“To Work for Women's Enfranchisement”

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Conservative chj History Journal

Winter 2008 | £7.50

Mitzi Auchterlonie “To work for Women’s Enfranchisement” The quiet campaign of the Conservative & Unionist Women’s Franchise Association, 1908-1914

Timothy Heppell No More than Another Major: How William Hague became Leader of the Conservative Party

Plus: Charles Dudgeon on the Jacobites; Helen Szamuely Interviews John Charmley; Robert Self on Neville Chamberlain and the ‘Guilty Men’; Nicholas Hillma on the ‘Rivers of Blood’ Speech; Jamie Martin on the 1992 General Election campaign Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 1 The Conservative History Journal is published by the Conservative History Group Contents ISSN 1479-8026

Advertisements 3 Editorial To advertise in the next issue Helen Szamuely call Helen Szamuely on 07733 018999 5 “To Work for Women’s Enfranchisement by Educative and Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles Constitutional Methonds Consistant with Unionis Principles” and book reviews are invited.The Journal is a Mitzi Auchterlonie refereed publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed and publication is not guaran- 8 The Club Whose Time Has Come Again teed. Contributions should be emailed or Alistair Cooke posted to the addresses below.All articles remain copyright © their authors 10 Were the Tories Jacobites? Subscriptions/Membership Charles Dudgeon An annual subscription to the Conservative History Group costs £15. Copies of the 13 John Charmley on the Other Conservative Tradition Journal are included in the membership fee. Helen Szamuely The Conservative History Group Chairman: Keith Simpson MP 15 Disraeli’s Historical Reputation and the Repeal of the Corn Laws Deputy Chairman: Professor John Charmley Richard A Gaunt Director: Iain Dale Treasurer: John Strafford Secretary: Martin Ball 18 The First Birmingham Conference Journal Editor: Helen Szamuely Helen Szamuely

Committee: 19 Neville Chamberlain and the Long Shadow of the ‘Guilty Men’ Christina Dykes Robert Self Lord Norton of Louth Lord Brooke Jonathan Collett 22 No More Than Another Major Simon Gordon Timothy Heppell Mark Garnett Ian Pendlington 24 Marketing the Tories in Opposition David Ruffley MP Quentin Davies MP Tim Sansom William Dorman Graham Smith 31 The ‘Rivers of Blood’: Forty Years on Jeremy Savage Nicholas Hillman Lord Henley William McDougall Tricia Gurnett 33 ‘Ernie’: A Centennial Reassessment of Ernest Marples David Dutton Conservative History Group PO Box 42119 36 Winning Before the Falklands London Lee Peck SW8 1WJ

Telephone: 07768 254690 39 Of Course it was the Conservatives Wot Won it Email: [email protected] Jamie Martin Blog: http://conservativehistory.blogspot.com

BOOK REVIEWS

42 Order of Merit by Stanley Martin, reviewed by Ronal Porter

43 A Political Suicide by Norman Fowler, reviewed by Iain Dale

2 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Editorial, Helen Szamuely Editorial

he best laid schemes o' mice an' “ men/Gang aft agley”. So said Robert Burns and, though he Twas hardly a conservative in the usual sense of the word, one cannot really argue with him.The plan to produce a larger Conservative History Journal than its predecessors has actually come to fruition; the plan to produce it a little earlier in the year did not. On the other hand, this issue will be the perfect Christmas reading for all those who are interested in various aspects of the Conservative Party’s history. There are articles about such diverse sub- jects as Conservative suffragists and the possible Jacobite connections of the early Tory leaders; there are studies of the reputations of Neville Chamberlain and Benjamin Disraeli; a new analysis is presented of Enoch Powell’s famous speech and of the now almost forgotten Ernest Marples; above all, there are articles about various aspects of theThatcher and post-Thatcher years. Something for every- Helen Szamuely is the editor of the Conservative History Journal. one, is the editorial hope. Email her on [email protected]. A section had to be dropped from the Journal for lack of space. It was my intention to write about recently published books that could be of interest to conservative historians interest … to those interested in conserva- Party,its politicians,the debates and ideas that and historians of conservatism as well as peo- tive history.Anyone who has ideas of pub- could be found in its vicinity.There is no edi- ple interested in conservative history.These lications to be included is encouraged to torial policy on what conservatism means; were not going to be full reviews but a para- let me know about them. Tory history and Tory ideas are as welcome graph or so about such books as Jean M. Let us now turn to future plans.I have said as more liberal and libertarian ones. The Lucas’s book about Conservative Agents, this before in editorials but this time I say it Conservative Party has been a “broad “Between the Thin Blue Lines” or Giles with real feeling: the Journal will improve in church”for a long time and conservative his- Hunt’s “The Duel” about that infamous its punctuality and,indeed,diversify.The plan tory must be equally broad. encounter between Canning and for early 2009 is to produce a supplement Let us not forget that there are conserva- Castlereagh. My intention was to expand the that concentrates entirely on what is the tive ideas and movements in other coun- Journal’s horizon by discussing briefly most exciting recent historical and political tries as well. Some of them will be covered Richard Pipes’s “Russian Conservatism and idea: the Anglosphere. I am collecting articles in the Anglosphere supplement; others can Its Critics”.There was no space for this won- of 2,000 – 3,000 words that look at the sub- be written about in the Journal itself. derful idea,so it will have to be transferred to ject of economic and political developments There is a third outlet. Part of the blog, I the Conservative History Journal blog that are specific to Britain or to the way those hope, will be contributions by other peo- (http://conservativehistory.blogspot.com/). ideas have developed in the Anglospheric ple. So far I have received two very differ- The blog has taken up a certain amount countries. Of course, if someone wants to ent ones, which were posted within hours of my time and will take up even more as write a knowledgeable piece on why the of being sent to me. One was a review of a I try to turn it into the pre-eminent site for Anglospheric ideas are completely erro- play in London, the other an eye-witness all those who are interested in conservative neous, they are welcome to do so. I shall be account of the recent American elections. history. Admittedly, my definition of con- happy to include it. Other contributions will be very welcome servative history has been rather wide but Later in the year, there will be a and I do credit the authors. Longer pieces that has not stopped hits from growing and Conservative History Journal of the kind we may then be reprinted in the forthcoming many interesting comments from being are more used to (though, perhaps, used to is issue of the Journal. posted on it (as well as some trollish ones not quite the right expression, given the edi- Plenty of ideas for all of us to get going that had to be removed). Among other tor’s shocking dilatoriness) that will once with.The Conservative History Journal in all strands in it will be the proposed “Books of again have articles about the Conservative its manifestations should have a bright future.

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 3 “To work for Women’s Enfranchisement by Educative and Constitutional methods consistent with Unionist principles” The quiet campaign of the Conservative & Unionist Women’s Franchise Association, 1908-1914

Dr Mitzi Auchterlonie, author of the recently published “Conservative Suffragists – The Women’s Vote and the Tory Party”, writes about Conservative women’s contribution to the enfranchisement debate

espite the considerable body of (CUWFA) as being ‘neglected in standard work that has been published on accounts of the movement’. It has been left the British women’s suffrage to Martin Pugh (TheTories and the People,The Dmovement in recent years, the March of theWomen etc.) to record the contri- contribution to the debate made by women bution made by the CUWFA to the eventu- who supported the Conservative Party dur- al achievement of votes for women.1 Pugh ing the second half of the nineteenth and first maintains that ‘we have underestimated the half of the twentieth century remains an conservatism and the Conservatism in under-researched area. In historian Harold women’s suffrage, and thereby lost an impor- Smith’s short overview of the British tant part of the explanation for the eventual women’s suffrage campaign there is the success of the cause’. admission that ‘the importance of Despite this historical marginalisation Conservative women in the NUWSS, and in there is no doubt that a number of the suffrage movement in general, has been Conservative women were active in the suf- underestimated’, while June Hannam identi- frage movement from the earliest days.They fies organisations like the Conservative & joined the first women’s suffrage commit- Lady Constance Lytton Unionist Women’s Franchise Association tees, became members of the two most

4 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Conservative & Unionist Women’s Franchise Association influential suffrage societies, the predomi- tively sympathetic to their campaign. Lady Plaque comemorating Emily Davies nantly Liberal National Union of Women’s Strachey could not deny that ‘the country Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), and, to a much has been roused to interest as it never was lesser extent, the Women’s Social and before . . . those of us who cannot commend Political Union (WSPU), and later founded the actions of the “Suffragettes” & will not their own organization,the Conservative and imitate them, feel we must at least keep Unionist Women’s Franchise Association silence, and reserve our polemics for our (CUWFA). enemies’.This remark suggests that although Because of the constraints placed on them the militant behaviour of the suffragettes did by the party hierarchy pro-suffrage cause some alarm among constitutional suf- Conservative women could not openly cam- fragists it was probably not the main reason paign for their cause through the popular that Conservative women decided to start grassroots Tory organization, the Primrose their own suffrage association.4 League.They had little option but to join a The NUWSS’s decision to maintain their branch of one of the existing suffrage soci- links with the Liberal Party meant that many eties. A number of Conservative suffragists, Conservative suffragists felt that that they including such prominent figures as Emily were placed in an untenable position in the It was important for Davies,Lady Louisa Knightley and Lady Jane light of Asquith’s opposition to the principle Conservative suffragists to Strachey, all of whom had supported the of women having a vote, despite the fact that enfranchisement of women since the days of a majority of Liberal MPs consistently voted feel that the promotion of a the 1867 Reform Bill,were actively involved for such legislation.A sign of this dissatisfac- strictly limited women’s in the NUWSS,while a few others,like Lady tion with the Liberal/suffrage connection Constance Lytton, became members of the was evident among some Unionist members franchise could be WSPU. Lady Strachey was elected to the of the constitutional suffrage societies.When satisfactorily linked to the Executive Committee of the NUWSS in Lady Strachey was asked to address the first 1907 (the only Conservative among the public meeting of the Brighton and Hove political principles that they twenty members), and on 9 February of that Women’s Franchise Society in September supported year, with Millicent Fawcett and Lady 1908, the letter of invitation spelt out the Frances Balfour, she led between two to dilemma. In six months the society had three thousand women through the rain- grown from 30 to 270 members, with ‘. . . a soaked streets of London in what became large proportion of Conservatives among its known as the ‘Mud March’ – the first major members, and we feel it to be of special outdoor demonstration organised by the importance that this meeting should be women’s suffrage movement.2 Strachey also addressed by at least one speaker who is not served as president of her local South a supporter of the present government’.5 Paddington branch of the London Society Lady Knightley would have agreed with for Women’s Suffrage (LSWS), an organisa- these sentiments since she disliked the public tion which she had joined in 1901 when it perception of women’s suffrage as being part was called the Central Society for Women’s of the radical politics of the Liberal Party. Suffrage.The LSWS, which operated under Lady Knightley expanded on her views the umbrella of the NUWSS and prided when she wrote in August 1908: itself on its independent stance, was popular with aristocratic suffragists based in London Hitherto the various suffrage societies have during the Season, and among its been supposed to be more or less . . . non- Conservative vice-presidents were Lady party . . . Not, however, perhaps unnatural- Edward Spencer Churchill, Lady Knightley, ly, the Liberal element had predominated, the Countess of Meath, the Countess of and . . . there can be no doubt that the most Selborne,and Mrs Henry Sidgwick.The vet- active and pertinacious of the agitators are eran Conservative suffragists Emily Davies to be found in the Liberal ranks . . . It is and Louisa Twining were also members of therefore of the utmost importance that the LSWS, the former being on the Conservative and Unionist women suffra- Executive Committee and the latter a vice- gists of all classes should organise, and that president until her death in 1912 at the age promptly, on party lines.6 of 91.3 Although by the end of 1908 there was It was important for Conservative suffra- growing concern about the increased mili- gists to feel that the promotion of a strict- tancy of the WSPU on the part of the con- ly limited women’s franchise could be sat- stitutional suffrage societies, for most of that isfactorily linked to the political principles year Conservative suffragists remained rela- that they supported, and that such legisla-

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 5 CUWFA journal), and Sophy Edmonds (the future CUWFA treasurer). These women, together with Mrs Emma Boulnois, decided to set up a distinctive party-based organization to campaign for women’s suffrage and Lady Knightley agreed to be the organisation’s president in July 1908. However, it was not until November that the CUWFA was officially launched.11 On November 6th, 1908, an informal meeting of those interested in becoming involved in the new group was held in London under the chairmanship of Lady Knightley. The formation of the CUWFA was announced in the newspapers a few days later,together with a list of names of fourteen prominent women who had consented to be Millicent Fawcett addresses a CUWFA rally vice-presidents, thus guaranteeing, the announcement claimed, that the women’s tion would be of benefit to the Unionist who possibly have no fender to put them in suffrage question would be judged ‘from a Party.One Conservative suffragist summed . . .’, but she had to admit that they could also political and academic as well as from a up the situation: ‘We must press home to ‘bring great influence to bear ...and have the woman’s point of view’.12 Among the names the leaders of our party the undoubted fact ear of the governing class’.9 quoted were the sisters and sister-in-law of . . . that the best way to defeat Adult One of the ways to fight the anti-suffrage Arthur Balfour,the Conservative leader,Alice Suffrage is to give that limited measure of accusation that Conservative suffragists were Balfour, Lady Rayleigh and Lady Betty enfranchisement to duly-qualified women bringing their party into disrepute was to Balfour respectively, together with such for which all the Suffrage Societies are take on their arguments and refute them,and prominent Conservative women as Lady unanimously asking - a measure which the Conservative & Unionist Women’s Robert Cecil (who was married to Lord would only enfranchise one million and a Franchise Association was formed with the Salisbury’s third son), Lady Edward Spencer quarter women, instead of suddenly and idea of mounting a campaign to counter Churchill, Lady Lockyer, the Countess of unprecedently placing an untried body of such propaganda.10 There was a particular Meath, Viscountess Midleton and Lady electors in a majority’.7 need to address the anti-suffrage argument Strachey.Distinguished names from the world In this context Conservative women suf- that took one of the most important tenets of of education and philanthropy were Miss E. fragists saw themselves coming to the rescue Conservatism – the preservation of the Constance Jones, Mistress of Girton College, of a beleaguered party - they could be relied Empire and the maintenance of the Miss Margaret Tuke, Principal of Bedford on to bear the duties of responsible citizen- Constitution – and claimed that women College, and Louisa Twining. ship, while other “untried” electors might be were unfitted to exercise political power A number of these women had a long and tempted by the false promises of socialism. where imperial matters were concerned. consistent record of support for women’s ‘The triumph of Socialism is impossible Conservative suffragists believed it was time enfranchisement at national and local level – without the previous adoption of adult suf- to challenge the accusation that women were among those who had signed the pro-suffrage’, wrote a prominent Conservative,‘and . not politically educated enough to cast a vote frage response to the famous appeal against . . the greatest safeguard against adult suffrage to elect an Imperial Parliament,and convince women’s suffrage published in the Nineteenth would be the bestowal of the franchise upon the waverers in the party that women’s Century in June 1889 were Alice Balfour, women’.8 enfranchisement would bring benefits to the Lady Knightley,the Countess of Meath, Lady The need to resist adult suffrage was not Empire, rather than undermine it. The Rayleigh, and Louisa Twining. The acquisi- the only spur to the formation of the importance of women’s imperial work had tion of women with a collective record of Conservative & UnionistWomen’s Franchise to be translated into an argument for the commitment to the expansion of women’s Association.Lady Knightley was one of those vote, and it is no coincidence that the political and social rights,and with the neces- who realised that it was necessary to address CUWFA was to have among its founding sary social standing within Unionist circles, the threat that the new Women’s National members a number of women who were was a coup for the new organization. It was Anti-Suffrage League posed to the suffrage members of imperialist associations. not surprising that Lady Knightley recorded cause. She was publicly disparaging about The idea of a Conservative suffrage socie- in her journal -‘Westart with an excellent list some of the female aristocrats who led the ty had first been suggested by a Miss ofVice Presidents.’13 Essentially most of these anti-suffrage campaign, writing that they Hutchinson Wright in a letter to Women’s women were members of London society were ‘women in Society with a big “S” . . . Franchise early in 1908.A number of women but when the society season was over they women with their feet in the fender,who do responded to her call, including Amelia continued their suffrage work in the counties not realise how the possession of the suffrage Gurney, Harriet Packer, Eveline Mitford where they had their houses and estates. would strengthen the position of the women (who later became the editor of the Conservative women who lived outside

6 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Conservative & Unionist Women’s Franchise Association

London,and who wanted to support the suf- Conservative MPs to support a limited frage cause and demonstrate their continuing women’s suffrage measure in Parliament and loyalty to the Unionist Party at the same in this project they were helped by three of time, were delighted to find that the their most dedicated male supporters, Lord CUWFA were encouraging the establish- Robert Cecil, the Earl of Selborne and Lord ment of local branches. Although only a Lytton.However,despite the strength of cam- small number of branches were established in paigning from all sides of the political spec- the provinces in 1909, the figure had more trum Parliament did not pass any legislation than doubled the following year, and there to enfranchise women the vote before the was a steady annual increase over the next outbreak of war in 1914, but it was generally three years, culminating in a total of 71 agreed that the argument had been won and branches (80 if those in London are includ- many in the Conservative Party admitted that ed) by the outbreak of war in August 1914.14 it was only a question of time before the vote Although never reaching the numbers would be granted to some groups of ‘the achieved by the NUWSS and theWSPU,the right sort’ of women.The CUWFA had not CUWFA was in a position to claim that in been formed in vain and could take some of terms of branches it was the third most the credit for the introduction of a vote for important women’s suffrage organisation. suitably qualified females in 1918. It soon became clear that Liberal predom- inance in Cornwall, Devon, East Anglia, and Endnotes much of the urban North-West, Yorkshire 1. Smith, H., The British Women’s Suffrage Campaign, 1866- 1928, London, 1998; Hannam, J., ‘ “I had not been to and the East Midlands accounted for the fact London”:Women’s Suffrage – AView from the Regions’, that there were hardly any groups in these in Purvis, J and Holton, S, Votes forWomen, London, 2000, areas. Wales, considered to be a bastion of pp.226-245; Pugh, M., March of theWomen, Oxford, 2000, Lady Frances Balfour chapter 5. Liberalism, appeared to have never had a 2. Lady Strachey is listed as an Executive Committee branch of the CUWFA, despite the fact that member in the NUWSS Annual Report for 1907, and there was a good scattering of Primrose Emily Davies and Lady Knightley are shown as vice- presidents in the 1911 Annual Report.Women’s Library. League habitations in the principality. The local government and charitable work, and Constance Lytton joined the WSPU in 1909. A report location of new regional groups was often joint meetings and marches were often held, of the ‘Mud March’ can be found in The Times, 11 dependent on whether there was an aristo- usually with the NUWSS,particularly at those February,1907, p.11. 3. The London Society for Women’s Suffrage Annual cratic suffragist with local influence. For times when a women’s suffrage bill was about Reports, 1908-1912. Box 338,Women’s Library. example, branches were set up in Hitchin, to be brought before the House of 4. The Conservative suffragist Lord Robert Cecil was less Knebworth and Stevenage, where Lord Commons. The importance of regular visits sympathetic to the militants. He introduced a Public Meetings Bill which penalised anyone who used disor- Lytton had his estate (the Cecils lived nearby from the President and other members of the derly conduct to disrupt public gatherings. HC Debates, at Hatfield), and in Coventry, Kenilworth, Executive Committee of the CUWFA was 4th series, vol. 198, 19 December 1908, col. 2336. Leamington, Rugby, Stratford and Warwick, demonstrated by the welcome that speakers 5. Letter dated 13 September 1908, Lady Jane Strachey papers.Women’s Library. where Lord and Lady Willoughby de Broke like Lady Betty Balfour, Lady Castlereagh, 6. The Queen, 29 August 1908, p.383. were local landowners and active members of Lady Knightley and the Countess of Selborne 7. Harriet Packer in the Conservative & Unionist Women’s the CUWFA. The East Hampshire branch received whenever they were able to attend Franchise Review, no. 2, February 1910, p.11. was centred on Alton, where the Earl and 8. Gilbert Samuel, brother of the Liberal MP Herbert local branch meetings.These visits were usual- Samuel, and husband of the Hon. Sec. of the CUWFA, Countess of Selborne,the latter a president of ly given good local newspaper coverage, and Louise Gilbert Samuel, writing in the Conservative & the CUWFA, had their estate, while the boosted the morale of what was sometimes a UnionistWomen’s Franchise Review, no. 3, May 1910, p.30. Woking branch owed its existence to the fact small group struggling to put the Conservative 9. The Queen, 29 August 1908, p.383. 10. The anti-suffragists accused the Conservative suffragists of that Lady Betty Balfour had a house in the case for women’s suffrage in areas where there opportunism and ‘political immorality’, because the latter vicinity.15 were already well-established branches of the assumed that propertied women ‘must necessarily be NUWSS and theWSPU. Conservatives and . . . their votes would be a valuable The president of a local branch of the addition to the strength of the party’.The anti-suffragists CUWFA would invariably be a member of However,it is important to remember that went on to claim that this was bound to lead to adult suf- the local Conservative aristocracy,but the sec- the great majority of Conservative women frage being brought in by ‘the Radicals’. The Anti-Suffrage retaries and other officers represented the who were involved in political life remained Review, no. 15, February 1910, pp.1-2. 11. An account of the foundation of the CUWFA can be middle-class suffrage activist, well-educated either members of the Primrose League or found in the Conservative & Unionist Women’s Franchise and predominantly Anglican, many of whom joined the new Women’s Unionist and Tariff Review, no. 5, November 1910, p.60. Journals of Lady were already involved in a variety of women’s Reform Associations, and in the interest of Knightley,20 July 1908. 12. The Times, 9 November 1908, p.16; Morning Post, 10 organizations which undertook educational party unity,both organisations always refused November 1908, p.9. and philanthropic work.These women were to become involved in the controversial and 13. Journals of Lady Louisa Knightley,5 November 1908. soon organising public meetings, lectures and potentially divisive debate on women’s suf- 14. These figures are taken from branch reports submitted to the Conservative & UnionistWomen’s Franchise Review from other events in support of the women’s suffrage. no. 2 in February 1910 to no. 20 in July - September frage campaign. They generally had friendly All the national and local campaigning of 1914. contact with other suffragists through their the CUWFA was directed at getting 15. Many of the details about Conservative landownership and local influence have been obtained from Pugh, M.,

