POPULAR SUPPORT FOR EGALITARIAN SOCIAL WELFARE* Autores: Rafael Salas Juan Gabriel Rodríguez P. T. N.º 3/10
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Campus de Somosaguas, 28223 Madrid. Tel: +34 91 3942512. E-mail: [email protected] Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378, 28035, Madrid. Tel: +34 91 3398793. E-mail: [email protected] Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Campus de Vicálvaro, 28032 Madrid. Tel: +34 91 4888031. E mail: [email protected] (*) We acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions of Peter Lambert, Serge Kolm, François Bourguignon, Francisco Ferreira and the audiences at ECINEQ2009 (Buenos Aires) and the Cornell-London School of Economics conference on Inequality: New Directions. This research has benefited from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology Projects SEJ2007-64700/ECON and SEJ2006-15172/ECON. The usual disclaimer applies. N.B.: Las opiniones expresadas en este trabajo son de la exclusiva responsabilidad de los autores, pudiendo no coincidir con las del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Desde el año 1998, la colección de Papeles de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios Fiscales está disponible en versión electrónica, en la dirección: >http://www.minhac.es/ief/principal.htm.
Edita: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales N.I.P.O.: 602-10-026-2 I.S.S.N.: 1578-0252 Depósito Legal: M-23772-2001
INDEX
1. INTRODUCTION 2. A RESULT ON MAJORITY VOTING 3. AN EGALITARIAN SOCIAL DECISION-MAKER WHOSE PREFERENCES 3. ACCORD WITH MAJORITY VOTING 4. EMPIRICAL EXERCISE 5. DISCUSSION APPENDIX REFERENCES SÍNTESIS. Principales implicaciones de política económica.
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a reconciliation of the welfarist literature and the political economy literature represented by the majority voting process. We show that a particular additive and concave utilitarian social evaluation function is consistent with the outcomes of majority voting if we restrict the class of income distributions to those that are symmetric under strictly increasing and concave transformations. A particular example is the lognormal distribution. We confirm that the required symmetry condition is generally accepted using an illustration for a panel of 116 countries. Moreover, the proposed methodology provides the inequality aversion parameter useful in practice and shows that median income is a good proxy for social welfare.
JEL Classification: D31, D63, H30, P16. Key Words: majority voting; social welfare; symmetric distribution.
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Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
1. INTRODUCTION
Arrow’s impossibility theorem demonstrates that if the decision-making body has at least two members and at least three options to decide among, then it is impossible to design a social welfare function that satisfies unrestricted domain (universality), non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives (Arrow, 1950)1. To deal with Arrow’s paradox, we must therefore eliminate or weaken one of the criteria. Among others, the extant literature explores two main proposals: majority voting and social evaluation functions. Majority voting breaks up with universality by imposing a restricted domain of preferences among voters. For example, if preferences are single-peaked, the majority rule meets Arrow’s remaining axioms and society commits to the median voter’s preference (Black, 1948). This result has proven useful in many fields. In public economics, for example, the median voter theorem has been applied to analysis of the demand for redistribution. Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richards (1981), for instance, sought the conditions for progressive taxation as a voting equilibrium outcome. More particularly, they applied the median voter theorem to linear tax schedules. Subsequently, Gouveia and Oliver (1996) generalized the analysis to two bracket, piecewise linear tax functions, Cukierman and Meltzer (1991), Roemer (1999) and De Donder and Hindricks (2003) to quadratic tax functions and Carbonell-Nicolau and Klor (2003) to all piecewise linear taxes. In addition, Marhuenda and Ortuño (1995) showed that if the median voter lies below the mean, then any progressive proposal wins over a regressive proposal. In the income inequality and growth literature, Alessina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) justified the negative relationship between growth and income inequality on the grounds of the median voter theorem. A different strategy to aggregate individual preferences is to assume a social evaluation function. In this case, we abandon the axiom governing the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The adoption of a particular social evaluation function relies on a set of generally accepted ethical principles transmitted from society to policymakers. Thus, a government should maximize its social evaluation function. In this framework, the concavity of the social
