Lecture 07 Debugging Programs with GDB
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University of California at Berkeley College of Engineering Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of California at Berkeley College of Engineering Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science EECS 61C, Fall 2003 Lab 2: Strings and pointers; the GDB debugger PRELIMINARY VERSION Goals To learn to use the gdb debugger to debug string and pointer programs in C. Reading Sections 5.1-5.5, in K&R GDB Reference Card (linked to class page under “resources.”) Optional: Complete GDB documentation (http://www.gnu.org/manual/gdb-5.1.1/gdb.html) Note: GDB currently only works on the following machines: • torus.cs.berkeley.edu • rhombus.cs.berkeley.edu • pentagon.cs.berkeley.edu Please ssh into one of these machines before starting the lab. Basic tasks in GDB There are two ways to start the debugger: 1. In EMACS, type M-x gdb, then type gdb <filename> 2. Run gdb <filename> from the command line The following are fundamental operations in gdb. Please make sure you know the gdb commands for the following operations before you proceed. 1. How do you run a program in gdb? 2. How do you pass arguments to a program when using gdb? 3. How do you set a breakpoint in a program? 4. How do you set a breakpoint which which only occurs when a set of conditions is true (eg when certain variables are a certain value)? 5. How do you execute the next line of C code in the program after a break? 1 6. If the next line is a function call, you'll execute the call in one step. How do you execute the C code, line by line, inside the function call? 7. -
What Is an Operating System III 2.1 Compnents II an Operating System
Page 1 of 6 What is an Operating System III 2.1 Compnents II An operating system (OS) is software that manages computer hardware and software resources and provides common services for computer programs. The operating system is an essential component of the system software in a computer system. Application programs usually require an operating system to function. Memory management Among other things, a multiprogramming operating system kernel must be responsible for managing all system memory which is currently in use by programs. This ensures that a program does not interfere with memory already in use by another program. Since programs time share, each program must have independent access to memory. Cooperative memory management, used by many early operating systems, assumes that all programs make voluntary use of the kernel's memory manager, and do not exceed their allocated memory. This system of memory management is almost never seen any more, since programs often contain bugs which can cause them to exceed their allocated memory. If a program fails, it may cause memory used by one or more other programs to be affected or overwritten. Malicious programs or viruses may purposefully alter another program's memory, or may affect the operation of the operating system itself. With cooperative memory management, it takes only one misbehaved program to crash the system. Memory protection enables the kernel to limit a process' access to the computer's memory. Various methods of memory protection exist, including memory segmentation and paging. All methods require some level of hardware support (such as the 80286 MMU), which doesn't exist in all computers. -
Measuring and Improving Memory's Resistance to Operating System
University of Michigan CSE-TR-273-95 Measuring and Improving Memory’s Resistance to Operating System Crashes Wee Teck Ng, Gurushankar Rajamani, Christopher M. Aycock, Peter M. Chen Computer Science and Engineering Division Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Michigan {weeteck,gurur,caycock,pmchen}@eecs.umich.edu Abstract: Memory is commonly viewed as an unreliable place to store permanent data because it is per- ceived to be vulnerable to system crashes.1 Yet despite all the negative implications of memory’s unreli- ability, no data exists that quantifies how vulnerable memory actually is to system crashes. The goals of this paper are to quantify the vulnerability of memory to operating system crashes and to propose a method for protecting memory from these crashes. We use software fault injection to induce a wide variety of operating system crashes in DEC Alpha work- stations running Digital Unix, ranging from bit errors in the kernel stack to deleting branch instructions to C-level allocation management errors. We show that memory is remarkably resistant to operating system crashes. Out of the 996 crashes we observed, only 17 corrupted file cache data. Excluding direct corruption from copy overruns, only 2 out of 820 corrupted file cache data. This data contradicts the common assump- tion that operating system crashes often corrupt files in memory. For users who need even greater protec- tion against operating system crashes, we propose a simple, low-overhead software scheme that controls access to file cache buffers using virtual memory protection and code patching. 1 Introduction A modern storage hierarchy combines random-access memory, magnetic disk, and possibly optical disk or magnetic tape to try to keep pace with rapid advances in processor performance. -