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 7 The Club whose time has come again

Alistair Cooke, co-author (with Sir Charles Petrie) of “The Carlton Club 1832–2007” has based this article on a talk he gave to the Conservative History Group on December 4, 2007.

oday's Conservative Party has not them full participation in the Club's affairs. had much time for the Carlton Here plainly was an institution untouched by Club, whose 175th anniversary last the modernising forces that must have free Tyear stirred few feelings of pride rein if the Conservative Party is to flourish in among senior Tories. In 2001 Iain Duncan the 21st century.In fact, for years the major- Smith turned down the honorary member- ity of Carlton members yearned to elimi- ship traditionally given to leaders of the Party nate the cause of their disparagement by the and Theresa May, as his Party Chairman, Party's high command.The Club voted four declared that the historic special relationship times in favour of full membership for between Club and Party was at an end. David women but it was lumbered with a constitu- Cameron's letter of invitation remained tional requirement to achieve a two-thirds unanswered in his intray. Taking their cue majority at a general meeting which was from the leadership, almost all Tory MPs narrowly missed in 2007. So Club and Party gave the Club a wide berth. No one now remained unreconciled - until May 2008 can remember the days when membership of when a further vote finally settled the issue in the Carlton was almost an obligation, and favour of full women's membership and many MPs cheerfully subscribed to at least David Cameron at last replied to his letter, one other Tory London Club such as the St accepting honorary membership. Stephen's or the Junior Carlton [no age limit The Carlton ought to be hailed for what despite the name] which until 1963 occupied it has contributed at various stages to the magnificent premises in Pall Mall, almost modernisation of the Party. Without the opposite the massive bulk of the Carlton Carlton the old Tory Party of Pitt and Lord itself until a Nazi bomb in 1940 forced the Liverpool, which lacked the means to oper- latter to move to its present abode in St ate outside Parliament, would not have James's Street. With membership of both been transformed in the 1830s into the Carltons dwindling, Harold Macmillan came dynamic Conservative Party with a steadily to the rescue. In 1977 at the age of 83 he expanding national organisation connecting employed his remarkable political skills to its supporters throughout the country with unite them and so preserve their heritages. the leadership at the centre for the first An informal, tieless Conservative leader- time. Regarded today at best as a dignified ship has,in recent years,looked elsewhere for survival, the Carlton was once the great company and relaxation. The Carlton was modernising force. It rescued the Party regarded with disfavour because of its failure from the state of collapse into which it was to admit women as full members to its hal- plunged by the first Reform Bill. lowed precincts, raising them from their Modernisation depended above all on the subordinate status as associates which denied establishment of premises within easy reach

8 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Carlton Club of Parliament where the completely new activities of registering voters under the reformed electoral system, securing agents to do the necessary work in the constituencies, raising money to help with the high cost of contested elections (a bill for £10,000 was not uncommon) and recommending candidates could all be overseen. The Carlton became in effect the capital of the entire Party under Robert Peel and its public face to the country at large. Professor Norman Gash, the leading expert on this period, concluded that 'within a few years of its foundation the Club contained the substantial strength of conservatism in England' including 'the regional leaders in the provinces, in the diplomatic service and the fighting forces'.A man of genius, Francis Bonham, one of the Party's many unsung heroes, was put in charge of the formidable modernising forces at the Carlton. According to Gash, 'there was hardly a rip- ple of opinion within the Party that was not reported to Peel by his watchdog at the Carlton'. He was 'the repository of a thousand secrets and the betrayer of none', in the words of Lord John Manners, one of Disraeli's colleagues in the 'Young England' group formed to oppose Peel. It was ironi- cally the Carlton, Peel's great modernising machine, which brought Disraeli into the House of Commons by recommending him to the Tories of Maidstone in 1837 where he was greeted on the hustings by cries of 'Shylock' and 'Old clothes' at the start of a hard-fought contest that cost £40,000 [£2.8 million in today's values]. Nearly a hundred years later the most Nearly a hundred years later moment, the beginning of modern British famous event in the whole history of the politics. But the Carlton to its credit Carlton, the meeting of October 1922, mod- the most famous event in approached it in splendidly relaxed fashion. ernised the whole fabric of British politics. the whole history of the The historic meeting opened at 11a.m.when The great gathering of Conservative MPs 'a waitress advanced with two immense voted by two to one to end their six-year Carlton, the meeting of brandies and soda to lubricate Chamberlain long association with Lloyd George that October 1922, modernised and F.E.Smith. Much cheering', as Lord might have made coalition the natural form Crawford recorded in his diary. Indeed it is of government in Britain designed to keep the whole fabric of British something of a tradition at the Carlton to Labour out of power for ever. That is what politics strike a light-hearted note on important occa- Winston Churchill wanted.By breaking with sions. When in January 1979 Macmillan theWelsh wizard and throwing out their own unveiled a superb bust of Magaret Thatcher leader, Austen Chamberlain, the Carlton's by Oscar Nemon,he caused great amusement finest put paid to that prospect. Instead they by muttering in a splendid stage whisper, made Stanley Baldwin,who introduced what 'Now I must remember that I am unveiling a he called a 'new Conservatism' based on far- bust of Margaret Thatcher, not Margaret reaching social reform,the dominant figure in Thatcher's bust'. the inter-war period and enabled the Labour Party to become the main opposition in Parliament,consigning the divided Liberals to Copies of The Carlton Club 1832-2007 are available at £30 from the Carlton Club, 69 St James's Street, permanent third party status. It was solemn London SWIA IPJ.

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 9 James Francis Edward Stuart, "The Old Pretender" and his council during 1st Jacobite Rising

Were the Tories Jacobites?

Charles Dudgeon, a history teacher and chairman of the Paisley and Inverclyde Conservative Association, discusses whether the first Tory was really as Jacobite as it is sometimes assumed.

10 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Jacobites

heTory Party has flirted with some dis- flight to France,the right of the Prince ofWales tlement – which was in fact created by aTory- astrous causes which have split it from was passed over and the succession passed to leaning ministry.Other Tories had undoubted top to bottom and shut it out of power Mary.Tories were less keen on the fact that the Jacobite leanings. They formed the October T– its attitude to parliamentary reform, revolutionary settlement declared her husband club, named after the month in which malt tariff reform and, most recently,Europe.The first William as joint-ruler, and so on Mary’s was collected for beer, and were, as Queen Tory Party seemed to back the biggest losing untimely death in 1693 from smallpox he con- Anne’s biographer Edward Gregg says, cause of all at the beginning of the eighteenth tinued to rule. Further Tory unease was trig- “Hanoverian when sober, and Jacobite when century,the Jacobites – and arguably completely gered by a Toleration Act passed by William drunk”.Why did some Tories take this view? disintegrated in the aftermath of the Hanoverian which allowed certain dissenters – but not Some,but not many,felt guilt at what they had succession in 1714. But in reality how Jacobite Catholics – to hold office.The Tory refrain of done to James;others felt no loyalty to the rev- were theTories? “the Church in Danger” was to be constant olutionary settlement which had produced The firstTory Party was formed in the reign from now on. monarchs sorely disappointing to the Tories. of Charles II during the Exclusion Crisis of William died in 1702 to be succeeded by But most were motivated by fear of a conti- 1678-81. Would James, Duke of York, the Anne.Anne was heaven-sent as far as theTories nental monarch, ensnaring good Britons in brother and heir of Charles be allowed to suc- were concerned. Staunchly high Anglican, their wars. The Hanoverians were not even ceed following his open conversion to Anne was suspicious of any concession to dis- Anglicans, but Lutherans who would be Catholicism? The Tories supported Charles’ senters or Catholics. However Anne was no labelled as dissenters in Britain. Perhaps 70 view that he should, championed the cause of Tory puppet. She was terrified by the thought Tories were at least prepared to contemplate a hereditary right, and were opposed by the of single-party government.Anne used “man- Jacobite restoration in the form of the Old Whigs, who fanned the flames of the “Popish agers” who stood above Tory and Whig to Pretender,“James III”. MostTories wished the Plot” and demanded James’ exclusion. Some form “moderate” ministries.Anne in particular problem away.Daniel Szechi, currently one of Whigs even supported the succession of held theTories at a distance in the early part of the leading academic historians on the subject, Charles’ illegitimate – but Protestant – son, the her reign as they opposed the War of the describes them as “hoping that Queen Anne Duke of Monmouth. The wily Charles suc- Spanish Succession, in which British forces would live forever”. ceeded in maintaining James as his heir,by con- were led, often brilliantly, by the Duke of But Queen Anne would not live forever – tinually proroguing a largely Whiggish parlia- Marlborough. not even very long. Her health, never robust, ment until the crisis blew itself out. The Tories were increasingly the anti-war was ruined by her numerous pregnancies, and But James still posed a problem for the party and expended their efforts in shoring up she collapsed at Christmas 1713. Doctors all Tories.As well as championing hereditary right, theAnglican Church.They fought – unsuccess- agreed that,although only 48,she had months the Tories cherished the Church of England – fully – for repeal of the Toleration Act, and to to live.The Tories now had to face the issue. especially when prefixed by the adjective introduce an Occasional Conformity Act (to For many years historians have accused the “High”.After James succeeded in 1685, many prevent dissenters takingAnglican communion Tory leadership of Jacobitism and it is in the Tories were alarmed at his attempts to relieve once a year and so qualify for office holding) last months ofAnne’sreign that the charges are the lot of his fellow Roman Catholics by and a Schism Act (to close down dissenting strongest.The theory goes back to the negoti- exempting army officers from theTest Act and schools). ation of the end of the War of the Spanish finally by his second Declaration of Indulgences In 1710 Anne replaced a largely pro-Whig Succession.TheTories were determined to end which he demanded be read from Anglican manager the Earl of Godolphin with Robert the war in defiance of their treaty commit- pulpits.1 Tories may have supported hereditary Harley,the Earl of Oxford, a largely pro-Tory ments with their Dutch,Austrian and German right,but they would not tolerate the erosion of one; Anne was beginning to turn against the allies. This involved negotiating a number of the position of the established church,and very expensive war, although chiefly she wished to secret clauses without their allies’ knowledge, few still believed in the divine right of kings. escape falling entirely into the clutches of the such as the right of selling slaves in Spain’s Fortunately James’ two daughters by his first Whig leaders, the Junto.The Tories won big South American possessions, and abandoning marriage, Mary and Anne, were good majorities in both the 1710 and 1713 elections the agreed division of Habsburg possessions.As Anglicans, and so, went Tory reasoning, any (elections were then triennial). it was,Anne had to create extra peers to get the Catholic revival would be short-lived.All that But the big question for both parties was the treaty through in the teeth of Whig and even changed with the birth of a Catholic son and succession. Anne, despite her legendary eight- someTory opposition.But the really explosive Prince of Wales in 1688 – the future old een pregnancies, had failed to produce an heir, Tory manoeuvre was the secret order given to Pretender. James now made theTories choose and the Stuart line was dying out – except that the British commander-in-chief the Duke of which element within their platform was most across in exile in France at the Palace of St. Ormonde, who had replaced Marlborough. important - and theTories chose the Church of Germain.The Act of Settlement of 1701 had Ormonde was ordered to withdraw the England. With some reluctance the Tories provided for a Protestant succession – the house British army from the fighting and in a final, threw their lot in with the Whigs during the of Hanover, headed by the Electress Sophia, fatal postscript to his orders theTory Secretary subsequent Glorious Revolution – indeed their granddaughter of James I, and her German of State and rising star, Bolingbroke, added abandonment of James was decisive in deter- heirs. these words. mining the success of Mary’s husbandWilliam The Whigs were united behind the of Orange in 1689. Hanoverian succession, but the Tories were I had almost forgot to tell your Grace that com- The next problem was the succession.James divided. Some, the “Whimsicals” supported munication is given of this order to the Court of was deemed to have abdicated“de facto”by his the Hanoverian succession and the act of set- France;so that if the Marescal deVillars [the

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 11 French commander] takes,in any private way, sibly to Rome, and that the Old Pretender notice of it to you,your Grace will answer accord- should become anAnglican.Both offers were a ingly. trap;a conversion this late in the day would fool no one and alienate existing Jacobites (as James As a result of this treachery,a depleted Dutch himself realised) and a move to Rome under army was roundly defeated at the battle of papal protection would make “James III” even Denain – the only French victory in the Dutch more unpalatable in English eyes. In fact theatre,and one which forced the Dutch to the Oxford, who recognised that a Hanoverian negotiating table. succession was almost inevitable, was trying to The Tories extricated themselves from the blunt the Jacobite threat,and present this to the war,to general applause in a war-weary Britain. new monarch as proof of Tory loyalty. But there was one huge drawback for the Bolingbroke’s last communications to the Tories. Hanover was one of the allies betrayed Jacobites told them to do nothing, allow by “perfidious Albion”, and initially the elector George to succeed and then wait for him to chose to fight on after the Treaty of Utrecht. become unpopular.Even“James III”would not Tories,the theory concludes,believed that they swallow this nonsense.Hence the ’15. would be unpalatable to a Hanoverian Why did someTories flee to the Pretender in Viscount Bolingbroke monarch.Therefore they had no option but to 1715? Most waited to see what would happen gamble on a Stuart restoration. In early 1714 when George I arrived.The early indications the leadership, principally Earl of Oxford and were not discouraging.HanoverianTories were the fast-rising Viscount Bolingbroke began offered places in government,as George initial- negotiations with the old Pretender. It was a ly, like Anne, wished to avoid falling into the race against time.Would an ailing Anne hold clutches of one party.But the Tory leadership out long enough for theTories to complete the made a crucial error. They refused to accept preparations for a Stuart successor? The Tories office unless all the Tories were included – a ran out of time when she finally died on 1st condition doomed to failure under George I. August 1714 before their preparations were This left the way open to a Whig-dominated complete. Sophia had died a matter of weeks government, who began to talk of inquiries before Anne, and so the new elector, her son, into the peace negotiations, impeachment of was proclaimed George I. Within a few Tories and worse. It was at this point that months,leadingTories such as Bolingbroke and Bolingbroke and others panicked and fled. Ormonde fled to the Pretender’scourt,provid- Bolingbroke’s real fear was not his alleged ing sure evidence of their guilt. Jacobitism but the publication of that treacher- So much for the theory,but is it accurate? In ous postscript in his order to Ormonde. fact most politicians, both Whig and Tory,and Oxford, against whom nothing could be even Queen Anne, who for many years was proved, spent a couple of years in the Tower incorrectly suspected of Jacobite sympathy,cor- whilst his impeachment petered out. But the responded and negotiated with the court at St. events of 1715 were enough for a wily and The Earl of Oxford Germain and offered a restoration“at the right disingenuous Sir Robert Walpole to describe time”.In Britain most politicians committed to theTories as treacherous, Popish Jacobites for a the revolutionary settlement, recognised that it generation and more, and lock them out of was best to offer a “political” solution to the power for the reign of the first two Georges. Jacobites for no other reason than to forestall The evidence that the Tories were Jacobites any “military” solution involving an armed is scant. At best some backwoodsmen were uprising.The Jacobites, starved of resources in genuinely committed to the cause, whilst the France and not sure of the efficacy of a “mili- leadership was engaged in fooling the Jacobite tary solution”,were all too ready to swallow the court in a game of double-bluff which politi- bait and play a waiting game.At various times it cians of all parties had been playing since the was put to them thatWilliam might adopt the early 1690s.It was the constellation of events of Prince of Wales as his heir, that Queen Anne 1715 – a Jacobite uprising, an unrealistic might do the same, that Goldolphin might demand for full power, a few panicked flights, back their cause.There is not a shred of evi- andWhig propaganda – which made it appear dence to suggest that any of these offers were otherwise. made seriously.The real motive of the Tory leadership in 1714 can be deduced when we 1. TheTestAct demanded that all office holders swear an oath examine the concrete proposals made by repudiating transubstantiation – thus flushing out Roman Catholics, and the Declaration of Indulgences was James Oxford and Bolingbroke to the Jacobites; the statement that he would suspend discriminatory legislation Jacobite court should move out of France,pos- against Catholics and Dissenters.

12 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 JC: Social history just doesn’t interest me. I think it is very vulnerable to a lot of the kind of deconstruction post-modernist viruses because the generalizations that social historians use are,obviously,open to this.How on earth can you generalize what the working class wanted when we know very little about the working class as a class if it existed at all. Of course, then post-modernist historians think quite reasonably that that is rather a large generalization and, of course, the only way of combatting that is by doing some very serious and hard work in regions and in some parts of British history that is being done. But in large sections it hasn’t been done and social history finds itself much more in danger of being paralyzed by this post-modern virus than the kind of history I write. ***

Turning to the subject of Conservative for- John Charmley eign policy,I’d like to say that there are huge areas that need studying and conservatives are as guilty of this as anybody.We take that Lord Blake and others told us that Conservative on the other foreign policy undergoes a change with Disraeli, that there is something really different after that. I think actually there is a real Conservative difference but how does it happen, where does it come from, what was there before it. One of the things that has become apparent to me from my own work and from that of tradition my graduate students,is that not only there is another very strong, vibrant conservative tradition that goes forward from Castlereagh, certainly to Disraeli’s time, but that, in fact, Some time ago Helen Szamuely, the editor that other conservative tradition is not destroyed by Disraeli, it may be overlain in of the Conservative History Journal, part by Disraeli, but like any tradition, it interviewed Professor John Charmley and doesn’t entirely vanish.And there were those in the Conservative Party who certainly up published those parts of the conversation to the 1930’s, the late 1930s are, if you like inheritors of this tradition of non-interven- that dealt with being a conservative tionism in foreign affairs, of scepticism of the historian and what conservative history possibility of actually doing any good by intervening in the affairs of other countries might be. For want of space a good deal and they are, in a sense, good country party economists in the sense that they do not had to be left out; in particular Professor think it is a good idea to drive up the tax rate Charmley’s discussion of a tradition of in order to pay for utopian schemes of intervention in foreign countries. I think that’s foreign policy in the Conservative Party quite an important strand in conservative thinking and it actually hasn’t gone away. that differs from the received wisdom. I think what we have done … so great was Here, those thoughts have been put the success of Churchill in 1940, who espoused quite a different strand of conserva- together. tive thinking, in essence a strand which,

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 13 “If you don’t have faith in JC: So have most people.If you can imagine that, it would be almost too painful. I think your own country’s mission there is a kind of turning away from that, in the world . . . why study it because it never longer seems relevant in the sense that Britain no longer matters. So I in relation to the world?” think it is part of that loss of national self- confidence that really we suffered from right until well into the Thatcher era. If you don’t have faith in your own country’s mission in the world, destiny in the world, why study it in relation to the world?Then,of course,you get trends such as the development of international relations. So what really matters is international relations, which is, on the whole, a flight from reality.The great problem with real foreign policy is that it does not fit into any of the schools of IR thinking,not even the realist one. Such is the modern academic life is that the answer to that has been: “so much the worse for real history”. One of the saddest notes struck in post- though it does not begin with Disraeli, but suchlike matters compared to exciting things like War Prime Minister’s autobiography is a lit- Disraeli, I think is the one who imposes it in Palmerston’s policy. tle noticed remark by Anthony Eden in the interesting circumstances on the I wonder how much that change in fashion has second volume, Full Circle, of his autobiog- Conservative Party.That tradition leads for- to do with our reluctance nowadays to think in raphy. He spends a lot of time in that vol- ward to Churchill and then, self-consciously terms of Britain’s interests,Britain’s national inter- ume of the autobiography dealing with the on Macmillan’s part, through Macmillan to ests. Because we are unable to define it – the spec- way in which he and the Foreign Office Thatcher. And that has become a very pre- tacular example of that is Blair being unable to give tried to build up General de Gaulle, because dominant part of our thinking,particularly in an even coherent reason for going to war in Iraq – they thought it was in Britain’s national the Cold War after 1945, that Britain had to but, perhaps, a more interesting example came last interests. So the basic view was that after the be involved in alliances abroad, Britain has to week. Another conservative historian Niall war de Gaulle would matter in France and pay a large defence budget in order to do Ferguson published an article on the special rela- France would still be as a geographical fact this.So,if you like,I think that what has hap- tionship between Britain and America, which said and, therefore, it was a good idea to be on pened is that there has been a process where- that going to war just to support your allies is not good terms with whoever was going to be by the ideas espoused from Disraeli to good enough, it has to be for your own interests, leading France. Churchill’s view was that Churchill fitted very nicely into a kind of which is fine and good, but he then proceeded not no, no, no, the Americans was all that mat- post-1945 conservative foreign policy think- to give any indication as to what he thought tered and, therefore, the fact that Roosevelt ing, that isn’t just conservative but also main- Britain’s interests might be.And I wonder whether and Cordell Hull did not like de Gaulle and stream Labour Party thinking. And I think, that is part and parcel of this reluctance to study thought that he was a proto-fascist meant such is our ignorance of what is actually hap- foreign policy.In the end, what is foreign policy but that the British should try to get rid of de pened in the nineteenth century that it is an expression of your own interests? Gaulle and, certainly, should not try to be very easy simply to say: that is the conserva- on decent terms with him.And Eden com- tive tradition in British foreign policy. JC: It’s an interesting way of looking at it ments in his autobiography about the way I think I would say it is a tradition in and I think there’s a lot in it. I think that it in which de Gaulle consistently and fairly British foreign policy but to say it is the only comes partly from that source and partly, successfully stood up both to the British and one is to misread our own history. too, from the long period after 1957, the Americans, despite the fact that he was through really until fairly recent times, economically totally dependent on them. HS: One mustn’t forget that this is little when foreign policy became dominated by And he just comments wistfully at one Englandism at its best, whether one agrees with it the idea of Britain’s decline.And, of course, point: “I wonder whether it would have or not. Little Englander has become a term of studying the nugatory influence of a declin- been in our interest to have adopted a rather abuse, whereas, of course, there were very sensible ing power is, I suppose, a fairly masochistic more Gaullist attitude to the United States.” underlying reasons for that. It is interesting what exercise. One of the reasons why I was That is,I think,a very sad comment because you say about the study of foreign policy,that it is never tempted to go into the later twentieth in a way it could have applied to the whole not nearly as fashionable as it used to be. I remem- century was, well, I suppose a species of hell of the post-war period.And what does it say ber a time when practically every history book was would be studying Michael Stewart as when even someone as clever as Niall largely about foreign policy.That suited me fine, as Foreign Secretary. Ferguson is not telling us what national it was much more interesting than anything else. interests we have in going along with the Who wanted to study various industrial acts and HS: I have completely forgotten about him. United States.

