Conduct of 2nd Round Interview with additional 89 new applicants leaving a total number of 8,641 PFWBs interviewed Ø September 2012 – Processing of 8,641 PFWBs submitted documents and data validation against HLI 6296 and MOA voters’ lists
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Results of ISF Processing
Preliminary List Provisional List BARANGAY NAME No. of FWBs No. of PFWBs ASTURIAS 370 86 BALETE 664 107 BANTOG 375 88 CUTCUT 542 173 LOURDES 534 93 MABILOG 547 124 MAPALACSIAO 701 104 MOTRICO 578 134 PANDO 504 150 PARANG 550 162 Grand Total 5365 1221
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Ø October 31, 2012 § Simultaneous posting of Preliminary Masterlist and Provisional List in 10 Barangays § Posting of Tarps and distribution of Kits to CSO leaders and 10 Barangay Chairmen of HLI. Kits contain Preliminary Masterlist, Provisional List, Patalastas and Notice with the instruction on how to file the Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion Ø November 5 to 30, 2012 – Submission of additional document/proofs as bonafide HLI “manggagawang bukid” of PFWBs in the Provisional List and filing of Petition for Inclusion/Exclusion Submission of Additional Documents Summary of PFWBs in the Provisional List
No. of FWBs who No. of FWBs who did not BARANGAY Submitted Additional Submit Additional Documents Documents ASTURIAS 42 44 BALETE 58 49 BANTOG 37 49 CUTCUT 112 62 LOURDES 51 42 MABILOG 103 25 MAPALACSIAO 63 41 MOTRICO 98 41 PANDO 102 47 PARANG 116 39 Grand Total 782 439
Summary of PFWBs who Filed Petition for Inclusion
Municipal/Barangay No. of Applicants Address ASTURIAS 4 BALETE 43 BANTOG 20 CENTRAL 2 CUTCUT 13 DPCH 2 LOURDES 10 MABILOG 51 MAPALACSIAO 70 MOTRICO 6 PANDO 38 PARANG 100 PURA 1 Grand Total 360 *There was no Petition for Exclusion filed at DARPO
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Ø December 10, 2012 – Seminar Workshop on the Preparation of Sworn Statements Evaluation of Additional Documents and Assessment of the … Ø December 17 to 22, 2012 – Getting the Sinumpaang Salaysay from Interviewed Applicants Ø January 4, 2013 – HLI Committee and Sub-Committee Members Meeting/Orientation Ø January 21 to 23, 2013 – Processing of PFWBs Folders who Submitted Additional Evidence in the Provisional list and with filed Petition of inclusion by DAR Nationwide Legal Team Ø January 28 to 29, 2013 – HLI Over-all Committee Meeting Regarding the Finalization of HLI’s Masterlist of Farmworker Beneficiaries Ø February 21, 2013 – Preliminary Ocular Inspection Ø February 27, 2013 – Posting of Final Masterlist with 6,212 qualified FWBs Land Acquisition
Ø Claim Folder Documentation per Title AREA/ AREA AREA LOCATION TITLE NO. LOT NO. TITLE Acquired/CARPABLE NON-CARP (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) LA PAZ T-236740 1,434.4829 1,093.5564 57.2838 T-240205 88-B 213.3321 T-401428 2-A 0.5152 T-401428 2-C 1.2302 T-240207 124-B 0.3629 SUB-TOTAL 1,308.4816 57.7990
TARLAC T-236741 1783.7684 799.0328 552.7322 T-287947 3 21.0189 T-287948 4 2.3639 T-287949 5 152.8236 T-287950 6 3.2245 T-287951 7 0.9032 T-287952 8 1.2833 T-287953 9 0.2752 T-287954 10 0.5255 T-287955 11 3.5310 T-287956 12 12.0821 T-240195 138-B 2.7402 SUB-TOTAL 999.8042 552.7322
CONCEPTION T-236742 1804.9834 38.2293 T-240201 40.7584 T-240203 5.6684 T-400303 35.8651 SUBTOTAL 1887.2753 38.2293
TOTAL 5,149.5581 4,195.5611 648.7605 Note: Non-Carpable include converted, SCTEX and residential areas
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Ø Conduct of Survey • October 4, 2012 – Execution of Service Contract for the survey of HLI between the DAR and FF Cruz & Co., Inc. (Contractor) as the winning bidder • October 5, 2012 – Issuance of Notice to Proceed (NTP) by the DAR and received by FF Cruz Co., • November 11, 2012 – Conduct of Aerial Photogrammetry • January 24, 2013 – Submission of Aerial Photogrammetry output • October 2013 to May 2014 – Fabrication of Monuments • Segregation Survey (SCTEX, access road, cemetery, residential areas) § Date Submitted to LRA – May 2, 2013 § Date approved – June 14, 2013 ; 13 plans • 3rd wk Feb to 2nd wk Mar 2013 – Preparation of Imaginary Consolidation and Subdivision Plans • Approval of Consolidation/Subdivision Plans Municipality Date Submitted Date of to LRA Approval 1. Tarlac June 14, 2013 July 3, 2013 2. La Paz July 4, 2013 July 8, 2013 3. Conception July 10, 2013 July 15, 2013 Ø BLD HLI Systems Development • Lot Allocation Raffle Systems § AutoKa Mapping System § Map Info/GIS System § Lot Allocation Certificate Printing & Tagging Systems § Application to Purchase & Farmer’s Undertaking Printing & Tagging Systems § HLI System Reports • CLOA Generation System Ø Lot Allocation Raffle • March to April 2013 – Submission of Tabi-tabi Manipesto & additional documents of representatives of 6,212 FWBs who are deceased, in abroud and in the Philippines