Clusterfuzz: Fuzzing at Google Scale
Black Hat Europe 2019 ClusterFuzz Fuzzing at Google Scale Abhishek Arya Oliver Chang About us ● Chrome Security team (Bugs--) ● Abhishek Arya (@infernosec) ○ Founding Chrome Security member ○ Founder of ClusterFuzz ● Oliver Chang (@halbecaf) ○ Lead developer of ClusterFuzz ○ Tech lead for OSS-Fuzz 2 Fuzzing ● Effective at finding bugs by exploring unexpected states ● Recent developments ○ Coverage guided fuzzing ■ AFL started “smart fuzzing” (Nov’13) ○ Making fuzzing more accessible ■ libFuzzer - in-process fuzzing (Jan’15) ■ OSS-Fuzz - free fuzzing for open source (Dec’16) 3 Fuzzing mythbusting ● Fuzzing is only for security researchers or security teams ● Fuzzing only finds security vulnerabilities ● We don’t need fuzzers if our project is well unit-tested ● Our project is secure if there are no open bugs 4 Scaling fuzzing ● How to fuzz effectively as a Defender? ○ Not just “more cores” ● Security teams can’t write all fuzzers for the entire project ○ Bugs create triage burden ● Should seamlessly fit in software development lifecycle ○ Input: Commit unit-test like fuzzer in source ○ Output: Bugs, Fuzzing Statistics and Code Coverage 5 Fuzzing lifecycle Manual Automated Fuzzing Upload builds Build bucket Cloud Storage Find crash Write fuzzers De-duplicate Minimize Bisect File bug Fix bugs Test if fixed (daily) Close bug 6 Assign bug ClusterFuzz ● Open source - https://github.com/google/clusterfuzz ● Automates everything in the fuzzing lifecycle apart from “fuzzer writing” and “bug fixing” ● Runs 5,000 fuzzers on 25,000 cores, can scale more ● Cross platform (Linux, macOS, Windows, Android) ● Powers OSS-Fuzz and Google’s fuzzing 7 Fuzzing lifecycle 1. Write fuzzers 2. Build fuzzers 3. Fuzz at scale 4. -
Compiling and Debugging Basics
Compiling and Debugging Basics Service CoSiNus IMFT P. Elyakime H. Neau A. Pedrono A. Stoukov Avril 2015 Outline ● Compilers available at IMFT? (Fortran, C and C++) ● Good practices ● Debugging Why? Compilation errors and warning Run time errors and wrong results Fortran specificities C/C++ specificities ● Basic introduction to gdb, valgrind and TotalView IMFT - CoSiNus 2 Compilers on linux platforms ● Gnu compilers: gcc, g++, gfortran ● Intel compilers ( 2 licenses INPT): icc, icpc, ifort ● PGI compiler fortran only (2 licenses INPT): pgf77, pgf90 ● Wrappers mpich2 for MPI codes: mpicc, mpicxx, mpif90 IMFT - CoSiNus 3 Installation ● Gnu compilers: included in linux package (Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, gcc/gfortran version 4.6.3) ● Intel and PGI compilers installed on a centralized server (/PRODCOM), to use it: source /PRODCOM/bin/config.sh # in bash source /PRODCOM/bin/config.csh # in csh/tcsh ● Wrappers mpich2 installed on PRODCOM: FORTRAN : mympi intel # (or pgi or gnu) C/C++ : mympi intel # (or gnu) IMFT - CoSiNus 4 Good practices • Avoid too long source files! • Use a makefile if you have more than one file to compile • In Fortran : ” implicit none” mandatory at the beginning of each program, module and subroutine! • Use compiler’s check options IMFT - CoSiNus 5 Why talk about debugging ? Yesterday, my program was running well: % gfortran myprog.f90 % ./a.out % vmax= 3.3e-2 And today: % gfortran myprog.f90 % ./a.out % Segmentation fault Yet I have not changed anything… Because black magic is not the reason most often, debugging could be helpful! (If you really think that the cause of your problem is evil, no need to apply to CoSiNus, we are not God!) IMFT - CoSiNus 6 Debugging Methodical process to find and fix flows in a code. -
The Fuzzing Hype-Train: How Random Testing Triggers Thousands of Crashes
SYSTEMS ATTACKS AND DEFENSES Editors: D. Balzarotti, [email protected] | W. Enck, [email protected] | T. Holz, [email protected] | A. Stavrou, [email protected] The Fuzzing Hype-Train: How Random Testing Triggers Thousands of Crashes Mathias Payer | EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland oftware contains bugs, and some System software, such as a browser, discovered crash. As a dynamic testing S bugs are exploitable. Mitigations a runtime system, or a kernel, is writ technique, fuzzing is incomplete for protect our systems in the presence ten in lowlevel languages (such as C nontrivial programs as it will neither of these vulnerabilities, often stop and C++) that are prone to exploit cover all possible program paths nor ping the program once a security able, lowlevel defects. Undefined all dataflow paths except when run violation has been detected. The alter behavior is at the root of lowlevel for an infinite amount of time. Fuzz native is to discover bugs during de vulnerabilities, e.g., invalid pointer ing strategies are inherently optimiza velopment and fix them tion problems where the in the code. The task of available resources are finding and reproducing The idea of fuzzing is simple: execute used to discover as many bugs is difficult; however, bugs as possible, covering fuzzing is an efficient way a program in a test environment with as much of the program to find securitycritical random input and see if it crashes. functionality as possible bugs by triggering ex through a probabilistic ceptions, such as crashes, exploration process. Due memory corruption, or to its nature as a dynamic assertion failures automatically (or dereferences resulting in memory testing technique, fuzzing faces several with a little help). -
