Hizb Ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir

A global Islamist movement in different national contexts

L.R. Enthoven Student number 5685613 Thesis European Studies: Identity and Integration First reader: Dhr. prof. dr. M. Kemper Second reader: Dhr. dr. M.E. Spiering University of Amsterdam June 27th, 2014

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

1. General overview of Hizb ut-Tahrir 4

2. Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 14

3. A comparative analysis of the webpages 31

4. Conclusion 45

Attachments 47

Bibliography 61

Introduction

The topic of this thesis forms Hizb ut-Tahrir, a globally active Islamist movement that strives to establish a Caliphate and unite all Muslims. Despite the fact that the movement states that the manner in which it wants to achieve it aims are strictly non-violent, it is banned in most Arab and Asian countries in which it has a presence. The movement is very active in the West and especially in the United Kingdom. In this thesis I will compare the movement's branches in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in order to examine to what extend these national branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir and their strategies correspondent and where they not correspondent are formed by or adapted to the different national contexts. Furthermore based on this case study I will come to a statement on to which extend Hizb ut-Tahrir is a rigidly centralised organisation or more a movement a of loosely coordinated national branches. In order to come to a thesis regarding the Dutch branch (Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands) and the English branch (Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain) it is important to first give an understanding of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Therefor I shall discuss the live of Al-Nabhani, the founder of the Hizb ut- Tahrir; the history of the movement; the ideology of the movement and the structure of the movement in the first chapter. Furthermore in this chapter I shall analyse if Hizb ut-Tahrir has to be considered non-violent. The second chapter forms an account of Hizb ut-Tahir Netherlands and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, in which I will discuss the number of members, the background of these members and how Hizb ut-Tahrir is confronted by policies of the English and Dutch authorities. Furthermore I shall give an interpretation and explanation of the similarities and differences encountered. The third chapter forms a comparative analysis of the online activities of the Dutch and the British branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the online media strategy of both branches. In this last chapter I will compare and analyse texts and articles that are on the respective websites of the Hizb ut-Tahir Netherlands and Hizb ut- Tahrir Britain. For my research I relied on various earlier studies on Hizb ut-Tahrir on which I will now first give a small overview. I will not discuss all articles used for my paper but limit the overview to the articles I deem most useful and informative. Probably the most well known researcher on Hizb ut-Tahrir is Suha Taji-Farouki. She is affiliated to the University of Exeter where she has a post at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. Taji-Farouki's most important study on Hizb ut-Tahrir is A Fundamental Quest: Hizb Al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (1996). In this work Taji-Farouki as she stated herself 'examined the

history, ideology and organizational structure of the trans-national Islamist party Hizb al- Tahrir.'1 Up to this day A fundamental quest remains the most thorough general survey on Hizb ut-Tahrir and therefor is a very useful source. However as it was published over 15 year ago it gives no insight on more recent developments. A second researcher that has to be mentioned when discussing Hizb ut-Tahrir is Kirstine Sinclair. She is an assistant professor at the Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies and the Department of History of the Syddansk Universitet (University of Southern Denmark). Sinclair has written several research-articles on Hizb ut-Tahrir among which Islam in Britain and Denmark. Deterritorialized Identity and Reterritorialized Agendas (2008) and The Calipate as Homeland. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain (2010). Both articles discuss Hizb ut-Tahrir's activities in the United Kingdom and Denmark and focus on how Hizb ut-Tahrir members in both the United Kingdom identify themselves and what they consider as homeland: are they British/Danish and is the United Kingdom/Denmark their homeland or is it the hypothetical Caliphate?2 Besides the above named articles I have corresponded with Kirstine Sinclair by e-mail in February 2014 to ask her further questions regarding the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir.3 A further article that is of interest is The varied performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Success in Britain and Uzbekistan and stalemate in Egypt and Turkey (2010) that was published in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs. The author of the article is Ihsan Yilmaz. Yilmaz is a professor at the Political Science and Public Administration of the Fatih University. Islamic Movements in general and Hizb ut-Tahrir in specific is part of his research interests.4 In the article Yilmaz describes and explains why Hizb ut-Tahrir thrives, as the title suggests, in Britain and Uzbekistan but is not able to create a solid base of support in Egypt and Turkey. While there is ample research and media coverage of the British branch of Hizb ut- Tahrir, the sources on the Dutch branch are far more limited. The main source on the Dutch branch forms the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). As I do not count the AIVD as an independent source, I have scrutinised the information provided by the service thoroughly. In order to gather further information on Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands and

1 Suha Taji-Farouki, 'Biography', http://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iais/staff/taji-farouki/biography/, last consulted on 14-04-2014. 2 General information on Kirstine Sinclair, http://findresearcher.sdu.dk:8080/portal/en/persons/kirstine- sinclair(146c3251-eb5b-4861-b830-653ef824801a).html, last consulted on 14-04-2014. 3 Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 17-02-2014. See attachments. 4 General information on İhsan Yilmaz, http://iibf.fatih.edu.tr/?cv,9309&language=EN, last consulted on 14-04- 2014.

to verify the information provided by the AIVD I have contacted various Dutch professors, who do research in the field of Islamism or political Islam. Most professors however replied that Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands really has to be considered as a fringe organisation, about which they knew very little, and that they could not further help me. One professor even stated that there are no Dutch experts on Hizb ut-Tahrir at all. The only researcher who has given valuable feedback on my questions regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir is Martijn de Koning, an anthropologist at the Radboud University Nijmegen who does research into amongst others Islamism and who can be regarded as an authority in the field of Salafism and Islamic identity (in the Netherlands). I have interviewed Martijn de Koning at his offices at the Radboud University on February 25th 2014. The account of the interview is in Dutch and can be found in the attachments to this thesis.5 Finally I have interviewed Okay Pala a man of around forty years who has a Turkish background but fluently and eloquently speaks Dutch and has attended the Islamic University of Rotterdam. Okay Pala is the spokesman of the Dutch branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir and I assume its leader, as I shall discuss later. I met Okay Pala on March 18th 2014 at the central train station of Breda. As he apparently had no office or he did not want to reveal his address to me, the interview took place in the nearby Park Valkenberg.6 Similarly to the interview with Martijn de Koning the account of the interview is in Dutch and can be found in the attachments to this thesis.

5 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments. 6 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments.

1. General overview of Hizb ut-Tahrir

This chapter gives a detailed background of Hizb ut-Tahrir. As stated in the introduction this is necessary in order to better understand the two more analytical chapters that follow. The most important source about the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir is the earlier mentioned A Fundamental Quest: Hizb Al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (1996) written by Suha Taji-Farouki. Almost all later articles that discuss the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir refer to A Fundamental Quest. The first paragraph will elaborate on the life of Al-Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the establishment of the movement. In the second paragraph I will give a short survey on the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the method in which the movement wants to implement its ideology. Finally the last paragraph of this chapter will elaborate on the structure of the movement.

1.1 Al-Nabhani and the founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir Taqi al-Dun Al-Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir, was born in 1909 in Northern Palestine, 'into a family distinguished by its tradition of scholarship in the Islamic sciences'.7 Through his family he became acquainted with Islamic jurisprudence and local politics. He further increased his knowledge of Islam and Islamic law when he attended al-Azhar University in 1928. Al-Azhar, which is located at Cairo, is the best renowned centre for Islamic learning. After graduating from al-Azhar, al-Nabhani returned to Palestine, that in 1920 had become a British mandate. He became a teacher in Haifa but developed an aspiration for a career at the Islamic law courts. Thanks to the contacts he made during his study at al-Azhar he was appointed as a clerk at an Islamic court in 1938. In the years following he rose through the ranks and became a judge of the Islamic Court of Jerusalem in 1948 and thereupon at the Palestine Court of Appeals. During his years in Jerusalem, al-Nabhani became increasingly politically active. This was driven by his resentment over the British administration over Palestine and the policy of King Abdallah. Besides the situation in Palestine al-Nabhani had a larger quarrel with what he understood as the corruption and decline of the Muslim world in total. In his eyes this was caused by the non-Islamic way in which the Muslims lived.8

7 Suha Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest. Hizb al-Tahrir and the search for the Islamic Caliphate, London: 1996, 1. 8 ibidem, 2-3.

The founding of Hizb ut-Tahrir by al-Nabhani must further be understood in the light of the decolonisation of the Middle East, the foundation of Israel and the subsequent Arab– Israeli War. Additionally the newly formed Arab states were internally weak as their leaders had little legitimacy. This was partly due to the fact that they were chosen by the French and the British, and in the eyes of the population continued to serve the causes of these former colonisers. Additionally the Arab states had 'weak state structures, a lack of industrialisation, large scale peasantry, and impoverished societies with artificial identities.'9 This period brought forward the secular Arab nationalism of the Ba'ath movement. This Arab nationalist movement called for the unification of the Arab world and had a socialist anti-imperialist program, which was to bring a common identity, economical success and a renewed Arab heyday. Al-Nabhani initially was involved with the Ba'ath movement and even had part of a failed coup plot by the Jordanian Ba'ath Party to replace King Abdallah in 1948-1949. Al-Nabhani however became dismayed as Ba'ath in essence was a secular movement and he deemed that Islam should be at the centre of the ideological and political system. Furthermore Ba'ath did not bring the prosperity promised. Instead the movement brought new repressive and corrupt regimes to the Arab world and further economical stagnation.10 Disillusioned with Arab nationalism and the Ba'ath movement, al-Nabhani pursued the establishment of an Islamic political party with as goal 'Arab unification based on Islam as opposed to the secular ideology of pan-Arabism'.11 In November 1952, together with two acquaintances he applied to the provincial governor of Amman for permission to establish the political party Hizb ut-Tahrir in Jordan. The application was rejected however, as in the view of the regime the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir was incompatible with the country's constitution and 'a potential cause of civil strife'.12 Consequently al-Nabhani and his associates informed the governor of Jeruzalem of the group's intention to form an association in the West Bank. This move displeased the Jordanian regime, as it was not able to block the group from registering as an association. The reaction of the regime that followed was harsh: al-Nabhani and his fellow founding members were imprisoned for a short term on the charge of bypassing the law and the movement was

9 Frank Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir. A threat behind a legal facade?, Monterey: 2006, 13. 10 Frank Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir. 13-14; Malik Mufti, Sovereign creations. Pan-Arabism and political order in Syria and Iraq, New York: 1996, 47-49 and 110-129 11 Houriya Ahmed and Hannah Stuart, Profile: Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK, 2010, 143. 12 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 6-7.

banned from holding speeches in Mosques and distributing leaflets. Due to these severe measures the movement leadership relocated to Lebanon.13 In the late 1950s and early 1960 Hizb ut-Tahrir successfully expanded its activities in the neighbouring countries. Al-Nabhani travelled around in the Middle East and new branches were set up in Syria and Iraq. In Jordan and the West Bank, despite the repressive measures taken against it, the movement was able to hold study circles, expand its cadres and win popular support. The apparent success led Hizb ut-Tahrir to optimistically strive for it goals more aggressively in the second half of the 1960s. As the movement had obtained wide support, at least in Jordan, the leadership ought the time right to achieve its final goal of installing the Caliphate there. The foreseen means of achieving this goal was the staging of a coup and in the late 1960s and early 1970s Hizb ut-Tahrir is said to have had a leading role in various unsuccessful coups in Jordan and later Iraq.14 Following this series of unsuccessful coups Hizb ut-Tahrir 'went into a phase of stagnation in the Middle East'.15 In 1977 al-Nabhani passed away. He was succeeded by 'Abd al Qadim Zallum as supreme leader or Amir of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Qadim Zallum was born in 1924 Palestine and like Al-Nabhani he followed part of his education at al-Azhar. Under the leadership of Qadim Zallum the movement in 1979 sent various delegations to the Islamic Republic of Iran to advise Ayatollah Khomeini how 'to apply Islam in its entirety'.16 As Hizb ut-Tahrir its goal is to establish a Khilafa in which Sunni and Shia are to co-exist the attempt to come to an understanding with Shia Iran is less surprisingly than it may appear. However despite the overtures Khomeini passed over their advice and as a consequence Hizb ut-Tahrir became disenchanted with him and the Iranian regime.17 The decades that followed have formed a stalemate in the movement's progression in the Middle East. In general it can be said that Hizb ut-Tahrir since its founding in the early 1950's has neither been able to develop a broad and solid enough support base in the Middle East nor has the movement been able to fulfil its ideal of establishing the Caliphate, this despite the wide popularity the movement enjoyed in Jordan. Where the movement progress stalemated in the Middle East it did successfully spread its message to a nearly global extent. Western Europe has proven to be a haven for Hizb ut-Tahrir, as for many other Islamist groups. Where the movement has to deal with strong repression in large parts of the

13 Ibidem, 7. 14 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 26-28. 15 Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 15. 16 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 31. 17 Ibidem.

Middle East, South- and Central- Asia and Russia, it can spread its message relatively undisturbed in countries as the United Kingdom, Poland, Denmark and The Netherlands. Germany forms an exception; the movement is prohibited to organize public activities there since 2003, 'on charges of spreading antisemitic propaganda following the publication of a leaflet the previous year'18, on which in Germany penalties remain rigorous.19

1.2. Ideology As stated before the main goal of Hizb ut-Tahrir is resuming the Islamic way of live by establishing a Caliphate. In order to achieve this the Western influences, that according to al- Nabhani have corrupted the minds of the Muslims and made them mentally sluggish, have to be challenged and suppressed. In essence Hizb ut-Tahrir calls for an ideological struggle. This struggle is between Islam on the one side, which al-Nabhani deems the superior system, and imperialistic democratic capitalism on the other. The movement has a variety of books and reports in which it elaborates on its ideology. At the core are the texts written by al-Nabhani himself, but since his passing away his direct successors and other members of Hizb ut-Tahrir have propagated additional texts. Based on several of the texts that are available on the various websites of Hizb ut-Tahrir I will give an overview of the movements ideology. According to one of the new texts of Hizb ut-Tahrir, of which the author is not named, the Muslim lands (states with a Muslims majority) are in quarrel and stagnating. In order to turn this around the movement argues that a Khilafah (caliphate), comprising all the Muslim lands has to be established. This caliphate should be ruled by Sharia-law under a Khalifa (caliph). What is remarkable and where Hizb ut-Tahrir differentiates form many other fundamentalist movements is that according to Hizb ut-Tahrir sources the movement envisions a Caliphate in which no distinction is made between Sunni and Shia.20 This however does not count for for example Alawis, as Hizb ut-Tahrir does not deem Alawis to be Muslims (this is of special interest in the light of the civil war in Syria and that Al-Sad is a Alawi).21

18Ian Cobain, 'Islamist group challenges Berlin's five-year ban in European court', http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/24/islam.religion, last consulted on 04-05-2014. 19 Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest, 170; Houriya Ahmed en Hannah Stuart, 'Proﬁle: Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK', Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 143-172, there 147. 20 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for change, London: 1999, 4-6. Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, The Islamic State, London: Al-Khilafah Publications 1998, 136–137. 21 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments.

In Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. Evaluating the threat posed by a radical Islamic group that remains nonviolent (2006) E. Karagiannis and C. McCauley confirm that Hizb ut-Tahrir officially does not differentiate between Sunni and Shia yet in spite of this Hizb ut-Tahrir is nearly exclusively a Sunni movement.22 Regarding this matter I asked both Martijn de Koning and Okay Pala, the spokesperson and I presume the leader of Hizb ut Tahrir Netherlands, how the current tension between Sunni and Shia should be understood. According to Martijn de Koning Hizb ut-Tahrir in practice is exclusively a Sunni movement. He however underlines that in contrast to other radical movements that are exclusively Sunni Hizb ut-Tahrir does not spread anti-Shia propaganda.23 According to Okay Pala the current tension between Sunni and Shia is mostly a representation by the West and Western media with as goal to undermine the establishment of the Khilafa and the unification of all Muslims.24 Hizb ut-Tahrir regards the current leaders of the Muslim lands as mere puppets of The United States and the "West", which have an imperialist program to suppress Islam. The underlying reason for this, according to the movement, is that the West fears Islam because it knows that Islam is a superior system and ideology and it will therefor prevail in the end. In its texts Hizb ut-Tahrir states that all the Muslim lands have Kufr (disbelief) systems, even though some laws are based on Islam. This is because the security in the Muslim lands is not maintained by the Aman (security) of Islam. So even though they are Muslim lands and their inhabitants are Muslims they are Dar ul-Kufr (land of disbelief) instead of Dar ul-Islam (land of Islam).25 The movement sees Islam as the only correct religion and ideology. It therefore considers other religions 'like Judaism, Christianity' and other ideologies like 'Communism, Socialism and Capitalism' as Kufr religions and Kufr ideologies'.26 Democracy is seen as Kufr as well because democracy is ruling of the people by the people, there where according to Hizb ut-Tahrir ruling should be by the mandate of Allah.27 Besides the fact that Hizb ut-Tahir considers democracy to be Kufr it also argues that democracy has no actual reality because in reality it is a small 'group of influential people' who are actually ruling in the West.28

22 Emmanuel Karagiannis and Clark McCauley, 'Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami. Evaluating the threat posed by a radical Islamic group that remains nonviolent.', Terrorism and political violence, 2 (2006), 317-318. 23 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments 24 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments. 25 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The methodology, 5-6. 26 Ibidem, 30. 27 Hizb ut-Tahrir, The campaign to surpress Islam, London: 1995, 16; Abdul Qadeem Zalloom, Democracy is a system of Kufr. It is forbidden to adopt, implement or call for it, 2nd edition London: 1995, 1-7 28 Hizb ut -Tahrir, The Campaign to surpress Islam,16-17.

An essential point regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology is whether it has to be regarded as violent or non-violent. The movement currently is not banned in most of Europe because it is regarded non-violent. However the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir prescribes the establishment of a caliphate ruled by sharia law. According to Taji-Farouki Hizb ut-Tahrir therefor in the final phase intends to overthrow the governments of the Muslim states either by civil disobedience, a procession to the seat of government or a military coup executed by 'forces that have agreed to hand over power to the movement.'29 So in the final phase Hizb ut-Tahrir approves violence in order to establish the Khilafa. The movement states however that even though it approves violence in this stage it is not the movement itself that will take a violent action. After achieving the establishment of the Khilafa the assumption regarding the non- violent ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir becomes even more ambiguous. According to the movement apostates of Islam and persons practicing homosexuality should be killed based on sharia-law. Additionally the established caliphal state has to be considered expansionist on a global scale as according to Hizb ut-Tahrir:

'[a]ll the countries of the world, in the East or the West are considered Dar al-Kufr and potentially Dar al-Harb (land of war), and the relationship with them is a part of the foreign policy, and this relationship is defined by the demands of jihad and the interest of Muslims and the Khilafah State according to the divine law'.30

Where according to Hizb ut-Tahrir treaties with non-Muslim states are allowed by Islam, an important condition is that these treaties always last a predetermined and limited period according to the demands of Jihad. No such treaties or even cease-fires can be entered into with Israel, because Israel occupies Muslim lands. The caliphate is therefor to wage war against Israel because according to the movement's ideology, Islam 'makes it imperative upon all Muslims to engage her (Israel) in war and exterminate such a state and free the Muslim lands from her'.31 However once again Hizb ut-Tahrir states that it will not act violent itself. The monopoly of violence will lay with the caliphate. However after the establishment of the caliphate, the role of Hizb ut-Tahrir will be to ensure that the caliph will rule by the Sharia or more accurate by Hizb ut-Tahrir its interpretation of the Sharia. So where the monopoly of

29 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest 104. 30 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 38. 31 Ibidem, 38.

violence lays at the caliphate, the caliph is to act violent according to the ideology of Hizb ut- Tahrir or to be removed by the movement, as he does not rule by divine law. What may seem remarkable is that Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology does not exclude other political parties after the caliphate is established; the foreseen caliphate is not to be a single- party state. However according to Hizb ut-Tahrir: 'Islam prohibits the existence of non- Islamic political parties and blocs that are founded on a basis that contradicts Islam, and it allows the existence of parties and blocs within the boundaries of Islam.'32 So where in theory other parties are allowed, in practice only parties with a program non-divergent to Hizb ut- Tahrir's ideology are allowed to exist in the caliphate. In conclusion it can be stated that the movement currently does not act violently, yet it does call up for violence. If Hizb ut-Tahrir will achieve its object of establishing a caliphate, this will change. Even though the movement states that it remains non-violent, this is difficult to belief. To start the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir calls up for violence by inciting for war with the West and Israel and the killing of for example apostates and homosexuals. That Hizb ut- Tahrir points out that it is not the movement but the caliphal state that that is to commit the acts of violence I consider merely as a false distinction, especially as if the ruler will not commit the violence Hizb ut-Tahrir is propagating, the movement will remove him from office as he does not rule by the movement's interpretation of the Sharia.

1.3 Party structure Recent works on Hizb ut-Tahrir that deal with the internal structure of the movement are for the main part based on research done by Taji-Farouki for A fundamental quest. This book however was published in 1996 and the sources Taji-Farouki based her research on are for the large part even (considerably) older. Furthermore what is known about the party structure at a local level is mainly based on how the movement is structured in the Middle East, an area where the movement has to deal with repressive regimes, this in contrast to the relative freedom it has in the West. As said what we know about the structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir is based mainly on findings by Taji-Farouki. According to Taji-Farouki the movement is rigidly organised. She states that the organization is to a large part modelled to the mass nationalist parties 'that had emerged in the Arab East from the 1930s' and similarly has a pyramidal structure.33 The centralised leadership committee forms the top it instructs and appoints the lower provincial

32 Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, Concepts of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, 1953, 65. 33 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest 114.

committees. Subordinate to these provincial committees are the local committees, which on their turn are appointed and instructed by the provincial committees. The unit of the province in general corresponds with individual nation states. Next to the local committees are the study-circles, which are not administrative organs as the committees, but rather a party activity. The communication between the various committees is arranged vertically, instructions are given top down and regular reports by the lower committees are transferred upward. Between the committees on the same level there are no direct links.34 The Amir heads the general centralised leadership. Al-Nabhani himself was the first Amir and as stated before he was succeeded by 'Abd al Qadim Zallum. 'Abd al Qadim Zallum laid down his position in 2003, only a few weeks before he died. He was on his turn succeeded by Ata Abu Rashta, a civil engineer, who previously was the spokesman of the Jordan branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir.35 Hizb ut-Tahrir makes various requirements before a person qualifies for membership. A first requirement is that a person should be at least 15 years old. Furthermore the movement only accepts Muslims, who are not part of an organisation that is in contradiction to Hizb ut- Tahrir's interpretation of Islam. Furthermore certain mental 'fitness' is required. Aspiring members start as novices and membership is only obtained after they convey the party ideology as if their own (own deviating opinions are allowed, but are to be kept to oneself). This period of transformation may require several years of indoctrination.36 After a novice is regarded fit to become a member he/she is to be swear the following party oath before a local committee leader:

'I swear by God Almighty to be loyal to Islam and to defend it, to embrace Hizb al-Tahrir's opinions and constitutions, to have confidence in its leadership, and to implement its resolutions even if they are contrary to my own opinion, as long as I remain a member. In all this I place my trust in God.'37

Membership is not reserved to men only; women are allowed to join Hizb ut-Tahrir as well. However there are some conditions to women members. For example the women are not to attend the same study-circles as the men but have separate study-circles. Additionally the

34 Ibidem, 114-115; Schneider, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 39 35 Zeyno Baran, 'Fighting the war of ideas', Foreign Affairs, 6 (2005), 71. 36 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 132-133. 37 Ibidem, 133-134.

women study-circles are to be 'supervised by either their husbands, relatives who they cannot marry or by other women'.38 The study-circles form the fundamental unit of party organisation and consist of a small number of party members and new recruits. The purpose of the study-circle is the intensive study of the party ideology under the supervision of a knowledgeable and veteran member. The circles are rather loosely defined. For example a party member can attend several circles and supervise the one and be a student in the other. Besides the role of supervisor there are generally no other functions. Membership of a study-circle is crucial for members and novices. The supervisors are expected to hold the study-circles regularly and to strive for discipline from the circle members. Members and novices that are repeatedly late or whose attendance is irregular are warned and can eventually be removed from the party. 39 During the study-circles, which are held weekly, the party ideology is studied.40 The party ideology for the main parts exists of texts by al-Nabhani. The supervisor selects further material he deems appropriate for the level of the study-circle. The procedures during a study- circle are regulated by strict instructions. The supervisor reads aloud a short section. The meaning of this passage is discussed and the supervisor answers questions that arise. The aim of the study-circles is to indoctrinate the circle members with predefined ideas, rather than actual open discussion and the development of independent thought. The atmosphere during the study-circles is serious; 'There is no joking or chatting'. Being supervisor is deemed a grave responsibility and the mentality and competence of an individual must be evident. The supervisors are required to rigorously study the party programme and Islamic literature. Furthermore they are expected to be informed of current political events.41 Even though Hizb ut-Tahrir cautions against selecting persons on educational level or social status, most recruits are relatively well educated. This is because according to Hizb ut- Tahrir understanding its ideology requires a good an active mind. Supervisors in general only invite people who respond positively to the party's message to the study-circle. The emphasis on caution by the central leadership is linked to the situation of repression the Hizb ut-Tahrir encounters in the Middle East. This repression can partly be understood by the coups in which the movement is said to have participated. It appears that in Europe where the Hizb ut-Tahrir is under less or no scrutiny by the authorities, its policies are more open. In the UK for

38 Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hizb ut-Tahrir, 11. 39 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest 125. 40 Ibidem, 125-128. 41 Ibidem, 125-128.

example individuals are admitted to study-circles on request.42 What further underlies the assumption that the European branches are more open is the large meetings and demonstrations that the movement organizes in the UK and other Western European countries. During these large meetings members of various study-circles meet, this is contradictory to the strict cell-structure the movement adopts in the Middle East.

1.4 Conclusion Based on my research on the history, the ideology and the party structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir I came to some key arguments. To start the presumed non-violent character of the movement has to be considered as a facade; Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology is violent and even the statement that the movement is currently is non-violent is debatable based on her virulent expressions. As stated above if the movement is ever to rise to power in the Middle East and to establish a caliphate, this caliphate will be violent both internally and externally. I further want to argue that Hizb ut-Tahrir can be seen as an avant-gardist movement. The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir regard themselves as an elite. The movement exist of small cells that are to influence the mass. A final argument I want to make is regarding the party structure. As stated the movement has a pyramidal structure. The supreme leader or Amir together with the centralised leadership committee forms the top. Underneath it there are various lower committees. Based on this structure a rigid and centralised organisation could be expected. To what extent this is the case I will give answer based on the following chapters that form a case study into the Dutch and the English branch.

42 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 128.

2. Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

This chapter discusses several aspects of the English and the Dutch branches of Hizb ut- Tahrir. The first two paragraphs give a general overview of respectively the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Dutch branch. In these paragraphs I will give an account on the number of members, the background of these members and on how Hizb ut-Tahrir is confronted by policies of the English and Dutch authorities. The following part of the chapter forms a comparative analysis. In this part I will first overview the similarities and differences between the Dutch and the English branch. Subsequently, and this is the essence of the chapter, I shall give an interpretation and explanation of these similarities and differences.

2.1 Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom The English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was founded in the early 80s. The initial success of the movement was rather limited and so was its outreach. This changed in 1986 when Omar Bakri Muhammad, who was expelled from Saudi Arabia, joined the English branch and became its local Amir. Under Bakri's inspired leadership Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain became more active and its number of members increased. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain transformed from a waning movement to one of the largest Islamist organization in Britain. Under Bakri's leadership however the English branch adopted rather extremist views. The most striking example hereof was made during the height of the First Gulf War (1990- 1991), which was a reaction to the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Bakri fiercely opposed the intervention that was led by the United States and backed by among others the United Kingdom. Because of this English support in the Gulf War, he is said to have uttered a death threat against than Prime Minister John Mayor in February of 1991. In an interview of the Daily Star Bakri was cited:

'Major is a legitimate target. If anyone gets the opportunity to assassinate him, I don't think they should save it. He is the head of a state which has declared war against Islam and our God says fight those who fight you. It is our Islamic duty and we will celebrate his death. I pray to God for someone to kill him.'43

Following the statement, several Members of Parliament demanded Bakri's arrest for

43 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 181.

incitement to murder. Bakri, who has been arrested several times, was indeed shortly detained on this occasion but after 48 hours he was released without being charged. There are two accounts on why no charge was brought against Bakri. The first account states that this was because of an intervention by moderate Muslim leaders, who thought that imprisoning Bakri would only further lead to further radicalization of the Muslim youth.44 According to the second statement however Bakri was released because during the interrogations he claimed that he was cited wrongly.45 In 1996 Bakri and the central leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir came to a conflict and Bakri left the movement and continued with an own organization Al-Muhajiroun. The exact circumstances of Bakri departure from Hizb ut-Tahrir are not clear, as also on this topic there are divergent reports. Bakri himself stated in an interview in 2004 that he 'resigned on 16 January 1996 in response to a violation of Islamic rules by the worldwide Amir [being: Ata Abu Rashta] of Hizb-ut-Tahrir.'46 In the same interview Bakri elaborates on the reasons for him leaving by stating that:

'The real dispute was over the methodology to establish the Khilafah, they did not like me attacking man-made laws here in the UK, and they did not like the fact that I was condemning the policy of John Major and the English government.'47

Whereas according to Bakri he left the Hizb ut-Tahrir, other sources state that he was expelled. In a press release of August 9th 2005 Hizb ut-Tahrir states that Bakri 'was expelled from the party in 1996 and has had no relationship whatsoever with the party for over 9 years.48 Various (former) Hizb ut-Tahrir members corroborate this statement. In an interview with Kirstine Sinclair of 2003 the Amir of the British branch Jalaluddin Patel and the branch its spokesperson Imran Waheed 'hinted that it was Bakri’s infamous demand that the English Queen should convert to Islam that decided the matter.'49 Furthermore in the interview I had with Okay Pala, the spokesperson of the Dutch branch, he also stated that Bakri was expelled

