Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Great Disruption: Uncertainty Over the Indo-Pacific,” Comparative Connections, Vol

JAPAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS GREAT DISRUPTION: UNCERTAINTY OVER THE INDO-PACIFIC KEI KOGA, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY Japan and Southeast Asia faced completely different situations in 2019 and 2020 because of the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2019, Japan-Southeast Asia relations were continuously positive. One of the major developments among Southeast Asian states was the creation of the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” (AOIP) which resonated with the principles in Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept. As a result, Japan expressed explicit support for AOIP. Functionally, they made progress, particularly in the fields of defense, infrastructure development, and digital, as illustrated by various Japanese initiatives—“Vientiane Vision2.0,” “Initiative on Overseas Loan and Investment for ASEAN,” and “Data Free Flow with Trust.” As such, both Japan and Southeast Asian states began to synthesize their respective visions of the Indo-Pacific and to establish concrete cooperative mechanisms. Diplomatic momentum was put on halt in 2020 as COVID- 19 spread. While Japan, Southeast Asian states, and ASEAN made efforts to coordinate counter-measures, share information and best practices, and provide mutual assistance through teleconferences such as the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on Coronavirus Disease 2019 in April 2020, each state faces different social and political situations, making it difficult to cooperate. As such, great uncertainty looms over Japan-Southeast Asia cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. This article is extracted from Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific, Vol. 22, No. 1, May 2020. Preferred citation: Kei Koga, “Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Great Disruption: Uncertainty over the Indo-Pacific,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp 137-148. JAPAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS | MAY 2020 137 Japan and Southeast Asia faced completely which can provide global public goods. In different situations in 2019 and 2020 because of addition, Japan is the most favorable “third the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. In choice” state for ASEAN in the context of US- 2019, Japan-Southeast Asia relations were China rivalry, although Japan’s political, positive. One of the major developments among strategic, and economic influence in Southeast Southeast Asian states was the creation of the Asia is considered to be much lower than that of “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP), China. This survey result is consistent with which resonated with the principles in Japan’s another survey conducted in 2019 by Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept; as Ministry of Foreign Affairs,. It shows that 93% a result, Japan expressed explicit support for of respondents considered Japan to be a AOIP. Functionally, they made progress, “reliable friend” and would contribute to “the particularly in defense, infrastructure peace and stability” of Southeast Asia. development, and digital fields, as illustrated by various Japanese initiatives—“Vientiane Vision Strategic Concept: Synergy between FOIP and 2.0,” “Initiative on Overseas Loan and AOIP Investment for ASEAN,” and “Data Free Flow with Trust.” As such, Japan and Southeast Asian The most significant development for Japan and states began to synthesize their respective Southeast Asia in 2019 was the creation of the visions toward the Indo-Pacific and to establish “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP). concrete cooperative mechanisms. However, The document was adopted at the 34th ASEAN diplomatic momentum was put on halt in 2020 Summit in June 2019, emphasizing “ASEAN as the COVID-19 pandemic occurred. While centrality, inclusiveness, complementarities, a Japan, Southeast Asian states, and ASEAN made rules-based order anchored upon international efforts to coordinate counter-measures, share law, and commitment to advancing economic information and best practices, and provide engagement in the region.” The outlook mutual assistance through teleconferences such essentially provides guidelines for ASEAN and its as the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on member states to engage the Indo-Pacific Coronavirus Disease 2019 in April 2020, each region, while asking for external partners to state faces different social and political support ASEAN’s initiatives and cooperate in the situations, making it difficult to cooperate. As areas that ASEAN indicates. such, great uncertainty looms over Japan- Southeast Asia cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Indonesia has long taken the initiative to push a concept of the Indo-Pacific in ASEAN, while Furthering the Japan-Southeast