Summary of FWBs with Tabi-tabi Manipesto No. of No. of Barangay Groups FWBs Asturias 16 98 Balete 57 342 Bantog 39 224 Cut-Cut II 67 344 Lourdes 54 345 Mabilog 103 548 Mapalacsiao 63 374
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Motrico 83 451 Pando 94 524 Parang 113 554 Grand Total 689 3,804 • Issuance of Lot Allocation Certificates (LAC) & Oath Taking and Signing of Application to Purchase and Farmer’s Undertaking (APFU) Lot Allocation Barangay Schedule
Barangay Petsa ng Palabunutan CUTCUT July 18 & 19, 2013 (Huwebes & Biyernes) LOURDES July 22 & 23, 2013 (Lunes & Martes) BANTOG July 25 & 26, 2013 (Huwebes & Biyernes) ASTURIAS July 29 & 30, 2013 (Lunes & Martes) MOTRICO August 1 & 2, 2013 (Huwebes & Biyernes) PANDO August 5 & 6, 2013 (Lunes & Martes) MABILOG August 8 & 9, 2013 (Huwebes & Biyernes) PARANG August 12 & 13, 2013 (Lunes & Martes) BALETE August 15 & 16, 2013 (Huwebes & Biyernes) MAPALACSIAO August 19, 20 & 21, 2013 (Lunes, Martes & Miyerkules
Lot Allocation Summary
Raffle/Address Lot Allocation Barangays Barangay Asturias Balete Bantog Cut-cut Lourdes Mabilog Mapalacsiao Motrico Pando Parang Total Asturias 263 179 442 Balete 87 30 307 311 735 Bantog 233 202 435 Cut-cut 3 523 120 646 Lourdes 122 1 282 4 177 586 Mabilog 637 1 638 Mapalacsiao 21 163 500 62 65 811 Motrico 669 1 670 Pando 603 603 Parang 646 646 Grand Total 385 87 236 524 312 965 167 1847 976 713 6212
• January 17 to 24, 2014 – Field Facilitators posting of tarps and serving of letters to FWBs in the Final Master List who failed to claim their LAC and sign their APFU with a deadline until February 15, 2014
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LBP Processing and Valuation DATE W/COD W/RP TITLE LOCATION TITLE NO. MOV NVLA ORDER TO DEPOSITE Date Date @ ROD (a) (b) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) LA PAZ T-236740 May 15, 2013 May 16, 2013 May 20, 2013 May 23, 2013 June 03, 2013 T-240205 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-401428 T-401428 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-240207 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013
TARLAC T-236741 May 24, 2013 May 30, 2013 May 31, 2013 June 4, 2013 June 17, 2013 T-287947 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287948 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287949 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287950 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287951 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287952 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287953 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287954 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287955 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-287956 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-240195 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013
CONCEPTION T-236742 May 15, 2013 May 16, 2013 May 20, 2013 May 23, 2013 June 3, 2013 T-240201 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-240203 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013 T-400303 April 26, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 02, 2013 May 06, 2013 May 20, 2013
CLOA Generation and Registration Summary of CLOA Generation and Registration As of July 3, 2014 Registered For Registration Barangay No. of FWBs No. of CLOAs No. of FWBs No. of CLOAs PANDO 603 664 MOTRICO 666 719 3 3 LOURDES 586 652 PARANG 642 719 1 1 MABILOG 635 707 3 4 BANTOG 379 432 50 55 CUTCUT 574 628 9 10 ASTURIAS 400 453 25 29 BALETE 674 729 11 11 MAPALACSIAO 751 852 23 28 TOTAL 5910 6555 125 141 CLOA Distribution
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Ø September 30 to October 8, 2013 – CLOA Distribution schedule at HLI Barangays Summary of CLOA Titles Distribution As of July 3, 2014
No. of CLOA DISTRIBUTED No. of CLOAs Undistributed Barangay FWBs CLOAs FWBs CLOAs 603 664 0 0 MOTRICO 665 718 1 1 LOURDES 585 651 1 1 PARANG 641 717 1 2 MABILOG 635 707 0 0 BANTOG 378 431 1 1 CUTCUT 567 618 7 10 ASTURIAS 396 448 4 5 BALETE 648 703 26 26 MAPALACSIAO 737 834 14 18 TOTAL 5910 6555 55 64 *Figure includes CLOAs distributed at DARPO