44 Ibidem. 45'Report on Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed', http://artsweb.bham.ac.uk/bmms/sampleissue_Jan2001.asp, last consulted on 02-04-2014; R. Israeli, Islamikaze. Manifestations of Islamic Martyrdom, London: 2003, 194. 46 Mahan Abedin, 'Al-Muhajiroun in the UK: An Interview with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed', http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=290, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 47 Ibidem. 48 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 'Omar Bakri was not the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir', http://www.hizb.org.uk/press- releases/omar-bakri-was-not-the-founder-of-hizb-ut-tahrir, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 49 Kirstine Sinclair, 'The Caliphate as Homeland. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain', 2010, 183. available on http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/0/D/1/%7B0D1B4B59-9755-44EB-887E- 90595D8D461D%7DKirstine%20Sinclair%20ph%20d%20afhandling.pdf.

from Hizb ut-Tahrir, adding to this that a vain man as Bakri would not admit that he was expelled.50

Number of Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain Hizb ut-Tahrir does not give an account of its number of members. Sinclair endorses this by stating that '[n]o branch will ever provide general membership information or numbers.'51 This makes it difficult to make a statement on how many members the movement has in the UK. Several researchers came with diverging accounts, which will form a starting point for my account. Sinclair stated in 2008 that the movement had between 500-1.000 members in Britain and had held gatherings which attracted over 10.000 people.52 Problematic about this first estimation of Sinclair is that she does not give any explanation how she comes to it. In her PhD dissertation of 2010 Sinclair comes with another estimation, which 'is based on conversations with former members.' She estimates that the movement then had approximately 1.000-1.500 members in Britain.53 This increase can be explained in several ways: either Hizb ut-Tahrir has increased its number of members, or Sinclair came to new insights that led to a more accurate estimation. In their article The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood (2007), Robert S. Leiken and Steve Brooke state that a former Hizb ut-Tahrir member they had interviewed stated that the movement 'dominates the English scene' and that he estimated that the movement had around 8.500 members in the UK.54 However Leiken and Brooke do not give an evaluation on this statement by the former Hizb ut-Tahrir member they interviewed, so it is not clear if they mark this as an accurate estimation. Except for the above named researchers, several journalists have made estimations on the support base of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain. One of these estimations was given in several newspapers after a renewed bid by the English government to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir in the aftermath of the murder of the English soldier Lee Rigby by a radical Muslim of May 22th,

50 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments. 51 Ibidem, 124. 52 Kirstine Sinclair, 'Islam in Britain and Denmark. Deterritorialized identity and reterritorialized agendas', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 1 (2008), 47. 53 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 77 and 185. 54 Robert S. Leiken and Steve Brooke, 'The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood', Foreign Affairs, 2 (2007), 120.

2013. According to this estimation the movement is 'believed to have several thousand members in Britain.'55 Contrary to the researchers above, who do not mention any decline in members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain in their papers, a spokesperson of the anti-radicalism think tank Quilliam Foundation stated in an interview with The Guardian, of July 2011, that in the past few years Hizb ut-Tahrir is strongly in decline and its influence is on the wane.56 This statement however should be viewed with the background of the Quilliam Foundation in mind. The Quilliam Foundation was founded in 2008, by Maajid Nawaz, Rashad Zaman Ali and Ed Husain, all former Hizb ut-Tahrir members. The latter is the writer of the bestseller The Islamist. Why I joined radical Islam in Britain, what I saw inside and why I left. (2007). In the novel, which is autobiographic, Husain describes how he became a radical Muslim and joined Hizb ut-Tahrir and later left Hizb ut-Tahrir and became a practitioner of Sufism. Many of the other foundation's staff members and researchers have also been members of radical Islamist groups. The foundation states about itself that its aim is:

'to generate creative, informed and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.'57

The foundation is somewhat controversial, mostly because of a confidential briefing paper it composed for the English Office for Security and Counter Terrorism that was leaked. This briefing paper titled Preventing Terrorism - Where Next for Britain (2010), was controversial as it contained a blacklist of organizations and persons the Quilliam foundation alleged to be extremist sympathizers.58

55 Alan Travis, 'Theresa May considers 'second-tier' banning orders', http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2013/jul/16/theresa-may-second-tier-banning-order, published on July 16th 2013, last consulted on 02-04- 2014; Nigel Morris, ' Government in fresh bid to outlaw hardline Islamists', http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/government-in-fresh-bid-to-outlaw-hardline-islamists- 8706589.html, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 56 Shiv Malik, 'Watchdog recommends Tory U-turn on banning Hizb ut-Tahrir', http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/18/watchdog-tory-uturn-hizb-ut-tahrir-ban, last consulted on 02- 04-2014. 57 Quilliam Foundation, 'About us', http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/about/, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 58 Vikram Dodd, 'List sent to terror chief aligns peaceful Muslim groups with terrorist ideology',http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/aug/04/quilliam-foundation-list-alleged-extremism, last consulted on 02-04-2014; Duncan Gardham,'Mainstream Islamic organisations 'share al-Qaeda ideology', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/7928377/Mainstream-Islamic-organisations-share-al-Qaeda- ideology.html, last consulted on 02-04-2014.

Furthermore in the paper the Quilliam Foundation criticized the 'Prevent' Strategy. This program of the then sitting Labour government entailed reaching out to non-violent though radical Islamic groups in order to prevent terrorism. The Quilliam Foundation disagreed with this strategy as '[t]he ideology of non-violent Islamists is broadly the same as that of violent Islamists; they disagree only on tactics.'59 Looking on the statement by The Quilliam Foundation it should be kept in mind that it is an anti-radical think-tank and has repeatedly stated its aim is to counteract groups as Hizb ut-Tahrir. The statement on the decline of Hizb ut-Tahrir could therefor be seen as boosting its own success-story. However after contacting Ms. Sinclair by e-mail and interviewing Martijn de Koning on the statement by the Quillian Foundation, it appears that the statement is valid at least to a certain extent.60 Sinclair stated that she agrees with the Quilliam foundation that the influence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom in specific and in Europe in general is in decline. She argues there are various reasons why Hizb ut-Tahrir is struggling. She first mentions the stricter legislation throughout Europe. Furthermore she stated that 'The Arab Spring' has proved difficult for Hizb ut-Tahrir to explain. How is the movement 'to maintain that what the Arab populations really want is a Caliphate', when in Syria various Muslim branches are fighting each other in a brutal civil war and in Egypt the support for the Muslim Brotherhood has waned and the military dictatorship appears to be stronger than before.61 The second argument however is in a retrospective view as when in 2011 the report by the Quilliam foundation was published the Muslim Brotherhood was still flourishing in Egypt and the insurgence in Syria had not yet become a cruel sectarian civil war. During my interview with Martijn de Koning he stated that he partly agrees. He argues that Hizb ut-Tahrir has lost some influence since its heydays in the 90s. However he underlined that Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain still has a strong core of members and remains very active at various universities in the UK. He further stated that Hizb ut-Tahrir has been surpassed in its outreach by Salafi movements, adding to this that the competition between the various radical Islamic movements in the UK is much stronger than in the Netherlands.62 Concluding it can be said that it has proven to be very difficult to give anything more than a rough estimate on the number of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain as the accounts strongly

59 Quilliam Foundation, Preventing Terrorism. Where Next for Britain, London 2010, 56. 60 Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 17-02-2014. See attachments; Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments. 61 Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 17-02-2014. See attachments. 62 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments.

diverge. However as Sinclair her estimation is (partly) based on interviews with former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and her research is the most thorough and relatively recent, I expect her estimation to be the most adequate and therefor assume the number of members to be around 1500. We should keep in mind however that besides the actual members there is a significant group of people supporting Hizb ut-Tahrir but who have not obtained member status yet. The overall outreach of the English branch therefor exceeds the number of members.

Background and status of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain In most research literature and media articles on Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain a fairly common view emerges on the general origin and background of its members. Even though in broad lines the views of the various researchers correspond with each other some dissimilarities are to be distinguished. In A Fundamental Quest Taji-Farouki states that the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir was established in the early 1980s, 'when a handful of experienced activists came to live and work in the country, having been forced to leave various parts of the Arab world as the result of their activities.' She further argues that where Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain initially was mainly focused on Arabs, temporarily living in the United Kingdom: 'for example students and visiting professionals.' 63 The movement at that time tried to recruit activists that after returning to their home country could disseminate the party's propaganda.64 During the 80s recruitment of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain gradually shifted to other nationalities such as Turks, Somalis and Pakistanis.65 On the reason of this shift Taji-Farouki does not elaborate, but she does state that the newfound recruitment pool existed mainly out of 'second-generation English-born Muslims whose immigrant parents had settled permanently in Britain.' 66 Recapitulating briefly it appears that Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain expanded its recruitment from solely temporarily staying Arabs to English born Muslims from a variety of backgrounds. A second shift in the recruitment policy can be distinguished in the 90s as the youth of Britain's large South Asian community proved to be an increasingly fertile breeding ground for the movement's ideology. Since then the majority of the Hizb ut-Tahrir followers in the United Kingdom are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. This further change of its

63 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 171. 64 Ibidem. 65 Ibidem. 66 Ibidem.

recruitment pool proved to be successful as Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain expanded further in the late 80s and early 90s. Similarly to Taji-Farouki in 1996, Kirstine Sinclair in 2008 and 2010 argued that the majority of Hizb ut-Tahrir's English branch are from South Asian, mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, origin. She explains this statement by pointing out that the majority of the Muslims in the United Kingdom are of South Asian decent. The background for this forms the colonial history of the United Kingdom, which has led to various major influxes of immigrants from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh.67 As stated in the previous chapter membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir is not confined to men, as women can be members of Hizb ut-Tahrir as well. Only Sinclair discusses the woman groups of the UK branch to a certain extent in The Caliphate as Homeland: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain (2010). What becomes clear is that the English branch of the movement has women's section and even a women's media representative.68 Robert S. Leiken and Steve Brooke in 2007 also corroborated that in the United Kingdom Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters are mainly young Southeast Asian Muslims. Interesting about Leikens and Brook's article is that it compares the backing of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain with that of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United Kingdom. Leiken and Brooke state that '[t]he contest between MAB [Muslim Association of Britain, the largest Brotherhood-linked organization in the United Kingdom] and HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir] roughly follows ethnic and generational lines: young Muslims of Pakistani descent are heavily represented in HT, whereas the older and fewer Muslims of Arab descent join MAB.'69 The article further states a full step further than the radical but 'formally non-violent" Hizb ut-Tahrir are the various Jihadi groups who according to the a assessment of the English internal security chief's numbers '[s]ome 200 groupings or networks, totalling over 1,600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas.'70 However as became clear after interviewing Martijn de Koning, Leiken and Brooke leave out the group that has taken over the dominance in the scene of radical Islam in the UK: the Salafi movement. Presumably Leiken and Brooke left out the Salafi movement as contrary to Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood it is not a clearly distinct and strict organization but more a puritanical tendency within Sunni Islam of

67 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 7 and 190. 68 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 57. 69Leiken, Robert S and Steve Brooke, The moderate Muslim Brotherhood, 120. 70 Ibidem.

loosely cooperating individuals and groups. Even though a part of the salafi movement exists of Jihadi groups, the majority of this radical group is non-violent.71 Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the Hizb ut-Tahrir members in the United Kingdom are from South-Asian descent, Hizb ut-Tahrir also attracts members of other origins. An interesting case form converts to Islam. According to Sinclair Hizb ut-Tahrir 'has a special interest in converts.' She came to this conclusion through interviews she has had with former members who are converts. The background of this special interest in coverts is because Hizb ut-Tahrir-ideology states:

'that people born in Muslim families are expected not to take residence in the West permanently, hence individuals of Western and non-Muslim origin are the only Muslims expected to stay in the West permanently and therefore of special interest to the party’s spreading of the message in non-Muslim countries.'72

The argument by Sinclair that Hizb ut-Tahrir expects Muslim families not to remain in the West I presume is mainly because Hizb ut-Tahrir argues that they can not live in a Islamic way in the West. Therefor when the caliphate is established they are to move to Caliphate as there they can live by Islamic rules, as Muslims according to Hizb ut-Tahrir should. Why the converts are to remain in the West spreading the Islamic message under non-Islamic conditions remains unclear, but I assume that the convert are to remain in the West to further spread Islam.

While the scholars on Hizb ut-Tahrir appear to be unanimous about the general origin of Hizb ut-Tahrir-members in the United Kingdom, they in majority also agree on the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir-recruits. A first interesting aspect of the recruits of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain forms the fact that the movement since long mostly recruits university students. According to Taji-Farouki Hizb ut-Tahrir is very active at universities and 'the movement has achieved a substantial infiltration of university Islamic societies.'73 According to her this is caused partly due to the feeling of alienation of the young Muslims of Asian origin. The younger generation distances itself 'from the strong ethnic base which

71 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments. 72 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland 74-75. 73 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 176.

characterises the mosque context associated with their parents'74 and are therefor especially susceptible to Hizb ut-Tahrir's interpretation of Islam, which calls for a unified Ummah. Taji- Farouki underlines Hizb ut-Tahrir 'message strikes a chord with the alienation from English society which many young Muslims feel, especially those from areas where racism is growing'.75 Another scholar that discusses the background of English Hizb ut-Tahrir members is Ihsan Yilmaz. In his article The varied performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir he argues that Hizb ut- Tahrir only recruits among the well educated. Yilmaz elaborates on this statement by pointing out that the movement has altered its target group variable times. About this he states:

'HT went someway down recruiting the disenchanted from the streets but has now reverted to recruiting in the universities. HT is not a populist movement like the Brotherhood or other Islamist movements; it is elitist.'76

Besides underlining that Hizb ut-Tahrir mainly targets students, Yilmaz brings forward several other points of interest regarding the background of Hizb ut-Tahrir members. To start he underlines that Hizb ut-Tahrir recruitment efforts benefit from the overall discrimination of Muslims in the UK and most of the rest of Europe. According to Yilmaz Hizb ut-Tahrir is known to target the frustrated youth of second an third generation Muslims who feel discriminated. A further point that attracts the Southeast Asian youth to Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain is the search for identity by the Muslim youth. They feel little for the traditional Islam that their parents avow. Furthermore they have little faith in the alim preaching in local mosques, as these alim are often from the rural areas of Pakistan and have little knowledge of the problems the Muslims youth encounters in modern Britain. So regarding the background of members of the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir two general statements can be made. First that Hizb ut-Tahrir mostly recruits at universities and consequently that most of the English members are highly educated and second that they to a certain extent feel discriminated and isolated. I would argue that the reason why Hizb ut- Tahrir mostly recruits on universities is caused by the avant-gardist tendency of the movement as the Hizb ut-Tahrir sees itself as an intellectual vanguard. It may appear

74 Ibidem. 75 Ibidem. 76 Ihsan Yilmaz, 'The varied performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Success in Britain and Uzbekistan and stalemate in Egypt and Turkey', Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 4 (2010), 509.

contradictory that highly educated Muslims feel discriminated and isolated, as they are successful. However the fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir nearly exclusively focuses on young highly educated Muslims and these highly educated Muslims do encounter discrimination, for example on the jobs market, and to a certain extent do feel isolated, explains why the members of the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir are in general highly educated.

