Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

Running the Gauntlet – Force Protection for Tactical Penetration in MOUT

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knight Headquarters Training Command - Army

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that well protected AFV, the ability to impose and operate within obscuration and automation of some existing combat functions might synergistically reduce the risks of operating in complex terrain and enable a manouverist capability. These means offer capability that is potentially decisive at lower to mid threat levels and still potent in higher intensity combat.

Complex terrain offers opportunities to the defender, the guerilla and the local whilst reducing many of the technical advantages enjoyed by sophisticated forces. There are many historical examples of complex terrain being exploited to inflict reverses on apparently superior opponents. To project forces into the uncertainties of complex terrain, particularly urban areas, has either required time and substantial forces to clear thoroughly and systematically or an acceptance of higher risk. AS can accept neither, airmobile options are not the answer, yet we must be able to operate there.

There is ample evidence of the value of in complex terrain, despite the risks if it is mishandled. Current armour offer the ability to protect AFV against the shoulder fired weapons that are the main threat there. Perversely, only recently have we seen this protection applied to IFV rather than , yet this offers projection into complex terrain at acceptable risk.

Smoke has been used to screen manouvre since ancient times. TI has reached a maturity where it is possible to equip a force so that it can see within a screen. Various low-lethality delivery methods can be used to impose and maintain local obscuration. Together these capabilities provide a force with psychological and tactical advantage that applies across the spectrum of conflict.

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

We are getting tantalising glimpses of entirely new tactics that unmanned technologies will soon offer us. Right now however, ‘robotic’ methods already proven in ordnance disposal, enhanced by artificial intelligence could allow us to automate vital high risk key activities such as reconnaissance and search, casevac and resupply as well as enhance the survivability of dismounted troops.

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

1. Introduction dislodge.

In 1945, Japanese naval forces The future Regional battlefield is likely defending Manila imposed 6,000 to be on complex terrain. An arc casualties and a months delay on the describing Australian strategic interest attacking Americans, despite the lack of sweeps across jungle, mountain or training of the defenders and the swamps. In most areas, it is simply resultant static character of the impossible to find scope for effective defences. manouvre over land that is not complex. Much of the cultivated land is farmed in In the Eastern European theatre, the small plots and relatively densely turning point of the war was at populated. The recent trends in conflict Stalingrad when the German Army was involve warring civil populations and drawn into an attritional battle. Urban therefore cities and towns. Future terrain negated Wehrmacht manouverist combat is complex and the most operational capability, allowing complex part is Military Operations in qualitatively inferior forces to be Urban Terrain (MOUT). concentrated to impose a devastating strategic defeat. Subsequently, as the This paper will describe the need for Germans were increasingly on the reach into urban terrain considering defensive, it was when on complex risks, opportunities and the terrain that they were able to defend contradictions the Australian Army most effectively.. faces. It will then proceed to explain three concepts which applied together The list of reverses and checks imposed appear to offer a way forwards. on the Allies in the West is a list of towns, cities and forests, places such as Cherbourg, Cassino, Ortona, Arnhem and the Ardennes. On the Eastern front, 2. The Need for Reach complex terrain was often the basis of tactical defence,. 1.1 Urban Terrain as Risk The same patterns of terrain offsetting Urban terrain tends to assist the inferiority are repeated since WW2. defender, particularly if he seeks to The highest Israeli casualties of the engage in an aggressive attritional 1967 War were inflicted in their battle. It offers an obstacle, cover and recapture of Jerusalem. At Hue in 1968 concealment and channels the attacker. Tet offensive, an force of the Often the defender gains advantages of North Vietnamese Army and the interior lines of communication and an Vietcong were able to hold parts of the outnumbered and outgunned force may seized city for three weeks against need quite disproportionate effort to intensive US and South Vietnamese

