Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000 Running the Gauntlet – Force Protection for Tactical Penetration in MOUT Lieutenant Colonel Charles Knight Headquarters Training Command - Army ABSTRACT This paper argues that well protected AFV, the ability to impose and operate within obscuration and automation of some existing combat functions might synergistically reduce the risks of operating in complex terrain and enable a manouverist capability. These means offer capability that is potentially decisive at lower to mid threat levels and still potent in higher intensity combat. Complex terrain offers opportunities to the defender, the guerilla and the local whilst reducing many of the technical advantages enjoyed by sophisticated forces. There are many historical examples of complex terrain being exploited to inflict reverses on apparently superior opponents. To project forces into the uncertainties of complex terrain, particularly urban areas, has either required time and substantial forces to clear thoroughly and systematically or an acceptance of higher risk. AS can accept neither, airmobile options are not the answer, yet we must be able to operate there. There is ample evidence of the value of armour in complex terrain, despite the risks if it is mishandled. Current armour technologies offer the ability to protect AFV against the shoulder fired weapons that are the main threat there. Perversely, only recently have we seen this protection applied to IFV rather than tanks, yet this offers projection into complex terrain at acceptable risk. Smoke has been used to screen manouvre since ancient times. TI technology has reached a maturity where it is possible to equip a force so that it can see within a smoke screen. Various low-lethality delivery methods can be used to impose and maintain local obscuration. Together these capabilities provide a force with psychological and tactical advantage that applies across the spectrum of conflict. Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000 We are getting tantalising glimpses of entirely new tactics that unmanned technologies will soon offer us. Right now however, ‘robotic’ methods already proven in ordnance disposal, enhanced by artificial intelligence could allow us to automate vital high risk key activities such as reconnaissance and search, casevac and resupply as well as enhance the survivability of dismounted troops. Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000 1. Introduction dislodge. In 1945, Japanese naval forces The future Regional battlefield is likely defending Manila imposed 6,000 to be on complex terrain. An arc casualties and a months delay on the describing Australian strategic interest attacking Americans, despite the lack of sweeps across jungle, mountain or training of the defenders and the swamps. In most areas, it is simply resultant static character of the impossible to find scope for effective defences. manouvre over land that is not complex. Much of the cultivated land is farmed in In the Eastern European theatre, the small plots and relatively densely turning point of the war was at populated. The recent trends in conflict Stalingrad when the German Army was involve warring civil populations and drawn into an attritional battle. Urban therefore cities and towns. Future terrain negated Wehrmacht manouverist combat is complex and the most operational capability, allowing complex part is Military Operations in qualitatively inferior forces to be Urban Terrain (MOUT). concentrated to impose a devastating strategic defeat. Subsequently, as the This paper will describe the need for Germans were increasingly on the reach into urban terrain considering defensive, it was when on complex risks, opportunities and the terrain that they were able to defend contradictions the Australian Army most effectively.. faces. It will then proceed to explain three concepts which applied together The list of reverses and checks imposed appear to offer a way forwards. on the Allies in the West is a list of towns, cities and forests, places such as Cherbourg, Cassino, Ortona, Arnhem and the Ardennes. On the Eastern front, 2. The Need for Reach complex terrain was often the basis of tactical defence,. 1.1 Urban Terrain as Risk The same patterns of terrain offsetting Urban terrain tends to assist the inferiority are repeated since WW2. defender, particularly if he seeks to The highest Israeli casualties of the engage in an aggressive attritional 1967 War were inflicted in their battle. It offers an obstacle, cover and recapture of Jerusalem. At Hue in 1968 concealment and channels the attacker. Tet offensive, an infantry force of the Often the defender gains advantages of North Vietnamese Army and the interior lines of communication and an Vietcong were able to hold parts of the outnumbered and outgunned force may seized city for three weeks against need quite disproportionate effort to intensive US and South Vietnamese Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000 attempts to retake it. At Khorramshahr a reverse. Another