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JAMES FERGUSON CONANT Curriculum Vitae JAMES FERGUSON CONANT Curriculum Vitae Address Department of Philosophy University of Chicago 1115 E. 58th St. Chicago, IL 60637 Personal Data U.S. citizen; born on June 10, 1958 in Kyoto, Japan Academic Employment 1991-1992, 1993-1998 Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh 1998-1999 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh 1999-2004 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago 2004-present Chester D. Tripp Professor of Humanities, University of Chicago 2004-2011 Chair of the Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago 2014-2015 Chair of the Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago Education 1982-1990 Harvard University, Department of Philosophy Ph.D. Program (Ph.D. June, 1990) 1976-1977 Harvard College (B.A. June, 1982) 1978-1982 Dual Major, Philosophy & History of Science 1977-1978 Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan 1975-1976 Universität Göttingen, Germany 1973-1975 Phillips Exeter Academy Academic Distinctions 1 2015-2017 Neubauer Faculty Project: The Idealism Project 2012-2013 Lichtenberg-Kolleg Fellow 2012-2017 Anneliese Maier-Forschungspreis five-year grant from the Alexander von Humboldt foundation 2011-2012 SIAS Grant (with Sebastian Rödl): The Second Person: Comparative Perspectives 2011-2013 Humboldt Transcoop-Projekt with Christoph König and David Wellbery: From Goethe to Wittgenstein 2011 The Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto in Portugal hosted a conference titled The Logical Alien at 20, on the 20th anniversary of the publication of my essay “The Search for Logically Alien Thought”. 2011 On June 10, 2011, the journal Philosophical Investigations published a special jubilee issue which features the ten best articles published in the journal from 1980 to the present day and includes my 1998 article "Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use". 2008-2009 Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin Fellow 2008-2010 Humboldt Transcoop-Projekt with Pirmin Stekeler on From Transcendental Logic to the Analysis of Practice 2006-2007 Andrew W. Mellon Foundation Fellowship with David Wellberry: Sawyer Seminar on Non-Discursive Thought From Goethe to Wittgenstein 2005-2006 Franke Center for the Humanities Faculty Fellow 2004-2006 Humboldt Transcoop-Projekt with Sebastian Roedl, on General and Transcendental Logic in the Tradition of Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein 1995-1996 University of Pittsburgh Distinguished Teaching Award 1994-1995 University of Pittsburgh Curriculum Development Grant 1992-1993 Michigan Society of Fellows, Junior Fellow 1990 George Plimpton Adams Prize for Outstanding Dissertation, Harvard University 1988-1989 Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation Fellowship 1985-1986 Harvard Graduate Academic Merit Fellowship 1983-1984 Harvard University Distinguished Teaching Fellow Award 1981-1982 Harvard College Class of 1982 Phi Beta Kappa Academic Top Twelve Award 2 Other Professional Activities Co-Director, FAGI, Institute for the Study of Analytic German Idealism, University of Leipzig Editorial Board, Wittgenstein-Studien, De Gruyter, Berlin Editorial Board, Iride, il Mulino, Firenze Academic Advisory Board, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin Academic Advisory Board, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen Academic Advisory Board, Berlin Center for Knowledge Research Co-Chair, International Wittgenstein Society Advisory Board, University of Dortmund, Institute of Advanced Study Advisory Board, Technical University of Berlin, Excellence Center in Philosophy North American Nietzsche Society, Board of Directors. Workshop Coordinator, Wittgenstein Workshop, University of Chicago. Referee for Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press, Routledge, Stanford University Press, Ashgate, Hackett, and University of Chicago Press. Co-member of international 5-year research project on Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Philosophical Therapy funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Co-member of Inter-Nordic Research Council Project on the relation between philosophy and science. University of Chicago Faculty Senate Representative. International Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, Board of Directors AHRC Project on Methodological Issues in Analytic Philosophy & Logic, Advisory Board Publications “Philosophie als Lebenspraxis und Philosophie als Schreibpraxis,” in Geschichte der Germanistik 49/50, 2016. pp. 134-144 “Why Kant Is Not a Kantian“ in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 44. No. 1 Spring 2016 „Wie Philosophen Probleme (auf)loesen,“ LVZ, January 2016. With Sebastian Roedl, „The Fundamental Character of the Second Person as a Form of Consciousness,” in The Second Person, ed. by James Conant and Sebastian Roedl, Philosophical Topics, 42:1, Spring 2016. 