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

attempts to retake it. At Khorramshahr a reverse. Another option is essential in 1980, irregular Iranian forces offered for urban reach. prolonged resistance to the Iraqis, at a cost that served to halt the latter’s wider 1.2 Urban Terrain as Opportunity offensive. The potential for complex terrain Helimobile forces are an obvious assisting the defence as described so far tactical option for urban penetration, yet is well understood. What is less well for warfighting may be extremely appreciated is the penalty paid by the vulnerable. The risk is to both the defender for a defence on urban terrain aircraft and the inserted force. During that does not prevail. the 1987 Indian peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka, the Indians attempted a In the 1980’s Rowland at the Defence ‘coup de main’ seizure of the ‘Tamil Operational Analysis Establishment Tiger’ HQ at the University of Jaffna by (DOAE) in the UK conducted an insertion of a company of troops using analysis of urban combat that led to Mi-8 helicopters. The three aircraft 'counter-intuitive' findings that in many escaped from the ambush that the Tamil respects favoured the attacker. In the 73 guerillas had set on the landing site, but urban battles studied, the defender, for the entire force was wiped outi. During all his advantages, lost three to four the UN operations in Somalia in 1993, times as many casualties as the attacker. the US Delta Force and Rangers iii An interesting further finding was conducted an operation in Mogadishu to that where the attacker had armour arrest and recover a warlord. Two (tanks) and the defender had few or helicopters were brought down by RPG- none, the urban casualty exchange ratio 7 fire and subsequently the inserted could shift as far as 25:1. American ground force found itself fighting desperately to survive and extricate itself.ii During the Chechnya campaign of 1995, and again in 1999, the Russians learned to keep even their well armoured Hind helicopters clear of urban areas.

In warfighting, there will probably still be opportunities to exploit surprise and weakness and employ helimobile forces. However, Australia has few aircraft or crews and cannot afford the level of risk involved if helicopter insertion is our only method of urban reach. The risk is then high because of the predictability of the helicopter option, and the lack of alternative backup if an aviation insertion sustains

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

circumstances demand results with low numbers, quickly and minimal This might be explained by the casualties. The Australian Ready observation that urban attacker will Deployment Force is able to project generally seek to isolate first the urban forces of the order of an Infantry area itself, then parts of the area, then Brigade, therefore two battalions of individual buildings. Concurrently the infantry is a realistic force for urban defender will tend to fight from known tasks. This is probably sufficient only prepared positions rather than accept the to clear in detail and secure either a exposure and uncertainty of small town or a single axis a few redeployment. The isolating effect is kilometers long across a large city. The enhanced by the ability of armour to detailed combat clearance of large move to positions that impose isolation. urban areas using a WW2 approach is The consequence is that defenders are unachievable by standing Australian separated and killed or captured forces on numbers grounds alone. In piecemeal. The implication is that likely offshore scenarios, without urban terrain might be a battle ground National survival at stake, heavy or of advantage, if existing vulnerabilities regular casualties are likely to be are overcome. politically unendurable and there will be an increasing pressure for swift results once warfighting commences. 1.3 Contradictions for Australia 1.3.3 Risks 1.3.1 Current MOUT The contradiction between MOUT Current US concepts for MOUT realities and Australian constraints is warfighting call for systematic clearing stark and evident to the thoughtful and securing of ground travelled. For observer. It is highly likely that any an urban area of any size, this will adversary would seek to exploit this and inevitably be slow. As an illustration, a draw Australians into urban terrain, US Army After Next wargame where the benefits of technological postulated the thorough clearance of a advantage are reduced and firepower is section of the South Korean capital, inhibited. Seoul. Allowing for 10 seconds to clear a room and with the assets of a division, 1.3.4 Conclusion – no no-go clearance was calculated at many months before even considering enemy Whilst we cannot mount a large detailed action. Combat of this nature is clearance, we cannot afford to allow attritional, requires sheer numbers and urban areas to be 'no go', and must have is slow. the means to reach into them to selectively strike, secure key points or 1.3.2 AS Imperatives recover elements. These imperatives and the tiny size of the Army demand In contradiction to the traditional manouverist solutions. Manouvre by air MOUT concepts, Australian and sea offer operational options but at

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

the tactical level, manouverist capability prescribed a combined arms force for on complex terrain is essential. urban tasks. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 provides a more recent This paper suggests three concepts to validation of that approach. The PLO achieve urban reach: fighting protected defenders were only lightly equipped by armoured vehicles, fighting obscured and had limited tactical ability, however by smoke and fighting by proxy using they were fighting on familiar and robotics. prepared urban terrain. As already discussed, this very situation has 2. Fight Protected frequently imposed serious reverses on superior attacking forces.