14 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 – and not a few of his followers – to doubt his sincerity and question the depth of his convictions, considering him as little more than a supremely gifted (but essentially shallow and showy) opportunist.2 No episode in Disraeli’s political career engendered more controversy, both at the Disraeli’s historical time and subsequently, than the one which materially advanced his claims to the leadership of the Conservative party. In 1846, the Conservative Prime Minister, Sir Robert reputation and Peel, piloted a bill through parliament accomplishing the graduated repeal of the Corn Laws.3 The measure overturned a 30 year Conservative defence of the Corn Laws, the repeal of the as the necessary support and bulwark of the landed interest,and vitiated the pledges made by the Conservative majority returned to corn laws parliament at the 1841 general election. In heated parliamentary exchanges, Disraeli established himself as Peel’s leading political opponent, using all his literary skills as a wit, Richard A Gaunt, Lecturer in History at the novelist and phrase-maker to flail the Prime Minister with forensic skill and exactitude.As University of Nottingham and editor of the Disraeli later wrote, Peel encountered ‘an Diaries of the Fourth Duke of Newcastle, opposition which he had not anticipated & partly carried on in a vein in which he did writes here about that most influential and not excel’.4 The Corn Laws were repealed in spite of the Conservative party’s overwhelm- controversial of Conservative politicians, ing opposition to the measure but the polit- Benjamin Disraeli. ical legacy was brutal:28 years of almost con- tinual opposition (punctuated by brief spells of minority government) and generations of bitterness between the Peelite and Protectionist wings of the party. The clash between Peel and Disraeli has all the hallmarks of a classic political drama – one rooted in the animus between the incumbent and the aspirant leaders of the party.It is a clash which continues to be seen as driven essentially by Disraeli’s personal pique at Peel for having passed him over for office in 1841.5 This stimulated Disraeli’s 25 years after his death, Benjamin increasingly adverse reaction to Peel’s ‘New Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, still Conservatism’ – witnessed in his classic provides the political lode-star for ‘political novels’ Coningsby (1844) and Sybil 1generations of Conservatives. Lately, (1845) - and his association with such for the first time in 30 years, Disraeli’s name quixotic parliamentary ginger groups as the and example has been enthusiastically evoked ‘Young England’ movement (1842-5). This by the party leadership and David Cameron suggests that Disraeli’s steadily accumulating has projected himself as a Disraeli for the sense of wrath against Peel inevitably culmi- 21st-century.1 nated in the antipathy he exhibited against Both these facts would have astounded him during 1846. As one (particularly hos- Disraeli’s contemporaries. No politician’s tile) anonymous pamphleteer put it at the credibility, character and creed were more time, Disraeli looked like nothing more than vigorously debated during the 19th-century ‘an acid adventurer’. Even the editors of and none was found so universally wanting. Disraeli’s collected Letters have noted that It became commonplace for Disraeli’s critics ‘there can be few if any parallels in English

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 15 history of one politician setting out to destroy another with such sustained attacks reaching such a climax’.6 It is undoubtedly true that Disraeli was a vociferous and disenchanted opponent of Peel but an over-concentration on the personalities involved in the drama has tended to obscure the very real differences of principle at stake.As Boyd Hilton has recently argued, ‘It is important to emphasize the fundamentally divided nature of the Conservative Party [in 1846] because there is a tendency to think that Peel might have got away with it but for Disraeli’s malevolence’.7 Because the Protectionists rallied behind such seemingly eccentric and unlikely champions as Disraeli (an Anglicized Jew and literary dilettante) and Lord George Bentinck (an aristocratic younger son of the turf) it is easy to overlook the coherent reasoning behind their political case. In recent years, historians have helped overturn the consensus which dismissed the Protectionists as unthinking blockheads, forced to bow to the superior intellectual logic and cogency of the Peelite case.8 There was a political as well as an economic rationale for maintaining the Corn Laws which Disraeli voiced in the House of Commons at the time but which it is all too easy to dismiss Disraeli’s Cabinet now as rose-tinted romanticism.‘I have faith in the primitive and enduring elements of the English character’, Disraeli told MPs in party:a fact underscored by the historical fate Disraeli’s reputation for his famous frontal assault on Peel in May which befell his closest competitors for 1846, ‘perchance they may remember, not prominence. Lord George Bentinck – who unprincipled chicanery and with unkindness, those who, betrayed and was connected by birth and marriage to two duplicitous mendacity deserted, were neither ashamed nor afraid to former Prime Ministers (the 3rd Duke of struggle for the “good old cause” – the cause Portland and George Canning) – was forced became intimately related to with which are associated principles the most to resign his leadership of the party in the his part in Corn Law repeal, popular, sentiments the most entirely nation- Commons in December 1847 and died sud- al – the cause of labour – the cause of the denly in September 1848. Disraeli’s biogra- providing contemporaries people – the cause of England!’.9 phy of Bentinck, published three years later, with a series of charges with In the political circumstances of mid- to was both an act of friendship and a manifesto late- nineteenth-century England, and the for his own leadership ambitions.11 which to assail him establishment of the economic hegemony of Meanwhile, the historical reputation of the periodically free trade, it was difficult for the 14th Earl of Derby - who led the party dur- Protectionists’ wider political case to find a ing the 22 years separating Peel’s from hearing above the narrower,sectional econom- Disraeli’s ministries - fell into a benign (if ic interests suggested by their support for the conscious) neglect from which he is only Corn Laws.The fact that the party leadership now beginning to emerge.12 accepted this (during the minority In these circumstances, Disraeli’s reputa- Conservative government of 1852) by aban- tion for unprincipled chicanery and duplici- doning its commitment to the restoration of tous mendacity became intimately related to the Corn Laws, reinforced the argument of his part in Corn Law repeal, providing con- The Times that ‘in one sense, we are all temporaries with a series of charges with Peelites’.10 which to assail him periodically.In a charac- It also reinforced the notion that Disraeli ter-sketch published in 1847, G. H. Francis had essentially used repeal as a platform to wondered whether Disraeli’s success was capture the leadership of the Conservative anything more than a ‘mere transient tri-

16 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Disraeli umph of ill-directed talent, favoured by for- to the ultimate detriment not only of his tunate circumstances’13 and concluded that own reputation but to that of the the Corn Law debates were the culmination Conservative party as a whole.17 of a process of political self-fashioning Over the long-term, fate has been kind to through which Disraeli had made himself Disraeli.As historians like JohnVincent have more acceptable to a party of landowners noted,death was (in many respects) the mak- and sons of the nobility.It must be admitted ing of Disraeli’s reputation.The Conservative that Disraeli contributed to this process him- party appropriated the famous Disraelian self, in later life, by explaining away his part concepts of ‘One Nation’, ‘Imperium et in the downfall of Peel as an act of youthful Sanitas’ and ‘Peace with Honour’ into a frenzy.To Mrs Stonor (Peel’s daughter), he is mythology of successful domestic political supposed to have remarked that ‘I was a very statecraft and stirring ‘jingoistic’ rhetoric small dog,and followed the example of other which continues to exercise a powerful hold small dogs by attacking the great dog of the over the imagination of modern day, although at the time I had the greatest Conservatives. In the Primrose League admiration for him.’14 The essentially negative (between the 1880s and 1930s) and the‘One rendition of Disraeli’s role in 1846 proved a Nation’ group (after 1950), the party institu- remarkably durable and potentially difficult tionalised Disraeli’s legacy,making it indistin- weapon for Conservatives to counter, at least guishable from its own.18 until the 1870s, when memories of the episode could be offset against the legislative and foreign policy achievements (and con- troversies) of Disraeli’s 1874-80 government. 1. The Daily Mail (24 Jan. 2006), p. 10. 2. For contemporary documentation and commentary, In the process, apologists and admirers alike see Michael Partridge and Richard A. Gaunt (eds.), constructed a line of political continuity Lives of Victorian Political Figures [hereafter LVPF] between the young Disraeli of Sybil and the (London, 2006), 4 vols.Volumes 2-3 (ed. Gaunt) chart the evolution of Disraeli’s public persona at the hands ‘Two Nations’ in the 1840s and the mature of contemporaries. Beaconsfield,legislating in the realm of social 3. The bill provided for the gradual extinction of protec- reform and pursuing an energetic foreign tive duties on corn until a nominal registration duty remained after 1849; this survived until its abolition in policy. As such, the events of 1846 seemed 1869. part of a natural – indeed necessary – stage in 4. Benjamin Disraeli, Lord George Bentinck [1851] (New the party’s evolution towards the mass-based Brunswick, New Jersey, 1998), p. 206. 15 5. This was Sir William Fraser’s view, for one: LVPF, II, urban democracy of the late 19th-century. 115-18. The innate drama of the parliamentary 6. LVPF, II, 97; M. G. Wiebe et al (eds.), Benjamin battle over Corn Law repeal 160 years ago is Disraeli: Letters, 1842-1847 (Toronto, 1989), p. xxxvi- ii. unlikely to recede.Viewed in historical retro- 7. Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad and Dangerous People? spect, it represents a particular type of ‘rite of England 1783-1846 (Oxford, 2006), p. 512. passage’ – a shifting of the tectonic plates 8. For a full exploration of the Protectionist case, see Anna Gambles, Protection and Politics: Conservative through which political leadership was trans- Economic Discourse, 1815-52 (Woodbridge, 1999). ferred from one type and variety of 9. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series, lxxxvi, cols. Conservatism to another.16 In the House of 676-7 (15 May 1846). 10. For a jubilant assault (by Thomas MacKnight) on Lords, the Duke of Wellington worked care- Disraeli’s ‘surrender’, see LVPF, II, 183-214. fully with the future Earl of Derby to allow 11. Angus MacIntyre, ‘Lord George Bentinck and the the Protectionist peers to register their oppo- Protectionists: A Lost Cause?’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 39 (1989), 141-65. sition to Corn Law repeal whilst minimizing 12. Angus Hawkins, The Forgotten Prime Minister:The 14th long-term damage to the party in the upper Earl of Derby, 1799-1869 (Oxford, forthcoming). house. No such careful accommodation was 13. LVPF, II, 179. 14. LVPF, II, 62. possible in respect of the party’s MPs, who 15. For examples of this change in emphasis, see LVPF, divided 2/3-1/3 against the measure. In the III, 27-43, 77-90. Commons, the consistent bitterness regis- 16. Hilton, Mad, Bad and Dangerous People?, p. 512. 17. For an attempt to re-establish the ‘Peelite’ credentials tered against Disraeli by leading Peelite MPs of the Conservative party, see Norman Gash, ‘The like William Gladstone, Sidney Herbert and Founder of Modern Conservatism’, in Pillars of Edward Cardwell ensured that they (if by no Government and other Essays on State and Society, c. 1770-c. 1880 (London, 1986), pp. 153-61 and The means all the Peelites) ultimately found their Radical Element in the History of the Conservative Party way into the nascent Liberal party after 1859. (The Swinton Lecture, published by the Conservative By extension, it became increasingly accept- Political Centre, 1989).We await Lord Hurd’s biography of Peel (scheduled for 2007) with interest. able to think of Peel as having been a liberal 18. JohnVincent,‘Was Disraeli a failure?’, HistoryToday, 31 apostate or dissident Conservative all along, (Oct. 1981), pp. 5-8.

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 17 We come to the great Birmingham Conference of the National Union, the 17th, held in October 1883, when Lord Randolph Churchill,with the aid of fellow“Fourth Party” member, John Gorst, made his first serious attempt to take over the party. The leadership sentViscount Cranbrook to deal with the attack and, according to Richard The first Birmingham Shannon, he did it rather well. Responding to Churchill’s fiery speech that accused the Central Committee of being inward looking and hostile to “working men” in the party as Conference well as of financial mismanagement,Cranbrook raised the question of whom the National Union really represented – the constituencies or the affiliated organizations. He also denied Helen Szamuely on the first Conservative any financial mismanagement and,it seems,that conference in Birmingham, in 1883 Churchill and his allies never managed to prove that.On the other hand,they did point out that the National Union had no funds to speak of. phone call from the Birmingham continued but for the disastrous defeat of 1880. In his diary Cranbrook referred to Council Leader’s office alerted me to As Robert Rhodes James puts it in his biogra- “Randolph Churchill’s Birmingham the fact that this is not the first time the phy of Lord Randolph: intrigues”, which is what it looked like to the AConservative Party has decided to Conservative leadership.The membership was hold its annual conference in Birmingham.The “It is a monotonous feature of English politics more divided in its opinion.(In parenthesis one Tory Council Leader wanted to know exactly that the defeated party in an election blames its may render thanks for the fact that so many when and in what circumstances did the previous organization for the débâcle.The Conservatives in British politicians,however busy they may have events take place. 1880 were no exception to this rule.” been,kept consistent and detailed diaries.This is Well, naturally,my first port of call was the a fascinating subject all by itself that needs to be historian and Conservative Councillor, John So they formed a Central Committee under written about more.) Barnes,who is a mine of information about the Lord Beaconsfield’s auspices and this organiza- In December of that year Churchill became Conservative Party and its history.He knew,of tion was put in charge of direction and man- Chairman of the National Union’s course,and directed me to the books that could agement of party affairs,as well as the disburse- Organisation Committee, though the method give me more information. Quite a story it is, ment of party funds.Clearly,this did not please used was rather dubious, as it ought to have too,as I put it together,usingAndrew Roberts’s the National Union, who considered them- been Lord Percy. biography of Lord Salisbury, Robert Rhodes selves to be the representatives of the real Lord Randolph’s exemplar was Joseph James’s biography of Lord Randolph Churchill Conservative Party. Chamberlain’s National Liberal Foundation, at and Richard Shannon’s “The Age of It is not east to work out what motivated this time prospering to the point of taking over Salisbury”. Oh and a quick look at R. J. Q. Lord Randolph.He presented himself as a man the party. Coincidentally, of course, Adams’s“Balfour”. who spoke for Tory democracy, for working Birmingham was Chamberlain’s power base. The story is quite fascinating and puts to pay class members of the party,for all the various Subsequent manoeuvrings, snipings and the notion that somehow politics was a much constituent groups against the “Carlton Club” open warfare between the Salisbury with his more gentlemanly affair when it was run by elite,who wanted to run things the old way. allies and Churchill with his allies did culminate “gentlemen”. The Salisbury/Northcote fight The idea of Lord Randolph as a representa- in some sort of a compromise,under which the with Churchill was anything but gentlemanly. tive of the working man or of anything resem- latter went through various ministerial appoint- In the end,Churchill lost not because he was a bling real democracy is slightly odd and one ments, once there was a Conservative govern- nicer person but because, seduced by apparent cannot help thinking that he viewed the ment, ending with the Chancellorship. party adulation,he could not envisage anybody National Union as a convenient ladder for his In December 1886 Churchill over-reached outmanoeuvring him as Salisbury did with own advancement to the leadership,something himself and using a disagreement over pro- apparent ease. Lord Randolph Churchill that he most definitely desired, his rebellious posed army and navy spending,offered his res- believed that he was indispensable – the most attitude notwithstanding. ignation, probably not anticipating its accept- dangerous delusion any politician can have. In 1882 the National Union began to artic- ance. Famously, he had forgotten about The National Union of Conservative ulate complaints about its inferior status in the Goschen,who took over as Chancellor,though Associations was founded in 1867 and held its party’sstructure and in July 1883 Churchill was he was a Liberal Unionist. first meeting in the Freemasons’ Tavern in elected to its Council with the help of the That is not how it was supposed to develop London on November 12 of that year.In 1868 Chairman’s casting vote. The Chairman was from that Annual Conference in Birmingham they went to Birmingham and there were 7 Lord Percy. There were several resignations, in 1883. Churchill could not have imagined people in attendance. By 1869, in Liverpool including that of Sir Stafford Northcote and that he would be outmanoeuvred within three there were 36 delegates.And so it would have Henry deWorms. years by Lord Salisbury.