option is essential in 1980, irregular Iranian forces offered for urban reach. prolonged resistance to the Iraqis, at a cost that served to halt the latter’s wider 1.2 Urban Terrain as Opportunity offensive. The potential for complex terrain Helimobile forces are an obvious assisting the defence as described so far tactical option for urban penetration, yet is well understood. What is less well for warfighting may be extremely appreciated is the penalty paid by the vulnerable. The risk is to both the defender for a defence on urban terrain aircraft and the inserted force. During that does not prevail. the 1987 Indian peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka, the Indians attempted a In the 1980’s Rowland at the Defence ‘coup de main’ seizure of the ‘Tamil Operational Analysis Establishment Tiger’ HQ at the University of Jaffna by (DOAE) in the UK conducted an insertion of a company of troops using analysis of urban combat that led to Mi-8 helicopters. The three aircraft 'counter-intuitive' findings that in many escaped from the ambush that the Tamil respects favoured the attacker. In the 73 guerillas had set on the landing site, but urban battles studied, the defender, for the entire force was wiped outi. During all his advantages, lost three to four the UN operations in Somalia in 1993, times as many casualties as the attacker. the US Delta Force and Rangers iii An interesting further finding was conducted an operation in Mogadishu to that where the attacker had armour arrest and recover a warlord. Two (tanks) and the defender had few or helicopters were brought down by RPG- none, the urban casualty exchange ratio 7 fire and subsequently the inserted could shift as far as 25:1. American ground force found itself fighting desperately to survive and extricate itself.ii During the Chechnya campaign of 1995, and again in 1999, the Russians learned to keep even their well armoured Hind helicopters clear of urban areas. In warfighting, there will probably still be opportunities to exploit surprise and weakness and employ helimobile forces. However, Australia has few aircraft or crews and cannot afford the level of risk involved if helicopter insertion is our only method of urban reach. The risk is then high because of the predictability of the helicopter option, and the lack of alternative backup if an aviation insertion sustains Land Warfare Conference 2000 Melbourne October 2000 circumstances demand results with low numbers, quickly and minimal This might be explained by the casualties. The Australian Ready observation that urban attacker will Deployment Force is able to project generally seek to isolate first the urban forces of the order of an Infantry area itself, then parts of the area, then Brigade, therefore two battalions of individual buildings. Concurrently the infantry is a realistic force for urban defender will tend to fight from known tasks. This is probably sufficient only prepared positions rather than accept the to clear in detail and secure either a exposure and uncertainty of small town or a single axis a few redeployment. The isolating effect is kilometers long across a large city. The enhanced by the ability of armour to detailed combat clearance of large move to positions that impose isolation. urban areas using a WW2 approach is The consequence is that defenders are unachievable by standing Australian separated and killed or captured forces on numbers grounds alone. In piecemeal. The implication is that likely offshore scenarios, without urban terrain might be a battle ground National survival at stake, heavy or of advantage, if existing vulnerabilities regular casualties are likely to be are overcome. politically unendurable and there will be an increasing pressure for swift results once warfighting commences. 1.3 Contradictions for Australia 1.3.3 Risks 1.3.1 Current MOUT The contradiction between MOUT Current US concepts for MOUT realities and Australian constraints is warfighting call for systematic clearing stark and evident to the thoughtful and securing of ground travelled. For observer. It is highly likely that any an urban area of any size, this will adversary would seek to exploit this and inevitably be slow. As an illustration, a draw Australians into urban terrain, US Army After Next wargame where the benefits of technological postulated the thorough clearance of a advantage are reduced and firepower is section of the South Korean capital, inhibited. Seoul. Allowing for 10 seconds to clear a room and with the assets of a division, 1.3.4 Conclusion – no no-go clearance was calculated at many months before even considering enemy Whilst we cannot mount a large detailed action. Combat of this nature is clearance, we cannot afford to allow attritional, requires sheer numbers and urban areas to be 'no go', and must have is slow. the means to reach into them to selectively strike, secure key points or 1.3.2 AS Imperatives recover elements. These imperatives and the tiny size of the Army demand In contradiction to the traditional manouverist solutions.