2.1.1 Armour as an Enabler The Israelis first isolated towns, then advanced tanks, armoured engineers Evidence of the value of armour on and infantry on key axes. Any urban terrain comes from a range of resistance was met with air strikes and sources. Mirroring some of the findings direct fire from self propelled guns and of the work of Rowland at DOAE in the tanks before the infantry and UK, described above, McLaurin et al in moved forwards to clear, screened by their analysis of 22 modern urban the dust and smoke of the battles iv found that 'tanks and bombardment. Whilst the reluctance of armoured personnel carriers have the Israelis to advance into Beirut city (also) proven vital to the attacker inside itself indicates limitations, their tactics the city, as long as they were protected were extremely successful in avoiding by infantry". An earlier study by casualties. In their attack on the city of Campbellv of the task organisation used Sidon, they suffered no fatalities. in 18 WW2 battles hypothesized a proper relationship of infantry, armour From this, we can conclude that armour engineers and . In this work, he is vital to offensive operations in demonstrates the emerging recognition complex terrain generally and urban of the need for an all arms team. areas in particular, but must be protected against infantry anti-armour Examples note the German change at weapons. In most of the world the Stalingrad from previous doctrine of not emphasis has been on protection by bringing tanks into urban areas. infantry and fire support. Interestingly, Similarly, the Soviets reaching the same those who have recent experience of doctrinal conclusions that are only urban combat, the Russians and the reinforced when deviations occur. At Israelis, are looking to the vehicles the battle for Poznan in 1945, the themselves for greater protection. Soviets had to regroup after the first assault without armour failed. 2.2 Armour for Manouvre In the Cold War period, the American, German and Soviet armies’ doctrine Another aspect of the urban battle less echoed their WW2 experience, they well recognised is the benefits of the

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

apparently high-risk tactic of mounted with fewer casualties. In the event, armoured assault. The Commonwealth however, conducting staff and observers and US approach to urban attack has noted that it tended to lead to failure to generally been to conduct a methodical maintain the momentum and cohesion and thorough clearance on one or more of the attack."vii axes, securing all ground moved over and accepting of the time penalty 2.3 Risks To Armour involved. There are many historical examples of In contrast, the Soviets during WW2 armoured forces sustaining heavy identified the possible benefits of casualties in urban areas. In the Soviet assaulting a disorganised urban defence final thrust on Berlin, the 2nd Guards with tanks alone. This was put into Army attacked in massed practice by 'forward detachments' formations in contravention of doctrine during the advance from the Vistula to and lost 64% of its vehicles to the the Oder. During the Cold War period, German defenders Panzerfaust.viii an endorsed Soviet tacticvi was a thrust by mechanised columns to ‘bounce’ In Suez city in 1973 an Egyptian force urban objectives directly. In the West of about two battalions ambushed the these tactics were (and in many cases Israeli 217th Armoured Brigade in the still are) viewed as inherently suicidal. streets, who had attempted a mounted assault without regrouping for an all- In 1985, as part of the research arms operation. The Israelis lost 28 mentioned above, the in vehicles and 88 killed. Berlin ran a series of interactive instrumented urban field trials. These In Grozny in 1995, the Russian 131st were known as the 'Kings Ride' trials Malikop Bde drove into the central city, and involved opposing laser-simulator- not grouped for combat, nor in radio equipped forces with infantry, APC's communication nor prepared for heavy and armour conducting a series of resistance. They also mistakenly attacks and defences employing both thought that paratroops had secured the UK and Soviet doctrine. One of the tops of buildings along the route. The unexpected findings of the trial was that subsequent Chechen ambushes the then current British deliberate attack destroyed 100 out of 120 BMP’s and 20 tactics sometimes failed, whereas more of 26 tanks. From this kind of example, rapid, Soviet tactics did not seem to. the conclusion that is often drawn is that Casualty levels were similar for both armour is inherently and unacceptably tactics. In the words of the trial officer vulnerable in urban areas. Maj Lynham; A slightly different perspective might "This came as a surprise to all. It had be that most armour is inherently been generally held that a British vulnerable to unsuppressed infantry anti approach, employing slow methodical armour weapons, and an all arms force methods involving (outwardly) less risk, is required to achieve supression. would lead to success in slower time but During the 1973 War, Israeli armour

