On Watch Profiles from the National
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CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources DECLASSIFY ON· Originating Agency's Determination Required. ~A.epro\l';~j ~)r Rel:a.~e tl'~l ,r~.J':::!~, Ot (JY-lO-LUtJ l FOI.l-'., l-,ac;e tf 13b5:: ON WATCH Profiles from T~I National Security Agencys'past 40 years ~- I I '~ UNCLASSIFIED PREFACE (U) On July 17, 1984, Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, the Director of the National Security Agency, asked the National Cryptologic School to produce a "popular history" of the Agency aimed principally at new employees who perhaps were unaware of the past accomplishments of NSA. As the project evolved, the National Cryptologic School envisioned an informal collection of significant experiences from the Agency's past which stressed NSA accomplishments as the best way to make new employees aware of the unique history of NSA and United States SIGINT and COMSEC efforts. At the same time the History and Publications Division was asked to compile a more formal one-volume study of NSA, stressing its organization, structure, mission and evolution. The two products, one produced by the School and the other by the History Office are complementary but separate. This is the National Cryptologic School's contribution. The History Office study is to be published separately. I I I I,,, 11~.·····'.'·'· I·;.. 'I;·I'···· L~:~' UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CONTENTS PREFACE CHAPTER I: The End of the Beginning CHAPTER 2: Emergence of a National Cryptologic Authority ______________________________________ 13 CHAPTER 3: Treachery and Triumph ___________________________________________________________ 19 CHAPTER 4: The Decade of the Fifties _________________________________________________________ 23 CHAPTER 5: The Vietnam Era ________________________________________________________________ 33 CHAPTER 6: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident ______________________________________________________ 43 CHAPTER 7: SIGINT Support to U.S. Combat Operations 51 CHAPTER 8: The Decade of the Sixties _ 61 CHAPTER 75 CHAPTER ~~/I~~I::::::: :::::: :::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. 81 CHAPTER I I: The Decade of the Eighties 91 (b) (1) (b) (3)-50 USC 403 (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 ~' I~.~··.;.·... ..··· i~ iii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED CHAPTER ONE THE END OF THE BEGINNING MAGIC and the Road to Victory July 11. 1945. Arlington, Virginia (V) The drilling ring of the telephone jolted Frank Rowlett out of a sound sleep. He fumbled with the instrument in the dark, switched on a lamp and grunted. It was two o'clock in the morning. (V) Rowlett, one of America's cryptologic pioneers began his career with the Army's Signal Intelligence Service in 1930. After four and a half years of war, he had grown accustomed to calls in the dead of night. (V) "I've got one that you've got to come and look at," said the duty officer in the Purple Room. (U) Rowlett rubbed the sleep from his eyes. "Yes, I'll be there." It may have been the clipped tone of the duty officer's voice, or maybe it was a sense that a change was in the air. They had seen hints of new directions in Japanese communications in recent weeks. Before Rowlett put the phone back in the cradle he said, "Is this something different?" (V) "Yes," was the duty officer's curt reply. (V) Rowlett was already swinging his feet to the floor. The duty officer placed an identical call to Signal Security Agency head Brigadier General W. Preston Corderman. He, too, was on his way to Arlington Hall Station. (U) When Frank Rowlett arrived at Arlington Hall, he went straight to the operations area in B Building known as the Purple Room. Purple was the nickname for the Japanese Cipher Machine, Type B, introduced in late 1936. Lieutenant Henry Graf, one of the linguists assigned to translate deciphered Japanese diplomatic messages, thrust a MAGIC decrypt at him. MAGIC was the covername used for decrypted Japanese diplbmatic traffic. The Japanese diplomatic message was an "extremely urgent" cable from Tokyo's Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Japan's Ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow. Since we are secretly giving consideration to termination of the war in view of the pressing situation confronting Japan both at home and abroad, you are not to confine yourself [in talking to Molotov] to the objective of a rapprochement between Russia and Japan but are to sound out the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia with regard to ending the war as well. (V) The intent of the message was unmistakable. Rowlett's mind raced. The Japanese were ready to quit, and they wanted to cut a Faustian deal with the Russians that would get them out of the war. More ominous was the possibility that Russian intervention on behalf of the Japanese