Stance of the English Authorities versus Hizb ut-Tahrir The United Kingdom and especially greater London area are of great importance to Hizb ut- Tahrir. This is as stated in the introduction partly caused by the fact that the party, due to the openness in United Kingdom, has considerable freedom in its actions. This is in contrast to most states in the Middle East where the party has gone underground as it is forbidden, and its members are rounded up and prosecuted. Even though Hizb ut-Tahrir is able to thrive in the United Kingdom it is controversial to say the least. The English branch has come under scrutiny of the authorities various times and there have been several attempts to ban the movement. Some of these instances (for example after the above discussed presumed death threat against Prime Minister John Mayor) stem to when Omar Bakri Muhammad held the leadership of the branch between 1986 and 1996. After Bakri's departure the English branch appears to have somewhat moderated its stances, but the movement remains disputed.77 One of the first times Hizb ut-Tahrir appeared in bad light was around 1993. This was mainly due to its virulent anti-Semitist statements during its campaign against the signing of the accord between Israel en the Palestine Liberation Organization in September of that year. The movement issued leaflets and posters with inflammatory headings such as 'Peace with Israel - A crime against Islam', and called up for a jihad against Jews in Palestine. Due to these and other outbursts the Union of Jewish Students accused Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain of anti- Semitism. Besides anti-Semitic expression the party uttered virulent against homosexuals and Hindus. For example in 1993 in a publication in al-Khilafa, a periodical issued by Hizb ut- Tahrir Britain, Hindus were called 'untamed savages' and homosexuals were demanded death.78 As a result the National Union of Students called for a ban by the government. However the Home Office responded by stating that it was aware of Hizb ut-Tahrir, but that there was no basis to ban it.79 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9-11 Hizb ut-Tahrir and many other Islamist

77 Sinclair, The caliphate as homeland, 82; Suha Taji-Farouki, 'Islamists and the threat of Jihad. Hizb al‐Tahrir and al‐Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews', Middle Eastern Studies, (2000) 30-31. 78 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest, 173. 79 Taji-Farouki, A fundamental quest,175-177.

movements came under renewed scrutiny in Britain. However as Hizb ut-Tahir is considered non-violent it proved difficult to ban it. Nevertheless, according to the BBC and The Guardian then Prime Minister Blair pursued the ban of the movement after the London bombings of July 7th 2005. He discussed the ban with police, counter-terrorism experts and the Home Office. Blair however was persuaded to put his plans on the shelf as he warned that driving the group underground would most likely backfire and obtaining a ban would proof difficult with no proof of violent activities. The experts argued that striving for a ban therefor could serve only as a recruiting agent if the group appealed against the move.'80 In 2004, Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned by the National Union of Students (NUS) from affiliated campuses. This was made possible 'by the policy set by the NUS in 2004 which pledges "no platform" for racist groups, and also includes the English National party.'81 Since 2010 Prime Minister Cameron has been attempting to ban the movement as well. While he was in opposition Cameron upbraided his Labour predecessor Brown as Brown's government did not ban Hizb ut-Tahrir. Cameron found the banning of Hizb ut- Tahrir of such importance that it even was part of the election manifest of the Conservative Party of 2010. This manifest stated that:

'Terrorism remains a major threat to our country and some of the biggest threats to our security do not come from abroad – they are home grown. A Conservative government will ban any organisations which advocate hate or the violent overthrow of our society, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and close down organisations which attempt to fund terrorism from the UK.82

However similarly to Blair in 2005, Cameron's government was forced to back down on his promise to ban Hizb ut-Tahrir. In a report by the counter-terrorism watchdog of 2011 it was stated that 'there were "formidable difficulties" to changing the proscription system, "which appear amply to justify the decision to stick with the status quo".83

80 Jamie Doward and Gaby Hinsliff, 'PM shelves Islamic group ban', http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/24/religion.uk, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 81 Polly Curtis, 'Blair's ban provokes mixed reactions on campus', http://www.theguardian.com/education/2005/aug/08/studentpolitics.students, last consulted on 02-04-2014; Taji- Farouki, A fundamental quest, 175-177. 82 Invitation to join the government of Britain. The Conservative manifesto 2010, 105. 83 Shiv Malik, 'Watchdog recommends Tory U-turn on banning Hizb ut-Tahrir', http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/18/watchdog-tory-uturn-hizb-ut-tahrir-ban

2.2 Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Netherlands It is exactly not clear in which year in the Dutch branch was founded. According to Okay Pala the branch was founded in the late 80s. This makes Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands nearly a decade younger than its English counterpart. The Dutch branch has been a topic of research for The Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). However since 2011 the AIVD has shifted its attention to other even more radical Islamic movements as Behind Bars, Street Dawah and Shariah4Holland.84 Furthermore based on my research I can state that in comparison to the English branch the Dutch branch receives far less media coverage. This is likely as contrary to the English branch it has a relative small outreach. The information available on the Dutch branch is therefor limited. Some of the activities of the Dutch branch do make it to the news. The best known of these activities is probably the campaign of the movement to convince the Muslims living in the Netherlands not to vote during the national election of 2010. This campaign received critique from various other Muslim organizations, such as the Union for Moroccan Mosques in the Netherland, which called upon their congregations to discard the campaign of Hizb ut- Tahrir.85 The leader of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands is probably Okay Pala. This is corroborated by various sources on the Internet that state Okay Pala is the leader and the spokesperson of the Dutch branch.86 On the website of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands however Okay Pala is referred to merely as member representative and during the interview I had with him, he denied to be the leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands. When I subsequently asked him who than is the leader of the Dutch branch he answered that the he did not wish to unveil the leader's identity. In spite of Okay Pala's denial I strongly suspect him to be the leader of the Dutch branch. The reason for this is that he is the sole person representing the branch and he writes nearly all articles for the Dutch website. Furthermore it is Okay Pala who visits conferences of other national Hizb ut-Tahrir branches such as for example one in Jakarta in

84 AIVD, Annual Report 2012, 27. 85 'N.N., Oproep aan moslims: niet stemmen', http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/998676/2010/06/02/Oproep-aan-moslims-niet- stemmen.dhtml, last consulted on 02-04-2014. 86 Joost Niemöller,' Interview Okay Pala: “Kritiek op credo islam wordt niet getolereerd.”, http://joostniemoller.nl/2013/11/interview-okay-pala-kritiek-op-credo-islam-wordt-niet-getolereerd/, last consulted on 04-04-2014; Ben Kok, 'Islamdebat in De Balie, A’dam met Hans Jansen vs Okay Pala (HuT) en Abdul Jabber v.d. Ven', http://tora-yeshua.nl/2013/10/islamdebat-in-de-balie-adam-met-hans-jansen-vs-okay-pala-hut-en-abdul- jabber-v-d-ven/, last consulted on 04-04-2014; N.N., 'Radicale bijeenkomst rustig verlopen', http://www.at5.nl/artikelen/64895/radicaal-islamitische-hizb-ut-tahrir-komt-bijeen, last consulted on 07-05- 2014.

2013.87 This together with the fact that in no other source, including sources denying that Okay Pala is the leader, any other person is named as the local Amir of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands leaves little doubt about whether Okay Pala is indeed the Dutch branch leader.

Number of Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir The Netherlands Similarly to the English branch it is rather difficult to give an account of the number of members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Netherlands, as the movement does not disclose the number of members it has. Only the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has made public reports that give an account of the number of members. For as far they are online available I have used the English translation of the reports, these however are available starting from the annual report of 2007. Earlier reports I have examined therefor are in Dutch. The AIVD has mentioned Hizb ut-Tahrir and its activities in the Netherlands in several of its reports. In the earlier annual reports of 2003 and 2004 the AIVD also made statements on the number of members Hizb ut-Tahrir. According to the service the party then had a couple of dozen members in the Netherlands.88 According to the AIVDs annual report of 2009 Hizb ut-Tahrir is not very successful, however the service perceived it is conceivable that the message of Hizb ut-Tahrir will in term catch on with young Muslims.89 In order to validate these numbers I presented them to various Dutch scholars and to Okay Pala, the spokesperson of the Dutch branch. Even though most scholars I contacted stated that could not really help me, as they knew relatively little about Hizb ut-Tahrir most stated that the Dutch branch is much smaller than the English branch and really is a fringe organization. Martijn de Koning, who I interviewed, confirmed that the movement has a small core of very active supporters and found the account of the AIVD plausible. According to him the outreach of the movement in the Netherlands however is larger as it is able to mobilize crowds for gatherings and events.90 Examples of these events are the Khilafa conferences Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands annually organises at the Rhone-centre, a conference- and party centre at an industrial area in Amsterdam and demonstrations the Dutch branch occasionally holds relating to events in the Middle-East (for example the coup against Morsi in Egypt) but also relating events in Dutch

87 Hizb ut-Tahrir, 'Okay Pala spreekt meer dan 120.000 mensen toe tijdens de Khilafah Conferentie 2013 in Indonesië', http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7Il4SjYCwA, last visited on 09-05-2014. 88 AIVD, Jaarverslag 2003 , 38; AIVD, jaarverslag 2004, 38. 89 AIVD, Annual Report 2009, 20. 90 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments.

society. The events and gatherings of larger crowds are public and open to persons who are not directly related to Hizb ut-Tahrir as well. Contrary to Martijn de Koning, Okay Pala rejected the account by the AIVD. He stated that the number of Dutch members exceeds the couple of dozen the AIVD mentioned. He however did not want to give a statement on the precise number of members and remained somewhat vague about it. To underline his statement Okay Pala pointed out that the last gathering the Dutch branch organized on March 16th, 2014 attracted between 800 and a thousand persons (a number I, based on the photos and films of the event expect to be exaggerated). This however as such forms no precise indication of the number of members the Dutch branch, as there were both members from other branches (for example the English branch) and also persons not being members present. Okay Pala agreed that the Dutch branch is smaller than the English branch pointing out that there is more potential in the United Kingdom as both the overall population and the Muslim community are larger.91 The fact that Hizb ut-Tahrir provides no general membership information or numbers makes it impossible to name an exact number. However as most scholars I contacted stated that the Dutch branch is much smaller than the English and Martijn de Koning found the account of the AIVD plausible it appears not unlikely that Okay Pala overstated the number of members of the Dutch branch. Therefor I argue that the accounts of the AIVD and Martijn de Koning are more plausible.

Background of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands The AIVD has made some short statements on the background of Dutch Hizb ut-Tahrir members in the annual reports that mention the movement. The information provided in most of these reports however is scarce. The 2004 annual report gives the most detailed report of the background of the members of the Dutch branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir. In this report the AIVD asserts that strictly speaking Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a Turkish organization but its followers in the Netherlands are mostly recruited among Turks. Furthermore the AIVD stated that Hizb ut-Tahrir is an international organization and that in each country where it is present Hizb ut-Tahrir adapts to the local circumstances. Because of this Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Netherlands varies from for example the Hizb ut-Tahrir branches in the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark or Uzbekistan. According to the report Hizb ut- Tahrir focuses on the largest group of Muslims in every country, so the English branch target

91 Ibidem.

groups are mainly Pakistani and Bangladeshi whereas in the Netherlands Hizb ut-Tahrir followers are mainly Turkish.92 This however does not mean that the movement excludes Muslims of different origins. Only in the annual report of 2009, the AIVD gives some information on the status and education of Dutch members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. In this report the service states that 'Hizb ut- Tahrir in the Netherlands attempts to create loyalty amongst well-educated Muslims and converts by means of modern Islamic reasoning.'93 With modern Islamic reasoning the AIVD presumably means both the ways through which Hizb ut-Tahrir reasons with its followers, namely through the extensive use of the Internet and the social media, as the movement's grassroots activism. Furthermore in the 2009 report the AIVD states that Hizb ut-Tahrir focuses 'mainly upon young, well-educated second and third-generation Muslims and upon converts'.94 Similarly as in regards to the number of members I put the assumption of the AIVD regarding the background and education to question to Martijn de Koning and Okay Pala. Martijn de Koning corroborated that Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands has a strong Turkish character and the majority of the Dutch members are of Turkish origin. The reason for this he thought is likely to be found in the migration-history of the Turkish community in the Netherlands and the social networks they set up. Martijn de Koning also found it likely that the strong Turkish character is the result of a focus of Hizb ut-Tahrir itself. De Koning further argued that, partly due to the strong Turkish character of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands, sympathizers of Shariah4Holland (who predominantly have a Moroccan background) have little affinity with the movement.95 I conclude from this that it appears that the initial Turkish character of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands causes the movement to be less attractive to Muslims of a non-Turkish origin. Regarding the converts Martijn de Koning stated that most religious groups welcome converts and that he expected the same for Hizb ut-Tahrir. He further stated however that during the gathering of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands that he visited he had seen very view or no converts under the attendees.96 Okay Pala contested the account of the AIVD that the Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands has predominantly Turkish members. He states that the Dutch branch has many members who are converts and other persons of a non-Turkish ethnicity. Regarding the converts Pala states that

92 AIVD, Jaarverslag 2004, 38. 93 AIVD, Annual Report 2009, 18. 94 Ibidem. 95 Interview with Martijn de Koning, 25-02-2014, Nijmegen. See attachments. 96 Ibidem.

they do not have a special status and that they have to fulfill the same tasks (such as for example following reading circles and distributing leaflets) as all the members. The converts however are given special guidance by Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands. This is because their private situation can be difficult as they encounter a lack of understanding from their environment.