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

without infantry or artillery support they were all intended to protect against counter-attacked Egyptian infantry, who small arms fire and splinters. As had crossed the Suez canal and dug in anti-armour weapons were fielded, on open ground. The resulting first designers began the search for balance major defeat of the Israeli armoured between the competing design corps was widely ascribed to the Sagger requirements of mobility, firepower and missile system, overlooking the role of protection that continues to this day. shorter-range systems, especially the Until well into WW2, defeat of the RPG-7. The point is that armour is also increasing armoured protection was by technically vulnerable on open terrain, ballistic means (or hand placed but that complex terrain concentrates charges). The physics of firing high this vulnerability in time and space. velocity projectiles to achieve this dictated that an effective infantry anti The primary warfighting threat to armour weapon was a crew served gun armour on complex terrain has, since of increasing size and decreasing 1942, been hand held infantry anti mobility. Well-concealed guns could armour weapons with hollow-charge wreak havoc on attacking armour in warheads. The RPG-7 family of urban areas, but their siting was weapons has been by far the most constrained widely used system. The secondary threat has been anti tank mines, which The advent of the hollow charge can be efficiently deployed on warhead changed this. An infantryman constricted routes, although armed with a Panzerfaust, PIAT or concealment is more difficult in paved Bazooka could, at close range, defeat urban areas. There is no indication that any tank. The cover of urban terrain the threat will soon change provided the opportunity to get close to substantially, although weapons with do so. The Germans fielded tanks with more advanced warheads might be additional stand off armour plates to quickly deployed. Off route mines reduce the threat, and experimented conceled beside roads and which launch with very heavy tanks, but the near a warhead or explosively formed impunity of the tank to dismounted fragment will present an increasing infantry fire was over for many years. detection problem. The early development of infantry carrying armoured vehicles took a path 2.4 Unsuitability of AFV that would reduce their protection and Protection for MOUT therefore utility for urban operations. In WW , personnel carrying variants of Most armoured vehicles are designed tanks (Mk V** and Mk IX tanks) were with manouvre and open spaces in developed, but between the wars the mind. They are not suitably protected notion of equivalent protective mobility for combat in close terrain against the vanished. weapons they will face there. During WW2, with the exception of the When the first tanks appeared in WW1, Anglo-Canadian Kangaroo or turretless

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

Sherman tank, armoured personnel experience of a series of wars has taken carriers were brought into service as a different approach to armoured lightly armoured battle taxis, not assault vehicle development, placing a vehicles. This trend continued after the premium on the preservation of the lives war with the M113 series as well as the of its soldiers. The indigenous BTR wheeled AFV in the USSR, has an unconventional although the Soviets planned a more front-engined layout, low silhouette and aggressive employment under massive advanced armour design for increased artillery superiority. The BMP series of survivability. This has been infantry fighting vehicles, designed for demonstrated on the Lebanese the nuclear battlefield was similarly battlefield with one vehicle sustaining lightly armoured. Its Western 20 warhead strikes without penetration equivalents, the Marder and the Bradley of the crew compartmentix. The are better protected, but still not Merkava has other survivability features sufficient to protect against the threat. such as a 60mm and the ability This vulnerability was demonstrated to carry and dismount through a rear during Operation Desert Storm on 27th door, a small squad of infantry. It has Feb 91 when an RPG-7 round been described as a Combined Arms penetrated a Bradley. Tank.

The irony is that whilst better protected The vulnerability of the M113 was tanks can at least theoretically stand off made clear during the 1973 war at Buq’ outside of the anti armour range to atta when most of the vehicles of the engage, the infantry, whose role is to Israeli 7th Recon Company attempting close with the enemy, have the less to assault a Syrian commando position protected vehicles. were knocked out. The lesson was driven home during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon when the lesser protection 2.5 New Developments levels of the infantry and engineers mounted in M113 compared to the tanks A challenge to the supremacy of the became evident. A major development RPG-7 was heralded with the British programme took two strands. One was development of Chobham armour, a to improve the protection levels of the heavy complex armour for their large fleet of M113’s in service; the Challenger tank. The Americans and other was to convert tanks into Europeans followed suit, yet still only personnel carriers. for tanks. Outside of Israel, the only APC with close country levels of Work in hand led to a passive armour protection was the British Warrior APC suite for M113 known as Toga, which in its hastily uparmoured Bosnia/Gulf provided greatly improved ballistic War guise. protection. Subsequently a light system was developed 2.5.1 Israel which will protect against RPG-7 type threats from the front and sides. The Israeli army, with its bitter