18 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Neville Chamberlain and the long shadow of the ‘Guilty Men’

Professor Robert Self, author of “Neville Chamberlain: A Biography” and editor of Chamberlain’s diaries and letters, writes here about that misunderstood politician’s reputation

oor Neville will come badly out of ‘ history’, Winston Churchill is once supposed to have quipped,‘I know,I Pwill write that history’. It was one of his shrewdest predictions. In his extremely influential but highly coloured account of the Gathering Storm (1948), Churchill charac- terised Chamberlain as ‘an upright, competent, well meaning man’ possessed of ‘a narrow,sharp edged efficiency within the limits of the policy in which he believed’ – but, as he also noted, he was fatally handicapped by a lack of vision,inex- perience of the European scene and a deluded confidence in his own omniscience.1 For many years, even among historians, this version of events held the field unchallenged and unchal- lengeable. More to the point,Churchill’s carica- ture of the 1930s, painted in the simplistic but compelling monochromatic shades of black and white, good versus evil, courage in ‘standing up located above only Anthony Eden whose repu- the Commons at the outbreak of war: to Hitler’ versus craven appeasement, still con- tation remains even more indelibly tainted by ‘Everything I have worked for, everything tinues to hold sway in popular memory,in tele- his role in the Suez fiasco of 1956.2 that I have hoped for, everything that I have vision dramas and in some historical texts even The most obvious explanation for this low believed in during my public life, has crashed to this day. As a result,surveys conducted among regard is that perceptions of Chamberlain’s into ruins’. Unfortunately for Chamberlain’s academic and other informed commentators long and varied career have been fundamen- reputation, contemporaries and posterity invariably rank Chamberlain in nineteenth tally blighted by the ultimate failure of his have judged him accordingly – to the detri- place out of the twenty who served as British very personal brand of diplomacy during the ment of any more balanced evaluation of the Prime Ministers in the twentieth century – last three years of his life. As he confessed to man, his broader career and the problems he

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 19 confronted during the late 1930s. Despite ly misunderstood period of his entire career. ‘beyond the resources of this country to make half a century of ‘revisionist’ scholarship As a result, we are still too often left with a proper provision in peace for defence of the emphasising the impact of impersonal forces picture of Chamberlain at theTreasury as the British Empire against three major Powers in and structural constraints upon British for- complacent ‘dead hand’ of official resistance three different theatres of war’.3 eign policy-makers, therefore, the abiding to recognisably postwar models of Keynesian In reality, any British government in the popular image of a man whose public career economic management doggedly adhering late 1930s would have been compelled to spanned a momentous quarter of a century to the outmoded canons of nineteenth cen- confront this challenge to imperial security between two world wars remains that of a tury balanced budgetary orthodoxy without within the relatively narrow parameters naïve tragicomic figure standing at Heston the understanding, the political will or the defined by a complex inter-related web of aerodrome with a rolled umbrella and a personal courage to do more than tinker with geo-strategic, military, economic, industrial, worthless piece of paper inscribed with the mass unemployment.Yet contrary to the pre- intelligence and electoral constraints, but the legend ‘Peace for our time’. As such, vailing mythology, Chamberlain was an debate at the time (and ever since) has Chamberlain continues to be misunderstood, exceptionally strong Chancellor of the focused on the precise degree of choice exer- underrated and dismissed too easily with Exchequer and genuinely revered by his offi- cised by policy-makers in the face of such Lloyd George’s malicious jibe that he was ‘a cials as the most competent holder of the threats and limitations. Broadly speaking, good Lord Mayor of Birmingham in a lean office since Gladstone. Moreover, it is clear Chamberlain’s contemporary supporters and year’. from Chamberlain’s own papers (and even a latter-day ‘revisionist’ school of historians Yet the supreme irony is that had more from his lengthy annotations on count- argue that these constraints were so com- Chamberlain retired or died just three years lessTreasury briefs) that far from being a pas- pelling as to be overwhelming. In these cir- earlier, he would have gone down in history sive mouthpiece for the blinkered views of his cumstances, Chamberlain’s defenders con- as a great peace minister – a radical but real- officials (as is often suggested), he actually tend that his policy of armed appeasement istic social reformer, a supremely talented played a very significant role in initiating represented a shrewd realpolitik response to administrator and the dynamic force behind some important aspects of real policy innova- the strategic dilemma created by the exis- many of the National Government’s underes- tion during these years – particularly as the tence of global obligations and interests timated successes of the 1930s. In large part, architect of pioneering new departures in which massively exceeded Britain’s defensive this alternative picture stems from his remark- industrial and regional policy. Indeed,on this capabilities. Conversely, his contemporary able record at the Ministry of Health during basis,it is possible to advance a strong case for critics and a later‘post-revisionist’school con- 1923 and 1924-29.Within two weeks of his regarding Chamberlain, not as an unrecon- tend that far from being the helpless victim of return to the Ministry in November 1924, structed champion of laissez-faire as often forces and factors beyond his control, Chamberlain had presented the Cabinet with alleged, but rather as the founder of a species Chamberlain consistently made choices in a provisional programme outlining 25 meas- of‘managed economy’in Britain between the favour of appeasement and negotiation at the ures encompassing everything from the radi- war – albeit a managed economy of a dis- expense of the supposedly equally viable cal reform of pensions, housing, rating and tinctly non-Keynesian variety. option of resistance and rapid rearmament:an the Poor Law to the wholesale restructuring Yet for all that was achieved in the domes- argument which,as David Dutton points out, of local government’s functions and finances. tic arena, ultimately Chamberlain’s reputation ‘completes a somewhat bizarre full circle, By the time the second Baldwin government remains indelibly tainted by bitter memories returning [the historiography] in the minds of left office in May 1929 no fewer than 21 of of ‘Munich’, the naïve promise of ‘Peace for at least some scholars very much to the point these 25 proposals had been passed into law. our time’ and the devastating indictment of of departure in 1940’.4 In reality, many of these measures were his leadership in ‘Cato’s’ Guilty Men pub- Despite endless scholarly debate over the already on the stocks at the Ministry before lished in the immediate aftermath of past half century, no consensus has emerged his arrival and he undeniably suffered signifi- Dunkirk. Unfortunately, the tone of moral on the subject – and all the evidence suggests cant policy failures.But for all that,the record outrage underpinning such an indictment that it never will. Yet what is beyond any represents a truly personal triumph to the often obscures the fact that any proper assess- question is that Chamberlain perceived him- extent that Chamberlain uniquely possessed ment of Chamberlain’s policy needs to take self to be trapped in a reactive position at the the detailed knowledge, administrative skill account of two crucial circumstantial facts. mercy of forces largely beyond his control and (above all) the imaginative vision of the First, by the mid-1930s Britain was attempt- and that, above all, the threat of armed resist- larger picture needed to weld a variety of dis- ing to defend a vast and vulnerable empire ance to aggression would not be a realistic parate reforms into a coherent single pro- encompassing a quarter of the world’s territo- option until well into 1940 at the earliest.As gramme capable of being carried in such a ry and population with the dismally depleted he noted stoically in January 1938, ‘in the short time and with far-reaching effects. On military resources of a third-rate Power. absence of any powerful ally, and until our these legislative foundations, Chamberlain Furthermore, anxiety about the threat posed armaments are completed, we must adjust rightly deserves his widely acclaimed reputa- separately by Japan, Germany and Italy was our foreign policy to our circumstances, and tion as the most effective social reformer of compounded by the widely shared convic- even bear with patience and good humour the interwar years. tion that war with any one of them would actions which we should like to treat in a very In striking contrast, however, inevitably tempt the others into opportunis- different fashion’.As a self-proclaimed‘realist’, Chamberlain’s term as Chancellor of the tic ‘mad dog’ acts on their own behalf. Chamberlain’s pragmatic response to this Exchequer between 1931 and 1937 remains Secondly,to make matters worse, since 1934 conundrum was to pursue what he called his undoubtedly the most neglected and woeful- the Cabinet had recognised that it was ‘double policy’ of rearmament (to repair

20 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Neville Chamberlain

defence deficiencies and provide a deterrent) faster level of expenditure on rearmament but while simultaneously seeking better relations rather it needed to buy more time through with the dictators in the belief that only by diplomacy to expand industrial capacity and redressing Germany’s legitimate grievances optimise the use of available resources on would it be possible to remove the impetus rearmament without either overheating the behind the military threat – or failing that, to economy or undermining the economic expose Hitler as an insatiable lunatic bent on strength which represented Britain’s ‘fourth world domination.As Chamberlain described arm of defence’. Indeed, as defence deliveries his strategy to Lord Halifax at the time of lagged behind orders and finance for much of Munich, it was a case of hoping for the best this period, it is highly probable that an earli- while preparing for the worst.5 er and more rapid expansion of the pro- Ultimately, this policy logic led almost gramme (as Conservative critics like inexorably to Chamberlain’s participation in Churchill and Eden demanded) would have the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at the resulted in not just a severe economic crisis Munich conference in September 1938; a jeopardising the ability to wage a protracted name often now synonymous with immoral war, but also fewer modern fighters and anti- great power diplomacy and the craven desire aircraft guns with a consequently narrower to avoid war at all costs – whatever the price margin of victory in the Battle of Britain. to national honour and the interests of small- Against this background,Chamberlain went Chamberlain went to his er states. Yet for Chamberlain (as for many to his grave in November 1940 absolutely others),the harsh and utterly inescapable real- confident that when the full story was grave in November 1940 ity of the situation was brutally simple. Was revealed, history would vindicate his policy absolutely confident that Britain prepared to threaten Germany with and rehabilitate his reputation.Alas,this was by war on behalf of a state which it certainly far the greatest miscalculation of his entire when the full story was could not save and which would probably public career. In the most extensive academic revealed, history would never be resurrected in its existing form - but poll designed to rank 20th Century British with the absolute certainty that any attempt Prime Ministers (conducted by the British vindicate his policy and to do so would provoke a ruinous and prob- Politics Group in 2004) it was significant that rehabilitate his reputation ably unwinnable war which would slaughter while political scientists still ranked millions, bring in Japan and Italy,destroy the Chamberlain nineteenth out of twenty,histo- British Empire, squander its wealth and rians now placed him in fourteenth position – undermine its position as a Great Power? no doubt in response to a steady flow of ‘revi- When he confronted this unenviable dilem- sionist’ research. But when we turn to the ma in September 1938, Chamberlain’s chill- views of the layman and the writers of popu- ing rationality prompted the almost inevitable lar novels and TV dramas, Churchill’s predic- conclusion that such an outcome would be tion has been fully vindicated – and it is likely far more disastrous for the Empire, Europe to remain that way. Poor Neville did come and the long-term victory of‘good’over‘evil’ badly out of history – and to a very consider- than territorial concessions in the able degree this was precisely because Sudetenland which Britain could not prevent Churchill wrote that history in order to ensure and to which Germany, at least, had some that his carefully crafted version of the 1930s ostensibly legitimate claim. But as he also would be the one which became indelibly assured a friend after Munich, he was ‘not a etched upon the national consciousness. “peace at any price” man’.7 As result, six

months later, after Hitler’s seizure of Prague Notes. had exposed his brazen quest for domination 1. Winston S. Churchill,The Second World War,Volume I: by force, this same calculation of the balance The Gathering Storm, (London: Cassell, 1948), pp.199- 200. of risks prompted a very different policy of 2. See Kevin Theakston and Mark Gill, ‘Rating 20th resistance in the shape of a guarantee to Century British Prime Ministers’, British Journal of Poland designed to draw a symbolic line in Politics and International Relations, 8(2), 2006, pp.193- the sand. 213. 3. Robert Self, Neville Chamberlain : A Biography, Despite much vociferous criticism of the (Aldershot:Ashgate, 2006), p.266-71. pace of rearmament, it also needs to be 4. David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain, (London: Arnold, recalled that Chamberlain was essentially cor- 2001), pp.184-85. 5. Halifax to Chamberlain, 11 October 1938, rect in his conviction that the existence of NC11/31/124A. intractable industrial and economic con- 6. Cabinet Conclusions,CAB 48(38)1,25 September 1938, straints implied that what Britain needed CAB 23/95. 7. Chamberlain to H.A. Gwynne, 7 January 1939, most in the late 1930s was not a higher or NC7/11/32/106.

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 21 ohn Major had assumed the leadership of the Conservative Party in November 1990 as the unity candi- Jdate. After the ideologically motivated disputes that contributed to the political assassination of MargaretThatcher, Major was supposed to bridge the divide between the No More than Europhile Tory left and the Eurosceptic Thatcherite right. However, he palpably failed to unify the Conservatives over the next six and half years. For much of his lead- another Major? ership tenure the Europhile Tory left and the Thatcherite Eurosceptic right would heap condemnation of his party leadership with How William Hague became Leader hideous predictability. The Europhile Tory left were strategising to enhance the possibil- of the Conservative Party ity of Michael Heseltine assuming the party leadership, whilst the EuroscepticThatcherite right gravitated towards Michael Portillo as the real heir to Thatcherism, and sought to enhance his chances of assuming the party Dr Timothy Heppell, Senior Lecturer in British leadership. The Heseltine versus Portillo showdown, the nemesis of Thatcher versus Politics at the University of Huddersfield and her favoured son, would be a fight for the author of “Choosing the Tory Leader: ideological soul of Conservatism.The put up or shut up strategy that Major adopted in the Conservative Party Leadership Elections from summer of 1995 would delay the face off between the two Michaels whilst the Heath to Cameron” discusses William Hague’s Conservatives were in government.The two ill-fated leadership. Johns contest, or Redwood versus Deadwood as the tabloid press dubbed it, failed to resolve the underlying ideological conflict, as Major remained the party leader until the inevitable general election defeat. The assumed Heseltine versus Portillo ideological showdown would have to wait for the opposition era. The dynamics of the war of the Major succession were fundamentally altered by two key events. First, there was the political demise of Portillo.The anointed candidate of the Eurosceptic Thatcherite right proved to the iconographic electoral casualty of the electoral meltdown in May 1997. Second, Heseltine was admitted to hospital having suffered an angina attack in the immediate aftermath of the general election defeat. He immediately abandoned any plans that he had to stand for the party leadership. The enforced absence of the prime candidate for the Eurosceptic Thatcherite right (Portillo) and the standard bearer of the EurophileTory left (Heseltine) led Major to make an immediate, albeit ambivalent deduction:‘I suppose it will be William’.1 Six weeks later, Major, a master of party leadership elections, if not general elections, proved to be correct. William Hague assumed the party leadership

22 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 1997 Leadership Election after a brutal and bruising six week election drawal of Heseltine, and now the voluntary Doubts did exist, however, amongst contest. However, on the night of his elec- withdrawal of Dorrell, Clarke became the Conservative parliamentarians about the tion as party leader, a leading Thatcherite sole candidate of the EurophileTory left.The charisma and electoral appeal of Lilley.Issues supporter of Portillo, who had voted for main strengths of his candidature were his of image and leadership credibility also Hague in his absence, admitted that Hague ministerial experience and his public popu- threatened the appeal of Redwood. was ‘no more than another Major’.2 Short of larity. He had established a reputation for Redwood attempted to argue that his status labelling Hague as the second coming of being a competent and capable Cabinet outside of the Cabinet between 1995 and Edward Heath, a Thatcherite Eurosceptic minister, having served as Chancellor of the 1997 absolved him of any responsibility or Conservative could not have mustered a Exchequer between 1993 and 1997, Home association with the discredited Major era more damning criticism of the new party Secretary between 1992 and 1993, as well as and the resultant electoral meltdown. leader. So given this ambivalence from his Education Secretary 1990 to 1992 and However, the association that did resonate own endorsers, we need to ask how did Health Secretary 1988 to 1990. His experi- was that of disloyalty resulting from the chal- Hague manage to win? ence and competence were supported by lenge that Redwood had made to Major. By After the curtain had come down and opinion polling evidence which suggested constantly reminding Conservative MPs of Major announced his intention to leave the that he was the most popular candidate with the failings of the Major era, an indissoluble stage six candidates emerged. From the the electorate.5 However,despite the fact that connection between the candidature of Eurosceptic Thatcherite right were three Clarke could offer experience, competence Redwood and the cause of party’s the implo- candidates that Major had earlier derided as and electoral appeal, Conservatives agonised sion under Major was established.7 Redwood bastards: John Redwood, Michael Howard over whether he would be a divisive party was a symbol of ideological division and dis- and Peter Lilley;3 plus Hague, who had soft- leader. His committed pro-Europeanism loyalty; to many his advancement would be er associations with the right, although com- would make it difficult for him to manage a an impediment to unity and renewal. mittedThatcherites doubted the depth of his parliamentary Conservative Party that was Those of the Thatcherite right wishing to commitment to their cause. The Europhile overwhelmingly Eurosceptic, should they advance the call for unity were now interest- Tory left were represented by Kenneth permit him to assume the party leadership. ed in encouraging the reluctant Hague to Clarke and Stephen Dorrell. The Eurosceptic Thatcherite right might be enter the ballot.The former Welsh Secretary The candidature of Dorrell would fail to inclined towards any candidate other than also could exploit the fact that many gather real momentum in the period leading Clarke. Conservative parliamentarians were attracted up to the closure for nominations. Unable to Eventually there were four non-Clarke, to the notion of skipping a political genera- gather sufficient backers he feared finishing non-Tory left, non-Europhile candidates for tion and making a clean and symbolic break in the bottom three in the first parliamentary the pure Thatcherites to consider; the three with the Thatcher and Major eras, with ballot.His problem was an inability to find an supposed ‘bastards’ – Howard, Lilley and which other candidates such as Howard, ideologically motivated core of supporters Redwood – and eventually Hague. It was Lilley and Clarke were clearly associated.8 who wished to advance his leadership cre- initially assumed that Howard would win the Howard realised that the probability of dentials. His natural constituency of support- primary battle for the Thatcherite him emerging as theThatcherite Eurosceptic ers should have been the EurophileTory left, Eurosceptic right candidate, thus leading to standard bearer and best alternative to Clarke but given that they amounted to a minority Howard / Clarke final ballot face off for the was dependent upon preventing Hague from within the parliamentary Conservative Party, ideological future of the Conservative Party. standing. If Howard could secure the Dorrell had been attempting to appeal to the This assumption was based on the following endorsement of Hague then it would pro- majority Eurosceptic right towards the end factors:first,Howard was the most senior fig- vide him with two clear advantages: first, it of the Major era, presumably in anticipation ure within the EuroscepticThatcherite right; would remove a potential threat to his first of the post-Major party leadership election. second, he had established a strong reputa- ballot vote base; and, second, it would place Dorrell assumed that an alliance between tion amongstThatcherite Conservatives dur- him as the most viable Eurosceptic moderate Europhiles endorsing his candida- ing his tenure as Home Secretary; third, his Thatcherite option and could immobilise ture, and a cohort of moderate Eurosceptics, Eurosceptic credentials were well established the candidatures of Lilley and Redwood would make him a viable unity candidate. – indeed, Eurosceptics had been outraged (they may withdraw or would finish in the This strategy backfired. His incremental dis- when Howard had been passed over for the bottom two places in the first ballot). The engagement with his Europhile past antago- Foreign Office in preference for Malcolm endorsement of Hague would probably nised Europhiles, who assumed he was aban- Rifkind in 1995; finally, it was assumed that guarantee that the final ballot would be a face doning his principles for personal advance- Howard was being backed byThatcher,albeit off between Clarke for the Europhile Tory ment. Moreover, Eurosceptics did not gravi- discreetly.6 The difficulty for the Howard left and Howard for the Eurosceptic tate to Dorrell as he had anticipated, as they campaign was the complexities created by Thatcherite right. doubted the sincerity of his ideological repo- the presence of other candidates fighting for Howard entered into negotiations with sitioning.4 the same ideological constituency.The Lilley Hague in an attempt to persuade him not to The collapse of the Dorrell campaign was candidature broadly mirrored that of stand and to endorse his candidature by act- so pronounced that he withdrew his candi- Howard in ideological terms: he was a fering as his running mate. He offered Hague dature prior to the closure for nominations vent free market advocate and a committed the positioned of Deputy Leader and guar- and immediately endorsed Clarke for the Eurosceptic, although he was viewed as anteed him the position of Party Chairman party leadership. With the enforced with- being more socially liberal than Howard. should Howard emerge victorious. In

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 23 attempting to persuade Hague to step aside, stand he would win.He therefore concluded the absence of Portillo and because they Howard was admitting that it was unlikely that he could not opt out. He desperately could not abide Redwood.The credibility of that the Conservatives would be able to win wanted to be party leader, and such an the Lilley campaign was being undermined the next election and therefore it was unlike- opportunity to snare the party leadership and this was compounded by his perform- ly that he would be the next Conservative may not occur at a later date.The next party ance before the 92 Group of Eurosceptics a Prime Minister. He was suggesting that the leadership election, presumably four to five few days before the first parliamentary ballot. rebuilding process was best undertaken by an years time, would probably involve Portillo: Howard and Redwood confirmed that they experienced Conservative, leaving Hague to this was a chance Hague could not turn would resign from a hypothetical cabinet that assume the party leadership in a far stronger down.13 advocated scrapping the pound and joining political (electoral) position in the aftermath The decision of Hague to renege on this the European single currency. The most of the next general election. Howard was deal undermined the momentum of the committed Eurosceptics were disappointed implying that if Hague wanted to be Prime Howard candidature and served to indicate by Lilley when he refused to answer the Minister it was best to stand aside now and that a gravitational shift towards the Hague question: Lilley appeared to be doing a assume the party leadership in more advan- candidature was mobilising.14 The credibility Dorrell in reverse, and was to suffer the same tageous circumstances. Hague was sufficient- of the Howard candidature then collapsed fate.18 ly persuaded by the arguments that Howard following a vitriolic attack by Ann Both Howard and Lilley remained dismis- made. They arranged the timing of a press Widdecombe, a former ministerial colleague sive of the candidature of Redwood. They conference and began constructing a joint of Michael Howard in the Home Office. both assumed that Redwood would come statement promoting their pact.9 By Howard and Widdecombe had disagreed last in the first ballot. Indeed, Lilley had announcing his candidature and the fact that over Howard’s decision to dismiss the Head somewhat arrogantly suggested to the Hague was endorsing him simultaneously, it of the Prisons Service, Derek Lewis. As a Redwood camp that they should withdraw would maximise the impact and would cre- consequence, Widdecombe publicly ques- (to save Redwood the humiliation of com- ate a bandwagon effect amongst Eurosceptic tioned the political integrity of Howard, ing last) and endorse the Lilley candidature Thatcherites towards the Howard candida- arguing that when under political pressure he instead.19 The Redwood campaign was cy.10 could‘do things that were not always sustain- indeed struggling.It was undermined by two With the endorsement of Hague and his able’.15 Moreover, in a deliberate attempt to critical image problems. First, given his chal- removal from the succession battle, the maximise the damage to his candidature she lenge to Major two years earlier and the pre- Howard campaign, mobilised by Francis announced that there was ‘something of the sumed inflexibility of his ideological stance, Maude, David Davis and David Maclean, night’ to his psychological make up that especially on Europe, the aforementioned believed that they had outflanked Lilley and made him unsuitable person to be party concern about his capacity to unify was pre- Redwood and ensured that Howard would leader.16 venting him from securing public endorsers. be the chosen candidate of the Thatcherite As the Howard campaign stalled, both Second,the brutal character assassination that Eurosceptic right.They also assumed that as Lilley and Redwood experienced difficulties he suffered in the Major challenge two years the parliamentary Conservative Party was in establishing momentum to their candida- earlier (i.e. the ‘vulcan’ jibe and the embar- overwhelmingly economically liberal, tures. Lilley had also failed in his attempt to rassment of his failed miming of the Welsh Eurosceptic, and socially conservative, they persuade Hague not to stand and to endorse national anthem) had raised concerns about would be well positioned to defeat Clarke in himself instead. He also suffered from the whether he could be presented to the elec- the final parliamentary ballot. One of his Widdecombe interventions. Widdecombe torate as an asset to the party.As the first bal- campaign team assumed that the party lead- became a symbol of divisiveness due to her lot approached, Redwood was struggling to ership was now ‘in the bag’.11 vitriolic attack upon Howard. She was now overcome these image impediments.20 The Howard campaign was about to publicly endorsing Lilley,who was desperate- However, despite the problems engulfing unravel with alarming speed. Much to the ly attempting Widdecombe to tone down Redwood,it was Lilley and Howard who saw chagrin of Howard, Hague reneged on their her behaviour as it was not aiding his candi- their ambitions stymied when the first ballot deal.12 The rationale for abandoning Howard dature. When she refused Lilley felt com- result was announced. It was they who had was four-fold. First, he was not sufficiently pelled to disassociate himself from her.17 finished in the bottom two positions. They attracted to the notion of being deputy party Furthermore, there were numerous and had both assumed that Redwood would fin- leader, and he had doubts about the benefits repeated reservations surrounding his candi- ish last and that he and his acolytes would to him of being Party Chairman. Second, he dature. First, polling evidence identified him transfer their allegiance to one of them given was concerned that those Conservatives par- as the least favoured candidate for the succes- their candidatures crucial momentum in the liamentarians who had encouraged him to sion amongst the electorate. Second, even second ballot. After their poor performances stand would not necessarily gravitate to Conservative parliamentarians who sympa- in the first ballot, both Lilley and Howard Howard just because he had. Third, he had thised with his views felt Clarke would easi- withdrew from the contest. reservations about whether Howard would ly defeat him in a final parliamentary ballot Despite coming first in the ballot, many be able to defeat Clarke in a final parliamen- due to his leadership limitations.Finally,there pundits felt that Clarke needed to have tary ballot. Finally, aligned to the third con- was concern about the ambivalence of his secured a bigger lead over Hague than the cern, he was now persuaded that he could main advocates: his primary endorsers (e.g. eight that he had secured.The elimination defeat Clarke in the final parliamentary bal- Eric Forth, Bernard Jenkin and John of Howard and Lilley freed up forty-seven lot. Hague was convinced that should he Whittingdale) had only gravitated to him in votes as the three remaining candidates