2.3. Overview and Analysis What becomes evident is that there are various differences between the Dutch and the English branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir. To start we can state that the English branch is significantly larger than the Dutch branch. This statement can be made even though we do not know the exact number of members of both branches. There are several explanations, which do no exclude each other, for the fact that the Dutch branch is smaller than the English branch. First of all the Dutch branch is nearly a decade younger than the English branch. Furthermore there live more Muslims in the United Kingdom. A further reason I would argue lies in the (past) leadership of both branches. As stated it was under the leadership of Omar Bakri that Hizb ut- Tahrir Britain greatly expanded. He evolved Hizb ut-Tahrir from a waning movement to one of the largest Islamist organization in the United Kingdom. So I would argue the success of the English branch is partly due the effective leadership of Omar Bakri. Furthermore as stated before Hizb ut-Tahrir focuses on the largest group of Muslims in each country and in the Netherlands that are persons with a Turkish background. However the Turkish minority is strongly organised and has a strong nationalist tendency and is less involved with its Muslim identity than the South Asians minority in the United Kingdom. Except for the number of members there is also a difference between the backgrounds of the members of the two branches differs. As stated above the Dutch branch has mainly members and followers with a Turkish origin. In contrast the English branch focuses mainly on Muslims from South Asian decent. According to among others the AIVD it is partial the policy of the movement itself that contributes to this difference as Hizb ut-Tahrir focuses on the largest group of Muslims every country. There are similarities as well: the activities and strategy of both branches correspond. For example in recruiting new members both branches focus on students. Furthermore both branches aim on the largest Muslim community. Regarding the activities of both branches, these appear to be corresponding too. Both branches hold conventions and demonstrations and spread leaflets, often around mosques, explaining the movement’s ideology. However the activities in the Netherlands are of a smaller scale as the Dutch branch does not have the

outreach the English branch has. Where the outreach to students in the United Kingdom is examined and described, little actual research appears to have been done into the activity of Hizb ut-Tahrir on Dutch universities.

3. A comparative analysis of the webpages

This chapter forms a comparative analysis of the online activities of the Dutch and the British branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the online media strategy of both branches. The survey focussed on the main webpages of the Dutch and the British branch. These are http://www.hizb.org.uk/ for the British branch and http://hizb-ut-tahrir.nl/ for the Dutch branch. There are various other Hizb ut-Tahrir related Dutch and British websites such as the Dutch websites http://khilafah.nl and http://tijdvoorkhilafah.nl and the British website www.uprising2012.co.uk. However as these pages show less activity compared to the main webpages of both branches they form only a very limited part of this survey. For her paper The Caliphate as a homeland (2010) Sinclair, conducted a similar survey regarding the British and Danish branches. In this survey Sinclair came to some interesting conclusions. First of all she concluded that 'the development in the Danish and British branches' use of their webpages emphasises differences in how both branches adopt their respective national settings and relevant political agendas'.97 To underline this conclusion Sinclair for example states that the Danish branch since the 2006 Cartoon Controversy, 'tried organising events with other organizations alongside their own recurrent events and conferences'.98 Conversely Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain is 'closing the door and focussing on delivering their message in a quieter but nevertheless easily recognisable way'.99 The English and the Danish branch have seemingly diametrically opposed strategies. It can be argued that this is as the English branch is still in the process of creating a less radical and Bakri-free profile and therefor 'distance themselves from other Islamist organizations and signal to British Muslims that they represent a political alternative not unfamiliar with life and norms on the British Isles.'100 Another reason for the different strategies may be that the London bombings of July 7th 2005 drove Hizb ut-Tahrir in to a more defensive position, as the bombings as mentioned in the previous chapter lead to a renewed bid to ban the movement, this despite the fact that the movement promptly after the terrorist attacks had condemned it.101 The Danish cartoons on the other hand targeted the Muslims and lead to protest by Hizb

97 Kristine Sinclair, The Caliphate as Homeland, 82. 98 Sinclair, The Caliphate as a homeland, 87. 99 Ibidem. 100 Ibidem. 101 Jamie Doward and Gaby Hinsliff, 'PM shelves Islamic group ban', http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/dec/24/religion.uk, last consulted on 02-04-2014. European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia,'The impact of 7 July 2005 London bomb attacks on Muslim communities in

ut-Tahrir and various other Danish Muslim organizations. A second interesting point Sinclair makes is that the Danish and British web pages related to the respective societies more directly than expected before.102 Initially Sinclair expected that as Hizb ut-Tahrir has a 'global appeal and presence', there would be more common and shared focus. Instead the Danish and British branches focus and attention was for an important part on the respective local societies. This conclusion of Sinclair has been an important for my research as I have verified if it is similarly applicable when comparing the English and the Dutch branches. Furthermore Sinclair her work has been valuable as it contains much recent information on the English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir. My survey however is different from Sinclair's in that it is to be considered more as a textual comparison and analysis. The core of the survey is comparing and analysing various texts and articles, where Sinclair's focus was more on the actual development of the web pages. So where Sinclair gave an overview on how the websites developed through the years, my analysis will aim more on the analysis of the texts and articles on both websites. The analysis addresses both the content and the structure of the Dutch and the British webpages of Hizb ut-Tahrir. The first paragraph forms a short comparative analysis of the overall structure of both websites. The larger part of the chapter however is on the content of articles that Hizb ut-Tahrir places on its websites. For this I have compared various texts that are on the Dutch website with those on the British website. As there is only a limited amount of topics that are disused on both the Dutch and the English website, I was forced to include texts which have a different subject, but nonetheless show a similar line of approach and underlying message.

3.1 Structure and general content of the websites There are several differences in the structure and general content between the website of the British and the Dutch branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir. First of all the webpages are in different languages. The Dutch site is in Dutch and the British one is in English. Furthermore the websites have different headings, colour schemes and pictures. The British site in general appears to be more professional maintained and is more frequently updated. Under the heading 'news watch' the website of the British branch reproduces articles of various British newspapers such as for example the national daily The Guardian, The Voice

the EU', http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/197-London-Bomb-attacks-EN.pdf, last consulted on 09-05-2014. 102 Sinclair, The Caliphate as a homeland, 82.

Online (which according to its subtitle is 'Britain's Favourite Black Newspaper'103), and the Today Zaman, a Turkish orientated newspaper. What is strange however is that there are no articles by newspapers with a Pakistani or Bangladeshi background, this even though young Pakistanis and Bengali form the target group of the movement. The Dutch website only contains articles from its own media centre and articles from media centres of other Hizb ut-Tahrir branches, that are translated into Dutch. Similarly the website of the English branch also contains articles of other branches, translated into English. The translations of articles on both the website of the Dutch and English branches however are of rather low quality. Both the translations on the Dutch and the English webpages are full of errors in the sentence structure; therefor it appears that the articles are translated with the help of Google Translate or a similar online translation machine. A short survey of the press articles on the British website shows that they are clearly selected. All articles relate to Muslims and Islam. A survey limited to five articles that were posted in the short period between June 10 and June 20 of 2013 shows articles with the following titles: 'Pregnant Muslim woman attacked in Paris loses baby', 'US to join direct peace talks with Taliban over Afghanistan's future', 'Man arrested after suspected arson attack on Gloucester mosque', 'Meat sent in post to Maidenhead Mosque', 'Jordan approves treaty to allow UK deportation of radical cleric'. The first article 'Pregnant Muslim woman attacked in Paris loses baby', which was originally placed in the Today’s Zaman on June 18th, 2013 reports on the attack on a pregnant Muslim woman by two Islamophobic men in a Paris suburb. The attackers first tried to take off her headscarf and when the victim screamed she was pregnant, one of the attackers started to kick her in the stomach. Due to the attack the woman suffered a miscarriage.104 The second article 'Man arrested after suspected arson attack on Gloucester mosque' was originally placed in The Guardian also on June 18th, 2013. The article reports on the arrest of a man for the suspected arson of the Gloucester mosque. According to the article the 'Police said they are treating the incident as a hate crime in the wake of the killing by two Muslim fanatics of the soldier Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich'.105

103 http://www.voice-online.co.uk/, last consulted on 10-4-2014. 104 'Pregnant Muslim woman attacked in Paris loses baby', http://www.hizb.org.uk/news-watch/pregnant-muslim- woman-attacked-in-paris-loses-baby, last consulted on 10-04-2014; Ferhan Koseoglu, 'Pregnant Muslim woman attacked in Paris loses baby' http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=318574. 105 'Man arrested after suspected arson attack on Gloucester mosque',http://www.hizb.org.uk/news-watch/man- arrested-after-suspected-arson-attack-on-gloucester-mosque, last consulted on 10-04-2014; 'Man arrested after suspected arson attack on Gloucester mosque', http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/18/man-arrested-arson- gloucester-mosque

The article article 'Meat Sent In Post To Maidenhead Mosque’ was placed in The Voice on June 13th, 2013. It reports on the intimidating behaviour towards the Maidenhead Mosque, since the killing of soldier Lee Rigby. The latest act was ''a piece of meat, suspected to be bacon", which was sent by post. Before this incident racist texts had been graffitied on the mosque.106 It appears that there is no apparent link between the Rigby-killers and this mosque and that the incident is part of various anti-Muslim incidents prompted by the murder. What becomes clear from a small survey of the press articles that are placed on the website of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir is that a large part of the articles deal with Islamophobic behaviour. By this focus on Islamophobic occurrences the view is supported that Hizb ut-Tahrir addresses a target group of young Muslims who already feel isolated, discriminated and suppressed and may lead them to believe there is no place for them in the United Kingdom. This thesis is supported by I. Yilmaz who states that many Muslims are left 'without a sense of belonging and purpose, which HT [Hizb ut-Tahrir] can provide'.107 Furthermore it appears that Hizb ut-Tahrir intentionally is choosing articles from various newspapers. By selecting articles from newspapers with different ethnical and social groups of readers the website appears less biased and more professional. The Dutch branch does not give a selection of articles from newspapers; it does not use articles of non-Hizb ut- Tahrir aligned media. Okay Pala, the spokesperson of the Dutch branch, however stated to me in our interview of March 18th, 2014 that a news watch would be added to the Dutch website in the short term.108 The reason why the website of the Dutch branch has less own material and no news watch appears to be at least partly caused by the smaller support-base.

3.2 Comparative textual analysis of Dutch and British Hizb ut-Tahrir texts Programmatic texts Both the Dutch and the British website contain programmatic texts. On the Dutch site these can be found under the heading books. Under this heading programmatic texts written in Dutch, Arabic, English or Turkish can be found. As I have not mastered Arabic or Turkish, have limited my scope to the Dutch and English books. A first point of notice is that there are more books downloadable in English than there are in Dutch. In Dutch there are seven books available namely: Definities van Hizb ut-Tahrir (Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir); Introductie tot

106 'Meat Sent In Post To Maidenhead Mosque', http://www.hizb.org.uk/news-watch/meat-sent-in-post-to- maidenhead-mosque, last consulted on 10-04-2014; ' Meat Sent In Post To Maidenhead Mosque', http://www.voice-online.co.uk/article/meat-sent-post-mosque, last consulted on 10-04-2014. 107 I. Yilmaz, 'The varied performance of Hizb ut-Tahrir', 512. 108 Interview with Okay Pala, 18-03-2014, Breda. See attachments.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (Introduction into Hizb ut-Tahrir); Het Islamitisch oordeel over: klonen, orgaantransplantatie, abortus, reageerbuis baby's, kunstmatige beademings apparatuur & leven en dood (Islamic verdict on: cloning, human organ transplantation, abortion - test-tube babies, life support systems & life and death); De Islamitische Khilafa (The Islamic Khilafah); Niet-Moslims in de Khilafah-staat (Non-Muslims in the Khilafa state) Het Goddelijk oordeel betreffende de deelname van moslims aan het politieke leven in het Westen (The divine judgment regarding the participation of Muslims in the political life in the West) and Methode ter verandering (The methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for change). In English there are seventeen books listed as downloadable: "The Economic System In Islam"; "Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir"; "Dangerous concepts"; "Democracy"; "How the Khilafah was destroyed"; "The Islamic state"; "The methodolgy of Hizb ut Tahrir for change"; "structuring of a Party"; "The ruling system in Islam"; "The social system in Islam"; "The system of Islam"; "The ummah's charter"; "A warm call"; "Organisations of the Khilafah state"; "The American campaign"; "Funds in the Khilafah state" and "Political thougts". Illustrative for the lack of professionalisme of the Dutch website is that even though the English books are listed as downloadable the hyperlinks do not work. When comparing the Dutch and English books on the webpage of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands with each other the thing that strikes most is that only the Dutch book Definities van Hizb ut-Tahrir and correspondents with an English book namely: Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir. What is almost as striking is the fact that the website of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain does not contain any of the 'books' that are on the Dutch website. The English books can however also be found scattered on other Hizb ut-Tahrir related websites such as for example http://www.hizbuttahrir.org and http://www.khilafah.com. As stated above the website of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain does not contain any 'books', instead under the heading 'solutions' it has what it calls 'reports'. These reports are to a certain degree comparable to the 'books' that are on the website of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands, as they too have a clear programmatic bias. However the focus of the British reports is, more than the Dutch books, on current topics and how the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir should be applied in a certain field, (for example the economy) or a specific state (for example Pakistan or Egypt), whereas the books on the Dutch Hizb ut-Tahrir website mostly explain Hizb but- Tahrir's ideology. For example the report "After the Arab Spring. The Islamic Khilafah. A Manifesto for Change" (2012) is a case study on how the implementation of the sharia and the

establishment of a caliphate in Egypt would remedy the social, political and economical problems Egypt was dealing with at the time.109 "The environmental problem its causes & Islam’s solution" (2009) Another report that is downloadable on the English website, though written by the Danish branch, forms a study on how Islam and the sharia form the solution to environmental issues such as climate changes and pollution, which as this report state are caused by capitalism. In the conclusion of this report an appeal is made to the Muslims in, as in all of Hizb ut-Tahrir material, to help with 'the establishment of the righteous Khilafah-State' this time with as reason that 'as this state is the only guarantee for the protection of man and the environment from the excesses and injustice that prevails globally.110 It must be concluded that the programmatic texts on websites of the English and the Dutch branch are not the same and even vary from each other in nature. The 'books' on the Dutch website are more theoretical, where the 'reports' on the British website are more practical and topical. What is striking is that the English books that are on the Dutch website, that are the ideological texts of Hizb ut-Tahrir, cannot only not be found on the British website, but appear to be scattered over a variety of websites that are linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir. One element that is distinguishable in both the books on the Dutch website as the reports on the English website is the call to establish the caliphate. There are several possible explanations for the dissimilarity regarding the programmatic texts on the websites of both branches. A first possible answer is that the steering by the central leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir is limited, which can be seen as contradictory the idea of a centralist character. A second explanation forms the fact that English branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir is in a further stadium. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain was established before the Dutch branch; it has more members and its website is maintained more professional. Based on my research it appears that the webpage of the Dutch branch is still in its infancy and is more or less a one-man enterprise of Okay Pala. Therefor it is doubtable if Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands even has the staff and skills to produce it own reports.

109 Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, After the Arab Spring. The Islamic Khilafah. A manifesto for change, 2012 http://www.hizb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/The-Islamic-Khilafah-A-Manifesto-for-Change.pdf, last consulted on 09-05-2014. 110 Hizb ut-Tahrir Denmark, 'The environmental problem its causes & Islam’s solution', 2009, http://www.hizb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/The-Environmental-Problem-Its-Causes-and-Islams- Solution.pdf, last consulted on 09-05-2014.