now could lead to Soviet domination of postwar Asia. (Vj The message and its implications were to have a staggering impact on the speed and direction of American prosecution of the war in the Pacific, the decision to drop two atomic bombs and the conduct of Vnited States foreign policy toward the Soviet Vnion for as far into the future as anyone could see. (V) The war in Europe had been over for nearly nine weeks, since the Germans signed the surrender documents at a farmhouse in Reims, France, on May 7. The Allies were now intent upon ending the war in the Far East although they fully expected the cost in lives to be high. The effort was to begin on November 1 with the invasion of Kyushu; Japan's great southern island, in what the Joint Chiefs of Staff called Operation OLYMPIC. They feared casualties could even go as high as a million men. (V) The B-29 bombing offensive against the Japanese home islands was taking an awesome toll, as was the ever-tightening naval blockade. The Allies had some evidence of a sense of despair in Japan. Some believed it started with the man in the street and reached upward all the way to the emperor. But no one contended UNCLASSIFIED DOCID,:. .. ,:~;~'.';:~:.:'><; ~:,; .;.~ ·,~~i;~i+t. UNCLASSIFIED 'l.' .••• ~~~_...-:_,,? ,'. ,, that the despair was universal. The war party, still strongly entrenched, was determined to carryon the fight .y~~;~.~~~L;~ , until the last general had committed hara-kiri on the summit of Mount Fujiyama. (U) But the MAGIC decrypt Rowlett received on July 11 was a new straw in the wind. , (U) It caused the United States to review the bidding, to take a close look at what was going on between ;.._.. ,:.• ~{'tr.' .'f: ..... "": Tokyo and Moscow. As it had throughout the war in the Pacific, MAGIC was to playa central role in Washington's assessment of Japanese peace feelers toward the Soviet Union. (U) As early as April 5, two days before the Nazi surrender in Europe, the Soviet Union had notified the Japanese that the 1941 non-aggression pact between their two countries would not be renewed when it ,'''~ . ,"- ," expired in 1946. MAGIC intercepts had revealed Japan's frantic but vain efforts to get Moscow to renew " ,.'t. the treaty. '-',r • (U) MAGIC material decrypted at Arlington Hall and passed on to G2 at the Pentagon turned up ." '; ~... .' indications of Japanese fears of what might lie ahead. MAGIC also told Washington about events unfolding .. in the Soviet Far East. Bits and pieces of COMINT were pulled together to form an intelligence mosaic. "~-i.'r1'~_--\-~, '.•;',. ,~; . (U) A Lieutenant Colonel Hamada, former intelligence officer with the Kwantung Army posted to the office of the Military Attache in Moscow, cabled Tokyo: "Assuming that the Russians do intend to attack .. ,-.. ~ .' .... - Manchukuo they will probably gain a quick victory by using overwhelming force, at least double the strength of ours. " (U) On May 26 the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow warned that the Soviet Union might "enter the war against Japan at the same time as the United States launches its all-out attack on the Japanese mainland (U) On June 1 a Japanese courier arriving in Moscow after a cross-continent trek made an ominous report to Ambassador Saw. The Red Army was continuing mass shipments to the Far East. From May 26 through 29 the courier reported seeing some 200 "transport trains" carrying tanks, guns, aircraft and trucks moving eastward. Sato sent the report to Tokyo by radio on June 4; it was plucked from the ether by the Signal Security Agency and decrypted. (U) Reports from the Japanese consulate in Manchukuo and the observations of another courier who traveled the Trans-Siberian Railroad caused Ambassador Sato to report that "by July or August Russia would have completed her military preparations in the Far East." Sato's situation reports from Moscow, duly intercepted and decrypted at Arlington Hall Station, continued their pessimistic tone. On June 8 he warned Tokyo that if the Russians attacked' 'we would have no choice but to reach a decision quietly and, resolving to eat dirt and put up with all sacrifices, fly into her arms in order to save our national structure." (U) By the time Frank Rowlett read the message from Tokyo in the small hours of the morning on July 11, he knew the end for Japan was rapidly approaching. (U) The drama intensified the following day when another message from Togo came in. His Majesty is deeply reluctant to have any further blood lost among people on both sides and it is his desire, for the welfare of humanity, to restore peace with all possible speed.... It is his private intention w send Prince Konoye to your place as Special Envoy and have him take with him a letter from the Emperor containing the above statements. Please inform Molotov of this and get the consent of the Russians to having the party enter the country. (U) Sato did his best to carry out his instructions, but to no avail.