CULTURAL CLEANSING Denial and Discrimination in Bhutan

Draft Report

INHURED INTERNATIONAL Lalitpur, Nepal

CULTURAL CLEANSING Denial and Discrimination in Bhutan 2008

Editor Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti

Concept: Yadu Lal Shrestha

Special Assistance Shreejana Pokhrel Shree Krishna Subedi Bidur Prasad Adhikari Bibha Prajapati

Setting/Layout Sanat Sapkota

Publisher

INHURED International GPO Box: 12684, Kathmandu Ceasefire House, Jhamsikhel, Lalitpur-2, Nepal

Editorial

Destruction by Design and Durable Solution

The difficult situation in which the Bhutanese refugees are getting through in the refugee camps has nothing to do with any nations or individual political interest and need not to be worried about. It is absolutely a humanitarian problem and demands immediate humanitarian solution in the best advantage of the refugees. The issue of human rights, justice and democracy has its own track and the cause is genuine and serious. It should not be at all diluted with the problems in the refugee camps. The RGOB has invited itself serious other obligations to fulfill to its citizens besides taking back the refugees. The transition to democracy has been deliberately designed to be slow and steady and the monarchy will continue to play a central role in Bhutanese life. The recent coronation would further de-consolidate the country's sovereign independence and security and derogate further unity, harmony, and peace in the country as the so called gross national happiness and cosmetic democratic change is for the selected only. Therefore, the Bhutanese issue and the refugee crisis should be seen as two separate entities and require separate solutions.

The refugees have suffered and experienced enough adversities without opportunity for improvement and advancement. None can deny that every human being has equal desire to live, to interact, to respond and to grow. Such desire serves as a motive force in life and adds towards the improvement of latent attributes within the individuals to unfurl and helps to render effective services to the society. The conglomeration of people for a prolonged period never produces constructive and meaningful end results. Where does then lie the prospects of nation building in the absence of responsible citizens? The current efforts to bring solution to the refugees are good signs of hope. The three-prong strategy in the UNHCR mandate would be an ideal mechanism to find solution and would be best if it is exercised based on the priority of needs and feasibility of options and not based on loss or gain of negotiations between nations and politicians – at least for the sake of humanity.

The US proposal of resettlement of more than sixty thousand refugees in the USA has been taken as one of the generous offers of sympathy for Bhutanese refugees who have remained refugees in Nepal for over one and half decade. Observers feel that the offer has brought division in the refugee community. It is true there is division among the refugees but it has to be understood by the onlookers that the division is not actually due to the US offer but due to the lack of understanding and wrong interpretation from some refugee leaderships. Thus the situation demands deep analytical study as the victims are in real form and are in dire need of liberation. More offers for resettlement is expected and requested from other nations, including Nepal and India to rehabilitate with dignity and honour the remaining willing refugees.

The primary source of this document is founded on the report titled "Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan" authored by Mr. David B. Thronson of Harvard Law School, USA and published by INHURED International in August, 1993. We have reproduced some of the chapters of the report as the story that we excavated 15 years ago remains intact even today. Similarly, the analysis of the camp life and the durable solution part has been based on the findings from the meticulously researched report titled "Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Anticipating the Impact of Resettlement" authored by Susan Banki and published by Austcare in June 2008.

Finally, we extend our heartfelt thanks to Lutheran World Federation Nepal and owe a great debt of gratitude to the organization for its financial support to successfully accomplish this special report. INHURED International is also grateful to Mr. Yadu Lal Shrestha of LWF Nepal for his insight in developing this report in a very short span of time. Credit also goes to all INHURED secretariat staff, namely Mahan Shrestha, Narayan Adhikari and Abhaya Raj Joshi who relentlessly contributed to the preparation of this report. The Bhutanese refugee leaders namely Ratan Gazmere, S.K. Pradhan, Narayan Sharma, Setu Nepal and Sushma Kharka Chhetri deserve special appreciation and acknowledgement with whose support and hard work, the preparation of this report would not have been possible.

Gopal Krishna Siwakoti, Phd President, INHURED International

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Bhutan is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the king. Until recently, there was no constitution and there is no comprehensive Bill of Rights. The king exercises strong, active, and often direct power over the government. Bhutan has no independent judiciary; judges serve at the king's pleasure. Though cosmetic bipartisan system was introduced last year, the legislature called the National Assembly is virtually partyless. Though an eye-washing election is held in 2007, most of the members are indirect nominees of the king or people's representatives taken by consensus. People cannot easily change the government. Reformist and democratic political parties and formation of unions are virtually banned in Bhutan. There is no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association. There are limitations on the right to a fair trial, freedom of religion and citizen's privacy. The Wangchuk Dynasty of hereditary monarchs has ruled the country since 1907.

The new king of Bhutan has been crowned in a lavish coronation ceremony in the isolated Himalayan kingdom. King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, 28, an Oxford-educated bachelor, becomes the world's youngest monarch. Bhutan held its first so called democratic elections for a new parliament and prime minister in March, 2007. The coronation of the Buddhist nation's fifth hereditary king fell in what is known in Bhutan as the month of the male earth rat. (BBC Report). He has become head of state of the world's newest democracy after his father abdicated in 2006 as Bhutan changed to a constitutional monarchy. Bhutan appeared in the international field only in 1971 when it became the member of United Nations and so far Bhutan has established diplomatic relation with only a few countries. Bhutan has close relations with India and by a 1949 treaty agrees to be guided by India in regard to its external affairs.

The country is a land of immigrants. The population of Bhutan comprises of three main ethnic groups. The Ngalongs of west and the Sharchops of eastern Bhutan though sometimes commonly identified as Drukpas bear different ethnic identity and place of origin. Although both groups are Buddhists the former are Kayugpa and the later practice Nyingmapa sect of Buddhism. Lhotshampas, the Nepali speaking populace along the southern belt are the Hindus.

State Repression

The Citizenship Act of 1958 granted the Nepali speaking people (also called the Lhotshampas which means people living in the south) the full citizens of the country. As the nationwide programmes of development and modernization commenced in 1961, the Lhotshampas, with the development of education, social services and the economy, during the 1960s and 1970s, rose to occupy influential positions in the bureaucracy. During the 1980s, the Lhotshampas came to be seen as a threat to the political order and Drukpa culture. The Durkpas of the northwest or the ruling elite began to see themselves as an endangered species that would one day be swamped by the Lhotsampas of the south or the Sharchops of the east.

In 1985 the government began its defense of Drukpa culture and traditions. A new citizenship act was passed that applied new criteria of citizenship, and made them retrospective, declaring all previous legislations null and void. The new citizenship Act of 1985, One Nation One People policy, Driglam Namza, Compulsory Labour, and No Objection Certificate were the vivid government repressions against the Nepali speaking Lhotshampas that resulted in the democracy movement of 1990.

One Nation One People

In the name of national integration, government's drive for "One Nation One People'' policy made all the southern Bhutanese liable to a fine or imprisonment if they ventured out in anything other than western traditional costume, and Nepali language was removed from the school curriculum. Many southern Bhutanese were fined

and imprisoned for not complying with this order. The wearing of 'gho' and 'kira', traditional Drukpa male and female garments was unsuited to the heat of southern Bhutan.

Driglam Namza, an ancient code of social etiquette of the western Bhutanese which dictates how to eat, how to sit, how to talk, how to dress or how to bow before the authority, and what hair style to adopt, was made mandatory to all the Bhutanese despite their cultural diversity. May it be Driglam Namza or One Nation One People policy, but they clearly had the political objectives behind and were initiated politically with a view to binding the growing class of educated lot with complete obedience to the crown and the ruling elite. However it was difficult to the Bhutanese nationals of other ethnicity to surrender their own traditional customs whatsoever.

No Objection Certificate

After the democracy movement of 1990, No Objection Certificate (NOC) or a police clearance was made mandatory to all the southern Bhutanese in order to work, obtain license or attend school allegedly for having their implication in the movement. NOC was denied to the southern Bhutanese and all the schools in southern Bhutan were closed down which deprived about 30,000 southern Bhutanese school children of their right to education. Seeking admission in schools in other districts was impossible owing to the so-called NOC as a compulsory credential. Other repression included strict marriage laws that imposed heavy burdens on anyone marrying a foreigner. A policy to create 'Green Belt' along the southern border threatened the eviction of thousands of southern Bhutanese; a one month free labour was demanded from each household, the noncompliance of which was a heavy fine.

Revocation of Citizenship

In 1985, the government passed a new Citizenship Act having retroactive applications and fixing 1958 as cut off date for citizenship. This Act became the basis for the so-called census exercise carried out only in the southern districts in 1988, in which every household of the southern population had to produce documentary evidence of having legal residence such as land tax receipt of 1958, or else be a non-national. The census teams randomly categorized the southern Bhutanese and in many instances members under a same household fell into seven different categories. In many cases citizenship cards previously issued were confiscated. Many genuine Bhutanese citizens who could not produce land tax receipt of 1958 were declared non-nationals. The village headmen formerly considered knowledgeable and authoritative sources in census matters, were not taken into confidence and were not permitted to testify the credentials of their village people.

Quest for Freedom

The overall effect of Driglam Namza, One Nation One People policy and a series of other repressive measures and discrimination against the Lhotshamas made them feel like second class citizens in their own country. The introduction of new Citizenship Act of 1985 with retrospective action, and the subsequent census exercise in 1988 that converted a large segment of southern Bhutanese citizens as illegal immigrants instilled fear and political unrest amidst the southern Bhutanese for the first time. This ultimately became the basis that led the Lhotshampas to campaign for their rights and freedoms.

A petition seeking a review of the 1985 Citizenship Act and the manner in which the census was carried out and other government policies was sent to the king by Tek Nath Rizal, who then was the Royal Advisory Councilor and people's representative from the south. But his appeal was taken by the king as an act of treason. Consequently Mr. Rizal was imprisoned and tortured on charges of inciting the southern Bhutanese against the government. A week later, on conditions that he did not attend any public functions or speak to more than three persons at a time, Rizal was released under amnesty from the king. Distressed at the way he was treated, Rizal soon fled the country to join dissidents and mobilize support in exile.

On July 7, 1989, Mr. Rizal formed the "People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan" (PFHRB) in exile (Nepal) and started campaigning against the gross violations of human rights in Bhutan. In October and November 1998

Bhutan Government arrested and tortured a number of Rizal's supporters including college and high school students inside the country. On November 16, 1989, Bhutan police trespassed into Nepal and abducted Tek Nath Rizal and his three associates. A number of other suspected dissidents fled Bhutan to escape arrest, and organised themselves into a political party called 'Bhutan Peoples' Party' (BPP) on June 2, 1990 on Indo-Bhutan border district of North Bengal in India. On August 7, 1990, the Home Ministry of Bhutan issued a circular branding all those who fled the country as traitors or anti-nationals. The Citizenship of family members and relatives of those fleeing the country were consequently confiscated and were charged with anti-national activities.

Notwithstanding the government threat and order, in September 1990, under the command of BPP, the southern Bhutanese in all the southern districts, organised a number of peaceful public demonstrations protesting against the discriminatory citizenship laws and Driglam Namza. The government reacted swiftly, arresting their leaders, and closing schools and hospitals throughout southern Bhutan. The protest grew into a movement for full human rights, and eventually into a call for democracy. The result of the demonstration was awfully disheartening and tragic. It all ended in ruthless government atrocities and forced evictions of the southern Bhutanese. Demonstrations against the government policies in September 1990 with thousands of arbitrary arrests, torture and detentions without trial as well as village raids and widespread inhuman and degrading treatment of the southern Bhutanese, including gang rape. The closure of almost all schools in southern Bhutan, the restriction of health services, a ban on the movement of essential commodities and people, confiscation of citizenship cards, termination of employment and even burning and demolition of houses were other gruesome examples of atrocities committed by the RGOB.

For the ruling elite, Lhotshampa became a byword for anti-national. Crackdown and campaign against the southern Bhutanese intensified. The innocent people were thus terrorized by the government forces and some began to flee from the country for fear of arrest and torture, some following evictions by the government forces. People previously classified as bona-fide citizens were pressurized into living voluntarily because they had relatives detained as political prisoners or participated in democracy movement. Mass expulsion started in 1991 when the government resorted to forced evictions intimidating the innocent villagers into signing "voluntary migration forms" under torture and threat of life imprisonment. Now the majority of the refugees in the camps in Nepal fall under this category.

Exploring Durable Solution

After 18 years, a lasting solution to the plight of Lhotshampa refugees is now available. In March 2008, over 100 Lhotshampa refugees boarded planes to the U.S., one of several countries that have agreed to resettle this refugee population. Other countries to offer resettlement to the Lhotshampas include New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Australia. There is no limit on the number of camp residents who can be resettled, and now that the Government of Nepal (GoN) has begun issuing exit visas for those accepted for resettlement, it is estimated that the process of resettling all who are accepted for resettlement will take between five and seven years. As of November 2008, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Nepal has already received nearly 50,000 expressions of interest in resettlement, representing nearly half of the entire refugee population.

The anticipation and excitement felt by some refugees is not shared by all, however. Some refugees are ambivalent about moving so far away permanently. Others oppose resettlement in principle, arguing that resettlement weakens the claims of those who want to return to Bhutan. The passion surrounding the issue of resettlement has resulted in threats of violence and even physical clashes between refugees inside and outside the camps, resulting in several injuries and the death of at least one camp resident.

anticipate some of these changes, so that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and policymakers can craft policies that reinforce the positive aspects of resettlement while developing policies and programs to address the negative consequences.

As resettlement moves forward, morale has wavered between hopeful and tense. There have been violent and even fatal clashes between refugees who oppose resettlement and those who support it. This has resulted in a highly charged camp atmosphere in which hope, resentment, and anxiety have all played significant roles. A lack of information about the resettlement process is compounded by the reluctance of many refugees to show an interest in resettlement for fear of being attacked. As large numbers of refugees depart from the camps, common resources will be more readily available and camp facilities less overcrowded. At the same time, the likely depletion of educated, skilled and experienced workers could reduce the quality of camp services, particularly in the health and education sectors. Overseas remittances will likely increase as refugees resettle to richer countries. However, informal income from regional or local work may decrease as educated and skilled refugees resettle early.

Spates of violent attacks associated with the advent of resettlement in and near the refugee camps represent a clear deterioration of the security environment. In response, the GoN has brought in a larger police presence, which may reduce overall crime but could simultaneously lead to a more restrictive environment in which refugees cannot travel outside of the camps. Bhutanese political leaders fear that resettlement will dilute the efforts of refugees who continue to promote political reform in Bhutan, as their cause loses its urgency and its constituents. Conversely, resettlement may lead to an injection of resources and media attention for political leaders. For local residents living near the camps in Nepal, the departure of large numbers of refugees will decrease competition for local resources and employment. In the long-term, however, resettlement will lead to a contraction of the local economy and a reduction in the pool of available human capital. The social, economic and political impacts of resettlement have the potential to improve conditions for remaining populations and/or exacerbate current problems.

Table of Content

Editorial: Durable Solution

Executive Summary

Section I: Denial of Nationality…………………………………………………………………..11

Section II: Life in Exile ……………………………………………………………………………23

Section III: Durable Solution……………………………………………………………………..32

Section IV: Annex……………………………………………………………………………..37-54 -Statements and Interviews -Resettlement in News

References…………………………………………………………………………………………55

Dedication

To all destitute without destination-victims of destruction by design

Acronyms

AMDA Association of Medical Doctors of Asia APF Armed Police Force BBC British Broadcasting Centre BCP Bhutan Communist Party BGNLF Bhutan Gorkha National Liberation Front BNDP Bhutan National Democratic Party BPP Bhutan Peoples' Party BRAVVE Bhutanese Refugees Assisting Victims of Violence BRRRC Bhutanese Refugees Representatives’ Repatriation Committee BRWF Bhutanese Refugee Women’s Forum CBO Community-based organization CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CMC Camp Management Committees CRC Rights of the Child CPN UML Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) CVICT Centre for Victims of Torture CWG Core Working Group on Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal DIAC Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship GoN Government of Nepal HUROB Human Rights Organization of Bhutan HRW Human Rights Watch ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights INHURED International Institute for Human Rights Environment and Development IOM International Organization for Migration JMLT Joint Ministerial Committee Talk JTMM-J Jantrantrik Mukti Morcha (Jwala Sing) JTMM-G Jantrantrik Mukti Morcha (Goit) LWF-Nepal Lutheran World Federation-Nepal LPRs Legal Permanent Residents NGO Non-governmental Organization NOC No Objection Certificate NUCRA National Unit for the Coordination of Refugee Affairs OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights OPE Overseas Processing Entity PFHR Peoples Forum for Human Rights PFHRB People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan RGOB Royal Government of Bhutan SAFHR South Asia Forum for Human Rights SCF-UK Save the Children Fund- United Kingdom SUB Students Union of Bhutan UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNHCR United Nations Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees WFP World Food Program YOB Youth Organization of Bhutan

BHUTAN: FACTS AND FIGURES AT-A GLANCE

• Area: 47.000 Km • Inhabitants: 635.000 (2005 census) • Refugees: Approximately 111.000 in camps in Nepal, 10.000 to 15.000 outside the camps Between 15.000 and 30.000 in India • Currency: Ngultrum (one ngultrum equals one Indian rupee) • Capital: Thimphu • Geography: High mountains in the north, hills in the centre and tropical in the southern belt • Governance: Monarchy since 1907. King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck ascended the throne in 2006 as the world’s youngest head of state • Languages: 24 languages spoken. Most important languages spoken are Dzongkha (national language), Nepali, Sharchopkha, Bumthangkha • Economy: Mainly agriculture, tourism and hydropower • Main religions: Buddhism and Hinduism • Literacy rate: 54 or 60 % (UNICEF Bhutan and the RGOB respectively) • Main ethnic groups: Ngalong, Sharchop and Lhotshampa

SECTION- I

DENIAL OF NATIONALITY

Background

In 1990, tens of thousands of Lhotshampas– Nepali-speaking minority groups from Bhutan’s southern regions – fled from Bhutan in the face of discrimination and forced displacement. After crossing through India, they sought refuge in Nepal. Today, more than 107,000 Lhotshampas live in seven refugee camps in Nepal’s eastern Jhapa and Morang districts, where they have remained in legal limbo, claimed as citizens by neither Bhutan nor Nepal.

In 1959, one year after nationality was extended to the Nepali-speaking population of southern Bhutan, the National Assembly noted that these new citizens had pledged "to think like all other Bhutanese citizens, and to adhere to the same culture and traditions." Over thirty years later this pledge is taken quite literally. In 1989, the King of Bhutan told the National Assembly that "in a large country, such cultural diversity would have added colour and character to its national heritage without effecting national security. However, in a small country like ours it would effect the growth of social harmony and unity among the people." result of this fear of diversity is the 'One Nation, One People' policy through which the government stresses the need for a "distinct national identity". Yet Bhutan does not envision forging this distinct identity to encompass the existing diversity of the nation's cultures. The chosen national identity is that of the politically dominant Drukpa culture of northwestern Bhutan.

Though culture and ethnicity are integrally linked, this is not a situation of "ethnic cleansing" but rather "cultural cleansing". The perceived threat to national identity stems more from cultural traditions than the individuals who practice them. Bhutan has made concerted efforts to integrate or assimilate the ethnically Nepali southern Bhutanese population into the Drukpa culture. But culture is a difficult thing to legislate or change, and many of the southern Bhutanese treasure their cultural heritage as much as the Drukpas of the north treasure theirs. Failure to convert the southern Bhutanese has been followed by efforts to remove them.

It is partially fears about their own culture's survival that the northern Bhutanese forward to justify the steps taken to impose Drukpa culture on southern Bhutan. But the real issue may be less about the continued survival of their culture than about continued dominance of their culture. Ironically, the harmony that the King fears would be disrupted by diversity was to a large extent present between the peoples of Bhutan before the crisis began. The question now is whether this harmony can be achieved again.

Tracing the History

In 1985 Bhutan passed a revision of its existing citizenship laws, in practice limiting the grant of citizenship to those who could prove residence since before December 31, 1958. In 1988, the new law was implemented through a census conducted only in the southern districts of Bhutan, inhabited primarily by ethnic Nepalese. In April 1988, Tek Nath Rizal, a southern Bhutanese member of the Royal Advisory Council, submitted a petition to the king questioning the implementation of the stricter 1985 citizenship law and calling attention to allegations of discrimination, threats, coercion, and confiscation of identity cards during the implementation of census. This petition was declared seditious against tsa-wa-sum, the three elements of King, Country, and People. Rizal was removed from office and detained for three days. He later fled to Nepal.

