Philosophy 303 The Practice of Philosophy: Modes of Philosophical Argument

TA: Carrie Swanson Email: nous@eden.rutgers.edu

Office hours: After class, or by appointment (Mondays or Thursdays).

Course description: This course is devoted to an examination of various modes of argumentation in the Western philosophical tradition. Our special topic this term is the art of refutation, with a special emphasis upon its origins and development in ancient Greek philosophy. Our starting point is the following remark of Aristotle (from chapter 11 of his treatise, On Sophistical Refutations):

‘Dialectic is at the same time a mode of examination as well. For neither is the art of examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry, but one which a man may possess, even though he has not knowledge. For it is possible even for someone who does not know the subject [scientifically] to hold an examination of one who does not know the subject, if also the latter grants him points taken not from thing that he knows or from the special principles of the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences attaching to [the special principles of a subject] which a man may indeed know without knowing the theory of the subject, but which if he does not know, he is bound to be ignorant of the theory. So then clearly the art of examining does not consist in knowledge of any definite subject. For this reason, too, it deals with everything: for every 'theory' of anything employs also certain common principles. Hence everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of examining: for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who profess to know things. What serves them here is the general principles: for they know these of themselves just as well as the scientist, even if in what they say they seem to the latter to go wildly astray from them. All men, then, are engaged in refutation (elenchousin); for they take a hand as amateurs in the same task with which dialectic is concerned professionally; and he is a dialectician who examines by the help of a theory of reasoning.'

We all engage in the examination and refutation of each others' views---in the market place, the coffee shop, the classroom; in the courtroom, in the media and in our political assemblies. But what constitutes a genuine refutation? Is mere persuasiveness enough? Must the premises also be true and the argument valid? Is it possible for a systematic, teachable art of refutation to exist? How can this be, if the domains of knowledge are indefinitely many--- wouldn't the possessor of such an art have to grasp indefinitely many arts and sciences? Can an expert in some particular domain of knowledge refute a non-expert if the latter does not accept--- or even understand---the former's premises? Can a non-expert refute an ignorant pretender to knowledge? As Socrates famously claimed, even a man who is not an expert in some domain of knowledge may refute the claims of a man who professes knowledge in that domain. But how is such refutation possible? Again, it seems obvious that one person may produce a false belief in another that the latter has been genuinely refuted. Should we explain the false appearance of refutation by reference to a false presupposition of some kind held by the victim of a sophism? If so, how should such false beliefs be characterized? If the number or kinds of such false presuppositions do not admit of enumeration or classification, how can a transmissible art of genuine refutation exist? The course will be organized around the different answers Plato and Aristotle provided to these (and related) questions. Our main texts will be Plato’s Euthydemus and Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and Topics. Plato and Aristotle, and our readings in general, will be read closely, and for their philosophical content. The course is therefore not a class in cultural studies, ancient history, or comparative literature. Nevertheless, it aims to appeal to students with broader interests beyond philosophy, in both the sciences and the humanities. Homework assignments will place special emphasis on the application of ancient theories of argumentation to contemporary instances of refutation---or its mere appearance---in our various media (television, newspapers, blogs) and in our political arenas.

Learning goals of the course:

Students will learn to read original source material closely, critically, and for its philosophical content. Given the special focus of the course----the nature of refutation---a special emphasis will be placed upon developing skills in the construction and evaluation of arguments. This course is also especially designed to help improve the writing skills of undergraduates. Every student will receive type-written, extensive comments on their 10-page essays, as well as extensive comments on their homework problems. Students receiving a ‘B’ or better on their first paper will be strongly encouraged to rewrite and polish their first essay and submit it in lieu of the final exam.

Prerequisites:

The course is open to juniors and seniors in good standing from any major. Sophomores must meet the following special prerequisites: a grade of B+ or better in both PHI 103/104 and PHI 201.

Schedule of Topics and Tentative Course Syllabus:

We will begin by examining an example of controversy and refutation in contemporary politics:

Video and discussion: President Obama meets the GOP Caucus (January 28th, 2010).

Next, we’ll examine a number of different portrayals of conflict and refutation in various literary contexts in the ancient world. These examples will serve as the historical backdrop to our examination of the Platonic and Aristotelian theories of refutation. We will however also seek to find contemporary counterparts to these contexts of refutation.

• Courtier vs. King: Homer, Iliad Book I: the quarrel of Achilleus and Agamemnon in the people’s Assembly.

• Old gods vs. new gods: Aeschylus, Eumenides: the trial of Orestes and the persuasion of the Furies.

• Male vs. female: Euripides, Medea: Medea’s denunciation of Jason; his ‘plausible’ defense.

• City vs. city: Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War: the plague of Athens and the speech of Pericles (Book II); the Melian dialogue and the fate of the Melians.

• Citizen vs. citizen: Isocrates, Antidosis.

• Citizen vs. the State: Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthanes; On a Wound by Premeditation; Gorgias, Speech of Palamedes;

• Citizen vs. the State, cont.: Plato, Apology of Socrates.

• The Wise vs. the Many: Parmenides, Collected Fragments; Gorgias, Helen; Protagoras: ‘the Great Speech’, Plato’s Protagoras, 309a-328d (Socrates’ challenge regarding the teachability of virtue and the sophist’s counterargument); the Dissoi Logoi (‘Double arguments’).

• Scientist vs. scientist: from the Hippocratic Corpus, On Tradition in Medicine; Science of Medicine; On the Sacred Disease.

• Scientist vs. student: Greek mathematics: Euclid, Elements, proposition 1.1: the construction of an equilateral triangle on a given straight line; Alexander, Analytics Pr.I (260.18-261.19): proof of the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side; on ‘false geometrical proofs’ (pseudographêmata): Alexander, Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics I (selections).