24 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 1997 Leadership Election entered the second ballot. Given that those The political necessity of this forty-seven votes had been built around the Eurosceptic Thatcherite credentials of hastily arranged tactical Howard and Lilley, many questioned alliance was obvious from whether Clarke would be able to penetrate into this with sufficient depth to retain his the perspective of Clarke. lead over Hague, over the next two ballots. The attractiveness of the With the majority of Conservative MPs wedded to Eurosceptism the psychological tactical alliance to Redwood winner of the first ballot was Hague, who was open to speculation. It happened to be the most moderate of the four Eurosceptics on offer.21 The forty- was assumed that should seven votes freed by the elimination of Clarke emerge victorious Lilley and Howard, did work to the benefit of Hague whose vote increased by twenty- then Redwood would be one to sixty-two votes.With Clarke increas- rewarded with the position ing his vote from forty-nine to sixty-four votes, the failure of the Redwood candida- of Shadow Chancellor ture became apparent. With forty-seven presumed Eurosceptic votes potentially available, the support the candidature of Redwood was increased by only eleven votes. Redwood was eliminated with Clarke and Hague proceeding to the final ballot. Both candidates needed to obtain a majority of the thirty-votes that Redwood had secured in the second ballot. Given the Eurosceptic basis of the Redwood candidature it was assumed that this favoured the Eurosceptic candidature of Hague and would resign Clarke to defeat. In anticipation of the crucial third ballot, Clarke attempted to formulate a tactical The Parliamentary Ballots alliance with Redwood which would provide him with the majority of the thirty- eight votes that Redwood had secured.If the First Ballot Second Ballot Third Ballot Redwood vote base was relatively cohesive then he had it in his power to be king-maker William Hague 41 (25.0%) 62 (37.8%) 92 (56.1%) and hand the party leadership to the leading Kenneth Clarke 49 (29.9%) 64 (39.0%) 70 (42.7%) exponent of Europhilia, Clarke. In ideologi- John Redwood 27 (16.5%) 38 (23.2%) - cal and policy terms the alliance seemed Peter Lilley 24 (14.6%) - - implausible: the single European currency, Michael Howard 23 (14.3%) - - the issue that divided them most was fudged. Abstentions --2 (1.2%) They agreed that the direction of European policy was no longer within their sphere of influence as they were in opposition. First Ballot (10th June 1997) Anyway, they agreed that British participa- Requirement for victory: an absolute majority and a majority representing 15 per cent tion within the single European currency of those entitled to vote. Any candidate with 95 votes elected was unlikely in the short-term and should it arise then they were offer a free vote on the Second Ballot (17th June 1997) issue.22 The political necessity of this hastily Requirement for victory: an absolute majority. If no winner emerges then the two lead- arranged tactical alliance was obvious from ing candidates would go forward to a third ballot. Any candidate with 83 votes elected. the perspective of Clarke.The attractiveness of the tactical alliance to Redwood was open Third Ballot (19th June 1997) to speculation. It was assumed that should Requirement for victory: a majority of the votes cast with a proviso made for the exis- Clarke emerge victorious then Redwood tence of a fourth ballot in the event of a tie in the third ballot. would be rewarded with the position of Shadow Chancellor.

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 25 The prospect of a Europhile The majority of the Eurosceptic party leadership presented him with a multi- Thatcherite right were contemptuous of the plicity of legitimacy problems.The first legit- figure of the Tory left in the Clarke-Redwood alliance. Redwood was imacy problem that we associate with the shape of Clarke acquiring derided as a careerist politician who had emergence of Hague as the new party leader abandoned his principles for personal relates to the perception that his was a default the party leadership was advancement. Reflective of the condemna- victory because the best candidates were not sufficient for Thatcher to tion was the view of Conservative MP,Peter available.On the day before the general elec- Tapsell, who viewed the unholy alliance as tion it was rumoured that there were twelve abandon her stance of ‘one of the most contemptible and discred- potential candidates preparing for the post- public neutrality. itable actions by a senior British politician election defeat contest for the leadership of that I can recall during thirty-eight years in the Conservative Party.25 The electorate the Commons.’23 The intervention of removed peripheral candidates such as Ian Thatcher would extinguish any possibility Lang, Michael Forsyth and Malcolm that the Clarke-Redwood pact could be the Rifkind, and the rumoured challenge of solution to the ideological conflict which Gillian Shepherd did not materialise. The had bedevilled post-Thatcherite presumed final ballot run off between the Conservatism. The prospect of a Europhile figure head for the Thatcherite Eurosceptic figure of the Tory left in the shape of Clarke right (Portillo) and the pro-European Tory acquiring the party leadership was sufficient left prime candidate (Heseltine) failed to forThatcher to abandon her stance of public materialise due to the electorate in Enfield neutrality. She instructed the Eurosceptic Southgate in the case of the former, and ill Thatcherite right not to support the Clarke- health in the case of the latter. Inside a few Redwood alliance. Standing alongside days the list of potential candidates was Hague outside of the House of Commons halved from twelve to six thus fundamental- and in front of the assembled press,she left no ly altering the dynamics of the ensuing con- scope for ambiguity: test in a manner advantageous to Hague. The magnitude of the electoral meltdown I am supporting William Hague. Now, have of May 1997 created Hague’s opportunity. you got the name? William Hague for the Had the swing from Conservative to Labour same kind of principled government which I been less pronounced and the scale of the led, vote for William Hague on Thursday. defeat less significant then Portillo would Have you got the message?24 probably have retained his Enfield Southgate constituency.Had Portillo retained his parlia- In the ensuing third and final ballot the mentary constituency we can assume the fol- failure of the Clarke-Redwood was con- lowing: first, that Portillo would have put firmed. Clarke could only secure six votes himself forward as a candidate to succeed from the Redwood third ballot vote base Major and probably would have won; and of thirty-eight, and Hague secured a com- second, that had Portillo been able to stand fortable victory as the Redwoodites pre- then Hague would have supported Portillo, dominantly switched their allegiance to rather than standing himself.26 him rather than Clarke. With ninety-two The second legitimacy problem that we votes Hague was elected as the new leader can associate with the emergence of Hague of the Conservative Party.Two notable tac- as the new party leader relates to the fact that tical votes in the final ballot were that of his ascent flowed from his status as the most former leader of the Conservative Party, appropriate conduit for the ABC (i.e. any- Major, and the future leader of the body but Clarke) brigade that existed Conservative Party, Duncan-Smith. Major amongst Conservative MPs. In a distended had endorsed Clarke in the first two ballots field of candidates it was inevitable that it but rejected the premise of the Clarke- would be a leadership election involving Redwood alliance and switched his alle- multiple ballots. In this context, the success- giance to Hague in the final ballot. Despite ful candidate would be the one best able to having acted as the campaign manager for attract second and then third choice votes the Redwood candidature, Duncan-Smith when preferred first choice candidates had also rejected the Clarke-Redwood alliance been excluded. Due to his relative inoffen- and voted for Hague and emerged as a siveness Hague was well positioned to sweep member of the Shadow Cabinet days later. up second and third preference votes. His However, the circumstances surrounding original support increased from forty-one to the means by which Hague had acquired the sixty-two (an increase of twenty-one) and

26 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 1997 Leadership Election

Had only one identifiable then from sixty-two to ninety-two (an around one candidate, Redwood, Lilley and increase of thirty). The respective increases Howard, guaranteed that they would finish Eurosceptic Thatcherite for Clarke were fifteen at the second ballot in the bottom three places in the first ballot.29 candidate stood and the and six at the final ballot.Only through these By the end of these multiple ballots it was third preference votes was Hague able to apparent to the EuroscepticThatcherite right other two had endorsed the overcome Clarke, who had defeated him in that although Hague was moderately identi- one advocate of there both the first and second ballots. Hague was fiable with their ideological bent his acces- the ABC candidate propelled to the party sion to the party leadership was a by-product cause, then Hague may not leadership on the back of second and third of their own tactical miscalculations. A have stood preference votes.27 Thatcherite Eurosceptic of greater repute The third legitimacy problem that we can and more identifiable with their cause would associate with the emergence of Hague as have emerged it they had not ‘shot them- the new party leader relates to the tactical selves in the foot’.30 misjudgements of the Eurosceptic The validity of this assertion dovetails Thatcherite right. If we assume that ideolo- neatly into the fourth of Hague’s multiple gy was a determinant of voting behaviour legitimacy problems.The support that even- and that the European ideological policy tually emerged and propelled Hague to vic- divide was the determining ideological vari- tory was a grudging one and thus indicative able then the following argument can be of the shallowness of his mandate to lead the advanced.The Eurosceptic Thatcherite right Conservative Party. In conjunction with the had three established candidates articulating aforementioned factors – i.e. the removal of their views – Howard, Lilley and Redwood heavyweight candidates; the fact that Hague – plus Hague, who was less well established was predominantly an ABC candidate; and as a pure EuroscepticThatcherite.The viabil- the fact that his emergence flowed from tac- ity of the Howard-Hague joint ticket that tical miscalculations within the Eurosceptic the Howard campaign sought to create was Thatcherite right – we can also compare the that should Howard assume the party leader- vote share for Hague to the vote shares that ship with Hague as his deputy, the had propelled his three predecessors to the Eurosceptic Thatcherite right would have party leadership. the lineage on the party leadership.This the- Heath assumed the party leadership in ory assumed that it was inevitable that the 1965 with 150 votes in the first ballot, Conservatives would lose the next general which amounted to 49.3% of Conservative election but that Hague would be well posi- MPs, whereupon the only viable option, tioned to be the next party leader but one.28 Reginald Maudling, who had secured 133 However, rather than unifying around one votes in the first ballot, withdrew from the senior and established Thatcherite contest and endorsed Heath. Thatcher Eurosceptic right candidate, Howard, sup- acquired the party leadership in 1975 via ported by an apprentice also of the same two ballots: first she defeated Heath having grouping, Hague, the Thatcherite secured 130 votes or 47.1%, and then Eurosceptic right fractured in different direc- defeated four new candidates who emerged tions. following the withdrawal of Heath, having Had only one identifiable Eurosceptic garnered 146 or 52.9%. Major annexed the Thatcherite candidate stood and the other party leadership having secured 185 votes two had endorsed the one advocate of there or 47.7% of the parliamentary Conservative cause, then Hague may not have stood (i.e. Party, whereupon both Heseltine and he may have adhered to the Howard pact if Douglas Hurd withdrew their candidatures. Lilley and Redwood had not stood). If If we consider the final ballot then Hague Hague had stood in these circumstances we stands comparison with his predecessors – can assume that he would have been elimi- he secured 92 votes or 56.1% of the parlia- nated after the first ballot. In such circum- mentary Conservative Party. However, a stances, the second ballot would have been a more appropriate comparison is the first run off between the Europhile Clarke and ballot, in which Hague secured 41 votes or one Eurosceptic who would have been well just 25% of the parliamentary Conservative positioned to sweep up the soft Thatcherite Party. Eurosceptic votes that would have existed Furthermore, as we have already empha- flowing from the elimination of Hague. By sised that miniscule first ballot support base their tactical misjudgements and failure to would not have existed had Portillo been mobilise the Thatcherite Eurosceptic vote able to stand. Thus in comparative terms

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 27 Like his predecessor, his ascent was devoid of the kind of 1. Joanne Nadler: William Hague: In His Own Right (London: Politicos), 2000, p. 6 political enthusiasm which is the essential precursor to 2. Joanne Nadler: Op Cit: p. 2 3. When Major referred to the existence of three bas- obtaining and maintaining authority and legitimacy as party tards it was initially assumed to be Peter Lilley, Michael Portillo and John Redwood. In his biogra- leader. It constituted an inauspicious start to his tenure as phy of Michael Howard, Crick refers to Howard as the fourth bastard. See Michael Crick, In Search of party leader and a portent of the difficulties that would lie Michael Howard (London; Simon and Schuster) 2005 4. Keith Alderman, ‘The Conservative Party Leadership ahead. Election of 1997’, Parliamentary Affairs,Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 6 5. A Gallup Poll stated that Clarke was the preferred candidate of both Conservative voters (Clarke first with 30 per cent and Hague second with 19 per cent) and all voters (Clarke first with 27 per cent and Hague second with 12 per cent) (The Daily Telegraph, 25th May 1997) 6. Crick, Op. Cit., p. 370 7. HywelWilliams,Guilty Men:Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997 (London:Aurum Press) 1998, p. 188 8. Alderman, Op Cit., p. 5 Hague’s support was not only shallow but ensured that Hague was the last man stand- 9. Crick, Op. Cit., p. 368-369 10. Nadler, Op. Cit., p. 4 was grudging. No factor indicated this more ing as the ABC candidate, despite the fact 11. Crick, Op Cit., p. 367 than the belated endorsement ofThatcher.In that he possessed the weakest Eurosceptic 12. Hague would always deny that they had agreed on a the earlier rounds she had avoided expressing Thatcherite credentials. Hague lacked an deal, just that they had discussed options. Lilley also attempted to persuade Hague not to stand, but to a preference but was known to harbour ideological core to his support; the support endorse his candidature, rather than that of Howard. doubts about the Thatcherite credentials of that he had acquired was default and had Lilley offered Hague the position of Shadow Chancellor Hague.31 However, when she was faced with gravitated to him because there was no bet- in a Lilley led Conservative Party Shadow Cabinet, plus an insurance that in the next Conservative Party leader- the prospect of the Clarke-Redwood ter alternative available to the Eurosceptic ship campaign Lilley would endorse the candidature of alliance, she felt compelled to endorse Thatcherite right. Hague was not elected as Hague. See Alderman, Op. Cit., 5 Hague. On the one hand her refusal to do so party leader because of who he was and 13. Nadler, Op. Cit., 11-13; Crick, Op. Cit., 369-370 14. Williams, Op. Cit., 190 earlier indicated doubts about his capacity to what he could deliver; he emerged because 15. Crick, Op. Cit., p. 373 oversee theThatcherite policy legacy; on the of who he was not (i.e. Clarke) and what he 16. Crick, Op. Cit., p. 373 other hand, her belated endorsement (which was willing to prevent in order to win (i.e. 17. Crick, Op. Cit., p. 375 18. Williams, Op. Cit., p. 199 highlighted the shallowness of his support) pro-Europeanism advancing as 19. Williams, Op. Cit., p.193 saddled him with an endorsement which Conservative Party policy).33 Indeed, Hague 20. His efforts were also undermined by organisational undermined the rationale of his candidature: had been a reluctant candidate whose can- complications within his campaign team.It had been assumed that Iain Duncan-Smith would act as his a fresh start and a break from the discredited didature emerged due to the elimination of campaign manager, and if Redwood emerged as the past which had been overwhelmingly reject- his preferred choice (Portillo) and his sense new party leader then Duncan-Smith would become ed by the electorate.32 that his second choice (Howard) would not Party Chairman. However, Duncan-Smith would not publicly confirm his support for Redwood Therefore, when considering the inter- be able to win.The perversity of the events immediately as he was contemplating standing him- woven nature of these factors, it is clear that and outcome of the Conservative Party self. Ultimately,Duncan-Smith did not stand and did Hague assumed the party leadership with- leadership contest of 1997 became even endorse Redwood but his prevarication undermined the Redwood campaign.Williams, Op. Cit., p. 192- out a strong mandate. In an acrimonious more apparent when the last placed candi- 193 and a debilitating contest the parliamentary date, Howard, was propelled to the party 21. Alderman, Op. Cit., p. 10 Conservative Party had in their infinite wis- leadership by ritual acclamation six years 22. Williams, Op. Cit., p. 218 23. Alan Watkins, The Road to Number 10: From Bonar Law dom rejected the following political and later. toTony Blair (London: Duckworth), 1998, p. 197 electoral indicators: the most experienced The Conservatives had entered the leader- 24. John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher.Volume Two: The Iron candidate was Clarke; the candidate most ship election seeking to terminate the ideo- Lady (London: Jonathan Cape), 2003, p. 788 25. Williams, Op. Cit., p. 186-187 popular with the electorate was Clarke; the logical insurgency that had engulfed the 26. Nadler, Op.Cit., p.5; Philip Cowley and Stuart Quayle, candidate most popular with the member- Conservative Party leadership tenure of ‘The Conservatives: Running on the Spot’ in Geddes, ship of the Conservative Party was Clarke; Major.Yet, with tragic symmetry the ration- A. andTonge, J. (eds.), Labour’s Landslide II (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 2001, p. 47 and the candidate who the Labour Party ale upon which Major emerged was replicat- 27. Philip Cowley and Mark Stuart, 2003:67, ‘The most feared was Clarke. The ideological ed in the emergence of Hague – he was no Conservative Parliamentary Party’ in Mark Garnett and infestation that had convulsed post- more than another Major. Like his predeces- Philip Lynch, (eds.), The Conservatives in Crisis (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 2003, p. 67 Thatcherite Conservatism ensured that the sor, his ascent was devoid of the kind of 28. Nadler, Op. Cit., p. 9 Europhilia of Clarke outweighed all these political enthusiasm which is the essential 29. Cowley and Stuart, Op. Cit., p. 67 indicators.The successor to Major had to be precursor to obtaining and maintaining 30. Cowley and Stuart, Op. Cit., p. 67 31. Alderman, Op. Cit., p. 13 of the Thatcherite Eurosceptic right, but in authority and legitimacy as party leader. It 32. Mark Garnett, ‘Win or Bust:The leadership gamble of the absence of Portillo, they were tactically constituted an inauspicious start to his tenure William Hague’ in Mark Garnett and Philip Lynch, P. disorganised and inept; by knocking each as party leader and a portent of the difficul- (eds.), The Conservatives in Crisis (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 2003, p. 58 other out, Redwood, Lilley and Howard, ties that would lie ahead. 33. Cowley and Stuart, Op. Cit, p. 68