As the census continued, a decree from the king required all citizens to observe the driglam namzha, a code of conduct and dress based on the Drukpa culture of western Bhutan. Teaching of Nepali language was dropped from the schools of Bhutan, and strict marriage laws imposed heavy burdens on anyone marrying a foreigner. A short lived plan to create a "green belt" along the southern border threatened the eviction of thousands of southern Bhutanese. Rizal and a small group of dissidents formed the Peoples Forum for Human Rights (PFHR) to address the human tights situation in Bhutan. Beginning in October 1989, a number of dissidents were arrested, including Rizal, who was abducted from Nepal and returned to Bhutan. The protests within Bhutan grew and the Bhutan Peoples Party (BPP) was formed in June, 1990. Mass rallies were organized in September and October, 1990 and resulted in violent conflict between the dissidents and the authorities, followed by mass arrests.

Throughout 1991 and 1992, refugees fleeing Bhutan described mass arrests, torture in custody, and the ongoing denial of Bhutanese citizenship to many southern Bhutanese through the census. 'No Objection Certificates' were required for enrollment in higher education, sale of some cash crops, and employment with the government. During this period the RGOB presented a much different story, reporting violence and terrorism in southern Bhutan and framing the situation as a struggle for national identity in the face of demographic threats from illegal immigrants. UNHCR was invited by the government of Nepal to provide relief in August, 1991.

The flow of southern Bhutanese across the open borders into India and Nepal started as a trickle and peaked in early 1992 with a flow of about I0,000 people per month entering Nepal. The flow slowed considerably in the later stage. New arrivals report continuing human rights violations, though on a smaller scale than in past years. In May 1993, the government of Nepal and UNHCR instituted a tighter screening process at the border utilizing international standards.

The growth in refugee population has been accompanied by a growth of human rights and political organizations among the refugees, creating more rivalry than cooperation. This fragmentation and politicization, coupled with generally improved conditions in the camps, increased unrest among the refugees, particularly among youth with little else to keep them occupied. Tensions between refugees and the local population are also visible. "Quiet diplomacy" by the governments of Nepal and Bhutan finally resulted in the agreement to establish a bilateral commission to address the situation. Its intended purpose was limited to determining the different categories of people claiming to have come from Bhutan in the refugee camps of eastern Nepal.

Demography and Democracy

The disparity between Bhutan's recently downsized total population estimate of 600,000 and the more precise yet presumably less accurate 1990 figure of 1,461,853 demonstrates the level of speculation which creeps into any discussion of demographics in Bhutan. Yet demographic forces and fears lie near the heart of events in

Bhutan. Refugees make demographic arguments to support their longstanding roots in Bhutan and their legal claims to Bhutanese citizenship. The RGOB counters with allegations of illegal immigration which threatens Bhutan's "survival as a distinct political and cultural entity" and "impose[s] a state of demographic siege on Bhutan." The open borders between Bhutan and India, and India and Nepal, historically have created easy movements of people and difficult determinations of nationality throughout the region.

The demographic battle has two primary fronts. First, within Bhutan the government argues that many of the ethnic Nepalese or their ancestors in Bhutan arrived after 1961 to work on development projects and do not meet the 1958 cutoff for citizenship established by Bhutan's 1985 Nationality Law. Second, outside Bhutan the government justifies the need for the current immigration crackdown citing "the relentless tide of the Nepali Diaspora" waiting for an opportune moment to invade Bhutan. At times this anticipated invasion is portrayed as the demographic pressure of people seeking better living conditions, but often it is described as a plot for the establishment of a "Greater Nepal" or a Nepali dominated Bhutan.

Under any interpretation, the southern Bhutanese population is a major part of the demographic equation of Bhutan. The then Bhutanese Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering stated that one-third of the country's population is of Nepalese origin while some refugee groups claim figures as high as 53%. The RGOB has not released any census data, and other potential indicators, such as the civil service composition of 39% southern Bhutanese in 1990, perhaps suggest that the true figure is somewhere in between. Estimates of the Ngalong population display similarly divergent ranges from refugee estimates of 16% to an official figure of 28%.

In supporting their positions, both sides have resorted to historical arguments concerning the early presence of ethnic Nepalese in Bhutan. Refugees place "the first batch of Nepali settlers... as far back as 1624 A.D." while the government "state[s] emphatically that no Nepalese ever crossed beyond the Teesta River until after 1865, let alone penetrate into Bhutan." The resolution of this historical argument has little relevance to the average resident of the camps in Nepal. The issue of early Nepali settlement is important, however, in analyzing the current population. Few dispute that in, or around, 1898 the Dorji family was granted permission to settle immigrants in southern Bhutan and in 1932 a British army officer reported 60,000 Nepali-speaking inhabitants in south west Bhutan. Nepalis came legally as laborers to clear forests in Samchi and the cleared - land was parceled off to workers. According to the government, only in the early 1950s did settlement spread from southwestern Samchi and Chirang to the Sarbhang, Geylegphug and Samdrupjhongkhar areas, and in 1958 the National Assembly passed its first Nationality Act, granting citizenship to these settlers. Most southern Bhutanese in the refugee camps claim to have settled before 1958 or trace their ancestry to those early settlers to derive claims to citizenship. The government charges that many of the southern Bhutanese came after the first five-year development plan in 1961 when: ... faced by a shortage of manpower to construct roads and implement development programmes, the government employed baidars (labour contractors) to import tens of thousands of labourers from Nepal. Almost three decades passed before the Royal Government became aware of the presence of illegal immigrants. By then substantial numbers of them had already mingled and merged with the local population in southern Nepal.

According to the government, "this influx was a case of outright illegal immigration over a porous and open border" and was "undetected by the government until the census carried out in 1988. Whether invited as potential future citizens simply as migrant laborers, ethnic Nepalis clearly were actively recruited and welcomed to Bhutan. The government's claim of thirty years of ignorance concerning their presence must be met with skepticism. Many of the workers were granted land and the 1958 Nationality Act allowed for the naturalization of landowners after ten years of residence. The issue of integrating the growing southern population frequently was discussed in the National Assembly, such as the 51st Session of the National Assembly in 1979 where debates included the appropriateness of using the Nepali language in the Assembly, southern Bhutanese attitudes towards driglam namzha and national dress, incentives for intermarriages between ethnic Nepalis and Drukpas, and the issuance of identification cards to Bhutanese citizens. Additionally, citizenship and marriage laws were debated repeatedly long before they were revised in 1977, 1980 and 1985 and a national census was conducted in 1981 followed by the issuance of citizenship cards. The then Deputy Minister of Home Affairs reported to the National Assembly that "according to an assessment in September, 1987 there was over 1 00,000 non-nationals in the country."

The picture is not one of a sudden realization, thirty years after the fact, that Bhutan was inhabited by a large number of illegal ethnic Nepalis, but rather a scenario of escalating concern over the failure to integrate this portion of the population into the politically dominant Drukpa culture. Writing in 1977, Leo Rose noted that the Bhutanese government "populated the area of Bhutan most susceptible to rapid economic development and to ideological penetration from India with a community that had not been integrated, either socially or politically, into the broader Bhutanese society." The progression of citizenship laws, the policies on driglam namzha and language, and especially the events since 1988 reflect a growing assimilations, and failing that exclusionist, mood.

While minimizing estimates of the ethnic Nepalis legally settled in southern Bhutan, the government repeatedly raises the spectra of "another 10 million Nepalis living in India, many of them across Bhutan's immediate southern border... look[ing] towards Bhutan as an economic haven." The 1981 census of India reports 1,252,444 speakers of Nepali, although this did not include Assam, which had 353,673 Nepali speakers in 1971.

While conceding this census figure may be low and a decade behind, it seems an estimate of ten million is clearly exaggerated, and certainly not all of these are looking towards Bhutan. Even crusaders for the inclusion of the Nepali language as an official language of India held their likely inflated projections to five or six million, including Nepalis settled in distant central, west and south India. Still, whatever estimate is reasonable; the Nepali population in India is substantial compared to that of relatively under populated Bhutan, and the fears expressed by Bhutan merit consideration.

The least credible of the fears Bhutan expresses is that of a "Greater Nepal" or "Pan Nepal" stretching across the Himalayas which Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering identified as a "motivating factor" of immigration to Bhutan. Under this theory, unnamed forces seek to unify the entire Himalayan region into one state with a dominant Nepali culture. The conflicting politics of the region make the likelihood of a unifying force seeking to exploit a consciously guided, politically motivated migration highly unlikely.

Comparisons with Sikkim are more apt and an Indian Adviser to Bhutan's King in the 1960s later wrote that the "Bhutanese have seen how, in neighboring Sikkim, the original inhabitants have been gradually outnumbered by Nepalese immigrants, and are determined to stop the process in their own country before it assumes unmanageable proportions." The RGOB echoes this thought, stating that "the southern Bhutan problem is neither a movement for democracy nor an issue concerning human rights. It is simply an attempt by an ethnic community to turn themselves into a majority through illegal immigration in order to take over political power." Crediting to this assertion raises problems similar to that of the "Greater Nepal" concept in terms of identifying leadership with the ability to influence and exploit long term patterns of migration. Further, while democratic reforms in Bhutan would likely lead to a weakening of consolidated Drukpa power, the timing of events indicates that the human rights activism and politicization of the southern Bhutanese were more a reaction to increasing pressure to assimilate than a proactive power grab.

Yet to argue that generations of migration were not politically orchestrated is not to argue that demographic forces do not pose a serious threat to the traditional society of northern Bhutan. The Bhutanese: "saw Sikkim lose its sovereignty and become a Nepali dominated state in India 17 years ago, watched apprehensively as Darjeeling erupted into anarchy and violence in a Nepali-led struggle for political autonomy during the late 1980s, and can hardly have been unaware of the Democracy Movement which reduced the status of Nepal's late King Birendra to that of a constitutional monarch in 1990 ... " Leaving aside the perceived spectra of ten million Nepalis waiting at the border, with the growing internal Nepali population it is understandable that the Drukpa elite of Bhutan to feel some trepidation for their continued privileged position.

Numbers alone, however, can give a misleading impression of pressures on the various cultures of Bhutan since "[s]settlement by Nepali Bhutanese in areas outside of southern Bhutan, while not specifically forbidden, in fact is still effectively discouraged." Each of the three main ethnic groups of Bhutan live in geographically separate areas and maintain distinct cultural patterns, and recent attempts at integration have been largely ineffective. The rare visitor to southern Bhutan would certainly not get a strong taste of Drukpa culture, and most visitors to Bhutan, who are restricted to the north, remain unaware even of the existence of a distinct culture in southern Bhutan. Perhaps because of this geographic separation, and the fact that southern Bhutanese for the most part

settled in previously uninhabited areas, the relations between the ethnic groups have been uncharacteristically positive on a subcontinent tom by communal conflicts. The flight of refugees is integrally linked to ethnicity, yet not charged with racial animosity. The issue is more of cultural assimilation than ethnic extermination. Bhutan is not an Asian Yugoslavia or Somalia where popular ethnic conflict bubbles openly to the surface. Policy decisions which have resulted in the present situation are largely centralized, and there is room for reconciliation between the peoples of Bhutan. Unfortunately, as time goes by, positions harden in reaction to propaganda and opportunities for negotiation may fade.

Diaspora and Nationality

Questions of nationality and methods employed to determine citizenship form a backdrop for all other issues and events in southern Bhutan. Bhutan's first attempt to define its citizenship came with the Nationality Law of Bhutan in 1958. This act was updated in 1977 and again in 1985. The government attributes great significance to these laws as all that stands between overwhelming demographic pressures and the survival of the Bhutanese people as a distinct political and cultural entity. Surely these laws are important, but the texts of the law are relevant only to the extent they influence implementation. The variance with which Bhutan has interpreted and applied nationality policies makes practical political realities outweigh the niceties of legal analysis. Still, since attempts to implement these laws are an integral part of the crisis, an understanding of the migration from southern Bhutan is not possible without some review of the laws. Although such a review of the laws raises more questions than answers, it is also necessary since the laws provide part of the framework for political decisions which may determine the fate of the refugees.

Citizenship and De-citizening

The 1958 law states "any person can become a Bhutanese national" and provides three avenues. First, through a father who was a Bhutanese national at the time of the child's birth, second, through a petition to an official appointed by the King if the applicant had been resident in Bhutan for more than ten years and owned agricultural land (or served satisfactorily in Government service for at least five years). Third, a woman married to a Bhutanese national could petition the official to be enrolled as a Bhutanese national. The last two of these three methods required an oath of loyalty. Growing cultural concerns are reflected in the 1977 Act which added the requirements of knowledge of the Bhutanese language and Bhutanese history, and increased the residency requirements to 15 years for government servants and 20 years for all others. The act specified the loyalty oath in more detail, including reference to the three elements of King, Country and People, or tsa-wa-sum. Foreigners married to Bhutanese were not considered citizens, but had to apply as other foreigners, removing the third category of the 1958 law. Children of mixed marriages became citizens only if the father was a citizen.

The 1985 act provides for citizenship by birth, by registration, or by naturalization. A person whose parents are both citizens of Bhutan is a citizen of Bhutan by birth. A person permanently domiciled in Bhutan on or before 31st December, 1958, and whose name is registered in the census register maintained by the Ministry of Home Affairs is a citizen of Bhutan by registration. Eligibility for naturalization requires residence of 15 years for government employees and those with one citizen parent, and 20 years for others, with this period of residence registered in the records of the Department of Immigration and Census. Naturalization also requires proficiency in spoken and written Dzongkha and a good knowledge of the culture, customs, traditions and history of Bhutan. Applicants must have no record of having spoken or acted against the King, Country or People in any manner whatsoever, and must take an oath of allegiance. The government reserves the right to reject applications for naturalization without assigning any reason.

The laws of Bhutan and its neighbors do not form a seamless web and the combination creates vast potential for statelessness. For one simple example, Nepali citizenship by descent comes through the father, as was the case in Bhutan's laws until 1985. Now that Bhutan requires both parents to be Bhutanese, the children of Bhutanese fathers and Nepali mothers are apparently citizens of neither state.

By the 1958 law, a person could lose citizenship by becoming a national of a foreign country, renouncing Bhutanese nationality, leaving agricultural land to live outside the kingdom, or engaging in activities or speaking

against the King or the people of Bhutan. Citizenship obtained through presentation of false information could be cancelled, as could citizenship granted to someone who was imprisoned for more than one year within five years of the grant. The 1977 law limits comment to revocation of citizenship based on acts or speech against the King or government, or presenting false information when applying. The 1985 law is only slightly different from its predecessor, terminating the citizenship of anyone acquiring the citizenship of another country, acquiring citizenship through fraud, or showing disloyalty by act or speech in any manner whatsoever to the King, Country and People of Bhutan. It adds that children who leave the country without the knowledge of the government lose citizenship even if both parents are Bhutanese, and spouses and children of someone acquiring another citizenship may retain their own Bhutanese citizenship.

The provisions of the later act prevail over conflicting earlier provisions, but the status of un- contradicted provisions is unclear. For example, the 1958 provision for losing citizenship for the abandonment of agricultural land is never repeated but never expressly overturned and presumably it survives as law. These laws have great potential for creating statelessness. Under these laws, dissidents accused of anti-national activity can be stripped of citizenship, but that certainly do not obligate other states to grant citizenship. Similarly, if the 1958 clause stripping citizenship from all those who abandon agricultural land is literally applied, without consideration of the myriad reasons the southern Bhutanese had to flee, every resident of the camps can be "legally" declared a non-national. Such an interpretation of Bhutan's nationality laws would run counter to international norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' guarantees of the rights to leave one's country and return, and to not be arbitrarily deprived of nationality

Census and Censor

Ambiguities in the way the laws have been interpreted and divergence from the laws as written began early. In practice, it is unclear what affirmative actions were required, or even possible, in the implementation of the 1958 law which the government now claims was passed to confer Bhutanese citizenship to all Nepali settlers in southern Bhutan at that time. No certification process followed the law although village headmen kept some forms of census records, mostly for the purposes of assessing taxes and conscripting labour.

The government asserts that one of the specific aims of the 1958 Nationality Law was to grant citizenship as a Kidug (welfare) and a once-and-for-all measure to all Nepali settlers in southern Bhutan who had applied ... That is why those Nepali immigrants who came to Bhutan after 31 December 1958 did not apply for naturalisation under the 1958 Law. The inclusion of naturalization and spouse provisions in the 1958 law seem to belie this interpretation. Although adopted in 1958, the text of the law itself makes no distinction between those arriving before 1958 and those arriving later. Presumably someone immigrating to Bhutan in 1954 would not have been eligible for citizenship until ten years later in 1964. A 1964 arrival would have been eligible in 1974. If the aim of the law was a one-time-only grant with a 1958 deadline, that aim is not found in the language of the text. Variance between the language of the acts and their practical application is compounded by terms like "can become a Bhutanese national", "may be enrolled", and "may apply". Such terminology leaves ambiguous the distinction between eligibility for citizenship on paper and actual grants of citizenship in reality. Given the ambiguous application process and absence of citizenship certificates, on a practical level it seems the 1958 law was not of great consequence for the average illiterate farmer, and life went on as usual.

A more rigorous approach was taken to implementation of the 1977 law through the first national census from 1979 to 1981. Teams of census officials from the Department of Registration were sent throughout the country. Following the census, citizens were issued passport-like documents entitled "Citizenship Identity Cards". According to the GoNt, 66% of the residents in the camps have citizenship cards or photocopies of cards that were confiscated in Bhutan. The RGOB first charged that the census was tainted by widespread abuse and now adds that the cards are being forged. As it turns out, having a card that said "The Holder of this Card is a Bhutanese Citizen" on the first page meant little when the 1988 census rolled around.

Census and Number Game

The RGOB informed Amnesty International in 1991 that the purpose of the census underway was to identify Bhutanese nationals in southern Bhutan. The census took place only in southern Bhutan, officially utilizing the new 1985 law. Census teams placed people into one of seven categories:

F I - Genuine Bhutanese F2- Returned migrants (people who had left Bhutan and then returned) F3- "Drop-out" cases - i.e. people who were not around at the time of the census [this Categorized is to be phased out] F4- A non-national woman married to a Bhutanese man F5- A non-national man married to a Bhutanese woman F6- Adoption cases (children who have been legally adopted) F7- Non-nationals, i.e. migrants and illegal settlers

Categorization was done by a committee of 12 persons, including three village elders. As implemented, the village elders were allowed little or no role and very few southern Bhutanese were included on the census teams. Adding to the stress of the census was the unclear consequences of being classified in the various categories, leaving people uncertain of their fate. Officially, the 1988 census implements the 1985 law, with its three methods of attaining citizenship: by having two Bhutanese parents, by registration of residence since 1958, or by naturalization. In practice, naturalization has not been an option and previous determinations of citizenship are not accepted. That leaves registration and confirm[s] what has become the fundamental basis for citizenship: residence since before 31 December 1958. The government dismisses charges that the 1985 law is thus retrospective, describing it rather as a liberalization since citizenship by registration waives the requirement of the 1958 Law for 10 years residence in Bhutan and ownership of agricultural land. Of course, by now a person qualifying for registration has resided in Bhutan for over thirty years and such a waiver should not be necessary. Both the hypothetical 1954 and 1964 arrivals mentioned above by now would have met the residency requirements for naturalization either under the 1958 law or the stricter 1977 law, yet only the 1954 arrival would qualify by registration. Here again the distinctions between eligibility for citizenship and grants of citizenship are important and unclear.

Concerns were raised in 1988's 67th Session of Bhutan's National Assembly concerning the retroactive impact of the 1985 law concerning the derivative citizenship of spouses and offspring where the new law's application had its greatest impact. For example, if a foreign wife arrived in Bhutan in 1959 and is not recognized as a citizen under one of the earlier laws, she fails under registration. This would leave all her children with only one Bhutanese parent, making them and any future generations' non-nationals. The King gave assurance that the provisions of all three Acts for the relevant period under which each was in force must be honoured so that, for example, children of Bhutanese men married to non-nationals prior to 1985 would be automatically eligible for citizenship. In practice, denials of citizenship in situations similar to the above example are commonly reported by those in the camps.

The Bhutanese government initially claimed that any documentary evidence whatsoever, (land ownership deeds or documents showing sale/gift inheritance of land, tax receipts of any kind, etc) showing that the person concerned was resident in Bhutan in 1958 is taken as conclusive proof of citizenship. Those without documents are verified by three village elders. In screening arrivals to the camps, the GoN reports that, in addition to the 66% with citizenship cards, 12% of those seeking asylum in the camps have land documents and 17% have other documents such as tax receipts. Bhutan in 1993 reproduced some of these tax receipts which had been displayed in an earlier refugee publication, adding the caption, "This is the kind of document produced by the people in the refugee camps as proof of their Bhutanese citizenship. Payment of property tax in itself is hardly proof of Bhutanese citizenship for there were many illegal immigrants in Bhutan who had acquired property." The latter statement is more in line with the strict attitude towards proof reported by refugees.