Hizb ut-Tahrir articles on current topics Same topic This part forms as stated earlier a comparative analysis of texts with the same topic. For this part I have chosen two texts with the same topic. The topic of the two texts is the intervention of France in Mali that started on January 11th 2013. The intervention of France in Mali had as objective to counter the Islamists that were overrunning the Malian government forces. The reason why I have chosen this topic is that it is one of very few topics that are discussed on both the Dutch and the British webpages. The Dutch article "Franse interventie in Mali nieuw hoofdstuk in de oorlog tegen Islam" (French intervention in Mali new chapter in the war against Islam) is written by Okay Pala, the media representative of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands. What strikes immediately is the lack of punctuations and the bad grammar right away in the title of the article. The article was published on January 23th, 2013. It gives no background information about the preceding conflict or about the various groups that were involved. In the article a reference is made to an interview with the French President Hollande on 11 October 2012, in which he stated that “We can’t intervene in the place of Africans, but we can offer logistical help, we can train, but France will not intervene”.111 The statement above Hollande made with a specific reference to the Malian situation. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands Hollande's statement proved to be a lie when French 'deep-rooted urges to colonialize surfaced again'.112 This as the French military eventually did intervene. What is interesting is that Okay Pala refers to Frans Timmersmans, the Dutch minister of foreign affairs, who stated that the French actions were urgently needed to counter the advance of Islamic terrorists in Mali. By referring to Timmermans, Okay Pala adds the Dutch national context to a topic that at first sight has little to do with the Netherlands. Furthermore he insinuates the Dutch government fosters an Islamophobic attitude and a 'VOC-mentality', as the Dutch government is supporting the French intervention. Okay Pala further argues that the 'West' is trying to dominate the region and secure its political and economical interest under the pretext of humanitarian aid and the war on terror.113 A further point that is of particular interest is the conclusion of the article. Here Okay Pala states that notwithstanding the artificial borders separating them, the Muslims are as one

111 'Hollande says no French troops in Mali offensive', http://www.france24.com/en/20121011-france24- exclusive-interview-france-president-francois-hollande-africa-dr-congo, last consuled on 10-04-2014. 112 Okay Pala, 'Franse interventie in Mali nieuw hoofdstuk in de oorlog tegen Islam', http://www.hizb-ut- tahrir.nl/index.php/persverklaringennl/303-franse-interventie-in-mali-nieuw-hoofdstuk-in-de-oorlog-tegen-islam, last consulted on 10-04-2014. 113 ibidem.

nation and an attack on the Muslims in Mali is an attack on the honour of all Muslims. Additionally he argues that Western powers will never cease their struggle against Muslims and Islam and to stop this continuing exploitation Hizb ut-Tahrir is calling upon the Muslims to work for the return of the Caliphate. The article does however not call up joining the Mali Islamist insurgents, it mostly points out that the intervention is part of a larger war against Islam. 114 What becomes clear from the analysis above of the Mali article that is posted on the Dutch Hizb ut-Tahrir webpage is that Hizb ut-Tahrir has interwoven three of its key ideological elements into it. First France and with it the Western powers in general are portrayed as colonizers, who attack Muslims in their own countries in order to suppress them. Secondly by referring to the statement of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Frans Timmermans it is suggested that the Netherlands are an Islamphobic country in which Muslims are suppressed, this corresponds with Hizb ut-Tahrir's view that Muslims in general are suppressed in the West. Finally the solution for these hazards is brought to notice, the reestablishment of the Caliphate. This reestablishment of the Caliphate can be considered as Hizb ut-Tahrir's main goal. The article by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain is titled "How should we view the Mali conflict?" and was published on January 30th 2013.115 The article, of which the writer is not named, starts by addressing how the mainstream media outlets describe and portray the conflict in Mali and the French intervention. According to the article the mainstream media are strongly on the French side in the event and portray the Muslim insurgents in Mali as Islamists, jihadist, rebels or extremist.116 Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain states that Muslims should be critical and not follow the 'politicised and biased media machine in the West'. The article is built up in a manner that can be considered as an Islamic question-answer construction. The question asked is '[h]ow should Muslims view the recent events?'. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain answers this question by making five statements on which it elaborates.117 The first statement that Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain makes is that 'Muslims fighting Muslims is terrible in any circumstance'. To underline this statement a reference is made to a Hadith by the prophet: "[a]busing a Muslim is Fusuq (evil doing) and fighting against him is

114 Ibidem. 115 'How should we view the Mali conflict?’, http://www.hizb.org.uk/current-affairs/how-should-we-view-the- mali-conflict, last consulted on 11-04-2014. 116 Ibidem. 117 Ibidem.

Kufr (disbelief)". This statement is probably made as in Mali before the French intervention Muslims fought against other Muslims. The article explains there were three factions. The first is the Malian army, which as the Malian population is for about 95% Muslim exists mainly of Muslims.118 Nationalist Tuaregs, who fought for an independent Tuareg state but who also are Muslims form the second faction. The third faction is formed by Islamists/Jihadists. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain doesn't elaborate on the struggle nor does it speak out its support for any of the belligerent parties in the article; the only statement it makes is that Muslims shouldn't fight each other.119 Given that Hizb ut-Tahrir strives to unify all Muslims in a Caliphate it is understandable that they do not choose parties in conflicts between Muslims and call for the violence to stop. The second statement Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain makes is that 'Western colonial states intervening in Muslim lands is an unwelcome sight and unacceptable'.120 Similar to the argumentation of the first phrase this statement is substantiated with religious Islamic text. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain cites from the Quran that Allah says: "[a]nd never will Allah give the disbelievers a way over the believers" (Quran 4:141) and "[o] Believers, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies" (Quran 60:1). Then Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain argues that France is not in Mali to protect but 'in order to secure a way over the politics and wealth of those regions'.121 The third statement Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain makes is '[k]eep a healthy scepticism about news from politically biased Western media'. This statement is also substantiated by a phrase from the Quran '[b]elievers! If a faasiq (wrongdoer) comes to you with news, verify it, lest you harm people in ignorance, and afterwards you become regretful to what you have done'. (Quran49.6). The fourth statement reads [b]eware the negative caricature of the 'Islamic' behaviour'. Similar to the third statement the key is that the Western media should not be trusted as they provide few reliable verifying sources.122 The fifth statement reads '[t]he problems exist due to the absence of a unifying power in the Muslim world - the Islamic Khilafah'. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain defends this statement by stating that when the caliphate existed 'the various tribes in Mali lived without conflict like that of today' and that '[t]he anarchy and chaos that has existed in the Muslim world post-

118 CIA, 'The world factbook. Mali', https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/geos/ml.html, last consulted on 09-05-2014. 119 'How should we view the Mali conflict?’, http://www.hizb.org.uk/current-affairs/how-should-we-view-the- mali-conflict, last consulted on 11-04-2014. 120 Ibidem. 121 Ibidem. 122 Ibidem.

Khilafah can be directly linked to the absence of a legitimate authority in the Muslim world'.123 When comparing the articles by the Dutch and the British branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir on Mali it is evident that the structure of the articles is very different and the content also rather diverges. The article by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain sharply criticises Western media, where the Dutch branch does not even mention them. Which seems odd, since it is precisely the British site that reproduces media statements as illustrated below. An explanation for this is that Tahrir only reproduces articles by 'Western' media when these underline the movement’s arguments, and the same Western media are rejected when they contradict Hizb ut-Tahrir arguments and/or opinions. This supports the observation made by Sinclair that Hizb ut- Tahrir members 'are taught how to use certain news items an ignore others'.124 In addition the Dutch article is taking the Mali conflict into the national context by quickly addressing the Dutch stance towards the conflict as another example of the continuing imperialist and Islamophobic behaviour of the Dutch government in specific and "the West" in general. Furthermore the British article on the French intervention uses references to statements by the prophet Mohammed and the Quran and the Dutch article does not. This however is not very relevant as in several articles on other topics also Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands does refer to prophet Mohammed and the Quran. In spite of the differences in layout and content it is undeniable that the articles share the same underlying message. Both the Dutch and the British branch come to the conclusion that the French intervention must be seen as a Western attempt to oppress the Muslim population of Mali and that this is only possible because the Muslims are divided, because of the absence of the Caliphate.

Similar line of approach In this paragraph an analysis is given of various texts of the websites of both the Dutch and the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which have a different subject, but nevertheless show a similar line of approach and message. This is especially interesting because Hizb ut-Tahrir often uses the local or national context to emphasise its causes. The first article I will discuss is an article of 19 June 2013, on the website of the Dutch branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, entitled "De examenfraude op Ibn Ghaldoun is een schijnargument;

123 Ibidem. 124 Sinclair, The Caliphate as a homeland, 129.

om de symbolen van Islam in de samenleving tegen te gaan"125 (The exam fraud on Ibn Ghaldoun is a mendacious argument; to counter the symbols of Islam in society). The background of the article is that in May 2013 during the final exams for secondary schools it became clear that various exams were stolen beforehand and spread. Important to know is that in the Netherlands the final exams are centralized and all students nationwide following the same level of secondary education take the same final exam simultaneously. It soon became clear that students of Ibn Ghaldoun, the only Islamic secondary school in the Netherlands, had stolen various exams beforehand and subsequently committed fraud during their exams. Furthermore these students had sold the stolen exams to students of other schools who thus also committed fraud. This proved to be the largest fraud regarding the final exams ever and the press broadly reported about it. As the Ibn Ghaldoun-school before this fraud had been highly controversial due to embezzlement of government aid and weak educational performances, voices were heard in the media and by politicians, among whom Geert Wilders to shut down the school. The school eventually closed as it became short of funds as the Dutch government, which finances most schools, found grounds to stop its financial grants to Ibn Ghaldoun. In the article that is written by Okay Pala, Hizb ut-Tahrir states that the exam fraud is a mendacious argument by politicians and the media to close the school. According to Hizb ut- Tahrir there have been comparable cases of fraud on other educational institutions in the past but these never attracted a similar amount of attention from politicians. The reason for this according to Okay Pala is not so much the fraud itself, but rather the Islamic identity of Ibn Ghaldoun students that caused the consternation. This argument is not very valid as the examples Okay Pala gives of comparable cases of fraud all concerned non-centralised exams. The magnitude of these cases of fraud was much smaller as they only affected the individual schools and not all high schools nationwide. The cases therefor are not comparable with the fraud on the Ibn Ghaldoun-school. In addition Okay Pala in the article omits the various other incidents Ibn Ghaldoun was involved in. Regarding the large consternation the event caused Okay Pala has a valid point to a certain degree, as it is likely that the consternation was indeed larger due to the Islamic character of the school. However in the article Hizb ut-Tahrir cleverly underlines the arguments in favor of its ideas and omits those that weaken it. For example the embezzlement

125 Okay Pala, 'De examenfraude op Ibn Ghaldoun is een schijnargument; om de symbolen van Islam in de samenleving tegen te gaan', http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.nl/index.php/persverklaringennl/308-de-examenfraude-op- ibn-ghaldoun-is-een-schijnargument-om-de-symbolen-van-islam-in-de-samenleving-tegen-te-gaan, last consulted on 11-04-2014.

of government aid and the weak educational performances by Ibn Ghaldoun are not named in the article. The underlying statement in the article is that Dutch politicians and media try to counter the symbols of Islam in society and suppress Muslims. This concurs with Hizb ut- Tahrir's larger argument that Western authorities and media are propagating against Islam. Furthermore this article is a clear example of how Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands similarly to the British branch disputes the western media as they consider them biased.

Conveyor belts of hate The second article I want to discuss is an article of 5 June 2013 that is on the website of the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir titled: 'Conveyor belts of hate are rooted in Government policy not mosques or madrasas'126. Similarlry to most articles that are on the website of the British branch the writer of the article is not named. The article addresses the Woolwich killing of soldier Lee Rigby and heavily criticizes what Hizb ut-Tahrir perceives as policies by the British government towards the Muslim community. What is conspicuous about the article is that it makes references to David Cameron's speech of June 3th 2013 in the House of Commons.127 By underlining some of Cameron's statements and omitting others Hizb ut- Tahrir takes Cameron's statements out of their context and by so doing Hizb ut-Tahrir sketches an Islamophobic attitude. Furthermore in the article conclusions are drawn that are based on false arguments or no argument at all. For example the article states that: 'the task force assigned to come up with policies of "rooting out extremism" in universities, Islamic institutions and schools will no doubt apply more on Muslim community leaders to hand over their institutions to what is in effect state control'.128 Nothing in Cameron's speech leads to this conclusion; nor does the Hizb ut-Tahrir article give any arguments for this conclusion. A second example is the statement that 'the new policies pushed by the task force will be nothing more than an extension of previous failed attempts to secularise the Muslim community'129, again this statement is not backed by any arguments and the reason behind it seems to be to give British

126 'Conveyor belts of hate are rooted in Government policy not mosques or madrasas', http://www.hizb.org.uk/current-affairs/conveyor-belts-of-hate-are-rooted-in-government-policy-not-mosques-or- madrasas, last consulted on 11-04-2014. 127 James Chapman and Matt ChorleyDrain the swamp of extremism: Cameron orders crackdown on 'conveyer belt' of hate in schools and universities', http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2335171/David-Cameron- orders-crackdown-conveyer-belt-hate-schools-universities.html., last consulted on 11-04-2014. 128 Conveyor belts of hate. 129 Ibidem.

Muslims a sense of not belonging and isolation as well as assuming that the British government is anti-Muslim.

Addressing the false characterisation of the conflict in Syria A third article that is analysed for this survey is "Addressing the false characterisation of the conflict in Syria". This article, that was posted on the webpage of Hizb ut Tahrir England on June 19th, 2013, is a response of Hizb ut-Tahrir' to the view of Boris Johnson, the mayor of London, who believes that arming the rebels in Syria.130 Boris Johnson gave his opinion in The Daily Telegraph in his column of June 16th, 2013 titled "We’ve left it too late to save Syria – this conflict can never be won". In his column Johnson comes to the conclusion that 'We can’t use Syria as an arena for geopolitical point-scoring or muscle-flexing, and we won’t get a ceasefire by pressing weapons into the hands of maniacs'.131 The article by Hizb ut- Tahrir Britain forms another clear example on how the movement takes statements out of their context by twisting the words of the person they pretend to be quoting. In the article Hizb ut-Tahrir for example states that:

'Boris Johnson described the Syrian rebels as "Odious twisted hate-filled thugs; arrogant and inadequate creeps, intoxicated by the pathetic illusion of power that comes with guns; poisoned by a perversion of religion into a contempt for all norms of civilised behaviour"'.132

However when comparing this quote to the actual column it becomes clear that the quote does not concern the Syrian rebels in general but a small radical element of the rebels that killed a sixteen year old boy in front of his parents, because in their eyes he had used the name of Allah in vain.133 In addition to taking various of Johnson's statements out of their context Hizb ut- Tahrir lists a variety of false arguments to come to a quite remarkable statement. In their response the movement equates Johnson with Putin, as Putin also characterised the rebels negatively. Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain continues to state that as Putin himself is a 'war criminal',

130 'Addressing the false characterisation of the conflict in Syria', http://www.hizb.org.uk/current- affairs/addressing-the-false-characterisation-of-the-conflict-in-syria, last consulted on 11-04-2014. 131 Boris Johnson, 'We’ve left it too late to save Syria – this conflict can never be won', http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/10123938/Weve-left-it-too-late-to-save-Syria-this-conflict-can- never-be-won.html, last consulted on 11-04-2014. 132 'Addressing the false characterisation of the conflict in Syria'. 133 Boris Johnson, 'We’ve left it too late to save Syria'.

because of the atrocities the Russian army has committed in Chechnya, he is in no position to lecture anyone on human rights and that Johnson's column should be seen as a 'justification for propping up Bashar al-Asad'.134 In the article Hizb ut-Tahrir further tries to convince the reader that even though in public Russia and the West pretend to disagree on Syria, in fact they have a common strategy namely to prevent 'the return of political Islam to the region'. Hizb ut-Tahrir underlie this statement by pointing out that 'Russia and the West are completely united in opposing rebels that are not prepared to do their bidding'.135 As explained in the previous chapter Hizb ut- Tahrir sees the rulers in the Muslim world as puppets from the West.