• Scientist vs. scientist, cont.: On pseudo-scientific proofs (sources various): Bryson’s squaring of the circle; Antiphon’s squaring of the circle; the false medical proof (based on Zeno’s thesis on the impossibility of motion) that it is not better to take a walk after dinner.

• Expert vs. non-expert critic: Plato, Protagoras: Socrates’ examination of Protagoras and the Many regarding the possibility of voluntary wrongdoing; Plato, Euthyphro: Socrates’ refutation of a professed expert in religious affairs.

In the next phase of the course, we will turn to examine the Euthydemus and Plato’s portrayal in that dialogue of Socrates as a practitioner of genuine, as opposed to eristic or sophistical refutation. Selected topics from the dialogue will include:

• Plato’s concern to free Socrates from the ancient slander of being a sophist teacher of virtue and an ‘eristic’ or contentious reasoner.

• The categories of false refutations recognized by Plato (homonymy, amphiboly, begging the question, secundum quid, etc.) and his recommendations as to their mode of resolution.

• Sophistical arguments for the impossibility of false speaking and false judgment and the impossibility of contradiction, and the Socratic response to these.

• Plato’s conception of a dialectically ‘self-refuting’ argument.

• The Platonic account that emerges from the dialogue of what constitutes a genuine refutation. In the light of our reading of the Euthydemus, as well as selections from Plato’s Sophist, we will attempt to determine how Plato would answer each of our core problems raised above regarding the possibility of an art of refutation. In the final phase of the course, we will read selections from Aristotle’s treatises On Sophistical Refutations, the Topics, and the Rhetoric with the aim of articulating Aristotle’s solutions to our core set of problems. Among the topics we will address in pursuit of this goal are the following:

• Aristotle’s account of the art of dialectic; his distinction between scientific demonstration and dialectical argument; his distinction between examinational and sophistical arguments.

• Aristotle’s distinction between the cause of the appearance of genuine refutation and the cause of an argument’s failure to be a genuine refutation.

• The Aristotelian account of a genuine refutation; his taxonomy of fallacy and his proof that every apparent but false refutation may be causally explained by reference to a violation of a clause in the account of genuine or ‘true’ refutation.

• His distinction between false scientific refutations and pseudo-scientific refutations. • His interest in upholding the social context and the social value of the art of dialectic and refutation.

Course requirements: There will be seven take-home problems (approximately one every other week). Each of these home-works will be worth 3-5 points for a total of 25 points. Two ten-page papers will be assigned (one on Plato, one on Aristotle). A selection of paper topics will be distributed in the second week of the course. Each paper is worth 25 points. The first paper is due in class on Monday, March xx. The second paper is due in class on Monday, May xx (the last day of class). There is a final exam, also worth 25 points. The final will be take-home, open book, open notes. It will be distributed to you on the last day of class, and is due in the office of the undergraduate secretary of the philosophy department at 4 p.m. Monday, May xx.

Grading: Your grade for the course will be based on the number of total points you earn, assessed according to the following scale: A = 100-91, B+ = 90-81, B = 80-71, C+ = 70-61, C = 60-51, D = 50-41, F = 40-31. However, if you do not complete three of the home-works, you will automatically be given an ‘F’. (I will not read your papers, and you will not be permitted to take the final). You will also receive an ‘F’ if you do not complete either paper or the final.

Other course policies:

(1) Attendance is required, and roll will be taken. If you miss four sessions, your grade will be lowered by 10 points. If you miss six sessions, you will be automatically failed.

(2) I expect you to do your best work on your papers, on your home-works, and in your daily presence in class. In particular, I expect you to show up to class on time, prepared to listen to lecture, to take notes, and to participate in class discussion. You may earn up to 10 extra credit points by participating in class. You may either bring up questions of your own, either before or during lecture, answer questions raised by me or your fellow students, or (on occasion) volunteer to do a brief presentation.

(3) The home-works will usually be assigned on Mondays. They will be due the following Monday. If you fail to turn in the work on the required day, you may not make up the work. That means that under no circumstances will you be allowed to turn in late homework. There are no exceptions.

(4) The papers and exam are due on the dates specified above. If the papers are turned in late they will be marked down 10 points for every 24-hour period after they are due. (That means that a paper that is two hours late will be marked down 10 points, a paper that is 25 hours late will be marked down 20 points). I will not accept late final exams. Exceptions to this policy will be made only in cases of unforeseeable emergency (e.g. extreme or prolonged illness, or family crisis), and only with your Dean’s written confirmation of the existence of the excuse. Examples of unacceptable excuses therefore include: my printer broke. I overslept. My car wouldn’t start. I signed up for too many courses. I had to work. I had to go to a wedding, etc.

(5) All completed work must be brought to class. You may not e-mail your course work to me without my express prior approval. I will not read it and I will delete your attachment. Do not under any circumstances put your work in my departmental mailbox.

(6) All written work, including home-works, must be typed. I will not accept handwritten work. (That means you cannot attempt to turn in a handwritten version and then ask for more time to submit a typed version of your work when I refuse to accept your handwritten version).

(7) Papers that are full of typos and grammatical errors will be marked down an entire grade.

(8) You may not use as source materials for your papers any secondary literature that is not on the syllabus below. In particular this means you may not ‘research’ your papers by cutting and pasting (i.e., plagiarizing) from a website. Any suspected violations of academic integrity will be turned over to the Dean of Judicial Affairs.

(9) A selection of paper topics will be provided to you for both the Plato and the Aristotle papers. Each topic question will come with a (short) list of required readings from the syllabus. Other items from the syllabus will be suggested (i.e., not required) as background reading in connection with the paper topics.