Refugees report impossibly strict standards for accepting documentation. Some report rejection for slight spelling differences, or because middle names are spelled out on one document and left to initials on others.

Others report having documents from years before and after 1958; but not 1958, and being rejected as "F2", i.e. returned migrants. Those who had moved from one part of Bhutan to another had exceptionally difficult obstacles to overcome. Even in a modernized society where paper-trails are a more pervasive part of life, documentation dating back to 1958 would be a stiff requirement. Under the demanding conditions imposed by the census teams, the requirement is impossible for many southern Bhutanese. After the events of September 1990, citizenship became even more difficult to acquire and much easier to lose.

Integration vs. Assimilation

Since the 1950s, the RGOB has made some clear efforts to integrate southern Bhutanese into a social and political mainstream. Some examples include standardization of tax structures throughout the country, development projects in southern Bhutan, and recruitment of southern Bhutanese into the civil service, police and army. These programs contributed to the strong ties the refugees feel for Bhutan, including among many a continued reverence for the King. Many of the leaders of refuge organizations were civil servants who were slow to believe reports of government actions in southern Bhutan, and still attribute the problems to a small cadre of elite rather than the people of northern Bhutan. But not all programs for integration are as simple inclusion in the government service, and many cut deeply into the cultural heritage of the southern Bhutanese. The 'One Nation, One People' policy of the government stresses the need for a "distinct national identity", but does not envision forging this identity to encompass the diversity of the nation's cultures. The government is on record that the culture of the north need not form the basis of the national identity, but in practice many policies impose Drukpa cultural elements at the expense of others.

Coded Culture

With deep roots in the Drukpa culture ranging back to Shabdrung Ngawang Namgyal in the early 1600s, the drigiam namzha, or code of traditional values and etiquette, encompasses such virtues as respect for the teacher, the sovereign, parent, elder; the institution of marriage and family; civic duties and behavior that keep together the strands of the Bhutanese social fabric. Beyond institutionalizing the particular value system of the Drukpa culture, it stipulates how people should conduct themselves at different types of occasions (ceremonial, official, informal, how to send and receive gifts, how to speak to superiors, how to serve and eat food and refreshments during public occasions, how to greet, etc.) As implemented, the driglam namzha includes a national dress code, requiring that gho be worn by men and kira by women. Just as the driglam namzha is not new, debates over its implementation also are not new. During the 1979 National Assembly: Most of the members agreed and consented that the National Dress must be worn during the National Assembly.

However, the member of Samchi and a few members from southern Bhutan expressed the inconvenience in wearing the national dress... [and] requested that they be exempted from wearing the national dress, as they felt they would be criticized by some members of their society. Even in these earlier debates on the driglam namzha, the dress code aspect dominated discussion. The King issued a royal kasho (decree) on January 16, 1989 implementing driglam namzha as part of the promotion of the distinct national identity and the 'One Nation, One People' theme of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The kasho itself did not strictly define national dress as the gho and kira, but the government insisted on the unavoidable necessity for a small country like Bhutan to have an easily recognisable type of dress. In practice, a man not wearing a Gho and a woman not wearing a Kira were to be fined Nu. 100 each and 50 percent of this amount was to go to the police as incentive. In southern Bhutan where the gho and kira are not the traditional dress and are ill-suited to the climate, widespread abuse accompanied the admitted provocative manner in which [the driglam namzha policy] was implemented by overzealous functionaries. Refugees report on the spot collection of fines (or in the alternative, imprisonment) if caught without the national dress in virtually any location outside their homes.

Intensifying the feelings of discrimination based on this policy is the view that southern Bhutan is especially targeted since it would appear that the dress code is enforced more strictly in Chirang [a southern district] than in the capital. Such a conclusion is born out by debate during the 1992 National Assembly session noting it was mostly in the capital city, Thimphu, that the policy on Driglam Namzha and national dress was not being observed... In particular, it was the children of high ranking and influential people in Thimphu, including some of

the high ranking and influential themselves. Complaints of lax enforcement of the dress code in Thimphu led to the drafting of a national Dress Act clarifying the law and stiffening penalties. Yet this act, written largely to ensure enforcement of the driglam namzha in Thimphu reluctantly was set aside by the Assembly in the face of strong opposition from the then Home Minister. In addition to highlighting the disparity between enforcement in the North and South, this discussion, complete with numerous asides about the reappearance of banned television antennas in Thimphu, also indicates the traditional society in Bhutan is under pressure from forces of modernization as well as the forces of growing ethnic populations

Language and Learning

Dzongkha is the official national language, although the King has noted that some of their people faced great inconvenience in learning Dzongkha and the then Foreign Minister concede that all of them speak the Nepali language. The official newspaper Kuensel publishes Dzongkha and English versions only; the National Assembly now no longer provides simultaneous translation into Nepali; and the government stopped radio broadcasts in Nepali. In general, life would be difficult for any Bhutanese, other than members of the monastic community or residents of far flung northern districts, who could not speak rudimentary Nepali. Language is perhaps the area of the most significant impact of the southern Bhutanese culture on the average Drukpa, and the use of Nepali has repeatedly come under fire in the National Assembly.

English has been the medium of instruction in schools since 1961 and until 1989 both Dzongkha and Nepali were taught as separate subjects, although Nepali was not taught in schools throughout the north. In 1989, Nepali was dropped by the schools, ostensibly as an educational decision, in part because Dzongkha is taught as a second language, the inclusion of a third language, Nepali, puts the child in southern Bhutan at a considerable disadvantage... [And it] was concluded that Nepali is the national language and lingua franca of another country and not an ethnic language... Furthermore, the Nepali language was only serving to accentuate the dichotomy of two distinctive national cultures. This argument goes well beyond purely educational motives, demonstrating the influence of the 'One Nation, One People' ideal. In light of the ongoing census exercise the decision to drop Nepali was understandably perceived as a strike against southern Bhutanese culture.

Marriage Mayhem

In 1988 the government reported 11,442 marriages between Bhutanese and non-nationals during the preceding 20 years. A breakdown of statistics on these marriages is not provided, yet it is safe to assume that a good percentage involve southern Bhutanese. Given the strict cultural and caste restrictions on marriage, spouses are commonly sought outside home communities, often in Nepal or India. A longstanding approach of the government to discourage such foreign marriages and promote integration is an incentive (raised to No. 10,000 in 1989) for intermarriage between southern and northern Bhutanese. Opposite this incentive stand stiff penalties for marriage to foreigners laid out in the 1980 Marriage Act. Under this act, a Bhutanese citizen who marries a foreigner is denied government assistance in the form of land, seeds, loans, livestock, and health benefits. If working for the government, promotion is denied from the day of marriage, and removal from service is mandatory for workers in the defence department or Foreign Ministry. All assistance from the government for education is denied and any expenses incurred to the day of marriage must be refunded.

Refugees contend this act is discriminatory because of the disparate impact on Southerners due to the large proportion of the foreign marriages from their communities. Further, they charge that the act is only implemented in the south, citing northern high ranking officials with foreign spouses who have received promotions and foreign postings in spite of the law. The King suggested that non-nationals married to Bhutanese... could be granted special resident permit. They would also be entitled to health, education and other social benefits extended to citizens of the country. There are no indications that any such permits have actually been issued.

Yes Objection

The RGOB states that in order to ensure that all bona fide Bhutanese children received the first preference for admission in schools, a No Objection Certificate (NOC) was made essential and these would not be issued to those students who have been involved in anti-national activities and to children of illegal immigrants. NOCs were also required for the release of cheques to farmers for the sale of their cash crops. The government explained that the money due to the owners of these cash crops is merely frozen and not confiscated and will be released once the current disturbed situation is resolved. Refugees report that NOCs were virtually impossible for southern Bhutanese to obtain. The impact of NOCs is still strongly felt by refugee farmers who had to flee before collecting payment for years of work, or by students who lost years from their education.

Steadfast Opposition

In April, 1988, two southern Bhutanese members of the Royal Advisory Council submitted a cautiously worded petition to the King outlining southern Bhutanese concerns about the census. The petition reported "Census Teams are questioning the people with undue threats," "Citizenship Identity Cards already issued have been confiscated," village elders "are not permitted to testify the credentials of their village people," "illiterate and simple village people are being coerced into signing documents, the contents of which are not known to them," and "the people believe that this is not a routine exercise as it is made out to be." The cabinet declared the petition seditious, focusing the blame on one of the authors, Tek Nath Rizal. Rizal was removed from office, arrested and held for three days. His release was secured after signing a confession and an agreement not to meet with more than three people at one time. Faced with constant surveillance and insecurity, Rizal left Bhutan for Nepal in July, 1988. Refugees report that seven people from Chirang who had been involved in the drafting of a separate petition to the King were arrested, held for up to three days, and later harassed through tactics such as being denied trade permits and refused participation in district meetings.

In July, 1989, a small group of dissidents in Nepal formed the Peoples Forum for Human Rights (PFHR) to address the human rights situation in Bhutan, and elected Rizal as chairperson. The group published several booklets which were distributed in Bhutan and subsequently declared seditious. In October, 1989, Ratan Gazmere, a lecturer at the National Institute of Education, was arrested as one of the main persons responsible for printing and distributing seditious pamphlets and accused of various anti-national activities such as having some students refuse to wear 'ghos' and 'kiras' during the winter vacation and instigate the people in villages to follow their example. Gazmere was not alone, and from October to December 1989, a total of 45 people were arrested for their involvement in the writing of 'seditious pamphlets', among them Tek Nath Rizal who along with Jogen Gazmere and Sushil Pokhrel was arrested in Nepal on 15 November 1989 and handed over to Bhutanese authorities. Most of these prisoners were released on January 19, 1990, and the remaining six, adopted as prisoners of conscience by Amnesty International, were held incommunicado without trial. Five of these six were finally released after periods of detention ranging from 26 to 28 months, and Rizal was released after 10 years.

Protests and Mass Arrests

After visiting Bhutan, Amnesty International reported that unrest at government policies regarding national integration and the application of the Citizenship Act became widespread in southern Bhutan from early 1990 onwards. The Bhutan Peoples Party (BPP) was formed in June, 1990, and, together with the Student Union of Bhutan (SUB) and PFHR, organized demonstrations and protests in September and October, 1990. Some of these rallies resulted in violent conflict between the dissidents and the authorities. Reports of government violence sometimes were highly exaggerated by refugees, such as the reported massacre of 300 people at a September, 1990 demonstration at Charmachi Bridge in Samchi. But in spite of the hyperbole in some cases, reports of government shootings cannot be dismissed. Many refugees received medical treatment for severe injuries and bullet wounds, and refugees report the names of 19 people killed by government gunfire during the months of September and October, 1990.

The government alleged increasingly violent activity by "anti-nationals", or Ngolops. Reports included murders of census officials, attacks on government facilities, and looting of local homes. Most of the schools in the south were converted into army barracks and health services were severely limited. Following the September, 1990 demonstrations, raids by the army on southern Bhutanese homes became common. People frequently were beaten and questioned on participation in anti-national activities. Rape was widely reported. Many were detained, for periods ranging from a few days to a year, in prisons or the local schools which were converted to army barracks and jails. Amnesty International reported that the total number of people arrested since early 1990 for suspected involvement in opposition activities ran into thousands.

Destruction by Design

A common theme among the stories of new arrivals includes being arrested without charge for a short period and forced to do intense labor. Victims were then released, after being told to emigrate or they would be re-arrested for longer periods. Having personally experienced arrest, and aware of the more pronounced abuse suffered by earlier victims, most "chose" to leave. For some such a decision was reinforced by feelings of isolation in near empty villages. Those who relied on community irrigation schemes or cash income from occasional employment with a rich neighbor cannot maintain their old ways and have added incentive to join their communities in exile. After the massive eviction, the schools were reopened and those only for children of security forces, government officials, National Assembly members, and other persons of influence. The situation would be a continuation of the earlier officially announced policy of the government by which schools will only admit the direct children of the government employees, security forces and public officials in active service. The National Assembly in 1992 debated 16 proposals for the resettlement by northerners of land vacated by southern Bhutanese. These proposals were partly justified as a counterpoint to an unsuccessful plan two years earlier to provide incentives to southern Bhutanese who settle in the north. The assembly resolved to develop a suitable resettlement plan, coordinating with all concerned departments.

SECTION -II

LIFE IN EXILE

According to latest UNHCR figures,1110,000 people are registered in the rows of small huts in the seven camps in Jhapa and Morang districts of south eastern Nepal. There are actually five sites, with the largest being divided administratively and considered separate camps. The largest grouping is found in the three Beldangi camps. Camps are run by UNHCR Project Monitoring Officers, government of Nepal Camp Managers, and a contingent of Nepali police. Much of the day-to-day operations and record keeping falls to the semi-elected Camp Management Committees. Over the years, UNHCR's major implementing partners have been Lutheran World Federation Nepal (LWF Nepal) for most livelihood aspects such as food and housing whereas Save the Children Fund (SCF-UK) was for health which has now terminated its presence in the camps. Camp residents are provided bamboo and sheet plastic to build their own huts. Refugees are supplied rations of rice, lentils, vegetables and kerosene for cooking. Some of the camps, such as the Beldangi camps, have a planned appearance, with long rows of huts and latrines. Others, such as Sanischare and Timai, are more scattered, revealing themselves as the earliest camps, established more as a squatters settlements than as organized camps. In some areas locals have capitalized on the presence of the refugees by establishing rows of small stores just outside the camps to cater to the basic needs of the refugees which are not met by the camps such as soap, tea, milk, etc.

Each of the camps has schools supported by Caritas Nepal, though they are crowded and run on several shifts with few supplies. Attendance at the schools is excellent, as there is little else for children to do. Health services are considered better than in the average Nepali village. There are still complaints that the food is not enough, or the briquette is hazardous to health or especially that the roofing rip easily and leak. The camps are far from luxurious, with small huts housing large extended families. As the likelihood of a long stay dawns on refugees, the prospect of empty days weighs heavily. Though the resettlement plan has raised some hope among refugee population, this idle population has proven a fertile breeding ground for political organizations adding to tension in the camps.

Free Food but not Freedom

Local integration in Nepal for refugees is a distant reality as it happened with Nepali speaking Burmese refugees who arrived in Nepal in the 60s followed by an undeclared assimilation. Though the assimilation possibility seems deem the ethnic, linguistic and religious similarities with host communities have permitted a de facto tolerance of some refugee movement and the possibility of low-paying daily labour. In majority cases, the refugees are generally restricted to camps and unable to pursue secure livelihoods formally. The locals also seem willing to welcome them for cheap and often comparatively more skilled labor especially in agriculture, construction and house roofing. The large majority of refugees remain dependent on international humanitarian aid. WFP provides food and runs income-generating activities in the camps, while UNHCR ensures that fuel and housing materials are provided to the refugee population. LWF Nepal has remained as a key partner in rendering these services to the refugees for decades.

Refugees: Residence and Mobility

• Every morning, refugees ride their bicycles out of the camps to participate in informal daily (but irregular) wage labour. The availability of daily labour, and hence the number of workers exiting the camps daily, depends upon the season and the local economy, but it is estimated that thousands of refugees work daily in nearby fields or construction sites, where they earn between 50 and 120 rupees per day ($.77 to $1.85 USD). • An estimated 1,000 refugees travel to India seasonally, to take jobs or study in schools there. • It is estimated that hundreds of refugees live in Kathmandu, where, with a good education, they work in higher-paying jobs. • Some refugee students attend local schools far enough away from the camp that they do not return each night, but instead, stay in nearby towns. • Thousands of educated English speakers work in boarding schools throughout Nepal, where they provide a helpful boon to Nepal’s English-speaking teacher force. • More than 100 refugee families are registered with the GoN who live officially outside of the camps, most of whom are political leaders.

[Source: Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Anticipating the Impact of Resettlement, June 2008]

Susan Banki, the author of "Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Anticipating the Impact of Resettlement", reveals that donor fatigue is visible as international donors have grown increasingly reluctant to continue funding a refugee situation with no end in sight. In the context of Bhutan’s outright refusal to accept any Lhotshampas back into the country, programs initially designed to prepare refugees for repatriation have been scaled back. Though the agencies claim that they have maintained the maximum possible standard in the camps, refugees express their grievances of cut-back in food, fuel, housing materials and clothing, exacerbating difficulties for the population. A calamitous fire in early March 2008 in Goldhap camp served as a stark reminder of the refugees’ vulnerability when, over the course of several hours, the fire destroyed 95 percent of the camp’s structures and left most of the camps 9,770 residents homeless.

Many refugees expressed with the INHURED Eminent Persons' team that aims of their life have been scattered. Just because of being a refugee, opportunities never knock at their door and when they go around looking for opportunity, many doors remain closed. Life in the camps is very difficult particularly for women and life is so uncertain that they have to live each day as it comes. Day by day the problem is getting more complex. Eighteen years have passed now since the problem began but the governments of Bhutan and Nepal could not find an agreed solution. Living as a refugee for too long is very miserable. It is very difficult to return to normal state of mind once destroyed. Refugees can see no way out. "I ask several questions to myself; where can I go? How can I live a dignified life with an identity? Where is my future? What are you going to do in the future? How? They all remain unanswered. In school Bhutan, I used to tell my teachers that I would become a lawyer in future. I have become a liar to my children" says a female refugee teacher in the camp.

Communities Coherence

Susan Banki, in her recent field study demystifies that with the refugee camps forming some of the largest concentrations of people in eastern Nepal, interactions between the local population and the refugees are unavoidable. According to her, relations range from excellent at Goldhap Camp to strained and angry around Sanischare Camp. Conversations with people of the surrounding communities inevitably include complaints about refugees leaving the camps to find work outside, often for low wages which undercut the daily wage demands of the locals. A common practice of refugees leaving the camps to work is giving their ration cards to those who stay behind. This means there are surpluses of some of the staples provided by UNHCR which find their way onto the local market, depressing prices. UNHCR has instituted spot checks to identify missing persons and pull ration cards of those not in the camps. Prices of those items not provided by UNHCR, such as milk or eggs, are not immune from influence and have greatly increased due to demand from refugees. According to Banki, locals also report that house rents have increased astronomically due to the influx of aid agencies and their workers. On the other hand, quite a few individuals have profited from the boom in contracts for construction, building materials, and other supplies.

INHURED International's Eminent Persons' team repeatedly visited three of the seven camps in 2008 and discovered the following situation:

• Frustration and confusion prevails mostly among some youths, owing to life becoming more and more difficult to sustain, and lack of major progress in finding a ‘desirable’ solution. • Sudden surge of radicalism – probably contributed by political changes in Nepal in combination with the proposal for third country resettlement noted, however, overall, the camps remain stable. • Increased activities of CPB (Communist Party of Bhutan) and other youth groups were reported but nothing visible on the surface. • Lessened opposition and overwhelming support for the allotment of Armed Security Force in the camps has been noted. • Intimidation reported to individuals and groups promoting and opting ‘durable solution’ but could not be found prominent, mostly perceived threat prevailed. • Based on the overall study and observation, in the given situation the only best available option (as endorsed by majority of refugees) could be 3rd country resettlement, however, other options must not be shuttered. • The possibility of local integration (formally) seems to become dimmer with timely voluntary repatriation bleak. • International community found keen to be engaged in finding durable solution to the protracted problem but with a concern that Bhutan must be made responsible for its faults. • Donor fatigue and probability of decreasing input of resources for humanitarian assistance in the days to come • The Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) administered by IOM is progressing with resettlement process • Demand by refugees for more information for 3rd country resettlement from UNHCR and other agencies involved expressed. • A need for constructive dialogue and engagement of youths from all camps with a view to defuse possible tension and confusion is vital.

In the most recent study carried out by Susan Banki, social effects also are acutely felt. According to her, locals complain of increased theft, prostitution and robbery. Some of these are due to the refuges, but other incidents are readily blamed on the refugees who provide a convenient scapegoat for local social problems. The Sanischare Camp, which is located closest to a Nepali bazaar town predictably, has the most friction between refugees and locals. LWF Nepal has coordinated a series of projects sponsored by a variety of donors to develop projects to offset or mitigate the impacts of the refugees on the local population. Suggestions from the local communities range from building schools to water projects to roads. Some communities already have benefited indirectly, such as Goldhap village which would have waited a long time for a road if not for the presence of a refugee camp. As screening increases the number of people who are refused assistance in the camps, local relations may see more strain. Those refused assistance are still free to enter Nepal and they likely will stick close to their relatives in the camps. This population is technically not allowed to spend the night in the camps, so they may attempt to squat on local or government land as the original flows of refugees did. This presence, adding to the population of homeless Nepali nationals such as the 4,000 households squatting near Timai camp would surely become a factor in local politics.