Asia others displayed a somewhat lukewarm attitude Relationship in 2019 toward such an initiative and were contentious in deciding what type of institutional documents Japan-Southeast Asia relations in 2019 were and contents should be included. The outcome stable, and steadily strengthened their political, was a political compromise—the title of the economic, military, and socio-cultural ties, document was changed from “ASEAN’s Indo- which contributed to the creation of strategic Pacific Outlook” to AOIP and ended up options for Southeast Asia, while providing containing 14 principles, including ASEAN diplomatic leverage over Southeast Asia. In centrality, transparency, inclusivity, and a 2019, Japan constantly enhanced its cooperation rules-based framework. In this sense, the with ASEAN, particularly with Vietnam, which document is similar to the 1971 Zone of Peace, became the 2020 ASEAN Chair and the 2018-21 Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which ASEAN Country Coordinator for Japan, so that aspired to regional neutrality in Southeast Asia Japan-ASEAN policy coordination in 2020 could amid power shifts in East Asia caused by the move smoothly. Japan gradually reoriented its retrenchment of the United States and the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) concept to United Kingdom, while seeking a way to secure lay the groundwork for the Indo-Pacific regional regional powers’ recognition of Southeast Asia order with ASEAN’s support. as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). As ASEAN sought regional autonomy Because of these efforts, Japan’s image in in the 1970s, the AOIP also attempts to secure Southeast Asia has been consistently positive. ASEAN’s independent political stance in the According to ISEAS’s 2020 Survey Report, Japan context of the Indo-Pacific strategic is the most trustworthy state among major competition between China and the United powers, including the United States and China, States. 138 MAY 2020 | JAPAN-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS However, unlike ZOPFAN, the AOIP gained strategic division, a welcome development for strong political support from major powers that ASEAN as well. advocated for the Indo-Pacific concept, namely Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Japan’s constant modification of the FOIP For those powers, including Japan, it was a concept thus provides strategic choices for political achievement because AOIP indicates ASEAN member states and becomes highly that ASEAN has incorporated the “Indo-Pacific” compatible with AOIP. This created a greater concept into its own strategic calculations, by possibility for Japan and ASEAN to further which they could discuss and work together to cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. shape a regional vision and cooperative frameworks. Furthermore, some of the Functional Cooperation: Defense, principles, particularly a rules-based Infrastructure, and Digital Infrastructure framework and respect for international law, resonated with those major powers’ Indo- Concrete cooperative actions between FOIP and Pacific concepts and visions. Thus, AOIP was a AOIP are still underway, but Japan and favorable development for Japan. Southeast Asian states made progress in three areas: defense diplomacy, infrastructure ASEAN’s major strategic objective for AOIP is to development, and digital infrastructure. neutralize great powers’ dominance in creating the Indo-Pacific concept, which could Defense Cooperation: Vientiane Vision 2.0 marginalize the association’s institutional role in the region. While a balanced great power First, Japan has adapted “Vientiane Vision 2.0” competition would give ASEAN strategic leeway at the 5th ASEAN-Japan Defense Ministers’ to locate itself in the middle, facilitating friendly Meeting on November 18, 2019. This is the relations with both sides, the intensification of updated version of the “Vientiane Vision” in rivalry would force ASEAN member states to 2016, which is “a guiding principle” for Japan’s choose sides. Given the increasingly firm US bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation stance against China and the potential with ASEAN and has three objectives: to institutionalization of the Quad—an anti-China consolidate a rules-based international order; to coalition—ASEAN emphasized the importance ensure maritime security; and to facilitate of inclusivity to mitigate China’s concern, capacity-building programs for ASEAN member although China avoided explicit support for states. Although the 2016 version was highly AOIP. compatible with Japan’s FOIP concept, Vientiane Vision 2.0 incorporates “the concept of the Among the various FOIP concepts, Japan’s FOIP ‘Indo-Pacific’” and defines ASEAN as a pivotal vision was largely compatible with AOIP. player in the region. Admittedly, when Japan launched the FOIP strategy in 2016, it implicitly featured Japan’s More specifically, Vientiane Vision 2.0 competitive strategy against China

Load more