28 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 The arguments about the marketing strategy were frequently based on the politician’s resentment about media professionals being responsible for the overall promotional strategy.The suspicious attitudes were particularly evident between 1966 and 1970. The Conservatives’ outgoing publicity director Marketing the highlighted the reticence of senior politicians to approve potentially expensive and labour- intensive marketing initiatives.The same mis- trust was evident in the Hague opposition, as Tories in Opposition: well as the concern that the use of modern marketing techniques would replicate the Labour Party’s communications approach, and debase the political process to a search A Difficult Tale for cheap headlines. Margaret Thatcher adopted a more amenable approach to market orientation and theTory leader was willing to be person- Tim Sansom approaches the vexed question ally involved in marketing initiatives. of opposition from a somewhat different However,the senior politicians still refused to be involved with various media interviews,as perspective well asTV debates,and there is little evidence that certain media initiatives, such as the Weekend Publicity Initiative, managed to develop beyond the committee stage. These intra- party arguments were linked to the second issue associated with setting or a political party whose marketing ical legacy from previous leaders,) and argu- the political agenda. The Tories were fre- strategy has been revered by political ments about the communication strategy. quently accused of desperately initiating an analysts, the attempts to promote The 1975 opposition began with argu- uncoordinated form of negative campaign- FConservative policies and personali- ments regarding why theTories were defeating, and it was only during the last week of ties have often been problematic. Some of the ed in the two 1974 elections, and the man- the 1970 campaign with the release of trade most difficult periods have occurred when ner of Thatcher’s leadership victory in 1975. figures supporting Heath’s economic warn- the party was in opposition. The 1997 defeat had a similar divisive impact ings, that the negative messages gained a This article will consider the political mar- on the party. Certain MPs continued to degree of credibility amongst the electorate. keting of the Tories between 1966 and 1970 believe that their party had won the policy The Conservatives were accused of initiat- when the party was led by Edward Heath; arguments during the campaign. ing negative campaigning in 1979, at the from 1975 to 1979 when MargaretThatcher The policy differences occurred in each of expense of promoting their own policies,and was leader; and under the leadership of the opposition periods. Throughout his Hague was accused of appealing to the reac- William Hague after the landslide 1997 opposition, Heath faced accusations that he tionary elements of society with hysterical defeat. The analysis is based on documents was merely echoing Labour’s policies and and inflammatory messages associated with from the Conservative Party and the offering collectivist solutions to the nation’s immigration and European integration in Margaret Thatcher archives as well relevant problems rather than marketing a truly radi- the 2001 election. media broadcasts from the three opposition cal product. The problems associated with setting the eras and interviews with a wide range of for- Many of the arguments in the Thatcher political agenda are closely linked to the third mer Tory strategists and senior political fig- opposition resulted from the reticence of issue regarding the political marketing of ures. shadow cabinet ministers (often Edward opposition parties. In each of the analysed With a hypothesis that questions whether Heath’s supporters) to adopt radical policy periods, the Tories had to inspire an elec- the Conservatives are competent practition- measures.The debilitating debates after 1997 torate that was uninterested in Conservative ers of proactive and innovative marketing, revolved round the question whether the policy or senior politicians. Although opin- the research has highlighted a series of issues party should campaign on the traditional ion polling was frequently used to meet this that are intrinsically linked to the political Tory issues that had predominately featured objective, the party was often less than marketing of opposition parties. in the election campaigns of the 1980s. At enthusiastic about conducting this process or The first dilemma concerns intra party dif- various moments in each of the opposition particularly receptive to the results. ferences regarding the reasons for the previ- periods, these arguments caused theTories to The polling during the Thatcher opposi- ous election defeat, new policies and ideolo- be unmanageable and critically unable to tion frequently appeared to be conducted for gy (including a‘perceived’rejection of a polit- implement innovative marketing. ‘symbolic reasons’ to demonstrate that the

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 29 electorate were being listened to.The party Margaret Thatcher between 1975 and 1979. was subsequently accused of marketing Thatcher was pictured whilst shopping for vague messages for the sake of courting pub- food or undertaking household chores but lic esteem. A sustained polling strategy was this marketing appeared to have a limited not evident during the Hague opposition, effect. The personal polling of party leaders and uncoordinated schemes including the demonstrated that Thatcher never achieved ‘Listening to Britain’ exercise were insuffi- better rating than James Callaghan during ciently promoted. The approach contrasts the 1979 election campaign. with the work of the Heath opposition dis- There were a number of ineffective initia- covering ‘target’ seats and specific voter tives to promote William Hague between groups for more focused campaigning. 1997 and 2001. Filmed visits to the Notting The Conservatives also attempted to inter- Hill Carnival and the Thorpe Park theme est the electorate with frequent policy pro- park as well as the revelation that Hague nouncements and Edward Heath adopted drank fourteen pints in a day were uncoor- this approach between 1966 and 1970. dinated and lacked credibility. This Tory Although a number of key policy documents leader was also perceived to lack sufficient were unveiled between 1975 and 1979 ‘leadership’ quality and was personally linked including ‘The Right Approach’ and ‘The to the unappealing aspects of the Thatcher The Conservatives were Right Approach to the Economy,’ the and Major governments. amount of the policy pronouncement was The final issue was the superiority of the accused of initiating less extensive. Thatcher believed that any incumbent governments who could use negative campaigning in election promises had to be adopted in gov- more financial and human resources as well ernment. The Tories were additionally con- as their governing status to gain more posi- 1979, at the expense of cerned that excessive policy promotion tive media coverage. How could that be promoting their own would provide the Labour Party with valu- counteracted? This problem provoked the able campaigning material. vague Tory marketing strategy of the 1979 policies A limited range of policies was marketed election without a radical industrial relations during the Hague opposition.After witness- policy that could provide the weak ing their more ‘inclusive’ image failing to Callaghan administration with valuable extra have a positive impact in the polls, and slow- campaigning material. Could another Tory ly recognising that it would be unlikely that government climax in a catastrophic ‘three- their party would overturn Labour’s landslide day week’like the Heath administration?The majority from the 1997 election, the subsequent pressure from Labour, the media Conservatives opted to attract their tradi- and the voters forced the Tories to provide tional supporters by discussing topics such as more policy details. immigration. However, not enough of the The Hague opposition were also con- electorate were sufficiently engaged with this cerned about assisting the Blair administra- narrow range of policies. When the Tories tion with their own promotional activity and discussed those key concerns of the elec- many initiatives attempted to attack Labour torate such as public service funding, the ideas rather than promote Tory policies. A advertising material, such as the ‘You’ve Paid strategy of vague policy marketing was less The Taxes’ posters, consisted of negative evident during the Heath opposition, and campaigning on the Labour ideas rather than the Tories continued to announce their dis- the Tory equivalents. tinctive policies despite the criticism from As well as promoting policies, the Tories Labour and the Heath opposition were out attempted to interest the electorate by proof touch regarding Britain’s true economic moting the personal characteristics of their situation as well as the concerns of the elec- senior politicians.A focus on the leader differ- torate. entiated the parties who were jostling for the During the development of innovative attention of the electorate on the political Conservative political marketing,there were centre ground. In the party political broad- a number of issues that could only be grad- casts and the city centre walkabouts, Heath ually resolved, regardless of the imperative was projected as an honest and approachable need to recover from an election defeat and politician, and this Tory leader marketed his develop an effective marketing strategy.This concept of ‘freedom’ and his wish to give ‘desperate’ inability to promote the party’s more opportunities to young people. personalities and policies effectively was A similar series of personality based mar- particularly evident during the Hague keting initiatives was undertaken to promote opposition.

30 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 The ‘Rivers of Blood’: forty years on

Nicholas Hillman recently wrote a new interpretation of the Rivers of Blood speech for the academic journal ‘Patterns of Prejudice’ and spoke at the Conservative History Group meeting which marked the 40th anniversary of Powell’s most famous speech.

noch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ ern Conservatism: Heffer is a former Daily speech, delivered in Birmingham in Mail columnist who now works for the April 1968, is the most famous Daily Telegraph, while Shepherd wrote a Espeech by any British politician dur- sympathetic biography of Iain Macleod and ing the past 50 years. But, until recently, it has now makes documentaries for the BBC. been very difficult to assess Powell’s words dis- It is time, however, to stop thinking about passionately – where a person stands on the Powell’s speech as wholly praiseworthy or speech has almost been a test of how much wholly disreputable. Instead, we should assess Thatcherite testosterone they have. Now, on the speech issue-by-issue – and with the the 40th anniversary of the speech and 10 years benefit of 40 years of hindsight. On some after Powell’s death, we can at last try to con- issues, like Powell’s primary motives, the sider it in a more objective way. arguments of Powell’s defenders have some Given that the most senior position he validity. On other issues, like whether the ever held was Secretary of State for Health, speech was racist, the arguments of Powell’s Enoch Powell has been the subject of the opponents are more persuasive. And on most incredible outpouring of comment. Powell’s influence on future immigration The two best biographies are a semi-official policy,both his defenders and his opponents On Powell’s influence on tome from 1998 by Simon Heffer and one have tended to miss the key point. future immigration policy, published two years earlier by Robert Shepherd, a former member of the Powell’s motives both his defenders and his Conservative Research Department. Many have claimed that Powell was simply opponents have tended to Broadly speaking, Heffer’s book is sympa- hitching a lift on a passing anti-immigrant thetic while Shepherd’s is critical. According bandwagon when he rose to speak. For miss the key point. to Heffer,the Rivers of Blood speech was not example, the left-wing journalist Paul Foot racist, kept largely within Conservative Party said Powell hardened his views against immi- policy and correctly forecast the future size of gration solely for political reasons. The ex- the black and minority ethnic population. In Tory MP Humphrey Berkeley agreed. contrast, Robert Shepherd’s book argues that It is true that Powell altered his position Powell’s speech provoked racial intolerance, radically on lots of major issues throughout went some way beyond existing party policy his life – the historian John Campbell once and offered exaggerated projections for the wrote: ‘[Powell] suffers Pauline conversions black and minority ethnic population. with the regularity of Mr Toad.’ This confirms that where a person stands But the evidence, some of which is only on Powell tends to reflect their view of mod- emerging now that Powell’s personal papers

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 31 are open, suggests Paul Foot and Humphrey allow just one of those hundreds of people to ble,was wrong because immigration remained Berkeley were wrong: in fact, Powell’s con- speak for me.’ So he wanted the correspon- on the political agenda: Heath’s Immigration cerns about immigration were remarkably dent’s words to appear as his own.And, at no Act of 1971 followed Harold Wilson’s consistent. point after quoting from the letter, does Immigration Act of 1968. For example, in 1955 Powell wrote a pri- Powell disassociate himself from any of the Those who think Heath was always trying vate letter to the Bishop of Lichfield, A.S. words. to catch Powell up are also mistaken. Heath Reeve,about a strike over the employment of All MPs regularly receive letters that con- consistently refused to meet Powell’s demand an Indian bus conductor:‘I believe the strikers tain racist abuse and come into contact with to restrict access to the dependants of migrants in West Bromwich to have apprehended the members of the public spouting racist views. already in the UK. In some respects, Heath dangers for this country of any appreciable The difference between them and Powell is was more liberal thanWilson on immigration. coloured population becoming domiciled that they do not use such comments as the For example, just before Powell spoke Wilson here.’And in his election address for the 1964 basis for their speeches. restricted the KenyanAsians from entering the election, Powell said: ‘I am convinced that Powell’s defence was that he did not have country,but four years later Heath provided a strict control must continue if we are to avoid the right to ignore his constituents’ concerns safe haven to the Ugandan Asians. the evils of a “colour question” in this coun- about immigration.But this is problematic on The truth is that Powell went some way try, for ourselves and for our children.’ at least two counts. First, Powell happily beyond Tory policy when he spoke, for So, while Powell’s language became more ignored his constituents’ views on things like example when he called for ‘the maximum colourful and his policies more detailed, his homosexuality and capital punishment (on outflow’ of migrants. This certainly helped opposition to immigration existed long before which he was more liberal than the mass of the Tories win the 1970 election, but Powell 1968. He can be justifiably attacked for what public opinion).Secondly,it is possible to raise had little impact in policy terms once the he said and, of course, he sought extensive the issue of immigration and its possible con- Tories were back in office: the programme press coverage. But his prime motivation sequences without resorting to the language Heath implemented on immigration was seems to have been a genuine desire to raise an of the gutter. In the Central Office press similar in scope to the one he had been important local issue on his home turf. The release issued a day after Powell’s speech,Ted advocating prior to the Rivers of Blood ‘Rivers of Blood’speech was not only a gam- Heath said:‘The reason I dismissed Mr Powell speech – a mixture of tougher control and ble for political preferment. from the Shadow Cabinet was not for stating humanitarianism. these policies.It was because of the way he did Was the speech racist? it.’On this occasion, Heath was right. Conclusion But if Powell’s motivations were genuine, his It is time for a new and more even-handed rhetoric was still deeply unsettling. He Powell andTory policies interpretation of Powell’s speech. On the one referred to a constituent of his who had told It is often said that Conservatives played a hand, we should recognise that he was speak- him,‘the black man will have the whip hand game of catch-up after Powell’s speech, with ing from the heart, that he pushed Heath to over the white man’.And, in one of the most politicians striving to outdo each other in victory in the 1970 general election and that famous sections of the speech,he quoted from implementing a Powellite agenda on immi- his forecasts for how many people would a letter written by a woman in gration. According to the historian Randall come to Britain were broadly correct. Northumberland about a female pensioner Hansen, for example, Powell ‘succeeded in On the other hand, we should recognise living ‘in a respectable street in continually manoeuvring Heath and the that Powell’s speech included racist language, Wolverhampton’ who had seen all the neigh- Conservative Party towards a more restric- encouraged racial tension and was inappropri- bouring houses ‘taken over’ by immigrants. tionist position.’ ate for a member of the Shadow Cabinet, Afterwards,‘She finds excreta pushed through Others, including the late journalist (and especially one who spoke on Defence rather her letterbox.When she goes to the shops,she formerTory minister) Bill Deedes,said in con- than Home Affairs and one who had already is followed by children, charming, wide-grin- trast that Powell’s speech made it harder for been reprimanded by Heath for speaking out- ning piccaninnies.They cannot speak English, politicians to take action on immigration as side his brief. but one word they know. “Racialist”, they they were so desperate to avoid association The main lesson for today from Powell’s chant.’ with Powellism. Deedes wrote: ‘Any figure, speech seems to be that politicians should stick Of course,these words are not Powell’s:they any uncomfortable fact or prediction that to discussing real-world problems in moderate come from a letter he had received, probably threatened to give the smallest credence to terms. There have been many shameful as a result of a previous speech on immigra- what Enoch Powell had said became unwel- episodes of racially-motivated violence in tion that he had delivered in February 1968. come evidence.’This was also the line taken Britain, but Britain is a more tolerant country Powell later explained to David Frost that recently by Trevor Phillips in a speech deliv- than Powell conceived and there have been no people erroneously thought the words in the ered in the very room in which Powell deliv- Rivers of Blood. letter were his own because he had failed to ered the Rivers of Blood speech. Phillips said: Winston Churchill once said,‘A politician preface each paragraph quoted from the letter ‘The forty-year old shockwave of fear has needs the ability to foretell what is going to with inverted commas in the text that was gagged us all for too long.’ happen tomorrow, next week, next month, released to the media. Neither of these two different positions is and next year. And to have the ability after- This is not good enough. Indeed, it is a red tenable.The position taken by Bill Deedes and wards to explain why it didn’t happen.’ By herring. In the speech, just before quoting Trevor Phillips, that Powell made proper dis- continuously refusing to recant on his apoc- from the letter, Powell said, ‘I am going to cussion about immigration control impossi- alyptic vision, Powell failed this key test.

32 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 ‘Ernie’: a Centennial Reassessment of Ernest Marples

David Dutton, author of the newly published “Liberals in Schism – A History of the National Liberal Party” writes of a little remembered Conservative politician.

here is a curious paradox about the career of Ernest Marples,cabinet minister of the 1950s and 1960s, who was Tborn one hundred years ago on 9 December 1907. In his own day Marples was a high profile politician, seldom out of the news and branded by his opponents (and even by some fellow Tories) as a vulgar self publicist, always on the look-out for a photo-opportunity before that phrase was even invented. His career was inter- twined with many iconic images of postwar domestic politics - the housing boom of the early 1950s,premium bonds,the Beeching axe,motorways, parking meters and double yellow lines - and even the Profumo scandal.Yet Marples has left little trace behind him.He died in 1978 without writing his memoirs. No biography of him exists and there is no known collection of Marples papers.He figures sparingly in the diaries and memoirs of his political colleagues and contemporaries. In his own day one of the most recognisable public figures, his name now means little to most people under the age of fifty. Born in Manchester, the only child of an engine fitter, Marples won a scholarship to Stretford grammar school. He left school early to train as an accountant but soon became prosperous as a result of speculative property deals.By the coming of the SecondWorldWar he was a man of some substance, his company Marples, Ridgeway and Partners having won the contracts to build a number of power stations. He joined the London Scottish territo- rials and rose to the rank of captain before

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 33 being wounded in 1944. By now he nurtured tion pledge to build 300,000 houses in a single Housing, he embarked on a quest for effi- political ambitions and he was elected to the year helped catapult Macmillan into the front ciency and looked abroad for examples of Commons as Conservative MP for Wallasey rank of Conservative politicians - ‘in fact’, good practice. He soon called for the mech- on theWirral in the General Election of 1945. Macmillan once suggested,‘Marples made me anisation of the postal services as ‘quickly as It is often suggested that Marples was elevat- PM’;5 at the same time Marples now had a possible’ in order to reduce costs, while ed from backbench obscurity when Harold loyal friend and mentor in the upper echelons recognising that this would necessitate Macmillan chose him as his parliamentary sec- of theTory party. investment in the short term.12 One of his retary at the Ministry of Housing when the At the Ministry of Housing Marples sought most lasting innovations was to introduce Tories returned to office in 1951.The truth is to learn from foreign practice in order to Subscriber Trunk Dialling. He also set in rather different. During the years of opposi- achieve greater efficiency in Britain.He visited train research into the electronic sorting of tion, 1945-51, he had emerged as one of the Switzerland,Germany,Denmark,Sweden,and mail and hoped that the extension of post party’sleading authorities on housing,a promi- Holland, returning with new ideas about codes and the introduction of standardised nent issue granted the impact of wartime estates,roads,sewers and narrow-fronted hous- envelopes would ensure improvements to destruction and the emphasis given to it by es.Among his most tangible contributions was the service. Marples was widely applauded Attlee’sLabour government.Several important the design of a house which needed almost no for ‘bringing such a climate of private enter- speeches in the House gained Marples recog- timber, then in short supply, using concrete prise to this nationalised industry’.13 nition and attention.The themes he developed instead. It was dubbed by Macmillan the Meanwhile, the first Premium Bond draw of efficiency,incentives and private enterprise ‘BonelessWonder’.6The goal of 300,000 hous- using ERNIE, the Electronic Random would stay with him throughout his political es, duly achieved in 1953 and described by one Number Indicator Equipment, appealed to career. The ‘key to the present problem’, he historian as ‘the biggest success story of the the minister’s flair for publicity. asserted in 1946,‘is the high cost of building’: 1951-55 government’,7 did not blind Marples Overall, Marples enhanced his reputation as to the need to improve the existing housing someone who could get things done and his There was no incentive to anyone to work hard. stock.The 1952 Rent Restrictions Act reveals promotion to the cabinet as Minister of The better a man worked, the higher the wage his influence over policy. Macmillan’s diary Transport after the Conservatives’ victory in he should receive,and if he did badly he should suggests that it was a paper produced by the the 1959 General Election was widely wel- get the sack.An efficient employer should be junior minister which led to legislation.8 comed. Here, the scale of Britain’s transport allowed to make a good profit.1 Marples argued that restrictions on rent meant problems posed the sort of challenge which he that maintenance work and repairs were not relished.‘The snarled up situation suited him, More generally,he took up the theme of prof- taking place, simply because landlords could London crawling with traffic jams,British rail- it sharing to ensure that workers were person- not afford to carry out the work. Under ways losing millions [and] roads built without ally concerned in the success or failure of a Labour the drive to construct new houses‘had planning or research.’14 It was Marples’ legacy business.‘Co-partnership’ would in turn help thrown into the shade the no less urgent prob- to the railway industry which left the biggest reduce the influence of trade unions, as work- lem of the repair and the proper use of the impact and which, with hindsight, has done ers’ energy would be channelled into their existing stock of houses’. It was ‘not surprising most to damage his historical reputation.It was companies.This, he hoped, would reduce the if many of the houses which are rented are in he who brought in Dr Richard Beeching, a number of strikes and thereby increase pro- imminent danger of falling into utter decay’.9 leading executive from ICI, first to join the ductivity.2 Marples was moved to the Ministry of British Transport Commission and then to be On the basis of these ‘years of apprentice- Pensions and National Insurance in October the first chairman of the British Railways ship’, Marples took office in 1951. One 1954, partly because of a potential conflict of Board with instructions to carry out a search- Labour spokesman even expressed regret that interest resulting from his family construc- ing enquiry. he had not been given a higher position in the tion company.He was heavily involved with It is easy to be critical of the resulting clo- government.3 His partnership with Macmillan the National Insurance Bill,but thereafter felt sure of 2,000 railway stations and something was an unlikely one, but was arguably vital to himself underemployed - ‘the job became like 5,000 miles of track. Later concerns over both men, uniting the Edwardian patrician routine… that does not suit my nature’10 - the environmental impact of the motor car whose pretensions, at least, were aristocratic and he returned to the backbenches in and ever-growing road use suggest a lack of with the entirely self-made and somewhat December 1955. But he was one of the planning and imagination. But the Marples- brash businessman,who had once worked as a minor beneficiaries of the Suez Crisis of Beeching strategy must be set in context. By bookie’s ‘dodger’. Symbolically, Marples’ 1956. In bringing Eden’s premiership to an the late 1950s the railways were running into a grandfather had been head gardener at abrupt end and elevating Macmillan unex- massive deficit. Losses peaked at £104m. in Chatsworth, the country seat of the dukes of pectedly to replace him, Suez also restored 1962.Inside the cabinet the Chancellor argued Devonshire, the landed family into which Marples’ ministerial career. In January 1957 that it was ‘essential to re-examine the burden Macmillan had moved by judicious marriage. he was appointed Postmaster General and on the Exchequer’of the ever-growing cost of Yet, as Anthony Sampson has put it,‘between elevated to the Privy Council. the railways. By 1961 the general ‘economic Macmillan with his languid style and Marples From the outset Marples made it clear that situation was more serious than at any time with his boasting efficiency, there existed an he wanted to run the Post Office with its during the past ten years’.15 By this time,more- alliance of mutual advantage, between the 350,000 employees as a business.‘As a child over, it was probably reasonable to regard the amateur and the professional’.4 Marples’ key of private enterprise’, he explained, ‘I am railways - or certainly much of the rural net- role in enabling the Tories to meet their elec- bound to stand by that principle.’11 As at work - as a rigid and inflexible left-over of the