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

The first tank based personnel carrier main urban threats may provide one known as the Nakpadon was derived means of enabling reach into urban from the . The turret was areas. Total invulnerability is neither removed, the fighting compartment possible nor sought. What is necessary extended upwards and advanced armour is a level of close terrain survivability, installed, very noticeably on the track equivalent to that of existing vehicles on skirts where the thickness of the open terrain. For this to be assured it protection is evident. The result is a 55 must be achieved through physical tonne vehicle that is protected to heavy protection means. Such a vehicle will tank levels and which appears to have have increased close range survivability been refined to develop the Puma generally, which will be valuable for all armoured engineer vehicle. complex terrain. It will be a close assault vehicle, able to deliver troops The other tank based personnel carrier through the zone of enemy infantry and is the Achzarit. This uses an obsolete artillery fire. Few armoured vehicles T55 tank from which the turret is and none in Australian service qualify. removed and the old engine replaced with a more compact one, offset to the The primary warfighting purpose of the left. This allows the installation of a close assault vehicle is to move troops rear access passageway and back hatch rapidly across unsecured terrain to a to the right of the engine. 14 tonnes of location where they deliver effects advanced is then dismounted. Depending on the added to the hull, giving an all up situation, this might be a rapid move of weight of 44 tonnes for a vehicle that many kilometres or merely across a can carry 10 troops with near immunity street. Occupants should be able to from the weapons of enemy infantry. It fight mounted, preferably from under is a true close assault vehicle. armour. Characteristics that meet this requirement will exceed those required 2.5.2 Russia for peace support operations.

In response to the losses of BMP All recent MOUT experience and the vehicles in Chechnya in 1995 the inventories of the armed forces of the Russians have also developed a close region suggest that the RPG-7 will assault vehicle, the BTR-T. This, like continue to be the greatest threat to the Achzarit, is based on the T55 tank, armoured vehicles operating on close in this case with the turret removed and terrain. a 30mm cannon installed. Troop capacity is five men, who must The requirement is therefore firstly dismount from roof hatches. protection against penetration by shoulder fired anti armour weapons, 2.6 Description of Concept – Close specifically and secondly, occupant Assault Vehicle survivability from track attack anti armour mines. Protection must extend Well protected armoured vehicles that around both sides and the front and up have a good chance of withstanding the or down for at least 30%. Ideally it

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

should extend over the upper surfaces appear to be to fit active protection and rear of the vehicle. The necessary devices to the upgraded M113. These level of hollow charge warhead defeat is fire disruptive charges at incoming likely to provide a significant level of warheads. Little is known about ballistic protection also. performance of these new systems, which are principally being developed (Further details of the defeat of hollow in Russia. Given the unfortunate track charge warheads are at Annex A.) record of Russian automatic controlled self defence systems such as It is desirable that the vehicle have the ‘Shilka’ anti aircraft system, it provision for rear debussing, however seems unlikely that active systems for MOUT warfighting purposes would give acceptable assurance of alternative protected exit may be protection without unacceptable risks to possible, using sheilds to dismount off crew and non-combatants. vehicle hulls sideways into buildings, or conceivably through a front hatch An equally simple, but mid to long term screened behind a dozer blade. The solution would be to procure a vehicle should ideally be capable of specialised vehicle such as the Achzarit. fitment with at least a simple dozer This seems unlikely to occur unless the blade and must be reinforced to vehicle was also to meet a wider withstand deliberate breaching collision requirement such as replacement of the with light buildings. Ideally close Armoured Engineer/Recovery Vehicle. protection weapons should be fitted that Should Australia follow the can be fired from under armour. development path towards a standard wheeled armoured vehicle, it will still Further refinements for a close assault need a tracked platform for high traction vehicle for urban terrain would be tasks. Alternatively, should a tracked means of delivering troops into upper standard vehicle be specified, an levels and an extendable boom with optional modular protection version CCTV. would be feasible. For combat in complex terrain a heavy combined arms The requirement for this vehicle is to re- tank such as the Merkava would be an deploy any dismounted soldiers for ideal base vehicle. specific tasks in a high threat environment. This can be met by a In the foreseeable future any close relatively small fleet of vehicles that assault vehicle would need to be based provide support to all units of a on the existing fleets. This appears to formation rather than permanent give two options. Reactive armour assignment to the lifted unit. could be procured for part of the M113 fleet. Reactive armour is the only current means of giving RPG-7 2.7 Options protection within weight limits. Both Rafael of Israel and SNPE of France A simple method of achieving the offer ‘bolt on’ solutions that will necessary levels of survivability would achieve this, with the former able to