Roadblocks to Resolution

Refugees are sincerely grateful to Nepal for the humanitarian response of the country in providing relief, but they resent being shut out of the process of negotiating for their futures. The faltering progress of the GoN's quiet diplomacy has left the refugees with understandably little confidence in Nepal as a genuine negotiator for their futures. Even if some categorization, sorting and verification processes are achieved, numerous issues are to be addressed before any thought of repatriation is possible. These are not issues that have simple answers, and resolution of these issues, and the refugee problem, has been slow in coming. Still, the problems of future should be factored into the final and groundbreaking talks at an early stage which unfortunately seems to be a distant reality.

The Bilateral Talks: Bitter Realities

• Both governments have rejected the strong appeals of the international community to involve an independent third party, preferably UNHCR, in the screening and repatriation process; • The Bhutanese government repeated its position (announced at the 14th round of talks in May) that it would allow refugees in Categories I, II and IV to return. However, the talks failed to clarify the conditions under which the refugees would be readmitted; • The Bhutanese government affirmed that refugees in Category II would have to reapply for citizenship in Bhutan after a probationary period of at least two years, even though the majority of them were forced to sign so-called "voluntary migration forms" when leaving Bhutan. The stringent and discriminatory nature of Bhutan's citizenship laws, including the requirement that all applicants are fluent in the language of northern Bhutan, Dzonkha, could exclude many southern Bhutanese from reacquiring citizenship; • The Nepalese government repeated their offer of citizenship for refugees in Category II, the supposedly "voluntary" migrants, who choose not to return to Bhutan. But the growing insecurity and instability in Nepal raise questions about the viability of this offer; • Refugees in Category IV, including those who participated in peaceful pro-democracy activities, would have to stand trial in Bhutan if they returned, despite the absence of any guarantees of fair trials or due process in Bhutan; • The talks gave no guarantees that refugees would be able to return to their original homes and properties or enjoy basic human rights protections and full access to social services, including education, all of which are critical conditions for sustainable return; • The governments agreed that the screening would proceed in a second camp - Sanischare - without any assurances that the serious anomalies and inadequacies in the process would be addressed. The decision to continue the screening process camp-by-camp in the other 6 camps will further delay the process. It took over two years just to complete the screening in Khudunabari camp; • The governments set a deadline of January 2004 for reviewing the appeals of refugees in Category III but failed to address the serious concerns of the international community regarding the flaws in the appeal process. These include: the absence of an independent third party to hear the appeals, the lack of transparency regarding the criteria for screening, and the extremely short timeframe for appeals. • The two governments look set to repeat all the mistakes of the initial screening in Khudunabari camp

For starters, although refugee groups and parties call for the return of all those in the camps, few observers believe that Bhutan will agree to the return of more than a fraction of those in the camps. Any future proposals for partial return are sure to be opposed by the refugees and create further divisions among the refugee groups. Another baseline issue for the refugees that has yet to be addressed is the guarantee of human rights upon return. Without international monitoring of some sort, many refugees will not feel safe returning to the country where they suffered abuse.

Children are classified as criminals in JVT Report

The eight year old daughter of Dhanapati Poudel, a Bhutanese refugee, has challenged the Joint Verification Team ( JVT) to prove her criminality. Devi Poudel of hut 9, Sector A has been placed in the fourth class of people involved in criminal activities. There are 347 refugees of 85 families classified under the criminal category. Among them more than 60 children were born in the refugee camps. After the inclusion in the criminal category, guardians of such children have reported that the children are suffering from depression. Subas Chhetri, another 'criminal' boy wants to go to his home. 'What can such a young child do? His father said. Similarly, 18 months old Kiran Gautam has also been placed in the criminal category. Govinda Dahal, a young child of Khudunabari Camp has been placed in the

category of people migrating voluntarily. In yet another case, siblings have been placed in different categories. Nima Dorji Tamang and his brother, according to the joint verification team report, are non- Bhutanese, while another brother Lakpa dorji has been categorized as a voluntary migrant, but their parents are said to be from Bhutan.

While there are still reports of ongoing abuse and political prisoners still are detained in Bhutan, constructive dialogue on this point is difficult. With Nepal's less than stellar human rights record, the refugees might wish for a different negotiator if the talks ever reach the topic of human rights guarantees in Bhutan. Refugee demands for democratic reforms are sure to create havoc. Bhutan has shown no willingness to even consider reforms so that refugees may find way for their return. Some groups see minimal reform as a future issue after return, while others demand a major overhaul as a prerequisite to return. The reconciliation of democratic reforms with Bhutan's concerns for cultural preservation has created immense complications, and consensus will not be achieved easily. Refugees want to return to the land they abandoned, but fear that Bhutan, if agreed to welcome some, will try to scatter them throughout the north.

Intolerance or Conspiracy?

R. K Budhathoki, the first president of the Bhutan Peoples Party (BPP, was hacked to death in Damak, Jhapa on 9th September 2001. He succumbed to serious neck injuries from a khukuri and died at Amda hospital in Damak. Budhathoki was attacked by about half-a-dozen young men at the BPP's youth wing office where he was attending a meeting.

Budhathoki, who is survived by his wife and three children, left Bhutan in 1989 and settled down in Birtamod, Jhapa from where he continued to raise his voice for democracy in Bhutan. He was among those refugee leaders credited with lobbying for raising awareness about the plight of the Bhutanese refugees. Some believe that the murder of Budhathoki is the apex of intolerance and rivalry among refugee groups. Many view this incident as a ploy of the RGOB to harass dissident groups fighting for democracy and freedom on Bhutan.

Various reports from Bhutan indicate that the government initiated a signature campaign in southern Bhutan calling for those who left to not be allowed back. The pressures a southern Bhutanese may feel when presented with such a petition are enormous, but the very existence of such documents will complicate return. Compensation issues also arise in the context of accountability for those who committed human rights violations. Bhutan has yet to admit violations, and is not likely to do so. Yet reconciliation without some acknowledgement or accountability will leave unresolved tensions. Other issues include the fate of refugees not in camps, extradition of refugee leaders sought by Bhutan, accountability versus impunity for human rights violators, etc.

Motivations for Compromise

Any movement towards a solution of the refugee situation will require compromise on all sides. As yet, there is little indication that the RGOB is ready to soften its stance on recognizing the claims of nationality by refugees in Nepal, despite pressure from many angles. Sources of some amount of pressure on Bhutan include growing international media attention, concerns of international donors and withdrawal of aid, the diplomatic talks with Nepal, activism by the refugees both inside and outside Bhutan, and India. Of these sources of pressure, most agree that India is the key to any solution, although its role has not been very open. As the regional superpower, and the country which land locks both Bhutan and Nepal, India has tremendous influence in the area. Nepal was reminded of this during its 1989-90 trade and transit dispute with India. Bhutan is equally vulnerable, receiving 70% of its foreign aid from India. Bhutan is further bound by a 1949 treaty to be "guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations." Since all the refugees in Nepal got there by crossing through about 100 kilometres of India, and would return the same way, any solution without Indian approval is unlikely. Also, a common claim of Bhutan is that many of those in the camps are really from India, again leaving a solution in India's absence impractical. As yet, India has not adopted positions openly or made clear use of its influence to promote a solution.

Gujral to Write to PM on Refugees

New Delhi, March 31: Former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral who is the chairperson of South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR) will write to President Pratibha Patil and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to try to help in solving the issue of Bhutanese refugees.

These refugees have been left out of the democratic process in the recent elections held in Bhutan, Mr Gujral said, "We need to understand the issue and also see how we can help." Mr Gujral was speaking at the deliberation organised by Sahr on the "Concerns of the Bhutanese Refugees in South Asia" on Monday, in the light of the Bhutan election results, to look at the possible solutions and a way forward.

Speaking at the deliberations, the president of Druk National Congress (Democratic) Thinley Penjore, who is living-in-exile in Nepal explained that though the world was all praises for the first elections in Bhutan held recently, their party does not recognise it as such since only two parties, both headed by the King’s relatives were allowed to contest the elections and large numbers of people were left out of the democratic process. He said, "Unless the refugees issue is addressed justly, we fear that the so called ongoing process will emerge a mockery of the democracy." He appealed to India’s prominent leaders, civil society and the media to play a greater role as citizens of the largest democracy to mount pressure on the government of India to press upon the King of Bhutan to restore political freedom and resolve the issue.

As many as 150,000 refugees live mainly in Nepal and a few thousands in the northeast part of India after they were forced to live Bhutan in the early 1990 and late 1980s. Explaining the crux of the problem, the general secretary of Peoples Forum for Human Rights, Bhutan, D.P. Kafley said, "For 18 years the Bhutanese refugee community in Nepal has been languishing in terrible conditions in seven separate camps." Most of the refugees are the Lhotshampas who lived mainly in the south of Bhutan and are ethnic Nepali speaking people who have been living there since before 1958 when a census showed that they were indeed legitimate people of the country, explained Mr Penjore. 31 March, 2008 03:48:54 [Source: Sonal Kellogg, http://howrah.org/india_news/8447.html]

In spite of the lack of public statements on its position, many believe India is active behind the scenes. Some attribute the entire problem to a conscious policy set in motion by India, perhaps seeking to destabilize either Nepal or Bhutan or both. Others see the hand of India in Bhutan's changed stance on talks with Nepal or in Nepal's sudden reversal of its decision to internationalize the issue. Still others deny an active Indian role, attributing India's inaction to its comfortable dealings with the Thimphu regime on issues such as the sale of cheap hydropower. The level of India's activity to date is unclear. What is clear is the need for India to become active, openly or behind the scenes, since this is the most realistic route to creating the kind of pressure needed to bring about a settlement. In the meantime, continued attention and publicity on the international front is needed to keep pressure on Bhutan and prompt India into positive action. International donor agencies are uniquely positioned to apply pressure on Bhutan. Meanwhile, Bhutan’s bilateral development partners namely Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and India have failed to consolidated pressure for the safe and dignified return of refugees to their homestead.

Another complication that is seen to crop up is during the process of categorization of those found to be Bhutanese into the categories as 'voluntary emigrants', and 'people who committed criminal acts'. Bhutan's real commitment to take back its citizens will only become clear if it takes a logical and flexible stand. If it continues with its obsolete stand of applying its retroactive and racially discriminative 1985 Citizenship Act, a significant majority of the people will be rendered as stateless persons. Therefore, the representation of the refugees and the involvement of the UNHCR and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in the process of negotiation, verification and repatriation are imperative if the Bhutanese refugees are to be dispensed justice.

Until now, not a single refugee has been able to return to Bhutan. Sadly, very little has happened since Bhutan and Nepal first held bilateral talks aimed at resolving the refugee crisis in 1993. In 2001, a verification process which was negotiated eight years earlier started in one of the smaller camps. When Bhutanese authorities visited the refugee camp to share the results at the end of the process in 2003, they announced that only 2.4 % of the refugees in the camp had been defined as genuine Bhutanese. This provoked the refugees to such an extent that some threw stones at the delegation. Further repatriation and verification plans have since been stalled, due to what many observers have claimed are deliberate delaying tactics by the Bhutanese authorities. Meanwhile, these authorities have encouraged other people, mainly from eastern Bhutan with little or no land, to move south and settle on the land of Lhotshampas who has fled. Police and military officers and their families have occupied the more valuable Lhotshampa properties, (i.e. the larger houses close to the main roads), thereby making it even harder for refugees to ever return to their homes. Recently, the option of third country resettlement has come to the fore, but the refugees are split on whether to accept resettlement rather than insist upon their right to return. Since resettlement is a new concept for most of the refugees, many do not know that their decision to move to a third country would not exclude repatriation at a later stage." [Bhutan: Land of Happiness for the Selected, Norwegian Refugee Council, June 2008]

Democratization in Bhutan: Cosmetic or Charismatic?

The autocratic Bhutanese monarchy seems to changing its attitude to democracy and human rights though an eye-washing exercise. Most importantly, in 2008, the country’s first ever constitution has been inaugurated. Partly due to the philosophy of Gross National Happiness, which states that development must be much more then only economic growth, change has come about gradually in Bhutan. Looking at the country’s recent history, however, some major economic, political and infrastructural changes have occurred. Serfdom has been abolished in the previously feudal society and an educational system has been developed. The country opened up to foreigners in the 1970s, but entry visas are not granted to critics of the regime and there is a policy of high value, low volume tourism. Television and the Internet became legal in 1999, but television channels that are considered a bad influence on the youth are banned.

In 1998 he granted the National Assembly the power to remove him by a two-thirds vote of no-confidence, he moved executive powers from the Throne to the Cabinet of Ministers, and in 2001 he ordered the drafting of the first Bhutanese constitution. This constitution will pave the way for the first democratic parliamentary elections to

be held in 2008. The population today elects only one third of the National Assembly; the other members are monks and people chosen by the King. The draft constitution, which was first published in March 2005, introduces political parties, which were not allowed before, and acknowledges freedom of the press and the right to freedom of religion as fundamental rights. Even though these articles are clear steps in the direction of democratization, other hot topics have not been dealt with. In line with the “One Nation, One People” policy, the constitution is silent with regard to the cultural diversity of the country. The constitution only mentions the national language Dzongkha, completely ignoring the other 23 languages spoken in Bhutan10. The fact that only those with a formal university degree are allowed to stand in national elections, also excludes many from participating.\

Lhotshampas and Constitution

The drawing up of a constitution was widely welcomed in international fora as a step in Bhutan’s progress towards democracy. It has, however, been criticised on several grounds. The Lhotshampa community was not represented on the drafting committee. Elements of the draft constitution confirm fears about the nationality status of Lhotshampas still living in Bhutan. A significant number of the 81,976 non-national residents referred to in the 2005 census figures may be Lhotshampas whose citizenship status was eroded in successive census exercises throughout the 1990s.Of the 20 fundamental rights set out in article 7 of the draft constitution, only six are available to all people. The majority are reserved for Bhutanese citizens. Non-national residents may be denied the rights reserved for citizens. Only citizens have voting rights. Only a “natural born citizen of Bhutan” as defined in the 1985 Citizenship Act may hold an office or post under the Constitution.

Many Lhotshampas, under current arrangements, have already been denied rights outlined in the constitution (such as the right to education, to freedom of movement and residence within Bhutan, to join the public service, to own property, to not be deprived of property, to practise any lawful trade, profession or vocation). If the nationality status of Lhotshampas is not regularized, they may become a permanent underclass with no guaranteed rights, stateless in their own country. The royal prerogative allows the monarch to grant citizenship, and to exercise powers relating to matters which are not provided under the constitution or other laws. It may therefore be in his power to ensure that those people who can claim no nationality other than Bhutanese enjoy full Bhutanese citizenship.

Diversity in the political party system will also be limited, as the majority party will form the government, and the second largest party the opposition. It now looks like only two political parties will contest the 2008 elections. At the end of November 2007, based on rather vague reasons, the Election Commission rejected the application of a third party. Both registered parties have close links to the royal family, of which the Bhutanese refugees have been particularly critical. Importantly, none of the existing political parties in exile are registered for the elections, and refugee-related issues remain unresolved. The last census, carried out in 2005, does not include the names of the refugees – since they had already fled Bhutan – and they will therefore not be registered to vote in the 2008 elections.

The National Front for Democracy Bhutan, a coalition of Bhutanese political parties in exile, has submitted an alternative draft constitution to the King. Stressing their constructive attitude towards democratization in Bhutan, the organization formed its own drafting committee and organized a wide range of discussions and consultations. The resulting alternative draft constitution is very similar to the official version but differs in some crucial areas, notably in article six, which deals with citizenship. It is, however, unlikely that article 6 – which repeats the requirements of the 1985 Citizenship Act – will be changed.

Further to this, the 2005 census defined 13 % of the remaining population of Bhutan as non-nationals.11 About 82.000 people will thus not receive citizenship cards and, consequently, not be allowed to vote. No exact figures are available but it is widely believed that many of them are Lhotshampas. From southern Bhutan Lhotshampas report that only people classified as F1 (Genuine Bhutanese citizens) or F4 (Non-national women married to Bhutanese men, and their children) receive a citizenship card. Moreover, those classified in the other categories usually do not have a No Objection Certificate.

According to many Bhutan researchers, the constitution could create a snowball effect with regard to democratization. Through the establishment of political parties, many more citizens will have the opportunity to participate in Bhutanese politics. In addition, through competition between different parties, people may gradually become more aware about their rights and how they are enshrined in the constitution. It remains unclear, however, how this will affect the Lhotshampas still living in Bhutan, or indeed those who have been forced to live in exile for the past 18 years. Many Lhotshampas actually fear it will become increasingly difficult to continue living in Bhutan.

Fallacies of Democracy

Democracy has the rule, set of principles under which the democratic governments run. The structure basically does not differ with countries because such change would raise questions on credibility on democracy.

See here Jigme’s democracy has different root. This is not based on the principles of democracy that most of us learn and is being practiced around the world. The constitution has not been approved, which though is not a constitution in real sense. Instead, other foolish laws formulated to suit the constitution have already been enforced. The peculiarities are gradually coming up. In democracy, people have the right to thought of conscience. People have the right to speech and express allegiance to a certain faith.

These are not in Jigme’s case because he always said Bhutan will have a peculiar democray. Might be, he has invented a new form of democracy that operates under undue suppression and direct control from this dictator.

The Sherubtse College sometime back terminated two students for alleged involvement in politics. While the laws demands that graduates to run the election, the students appearing graduate degrees are not allowed to talk politics. Along this, the ‘fool-intellectuals’ who held powers for several years, raise question on maturity of the fresh graduate on politics and political principles. Without allowing the students to talk political issues, participate in political activities, ca we expect any matured politicians from new generation? Or is it the only those who attended the university degrees in foreign land allowed to join the politics.

Can we expect removal of political science from the curriculum of Royal Bhutan University and the Sherubtse College to avoid students from talking politics?

On the other hand, the Election Commission has warned the parties not to form any wings such as youths, students, women, farmers, trade unions……… Can a democratic party become complete without having such components? Hope, Jigme is copying some of the examples from China as well. Similarly, the district administration in Chukha has expelled two tshogpas from their responsibilities merely for attending a party meeting. In my course of democracy studies, I have never found that local government remains out of politics. In all democracies, the local governments are elected by the people and such local bodies are group of members affiliated to various political parties. This is the fundamental structure through which the political parties implement their priorities and programmes. Similar, incidents are likely to appear in other districts like Paro, Dagana, Yangtse and others.

Here, the local governments are designed to be like the national bureaucracy. They do not join the politics, they do not represent the political parties but implement the programmes designed by the parties. To point out at other corner, the trade union bill has been prepared but workers are not allowed to form trade unions. The workers have restricted from their right to collective bargaining.

Is this a democracy?

[http://lhapaa.wordpress.com/category/uncategorized/October 9, 2007 · Filed under Uncategorized]

SECTION III

DURABLE SOLUTION

At the end of 2006, the offer from the United States and several other countries to accept at least 85.000 refugees sparked both hope and tension in the refugee camps. Many are happy finally to be able to leave the camps, and naturally, many parents are anxious to give their children a better future. Some of the refugee leaders, however, criticize the fact that this solution only addresses the humanitarian needs of the refugees, while the original reasons for the Bhutanese refugee crisis are political. They argue that resettlement in third countries allows Bhutan to get away with the ethnic cleansing of about one sixth of its population. The international community depended upon consent from the GoN, and once the green light came in November 2007, UNHCR and some of the resettlement countries’ governments initiated a information campaign among the refugees. Actual resettlement has already begun early 2008, while voluntary repatriation is still not an option for the [Bhutan: Land of Happiness for the Selected, Norwegian Refugee Council, June 2008]

In November 2005, Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and the United States organized themselves into the Core Working Group on Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal, in which the European Commission participates as an observer. The Core Group aims to find durable solutions to the Bhutanese refugee problem, and encourages the governments of Bhutan and Nepal to cooperate with UNHCR. The RGOB has been called upon to provide written terms and conditions of return in order to implement the commitments to repatriation made in 2003, and to ensure that conditions in the country will not cause further forced displacement. The members of the Core Group are willing to provide assistance with repatriation efforts and a number of particularly vulnerable refugees have been accepted for third country resettlement.

Ground Update

The Bhutanese refugees, who were initially against the idea of third-country resettlement, hoping instead to be repatriated to their homes – have expressing stronger interest to UNHCR and IOM for third-country resettlement. The two agencies have been facilitating their resettlement since 2007.