34 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Ernest Marples

Victorian era,unable to compete with the lib- increased from 81 miles in 1959 to 292 miles again in March 1966 and now secured a par- erating versatility of the motorcar, empowered in 1964 with plans for extensive further devel- liamentary majority of 96 seats. by newly-opening but still largely under- opments in place. By this time Edward Heath had taken over utilised motorways.A third of the railway track Marples’ critics suggested that he was too as Conservative leader and Marples’ fate was carried only 0.3 per cent of passenger traffic fond of the latest gimmick and of the political sealed. Despite the similarity of their back- and just 1.5 per cent of freight. Marples him- quick-fix. In reality, however, his sights were grounds, at a time when theTory front bench self regarded Beeching’s 1963 report, The fully set on the long-term and he invited Sir was still dominated by ex-public school boys, Reshaping of the Railways, as ‘a major contribu- Colin Buchanan to produce a comprehensive the two men never got on. Anxious to pro- tion to the government policy of providing an report on the entire road network. Traffic in mote figures of his own generation (Heath was efficient, economic and well-balanced trans- Towns was published in 1963 and called for the 49) and, as a former chief whip,perhaps aware port system’.16 He had no intention of getting systematic planning of urban development to of the stories surrounding Marples’private life, rid of the train altogether, accepting the need reconcile the needs of road transport with Heath summarily dropped the member for for a substantial railway network.‘Its shape,size those of social amenity. Wallasey from the shadow cabinet. [and] pattern may alter, but whatever happens Illness forced Macmillan’s resignation in Though he remained in the Commons we cannot,in this congested island,do without October 1963.With hindsight it is clear that until 1974, Marples’ political career was effec- a railway system.’17 Each proposal for closure Marples’ own career had now peaked. Even tively over. He took a life peerage, but played inevitably incurred much local opposition and the retiring Prime Minister had perhaps seen no part in the upper house, preferring to an effigy of Marples was burnt outside that there were limits to his potential.Marples, retreat to his French vineyard, with the Inland Cirencester station. But the Minister had the he once declared,was‘one of the cleverest men Revenue in hot pursuit. Born a generation courage to do something about an industry in I have ever met in a limited, practical field’.21 later, Marples might have risen considerably seemingly remorseless decline. The claim of Indeed, the Profumo affair, which probably higher in the party’s ranks, especially given his one of his Labour successors at Transport, hastened Macmillan’s departure, could easily belief in the primacy of the market and his Barbara Castle, that he showed little regard for have claimed Marples among its victims.When commitment to the ideas of enterprise and the environment, seems a classic case of being Lord Denning was asked to investigate the entrepreneurship.Strikingly,even though there wise after the event.18 In any case the Labour wider ramifications of the affair, he reported was a generation between them, he and the government after 1964 accepted the broad privately to Macmillan that the conduct of one young Margaret Thatcher became friends in thrust of Marples’ work. cabinet minister in consorting with prostitutes the early 1960s, when the latter was junior Marples’ impact on road transport was could bring discredit on the government. Pensions Minister.25 But Marples died in equally profound. Many of his innovations are Though Denning’sletter remains unpublished, Monte Carlo in July 1978, just under a year now commonplace features of urban life. It it is widely believed that Marples was the cab- before MrsThatcher became Prime Minister. was during his five years as minister that yellow inet minister concerned.22 As it was, the new no-parking lines and parking meters with fixed premier, Alec Douglas-Home, made as few Endnotes penalty fines imposed by traffic-wardens first changes as he could to the cabinet,aware from 1. TheTimes, 31 July 1946. made their mark in Britain’s towns and cities. the outset that a general election could not be 2. E.Marples,The Road to Prosperity (London,1947),p.38;The Ten-year vehicle tests became compulsory in long delayed, and Marples retained the trans- Times, 15 June 1948. 3. Wallasey News, 24 Nov. 1962; House of Commons February 1961, revealing that a sizeable pro- port portfolio for the remainder of theTories’ Debates, 5th Series, vol. 493, col. 320. portion of the country’s cars and lorries were time in power. 4. A. Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London, unfit for the road. Marples also prepared the In opposition, Marples took on the shadow 1967), p.98. 5. A. Horne, Macmillan 1894-1956 (London, 1988), p.337. way for some of the reforms usually attributed portfolio of technology. His background and 6. P. Catterall (ed.), The Macmillan Diaries:The Cabinet Years to his Labour successors, including the intro- experience better equipped him for this posi- 1950-1957 (London, 2003), p.226. duction of the breathalyser to tackle the prob- tion than Labour’s choice of minister, Frank 7. H. Jones, ‘“This is Magnificent!”: 300,000 Houses a Year and the Tory Revival after 1945’, Contemporary British lem of drink-driving.He even looked forward Cousins,the head of theTransport and General History, vol. 14, no.1, p.109. to developments of the twenty-first century, Workers’ Union, hastily catapulted into front- 8. Catterall (ed.), Macmillan Diaries, p.169. suggesting that road pricing was ‘technically line politics following a by-election in 9. TheTimes, 1 May 1951. 19 10. Wallasey News, 24 Nov.1962. feasible’. Many of Marples’ reforms aroused Nuneaton.The leader of‘one of the most reac- 11. H of C Debs, 5th Series, vol. 579, col. 623. the hostility of motorists and ‘MARPLES tionary unions in the country’, suggested 12. TheTimes, 13 Nov.1957. MUST GO’ stickers became a common sight Marples, had no right to preach the merits of 13. H of C Debs, 5th Series, vol. 588, col. 1303. 23 14. A.Sampson,TheAnatomy of Britain (London,1962),p.543. on car windscreens, but the minister, with his modernisation to British industry. Marples 15. National Archives, CAB 128/31-38, cabinet 8 March combative approach,relished the challenge.He found it relatively easy to score points at 1960, and 30 June 1961. could point to obvious improvements and Cousins’ expense, particularly in a Commons 16. TheTimes, 28 March 1963. 24 17. H of C Debs, 5th Series, vol. 627, col. 2360. achievements. In October 1961 he noted that debate in July 1965. 18. B.Castle, Fighting all theWay (London, 1993), p.371. ‘under the old system, volume of traffic [in With the Labour government struggling to 19. H of C Debs, 5th Series, vol. 696, col. 445. London] increased by two per cent per survive with a majority that at one point fell to 20. Wallasey News, 21 Oct. 1961. 21. N. Fisher, Harold Macmillan (London, 1982), p. 137. annum,while journey speeds decreased by two just three seats, it was always possible that the Emphasis added. per cent per annum. In the last year there is Conservatives would soon return to power. 22. R. Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging four per cent more traffic than a year ago but But the public mood slowly swung in Labour’s Truth (London, 1995), p.480. 20 23. M. Stewart, Frank Cousins:A Study (London, 1968), p.75. journey speeds are about nine per cent better.’ favour and Prime Minister Harold Wilson 24. TheTimes, 15 July 1965. In addition the size of the motorway network seized the opportunity to go to the country 25. M.Thatcher, The Path to Power (London, 1995), p.124.

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 35 of information on grounds that it would be leaked. James Prior concludes that from the start she ‘made policy’ on television as a way of bypassing Cabinet, and she confesses as much in her own memoirs. By appealing to other organs of the Party such as the 1922 Committee and the Conference, she could Winning before compensate for any lack of Cabinet support. The tactic of developing a parallel government alongside Cabinet convention had the Falklands already begun in opposition. For instance The Right Approach to the Economy was not released as a shadow Cabinet paper in Thatcher’s subordination of a political party October 1977. As PM ‘she did not believe that the Cabinet should decided con- tentious issues’, or that ‘her policies should be subjected to defeat by a group she had selected to advise her’. ‘Dries’ like Nicholas In response to last year’s celebration of the Ridley may well have lamented that she was 25th anniversary of the Falklands War, Lee Peck, chairing what could have easily been William Whitelaw’s Cabinet, but this really who is a trainee teacher of history, has written was of no significance because Cabinet was effectively bypassed in the decision making about Margaret Thatcher controlling the process. Indeed, Nigel Lawson describes the Conservative Party by methods we have special breakfast meetings he had with the PM to discuss policy, well before he was since seen in other leaders. even in the Cabinet. Supporters were often rewarded by a liberal use of the honours system. Orthodox centres of advice such as the Conservative Research Department (CRD) were increasingly displaced by more Thatcherite bodies such as the Centre for Policy Studies he 25th anniversary of the Falklands her memoirs that the ‘wets’ had been (CPS). Thatcher admits that the process of conflict seems as good a time as any defeated by the time of the October 1981 empowering her own personal policy unit to address its real impact on the conference. The psychological balance of began energetically as soon as she entered Tdevelopment of the Conservative power had moved decidedly against them Number 10. Outside advisors continued to Party.The phrase “Falklands Factor” quickly during the previous month.Various second- multiply, and figures such as John Hoskyns entered the political vernacular and permeat- ary sources have also referred to the disinte- were co opted from business. Derek Rayner ed subsequent historiography. However the gration of corporatism between the from Marks and Spencer was recruited to simple truth is that well before a single Conservative victory in 1979 and the defeat set up an efficiency unit. She was deter- Argentine soldier entered Crown territory of the ‘wets’ by Mrs Thatcher in 1981. mined to increase control over the Civil Thatcher and what was to become known as An analysis of the leader’s strategies and Service, and personally carried out all the Thatcherism had acquired political suprema- personality would seem a logical place to interviews for her private office. cy over the Party. A consideration of the start in order to understand just how ‘that Once in office she ensured that all her debate from this angle, therefore, undermines woman’ eventually tamed ‘those grandees’. appointees to the Treasury were at least the significance of the conflict in terms of The first and most obvious point to men- sympathetic to monetarism, which enabled contemporary Conservative history. tion is that both critics and supporters agree the 1979 budget. This was key to the suc- The Thatcherites (colloquially known as that Thatcher did not respect Cabinet con- cessful implementation of the new non- dries) had defeated their staunchest internal vention. She increasingly withheld infor- Keynesian agenda, which received further Party critics (colloquially known as wets) mation and, as Gilmour notes, only rarely boosts in subsequent reshuffles. Moderates several months before the outbreak of war. were the most important issues permitted that could not be sacked from the Cabinet Indeed the intellectual leader of the latter, to reach the Cabinet. Bilateral negotiations were skilfully kept away from the Treasury. Sir Ian Gilmour, confirmed as much in his with ministers would often precede The only weak spot in this strategy was (for 1992 anti-Thatcher polemic, where he stat- Cabinets being presented with a fait accom- reasons of political realism) having to keep ed that the ‘wets’ failed to prevent the poli- pli. She turned one of the ‘wets’’ tactics Jim Prior in the related department of cies of 1979-81. The lady herself wrote in against them, by justifying the withholding Employment. However by forcing him to

36 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Margaret Thatcher

accept her personal choice for his deputy, until divisions of that magnitude re- she turned one of many clever cosmetic emerged. compromises into a real victory for the dry In addition to removing key ‘wets’, this agenda. reshuffle was impressive because it was lim- Defeats seemed to make her all the more ited, a further illustration of Thatcher’s real- determined, as increasing taxation in the ism and sense of what was politically possi- March 1981 budget was seen as revenge on ble at any given time. The Times shouted the moderates for preventing expenditure that the three sacked ministers were cuts in the autumn of 1980. Determination ‘pushovers’, and there still remained many was clearly her greatest asset, and these were moderates, such as Whitelaw, Francis Pym, quite obviously the actions of ‘a bully,but a Michael Heseltine and Peter Carrington. very smart bully’. She was particularly The middle two could have caused trouble determined over the economy, and only on the backbenches. Keeping Carrington as ever offered limited concessions.The subse- Foreign Secretary was tactical, in that as a James Prior concludes that quent revolt over the 1981 budget saw her Lord he was of a reduced threat to her.Prior concede over fuel duty, but taxes were was moved to the more isolated department from the start she ‘made merely increased elsewhere to compensate. of Northern Ireland, which was a good tac- policy’ on television as a Various other tactics were used to ensure tic, as refusal would have left him liable to that the economic agenda was realised. She allegations of cowardice. way of bypassing Cabinet, sought to protect the Chancellor from the She was always able to compromise when and she confesses as much Cabinet as a way of enabling the economic necessary, especially when in opposition. strategy. Setting targets as part of the From 1975 her main task seemed to be one in her own memoirs Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) of ‘papering over the cracks’ and totally was fundamental to defeating the ‘wets’, and against her conviction, finding the ‘middle made the controversial 1981 budget possi- ground’ on industrial relations. Heath’s ble. She made herself chair person of the ‘E 1970 manifesto was more radical than her Committee’, was aware of the backdrop, proposals of 1979. Once in power the story and fully prepared for cuts. Regular mock was one of tactical retreats in order to pre- exercises had been carried out in opposi- serve the long term economic strategy. tion. The decision was made to try and These years were punctuated by the bail implement the entire economic agenda outs of British Leyland, and the Times immediately on gaining power; as such a reported a ‘wise retreat’ with reference to decisive leap could only be made at the start the coal strike in February 1981. When the of a parliament. Finally ‘cash limits’ were neo-Liberal who worshipped at the altar of introduced to replace what had become Hayek was approached for subsidies, the known as ‘funny money’, which made money just kept flowing. However as has imposing spending limits on moderates eas- been said this was all tactical, as these were ier. battles she could not win, and certainly in Despite the new scaled down role for the the case of coal, a decision was made to ‘cut Cabinet, Thatcher’s power to reshuffle was our losses and live to fight another day’. still used in a very tactical way.From January The above account should in no way 1981 key ‘wets’ were removed or placed in mislead readers as to the unparalleled supe- departments where they would be less of a riority of Thatcher’s tactics, or the signifi- threat. Preparation for this included having cance of her unusual personality. If history stocked the junior ranks with supporters for teaches us anything, it has to be that every future promotion. successful revolutionary has pushed against Thatcher actually lists these individuals in an open door. In this context Thatcher’s her memoirs as Cecil Parkinson, Nicholas Cabinet foes really did not help themselves. Ridley and John Nott. During the summer The fact that only a handful of the Cabinet 1981 row over public spending Thatcher supported her meant that she was left alone promised the Cabinet that they would to defend policy. Paradoxically this revisit the issues in the autumn, but by then enhanced her status, as she was given a free key opponents had been sacked or moved. rein to propagandise throughout the media. For two years the Cabinet had thwarted This was counter productive to expenditure cuts, but the press anticipated Conservative moderates who increasingly more agreements by late 1981 with a looked ’run of the mill’. Having allowed her Cabinet that would ‘carry her through’, and to behave in such a way for so long a peri- the PM herself noted that it would be years od of time, meant that any action against

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 37 Thatcher by the Cabinet would have been dismissing the Social Democratic Party election pledges.The desire to pick winners ’a humiliating admission of policy and lead- (SDP) as ephemeral and the government as could easily be mocked in the context of ership error’. far from excessively right wing. Key previous governments having failed to do Her tactics and personality were not Thatcherites were adept at reversing ortho- this. Reflation could be ridiculed as a always well received during these years. dox assumptions. For example Keith Joseph panacea, in the same way ‘wets’ were to cri- Increased television appearances were suf- argued that Conservatives could work with tique monetarism. The coordinated aim fering from diminishing returns by 1981. the unions as free enterprise complemented was always to smoke out the arguments for However the real significance of Thatcher’s perfectly free collective bargaining. reflation. unorthodox behaviour does depend on Exogenous factors were regularly incor- Comparisons with previous Labour interpretation. Even allies (albeit semide- porated into the defence strategy as having administrations could easily be manipulated tached ones) saw it as a liability, having exacerbated the unpalatable consequences to project the ‘wets’ as alarmist, as Dennis described her as hectoring, manipulating of monetarism. Firstly theirs was essential- Healey had certainly cut spending more. discussions, using feminine wiles, summing ly a corrective exercise for the past mis- With the longevity of the parliament up discussions at the beginning rather than takes of the post war consensus, therefore increasing, the ‘dries’ could increasingly dis- at the end, and seeking to out argue all to ‘pin the blame on Mrs Thatcher for miss alternatives. It was argued that there opposition. which she is less to blame than almost any simply was not enough time before the next The press may have seen a balanced PM of the people who were blaming her’ was election for any change of policy to have willing to compromise over the coal strike simply not logical. It was suggested that any impact on the economy. TheTimes ran of 1981, but the Cabinet saw histrionics and money supply was out of control all over a three part series on alternatives in the empty threats of resignation in order to the world which was undermining British summer of 1981, but ‘dries’ successfully bully them into submission. efforts. Unions were used as a scapegoat for attacked these in Cabinet using this argu- The PM was also being flanked by a con- the apparent unemployment consequences ment. tingent of ‘dries’, who collectively were able of the MTFS. At the 1981 Party There was always some positive news that to devise some highly effective defence Conference, unemployment was even the ‘dries’ could utilise in their defence, and strategies. By political manipulation the explained in part by the 1960s baby the critics could never point to undisputed ‘dries’ managed to turn defeats into victo- boomers having entered the labour mar- failure. In terms of the primary objective, ries. The monetarist experiment may have ket. the administration had not yet failed as received a fundamental set back, this having Using threats as a tactic was possible, in inflation fell ‘undeniably fast’. Despite the been crystallised in the Niehams Report. that failure to cut spending implied higher idiosyncratic failings of pure monetarism, However the paradox of such defeats was taxes if the PSBR was to be reduced, other- the Thatcherites could therefore stress that the ability of the ‘dries’ to use them against wise interest rates would have to rise. In the experiment had worked in terms of the the ‘wets’. Indications that monetary policy addition to the ‘wets’ failing to provide an central objective of reducing inflation. By was too tight after all, despite ‘M3’1 stating alternative, the ‘dries’ insisted theirs was the September 1980 it was even in single fig- the opposite, merely reinforced the ‘dry’ only away. Indeed the contemporary ures, therefore more than matched even case to cut public spending further. This acronym of ‘TINA’ entered the political optimistic expectations.Wage rises had fall- would reduce crowding out and facilitate vernacular, standing for ‘there is no alterna- en which was further confirmation of a re- further interest rate cuts.It appeared that the tive’, and moderates in Cabinet agreed. augmentation of expectations wrought by failure of one aspect of monetarism could Even if by 1981 the government had been successful monetarism. On occasions inter- merely be used to reinforce the stature of forced into policy reversals over taxation, est rates were below some Western another aspect of the theory.This comple- the overall objective of deflation still had European countries in 1981. Certainly by mented the longer term campaign by not been abandoned. Higher public spend- 1982 it appeared that the worst was over, Thatcherites to present the Public Sector ing could not be reconciled with combat- and the budget was less draconian.This was Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) as a fun- ing inflation, and this became known as ‘the still weeks before the Falklands War. damental cause of British decline. Ian wets’ dilemma’. Indeed ‘TINA’, more than It is therefore possible to argue that Gilmour describes the alleged triumph of any other factor was responsible for defeat- Thatcher had subordinated the Party well Thatcherism in the 1981 budget as ’camou- ing the Cabinet doubters.A sense of clarity before the Falklands War. In many ways flage for monetarist failure’. and certainty surrounded the thesis of a 1981 was her finest hour, when she finally In response to specific criticisms, the causal link between money supply,inflation managed to wrest control of the Party from ‘dries’ again seemed adept at providing and unemployment. her critics. According to academics like coherent and logical responses. For example The ‘wets’ were successfully attacked on a Andrew Gamble,Thatcher’s personality and cutting the PSBR was projected in populist number of levels. They were accused of style enabled her to ‘hijack’ the Party.This terms, as it was only fair that the public sec- being unpatriotic, by fermenting division in article attempts to provide a more detailed tor should suffer as much as private inter- the Conservatives, therefore perhaps explanation, emphasising the importance of ests. A direct appeal was made in the press, enabling Labour’s discredited alternative of her ‘dry’ allies and the downside of her in order to quash the‘wet’critique.MPs like a siege economy. Thatcherism could always activity. Archie Hamilton wrote open letters to the take the moral high ground, as surely allow- Note Times, addressing these to their ‘wet’ col- ing public debt to escalate was irresponsible 1 ‘M3’ refers to the indicator that the government used leagues. The arguments tended to be lucid, and opportunistic, not to mention breaking to measure money supply growth

