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Changing Political Dynamics in South Asia the Belt and Road Initiative and Its Effects on Indian Regional Hegemony

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Changing Political Dynamics in South Asia the Belt and Road Initiative and Its Effects on Indian Regional Hegemony VIEW Changing Political Dynamics in South Asia The Belt and Road Initiative and Its Effects on Indian Regional Hegemony VIRAIN MOHAN Abstract India’s dominance in South Asia is due to its large geographical area, economic might, military strength, and strategic positioning over the Indian ocean. But the coming of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has shaken up this hegemonic balance and given other, smaller regional nations a chance to rise up against the dominant influence in the region. China has been penetrating regional diplomacy in South Asia, all the while keeping in mind its larger aim of further securing its sources in the West. For countries in the region such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the BRI is seen as a more neutral, if not benign force and has pushed India to become more considerate of changes and more responsible for its own actions. With the rise of China, many scholars and think tanks have aggressively researched this issue and proposed theories such as the “String of Pearls,” which has become a topic of discussion and worry not only for India but also for the nations that have become a part of China’s projects. This article will delve into the issue and discuss how China’s rise in South Asia has changed the course of India’s regional and bilateral policies and relations. Although China may seem to have a drastic impact on India’s position, it has not panned out that way. India has been a dominant power in the region and unilateral in its diplomacy, but the rise of China gives smaller nations power at the negotiating table with India and thus pushes India to place more focus on neighbors. Introduction China initiated the BRI in 2013 when Chinese president Xi Jinping officially visited Kazakhstan. BRI is considered to be the cornerstone policy of the Chinese Communist Party’s economic policy and is aimed at strengthening China’s ties with the globe through the expansion of infrastructure, policy, and cultural ties. The goal to achieve connectivity has been both land- and sea- based, namely the Belt (i.e., land-based) and the Road (the so-called Maritime Silk Road). The Maritime Silk Road aims to connect China to the North Sea, linking Singapore, 72 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS FALL 2021 Changing Political Dynamics in South Asia Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Djibouti, Suez Canal, Turkey, Greece, and Italy in between. Through this connectivity, China aims to not only connect itself to its oil sources in the West1 but also to effectively counter its drawbacks in South Asia and Southeast Asia; front- burner issues include the presence of US and Indian troops in the Indian Ocean, fear of a blockade of the Strait of Malacca (through which passes most Chinese imports), and piracy in the Indian Ocean threatening China’s mercantile business.2 This region plays a huge role in the BRI project, and China has initiated massive plans enabling China to connect to the Indian ocean, mini- mizing the threats posed. These include the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Gwadar Port, the Rahim Yar Khan Power Plant, and various wind, solar, and coal power projects in Pakistan, as well as Hambantota Port, the Norochcho- lai Power Plant, and the Colombo Port City project in Sri Lanka along with various other projects in Myanmar.3 China has pulled smaller nations such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Maldives into its orbit of influence as well, targeting their fear and insecurities regarding India and a lack of international funding to enable and support their economic growth. India’s neglect of smaller nations’ demands, both political and economic, have been sidelined for a long time. These nations are now part of the BRI and have been promised massive funding under its banner; some have already received billions of dollars of investment to fund infrastructure projects. But the funding came with drawbacks, such as massive debt on loans, increased Chinese bureaucratic influence, high interest rates, various labor and working rights issues, as well as, in some cases, complete takeover of ports and land to counterbalance increasingly negative trade imbalances.4 Despite these challenges, politicians in the debtor nations have advanced relations with China as the most viable and/or logical partner against India as well as to maintain standing in the economic development race. China has thereby been able to grow its influence over smaller South Asian countries to support its aims and to counter India. As for Indian foreign diplomacy, we see a change in the decisions taken by the current ruling government. India has started to look at neighboring nations, especially in the East and South East, to expand its influence, as is evident in its Look East policy, the Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–Nepal