By November 2008, a total of more than 6000 refugees have departed for the USA, Canada, The Netherlands, Denmark, Australia, New Zealand and Norway. More countries in Europe have shown interest in housing refugees from Bhutan but so far there has been no confirmation of additional offers. To date, more than 50,000 Bhutanese refugees have registered their desire for resettlement The numbers could grow immensely as they become aware of better lives [abroad] rather than the hardship of living in the camps.

However, there remain security concerns due to constant threats by underground organizations run by some refugees who advocate for repatriation and against resettlement. One of them includes the Bhutan Communist Party, which has often been blamed for intimidating refugees against applying for resettlement. However, as more refugees declared their desire to leave openly, the threats had decreased. In fact, several of those who supported the BCP have also applied for third-country resettlement themselves.

Since the resettlement offer first emerged in 2006, refugees’ conflicting opinions about resettlement have resulted in a highly charged camp atmosphere in which hope, resentment, and anxiety have all played significant roles. At stake for those who oppose resettlement is the loss of their political movement, the loss of their community and the loss of the dream of returning to Bhutan. ‘We have worked for so many years to make repatriation a reality,’ lamented one refugee. ‘With resettlement, I fear that we will give it all up.’

Implicit in this view is the opinion that the option of resettlement is disastrous, not only for those who espouse it, but for everyone, because declining numbers of refugees in the camps lessen the urgency of promoting repatriation. Thus ‘anti-resettlement’ refugees have discouraged resettlement in a number of ways, from publishing statements to issuing threats to engaging in actual violence against ‘pro-resettlement’ refugees. For their part, pro-resettlement refugees want to be able to promote, discuss and apply for resettlement openly. Some insist that anti-resettlement refugees only care about losing power while others accuse anti-resettlement factions of being self-serving. ‘They have land, money, maybe even citizenship here in Nepal,’ asserts one refugee. ‘For them, it is no problem to stay and they want the rest of us to stay too.'

A more sympathetic view of anti-resettlement groups may instead label them ‘pro-repatriation’ as their aim is to shift the focus of the international refugee regime away from resettlement and toward repatriation. ‘Repatriation was the entirety of their political career,’ notes one journalist. ‘If the refugees go, their constituency is gone.'

Anti-resettlement Activity

Several stakeholders, including UNHCR officials, NGO employees and other agencies estimate that there are no more than about a hundred people actively opposed to resettlement. Whether this number is accurate is difficult to ascertain, but it is certain that the anti-resettlement presence has made itself known in powerful ways. First, camp elections in 2007 shifted the power dynamics in the camps. Prior to these elections, most refugees elected to the Camp Management Committee (CMC) were pro resettlement or neutral. In 2007, however, a new round of camp elections ushered in an almost entirely pro-repatriation/anti-resettlement slate of CMC officers. There were allegations that pro-resettlement candidates were intimidated into not standing for election, but these could not be substantiated. Since the CMC is one of the most effective channels to deliver information to camp residents, a lack of cooperation on the CMC’s part could impede the distribution of resettlement information.

Second, several stakeholders claim that anti resettlement leaders have influenced young refugees who are susceptible to manipulation. The then-Country Director of UNHCR’s Nepal office noted that ‘youth are being persuaded by elders to act violently…. They encourage this rebellious attitude.’ This oft-repeated argument, however, is undermined by new research that contends that Lhotshampa refugee youth are not being

manipulated by others, but are, instead, educated, competent and rational actors who have embraced political groups advocating violence at the same time that they promote human rights and children’s rights in the camps. This argument indicates that anti-resettlement youth may have given careful thought to the possibility of resettlement, and may continue to reject it categorically even after exposure to UNHCR pamphlets and information sessions. It may also indicate that there are more than 100 anti-resettlement activists, because youth may be taking the initiative to pursue anti-resettlement activities, rather than only following the orders of leaders.

Third, pro-resettlement refugees (i.e., those who have welcomed visiting delegations and/or personally expressed an interest in resettling) have been threatened. ‘There are lots of handwritten notes,’ asserts one refugee. ‘I have found a note in my hut that says, “We will end your life if you choose to resettle.” They are genuinely playing an emotional game with people that have nothing.’ An article in the Himalayan News Service reported that in November 2007, sixty-two refugees appealed to the police for protection after receiving death threats. The article reported that the anti-resettlement groups ‘told the refugees that they will be forgiven and allowed to remain in peace if they recant from their pro-(re)settlement stance.’

Fourth, pro-resettlement refugees have been subject to attacks on several occasions. These attacks underscore the depth of the resentment that resettlement has wrought:

• In May 2007, the pro-resettlement secretary of Beldangi II was attacked for espousing resettlement openly. In the ensuing clash, in which Nepal’s Armed Police Force (APF) protected the secretary, one refugee was killed. • In December 2007, one individual interested in resettlement was shot in the town of Damak, indicating that violence associated with resettlement is not confined to the camps themselves. The group that claimed responsibility for the attack claimed that its actions were specifically geared to ‘foil’ resettlement. • In early May 2008, nine masked men attacked an IOM bus that was carrying refugees being processed for resettlement, an incident that ‘shocked’ UNHCR. The bus was substantially vandalised and the driver and some of the refugees inside were injured.

The threat of and actual violence surrounding the resettlement issue have further inflamed and divided the refugee community and created an undercurrent of fear in the refugee camps. People seem to be scared even to express interest in resettlement. The tension between pro- and anti-resettlement factions is made worse by the fact that each side claims that the other manipulates the truth to achieve its aims. Anti-resettlement groups allege that refugees who want to resettle actually manufacture threats to demonstrate false vulnerability as a way of expediting their own resettlement claims. ‘They will pay a radical boy 12 thousand rupees (nearly $200 USD) to dismantle their hut, just so that the victim will be resettled first,’ explained one refugee leader. Pro-resettlement refugees accuse anti-resettlement groups of manufacturing evidence to try to prevent resettlement. Knowing that most resettlement countries will likely not resettle anyone who has been involved in violent activity, anti- resettlement groups can easily jeopardize an applicant’s chances for resettlement by suggesting affiliation with insurgent groups. Such evidence can easily come in the form of a receipt for a contribution to one of several communist or Maoist groups. Over the past several years, thousands of Lhotshampa refugees have donated to these organizations, either willingly or through fear or coercion.

Violence and the fear of violence have polarized the camps somewhat, but it is important to remember that the majority of camp residents do not fall neatly into the pro- or anti resettlement factions. Many families want to decide their futures together, and have, until the present, not made up their minds. The next few years will be very difficult for these refugees as they navigate the needs of family, the opinions of friends and pressures from anti resettlement groups. On June 30, 2008, an explosion at the office of the IOM in Damak destroyed part of the building near its main gate. The JTMM-J subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack. In sum, refugees must be able to exercise their freedom of decision regarding durable solutions (it also applies to those who are not willing to go for resettlement and rather pursue their right to return home) and protect them from harassment, intimidation and the use of force.

Confusion and Anxiety

According to Banki, despite concerted efforts by UNHCR to conduct information campaigns for all camp residents beginning in November 2007, including the distribution of UNHCR information pamphlets in local languages and in English, refugees lack information about many aspects of the resettlement process. Threats and violence have also meant that some refugees fear asking questions about resettlement in a public forum. There are even indications that some individuals publicly opposed to resettlement have, in private, requested it, indicating how unwilling people truly are to express their interest in resettlement openly. Under such circumstances, where refugees feel uncomfortable both expressing interest in resettlement and asking questions to alleviate their concerns, it is not surprising that rumours have thrived.

There is also confusion surrounding the process of applying and interviewing for resettlement. Depending on the resettlement country, refugees may be asked to meet with different personnel (UNHCR, resettlement country representatives and IOM staff) as many as five times. The process, from first interview to flight departure, is expected to take six months on average, if no extenuating circumstances present themselves. But some refugees confuse an expression of interest (made by letter or in person at UNHCR) with an interview, and the wait thereafter feeds their anxiety.

Further, situations of polygamous marriage, separated children and extended families complicate the resettlement process. While such complications do not necessarily stop resettlement, but only slow it, refugees who are impatient to leave, or fear remaining in the camps after they have expressed their wish to resettle, have discussed feelings of nervousness and fear because resettlement doesn’t occur immediately.

Because the resettlement process is just beginning, refugees’ fears of being left behind have not yet materialised. Over time, however, refugees may be rejected for a variety of reasons: medical problems, participation in insurgent forces, or other particularities having to do with resettlement country policies. It can be anticipated that rejected refugees (or those who do not resettle because family members have chosen not to) will undergo stress and depression, as has been documented in other refugee camps where populations are left behind. Because several resettlement countries are committed to taking large numbers of Lhotshampa refugees, the phenomenon will likely not be as widespread, as, for example, in Dadaab camp in Kenya, where the percentages of refugees who are actually accepted for resettlement are miniscule. Nevertheless, refugee depression and anxiety, already a cause of concern in the camps, may increase significantly in such situations.

Resettlement Rumors

• Refugees must pay back all the expenses incurred during the resettlement process. • Once left from the camp, they will never be allowed to return neither to Bhutan nor Nepal. • Refugees are being ‘sold’ to resettlement countries for slave labour. • All refugees will be forced to eat beef, pork and drink alcohol. • Refugees will be barred from practicing their religion and culture. • Resettlement countries will not take applicants who are old and infirm. • Refugees will be scattered in a dozen places of remotest states. Refugees will be forced to fight in Iraq for the U.S. military • Refugees will be taken in ship and will be thrown out at the middle of the ocean. • • A button on the airplane will eject refugees when the airplane flies over the ocean

• Pro-resettlement individuals received money from UNHCR to say positive things about foreign countries • Canada is so cold that it will be almost impossible to give birth. • In Australia, refugees will be forced to work in the desert above 55 degree celcious. • India promotes resettlement because it wants to send the refugees far away. • After several years, resettlement countries will force refugees to move once again, to another country

Future Direction

After 18 years, a lasting solution to the plight of Lhotshampa refugees is now available. In March 2008, over 100 Lhotshampa refugees boarded planes to the U.S., one of several countries that have agreed to resettle this refugee population. Other countries to offer resettlement to the Lhotshampas include New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Australia. There is no limit on the number of camp residents who can be resettled, and now that the GoN has begun issuing exit visas for those accepted for resettlement, it is estimated that the process of resettling all who are accepted for resettlement will take between five and seven years. As of May 2008, the UNHCR in Nepal has already received nearly 30,000 expressions of interest in resettlement, representing nearly one-third of the entire refugee population.

Although few refugees will discuss the matter publicly, resettlement has raised the hopes of many refugees. Some ask questions that reveal an eagerness to begin a new life outside the confines of a refugee camp, expressing excitement and apprehension in the same breath. Similarly, some parents (particularly the educated) who have watched their children lose out on educational and economic opportunities are focused on ensuring a better future for their children. And local news sources have reported that refugees who intend to resettle are more positive and hopeful than they have been for years. While these impacts on morale are indeed positive, it is important to note that they offer hope to those resettling, rather than to the remaining population.

The departure of large numbers of refugees over a relatively short period of time will significantly alter the camp population and structure. As with any significant change, this one will have both positive and negative impacts on the remaining refugees – those who don’t want to resettle, those who cannot resettle and those who haven’t yet resettled – and surrounding communities. As the resettlement program gets under way, there is a need to anticipate some of these changes, so that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and policymakers can craft policies that reinforce the positive aspects of resettlement while developing policies and programs to address the negative consequences.

24 Bhutanese resettled in Saint-Jerome, Canada

Canada, December 11: The first group of the exiled Bhutanese landed here safely in Toronto Pearson International Airport, Canada on December 8.

As per a highly-placed government source, these people will be settled in a place called Saint-Jerome, a town some 40 kilometer away from Montreal which is one of the biggest cities in Quebec. Quebec mostly has settlers from France who speak French. No details about the relocated families are disclosed regarding the number and status of the newcomers.

According to the office of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the next group from Nepal is scheduled to arrive here in early 2009 and will be settled in various provinces of Canada including Charlottetown, and Prince Edward Island.

[Source: APFA News/Contributed by Madan Kumar Giri/Charlottetown, Canada]

The issues outlined above will not be resolved easily and the prospects for quick solutions are dim. For refugees in Nepal this means the challenge of living in exile and struggling to hold together their families and society under trying circumstances. For southern Bhutanese in Bhutan this means continued insecurity and exposure to the threats of violence and deportation. For all there is the continuing fight to have the RGOB recognize legitimate claims to nationality and legitimate claims to live according to one's own culture. The contrast between the image of Bhutan as Shangri-la and the reality of southern Bhutan is hard for many to accept. Yet Bhutan has a long history of strong action to protect its borders from perceived threats of invasion. The fierce passion of the northern Bhutanese in protecting their culture is not in itself the problem. It is the manifestation of this cultural protection in the denial of the human rights of the southern Bhutanese that must be condemned. The RGOB cannot make the simple equation that advocating for the rights of the southern Bhutanese is the same as advocating for the extinction of the Drukpa culture. Hope for the future lies in the belief that in Bhutan there is room for both the northern and southern cultures. Diversity is not a luxury reserved for large countries and can be an aspect of Bhutan's distinct national culture.

The durable solution for Bhutanese refugees requires a three-pronged strategy. First, resettlement should be a genuine option for as many refugees as want it with fully informed choice. This means that other countries should join in a coordinated effort to maximize the number of resettlement places. Bhutanese refugees living outside the camps in Nepal and India should also be eligible to this option. Second, Nepal should grant citizenship to those refugees who express a preference for local integration over resettlement or repatriation as a genuine demonstration of a traditional hospitality to the asylees. Finally, the United States, India, EU and other countries should redouble their efforts to persuade Bhutan to allow refugees who want to repatriate to do so under conditions that are compatible with international human rights law. The Core countries must press Bhutan for a genuinely comprehensive solution to this protracted refugee situation. The decline in advancing the cause of refugees by the international community means a clean chit to the despotic royal regime which may provoke for another round of flushing of its own people.

It is vital for refugee leadership now to seek strength within the resettlement and charter a long-term strategy for global campaign on larger freedom in Bhutan so that their right to return will be secured.

The End

SECTION-IV ANNEXES

A. Statements

1. Nepal Bhutan Ministerial Joint Committee and Joint Verification Team Report

TWELFTH MINISTERIAL JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING Kathmandu, 5-7 February 2003

JOINT PRESS RELEASE

The Ministerial Joint Committee (MJC) of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the Royal Government of Bhutan held its twelfth meeting in Kathmandu from 5-7 February 2003 to discuss the harmonization of positions of the two governments and the resumption of work by the Joint Verification Team (JVT) towards finding an early and lasting solution to the problem of the people in the camps in eastern Nepal.

His Excellency Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley, Minister for Foreign Affairs, led the Bhutanese delegation that included Mr. Daw Penjo, Officiating Joint Secretary and other senior officials of the Ministry of foreign Affairs. His Excellency Narendra Bikram Shah, Minister for Foreign Affairs, led the Nepalese delegation that included H. E. Dr. Bhekh Bahadur Thapa, Royal Nepalese Ambassador to Bhutan, Mr. Madhu Raman Acharya, Foreign Secretary, and other senior officials. The Foreign Minister of Bhutan expressed appreciation for the warm welcome and hospitality extended to his delegation by His Majesty’s Government of Nepal.

His Majesty the King of Nepal granted an audience to the leader of the Bhutanese delegation on 6 February 2003. The Bhutanese delegation also called on the Prime Minister of Nepal, Rt. Honourable Lokendra Bahadur Chand. The two Ministers expressed their firm resolve and commitment to arrive at a lasting solution to the issue of the people in the camps in Nepal through the bilateral process. The two Ministers commended the efforts of the Joint Verification Team and the two Ambassadors in New Delhi in carrying out their important responsibilities to the mutual satisfaction of both the governments.

The two sides harmonized their positions on the four categories. It was agreed that the JVT would resume its work in Bhutan from 24 February 2003 to undertake the work of categorization. It was agreed that the next Ministerial Joint Committee meeting will be held in Thimphu from 24 March 2003. The two Ministers exchanged views on several areas of mutual interest to further promote and strengthen friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries. They expressed mutual satisfaction with the progress achieved during the twelfth MJC, which was held in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere.

2. Bhutanese Refugees: Pawn in the hands of governments and politicians

The Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese ethnicity are once again in the eye of a controversy. This time it is about the offer of the US government to resettle about 60,000 refugees in the United States. A section of the Nepalese and international media as well as some NGOs are projecting the US offer as an attempt to weaken the unity and the resolve of the Bhutanese refugees to 'return to their homeland'. It seems that all the well-wishers of the Bhutanese refugees are convinced that 'repatriation to Bhutan' is the best and the ideal solution. Under the UN Convention on Refugees there are three options for durable solution: 1. Return to the country of origin. 2. Rehabilitation in the host country. 3. Resettlement in a third country. The UDHR also guarantees the right of every person to seek asylum. Though the UN convention on refugees does not indicate that any of the three is the most preferred, 'return' has somehow emerged as the most preferred solution.

While it is nice to think 'return' as the ideal solution and hope that when every one went back home, the neighbours would came over and hug the returning families and all of them would settle down happily and life would restart from where it was 'stopped' at the moment of departure. But this as we all know never happens in reality. Experience shows that 'return' is one of the most difficult solutions. The reasons which had forced the refuges to leave their home and hearth often remain powerfully alive. The involvement of the government, political groups and sections of the neighbours and the violence that was perpetrated by a combination of these forces is a memory the refugees can not forget. The very first requirement of a 'returnee' is a protection against those forces. And this can not happen unless the government of the state is committed to provide that security and the assistance to the returnees which are essential for successful resettlement in their home country. The South Asian experiences of return, be it the case of Rohingyas to Myanmar from Bangladesh, Chakmas to Bangladesh from India and Sri Lankan Tamils from India to Sri Lanka have been extremely painful for all the returnee communities.

Under these circumstances the hope of 'return' for the Bhutanese refugees defies reality. Since the arrival of the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal in 1990-91, Nepal government has made every effort to secure their 'right to return'. During the 17 rounds of the so-called bilateral dialogue with the RGOB, Nepal government gave into almost all the demands of Bhutan including to the obnoxious policy of 'categorisation and verification of the refugees by a joint team of Nepal and Bhutan'. However, all the efforts of Nepal government achieved nothing. The refugees are still stuck in the seven camps in eastern Nepal. The first country of asylum for the Bhutanese refugees was and is India. After being uprooted from their homes and pushed inside Indian Territory, the refugees found they were unwanted there. Indian authorities showed no sympathy. They did not recognize their status as citizens of Bhutan. On the Bhutanese refugee issue, Indian government has refused to seriously dialogue with Bhutan government and has prevented Nepal from taking the issue to the UN. Senior Indian bureaucrats and political leaders prefer following a policy of non- interference in the internal affairs of Bhutan, its trusted ally and dependable supplier of energy resources. Political leaders from the Congress, CPI (M) and AGP in West Bengal and Assam felt that the government should stay out of the question of the claims of Nepalese settlers in south Bhutan to Bhutanese citizenship rights, as it might boomerang on India. Already India was confronted with the unregulated movement of masses of Nepalese people from the eastern and western hill regions of Nepal. In other words, the Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese ethnicity were seen as Nepal's problem and therefore were pushed into Nepal.

During a discussion with Mr Shyam Saran, the then Indian Foreign Secretary, when I asked why India had pressurized Nepal to accept the blatantly unfair Bhutanese demand for 'categorisation and verification' of the refugees as a precondition for Bhutan's recognition of these people as its citizens, he explained, it was the only terms on which Bhutanese government was agreeable. It would appear that India was trying to get Bhutan to take back a few, thus saving Nepal's face, and then the rest could be resettled in India and Nepal. Apparently Indian government had assured Nepal that it would share a part of the burden of re-settling the remaining Bhutanese refugees. According to Mr. Saran, Bhutan's offer to take back a small number of refugees from Khudnabari camp after the completion of the first round 'categorisation and verification' was acceptable to the government of Nepal and the Bhutanese refugees. The return of people identified as category 1 and category 2, was expected to have paved the way for resolving the refugee crisis. Mr. Saran blamed the UNHCR and human rights NGO for destroying that opportunity by campaigning against Bhutan's offer, motivating the refugees to reject it.

It should be added, that the Bhutanese offer for persons in category 1 (citizens wrongly evicted) was that they could return but would receive no support for their rehabilitation nor would they be any restitution of their property. For people in category 2 (who left voluntarily) on return, they would have to live in designated camps. Only one member of the family would get employment. After eight years they could regain full citizenship, if they passed an examination to prove their loyalty to the nation and the king of Bhutan.