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

provide protection against top attack. to enable manouverist options. The This would involve in excess of 2.2 obscuration concept would assist. tonnes of additional weight and is therefore probably not compatible with the current upgrade, nor possibly the fitment of a turret. 3. Fight Obscured

The reactive armour fitted vehicle would be capable of fulfiling the urban 3.1 Obscurant Use close assault role, retain airportability (with preparatation), be relatively agile Smoke has been used throughout in narrow streets and narrow enough to warfare to screen movement and achieve ‘clean’ breaches between disorientate the enemy. In WW1 smoke vertical supports when ramming into was used to screen infantry attacks and light buldings. Explosive reactive Naval manouvre, particularly during the armour poses some hazard to nearby battle of Jutland. During WW2 both dismounted troops if struck by allies and axis forces used smoke, explosive rounds, and the vehicle would especially to screen against air attacks. be vulnerable to repeated strikes. The Germans and Russians fired smoke onto objectives to screen their assault The alternative solution is to adapt part from depth and flank positions and the of the Leopard tank fleet (or second former developed weapons principally hand vehicles bought for the purpose) for this task. During the Cold War along the lines of the Israeli period, the Soviets developed the conversions. This would involve combination of artillery and tank removing the turret, developing a crew exhaust injector smoke as the chief compartment, installing machine gun means of protecting their armoured mounts and fitting passive formations against anti tank missiles. supplementary armour. A front hatch Activity within smoke remained a behind a dozer blade is probably confused and disorienting prospect and feasible. Such a solution would provide this effect is also exploited by the use of the basis of both a close assault vehicle irritant to maintain public order. and a combat engineer vehicle.

The tank based vehicle would be very 3.2 TI and Smoke Developments well protected against the spectrum of anti armour weapons, giving utility on In a dual response to a need to fight at all terrain. Durable 360 degree and night and to Soviet obscurant tactics the partial overhead protection is possible. western armies developed and fielded This vehicles manouvre would however thermal vision technology for anti be constricted in narrow streets. armour weapons during the 1980’s. These cooled systems, able to view in The close assault vehicle concept the 9-13 micron band, were able to view appears to offer a means of achieving through most smokes. Advances since sufficient mobility at an acceptable risk have produced uncooled systems small

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

and light enough to fit individual which may lead to exposure or weapons. These systems hold out the asphyxiating atmospheres. prospect of revolutionizing close combat. In a battlefield ‘kingdom of the Conventional indirect and direct fire blind’ obscured by smoke, the ‘one methods of smoke delivery are eyed man will be king!’ inapropriate, because of the ballistic hazards from smoke carrier or base ejection shells and the fire hazards from phosphorous ammunition. The 3.3 Description of Concept commonly used hexacloroethane filling poses an inhalation hazard also. A technologically superior force that is able to obscure a selected area of the oil, Polyethelyne Glycol and battlefield and deploy thermal imager- Dioxide are preferred equipped troops there will gain an local obscurants for reduced inhalation asymetric advantage. Even if both hazard and new materials such as micro forces have access to imaging fibre and flakes are under equipment, advantage will accrue to the development to mask thermal viewers. side with the operational initiative, since New pyrotechnic ammunition might be the latter can concentrate capability at designed for obscurant delivery, by the point of decision. mortars, or simple launchers, using a light projectile that is fitted with a The concept suits the small well safety drogue chute. This would equipped force and is a counter to the dispense many small burning pellets usual advantage of the unsophisticated that are bound by thermal insulation urban enemy as well as being an which would reduce fire hazard. effective aid to countering threats concealed amongst the civil population. Dispersing smoke from vehicles or smoke pots allows good control and 3.3.1 Effect Requirements localisation of effects but does not assure effects forwards or upwind of the The effect required is to be able to force. Unmanned vehicles probably rapidly and fully obscure sections of the provide the simplest supplementation urban battlefield, and maintain that method. The wing tank dispenser condition until manouvre is completed. technology, developed for fighter Obscurants and delivery systems used aircraft to simulate poison gas attack should pose little threat to civilians, could probably be adapted to lay almost own troops and, for warfighting, not instant obscurant clouds by flying single breach chemical warfare conventions. low passes at high speed