Conclusion After analysing and comparing the websites of the Dutch and British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the articles the two branches have put on their website some conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion is that the exchange of digital information between the two branches is relatively limited. Not a single article that is on the website of the Dutch branch is a translation of an article on the website of the English branch or vice versa. Furthermore it appears that both Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands' stance on Western media in general is negative. Both branches see Western media as unreliable and strongly biased against Islam and Muslims. However the British branch does reproduce some articles by Western media but only when these articles underline Hizb ut-Tahrir arguments and/or opinions. The messages that the websites of Dutch and British Hizb ut-Tahrir branches put forward in their articles show an undeniable common ideology. In both the Dutch and English articles the discrimination and suppression of the Muslims in Europe is one of the underlying messages. Another key point is the perceived persistent interference by 'the West' in Muslim countries. Finally in most Dutch and English articles a reference is made to the Caliphate. Either the current suffering by Muslims is supposed to be caused by the disintegration of the Caliphate or the solution to stop the suffering is regarded to be the reestablishment of the Caliphate.

134 Addressing the false characterisation of the conflict in Syria. 135 ibidem.

Conclusion

After my research on Hizb ut-Tahrir and especially on Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain I can make various statement on the movement. There are three main topics on which I shall recapitulate in this conclusion: the assumption that Hizb ut-Tahrir is essentially non-violent; the differences between the Dutch and the English branch and the differences in online activities and online media strategies of both branches. As discussed in the first chapter it can be stated that the movement currently demonstrates a non-violent character. Even though Hizb ut-Tahrir calls up for violent acts after the establishment of the caliphate such as war with the West and Israel and the killing of for example apostates and homosexuals. The movement states that the acts of violence themselves are to be committed by thirds and not by members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. However as the caliph is to rule by Hizb ut-Tahrir's interpretation of the sharia and deviating from this will lead to his removal, this demarcation Hizb ut-Tahrir is creating between itself and acts of violence is a false one as the movement does not leave the caliph a choice other than to wage war and to sentence apostates and homosexuals to death. As described in the second chapter there are various differences between Hizb ut- Tahrir Netherlands and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Where the English branch its members are mostly of South Asian decent the members of the Dutch branch have in majority a Turkish background. Furthermore the English branch is considerably larger than the Dutch branch in both the number of members as outreach. For both differences explanations are given. The difference in size and reach can be explained by the fact that Dutch branch is nearly a decade younger than the English branch. Furthermore there live more Muslims in the United Kingdom. Additional I would argue that Omar Bakri has been of undeniable influence to the relative success of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, as it was under his leadership that the English branch evolved to a prominent player in the English Islamist scene. Furthermore after Bakri's (forced) departure the movement's popularity and support appear to have declined. Regarding the difference in background of the members this partly results from the policies of Hizb ut-Tahrir itself as according to various sources the movement focuses on the largest group of Muslims in each country and in the Netherlands that are persons with a Turkish background, contrary to the United Kingdom where most Muslims are from South Asian origin. An interesting topic for further research into the background of the members of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands would form the little affinity the Moroccan community appears to

have with Hizb ut-Tahrir. Is this as Martijn de Koning suggested caused by the Turkish character the Dutch branch currently has or are there other reasons? There are various similarities as well. Both the strategy and activities of both branches are corresponding. It is clear that the movement adapts to local circumstance but this does not affect the thread of the movement's ideology. Regarding the comparison of the websites of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands and Hizb ut- Tahrir Britain and the articles the two branches have put on their website some conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion is that the exchange of digital information between the two branches is very limited. Not a single article that is on the website of the Dutch branch is a translation of an article on the website of the English branch or vice versa. Furthermore it appears that both Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands' stance on Western media in general is negative. Both branches describe Western media as unreliable and strongly biased against Islam and Muslims. However the British branch does reproduce some articles by Western media in its 'news watch', but only when these articles underline Hizb ut- Tahrir arguments and opinions. A reason why Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands currently is not doing this is probably is due to a smaller support. Furthermore it appears that the webpage of the Dutch branch does not have the staff and skills to produce own report or keep the website functioning properly. A good example for this forms the statement Okay Pala made in the interview of March 18th, 2014 that in the near future a 'news watch' and more information on the women's section of the Dutch branch would appear on the website of the Dutch branch; over three months have passed since but neither has happened. The messages that the websites of Hizb ut-Tahrir Netherlands and Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain spread through their articles show an undeniable common ideology. In both the Dutch and English articles the discrimination and suppression of the Muslims in Europe is one of the underlying messages. Another key point is the perceived persistent interference by 'the West' in Muslim countries. Finally in most Dutch and English articles a reference is made to the Caliphate. In all the articles in which the Caliphate is named it is either its disintegration that has led to the supposed current suffering by Muslims or it is the reestablishment of the Caliphate that is the perceived solution to end the suffering.

Attachments

Attachment 1

Verslag van het interview met Martijn de Koning gehouden in diens werkkamer op de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op dinsdag 25 februari 2014.

In verschillende verslagen stelt de AIVD dat de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir enkele tientallen (couple of douzen) leden heeft. Kunt u zich daar in vinden. Martijn de Koning stelt dat Hizb ut-Tahrir een kleine harde kern heeft. Of de Nederlandse tak met aspirant leden werkt is twijfelachtig. Hoewel de harde kern klein is, is Hizb ut-Tahrir in staat veel grotere aantallen mensen te mobiliseren voor bijeenkomsten/evenementen.

Wat is de plaats van bekeerlingen bij Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland. Martijn de Koning stelt dat bijna alle religieuze groepen (ook christelijke) bekeerlingen belangrijk vinden. Hij verwacht ook zeker dat bekeerling door de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir worden verwelkomd. Echter geeft Martijn aan dat hij weinig tot geen bekeerlingen heeft gezien bij bijeenkomsten van Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Wat is de achtergrond van de leden van Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland? Volgens de AIVD focust Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland zich in Nederland voornamelijk op de Turkse gemeenschap. Martijn de Koning stelt dat de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir inderdaad een sterk Turks karakter heeft. De oorzaak hiervan kan liggen in de migratiegeschiedenis en de door de Turkse gemeenschap opgezette netwerken. Door onder meer dit Turkse karakter voelen sympathisanten van Sharia voor Belgie / Sharia voor Nederland (welke over het algemeen vaker een Marokkaanse achtergrond hebben) weinig affiniteit met de beweging. Dit zou ook kunnen liggen aan de strategie van de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir, dat zich voornamelijk richt op de Turkse gemeenschap.

Betreffende de structuur van de partij in Nederland, heeft deze een celstructuur binnen welke contacten beperkt blijven tot verticale contacten zoals Taji-Farouki aangeeft over de beweging in het Midden-Oosten?

De partij organiseert bijeenkomsten waarbij iedereen welkom is. Er is wel een structuur, maar niet heel rigide. Het is twijfelachtig of de Nederlandse tak werkt met aspirant-leden. Dit komt ook omdat de partij in Nederland, maar ook in Engeland, niet onderdrukt wordt.

Wat is de positie van vrouwen binnen de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir? Hizb ut- Tahrir UK heeft een vrouwenafdeling. Hoe zit dit in Nederland? Martijn de Koning vermoedt dat er binnen de Nederlandse tak een soort van vrouwenafdeling is. Echter hij stelt dat hij er weinig van gezien heeft. Wanneer aan Hizb ut-Tahrir gelieerde vrouwen ergens opduiken dan is dit altijd in de slipstream van de mannen.

De Quilliam Foundation stelt dat de invloed van Hizb ut-Tahrir in de UK tanende is. Dit is door Kirstine Sinclair bevestigd. Kunt u zich hier in vinden? Martijn de Koning geeft aan dat Hizb ut-Tahrir in de UK nog altijd sterk vertegenwoordigd is op de universiteiten. De beweging is sinds de jaren negentig enigszins overvleugeld door de Salafi-beweging. Er is in de UK veel meer sprake van een concurrentiestrijd tussen Islamitische groeperingen. Hizb ut-Tahrir heeft een harde kern die behoorlijk sterk en zeer actief is.

Hizb ut-Tahrir presenteert zichzelf als een niet gewelddadige beweging, echter wanneer je de ideologie van de beweging erop nakijkt blijkt ernaar streven een Kalifaat in een 'Moslimland' op te richten en dat zij dit eventueel doormiddel van een staatsgreep willen bewerkstelligen. Kan de beweging zodoende wel als niet gewelddadig worden beschouwd? Om tactische/strategische redenen bepleit Hizb ut-Tahrir op het moment geen geweld. Wanneer zij achten in het stadium te zijn waarin het Kalifaat kan worden opgericht, zal Hizb ut-Tahrir geweld wellicht niet langer schuwen.

Als gevolg van de Arabische lente zijn er oplopende spanningen tussen Sjiieten en Soennieten. Hoe staat Hizb ut-Tahrir, met haar streven tot een Kalifaat voor alle Moslims (zowel Soennieten als sjiieten) hier tegenover? Martijn de Koning stelt dat Hizb ut-Tahrir is in de praktijk eigenlijk exclusief soenitisch is. Echter waar andere radicaal Islamitische bewegingen veel aan ant-Shia propaganda doen, doet Hizb ut-Tahrir hier eigenlijk niet aan mee. Ze doen er ook niks tegen.

Casus Syrië: Alawieten worden veelal niet als Moslims beschouwd. Propaganda tegen Assad wordt wel door Hizb ut-Tahrir verspreid. Hizb ut-Tahrir houdt ook demonstraties tegen Assad.

Verdere aantekeningen: Hizb ut-Tahrir stelt een politieke partij te zijn. Zij is echter niet geregistreerd als politieke partij en is ideologisch fel tegen een democratische systeem. Het is meer een ideologische beweging. Hizb ut-Tahrir is buitenparlementair en tegen het democratische systeem.

De manier van actie voeren / trotskistisch

Verenigd Koninkrijk: Moslim Broederschap meer aanhang onder Moslims met Arabische achtergrond en Hizb ut-Tahrir meer aanhang onder jongere generatie met een Zuid- Aziatische achtergrond.

Oorzaak: de Moslim Broederschap is meer verspreid vanuit het Midden-Oosten. Het netwerk van de Moslim Broederschap is overal door Arabieren gedomineerd. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk wonen veel Arabieren, dus kan de Moslim Broederschap voldoende steun onder deze bevolkingsgroep vinden.

Hizb ut-Tahrir heeft de strategie zich te focussen op de qua afkomst grootste moslimgroep. In de UK zijn dit de Zuid-Aziaten. In Nederland zijn dit de Turken.

Attachment 2

Verslag van het interview met Okay Pala gehouden in Park Valkenberg, Breda, op 18 maart 2014.

Op de website van Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland staat u genoemd als contactpersoon. Kan ik aannemen dat u de lokale (Nederlandse) leider bent van Hizb ut-Tahrir? Okay Pala stelt dat hij de vertegenwoordiger van de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir naar de pers en de media is. Hij stelt dat hij niet de leider van de Nederlandse tak is en geen uitlatingen wil doen over wie wel leider van de Nederlandse tak is.

In verschillende verslagen stelt de AIVD dat de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir een aantal dozijn (couple of douzen) leden heeft. Kunt u zich hier in vinden? Okay Pala stelt dat dit aantal niet (meer) klopt. De beweging is sindsdien flink gegroeid. Bij de laatste Khilafa-conferentie waren er tussen de 800 tot 1000 aanwezigen. Het klopt dat een deel van de aanwezige geen lid van de Nederlandse tak, maar het geeft wel aan dat de beweging veel steun ontvangt. Hoewel een deel van de aanwezigen geen lid was van Hizb ut- Tahrir is het aantal leden zeker flink hoger dan een aantal tiental. De stelling van de AIVD dat Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland wordt gedomineerd door Nederlanders met een Turkse achtergrond klopt ook niet. Zo heeft de Nederlandse tak ook veel Nederlandse bekeerlingen en andere personen met andere etniciteiten als lid.

Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland lijkt in vergelijking met de UK maar een beperkt aantal leden te hebben? Hoe verklaart u dit? Okay Pala stelt dat de Britse tak waarschijnlijk groter is. Er is daar echter ook meer meer potentie. Er wonen meer mensen in het Verenigd Koninkrijk en er zijn daar ook meer Moslims.

Hoe zit het met lidmaatschap van de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir? Is er sprake van aspirant leden die zich moeten bewijzen alvorens zij daadwerkelijk tot de partij mogen toetreden? In literatuur over Hizb ut-Tahrir komt zo een procedure ter sprake betreffende de partij in het Midden-Oosten. Kunt u mij ook vertellen hoe dit in Engeland zit?

Okay Pala stelt dat deze procedure tot het worden van lid van Hizb ut-Tahrir overal zo is.

Wat is de plaats van bekeerlingen binnen de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir? Okay Pala stelt dat bekeerlingen geen aparte status hebben. Zij zijn gewoon lid en moeten de zelfde taken uitvoeren als ieder ander lid. Wel krijgt hun privéleven meer speciale aandacht. Dit is echter om hen te ondersteunen. Ze hebben veelal hun oude geloof verlaten voor de Islam. Dit zorgt vaak voor problemen voor de bekeerlingen. Zij stuiten op onbegrip van hun familie en raken hun oude sociale leven kwijt. Hizb ut-Tahrir begeleid hen extra tijden deze periode, maar dit is niet omdat de bekeerlingen een aparte status hebben.

Betreffende de structuur van de partij in Nederland, heeft deze een celstructuur binnen welke contacten beperkt blijven tot verticale contacten zoals Taji-Farouki aangeeft betreffende de organisatie van de partij in het Midden-Oosten? Of is de structuur van Hizb ut-Tahrir in Nederland minder rigide (transparant) aangezien de partij hier niet/minder onderdrukt wordt dan in het Midden-Oosten. Okay Pala stelt dat de structuur in Europa minder rigide (transparanter) is. De rigide structuur is ook geen onderdeel van het politieke programma van de partij. In staten waar Hizb ut-Tahrir wordt onderdrukt is de administratie geheim. De beweging zelf en haar ideeën zijn echter niet geheim. Zij bevinden zich onder de Umah en verspreiden de Dawa.

