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DNS Priručnik Verzija 1.1 Korunić: DNS priručnik verzija 1.1 DNS priručnik Dinko Korunić <[email protected]> verzija 1.1 Licenca: • CC Imenovanje-Nekomercijalno-Bez prerada 2.5 Slobodno smijete: • umnožavati, distribuirati i javnosti priopćavati djelo Pod sljedećim uvjetima: • Imenovanje. Morate priznati i označiti autorstvo djela na način kako je specificirao autor ili davatelj licence. • Nekomercijalno. Ovo djelo ne smijete koristiti u komercijalne svrhe. • Bez prerada. Ne smijete mijenjati, preoblikovati ili prerađivati ovo djelo. • U slučaju daljnjeg korištenja ili distribuiranja morate drugima jasno dati do znanja licenčne uvjete ovog djela. • Od svakog od tih uvjeta moguće je odstupiti, ako dobijete dopuštenje nositelja autorskog prava. Prethodno ni na koji način ne utječe na zakonska ograničenja autorskog prava. Zagreb, 2006. 1/64 Korunić: DNS priručnik verzija 1.1 Sadržaj 1 Uvod ..................................................................................................................4 1.1 Domensko ime ............................................................................................4 1.2 Domene.......................................................................................................5 1.3 Domenski registri.........................................................................................6 1.4 DNS rezolucija.............................................................................................7 1.5 DNS međuspremnici .................................................................................10 1.6 Reverzna rezolucija...................................................................................11 1.7 DNS protokol i komunikacija......................................................................12 1.8 DNS klase i zapisi .....................................................................................15 1.9 Primarni i sekundarni NS, prijenos zone ...................................................18 1.10 Prijenos zone i poboljšanja......................................................................19 1.11 Delegacija................................................................................................22 1.11 DNS dodaci i neki detalji .........................................................................23 1.12 DNS sigurnost .........................................................................................24 2 DNS alati..........................................................................................................26 2.1 Naredba host.............................................................................................26 2.2 Naredba dig...............................................................................................27 2.3 Naredba dnswalk.......................................................................................29 2.4 Naredba fpdns...........................................................................................30 2.5 Naredba nslint ...........................................................................................31 2.6 Naredba zonecheck ..................................................................................31 3 Bind9 poslužitelj...............................................................................................33 3.1 Konfiguracija općenito ...............................................................................33 3.2 Komentari..................................................................................................34 3.3 Parametri rada servisa ..............................................................................34 3.4 Pristupne liste............................................................................................37 3.5 Odjeljak za zapisnike.................................................................................38 3.6 Odjeljak kontrole........................................................................................39 3.7 Odjeljak ključeva .......................................................................................40 3.8 Server odjeljak...........................................................................................40 3.9 Odjeljak konfiguracije pogleda...................................................................41 3.10 Umetnuta konfiguracijska datoteka .........................................................43 3.11 Odjeljak za zone......................................................................................43 3.12 Konfiguracija zona...................................................................................45 4 Djbdns poslužitelj.............................................................................................49 4.1 Dnscache ..................................................................................................50 4.2 Tinydns......................................................................................................52 5 MaraDNS .........................................................................................................55 6 PowerDNS .......................................................................................................56 A Primjeri konfiguracija .......................................................................................57 A.1 Bind9 konfiguracija - named.conf..............................................................57 A.2 Bind9 forward zona - hosts_fsb.db............................................................59 A.3 Bind9 reverse zona - db.127.....................................................................60 A.4 Bind9 wildcard zona - blockeddomain.hosts .............................................60 2/64 Korunić: DNS priručnik verzija 1.1 A.5 Bind9 prazna zona - db.empty ..................................................................60 A.6 Bind9 reverse zona - hosts_116.rev .........................................................61 A.7 TinyDNS zapisi .........................................................................................61 B. Literatura ........................................................................................................63 Primjer 1: Domenska imena, FQDN, labele......................................................5 Primjer 2: TLD-ovi.............................................................................................6 Primjer 3: Međunarodni TLD-ovi.......................................................................6 Primjer 4: Rekurzivni DNS upit .........................................................................9 Primjer 5: Standardne i reverzne adrese ........................................................12 Primjer 6: Različiti RR-ovi u svijetu i kod nas..................................................16 Primjer 7: SOA polja u praksi..........................................................................20 Primjer 8: Reverzna delegacija bez klasa.......................................................23 Primjer 9: Kružno posluživanje .......................................................................23 Primjer 10: Korištenje naredbe host ...............................................................26 Primjer 11: Korištenje naredbe dig .................................................................28 Primjer 12: Korištenje naredbe dnswalk .........................................................29 Primjer 13: Korištenje naredbe fpdns .............................................................30 Primjer 14: Korištenje naredbe nslint..............................................................31 Primjer 15: Korištenje naredbe zonecheck .....................................................31 Primjer 16: Komentari u named.conf datoteci.................................................34 Primjer 17: Options odjeljak iz named.conf datoteke......................................36 Primjer 18: Definiranje pristupnih listi u named.conf.......................................37 Primjer 19: Korištenje logging direktive...........................................................39 Primjer 20: Controls odjeljak iz named.conf datoteke.....................................40 Primjer 21: Ključ za rndc program i za Bind servis .........................................40 Primjer 22: Korištenje server odjeljka .............................................................41 Primjer 23: Razdijeljeni DNS kroz view direktive ............................................42 Primjer 24: Umetnute konfiguracijske datoteke ..............................................43 Primjer 25: Korištenje parametara unutar zonskih datoteka ...........................46 Primjer 26: Kratice za dnscache .....................................................................51 Slika 1: DNS hijerarhija.....................................................................................7 Slika 2: DNS rezolucija .....................................................................................8 Slika 3: Reverzna DNS rezolucija...................................................................12 3/64 Korunić: DNS priručnik verzija 1.1 1 Uvod Na današnjem Internetu je tzv. DNS jedan od osnovnih servisa, te se praktički podrazumijeva njegovo shvaćanje i ispravna uporaba - čije ćemo temelje postaviti u ovoj kratkoj kuharici. Kako svaki priručnik počinje sa teoretskim uvodom, tako će i ovo uvodno poglavlje sadržavati neke osnovne pojmove nužne za razumijevanje i kasniju praktičnu primjenu u idućim poglavljima. DNS (Domain Name System) je strogo hijerarhijski distribuirani sustav u kojem se mogu
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