Government of Nepal is not willing to resettle the Bhutanese refugees in their country. Mr. K. P. Oli, the Deputy Prime Minister of Nepal had told me that there is no question of Nepal granting citizenship to the Bhutanese refugees. In my discussions with successive Nepalese Foreign and Home Ministers as well as leaders of Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (UML), I was firmly told – the Government of Nepal was not ready to explore the 'third country resettlement option'. Evidently, 'return to Bhutan' was an article of faith of Nepalese foreign policy and no politician was willing to tinker with it. I also felt that behind this inflexible policy stance was an effort to cover the humiliation at the failure to get Bhutan to take back the people of Nepalese ethnicity. The need to save 'face' is epitomized in the ludicrous response of Nepal's Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala to the US offer for resettlement of Bhutanese refugees - all the Bhutanese refugees should return to Bhutan even for a day before they go to another country for rehabilitation. Mr Oli had told me that 'return of the refugees' was a part of the larger vision of a 'democratic Bhutan'.

Now, Bhutanese politicians in exile, young revolutionaries and Maoist party cadres are campaigning against the offer for resettlement of 60,000 essentially because it has come from the Government of the USA. Some of the older Bhutanese NGOs which have been propagating 'return' as the only demand with the support of the 'revolutionary' groups are intimidation those refugees who would like to explore the possibilities of 'resettlement in a third country'. The claim of the so-called leaders of the refugee community that all the Bhutanese refugees want to return at any cost is a lie. The lie is proved by the fact that all the refugees in category I and II had refused to go back to Bhutan on the terms put forward by the Bhutanese government. The lie is further exposed by the fact thousands of refugees have sent appeals to the UNHCR requesting their resettlement in a third country. In all the training workshops that SAFHR organised on the rights of refugees in the camps during the past four years, overwhelming majority of the participants were keen to learn about the process of resettlement in a third country. The Bhutanese refugees live in the seven camps without any security. Nepal government has withdrawn the police posts from the camps long ago. They have often faced violence from the local communities. A few camp inmates were killed in clashes with local Nepalese on issues of theft of firewood from local forests. Young refugee women have been lured into sex work. There are reported cases of rape of refugee women which have remained unsolved.

It seems, once again the refugees would have to give up this opportunity to rebuild their lives in a new country to fulfil the dreams of the self centred 'elite' political leaders. Not one of the so-called Bhutanese politicians lives inside the camps. All of them have their homes outside the camps. Some also own property in Nepal. Their children study in expensive schools in Nepal and abroad. Obviously the leaders can not afford their captive masses to desert them.

We have been failing the Bhutanese refugees all these years. Let us not let this opportunity pass them by. Let us not stand aside and let these so-called political parties in exile decide the collective fate of all the refugees. It is important for the government of Nepal, the UNHCR and the NGOs to intervene and help those who want to accept the offer of resettlement in the USA. Let some escape the camps where they have been prisoners for the last seventeen years.

(Tapan Kumar Bose, Secretary General, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu, May 21, 2007

3. Drukyul and Delhi's Dilemma

In the changed political transition in Nepal and the new proposal floating on air regarding the resolution of Bhutanese refugee crisis, it seems that the lobby within Indian civil society and political circle to alter Delhi's conventional position is getting stronger. The 2006 conference organized jointly by Druk National Congress, Indo-Bhutan Friendship Society, and Public Interest Legal Support and Research Center in New Delhi, a number of prominent individuals from India including Bhutanese leaders Rongthong Kuenley Dorji, President of Druk National Congress and Dr D.N.S. Dhakal, Founding General Secretary of Bhutan National Democratic Party, has given a new impetus to such effort. The deliberation of Satya Prakash Malaviya, former Union Minister of the Government of India along with Sudhindra Bhadoria is an indication of growing political pressure and support to the cause of refugees from the first country of asylum.

While the Bhutanese leaders were toeing the long held view that India should exercise its diplomatic influence on Thimphu to end the long sufferings of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal and enable the political parties in exile to participate in the forth coming first election to be held Bhutan in 2008, the viewpoints, this time, of the Indian delegates were notably different.

India is doing nothing, making excuse of the security threat form the North, and trampling upon the human rights of the Bhutanese refugees was the assertion of Anand Swoorup Verma, convener of Bhutan Solidarity Group. He further elaborated that earlier the King of Bhutan was the villain in the eyes of the refugees, now it is the government of India according to the recent studies undertaken in the camps. His worry was that the time bomb is tricking in the refugee camps and India will repent for its apathy towards the Bhutanese refugees should the youths in the camps decide to collude with the regional outfits, for example, ULFA, NFDB or KLO in addition to Nepalese Maoists. Now the scenario is different for the Bhutanese refugees; they could have easy access to resources which were not available earlier. All the peaceful efforts have failed in the past to bring about the King to reason. Peaceful March, whether Satyagrah or Dharna, are no longer relevant in the context of Bhutan, and the assertion was made that the Indian civil society would support any kind of just struggle by the Bhutanese people.

Prominent human rights activist Ravi Nair, who has been working since 1990 on human rights issue of Bhutanese people, concurred with Mr. Verma on the continued indifference of the Indian government and does not see a change in it any time in future. He asserted that the mandarin at the Ministry of External Affairs who go by the tradition of the British Raj has little interest on the plight of ordinary people. They are too busy to enjoy the diplomatic niceties of the Royal Government and believe that the tribal minds in the fringe of the Himalayas lack the diplomatic sophistication of the trained Babu in South Block to harm India’s long-term interest, and this profound belief had been the road block for the Indian government to stand by the Lhotsampa community at the time when they were evicted from their homes in Bhutan.

Ravi Nair, however, warned the refugees against taking arms. If that happens, he cautioned refugees will become stateless people like the Palestinians in the Middle East. The Indian military is bound to crush any armed struggle in Bhutan and the chances for third country resettlement would also vanish. He further asserted that the western world is already aid fatigue. The US pays a large portion of UNHCR’s humanitarian assistance to the Bhutanese refugees. If the refugees miss the US offer for resettlement, they are doomed to become identityless manual workers, hawkers or rickshaw pullers pushing their progenies to never ending cycle of poverty.

In his academic presentation by Prof. Mahendra Lama of JNU, attributed the cause of the refugee problem to xenophobic attitude of the Drukpa regime in Thimphu, and this development occurred after the Sikkim episode in 1974. Referring to articles after articles in the 1958 Citizenship Act, 1977 Citizenship Act, 1980 Marriage Act and 1985 Citizenship Act, he concluded that Bhutan had been resorting to legal measures to block socio-cultural interaction of the Lhotsampa community with Nepali speaking people across the border. The draft constitution maintains the character of the 1985 citizenship laws and if Article 6 is not changed it would be difficult for the refugees, particularly those married with foreigners, to regain their full citizenship rights. Freedom to practice culture, language and religion are inalienable rights of every human being. Bhutan will have to agree to respect those rights of the Lhotsampa people before the refugees are encouraged to consider repatriation.

However, Prof. Lama cautioned the refugee leadership and the Nepal Government to be practical in search for a solution. Comprehensive solution should get the top priority. He pointed out that the burden sharing between Bhutan and the rest of the world could be 40:60 considering the aspiration of that country for population management.

Segregation of people will be the major problem, and in that context he endorsed the proposal put forward by Dr. Dhakal that the king use the royal prerogatives to quash any legal wrangling in the citizenship laws in order to enable category II to become category I and provide thereafter an option for them to exercise either to return to Bhutan or opt for third country resettlements. India, Nepal or the rest of the world could address the statelessness problem of non- Bhutanese people if any, including those not registered in the camps. A negotiation on the number for repatriation without firming up the criteria is not going to resolve Bhutan’s political problem; it will have the potential to precipitate the refugee problem into an ethnic conflict as we see today in Sri Lanka.

Constitution expert R.K. Dhawan and his team have prepared a review on the Bhutan's proposed Draft Constitution. There were mixed reactions. While welcoming the steps to introduce the written constitution, the review team pointed out the lacunas in articles related to the royal privileges and the citizenship issues. However, individual reviewers, for example, Ravi Nair, slammed the draft constitution as an “eye-wash” to the international community. Other speakers, noted columnist Praful Bidwai, Prof Balraj, Prof Arvind Chaturvedi, Prof Anand Kumar and Sri Satyapal reminded the delegates of the conference that the draft constitution opens up the opportunity for future amendments and it would be unwise to reject the proposed constitution altogether keeping in mind the unique situation in Bhutan.

Satya Prakash Malvia is of the opinion that about one seventh of the country’s population is living in exile and a democratic election without their participation will carry no credence in the international community particularly when Bhutan is trying to project itself as a benign nation which places premium on gross national happiness vis-à-vis gross national product. Therefore, an amicable resolution of the refugee problem should find a priority in the task ahead for Bhutan government, and Indo-Bhutan Friendship Society would be happy to play the role of a facilitator to open up a dialogue among the different stakeholders, particularly the Government of India, Nepal and Bhutan and the refugee community. Eventually, the solution will have to be worked out by the Bhutanese themselves: whether they are in the government or in the exile!

Back home, the past failures of the Nepal-Bhutan talks on refugee repatriation needs serious evaluation to ascertain whether it should be continued any longer. It must now assert that it is high time to start afresh with India on board rather than playing the same old record of gramophone. Considering the current volatile political transition associated with arms management, Nepal should seriously explore an immediate amicable comprehensive solution to the refugee crisis before it goes out of hand.

[Gopal Krishna Siwakoti, President, INHURED International]

4. Joint NGO Letter to the Delegates of the Bhutan Donors Roundtable Meeting

Dear Sir/Madam,

Re: Bhutan: Round Table meeting on 15 February 2006

As a group of non-governmental organizations with a long-term involvement with the Bhutanese refugees – through advocacy on behalf of this community as well as in humanitarian service delivery and support – we would like to raise a number of concerns with you in advance of the Round Table meeting of Bhutan’s development partners to be held in Geneva on 15 February 2006. Fifteen years have passed since the forcible exile of the majority of the ethnic Nepali southern Bhutanese population without a durable solution for the approximately 106,000 people now living in the refugee camps in southeastern Nepal. During the last Round Table meeting of Bhutan’s development partners held in Geneva in February 2003, delegates expressed concern at the unconscionably long delay in resolving this humanitarian and human rights crisis. At that meeting, some of Bhutan’s partners also raised the issue of alleged ongoing discrimination against ethnic minorities in Bhutan, including in relation to the issuance of ID cards, and urged that the principle of equal treatment, irrespective of ethnic origin, be established in the new Constitution. We share these concerns, and are dismayed that, three years on, they remain unresolved.

The Round Table meeting to be held in Geneva this month will bring together many of the stakeholders who could play a part in resolving the longstanding Bhutanese refugee crisis. In anticipation of this meeting, we would like to take this opportunity to set out our current concerns and recommendations.

Deadlock in the process for resolving the Bhutanese refugee crisis

In June 2003, after an inexplicably and inexcusably lengthy delay, the Bhutanese government announced the results of a pilot verification exercise conducted in Khudunabari camp in 2001, agreeing to take back those people placed in Categories I (bona fide Bhutanese citizens), II ("voluntary emigrants") and IV ("criminals"): a total of 75% of those screened. Since the end of 2003, the Bhutanese government has periodically declared itself willing to resume bilateral talks, and to honour the agreements already made with Nepal to repatriate at least a proportion of the refugees. However, no concrete steps have been taken to resume bilateral talks with Nepal, or to proceed with voluntary repatriation of any of the refugees. Moreover, guarantees of the conditions of return to Bhutan have been inadequate or entirely lacking.

It must also be remembered that Khudunabari is only one of the seven refugee camps – with a population of only about 12,000 out of the estimated total of 106,000 – and that no steps have yet been taken towards verification in any of the six other refugee camps.

Bhutan’s population figures

Population figures for Bhutan have been notoriously problematic. Results of the nationwide census held in June 2005 suggest that the government may be categorising a significant number of the Lhotshampas (Southern Bhutanese) still living in Bhutan as non-nationals. In 2004, official figures put Bhutan's population at 730,340, and the number of foreign workers in Bhutan at 40,350. The June 2005 census has found the population of Bhutan to be 553,000. We must ask whether the declaration that more than 125,000 non-nationals are working in Bhutan (as stated by the King in October 2005) amounts to a declaration of “denaturalization” of the majority of Lhotshampas remaining in Bhutan. As much as Bhutan’s development partners should not be silent about the history and continuing humanitarian consequences of the discriminatory policies implemented by Bhutan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, neither can they stand by when faced with the prospect of similar numbers of Bhutanese people being deprived of their citizenship in 2006.

Bhutan’s draft Constitution

Elements of Bhutan’s draft Constitution, published in July 2005, tend to confirm our doubts about the possibility of Lhotshampas retaining or reacquiring their citizenship. The citizenship status of Lhotshampas has been eroded by various measures taken since the end of the 1980s. Essentially, what makes their situation precarious is the denial of their right to a nationality. The provisions of the draft Constitution, if followed to the letter, would make it very difficult for Lhotshampas to reacquire citizenship status of which they had been deprived. However, the King, under the terms of the draft Constitution, is above the law and pursuant to his royal prerogative may exercise powers relating to matters which are not provided for under the Constitution or other laws – giving him the possibility of correcting this injustice despite the stipulations of the Constitution.

The need for action

The refugees in the camps have been living in limbo for fifteen years, unable to plan for the future or take control over their lives. Not surprisingly, morale in the camps in Nepal is very low. Refugees are faced with deterioration in both the physical environment and the resources available to them. At the same time the security situation in Nepal has deteriorated severely, putting this vulnerable population at even greater risk. A just and durable solution which will enable the refugees to restore some stability and normalcy to their lives is desperately needed. We believe that sustained international pressure is the only realistic means for achieving a rapid and durable solution to the Bhutanese refugee crisis and for ensuring that members of the Lhotshampa community in Bhutan enjoy their full citizenship rights. We urge Bhutan's development partners to press for implementation of the following recommendations. 1. Bhutan must take practical and concrete steps to demonstrate its stated commitment to a just resolution of the longstanding refugee crisis. It should, among other actions, proceed immediately to repatriate the Khudunabari camp refugees verified as having a right to return to Bhutan and who wish to do so.

2. Bhutan, Nepal and UNHCR should adopt a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for voluntary repatriation that includes a clear statement of rights and entitlements upon the refugees’ return to Bhutan - including full

citizenship rights and human rights protections. The MOU must include a provision for monitoring of repatriation by an independent third party, ideally UNHCR.

3. An accelerated and simplified verification exercise needs to be carried out in the six camps which have not yet been screened, based on two categories only: Bhutanese and non-Bhutanese.

4. A registration exercise needs to be carried out urgently (by UNHCR or an appropriate NGO) to provide a baseline census of the entire current camp population. Those refugees in most immediate need should be identified, and the interest of individual refugees/households in each of the three durable solutions (voluntary repatriation to Bhutan, resettlement in third countries, and local integration in Nepal) assessed.

5. Donors, UN agencies and Bhutan's other partners should insist on measures to eliminate discrimination against Lhotshampas who have remained in Bhutan since the exodus of refugees, and to ensure the protection of their fundamental human rights and their right to participate as full citizens of Bhutan.

6. Bhutan’s development partners should urge the King to exercise his royal prerogative to regularize the nationality status of Lhotshampas who have no prospect of claiming any nationality other than Bhutanese.

7. Donors should provide increased support for new programs and projects in the south of Bhutan and the east of Nepal to create new economic and educational opportunities which do not discriminate in purpose or effect, including on the basis of race or ethnicity; and to facilitate voluntary repatriation and local integration.

8. Pending a full resolution of the crisis, donors should seek assurances from the Government of Nepal that it will not obstruct the exit of refugees wishing to leave Nepal, especially for vulnerable cases or those requiring protection. In expectation of clear and concrete progress in the forthcoming Round Table discussions, we remain,

February 9, 2006

5. Bhutan's Ethnic Cleansing

Although Bhutanese police initially listed Nepal-based exile groups as their top bombing suspects, their suspicions were based more on their knowledge of historical grievances than forensic evidence. A hitherto unknown group, the United Revolutionary Front of Bhutan, claimed responsibility, saying that Thimpu’s changes were cosmetic and would not benefit all Bhutanese. Though such bombings are never justified, the alarms they sound should not be ignored. This salvo should warn the government to be inclusive in its experiment with democratization. To start, it needs to address a blot on Bhutanese history that remains unresolved.

In the late 1980s Bhutanese elites regarded a growing ethnic Nepali population as a demographic and cultural threat. The government enacted discriminatory citizenship laws directed against ethnic Nepalis, that stripped about one-sixth of the population of their citizenship and paved the way for their expulsion. After a campaign of harassment that escalated in the early 1990s, Bhutanese security forces began expelling people, first making them sign forms renouncing claims to their homes and homeland. “The army took all the people from their houses,” a young refugee told me. “As we left Bhutan, we were forced to sign the document. They snapped our photos. The man told me to smile, to show my teeth. He wanted to show that I was leaving my country willingly, happily, that I was not forced to leave.” Today, about 108,000 of these stateless Bhutanese are living in seven refugee camps in Nepal. The Bhutanese authorities have not allowed a single refugee to return. In 2006, the US government, seeing an impasse, offered to resettle 60,000 of the Bhutanese refugees. Processing has been slow to start, and the first refugees are not likely to depart until March.

After 17 years of deadlock, the coincidental synchronization of elections in Bhutan and resettlement of Bhutanese refugees to the United States plays into the fears of some refugees, who believe the US is conspiring with Bhutan to keep ethnic Nepalis from repatriating and asserting their rights. These refugees insist that return to Bhutan is the only acceptable solution and they are increasingly intimidating refugees who want to accept the US offer - through beatings, burning huts, and death threats.

Even if the Bhutanese government were to respect their right to repatriate under international law, its treatment of the ethnic Nepalis who still live in Bhutan suggests that the basic rights of returnees cannot be guaranteed.

A Bhutanese government census in 2005 classified 13 percent of Bhutan’s current population as 'non-nationals', meaning that they are not only ineligible to vote, but are denied a wide range of other rights. An ethnic Nepali non- national living in Bhutan told Human Rights Watch, “they don’t ask me to leave, but they make me so miserable, I will be forced to leave. I have no identification, so I cannot do anything, go anywhere, get a job.”

The militants should not deny their fellow refugees the choice of going to the United States or remaining in Nepal. But a genuine choice between resettlement, integration in Nepal, or return to Bhutan can only happen if Bhutan allows refugees to return and restores their rights. Bhutan should make citizenship available to all people with legitimate claims, including the refugees who can trace their statelessness to the events of the early 1990s.

If Bhutan aspires to be truly democratic, it should choose a path of reconciliation with the disenfranchised ethnic Nepalese inside and outside its borders. If instead it deliberately excludes many of its people, it may strengthen the hand of the militants and discover that simply holding elections will bring neither real democracy nor peace.

[Bill Frelick, Refugee Policy Director of Human Rights Watch.] January 31, 2008

6. "OUR PARTY IS GETTING READY FOR 2008 ELECTION"

- Rongthong Kuenley Dorji

Rongthong Kuenley Dorji, president of Druk National Congress was once a top leader in Bhutanese political movement. However, while he was trying to garner support from Indian friends, he was arrested by Indian authority and sent to jail. With special request from the Bhutanese government, Indian attempted his extradition but failed. One year later, he was released but restricted to leave New Delhi. He said his party may take part in the election to be held in 2008. Based in the Indian capital, Dorji talked to Bhutan News Service on contemporary Bhutanese politics. Excerpts:

How the Bhutanese political movement moving ahead ? RK: You are indeed well aware of fact that Bhutanese king has announced to established democracy in 2008 and this itself is the testimony of progress made by Bhutanese political movement. It is only obvious that political movement hereafter will always move forward.

What have you done in New Delhi during your long stay ? RK: The Government of India arrested me at the behest of Royal Government of Bhutan in 1997. Initially I was kept for fifty days in Lumpur Beggar House. After twelve months in Tihar jail, I was release on bail in 1998 with conditions that I should report local police station twice a week and cannot go out of New Delhi jurisdiction. The extradition proceeding is continuing at the Delhi Court. In spite of my limited option, I have organized many conference, symposium and seminar on Bhutanese political and refugees issues here. Every Indian leaders, academicians and intellectuals are aware of Bhutanese political and refugee issues and expressed their solidarity and moral support. Recently, we have released the CD and cassettes on Democracy and Human Rights Education Program. We have distributed thousands of CD and cassettes all over Bhutan.

What you think would the result of resettlement offered by the US and the UNHCR ? RK: We have welcomed the US and UNHCR offer. However, we categorically stressed that Bhutanese nationals should merit first priority from non-nationals for any settlement. Any result will be positive if it unshackles their present ordeal.