Wat is de positie van vrouwen binnen de Nederlandse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir? Hizb ut- Tahrir UK bijvoorbeeld heeft een vrouwenafdeling. Hoe zit dit in Nederland? De mannen en vrouwen afdeling werken apart. Zij werken op zichzelf, maar er is zeker wel communicatie onderling. Momenteel staat er op de website van Hizb ut-Tahrir Nederland weinig informatie over de vrouwenafdeling, maar dit gaat binnenkort veranderen.

Als gevolg van de Arabische lente lijken er oplopende spanningen tussen Sjiieten en Soennieten te zijn. Hoe staat Hizb ut-Tahrir, met haar streven tot een Kalifaat voor alle Moslims (zowel Soennieten als sjiieten) hier tegenover? Okay Pala stelt dat Hizb ut-Tahrir tegen het systeem in Iran is. Iran staat aan de kant van de Westerse wereld. Saoedi-Arabië en Iran worden door de Westerse wereld en Westerse media gepresenteerd als tegenpolen. Dit is echter een tool in de handen van Amerika om de vereniging van de Ummah tegen te werken. Dit is een kunstmatig probleem. Het werkelijke

probleem is juk van het Westen en de marionetten die momenteel namens het Westen de Moslimlanden regeren. Dit probleem moet worden opgelost. Het onderlinge probleem tussen Sjia en Soena lossen we onderling op (als de Islamitische Staat is opgericht)

Ziet Hizb ut-Tahrir Alevieten als moslims? Okay Pala stelt dat zij geen Moslims zijn. De Alevieten, welke een stroming binnen het Sjiisme vormen, worden zo stelt hij ook door de Sjiieten niet als Moslims gezien. Zij zijn te ver afgedwaald.

Betreffende het opleidingsniveau van de leden van de Nederandse tak van Hizb ut- Tahrir: door verschillende onderzoekers (Sinclair 2010, Baran 2006) en de AIVD word gesteld dat in het Verenigd Koninkrijk voornamelijk op univer-siteiten wordt gerekruteerd. Hoe zit dit in Nederland? Okay Pala stelt dat ook in Nederland de leden van Hizb ut-Tahrir voornamelijk (uit hoogopgeleiden en studenten bestaat. Hij benadrukt dat Hizb ut-Tahrir een professionele beweging is.

Begrijp ik goed dat Hizb ut-Tahrir in eerste instantie een kalifaat wil oprichten in de Moslimlanden, maar dat de partij uiteindelijk doormiddel van woord en Jihad Islam over de hele wereld wil verspreiden? Hoe moet ik Jihad hier beschouwen? Is dit gewapende strijd? En in hoeverre valt Hizb ut-Tahrir in dit geval als niet-gewelddadige beweging te worden beschouwd? Wanneer het kalifaat is opgericht en de Kalief is benoemd, verandert de taak van Hizb ut- Tahrir, De taak van Hizb ut-Tahrir zal dan zijn om rekenschap aan de Kalief te vragen en er op toe te zien dat hij volgens de Sharia regeert. Het voeren van oorlog is echter een taak en een plicht (verantwoordelijkheid) van de Kalief.

De Kalief hoeft niet vanuit Hizb ut-Tahrir te komen. Okay Pala stelt dat zijn voorkeur er echter wel naar uitgaat. De Kalief zal gekozen worden door de Ummah.

Betreffende Israël stelt Okay Pala dat Hizb ut-Tahrir het huidige verzet niet als de oplossing ziet. De Palestijnen hebben namelijk niet de middelen. Hij keurt het verzet wel goed. Naast het verzet zouden zij zich echter moeten inzetten voor de oprichting van het Kalifaat. Pas

wanneer het Kalifaat is opgericht kan Israël worden verslagen en daarmee de Palestijnse kwestie worden opgelost.

Zijn andere Islamistische bewegingen die in Nederland actief zijn concurrenten van Hizb ut Tahrir? Okay Pala stelt dat hij de andere bewegingen niet als concurrenten beschouwt omdat zij het zelfde doel hebben: namelijk het beste voor moslims hier en voor de Islam. Andere bewegingen hebben misschien een andere methode maar het doel is hetzelfde. Het doel is niet een concurrentiestrijd. Er is zeker geen haat en nijd tussen de verschillende bewegingen. Eenheid is ook dat je samen kan werken ook al hebben we andere ideeën. Tijdens de afgelopen conferentie waren ook "leden" van andere bewegingen aanwezig.

Er waren ook Nederlanders tijdens deze conferentie. Het is een plicht van alle Moslims om de om (de niet-moslims) Nederlanders in te lichten. Het is de plicht van de Moslims om de niet- Moslims de Boodschap van Islam te presenteren maar we kunnen niet stellen dat het verduidelijken van de Methode van Hizb ut-Tahrir een plicht is van alle Moslims .

Er bestaan onduidelijkheden betreffende het ten einde komen van het leiderschap van de Engelse tak van Hizb ut-Tahrir van Omar Bakri Mohammed. Omar Bakri zelf stelt dat hij Hizb ut-Tahrir zelf heeft verlaten vanwege een dispuut met het centrale leiderschap. Andere (voormalige) leden van de Engelse tak stellen echter dat Omar Bakri uit de partij is verbannen. Kunt u hier toelichting op geven? Okay Pala stelt dat Omar Bakri uit de partij is verwijderd door het centrale leiderschap omdat hij zich niet aan de partijrichtlijnen hield. Verder stelt Okay Pala dat de reden voor Omar Bakri zijn bewering dat hij de partij zelf heeft verlaten voortkomt uit het feit dat hij een ijdele man is.

Verdere aantekeningen

De Nederlandse en Engelse takken van Hizb ut-Tahrir werken apart. De Nederlandse site wordt binnenkort aangepast. Er zullen ook krantenartikelen komen en reacties op nieuwsberichten komen.

De aanname dat Hizb ut-Tahrir UK een speciale rol heeft bestempelt Okay Pala als onzin. Het Engelse mediakantoor is niet van speciaal belang. Momenteel is het misschien wel de realiteit. Dit is echter zo omdat in London de wereldmedia aanwezig is en London het centrum van het Westers imperialisme is. De reden waarom door derden gesuggereerd wordt dat London een belangrijk centrum is, is omdat zij zo doen lijken alsof Hizb ut-Tahrir gesteund wordt door Engeland en daardoor zou de integriteit van Hizb ut-Tahrir beschadigd kunnen raken. Het is dus niet waar dat London een speciale rol speelt. Hizb ut-Tahrir staat op zichzelf en heeft geen buitenlandse bemoeienis.

Attachment 3

Correspondence by e-mail with Kirstine Sinclair between 12-02-2014 and 14-02-2014

Email to Kirstine Sinclair February 12th, 2014

Dear Mrs Sinclair, / Dear Kirstine,

Please allow me to introduce myself. My name is Luuk Enthoven and I follow the master European studies; Identity and Integration at the University of Amsterdam.

For my master thesis I am doing research into Hizb ut-Tahrir. I try to compare the Dutch branch with the English branch. More specifically I'm looking into who joins Hizb ut-Tahrir in the Netherland and who joins Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom. Furthermore I look into how Europe forms a haven for Hizb ut-Tahrir.

Up to now the secondary sources that I found on the Dutch branch (mostly reports by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) indicate that in The Netherland Hizb ut- Tahrir is a very small splinter group, this in contrast to the UK branch which appears to be quite substantial.

As I have studied your Phd-thesis and 'Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialized Identity' that both deal with Hizb ut-Tahrir I was wondering if I could ask you a couple of questions.

Firstly I found an article in the guardian in which a spokesperson of the anti-radicalism think thank the Quilliam Foundation stated about the the British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir that its support is waning as is its influence.

See: (http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/jul/18/watchdog-tory-uturn-hizb-ut-tahrir- ban - The foundation was founded in 2008, by Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain. ).

As this foundation was founded in 2008, by Maajid Nawaz and Ed Husain, both formal members of Hizb ut Tahrir, I have some considerations regarding this statement as I do not consider the foundation to be completely objective. Therefor I would like to ask you if you concur with the statement of the Quilliam Foundation that the support of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom is strongly in decline.

The second request I have concerns "Strategies of action in the West" (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2005). As for my thesis I am also studying the role of converts in both the Dutch and the English branch I was wondering if I could have a copy of this document.

I hope you can help me with both matters above.

Thank you in advance.

Kind regards,

Luuk Enthoven

Email of Kirstine Sinclair February 14th, 2014 Dear Luuk,

Thanks for your email and your interest in my work. Please find attached the document you requested (in English & Arabic). Regarding your question concerning the decline in HT’s influence in the UK: I agree with the spokesperson from Quilliam Foundation. Throughout Europe, Hizb ut-Tahrir is struggling due to stricter terror legislation as well as internal debates concerning the Arab uprisings (how is HT to explain the uprisings? Can they maintain that what the Arab populations really want is a Caliphate?), and in the UK, HT are facing even more challenges as they have been banned from activities on university campuses and they are being confronted continuously by critics (amongst them the Quilliam Foundation).

Hope this answers your question. Don’t hesitate to get in touch with further questions or comments.

Kind regards

Kirstine Sinclair Assistant Professor, PhD, Centre for Contemporary Middle East Studies

Attachment 4

Strategies of action in the West, received from Kirstine Sinclair (The translation to English was done by freelance journalist David Patrikarakos.).

Strategies of action in the West

A political party based on Islam and its purpose is to establish Islamic life by establishing a well-guided khilafa state and expanding its mandate to Muslim countries; and it has used a number of these countries as the place for its action and working according to the Shari‘a and the Sunna and the Sira, especially from the time the Prophet started his mission in Mecca to the time when he established government in Madina.

It takes the following well-known stages: intensive education for the whole community, intellectual challenge, political struggle and request for backing and establishment of the state/government. The party has not extended its action to the lands of the unbelievers, but the youth of the party who happen to be in unbelieving countries in the West for studies, tourism or treatment… they carry this message with them in their travels to show the greatness of Islamic thought and rulings and the corruption of ‘thoughts of the unbelievers and their rulings’ and influence others as much as they can in the time that they have and how they present these ideas and according to the response of the others. Sometimes they establish relations with people who they converse with in the West; they keep in contact with them after they return to the original countries after finishing their studies, travel or treatment…

But the situation has changed for some Muslims who have settled in the West for several reasons, including work, persecution, marriage…

Now it has become a reality to find an Muslim community in the West, and many more Muslims have settled in the West permanently.

The West has noticed the increasing number of Muslims settling in these countries and has feared their holding on to their religion. They have tried to assimilate them into the corrupt Western culture, especially since the last century since Islam and the establishment of the Khilafa have been more discussed (in conferences, etc.). The West has created ways to be at war with Islam in the West and with/in the Muslim countries.

Therefore, the party has had to come up with a plan of action in the West to draw the Muslims back to their religion and their umma. The party sent a letter on 22/05/1998 to the “directors there” [do not know who are these directors].

Then September 2001 happened which the West used to attack Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. This created this atmosphere of pressure targeting Muslims in the West. All this was done under the pretext of the War under Terror. In addition to the economic and political attack on Islam, they tried to spread their corrupt culture in the guise of democracy. Therefore, all these events required re-considering the strategy that was drawn up in 1998.

Therefore, your meeting at the end of THIS [do not know the year] year to re-examine this issue. It was found that the main previous strategies from 1998 still applied in 2001 with some amendments. (p.1)

1. The party will not work to establish the Khilafa in the West but in Muslim countries. The members of the party in the West must not take part in anything related to governance in those countries (i.e. they should not take part in elections or participate in civil disobedience, etc). But they should expose the West’s conspiracies to the Muslim countries and mobilise Muslims in any appropriate method of protest in the case that any harm is done to any Muslim country or the Muslim community in the West, for example banning the veil or forbidding the Friday paryer. They should mobilise Muslims against collaborating [i.e. pro-Western] rulers from the Muslim countries when they visit the West. There can be political struggles except when it is related to governance [??]

2. Muslims in the West are exposed to Western culture and civilisation which might influence them. Therefore the party should educate Muslims about their religion and maintain intensive relations with the community.

3. After September 2001, the West launched major attacks on the Muslim worlds with crusaders tendencies, targeting political Islam of al-Khilafa and setting up specialised centres

and conferences to study what they thought was an imminent establishment of the al-Khilafa. They worked on cutting links in Muslim communities living in the West so that they do not take part in establishing the Khilafa, using the War against Terrorism to put pressure on it. This was happening before September 11, but September 11 was a good opportunity to increase this process. This requires that the party in the West fights assimilation of Muslims and make Muslims realise that they are part of the great Umma.

4. September 11 exposed the weakness of Western capitalist regimes, especially in relations to democracy and human rights which they have infringed upon without being punished/put on trial. This requires the party to highlight that the principles of Western culture do not work to treat problems of humanity and are drowning in crime and corruption.

These four points need to be taken into consideration with the 1998 strategy. Therefore the full strategy with amendments is as follows:

Part I: carry the message to Muslims in the West: 1. With the Muslim community, the action concentrates on: a. Lively interactions with them, gaining their trust, educating them about their religion b. Highlight that they are part of the Umma c. Mobilise them if the freedom of religious practice is threatened (the veil…) d. Give importance to the ‘ulama’ (i.e. scholars) to be aides to the Khilafa in their knowledge and professional experience e. Prepare the community for the establishment of the khilafa in the Muslim countries

2. With the Muslims in the West for temporary reasons a.. Students, tourists, businessmen: they should carry the message of the mission to the West and then ensure that they return to their countries. b. Pro-Western collaborators: try to hold protest to highlight how [these collaborators] have betrayed their umma. c. The political parties in power, or opposition, independent politicians and thinkers: try to connect with those influential ones to relay the opinion of the party, highlight hot topics related to Muslims; highlight the greatness of Islam

d. People of power visiting: give them information

Part II: carry the message to non-Muslims 1. Call to the doctrinal call: a. Show that Islam is the religion of comfort in this world and after (?????) b. Give attention to those who convert to Islam to educate them c. Give attention to those who convert so that they can carry the strong message

2. Interact with Western thinkers and politicians: a. Shake the capitalist system and start debate about it b. Show the inability of the capitalist system to treat human problems c. Expose the collapse of its [the West’s] tenets of democracy and freedom, especially after September 11 d. Show its inequality in society e. Present Islam though its history and civilisation f. Mention examples from the Western life and its discrimination against Muslims (p.3) g. Give examples from Muslim life and its equal treatment of everyone.

3. Monitoring what is published in institutes, think-thanks, etc. about Muslims and relay the information to those in power.

This is the strategy and you have to study it….

Details and schedules for implementation need to be based on good judgment. Tools of implementation can change from place to place, and from time and time. Use what is best for that time and place. Keep in mind that good judgement without monitoring the situation leads to forgetfulness and failure like a green tree which does not get water and becomes yellow.

Dated: 16/02/2005

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