3 “Kants Kritik des Schichtenmodells des menschlichen Geistes”, in Das Neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik ed. Andreas Speer, Suhrkamp 2015, pp. 137-149. "The Emergence of the Concept of the Analytic Tradition as a Form of Philosophical Self-Consciousness", forthcoming in Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide, ed. by Jeffrey Bell, Andrew Cutrofello and Paul Livingston, New York: Routledge, 2015. "Die Unsichtbarkeit einer perfekten Regie: Über Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, USA 1960)” in Angela Keppler, Judith-Frederike Popp u. Martin Seel (Hrsg.) Gesetz und Gewalt im Kino Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2015, pp. 258- 280 James Conant and Andrea Kern,"Analytischer Deutsche Idealismus: Vorwort zur Buchreihe” in Robert B. Brandom, Wiedererinnerter Idealismus, Suhrkamp Verlag 2014, pp. 9-12 Friedrich Nietzsche: Perfektionismus & Perspektivismus, Konstanz University Press, 2014 “Das Exemplarische bei Emerson und Nietzsche" in Christian Benne and Enrico Müller (eds.) Ohnmacht des Subjekts – Macht der Persönlichkeit, Basel: Schwabe 2014, pp.207- 225 “Amerika als das philosophische Telos von Schillers literarischem Kantianismus" in Geschichte der Germanistik: Historische Zeitschrift für die Philologien vol. 43/44, 2013, pp.12-20 “Die Suche nach logisch fremdem Denken: Kant, Frege und der Tractatus", tr. by Bastian Reichardt, forthcoming in Bastian Reichardt and Alexander Samans (eds.) Freges Philosophie nach Frege. Münster: Mentis, 2013 “Interview. From Positivist Rabbi to Resolute Reader: James Conant in Conversation with Niklas Forsberg, Part 1”, in Nordic Wittgenstein Review. Volume 2, Issue 1, (Aug, 2013) Pages 131–160 Συμμετρíες και ασυμμετρíες στον πρακτικó και τον θεωρητικó λóγο [Symmetries and Assymetries in Practical and Theoretical Reason] in ΔΕΥΚΑΛΙΩΝ [Deucalion], Vol.29, Issue 1-2, December 2012. “Nos pouvoirs cognitifs peuvent-ils atteindre les objets eux-mêmes ?” in Lire L’esprit et le monde de John McDowell, co-edited by Anne Le Goff and C. Al‐Saleh, Vrin, Paris, Fall, 2012. Le perfectionnisme de Nietzsche, translated by Pascal Duval, published by Amazon Kindle, Fall 2012 4 Orwell ou le pouvoir de la vérité, Agone, Paris, 2013 “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in Rethinking Epistemology, Vol. 2, edited by Guenter Abel and James Conant, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin, 2012. “Spielarten des Skeptizismus” in Skeptizismus und Metaphysik edited by Markus Gabriel, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 2012, pp. 21-72. “Von der mathematischen Logik zur Sprache: Wittgensteins spätere Kritik des Tractatus”, in Wittgenstein: Zu Philosophie und Wissenschaft, edited by Pirmin Stekeler, Felix Meiner Verlag, Berlin, 2012, pp. 30 - 62. “Grenzen der Sprache: Eine Skizze von Wittgensteins Spätkritik am,Tractatus,” in XXIst Deutschen Kongreß für Philosophie, ed. Hans Julius Schneider und Carl Friedrich Gethmann, Academie Verlag, Leipzig, 2011. "The Triumph of the Gift over the Curse in Stanley Cavell's Little Did I Know" in MLN Comparative Literature Issue, Vol. 126, No. 5 (December 2011), pp. 1004-1013. “Three ways of Inheriting Austin”, in La philosophie du langage ordinaire: Histoire et actualité de la philosophie d’Oxford / Ordinary Language Philosophy: The History and Contemporary Relevance of Oxford Philosophy, eds. Christoph Al-Saleh and Sandra Laugier, Olms Verlag, Hildesheim, 2011. Co-authored (with Ed Dain), "Throwing the Baby Out: A Reply to Roger White" in Beyond The Tractatus Wars: The New Wittgenstein Debate Edited by Rupert Read, Matthew A. Lavery, Routledge, "Wittgenstein’s Methods" in The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, eds., O. Kuusela and M. McGinn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. "The World of a Movie", in Making a Difference, edited by Niklas Forsberg and Susanne Jansson, Thales, Stockholm, 2011. James Conant and Cora Diamond, Rileggere Wittgenstein (with a Foreword by Piergiorgio Donatelli and an Afterword by Silver Bronzo), Carocci, Rome, 2010 “Eine Skizze von Wittgensteins Spätkritik am Tractatus,” XXIst Deutschen Kongreß für Philosophie, ed. Hans Julius Schneider und Carl Friedrich Gethmann, Academie Verlag, Leipzig, 2010 "A Development in Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy: From 'The Method' to Methods", in Sprachspiele verstrickt - oder: Wie man der Fliege den Ausweg zeigt, edited by Stefan Tolksdorf and Holm Tetens, Berlin, De Gruyter Verlag, 2010, pp. 55–80 5 “Absorption – Die Ontologie einer Spielfilmwelt”, in Geschichte der Germanistik, Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, 2009 “The American Scholar,” in New Literary History of America, ed. Greil Marcus and Werner Sollors, Harvard University Press, April, 2009. “Josiah Royce and the Problem of Error,” in New Literary History of America, ed. Greil Marcus and Werner Sollors, Harvard University Press, April, 2009. “Continuity and Discontinuity in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy”, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Ingenieur—Philosoph—Kuenstler,
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