Resettlement will not hamper Bhutanese political movement. It is a misconception that only refugees are engaged in political movement. Every Bhutanese citizen inside country is desperate to breathe the air of freedom and democracy. The intensity of democratic aspirations of people has already risen and it will continue to ascend.

How have you taken the latest development is refugee issue ? RK: This development is positive and I welcome it. However, US reminded that the Bhutanese government must show good faith to repatriate a ‘small number’ of Bhutanese nationals. Now, the ball is in Bhutan’s court. I believe that resumption of ULFA camps in Bhutan would not take place without the consent of RGoB (Royal Government Of Bhutan).

What you expect the role of India in Bhutan's politics ? RK: Bhutan and India enjoys sort of fraternal relationship and the role of India in Bhutan’s politics will be pivotal. Involvement of India in repatriation of refugees will naturally come as Bhutan and Nepal doesn’t share common boundary. First and foremost verification of refugees on line of national and non-national (Bhutanese and non- Bhutanese) must be completed before any talk on repatriation.

Is India proactive in refugee issue? Why ? RK: The involvement of India in refugee issues is inevitable and displays the presence behind the scene. However, definite concerted effort from the refugee leaders to lobby and canvass in India is lacking. Refugee leaders have even failed to pursue the government of Nepal in this issue. Engagement in mudsling in camps politics will only rub the salt on sore wounds. Your party cautiously welcomed the new draft of constitution. In want sense it is good and what it lacks? Does it encompass all demands raised during the political movement ? RK: Our party welcomed the released of draft constitution because it is a first ever written constitution of Bhutan. This development is a fruition of our effort to certain degree. It is good that some sort of democratic institution is going to be instituted. The drastic replacement of old order by new order cannot be viable to Bhutan. Changes needs to seep slowly so that foundations of democratic institution in Bhutan become firm and strong to withstand future challenges. It certainly doesn’t encompass all the democratic demands. However, it is totally ridiculous on part of refugees to bring out constitution. Every one is entitled to criticism and suggestions. There is an amendment provision in draft constitution (RGoB version) so that all the demands of public are adequately accommodated.

How do you analyse the role of international community and that of UN at this period of repatriating refugee and political change in Bhutan ? RK: The role of international community and that of UN is very important and must play as a constructive player. At the same time, it cannot force its opinion/decision on the Royal Government of Bhutan because Bhutan too is a member of UN and mutual and amicable consensus must evolve. The neighboring countries must also come forward to support the political changes in Bhutan including refugee repatriation.

How have you taken the philosophy of GNH ? RK: At present moment, I cannot subscribe to the philosophy of GNH. I cannot give affirmative answer to suitability of philosophy to Bhutan. So far Bhutan is plagued by vast difference in haves and haves-not. There are massive differences in developments activities. One particular region has skyrocketed in living standard whereas other region lies below poverty. Therefore, we cannot draw conclusion on the state of Gross National Happiness.

Will your party also accept the election going to be held in 2008 ? RK: Obviously, we will accept it because we have already welcomed the draft constitution. Our members inside Bhutan are getting ready for the 2008 election. I am of view that RGoB should grant all political parties the opportunity to participate in the historical election.

What should be the political system of Bhutan ? RK: According to draft constitution, Bhutan is poised to institute two-party system with bi-cameral legislature. It is the wishes of people to determine the system that is most suitable and stable to country. Even the economic policy will be subjected to the wishes of people. Communism has begun to rise in Bhutan. It is natural and no one can stop it. [Source: APFA News]

2. RESETTLEMENT IN NEWS EDITORIAL Saturday February 9, 2008 Source: VOA NEWS

The opening of the International Organization for Migration’s refugee processing center in Damak in western Nepal offers hope to more than one-hundred-thousand Bhutanese refugees, most of whom have lived in camps for nearly two decades. The U.S. has offered to re-settle up to sixty-thousand of these refugees in the United States.

U.S. Ambassador to Nepal Nancy Powell is the chairman of the Core Group of Nations as Represented in Nepal, which includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway. They are working to resolve the Bhutanese refugee crisis. On behalf of the core group, Ms. Powell issued a statement saying, “it is our hope that in 2008, more than thirteen- thousand refugees will be resettled from Nepal. By the end of 2009, we hope that an additional twenty-thousand more refugees who have chosen resettlement will be starting new lives in the United States, Australia, Canada, and elsewhere.”

The refugees are descendents of Nepalese who moved to Bhutan in the nineteenth century. Most of these ethnic Nepalese were Hindu and remained largely distinct from Bhutan’s Buddhist Druk majority. During the 1980s, the Buddhist-dominated Bhutanese government stripped ethnic Nepalese of citizenship and other basic rights and expelled tens of thousands of them.

Since 1991, Nepal has given asylum to more than one-hundred-thousand Bhutanese refugees. Many of these refugees wish only to return to their homes in Bhutan. “The Core Group would like to emphasize,” said U.S. Ambassador Nancy Powell, “that the offer of resettlement goes hand in hand with our continuing efforts to urge the RGOB to accept the return of the refugees.” Local integration within Nepal, said Ms. Powell, is also a desirable solution to the problem.

Some refugees who have chosen resettlement in the U.S. or other countries have suffered violence from other refugees who want all refugees to be repatriated to Bhutan. “Each refugee is entitled to make his or her own choice, in an atmosphere free from threats and intimidation,” said Ms. Powell. “We know that many refugees in the camps remain concerned about their security and ask that the government [of Nepal]. . .vigorously pursue the perpetrators of violent acts against the resident of the camps.”

U.S. Ambassador to Nepal Nancy Powell said that the Core Group nations “have extended the offer of resettlement as a durable solution” to the plight of the Bhutanese refugees.

HARI PARSAD ADHIKARI Monday December 3, 2007 Source: GORKHAPATRA Daily

After all peaceful efforts at reconciliation with King Jigme Singye Wangchuk's Government (hereafter termed as the KJSWG) through the then Royal Advisory Councilor, Tek Nath Rizal, over the ethnic cleansing begun in 1988 failed, the people of Nepalese origin in Bhutan were forced to demonstrate in the towns, villages, streets, district headquarters and village administrative centres. The KJSWG took this as illegal and started atrocities against the innocent dwellers of Bhutan. The Royal Bhutan Police arrested, tortured, imprisoned, looted both movable and immovable properties and raped the women in a bid to terrorise them. The police authorities even did not hesitate to shoot at sight.

Political asylum

Any action taken by the government militia was considered legal. The officers were even rewarded, and the 'loot' was distributed to the perpetrators by the king himself along with the recommendations from the council of ministers headed by the then Home Minister, Dago Tshering.

Tshering had initially made the grounds to evict the Nepali-speaking Bhutanese through the circular of August 17, 1990, which says, ?Any Bhutanese national leaving the country to assist and help the anti-national (allegation against political parties or organisations that differ with the king's policy) shall no longer be considered a Bhutanese citizen. It must also be made clear that family members of such people living under the same household shall also be held fully

responsible and forfeit their citizenship." Consequently there was no other choice for the Nepali speaking Bhutanese than to leave the country and seek political asylum.

In the beginning, those who managed to escape came to India to seek political asylum, but the Indian government turned out to be the protector of the KJSWG. Thus, any chance of getting political asylum in India was shattered when the printed and electronic media that were initially interested in publishing and broadcasting our stories stopped doing so. Instead, they began publishing the KJSWG's version only. Not only this, the security forces of West Bengal and Assam began loading the Bhutanese in public or government vehicles and dumped them at the Mechi border.

Subsequently, Nepal invited the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to look after the Bhutanese refugees and started a quiet diplomacy to repatriate them. But all attempts in the past 19 years have turned futile, with the KJSWG making the bilateral platform as a time-buying machine. In the meantime, several visits were made to Bhutan and India by officials from overseas, including the United States and governments of Europe advocating human rights. They requested the KJSWG and the Indian government to repatriate the Bhutanese but without success.

Therefore, the UNHCR brought forward the second and third options - that of local assimilation and third country settlement involving many countries from Europe, Australia and America. These interested countries formed a core group for third country settlement for Bhutanese refugees and began to distribute forms of 'declaration of interest' to the interested Bhutanese refugees. This process has deeply divided the Bhutanese between those favouring resettlement and repatriation. Although a huge controversy has erupted due to the ongoing UNHCR-sponsored programme, yet there is no disagreement on repatriation to Bhutan. Therefore, an avenue of repatriation, which is the most acceptable and long-lasting solution, needs to be explored, for which the struggle must go on.

Simultaneously, it should be clear that all Bhutanese in exile - whether living in camps or opting to be resettled in another place - must be guaranteed the right to return according to their convenience as these people have been forced to choose the path of third country settlement in the absence of repatriation. For this, if necessary, a mechanism must be forged to keep unity amongst the Bhutanese in exile or within the country or the place of resettlement.

Accordingly, the culture of unity in diversity must be developed for co-existence. This could help restore the right to citizenship, justice and equality with appropriate respect for each other as sovereign citizens of the world. Furthermore, the restriction that is currently being imposed against the people of southern Bhutan in contesting the elections, recruitment in the armed forces and appointment in the civil services must be wiped out with immediate effect through international pressure and sanctions.

Not only this, most of the southern Bhutanese, who are deprived of the right to vote, are in need of immediate attention from all global human rights protectors. Also, constant activities must be carried out both from within and outside Bhutan for the reinstitution of the situation prior to April 9, 1988. To reach the ultimate destination, an appropriate methodology has to be adopted to remain unified against the racist king of Bhutan.

The people from eastern, central and western Bhutan who have also been recently discriminated and restricted from contesting the election on the pretext that they do not hold a university degree could be the appropriate ground for starting an agitation against the king with financial support from Bhutanese in exile.

UN mission

Also, the United Nations could be requested to send a fact finding mission to investigate the places from where Bhutanese Nepalese were evicted and also to see if the funds provided by organisations were spent in the project areas specified since 1985. Last but not the least, the UN must try to bring the KJSWG on the democratic track through persuasion or sanction and stop the ethnic cleansing and racial discrimination in the areas that belong to the Tsanglas, Lhotshampas and Khengpas who constitute 80% of the Bhutanese population.

CHELSEA CONABOY Saturday September 22, 2007 Source: CONCORD MONITOR

Two new groups of refugees, Bhutanese now living in Nepal and Iraqis living mostly in Syria and Jordan, are expected to arrive in Concord over the next year. It's not clear exactly how many will come. So far, only one Iraqi family of four is on its way, but the resettlement agency Lutheran Social Services often receives little notice of who is coming when. The agency has told national groups that allocate refugees for resettlement in each state that it can manage about 125 refugees in the coming fiscal year, which starts in October. Most would come to Concord, and some to Laconia. Program Manager Amy Marchildon said the agency has asked for Bhutanese and Iraqis because they could do well here. She said there are about 200 Nepalese immigrants in Concord who could relate to the Bhutanese culturally, and about 39 Iraqi Kurds were settled successfully in Concord between 1999 and 2001. The caseload also would include a diverse group of refugees from African nations. Their refugees are people who have been persecuted for their race, ethnicity, religion, politics or social standing and who are selected for entrance to the United States. In the past nine years, Lutheran has resettled more than 470 refugees in Concord. The agency provides assistance in the first few months after arrival.

While Lutheran sets a target capacity each year, the number of refugees coming to New Hampshire doesn't always reach that level. This fiscal year, which ends at the end of September, the agency was expecting up to 130 refugees, including as many as 80 Burundians coming from camps in Tanzania. As of the end of August, 103 had arrived, including 85 who were resettled in Concord and 33 Burundians settled between Concord and Laconia. All refugees must go through a background and health check before being considered for resettlement and are excluded if the United Nations determines they committed war crimes or acts against humanity, according to a pamphlet by the Church World Service, a national resettlement agency. Background checks include a screening by the State Department, fingerprinting, an interview by the Department of Homeland Security and review by the FBI and CIA.

"I think there might be a level of fear when we say 'Iraqi refugees' just in terms of security," Marchildon said. "It's important for people to understand that the refugees very involvement with the United States is the reason why they are being persecuted and targeted at home and is why they had to flee Iraq or are displaced in the country. This is historically consistent with U.S. humanitarian and foreign policy commitments." As of the end of 2006, the population of Iraqi refugees worldwide quintupled and was second in size only to Afghans, according to a United Nations report. Today, about 2 million Iraqi people have fled to Jordan and Syria, and an equal number are displaced within Iraq. The number of total displaced is expected to grow by another 1.5 million by the end of the year, according to Church World Service. The refugee crisis is the largest since Palestinians fled the creation of Israel in 1948. At an April conference, the United States pledged to take in up to 25,000 Iraqi refugees. This year, about 7,000 have come.

Marchildon described them as "urban refugees" who aren't concentrated in camps but who are living underground lives, destitute because they can't work without papers. "The boys in the family . . . work in factories, child labor," Marchildon said. "The girls are being prostituted. These are extreme survival mechanisms. These are families that would never dream of a life like that." Unlike the Burundians and other African groups who have spent decades in refugee camps, the conflict that has made Iraqis into refugees is not far from the present.

"Trauma is fresher for them," Marchildon said. But they have had access to much more education than those who grew up in camps and they are more accustomed to Western ways. Marchildon said some aspects of integration, including finding work, could be easier. The Bhutanese, on the other hand, face challenges largely caused by their protracted stay in refugee camps. The refugees fled Bhutan, a Himalayan country smaller than the Dominican Republic, in the early 1990s. In the 1980s, the Bhutan government started a campaign to identify people who were "genuine Bhutanese" and forced migration of those who didn't fit that categorization, according to a slide show created by the office of the United Nation High Commission for Refugees. Efforts in recent years to repatriate those who have lived in Nepal for as many as 16 years have been unsuccessful.

There are more than 108,000 Bhutanese refugees in seven refugee camps in Nepal. Most are Hindu and speak Nepali. About 35 percent also speak English. Children in the camps are educated to about grade 10, and a limited number have gone on to college in India. About 25 percent have not been educated, according to the UNHCR. Job training has been limited. A small political faction in the camps opposes resettlement and has pushed to return to the Bhutan, causing tension in the camps when threats have been made against those in favor of resettlement. The UNHCR slide show says at least 20,000 refugees are expected to request resettlement, but the number could be "much higher."

OPINION: Friday August 17, 2007 Source: ONE WORLD NET

After languishing for 17 years in temporary camps, some 108,000 ethnic Nepalis, expelled from their homeland in Bhutan, have a real chance to get out of the wilderness. But while the promised land, the United States -- as well as several first world countries that form a "core group' -- will accommodate the "Lhotsampa' refugees, many of them continue to harbour hopes of repatriation to Bhutan.

"If the Nepal government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the core group countries merely say, 'get up and board the plane' it will not work," Yadu Prasad Subedi, 27, told IPS. "A detailed dissemination of information is needed to allay the fears of refugees who want to opt for resettlement in third countries but are apprehensive about details,' the refugee said.

Although the prospect of resettlement in the U.S. is attractive, suspicion is rife in the camps that this is a ploy to break the determination of the refugees to return to Bhutan. The community stands divided between resettlement in third countries and repatriation to Bhutan -- even though this could mean facing the persecution from which they fled in the early 1990s. While some are concerned that resettlement in the U.S. will quickly dissipate the movement to compel Bhutan to take the refugees back, others believe that the campaign could be continued and even intensified while based in a first world country.

Just how contentious the issue is became apparent late May when a mob of those advocating repatriation to Bhutan attacked supporters of resettlement in third countries. Two persons were shot to death when Nepali police opened fire to quell the violence. Subedi says he is tired of "'waiting for so many years'. "'I want to take the plane sooner rather than later."

At the beginning of this year, the U.S., Canada, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand -- known as the 'core group' -- announced that they were ready to resettle the refugees. The U.S. alone has offered to take on 60,000 and has set no cap. According to UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) other interested countries are Ireland, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. But instead of celebrating the refugees in the UNHCR-run camps have, since the resettlement offers were announced, been living in a state of tension with pro- and anti- resettlement refugee groups trading charges and counter-charges. Many of the younger refugees are impatient. Those in their 20s are eager to avail of the chances offered in the first world countries. Data provided by UNHCR shows that of the 108,000 odd refugees 63,000 are in the 18-59 categories.

"I am willing to go to the U.S., my first choice, or to any of the core group countries to study and work," says a 28-year old chemistry graduate who requested anonymity because he is teaching in an institute in the Nepalese capital. Refugees cannot legally work in Nepal. He and others who have managed to get higher education outside the camp schools -- where education is limited to the secondary level -- are frustrated when they see their chances of making it in the developed world delayed. Pingala Dhital, 34, who established an organisation called Voice for Change a couple of years ago to press for a durable solution to refugee crisis, says many refugees are tired of seeing no progress in talks between Nepal and Bhutan to settle the issue. "Except for a few older ones who might prefer Bhutan, many would be willing to go just anywhere as long as it means leading a life outside the camps," Dhital told IPS in her rented apartment in the Nepalese capital. The refugees started arriving in eastern Nepal via India (Nepal and Bhutan do not share a border) in the early 1990s, alleging forced eviction by the Bhutanese government, under an 'ethnic cleansing' drive -- a charge that the 'Dragon Kingdom' denies.

Fifteen rounds of talks between the foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan, aimed at securing the refugees' safe repatriation and dating back to 1993, have yielded little progress. Most Bhutanese refugees say their first choice is to go back home, and their leaders speak of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other international treaties that oblige Thimphu to take them back. But not one refugee has been able to return in all these years. This year the Nepal government, following a request from the UNHCR and donor countries, decided to open up to resettlement on humanitarian grounds. There are indications that India, where some 20,000 already live, may follow suit.

The chief of the UNHCR here, Abraham Abraham, says the organisation is ready to begin resettlement but wants the government to bolster security in the camps first. "'What we need is a chance to make a free choice between resettlement and staying on to continue the movement to pressure Bhutan into granting us our rights,' said one refugee asking not to be named. "'Right now we live in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.'

EDITORIAL Saturday July 7, 2007 Source: NEPAL TIMES

More than 100,000 Bhutani refugees are finally seeing light at the end of the tunnel. After 17 years in camps in eastern Nepal, there is the prospect of resettlement in the United States, Canada, Denmark, and Australia.

But the refugees are now suddenly confronted with a political backlash from activists and refugee leaders who insist that resettlement would jeopardize their right of return to Bhutan. We find this incongruous.

The Lhotshampa have suffered enough. Thimphu’s constant prevarication and India’s baffling unwillingness to confront the culpable Bhutan regime raised fears the refugees would simply disappear into the South Asian night. The US resettlement offer lets Thimphu off the hook for now, but offers refugee families a chance to rebuild their lives.

There is a surprising silence from the refugees. A majority of refugees would want to take up the resettlement offer rather than wait any longer in Jhapa. But ultra-left radicalisation of the camps means refugees are afraid to speak out. Some Bhutani political leaders who stand to lose their flock to resettlement are also against the proposal.

There is genuine concern that the refugees’ right of return might be compromised if they are settled overseas. Nepal fears resettlement may trigger another wave of Lhotshampa, and word is at least 80,000 are being ‘prepared’ for departure. Resettlement rather than return could trigger depopulation of Nepalis from the Indian northeast as well.

These fears have a sound basis, but the interest of the refugees must come first. This is a humanitarian issue and only then a political one. People cannot be sacrificed to principles against their best interests. Besides, the refugees’ right of return to Bhutan will not be compromised when they are resettled. And a future Bhutani Diaspora could even evolve as a strong force for human rights and democratisation back home, as we have seen with refugee resettlements elsewhere.

Refugee leaders must now speak for the humanitarian interest of the people they represent. The Core Group countries must ensure that Bhutan’s depopulation exercise does not go unpunished in the long run. Nepal’s Home Ministry must maintain law and order in the camps so individual refugees are free of intimidation.

Sital Nibas must come out with a white paper to detail the policy shift that has already been set in place by Foreign Minister Sahana Pradhan, which is that Nepal supports resettlement without giving up the goal of right of return.

Finally, it is India that must atone for its inaction on the return of Bhutan’s refugees. New Delhi must send a strong message to Thimphu that further ethnic cleansing will not be tolerated. It must also firmly stamp out any copycat moves to evict Indians of Nepali origin from its own northeast.

Kazi Gautam Monday March 12, 2007 Source: The Rising Nepal

The American proposal of resettlement of the Bhutanese refugees that was made public in Geneva is eventually getting implemented within a few years. Even in the face of protests by some of the refugees, particularly the Bhutanese political leaders in exile, the US seems committed to resettle the refugees. With the establishment of an overseas processing entity on July 1, the process is expected to get expedited, thus, resettling about 60,000 Bhutanese refugees in the US within the next 4-5 years.

