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Contemporary Operations Study Team on Point Contemporary Operations Study Team On Point III A project of the Combat Studies Institute, the Contemporary Operations Study Team compiles a history and archives firsthand accounts from US Army personnel and personnel from other American, Coalition, and international organizations who planned, participated in, or supported select Army operations. On Point III is a study of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from February 2005 through January 2007. Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland Combat Studies Institute Fort Leavenworth, Kansas UNCLASSIFIED Abstract In command of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, also known as the “Ready First” Brigade, COL Sean MacFarland, deployed his command from Central Germany to Iraq in March 2006. The Ready First Brigade assumed control of western Ninewah Province from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. There MacFarland‟s troops, along with their counterpart Iraqi Security Force units, maintained security for Tall Afar, Sinjar, Rabiyah, and other areas of western Ninewah. When the brigade took over, Tall Afar was largely tamed, but there were still Anti-Iraqi Forces operating in the area. MacFarland used Information Operations extensively against the remaining enemy. One operation, called Bridge Builder, was a unique approach. MacFarland recalled, “These were really AQ guys and we had reports from various interrogations that some of these guys were drug addicts, alcoholics, homosexuals, pedophiles, and all this kind of stuff. So, we put posters up for these guys with their pictures and we said, „Hey. These guys are homosexuals, pedophiles, drug addicts, and alcoholics,‟ and figured if they wanted to sue me for slander, then, come on in and we‟ll talk. That would be great because then they could just sue me from Abu Ghraib.” In June 2006, MacFarland‟s brigade was sent south to Ramadi in Anbar Province. There his command took over that area of operation from the Pennsylvania National Guard‟s 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division. In Ramadi MacFarland found the situation far different than in Tall Afar. The city was under al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) domination and the new mission was to clear them out. After about three months of Ready First Brigade‟s efforts working with local leaders, and due to AQI‟s own missteps with the local population, a key sheik in the city “flipped” and brought a number of other sheiks with him to start working with the coalition forces. This event has since become known as the “Anbar Awakening” was the beginning of the great success by MacFarland‟s troops to bring Ramadi under control in 2006 and 2007. In summing up his view of his key lesson learned in Iraq, MacFarland explained, “. indigenous forces are the key to winning a counterinsurgency fight and you have to accept them for what they are and not be put off by the fact that they are not like us and don‟t operate just like us . You know, we always ask ourselves, „Well, are they worthy allies?‟ Well, you know, we need to ask ourselves that same question and I would argue that we had not been worthy allies up until that point and, certainly, our history requires a bit of a leap of faith for anybody who wants to align with the United States. Anybody who watched our experience in Vietnam kind of has to really swallow hard when we say, „Don‟t worry. We are not going to leave you behind.‟” Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2 UNCLASSIFIED Interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland 17 January 2008 This is an interview with Colonel Sean MacFarland [SM] on his experiences in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). The interview is being conducted by Mr. Steven Clay [SC] from the Contemporary Operations Study Team (COST) at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. COST is compiling a history of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM covering the period February 2005 to January 2007. The date is 17 January 2008 and this is an unclassified telephonic interview. SC: Sir, if I stray into unclassified territory, if you would, please either respond with an unclassified answer or say that you can‟t answer the question. SM: Inaudible acknowledgement. SC: If you would, please introduce yourself with your rank, your full name, the position you hold now, and then the position you held during your deployment to Iraq. SM: I am Colonel Sean MacFarland. I am currently the Chief of the Iraq Division in the J5, Joint Staff. During my deployment, I was the Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team [BCT], 1st Armored Division [AD]. SC: And you are currently located where today? SM: In the Pentagon. SC: When you got the initial notification that the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division was going to get a mission in Iraq, what were your thoughts? SM: I wasn‟t very surprised by it. Coming from my previous job as the V Corps G3, I knew that the brigade was in line for deployment before I assumed command. So, it was expected and the brigade was already preparing itself for that deployment by the time I joined it and it had also recently completed its recovery from its previous deployment. SC: Given the fact that you were based in Germany, you had a different set of challenges for deploying into Iraq. Please describe for me, at least in general terms, your train-up program and then the process that you went through for deployment to Kuwait. SM: The train up program was based on the ability to conduct full spectrum operations in Germany and we were initially told that we were going to be configured in a nonstandard way. We had one additional infantry company attached to us from my sister brigade in Baumholder, Alpha Company, 1-6 [Infantry], and we were told that a certain percentage of our brigade was going to be motorized. All the infantry guys would be mounted on Bradleys; but, we were only going to have two tank companies mounted on tanks. My other four tank companies would be mounted on HMMWVs and then my artillery was only going to have one firing battery and two of the batteries would be converted into motorized infantry. So, that was a bit of a problem for Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 3 UNCLASSIFIED me because the intent was to train all tankers and infantrymen and artillerymen in how to shoot tanks, Bradleys, and Paladins, as well as train them on their uparmored HMMWV motorized tasks. We were able to accomplish both; but, it created one of the more intensive gunnery experiences that I have ever gone through. I also became concerned that we weren‟t bringing enough of our tanks with us and, over time, was able to persuade the folks in Germany to let me bring two additional companies worth of tanks. But, I still ended up leaving two companies worth of tanks in our motor pool, which, as soon as we got to Iraq, I began scrounging around and was able to eventually outfit all my tank companies with tanks, which they desperately needed. So, there was some friction in terms of our train up because the task organization that we were told to deploy under didn‟t resemble the mission set that we were going to execute. On the patch chart that gets distributed, we were lined up against the 3d CAV (Cavalry). So, while the 3d CAV originally started out south of Baghdad, they had moved up to the Tall Afar area in West Ninewa and this was long before we deployed. So, I made it known to the powers that be that I didn‟t think that we were going south of Baghdad and that we were going to go up to West Ninewa. However, our train up was still based on a south of Baghdad scenario with this motorized set. Then, the other thing was that the 3d ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment] was not actually operating as a primarily motorized organization and I thought we should look more like the unit we were replacing. Well, that, more or less, fell on deaf ears; although, like I said, I was able to win a partial victory there on tanks. Then, the other thing that began to percolate, as we got closer to deployment, was the possibility that we wouldn‟t stay in West Ninewa and that we might end up going to Ramadi. That brought up a whole other series of questions because the brigade in Ramadi, obviously, was kitted out with all of its tanks and Bradleys because they were in a pretty heavy fight. But, still, nobody wanted to make any adjustments to my MTOE [modification table of organization and equipment]. The other problem that we had, going out on our deployment, was I was a Legacy brigade combat team, an Army of Excellence [AOE] table of organization. Now, on 30 June 2005, when I took command, we also formed as a BCT; so, it wasn‟t as though I didn‟t have direct control over my artillery, engineer support, MI [military intelligence], and signal guys. I did. The problem was that we were going to go work in the area that the 101st Airborne Division was in, which was a light division, and it was modernized. It didn‟t have a DISCOM [division support command]. It had a division sustainment brigade and the new modular brigades have a more robust capability when it comes to logistics support: more trucks, more drivers, more clerks, and people who can work the automated supply systems. I didn‟t have all that and I was not successful in getting that from my parent division before we deployed and, of course, the 101st was not inclined to give me anything out of their organization because they were in the fight.
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