Harsh and Philanthropic War: Success and Failure in U.S. Third Party Counterinsurgency Dallas E. Shaw Jr. Dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy In Planning, Governance and Globalization Ariel Ahram Joel Peters Gisele Datz Norman Cigar 02 November 2017 Alexandria, Virginia Keywords: Counterinsurgency, intervention, state-building, trusteeships, neo-trustee- ships, shared sovereignty arrangements, Advise and Assist. Copyright 2017 by Dallas E. Shaw Jr. All Rights Reserved Harsh and Philanthropic War: Success and Failure in U.S. Third Party Counterinsurgency Dallas E. Shaw Jr. ABSTRACT Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as of- ten and remained just as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states de- veloped before 1950 tended to survive an average 71.4 years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive on average only 3.25 years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsur- gency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host na- tion security forces that tended to endure almost twenty-four times longer than interven- tions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military deeply embeds within and inhabits host-nation institutions (institution inhabiting strategies) then, state longevity im- proves in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness (institution influencing strategies) then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in tabula rasa or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in governance and security development while the latter utilized low de- grees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1927-1933 and Vietnam 1965-1973. The former case employed a high degree of embed- dedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation gov- ernment development while and the latter case employed low degrees in both. My re- search finds a correlation between the degree of embeddedness used in developing secu- rity and governance and the duration of state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institu- tion influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent effica- ciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions. Harsh and Philanthropic War: Success and Failure in U.S. Third Party Counterinsurgency Dallas E. Shaw Jr. GENERAL ABSTRACT Before 1950, the United States intervened in large scale counterinsurgencies twice as of- ten and remained just as long as interventions after 1950. Yet, U.S. supported states de- veloped before 1950 tended to survive an average 71.4 years after U.S. withdrawal. In contrast, U.S. supported states after 1950 have tended to survive on average only 3.25 years. The central question of this examination is why did U.S. military counterinsur- gency (COIN) interventions before 1950 produce host-nation governments and host na- tion security forces that tended to endure almost twenty-four times longer than interven- tions after 1950? My central argument is that when the U.S. military embeds deeply within and inhabits host-nation institutions then, state longevity improves in the course of counterinsur- gency (COIN) interventions. Inversely, when the U.S. military employs strategies of lower embeddedness then, state longevity decreases in the course of counterinsur- gency (COIN) interventions. I compare cases of intervention in non-existent or erased governance in the Philippines 1898-1913 and Iraq 2003-2010. The former employed high degrees of embeddedness in governance and security development while the latter utilized low degrees in both. I also compare cases of intervention in existing governance in Nicaragua 1927-1933 and Vietnam 1965-1973. The former case employed a high de- gree of embeddedness in host-nation security force development and a low degree in host-nation government development while and the latter case employed low degrees in both. My research finds a correlation between the degree of embeddedness used in de- veloping security and governance and the duration of state longevity after withdrawal of U.S. forces. The implications for this study are salient today. Where state fragility has progressed to the point where intervention by conventional military force is required to arrest it, institu- tion influencing strategies like Advise and Assist are insufficient. And while trusteeship forms of relation have been largely dismissed since decolonization, the apparent effica- ciousness of neo-trusteeships and shared sovereignty relationships in places like Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, hold out the promise of more effectual strategies for state building in counterinsurgency interventions. DEDICATION To my precious bride Jeannette The Wife of Noble Character iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS “I will not boast in anything. No gifts, no power, no wisdom. But I will boast in Jesus Christ, His death and resurrection. Why should I gain from His reward? I cannot give an answer. But this I know with all my heart--His wounds have paid my ransom.” -Stuart Townsend, How Deep the Father’s Love For Us, (1995) There is a long list of people to whom I owe an unpayable debt of gratitude. Foremost among these is my Redeemer, Jesus Christ-the lover of my soul. On a more terrestrial level there is a long list of people who have made this arduous journey one of the most fulfilling challenges of my life. My wife Jeannette has been more than a wife, more than a friend, more than a confidant, more than an advisor, more than an encour- ager, and more than a coach. I lack the vocabulary to adequately describe her impact on me in this challenge except to say—I love you and I could not have done this without you. Secondly, I am grateful to my sons, Hithem and Sami, who are my pride and joy. They surrendered substantial time with me during this process-thank you. Outside my family, Ariel Ahram, my dissertation advisor demonstrate by his per- sonal example what it means to be a genuine student of the game. Ariel is a teacher who has not stopped learning. It has been a blessing to not only learn from him but to follow his example as closely as possible. Navigating the academic process is a challenge and making that transition from the military can be even tougher. Yet, Joel Peters’ mentor- ship, friendship, and sage advice made the process not only successful, but also incredi- bly enjoyable. I also have to thank Giselle Datz as my favorite lecturer and an academic who genuinely loves to teach. That passion comes through and is a blessing to the stu- dents. Norman Cigar, was critical to my understanding of rentier states and his encour- agement has made my masters and doctoral studies far more satisfying. I also owe a further debt of gratitude to those who helped proof my work at differ- ent points and sharpen my argumentation. The one who had the greatest impact was Timothy Ray. As a distinguished graduate of U.S. Army War College and historian, his insights on writing style, historical presentation, and argumentation impacted every chap- ter. Charles Neimeyer is a near legend in the United States Marine Corps and his advice on my Philippine and Nicaragua chapters was greatly appreciated. Additionally, Richard Dick, a great historian and even better mentor, provided wise counsel on these chapters as well. Lastly, Todd Holm has been a continuous encouragement and charged me seem- ingly daily to keep writing and do not stop. I have to many brothers and sisters outside academia. The men of Burke Commu- nity Church have steadied me through this demanding process with genuine agape—sac- rificial love. Thank you all for challenging me, encouraging me, lifting me, praying for me, and helping bear my burdens. Lastly, I want to express my gratitude to the Marines, Sailors, and commanders I served with in Iraq and Afghanistan. I especially want to say v thank you to my fellow Marines and Sailors in 1st Battalion, 4th Marines and in 2nd Bat- talion, 9th Marines who died in the service of our nation and their fellow Marines in Sadr City, Hilah, and Ramadi, Iraq and Marjah, Afghanistan. Part of the purpose of writing this paper was to help me come to peace with your passing. I miss you all. Semper Fi- delis and God Bless. vi Table of Contents Chapter 1-Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 1949-1955: The End of Institution Inhabiting Strategies .......................................................... 1 Results of Interventions Before and After 1950 .................................................................... 2 Hypothesis .........................................................................................................................