~Clearchannel
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~ CLEARCHANNEL May 6,2010 Ms. Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary Federal Communications Commission 445 Twelfth Street, S.w. Washington, DC 20554 Re: Examination of the Future of Media and Information Needs of Communities in a Digital Age GN Docket No.1 0-25 Dear Ms. Dortch: Clear Channel Communications, Inc. ("Clear Channel"), indirect parent of KCJB(AM), Minot, North Dakota (Facility 10 No. 55681) submits this letter to correct factual inaccuracies introduced in the above-referenced proceeding concerning the role of station staff in alerting the public about an early morning chemical spill, including efforts by the eighteen year broadcast veteran manning the station's studio at the time of the spill. In summary, just after 1:30 a.m. on January 18, 2002 thirty one cars of a Canadian Pacific Railway freight train derailed approximately one half mile west of Minot, North Dakota. The derailment set off explosions which caused five tanks carrying anhydrous ammonia to rupture and release a toxic vapor cloud. For the rest of the night, KCJB staff attempted to alert the public about the disaster as best it could, despite failure of the local officials to provide the station information via activation of its Emergency Alert System ("EAS"). In the following weeks, station staff work with the authorities to fix their EAS system and train them on its use. Yet, in spite of these efforts, for the past eight years critics of media consolidation have cited this incident as an example of the negative impact of corporate media ownership.1 See, e.g., Competition issues in the telecommunications industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communications ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 14,2003) (coments of Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND); Eric Klinenberg, Fighting for Air: The Battle To Control America's Media (2007). Now, once again, the specter of Minot-complete with oft repeated factual inaccuracies-has been raised, this time by New York University Professor of Sociology Eric Klinenberg in his statement in the FCC's Future of Media hearing.2 As always, the Myth begins with the same incorrect fact: KCJB(AM) was unmanned the night of the disaster. This leads to a faulty assumption: Unattended operation delayed the broadcast of emergency information. And then an unsupported conclusion: Corporate consolidation led to the unattended operation of the station and the resulting delay in information dissemination. And so, once again, Clear Channel takes this opportunity to dispel the Minot Myth.3 FACT: At 1:30am on January 18, 2002, the KCJB(AM) studio was manned. In fact, the KCJB(AM) studio was staffed on a 24/7 (365 day a year) basis prior to January 18, 2002, on the night of the derailment, and ever since. That night, Gerald "Jerry" Michels, an eighteen year broadcasting veteran, worked the overnight shift at KCJB(AM). Immediately after the derailment, the station began receiving a flood of telephone calls. Michels awaited official information via an EAS message without which he did not know exactly what had happened. In the absence of official news, he had no information to provide the stations' listeners. He contacted the station's Operations Director, Allison Bostow and its News Director, Don May to alert them to the situation. Ms. Bostow, (whose concern for the community compelled her to continue working from her basement despite being within the area affected by the toxic cloud), and Mr. May, tried calling their police contacts, but police phone lines were jammed with callers. Finally, Lt. Kurt Smith, the Minot Police Department's overnight shift commander, and May reached each other. By this time, additional Clear Channel personnel (from sales people to on-air staff) had left the safety of their homes and joined Michels at the studio to help proVide on-air information and answer the flood of incoming telephone calls to all of the Clear Channel stations in Minot, inclUding KCJB(AM). 2 FCC Future ofMedia Workshop, Federal Communications Commission (Mar. 4, 2010) ~statement of Eric Klinenberg, Professor of Sociology, New York University). Clear Channel has tried several times to correct these factual inaccuracies over the years. See, e.g., Letter from Dorann Bunkin to Peter Doyle, Chief, Audio Division, Media Bureau, FCC (May ii, 2007); Reply Comments of Clear Channel Communications, Inc., MB Docket No. 06-121, at 34-35 (Jan. 16, 2007); Reply Brief of Petitioner Clear Channel Communications, Inc., at n.16, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 373 (3rd Cir. 2004); Letter from L. Lowry Mays, Chief Executive Officer, Ciear Channei Communications, Inc., to Senator Byron L. Dorgan (Feb. 12,2003). See atso, Clear Channel, Know the Facts, (available at http://www.c1earchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaselD= 1167); Steve Davis, Senior Vice President of Engineering, Clear Channel Communications, Inc., Address at the 2006 National Summit on EAS and Emergency Communications of the National Alliance of State Broadcasters Associations' (Feb. 