The structures of urban areas assist in Operating in smoke will pose defining zones to be obscured and considerable challenges, particularly for reduce the effects of ambient winds, dismounted soldiers. Fields of view are however they can also cause local still much narrower than natural vision dispersion and concentration effects and using a weapon mounted viewer

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whilst moving is quite difficult. To mechanical mine clearing vehicles such accommodate this limitation, as the US Army Panther. This is based procedures are likely to require soldiers on a with the turret removed deployed forwards to be coverd by that is fitted with mine rollers and is another behind who is in radio radio controlled from a safe distance. communication and can overwatch. The use of obscurants at night will 4.2 New Developments heighten psychological advantage and reduce unintended exposure due to Technological advances in processing cloud gaps. As thermal imaging power, artificial intelligence and the eqipment becomes more wideley decrease in size and cost of electronic available, smoke tactics might evolve to equipment have opened up a whole surround normal smoke with thermal new field of military robotics. The US imager opaque smoke. military in particular are developing a range of ground and air vehicles of Fighting obscured appears to offer an decreasing size and increasing assymetric advantage. Even a small capability. There are a number of group of soldiers could feasibly move programmes specifically focussed on across a hostile major city if the MOUT requirements. obscuration could be maintained. The concept is particularly attractive in The MPRS (man portable robot system) current strategic circumstances where provides small low cost model tank Australia may require a potent sized devices with cameras for intervention option. A relatively small inspection of underground systems. investment that equipped a Teleoperated vehicle control has now company/squadron sized organisation been extended to a wide range of to fight obscured could only be military vehicles and mounted weapons countered by much wider investment. systems whilst autonomous systems are being fielded for recconnaisance 4. Fight by Proxy purposes. The REMOTEC ANDROS is similar to earlier bomb disposal machines but specifically designed for 4.1 Robots as enablers hazardous building search and clearance tasks and is capable of unlocking a The first military use of robotics was door with a key. probably by the Germans in WW2. The Goliath, a small vehicle shaped like an 4.3 Description of Concept early British tank, controlled by a 400m cable and packed with 85Kg of There are almost unlimited tasks for explosives was used for assault robotic devices in MOUT. Most have demolition tasks. In the 1970’s, the the potential to reduce vulneratbilitiy British began using small tracked robots and so increase reach. The difficulty is with actuated devices for bomb disposal determining where to invest. It is purposes. Similar technology was then logical to seek multiple roles, including used to produce remote controlled those for other terrain, and address

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

greatest risks first. Historically the smoke. It is desirable for the system greatest operational or tactical risk has also to be able to inspect through been from the major ambush. This windows and to manouvre within suggests that a platform able to prove buildings. routes and threaten ambushing forces with being cut off or destroyed would A small number of systems of this kind be a high payoff system. Similarly, at would add capability on all complex the minor tactical level the the greatest terrain and act as a force multiplier for risk occurs when teams are exposed on small elements. the street outside objectives. A platform that carries out tasks requiring such exposure would also be high payoff. 5. Conclusion

The procurement of teleoperating Each of the above concepts: fighting systems for the M113 vehicle and protected, fighting obscured and weapons would appear to offer a robot fighting by proxy offers increased with combat power, without the reach. If the concepts are integrated investment in a new platform. An synergies result. Armour gains added tactical and logistic advantage is increased psychological shock effect the ability to interchange unmanned and within obscuration whilst vehicles and manned vehicles. This would be a dismounting troops are further relatively low cost exercise using protected. Armoured vehicles mature technology proven in mine themselves can be used to generate clearing. The robot M113 vehicle could smoke and provide a good platform for be expected to be more durable than thermal viewers. The enemy difficulty many specialist devices, and with extra of defeating protected vehilcles is armour on the engine compartment compounded by using unmanned would probably be very difficult to teleoperating systems for route proof diable. The running costs would probably be larger than dedicated The acquisition of capabilities as systems. described would, even if only provided for a small force, offer the ability to The procurement of a version of the rapidly reach into a hostile urban ECHIDNA bomb disposal robot would environment with a huge advantage, have similar commonality and proven rather than the current vulnerability. technology advantages. The primary requirements are to be able to mount a weapon systems, including the Minimi LSW and launcher, place external breaching charges and deploy