On the other hand, the Bhutanese refugees have been waiting for the last 16 years to have a decorous repatriation to their motherland. They have succumbed to all sorts of predicaments only to have a dignified return to their motherland. However, having seen no prospects of getting repatriated, the refugees are compelled to look for an alternative. At this point of time, it deserves critical comparison between the two, so that the refugees themselves can decide to choose.

Inside Bhutan

The king is the head of the state. The matter of national interest is, thus, decided solely by the king and doesn't need the consent of others. The ministers also hold their portfolio for lifetime together with the king. They make the policies

that safeguard their interests, which cannot be opposed. During royal celebrations, the general public is required to contribute free labour for the preparation and raise funds and material contributions to pay as a gesture of respect and wish for the prosperity of the celebrities. The civil and army officers enjoy the privilege offered to them by the village headmen, thus, terrorising and abusing the innocent villagers. The land act does not permit a person to own more than 25 acres of land.

The system of administration is operated at the home, district and block level. While the Home acts on behalf of the entire machinery of the cabinet functioning under the dictatorship of the king, the Dzongdag (district chief) represents the Home in the districts to keep control over the people in the respective districts.

Bhutan practises a very different judiciary system that is not common in any of the countries of the world. A person cannot be granted royal audience before passing any verdict. Upon passing of the court verdict, if a person is sentenced to imprisonment, he does not get permission to appeal to the king for justice. Hence, Bhutan's advocacy about freedom of appeal to the king by an unsatisfied culprit is just limited within the touch of the elite. The general people have no right to raise a voice even if they are going to get a sentence for no good reason. In fact, it is the king and the ministers who are the privileged ones. The king is above the law. Moreover, human rights violation continues to this date.

The proposed draft constitution of the country does not guarantee the rights of the people. Moreover, it has failed to include the provision of the people in exile. In this scenario, how could the practice of democracy from 2008 be fruitful as the exiled ones are already declared to have carried out activities against the king and the country? Anyone who has spoken against the Tsawa tsum (king, country and the people) cannot take part in government activities. Hence, if the refugees are repatriated, will they be allowed to exercise their political rights ?

The US package of resettlement, proposed on humanitarian grounds may be a comprehensive solution to the refugee deadlock. Firstly, the resettled refugees, who will be declared Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs), can enjoy everything like the Americans. They would be given a language course and job training. After five years they can apply for American citizenship. On the other hand, the LPRs have no right to vote. Specifically, they will have no political rights. Though the American representatives have implied, though not stated directly, that the Bhutanese can return to their country if the environment becomes conducive, it also appears vaguely that they will have no right to return.

Within the last one-and-a-half decades, numerous futile attempts have been made to repatriate the Bhutanese refugees. This long idle stay has also invited numerous hazards in the refugee camps as well as in the local areas. Due to the gradual curtail in the commodities, the refugees have faced numerous problems off and on. It is because of this mental harassment that most of the refugees have lost their state of mind.

When the commodities provided to them are not sufficient to make their ends meet, the refugees are compelled to go out of the camps to earn money. This has resulted in a dispute with the locals numerous times. While going to the local's house or fields as labourers, collecting firewood in the forest or opening small shops in a local market, they have to endure either the locals' misbehaviour or their haughty treatment. Most often, the refugees are treated inhumanly. They are insulted and tortured mentally because they are stateless. This eventually leads to serious problems. Bhutanese are peace loving. They have not created any nuisance but tolerated all kinds of bereavement. Some instances of havoc have been only the result of annoyance. The incident of February 22nd is the latest instance. In fact, the apparent reasons behind the refugees' convoluted acts are nothing but their frustration, constant and unnecessary pestering given to them by the locals and the fear of being destitute in the days ahead.

Assimilation

This is the right time for the refugees to take a decision that would be advantageous to the refugees and the host country. The Bhutanese political leaders must come to a common point so as to decide the future of over 100,000 refugees. It must also be clearly analysed by the refugees themselves as well as the leaders and the Nepalese government before deciding whether to waste more time in vain waiting for repatriation or get assimilated in the United States.

Let us assume that the latter is to be chosen. In this case, the US government must guarantee that the resettled Bhutanese can return to their homeland if they wish to because the objective of the Bhutanese political movement is to establish and institutionalise true democracy in Bhutan.

DR S CHANDRASEKHARAN Monday August 15, 2005 Source: SAAG.ORG

Many of the well wishers of the refugees now over 105,000 strong and languishing in the refugee camps set up by the UNHCR have been advising the refugees not to make the issue a political one and not to let the political parties take the lead in looking for a solution as that would only complicate the matter. This dilemma whether to treat the issue as a human problem or a political one has been in the minds of the refugee leaders, right from the time; the camps were set up in the nineties.

Till recently the general consensus was that it is a human problem and that human rights have been violated in dealing with the refugees. Tek Nath Rijal who was in jail for over nine years for this cause realised that it was better to go through the route of "human rights violations" and did not give in to the temptation of making it a political issue. Even the moderates among the political leaders were, till recently convinced that there was still some hope of getting genuine refugees back into southern Bhutan and that at least those of the Kudenabari camp whose status was verified and approved by both the governments of Bhutan and Nepal would start moving. Unfortunately there was "action paralysis," with no one Nepal, Bhutan and UNHCR willing to take the initiative to set the ball rolling in the matter of repatriation. We had mentioned about this in our last update. On the Indian government, less said the better.

It is no wonder that the refugees were losing all hopes of returning and the incident on 3rd August had to happen. It is also clear that Tek Nath Rijal who is at present sick, as also the moderate political leaders have lost the initiative and the more activist leaders have taken the lead. It looks that this issue is not going to stop with a handful of refugees moving towards Bhutan through Indian territory but much more may happen..

The August 3 Incident:

On August 3, 2005, 323 refugees from Beldangi Camps I, II and III moved in five buses to Kakarbita and reached the Mechi Bridge by 11 A.M... They were led by S.B. Subba and two other leaders of Bhutan Gorkha National Liberation Front (BGNLF). One of the other two belonged to Sanichare camp. The refugees belonged to 41 households and included 120 children and 40 disabled persons. Many of them were women with children in their arms.

The refugees who demonstrated were also joined by local political leaders like Dipak Tamang, President of Trade Union Congress, Bimal Acharya, District member of Nepali Congress and Rabin Koirala, former chairman of Mechinagar Municipality. There were some stone throwing incidents and three journalists were injured.

The refugees were not allowed to cross into Indian territory by the SSB and the latter told the Press that the Indian government had ordered them not allow the refugees to return home through Indian soil, though the refugees claim that at one time the Indian government let them go through Indian territory from Bhutan to Nepal!

The refugees squatted in the middle of the Mechi Bridge when they were stopped. The Nepalese Police who should have prevented the refugees from going to the border in the first instance came to the scene and took them away to Beldangi camps in their trucks.

Significantly all this happened when the King was away in India on a working visit. The issue has not ended there. On 13 August, a few members of the Bhutan Gorkha Liberation Front supported by the Human Rights Organisation of Bhutan (HUROB) preceded to Phuntsoling the gateway by road to Bhutan to present a memorandum to the King of Bhutan. Latest reports indicate that over eight of them have been arrested by the Bhutan Police.

It is sad to see the refugees getting radicalised. Frustration has set in too deeply as they have lost all hopes of returning. Radicalisation may take different forms. Their social structure within the camp is destroyed. Many may join the Maoist movement as they are doing already and many may get ready to march in thousands towards Bhutan. And the more active of the political leaders are waiting in the wings to take the lead!

Incidentally on 3rd August, the Maoists did not allow any commercial vehicles to ply in Jhapa area and yet they allowed the five buses to go towards Kakarbhitta!

The King’s Visit:

The King of Bhutan made a surprise working visit to New Delhi on 1st August. He met all the leaders including the Chairperson of UPA, Sonia Gandhi. The visit was described as an informal ‘working visit" to discuss bilateral cooperation in matters relating to energy and security.

Some media reports indicate that the King dashed to Delhi to explain the circumstances that led Bhutan to give a changed claim line on the Sino Bhutan border. Dasho Pema Wangchuk, who led the Bhutan delegation to discuss the boundary issue with his counter parts on July 13 and 14th is said to have given the Chinese a new claim line. Soon after the border talks, the DGMO from India made a visit to Thimpu, perhaps to discuss the security issues related to the claim line. Media reports also claim that the new claim line would affect India’s security adversely.

One would have expected the official sources from either of the two countries to deny such reports. It is important to note that Bhutan would certainly look into its national interests first. At the same time, we are quite clear that Bhutan will not proceed or agree on anything that would have an adverse impact on Indian security without prior consultation with India. On the claim line, the Chinese have also made many claim lines before! The "tri-junction" of the Chumbi valley could be cause for concern for India but it could be amicably settled.

KAMALA SARUP Saturday June 11, 2005 Source: SCOOP

The UNHCR has just announced that they are gradually reducing their facilities for Bhutanese refugees, even though refugee representatives have been continually appealing for a greater supply of various staples. The cut in UNHCR aid fundamentally affects the lives of the Bhutanese, and directly impacts their human rights.

For ten years Bhutanese who have been forced to leave their country have been living in Nepal, but no international human rights organizations, NGOs, Bhutanese government have established any effective, concrete program to protect their rights. The seminars, talks, programs, meetings, articles and interviews have done nothing to help the Bhutanese with their problems or defend their fundamental rights.

Given the urgency of the situation, UNHCR and as well as other humanitarian organizations should launch an emergency campaign for Bhutanese refugees. UNHCR's 6,000 staff work in 115 countries worldwide has helped more than 50 million people over the past five decades should not cut its aid for Bhutanese refugees. Sadako Ogata, the UNHCR has recently said "The issue of human rights and the problems of refugees are inextricably linked. The vast majority of refugees are driven from their homes by human rights abuses. Persecution, torture, killings and the reprehensible practice of 'ethnic cleansing' generate huge flow of refugees". On the other side US Ambassador James F Morairty recently said "International community is making efforts at solving the Bhutanese refugee problem."

With time running out before the UNHCR intends to leave the Bhutanese with nowhere to go, local officials in Jhapa and Morang in eastern Nepal have begun cutting down the basic facilities for refugees. Four players have crucial roles in deciding the future of over 100,000 Bhutanese: the UNHCR, the Nepali government, the Bhutanese government, and India as the largest neighbor of the two countries. Unless these four parties come together to ensure a decent future for the refugees, they will have nowhere to turn. Bhutan plans to delay the verification and repatriation process, Nepal is busy with its own internal Maoists chaos, India has shown no interest in finding the solution, and the UNHCR insists it will leave the refugees by the end of the year regardless of their circumstances.

Though the JVT reports that over 80 percent of the people in camps in Jhapa and Morang are Bhutanese, the Bhutanese monarch announced, while in India as the chief guest at Republic Day celebrations, that there are no Bhutanese taking asylum in Nepal. India continues to show no concern despite several requests. The first official dialogue on the problems of Bhutanese refugees was held on April 10, 1993. Bhutan invited Nepalese delegation for talks to Thimphu on July 15, 1993. On September 13, 1993, the Bhutan-Nepal Joint Ministerial Committee Talk (JMLT), comprising Home Minister of both countries was constituted. The first JMLT was held in Kathmandu on October 4-7, 1993. The sixth JMLT held in Thimphu on April 20, 1995 but those all six meetings were failed.

Nepal never tried to garner international support for the Bhutanese cause. Working under Nepalese law, the UNHCR finds it difficult to offer solutions unless they are authorized by the Nepalese government. Nepal also never tried to hand over decision making or call for international assistance when it was miserably unsuccessful in finding a solution. Its only request to the international community and the UNHCR has been to continue providing facilities to the refugees. The newly elected camp secretary of Beldangi Extension, Subash Acharya, expressed his concern that "the dilemma cannot be resolved unless the Nepalese government allows the refugees themselves to find an appropriate

solution meeting their growing needs. The role of the UNHCR and its international donors is to assist the refugees in doing so. After a recent windstorm blew over many huts in the camps, the UNHCR and the Red Cross would not provide materials to rebuild them. The affected had to take shelter in the camp offices. They had to seek help from neighbors to buy bamboo and thatch". He said.

It is true; the Bhutanese camps are now established in terms of sanitation and water systems, healthcare and education programmes. But if the UNHCR has begun cutting services to the refugees it will create misery for the very lives of Bhutanese refugees. UNHCR is working with the Government and other UN agencies to protect the right of refugees, should take the crucial next step.

Nepali-speaking southern Bhutanese, known as Lhotshampas, were driven out of the country by the Bhutanese government in 1990. Over 134,000 Bhutanese citizens, approximately 20 percent of Bhutan's total population, are now living in refugee camps in Nepal and India. Nepal wants all Bhutanese refugees to go back to their homes but Bhutan has been avoiding constituting verification mechanism.

Only little attention has been given to the plight of the Bhutanese refugees for over a decade. International donor agencies continue to pour resources into Bhutan without addressing the refugee crisis or attaching conditions to the donations. So the UNHCR should play a critical role in finding concrete ways for alternative solutions to the crisis. Nepali government as well as international community and US have to do everything to make sure the assistance of Bhutanese refugees.

REFERENCES

A. General Reports • David B. Thronson 'Cultural Cleansing: A Distinct National Identity and the Refugees from Southern Bhutan' ( Harvard Law School, USA., 1993) • Susan Banki, ‘The Durable Solution Discourse and Refugee Resettlement: The Bhutanese in Nepal,’ in No Place to Call Home: Protracted Displacement in Asia, ed. Howard Adelman (London: Ashgate, 2008, forthcoming). • Daniel Schäppi, ‘Cultural Plurality, National Identity and Consensus in Bhutan,’ (Zurich: Center for Comparative and International Studies, 2005). • ‘Last Hope: The Need for Durable Solutions for Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal and India,’ (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007), p. 19 – 23. • Unless otherwise noted, all statistical data about the Lhotshampas presented in this report come from UNHCR’s resettlement data, April 2008. Many thanks are due to Parveen Mann at UNHCR-Damak for compiling and sharing this information. • Internal UNHCR document distributed to the Core Working Group on Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal (CWG), p. 3. Used with permission. • Internal UNHCR document, p. 2. 17 Interviews, international NGO staff (KN2), Kathmandu, Nepal, November 2007; refugees (DN25, DD46), Beldangi camps, Nepal, November and December 2007. • ‘Another Refugee Dies in Police Firing; Curfew in Beldangi; UNHCR Urges Restraint,’ Nepal news.com, 28 May 2007. • S. Chandrasekharan, ‘Bhutan: Distribution of Maoist Document in Refugee Camps: Should Be Cause for Concern. Update 30,’ (SAAG, 2003). • UNHCR, ‘Third Country Refugee Resettlement Information: Refugees from Bhutan Living in Nepal,’ (Jhapa, Nepal: UNHCR, 2007). • Susan Banki and Hazel Lang, ‘Planning for the Future: The Impact of Resettlement on the Remaining Camp Population,’ (Bangkok: Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), 2007), p. 5. • UNHCR, ‘Third Country Refugee Resettlement Information: Refugees from Bhutan Living in Nepal,’ Kathmandu, (Kathmandu: UNHCR, 2007). • Human Rights Watch, ‘Last Hope: The Need for Durable Solutions for Bhutanese Refugees Nepal and India,’ section 5. Because it is virtually impossible to conduct research inside of Bhutan, HRW interviewed Bhutanese who were studying in India.

B. Comprehensive Reports

1. State Citizens and Outsiders, The uprooted Peoples of South Asia Author: Tapan K. Bose and Rita Manchanda (Editors) Year of publication: 1997 Publisher: South Asia Forum for Human Rights Kathmandu, Nepal

2. Protection of Refugees in South Asia Need for Legal Framework Author: Tapan K. Bose Year of publication: 2000 Publisher: South Asia Forum for Human Rights Kathmandu, Nepal

3. A Moment in Exile, Bhutan Author: Dr. D.N.S. Dhakal and Christopher Straw Year of publication: 1994

4. The Bhutanese Political Crises and Refugee Problem Author: South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre Year of publication: 1998 Publisher: South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre New Delhi, India

5. A Shangrila without Human Rights Author: AHURA Bhutan Year of publication: Ist edition 1993 2nd edition 2000 Publisher: AHURA Bhutan, Damak 11 Jhapa, Nepal

6. Victims of Deprivation of Right to Nationality and Political Repression Author: AHURA Bhutan Year of publication: 1994 Publisher: AHURA Bhutan

7. Victims of Forced Eviction Author: AHURA Bhutan Year of publication: 1999 Publisher: AHURA Bhutan

8. Refugee Statistics in South Asia: Development of a more Global Regime Author: Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti Year of publication: 2000 Publisher: Swiss Federal Statistical Office Conference of the International Association for Official Statistics (IAOS) on "Statistics, Development and Human Rights".

9. Bhutan: Destitute Without Destination Author: Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti and Mr. S.K. Pradhan Year of publication: 1993 Publisher: INHURED International

10. Bhutanese: An Iron Path to Democracy Author: Dr. Gopal Krishna Siwakoti and Mr. S.K. Pradhan Year of publication: 1992 Publisher: INHURED International, Nepal

11. Bhutan: Cultural Cleansing Author: David Thrompson Year of Publication: 1993 Publisher: INHURED International

12. NRC REPORTS: Bhutan Bhutan: Land of Happiness for the Selected Author: Norwegian Refugee Council Year of Publication: June 2008 Publisher: Norwegian Refugee Council

13. Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal: Anticipating the Impact of Resettlement Author: Susan Banki Year of Publication: June 2008 Publisher: Austcare, Australia

C. Media Coverage • Rakesh Chhetri, ‘Betrayal of Hope and Dignity,’ Kathmandu Post, 26 July 2003; and P. G. • Rajamohan, ‘Terror and Refuge,’ South Asia Intelligence Review 3, No. 19 (2004). • ‘More Funds Needed to Aid Bhutanese Refugees after Fire Destroys Camp,’ UN News Service, 8 March 2008. • 29 ‘Refugees Get Death Threats,’ Himalayan News Service, 12 November 2007. • ‘Thousands of Bhutanese Refugees Ready to Resettle in Third Countries,’ IRIN News, 5 February 2008. • Lee, Tang Lay (1998) ‘Refugees from Bhutan: Nationality, Statelessness and the Right to Return. International Journal of Refugee Law, 10: 118–155. • Bhutan Party Admits Shooting of Refugee,’ the Rising Nepal, 22 December 2007. • ‘UNHCR, IOM Condemn Attack on Refugees,’ Nepalnews.com, 6 May 2008. • Chetan Adhikari, ‘IOM Starts Refugee Interviews: Youths Resent ‘Joining’ US Army,’ Kathmandu Post, 2 December 2007. • Cindy Horst, ‘Buufis amongst Somalis in Dadaab: The Transnational and Historical Logics Behind Resettlement Dreams,’ Journal of Refugee Studies19, No. 2 (2006).

D. Websites Consulted • Ethnologue.com, SIL International; Bhutan: www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=BT • Ethnologue.com, SIL International; Bhutan: www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=BT • Office of the Census Commissioner, RGOB: http://bhutan switzerland.org/pdf/Fact_sheet.pdf • For Indian views and news: http://howrah.org/india_news/8447.html • For regular update on Bhutan: http://www.apfanews.com/news/?id=31323838 • Government Repression of Southern Bhutanese [Lhotshampas] available from http://www.hurights.or.jp/wcar/E/doc/other/Refugee/AHURA.htm • Shaikh, Farzana (2004) ‘Nepal: Early Warning Analysis,’ available from www.unhcr.org/publ/RSDCOI/4186626c4.pdf [accessed 11 December 2007] • To download Bhutan’s constitution, www.constitution.bt • Translation of the Resolutions of the 85th Session of the National Assembly of Bhutan (June 15– July 7, 2006), available from www.nab.gov.bt/resolution.htm [accessed 12 December 2007] • US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Bhutanese Refugee Killed in Clash with Locals USCRI, 2007 [accessed 13 May 2008]); available from http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=15 4&rid=1179&subm=33&ssm= 87&area=Investigate

The genuine issue of basic human rights, peace and justice in Bhutan has been succumbed into refugee issue. Everyone is aware that the refugee issue is the offshoot of state repression over its genuine citizens but not a single issue of crime perpetrated by the state comes to any discourses. When the issue of rights violation in Bhutan arises, the refugees in eastern Nepal immediately comes to ones mind and becomes a mere agenda to just testify the misery in camps and topic to talk about. The real soul aching stories of pain and sufferings of the people of both inside and outside need to be equally heard more and taken into consideration to make a rational move in resolving the crisis.