Ø August 26, 2014 – DAR Secretary Issuance of Order re: Request of Forty-six (46) Farmworker Beneficiaries for Permission to Claim the Lot Allocation Certificate and to Execute Application to Purchase and Farmer’s Undertaking (with 125 FWBs disqualified) Ø August 27, 2014 – Issuance of Notice of Order re: Request of Forty-six (46) Farmworker Beneficiaries for Permission to Claim the Lot Allocation Certificate and to Execute Application to Purchase and Farmer’s Undertaking by the Assistant Secretary/OIC HEA Ø September 4 to 12, 2014 – Sheriff’s service of Order to the 46 FWBs who were granted to claim their LAC and sign their APFU and to the 125 disqualified FWBs Statues of 171 FWBs who failed to execute APFU
46 FWBs granted to sign APFU (Order successfully served)
43 FWBs signed and claimed their APFUs 3 still did not claim their APFU
125 FWBs disqualified 33 refused to receive the copy of the 92 successfully served – 13 filed their letter Orders/registered mail request to grant the signing of their APFU (after Aug. 26, 2014)
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Setting out of Boundaries and Monumenting
Ø November 28, 2013 – Posting of “Babala” tarps on Altering Boundaries and Landmarks to all HLI barangays Ø December 10, 2013 – Posting of “Paunawa” tarps on “Arrienda” to all HLI barangays ARB Installation
Ø January 28, 2014 – Started ARB Installation conducted by admin at Block 2 of barangay Mapalacsiao which consist of 46 lots involving 45 ARBs. Ø May 31, 2014 – Last day of installation Program Beneficiaries and Development
Ø May 23 to 25, 2013 – Information Drive on Agricultural Support Services Ø October 15, 2013 – Area Profiling and Reconnaissance • Profiling or rice, vegetables and other crops was undertaken to generate pertinent data such as total area devoted to crops other than sugarcane • Complex issues on arienda (leasing) system • Rice, Vegetables and other crops shall be the take-off point of the agricultural development component of PBD
Area Profiling Results
Area Devoted by Type of Crops
48.77 19.9
446.9
3,584.35
Sugarcane Rice Vegetables Idle Lands
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RICE PRODUCTION AREA = 446.90 has
5.6 21.74 24.34 15.71 32.75 18.21
28.09 27.96 272.49
CUT-CUT MOTRICO BANTOG ASTURIAS LOURDES
MAPALACSIAO PARANG MABILOG PANDO
VEGETABLE PRODUCTION AREA = 48.77 has
5.8152
6.9834 24.4853
7.3553
2.3727 1.067 0.7442
CUT-CUT BANTOG LOURDES MAPALACSIAO PARANG MABILOG PANDO
Ø February 23 to 25, 2014 – PBD Info Drive re: ARBO Formation Ø March to April 2014 – SEC Registration of the ten HLI ARBOs
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OE-NADA and ARCCESS Program Activities
Ø April 15, 2014 – MOA signing with Tarlac State University (TSU) & Tarlac College of Agriculture (TCA) as partner Professional Service Provider in the conduct of OE-NADA Ø April 24 to May 2, 2014 – Conduct of Organizational Enterprise – Needs Assessment and Design Assessment (OE-NADA) in all barangay of HLI Ø May 8, 2014 – Meeting with TsU and TCA re: BDS component of ARCCESS program for HLI FWBs Ø May 9, 2014 – Orientation conducted by BSWN re: Fertility Assessment result DARPO Ø May 13, 2014 – Submission of Initial Drafts by SUCs for the OE-NADA result at DARPO Ø May 16, 17 & 18, 2014 – PBD Grounding cum planning session with BARBD & DARPO Staff/FFs Ø May 23, 2014 – Submission of Identified Strategic Goals & Objectives, as well as the Key Tasks to be done re: ARBOs Organizational Development & Strengthening/Enterprise Development (DARPO level) Ø May 20, 2014 – Technical review And Feedbacking Sessions on the OE-NADA with DAR, Tarlac College of Agriculture and ARBOs Ø May 21, 2014 – Technical review And Feedbacking Sessions on the OE-NADA with DAR, Tarlac State University and ARBOs Ø May 30, 2014 – Presentation of utput by DARPO to BARBD Ø June 3, 2014 – Endorsement of 10 HLI ARBOs Final Draft of OE-NADA Reports
Interventions
Ø May 31, 2014 to Dec. 2014 – Preparation of Project Proposals (AES/BDS Components) • Conduct of Various livelihood trainings/seminars (in house & community based) • Provision of Agri-Extension Services/Business Development Services to HLI ARBOs (upon approval of the proposals under ARCCESS Program) Ø May 30-June 4, 2014 – Field Facilitators Identification of Actual Cultivators in Hacienda Luisita Ø June 6, 2014 – Exploratory Conference of DAR Re: Terms of Reference (TOR) of AES and BDS Engagement in HLI Ø June 9, 2014 – PBD Meeting Re: Orientation of Vegetable Production and Distribution of Assorted Vegetable Seeds in HLI on June 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 2014.
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