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

Appendix A: Explanation of the Hollow Charge Warhead Mechanism and its Defeat

A.1. Warhead Description Active protection detects an incoming warhead and fires an explosive charge In a High Explosive Anti Tank (HEAT) in its path to break up or prematurely or hollow charge warhead the explosive detonate it. The remaining methods aim surrounds an inverted cone of ductile to break up or degrade the jet. Passive metal. As the explosive is detonated systems do this by exploiting the from the rear, the huge pressures distortions of the jet that occur at the generated around the cone deform the interface of materials of different metal and accelerate it in the direction and angles. Such systems may of least resistance. This forms a long present hazards for crew and third and thin rod of metal moving out of the parties cone, sometimes referred to as a jet. The tip of the jet travels at up to Mach Lighter passive applique systems seek 25 and the effects on target surfaces are to detonate the warhead at increased mainly kinetic. The enormous stand off distances and place laminates momentum of the metal jet imposes (which may be angled) in the path of the deformation on metal target jet, in front of and behind the vehicle surfaces. Because the tip of the jet armour wall. Typically this does not travels faster than the rear, within a few defeat the jet but greatly reduces tens of centimeters the jet becomes penetration and behind armour effect. stretched then breaks up. Warhead design requires detonation at an Heavy passive complex such as optimum stand off and increasing the Chobham armour or that used on heavy distance of the warhead from the target Israeli vehicles use proprietary permits jet break-up and reduces combinations of materials of different penetration. densities and shock transmitting properties, sometimes including air gaps A.2. Defeat Methods and fuel storage. These armours are capable of completely adsorbing the Defeating HEAT warheads with attack of specified HEAT jets, will homogenous armour is difficult even withstand a series of adjacent attacks exploiting sloping thickness. Warhead and give good general ballistic penetration is roughly proportional to protection. They are however very charge diameter and warheads in the 60- heavy and can only be fitted to vehicles 70mm range will readily penetrate in with tank type suspensions. The Israeli the order of 300mm of RHAl: far more Achzarit, for example, carries 14 tonnes than any practical AFV can carry over of additional armour most surfaces. There are four main approaches to counter HEAT warheads. Explosive reactive armour provides an array of modules over the armoured

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

vehicle. The modules consist of of the protective module presents a explosive material sandwiched between greater hazard to exposed crew or armour material and are sited so that the personnel nearby than the warhead armour surfaces will be at an angle to alone does. Once a module has incoming warheads. When a warhead detonated there is an unprotected area, detonates against a module, the jet tip and this effect can be exploited by firing triggers detonation in the explosive explosive rounds to strip protection causing the armour to fly apart, moving away. across and down the path of the jet and breaking it up. Reactive armour is much lighter than passive armour equivalents. A suite giving frontal and side protection on an M113 weighs in . the order of two tonnes. The detonation

Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000

3. References

i Schilling A. and Sims D. CAPTs, The Battle for Jaffna, Field Artillery, April 1980 ii Task Force Ranger, a Case Study, George B.Akers, National Security Program Office, Feb 2000 iii Rowland D, The Effect of Degradation on the Urban Battle,Operational Research Society 1991 iv McLaurin R.D. et al Modern Experience in City Combat US Army HE Lab 1987 v Campbell J.D. Task Organising for Urban Combat, USAC&G SC 1976 vi Donnelly C. Soviet Techniques for Combat in Built up Areas, International Defense Review Feb1977. vii Lynham J.M. Kings Ride V Initial Impressions, Army Training News, April 1986 viii Vigor P.H. FIBUA: A Soviet View Pt 1 RUSI Jan 77 ix Eshel D. LTC, “Armoured Anti-Guerilla Combat in South Lebanon”, ARMOUR, Jul- Aug 1997, p 29.