Lecture 15 15.1 Paging
CMPSCI 377 Operating Systems Fall 2009 Lecture 15 Lecturer: Emery Berger Scribe: Bruno Silva,Jim Partan 15.1 Paging In recent lectures, we have been discussing virtual memory. The valid addresses in a process' virtual address space correspond to actual data or code somewhere in the system, either in physical memory or on the disk. Since physical memory is fast and is a limited resource, we use the physical memory as a cache for the disk (another way of saying this is that the physical memory is \backed by" the disk, just as the L1 cache is \backed by" the L2 cache). Just as with any cache, we need to specify our policies for when to read a page into physical memory, when to evict a page from physical memory, and when to write a page from physical memory back to the disk. 15.1.1 Reading Pages into Physical Memory For reading, most operating systems use demand paging. This means that pages are only read from the disk into physical memory when they are needed. In the page table, there is a resident status bit, which says whether or not a valid page resides in physical memory. If the MMU tries to get a physical page number for a valid page which is not resident in physical memory, it issues a pagefault to the operating system. The OS then loads that page from disk, and then returns to the MMU to finish the translation.1 In addition, many operating systems make some use of pre-fetching, which is called pre-paging when used for pages. -
NASM for Linux
1 NASM for Linux Microprocessors II 2 NASM for Linux Microprocessors II NASM Package nasm package available as source or as executables Typically /usr/bin/nasm and /usr/bin/ndisasm Assembly NASM Linux requires elf format for object files ELF = Executable and Linking Format Typical header size = 330h bytes for nasm −f elf [−o <output>] <filename> Linking Linux Object files can be linked with gcc gcc [−options] <filename.o> [other_files.o] Disassembly View executable as 32-bit assembly code ndisasm −e 330h –b 32 a.out | less objdump –d a.out | less Fall 2007 Hadassah College Dr. Martin Land Fall 2007 Hadassah College Dr. Martin Land 3 NASM for Linux Microprocessors II 4 NASM for Linux Microprocessors II gcc Stages Example — 1 Stages of Gnu C compilation factorial2.c #include <math.h> main #include <stdio.h> sets j = 12 main() Source Translation Assembly Object Executable calls factorial 10,000,000 times Code Unit Code Code File { int times; prog.c prog.i prog.s prog.o a.out int i , j = 12; preprocess compile assemble link for (times = 0 ; times < 10000000 ; ++times){ i = factorial(j); gcc -E } gcc -S printf("%d\n",i); gcc -c } gcc int factorial(n) int n; factorial calculates n! by recursion { if (n == 0) return 1; else return n * factorial(n-1); } Fall 2007 Hadassah College Dr. Martin Land Fall 2007 Hadassah College Dr. Martin Land 5 NASM for Linux Microprocessors II 6 NASM for Linux Microprocessors II Example — 2 Example — 3 ~/gcc$ gcc factorial2.c Compile program as separate files produces executable a.out factorial2a.c ~/gcc$ time a.out main() { 479001600 int times; int i,j=12; for (times = 0 ; times < 10000000 ; ++times){ real 0m9.281s i = factorial(j); factorial2b.c } #include <math.h> printf("%d\n",i); user 0m8.339s #include <stdio.h> } sys 0m0.008s int factorial(n) int n; { Program a.out runs in 8.339 seconds on 300 MHz if (n == 0) Pentium II return 1; else return n * factorial(n-1); } Fall 2007 Hadassah College Dr. -
Recovering from Operating System Crashes
Recovering from Operating System Crashes Francis David Daniel Chen Department of Computer Science Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Urbana, USA Urbana, USA Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Abstract— When an operating system crashes and hangs, it timers and processor support techniques [12] are required to leaves the machine in an unusable state. All currently running detect such crashes. program state and data is lost. The usual solution is to reboot the It is accepted behavior that when an operating system machine and restart user programs. However, it is possible that after a crash, user program state and most operating system state crashes, all currently running user programs and data in is still in memory and hopefully, not corrupted. In this project, volatile memory is lost and unrecoverable because the proces- we use a watchdog timer to reset the processor on an operating sor halts and the system needs to be rebooted. This is inspite system crash. We have modified the Linux kernel and added of the fact that all of this information is available in volatile a recovery routine that is called instead of the normal boot up memory as long as there is no power failure. This paper function when the processor is reset by a watchdog. This resumes execution of user processes after killing the process that was explores the possibility of recovering the operating system executing when the watchdog fired. We have implemented this using the contents of memory in order to resume execution on the ARM architecture and we use a periodic watchdog kick of user programs without any data loss. -