initiative, and the “Neighbourhood First” and other funding projects that India has established in- dividually or through partnership with nations such as Japan and the United States.5 We next begin to look into the multipolar aspects of policy changes and diplomatic exchanges resulting from the increase of Chinese influence and inter- ests in the region among the affected countries of South Asia, India, and China. JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS FALL 2021 73 Mohan Chinese Foreign Policy Initiatives and India's Responses The BRI in South Asia aims to build economic partnerships and fulfill geostra- tegic ambitions. After 2013, Chinese investment and other diplomatic strategies gained ground among Indian Ocean littoral nations. Chinese authorities devel- oped mechanisms to create cultural and economic links, boosting China’s aims and image. Pakistan China’s relations with Pakistan have been the most notable. They signed a memorandum in 2013, a landmark agreement for long- term planning and devel- opment of CPEC, the BRI’s flagship project. It is one of the six branches that serve China’s aims and aims to give China access to the Indian Ocean through the construction of a 3,000km pipeline with road infrastructure. The access to Gwa- dar Port will put China just 400km away from the Strait of Hormuz and would link Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean. Apart from serving trade and commerce, the base could provide naval support to Chinese forces in the region and help China secure its sea lines of communication, as well as counter the so-called Malacca Dilemma and Indian and US troops in the region.6 The projects have also brought worry for Pakistan’s politicians and bureaucracy, as the debts to China keep mounting and resulted in the speculative “Dept- Trap” diplomacy, a tool utilized by lending nations to burden borrowing nations with huge dept so as to influence its internal and external affairs. However, bilateral relations have remained strong since 1951, when diplomatic relations were established. China and Pakistan have backed one another in interna- tional disputes. Relations hardened with the advent of the BRI in Pakistan. In- creased Chinese interventions in the disputed region and the Indian Ocean caused India to pay greater attention in the region, with the development of Indian naval capabilities to protect Indian interests.7 The increased cooperation has also resulted in US concerns, not only regarding Chinese activity but also the significance Paki- stan plays due to its strategic geographical position.8 China tried a counterbalance strategy, supporting Pakistan through political, military, and economic fulfillments while trying to allay India’s suspicions by offering antiterror cooperation.9 India worries about the repercussions that could follow its rivals’ coordination in areas of interest to India. China’s BRI passes through Pakistan-occupied Kash- mir, and China’s construction activity threatened India’s sovereignty. China and India have many conflicts on its long borders, adding to mutual discontent among populations in both countries. Pakistan and India also have disagreements and refuse to solve mutual conflicts, even though the United States and China would 74 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS FALL 2021 Changing Political Dynamics in South Asia like to see peace and stability in the region. Pakistan’s foreign policy aims to re- lieve some of this tension and enmity, if one is to believe Imran Khan, the current elected prime minister of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan’s military has a propensity of exerting intervention into Islamabad’s external political affairs, and terrorism emanating from Pakistan’s territories has frequently thrwarted efforts to calm simmering conflicts.10 Pakistan has taken a positive attitude toward China, the BRI, and its foreign policy despite harsh allegations over how Chinese investments function in the country. The International Crisis Group reported discontent among local popula- tions from regions such as Balochistan and Sindh, the fruits of the investments have not trickled down. The vast amount of raw materials being mined, the huge number of illegal Chinese laborers being granted work permits, and the displace- ment of communities have created resentment.11 Also, Pakistan has a $62 billion debt to China, causing not only Pakistan but other international players to worry. Pakistan has no other option but to take loans from China.12 India–Pakistan relations have not seen drastic changes as a direct result of the BRI and Chinese intervention. India has always been critical of Pakistan and vice versa, but Chinese investment in Pakistan creates reasons for worry in India. The ruling government there shows no desire to mend relations in light of issues such as the Pulwama attack and the eradication of Article 370. The attack at Pulwama, by a suicide bomber, was one of the deadliest against the Indian military, killing 40 military personnel on the Jammu- Srinagar National Highway. Responsibility owas claimed by a Pakistan- based terrorist group, Jaish- e- Mohammed, adding to the anger.
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