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.c1earchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID= 1558). - 2 - FACT: The night of the derailment KCJB(AM) had fully functioning EAS equipment. Emergency responders, however, never activated the system. At the time of the accident, KCJB served as the local primary one (LP1) station that would feed emergency messages to other stations within its coverage area. The station's EAS had been activated numerous times before by the National Weather Service to alert listeners to severe weather, and proved to be in working order during monthly testing by the National Weather Service ("NWS") days before the derailment. Unlike the Emergency Broadcasting System CEBS") it replaced in 1997, the EAS allows local authorities to originate an emergency message and interrupt station programming without assistance from local rad io station staff. According to an official timeline of the train derailment, however, not until 2:38-an hour after the train derailment-did emergency responders "put out to radio stations" a "public address announcement.,,4 Unfortunately, these messages never reached KCJB(AM). First, the local authorities attempted to transmit a message to the station via what they believed to be a working EAS system and a radio receiver they had provided to the station long ago. According to Minot Police Lt. Fred Debowey technical glitches caused the system to fail. Even if the police department's system had been working, KCJB would not have received a direct transmission because the police department had changed the frequency of its emergency radio without informing the radio station, resulting in the two systems operating on different frequencies. Finally, even if KCJB(AM) had been able to receive the police department's voice transmissions, doing so would not have activated the station's EAS. To do so, the police needed an EAS encoder linked to KCJB(AM), but the Minot police had not installed this equipment. No EAS alert went out from the police department to KCJB(AM) or any other broadcast station. Unable to use their equipment to activate the KCJB EAS, Minot police attempted to reach the station with the EBS. Consistent with FCC requirements, KCJB(AM) had taken EBS out of use and replaced it with the EAS five years earlier. The disconnecting of EBS (including a former dedicated phone line from the police department to KCJB(AM) which bypassed the main switchboard at KCJB) and replacing it with EAS occurred at least two years prior to Clear Channel taking over ownership of KCJB(AM). In light of these failures, local officials could have used alternative entry points to transmit an EAS message. They could have requested NWS activation 4 Derailment ofCanadian Pacific Railway Freight Train 292-16 and Subsequent Release of Anhydrous Ammonia Near Minot, North Dakota, January 18, 2002 RAR-04-01, National Transportation Safety Board 2004 (Mar. 9, 2004). - 3 - of the KCJB EAS by contacting the NWS dispatch line or by calling the National Warning System hotline. Alternatively, the local authorities could have requested initiation of an EAS message through KFYR(AM), Bismarck, North Dakota, the state primary emergency message entry point. KFYR(AM) would then relay this message through the EAS network to stations statewide, including KCJB(AM). According to Lt. Debowey, local authorities decided not to call the National Warning System hotline because, B ••• at the time of the derailment we were not aware that we could activate the NWS with the hotline. No one had informed us that this was an option.B5 The authorities resorted to trying to call the station after they failed to activate the KCJB(AM) EAS using their malfunctioning two way radio operating on the wrong frequency without the required encoder equipment. The same jammed telephone lines that prevented station personnel from reaching the authorities, however, prevented the authorities from getting through to the station. All the while, a fully functional EAS sat idle. To prevent future problems, Clear Channel offered to assist the police department in setting up, testing and training personnel on the use of the EAS. The local authorities accepted this offer, and Clear Channel Regional Vice President of Engineering, Allan Brace, traveled to Minot to work with the local Clear Channel engineer on this project. Together, they succeeded in getting the police department's EAS operational. The local engineer taught the police how to use the system and assisted them with running tests. Additionally, for several months thereafter, Ms. Bostow reminded the police department to run the EAS tests. The staff of KCJB(AM) should be applauded for their efforts in the early hours of January 18, 2002. These local residents followed proper procedures and worked feverishly to keep the public informed of the dangers created by the derailment.