Memory Management
Memory management Virtual address space ● Each process in a multi-tasking OS runs in its own memory sandbox called the virtual address space. ● In 32-bit mode this is a 4GB block of memory addresses. ● These virtual addresses are mapped to physical memory by page tables, which are maintained by the operating system kernel and consulted by the processor. ● Each process has its own set of page tables. ● Once virtual addresses are enabled, they apply to all software running in the machine, including the kernel itself. ● Thus a portion of the virtual address space must be reserved to the kernel Kernel and user space ● Kernel might not use 1 GB much physical memory. ● It has that portion of address space available to map whatever physical memory it wishes. ● Kernel space is flagged in the page tables as exclusive to privileged code (ring 2 or lower), hence a page fault is triggered if user-mode programs try to touch it. ● In Linux, kernel space is constantly present and maps the same physical memory in all processes. ● Kernel code and data are always addressable, ready to handle interrupts or system calls at any time. ● By contrast, the mapping for the user-mode portion of the address space changes whenever a process switch happens Kernel virtual address space ● Kernel address space is the area above CONFIG_PAGE_OFFSET. ● For 32-bit, this is configurable at kernel build time. The kernel can be given a different amount of address space as desired. ● Two kinds of addresses in kernel virtual address space – Kernel logical address – Kernel virtual address Kernel logical address ● Allocated with kmalloc() ● Holds all the kernel data structures ● Can never be swapped out ● Virtual addresses are a fixed offset from their physical addresses. -
Protect Your Computer from Viruses, Hackers, & Spies
Protect Your Computer from Viruses, Hackers, & Spies Tips for Consumers Consumer Information Sheet 12 • January 2015 Today we use our computers to do so many things. We go online to search for information, shop, bank, do homework, play games, and stay in touch with family and friends. As a result, our com- puters contain a wealth of personal information about us. This may include banking and other financial records, and medical information – information that we want to protect. If your computer is not protected, identity thieves and other fraudsters may be able to get access and steal your personal information. Spammers could use your computer as a “zombie drone” to send spam that looks like it came from you. Malicious viruses or spyware could be deposited on your computer, slowing it down or destroying files. By using safety measures and good practices to protect your home computer, you can protect your privacy and your family. The following tips are offered to help you lower your risk while you’re online. 3 Install a Firewall 3 Use Anti-virus Software A firewall is a software program or piece of Anti-virus software protects your computer hardware that blocks hackers from entering from viruses that can destroy your data, slow and using your computer. Hackers search the down or crash your computer, or allow spammers Internet the way some telemarketers automati- to send email through your account. Anti-virus cally dial random phone numbers. They send protection scans your computer and your out pings (calls) to thousands of computers incoming email for viruses, and then deletes and wait for responses. -
PC Crash 7.2 Manual
PC-CRASH A Simulation Program for Vehicle Accidents Operating Manual Version 9.0 November 2010 Dr. Steffan Datentechnik Linz, Austria Distributed and Supported in North America by: www.pc-crash.com Contents CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND INSTALLATION ........................................................................................ 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 1 ABOUT THIS MANUAL .......................................................................................................................................... 1 THE PC-CRASH SOFTWARE PACKAGE ................................................................................................................. 2 HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................................... 2 USE OF MOUSE AND PRINTERS ........................................................................................................................... 2 INSTALLATION OF PC-CRASH .............................................................................................................................. 2 Licensing PC-Crash ...................................................................................................................................................... 5 Check for Updates .......................................................................................................................................................