38 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Of Course it was the Conservatives Wot Won it Rethinking the 1992 General Election

Jamie Martin argues that the 1992 Conservative victory was not a surprise and it was not won by the newspapers but by the party itself.

he 1992 British general election was that the Conservative party prosecuted a about a girl with glue ear suddenly swung one of the most exciting, eventful hugely effective long term campaign which the election toward the government. At and important of the twentieth cen- focused unrelentingly on exploiting and most, these were events reflecting and react- tury. It was the first time one party augmenting the electorate’s negative per- ing to the underlying themes and dominant T 3 had won four successive victories since the ceptions of the opposition. narrative detailed below. 1832 great reform act; saw the highest ever Though the 1992 election is perhaps too The place to begin unravelling the ‘mys- share of the popular vote by a winning party; recent to have spawned a truly authoritative tery’ of 1992 is with the opinion polls.Peter and produced a result which confounded historical work, it is worth discussing the Kellner was right to call it ‘…the worst per- opinion polls’ predictions. Despite this, polit- existing literature. It consists of segments of formance by opinion polls since polling ical history has thus far treated it as an apos- memoirs or biographies, which give the began’: the Conservatives eventual vote trophe between the Thatcher and Blair pre- election scant detailed analysis, symbolised share and number of seats exceeded all pre- mierships. by its receiving relatively little space in dictions.4 The error came from two places: Central to the failure to understand 1992 Major’s own memoirs (one might have firstly, a failure to acknowledge that those has been the dominant narrative that the thought it was one of the few events of his refusing to express a preference were over- Conservative’s victory was a surprise. This turbulent premiership he would be happy whelmingly Conservative (by a margin of article will demonstrate that inaccurate to recount at length).1 The exception to around four to one) which gave inaccurate opinion polls caused commentators to often unsatisfactory accounts is the ever party preference figures; secondly, a failure ignore the overwhelming evidence that the excellent Butler and Kavanagh British to realise that underlying data which indi- Conservatives were always strong favourites General election series, which is comprehen- cated Labour’s weaknesses was being to win.This consisted of four key facets;that sive and authoritative.2 From a political sci- ignored in the media’s obsession with these the recession, far from encumbering the ence perspective, Philip Gould and Giles headline numbers. Conservatives, made the electorate more Radice have produced sharp analysis of the When asked for the most important cautious about electing a Labour govern- reasons for Labour’s defeat. issues affecting ‘me and my family’ rather ment; that the accession of John Major, It is also necessary to rebut the myths that than ‘the country’, tax trebled in signifi- with a leadership style perfectly suited to have sprung from the election: the unex- cance and prices quadrupled.5 The media the post-Thatcher context, had blunted pected result offered them a fertile breeding used polling evidence to show the NHS Labour’s charge it was ‘time for a change’ ground. This essay doesn’t have space to was the dominant issue, but this primacy and instead made trust the crucial issue; that undertake a detailed rebuttal, but rejects the was greatest among non-voters. The polls the key section of the electorate in the notion that events such as Labour’s failed to present an accurate picture of vot- C1/C2 social class were alienated by ‘Sheffield Rally’, the Sun’s incendiary last ers’ foremost concerns and thus the elec- Labour’s image, values and philosophy; and week coverage or Labour’s health broadcast tion’s likely outcome. This has inevitably

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 39 hampered attempts to establish a proper his- Labour’s difficulties were compounded torical narrative of the 1992 election. by its deeply entrenched problems with a The apparent Labour poll leads were key section of the electorate. Margaret perceived as highly believable because of Thatcher’s electoral hegemony had been the severe recession which provided the built on a generation of voters in social class election’s backdrop. The age old theory C1/2 shifting toward her party from states that governments who oversee Labour.Their votes held the key to scores of prosperity win elections, and those which those marginals in the midlands and south- oversee recessions lose them. 1992 turned east Labour had to win in order to form a this on its head: the Conservatives won government. Detailed post election research not in spite of the recession,but in a large shows that substantial portions of these vot- part because of it. ers felt that the Labour party failed to Crucially the electorate, reflecting either understand their lives or articulate their theThatcherite zeitgeist separating state and aspirations.10 This crucially hampered their economy or just their sense Major was new, ability to return to government. did not blame the government for the These electors had moved on and left the recession.6 Meanwhile, economic difficul- Labour party behind them. They were ties heightened people’s concern regarding repelled by the party’s belief in equality and Labour’s tax and spending plans. A private a welfare society financed by high state Major’s unassuming style Labour Party poll of 4 April showed seven- spending. The Conservatives utilised this ty five percent of respondents were con- through a robust attack on the threat and managerial competence cerned a Labour victory would mean high- Labour posed to the material advances this were perfectly suited to the er taxes for the whole country.7 In the con- group had achieved.This, alongside Major’s text of recession, the Conservatives’ fero- positive appeal to these voters’ aspirations, post-cold war and post- cious attacks on Labour’s fiscal irresponsibil- was a potent attack. Thatcherite world. The ity became the centrepiece of the election. For all its continued advances among All incumbent governments sooner or affluent liberals Labour was unable to gain electorate was crying out for later come up against an underlying sense it sufficient ground among social groups a new, less ideologically is ‘time for a change’.After the unpopulari- C1/C2. Beginning with the highly symbol- ty of the government during 1989 and ic victory in Basildon, the government held combative style of politic 1990, and with the Conservatives incum- a string of key marginals where this group’s bent for thirteen years, this sense ought to support was decisive. Philip Gould’s post- have been considerable by 1992. However, election analysis was resolutely clear: the entry of John Major into Downing Labour could not win an election ‘…unless street was, as Butler and Kavanagh noted,‘a it is razed to the ground and rebuilt’.11 Giles change of government without a general Radice, in his analysis of hundreds of swing election’.8 Major enjoyed the (then) longest voters in southern marginals, echoed honeymoon of any occupant of number Gould’s conclusion.12 The Conservatives ten, and through deft moves on the poll tax won the 1992 election because Labour and softened rhetoric about building ‘a could never receive sufficient support from country more at ease with itself’ created, to this vital portion of the electorate. a remarkable degree, the sense of a break This deep-set problem of voter identifi- with his predecessor.9 cation augmented the contextual handicaps Major’s unassuming style and managerial regarding the public’s perception of competence were perfectly suited to the Labour’s fiscal policies and competence as post-cold war and post-Thatcherite world. an alternative government. This bleak The electorate was crying out for a new,less prospectus was compounded by a ideologically combative style of politics. Conservative strategy which utilised and Having neutralised‘time for a change’,Major extended the party’s in-built advantages. made the election a question of trust and The government campaign has been seen as competence. Instead of an election about the unimaginative, narrow and increasingly des- Conservative’s record, 1992 became a refer- perate. It was, in fact, a brutally effective les- endum on Labour’s suitability as an alterna- son in how to maintain political power. tive government.With Kinnock consistently Beginning in June 1991 the government trailing Major as voters’ preferred prime launched two pre-election offensives,first the minister, and Labour still tarnished by mem- ‘summer heat on Labour’ and then the more ories of its nadir of 1978-83, the coherent ‘near term campaign’. These were Conservatives advantage was telling. remarkably effective. The Conservatives co-

40 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 1992 General Election opted this strategy from Reagan’s 1984 cam- announced their would be no increases in palatable government in waiting. He is, paign which used the advantages of incum- income tax, and that he would stick to the for a number of reasons, better placed bency to achieve decisive pre-election spending plans laid out by the government than Kinnock was to do this.Time will momentum. The Conservatives thus made for the first two years in office; controlling tell if he is successful. full use of the international stage to contrast inflation, not achieving full employment, Time will also tell if the significance of Major’s leadership with Kinnock’s, and became the clear economic priority; Blair’s the 1992 general election is grasped by his- turned announcements of routine economic leadership dominated the party’s message, torians. It marked a sea change in British data into a detailed assault on Labour’s tax with their desire to portray competence and politics, as the Thatcher revolution gained and spending plans. Polling data on tax, lead- engender trust seen by Roy Jenkins as ‘akin permanence and it sounded the death knell ership and party preference showed the gov- to someone carrying a crystal vase down a for the existence of a party of government ernment made large advances between long corridor’.14 In terms of broader identi- from the centre-left. Not only did the elec- December 1991 and February 1992.13 ty and image, Radice and Gould’s advice tion reflect and deliver these changes, the The Conservative strategy showed fur- was fully embraced through reforms both to campaign’s rhetoric and events directly ther innovation in its historically unusual the party’s links with the unions and the shaped the identity of what became New capacity to move beyond the previous elec- hugely symbolic Clause Four of the Labour Labour. Few British general elections that tion. While Labour kept with the norm of Party’s constitution. can claim to have been so decisive in shap- using a strategy based on the lessons of the Labour had fundamentally changed its ing political history. 1987 election (dropping extreme policies, core values. As the historian Richard Toye focusing on unemployment, trumpeting the has argued, this was to all intents and pur- recession, emphasising it was ‘time for a poses a new party and represented a sea Endnotes 15 1. J Major, John Major,The autobiography (London:, Harper change’) the Conservatives necessarily change in British party politics. Blair him- Collins, 1999) fought a firmly post-Thatcher campaign. self directly referenced the 1992 election as 2. D Butler & D Kavanagh, The British General Election of Adapting to 1992’s context admirably, it the origin of what was universally called 1992 (London, St Martin’s Press, 1992) 3. P Gould,‘1992 General Election Result – reasons for utilised the recession and portrayed Major’s ‘New Labour’. He recalled canvassing a defeat’, The Kinnock Papers, box 394; Also see P cabinet as a new administration, while working class voter in a crucial marginal Gould, ‘Labour’s tax nightmare’ The New Statesman attacking Labour on the key issue of com- seat:‘His instincts were to get on in life.And (30 October 1998) p28-33; G Radice, Southern discom- 16 fort: Fabian pamphlet 555, (London, Fabian society, petence and trust rather than ideological he thought ours were to stop him’. Blair 1992) extremity. himself, who had no emotional or per- 4. Speaking on P Horrocks (Dir)‘Election 92’P Horrocks The Conservatives’ effective strategy ceived association with the party’s past, was (Dir), Election 92, BBC parliament (9 April 2007) originally broadcast 9-10 April 1992 ensured full advantage was taken of the pro- the perfect embodiment of the new party. 5. Quoted in P Clifford & A Heath, ‘the election cam- pitious context. The result, a lead of eight With his three successive general election paign’ in A Heath, R Jowell & J Curtis, Labour’s last percent in the popular vote and outright victories and now succession by Brown, this chance p14 6. For example, a poll taken just days before the election majority of twenty one in the House of change in the make up of British party pol- saw only four percent of the electorate blaming the Commons, gave the Thatcher revolution itics appears complete. current administration. D Kavanagh, Election campaign, permanence. Not only were her reforms A proper reconstruction of the 1992 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 231 (Gallup poll, March 1992) concreted by five further years of election therefore allows us to understand 7. Quoted in Labour Party, ‘Report by the General Conservative government, but the 1992 fully the last decade and a half of British Secretary to the NEC on the General Election 1992’, election was the catalyst for a revolution at political history.It could even shed light on Kinnock papers box 380, p. 3 8. Butler & Kavanagh, British election 1992, p. 18 the heart and soul of the Labour party the future. The next election, expected in 9. It was certainly a complete contrast to the mid-term which produced the most drastic change in 2009/10 will take place in strikingly similar successions by Douglas Home and Callaghan respec- the ideological basis of the British party sys- circumstances.A prime minister succeeding tively. For Major’s popularity, see D Sanders ‘Government popularity and the next election’, Political tem since 1918. a charismatic and dominant predecessor, quarterly 62 (1991), pp. 255-261 This shift in Labour’s identity did not seeking his first but his party’s fourth term. 10. See G Radice, Southern Discomfort; P Gould, The unfin- take place straight away.John Smith placed An opposition leader who has sought to ished revolution (London, Little, Brown and co, 1998) p. 106 a check on the aspirations of the more modernise his party after three successive 11. I Crewe, B Gosschalk, J Bartle, Political communications – ardent modernisers and trod a gradual path defeats. A government whose strong eco- Why Labour won the General Election of 1997 (London, akin to that taken before by Kinnock and nomic record is checked by economic diffi- Frank Cass & co, 1998) p. 3 12. Radice, Southern Discomfort, p. 24 Gaitskell. Smith’s sudden early death in culty after a decade in office.An opposition 13. R Worcester et al, Report by the market research society May 1994 brought to the forefront of looking to emphasise change against a gov- into polling at the 1992 election (London, Market Labour politics a new generation for ernment asserting its trustworthiness and Research society,1994) appendix one (poll by MORI for The Times published 21 January 1992); ibid, whom the 1992 defeat had been a water- competence. (Gallup monthly survey for the Daily Telegraph, shed. The newly elected Tony Blair was These battles are already taking shape.If February); ibid, (Poll by ICM for The Guardian pub- joined by Gordon Brown, Philip Gould, David Cameron is to avoid Neil lished 11 January 1992) 14. Speaking on R Hopkin (Dir), Election ’97, screened 7 Peter Mandelson and others in fashioning Kinnock’s fate, he will have to paint May 2007, originally shown 1-2 May 1997 a completely new party from the existing Brown as continuity,not change,from the 15. RToye,‘“The Smallest party in History”? New Labour Labour organisation. Blair years and dilute Labour’s ability to in Historical Perspective’, Labour History Review, 69, No. 1 (April 2004) pp. 371-391 The hat tips to the lessons of 1992 came trumpet superior economic competence. 16. Quoted in A Geddes & J Tonge, Labour’s landslide thick and fast; Shadow Chancellor Brown He will also have to present his party as a (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1997)

Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 41 Book reviews Book reviews

'No Damned Merit in it...' Ronald Porter rewiews Order of Merit by Stanley Martin

I.B. Tauris ISBN 1 86064 848 7 £45.00

his weighty volume on the Order of birth, in Appendix C, is given as 192! Now the author's annoyance, it ranks below the Merit has been written by a retired is that AD or BC? And while we are on GCB in terms of precedence. He should Foreign Office official, Stanley Appendix C, the author appears to have also have added that it ranks below theVC, TMartin. Honours and decorations re-christened Sir John French, first Earl of the GC, the KG and the KT! have clearly fascinated him for most of his Ypres. The family name was, and still is, For ordinary people to take the Order of life, ever since he started reading old copies French. According to the appendix, it is Merit seriously, it needs to be a broader of Whitakers Almanack as a boy during the 'Pinkstone'. In the body of the book, on Order. In other words, the number of Second WorldWar.This is his first book. In it page 423, we are told that when Prince appointments to it need to be expanded. he traces the history of the Order since its Philip was given the OM in 1968, which At the moment, for every writer who is inception in 1902 by Edward VII., then goes was a ' first time ' for a member of the considered [ eg Pinter] there are others of on to give us brief biographies of all the Royal Family. But what about Dickie equal ‘merit’ [ eg J. K. Rowling] who can- holders of the OM from 1902 up to the pres- Mountbatten, who got the award some not be appointed. This is because the ent day . There are also chapters on other years before? Wasn't he a member of the number of writers allowed into the order related matters like Those Who Turned it Royal Family, albeit way down the list in at any one time is severely limited, bearing Down and Those Who Should Have Got it the Order of Succession? On page 331, the in mind that the Order has a total of 24 but Didn't . author implies with intended irony, that holders, and that a vacancy for 'literature' He claims that this volume is not a door Alan Clark's father, Lord Clark OM, had normally only arises when a writer mem- stop and it is quite handy to use. I disagree to 'buy his own antiques' to furnish one of ber pops his or her clogs! Of course, the on both counts. It made a good door stop his houses. This is a reference to Alan author would not like to change things for my kitchen door when I had to leave it Clark's ALLEGED comment about because that would lead to 'dilution' and open to get rid of the smell of burnt toast Heseltine having to ' buy his own furni- detract from the order’s status as 'a match- last Sunday morning ad it certainly is not ture ' for his country house. Had the less honour'. handy to use. Because of its weight and author actually read the Clark Diaries, he Some of the photos in the book are rea- size - over 600 pages, two and a half inch- would have found that it was Michael sonably good.The sketches are less so.To a es thick and about nine inches long - it Jopling who made the remark about serious researcher, the book is of limited cannot be read satisfactorily in bed. Heseltine, not Alan Clark. And I remain usefulness. If I wanted to look up the biog- I suppose the book, if it cannot be con- puzzled why someone who is so interest- raphical details of a leading literary, mili- sidered a good read, which it is not, might ed in honours and their various classes tary or political figure in the last hundred be looked on as a solid work of reference should take Sir Alec Guinness's title away years, my first port of call would be the by some. In other words, it could be from him at page 217. DNB - the Dictionary of National parked on a reference library shelf and The author pompously claims that the Biography or Who Was Who. Stanley dipped into when the need arises. But for Order of Merit is a 'matchless honour'. It Martin's book would only be of use if I a book to earn this accolade fully, it needs attempts to honour the most eminent knew that the person held the OM. If one to be accurate. And accuracy does not people in their sphere, be they writers, did not know this, one would be wasting appear to be the author's strong point. actors, past prime ministers, field marshals, one’s time. I found this out the hard way There are some obvious howlers in it. scientists, musicians, actors, etc. etc. with the late John Betjeman. Surprisingly, For example, David Attenborough's date of The Order is limited to 24 members.To he did not get the OM.

42 Conservative History Journal • issue 7 • Winter 2008 Editorial, Helen Szamuely

Publish the diaries Iain Dale, Director of the Conservative History Group, reviews A Political Suicide by Norman Fowler

Politico’s ISBN 1 84275 227 8 £14.99

ineteen years ago I was within the way from the mid 1980s through to subsequent dock strike. Fowler was an inch of playing a walk on David Cameron’s election as Tory leader. In Employment Secretary at the time, and han- part in this book. I very nearly the final chapter, he comes up with nine les- dled the announcement with consummate Nbecame Norman Fowler’s sons political parties need to learn if they are skill. Nigel Lawson described it in his mem- Special Adviser. I accepted the job, then to avoid the mistakes made by the oirs as a classic example of how government waited … and waited. I had heard that Conservatives in the fifteen years from 1990. announcements ought to be made – no leak, Fowler was a reluctant decision maker, but One wonders how closely Gordon Brown total surprise, thus wrong footing the oppo- this got ridiculous.Then the reason became should read Fowler’s words. sition. It has to be said that Fowler made clear. He had decided to resign his cabinet There is no doubt that the best parts of this mincemeat of the more woolly minded offi- job as Secretary of State for Employment to book are when Fowler digs into his diaries. cials in his department who, right up to the “spend more time with his family”.And so Indeed, I question why he didn’t make more last minute, were fully in favour of appeasing my only chance to serve in government dis- use of them. While not quite in the Alan the unions. Fowler stuck to his guns and appeared. I was asked if I would like to work Clark league, the diary excerpts are full of delivered the goods. for his successor, Michael Howard, but I anecdote, opinion and gossip – very unlike After he left Cabinet, Fowler took on sev- decided that he and I were not a match the public persona of the author. Fowler had eral crucial roles, not least as party chairman made in heaven. a reputation as a minister for being a bit of a for two years from 1992-94. Indeed, reading Anyway,Fowler’s resignation gave birth to fence sitter. One civil servant told me he his book you come to understand that this book, which is in effect the second vol- excelled in putting off a decision for as long Fowler was a key player inTory politics right ume of his memoirs. The first volume, as possible.This was not always a bad thing, through the last quarter of the last century. Minister’s Decide, was panned by the critics but civil servants like firm leadership and For that reason I hope that Fowler and failed to trouble too many bookshop some of them felt they didn’t get it from might consider publishing his diaries in tills.This was a shame as it was a better book Fowler.They tended to ignore Fowler’s desire full.The excerpts in A Political Suicide shed than the critics thought.This sequel has had to weigh up fully the political consequences new light on the events leading up to the a kinder press, in part because it is very well of whatever decision he was being asked to fall of Margaret Thatcher and form an written, but also because it contains a mes- make. important part of our recent political his- sage, or perhaps the word ‘warning’ is more I came to Fowler’s attention was because tory. I have no doubt that one day they appropriate. of my role in the campaign to repeal the will end up in a university archive and will Based on his diaries A Political Suicide Dock Labour Scheme, and my role as be open for others to read. But I am more traces the history of Conservative division all spokesman for the port employers during the impatient than that!

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Conservative History Journal • Issue 7 • Winter 2008 43 Join the debate at: chj http://conservativehistory.blogspot.com/ The blog of the Conservative History Journal