1 The original criteria proposed by Arrow were unrestricted domain, nondictatorship, monotonicity, nonimposition and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The most recent version is stronger –that is, it has weaker conditions– as nonimposition and Pareto efficiency, and the independence of irrelevant alternatives together do not imply monotonicity. — 7 —
evaluation function ensures that an egalitarian principle, the so-call principle of progressive transfers (Dalton, 1920), applies. In principle, the two alternatives –majority voting and social evaluation functions– are rather different. On one hand, majority voting represents a real world aggregation of individual preferences. Moreover, majority voting constitutes an ordinal approach that permits only the partial comparability of social states. On the other hand, a social evaluation function is an ad hoc methodology based on a set of desirable assumptions to aggregate individual preferences. Moreover, a social evaluation function constitutes an ordinal or cardinal approach that allows for full comparability between social states. It could therefore be fruitful to study the sufficient conditions under which both alternatives are equivalent. Among other advantages, the development of this unified framework would reconcile both approaches and provide a political economy rationale to the classical social welfare literature. However, as far as we are aware, there has been no attempt to unify these approaches. The reconciliation of the welfarist literature and the political economy literature represented by the majority voting process is the aim of this paper. First, we assume that people vote over distributions. In this manner, we can view changes in the distributions as the result of a political process (see Grandmont, 2006). We then prove that majority voting over distributions that are symmetric under strictly increasing transformations align with the median voter’s preferences. Note that a particular example of this kind of distribution is the lognormal income distribution. Afterwards, we show that a particular additive and concave utilitarian social evaluation function for a distribution that is symmetric under a strictly increasing and concave transformation is ordinal equivalent to the corresponding median income. It then suffices to connect these results to show that the welfarist and majority voting approach are ordinal equivalents under a set of conditions. Finally, we test the main assumption of the paper, i.e., the symmetry condition of income distributions under strictly increasing and concave transformations. Assuming general power concave transformations, we test the symmetry hypothesis for 116 countries over several years using the World Bank’s POVCAL database. The results confirm that the required symmetry condition is generally accepted. Moreover, our empirical application allows us to provide a consistent aversion parameter of relative inequality for this set of countries. In addition, we show that median rather than mean income is a good proxy for social welfare. This finding permits us to deal with complex dimensions of income distributions, say social welfare, in an easy manner that constitutes a good outcome for other fields, like macroeconomics. The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we show that the median voter’s preferences drive the solution for majority voting under the — 8 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales symmetry condition. In Section 3, we link the social evaluation function of a distribution that is symmetric under a strictly increasing and concave transformation with the corresponding median income. We also deal with the unification of majority voting and a class of social evaluation functions. Section 4 provides the empirical illustration. Section 5 concludes.
2. A RESULT ON MAJORITY VOTING
We begin our analysis with some notation and definitions. Assume an odd finite number of individuals, n, that decides over income distributions described by the profile:
n x1, x2,, xn R , 2 Where xi is the income of individual i, assumed positive . Let n T ^ x1, x2,, xn R / 0 x1 d x2 d d xn ` be the set of all ordered profiles with increasing order.
When comparing two distributions, X x1 , x 2 ,, x n T and Y y1 , y 2 ,, y n T , we define the individual gain function of passing from X to Y as gi X, Y yi xi , for all i 1, 2,,n . We assume that there is no reranking among individuals between X and Y. For example, if X is pre-tax income and Y is post-tax income, we guarantee –as do all real-world statutory tax policies– that the ranking of taxpayers is identical. Similarly, we define the individual voting function of passing from X to Y as follows:
1 gi ! 0 ° vi X, Y ® 0 gi 0 ° ¯ 1 gi 0 for all i 1, 2,,n . Consequently, Y is weakly preferred to X under the majority voting rule, n Y t X , if and only if v t 0 . Alternatively, Y is strictly preferred to X under ¦i 1 i n the majority voting rule, Y X if and only if v ! 0 . Finally, Y is indifferent ¦i 1 i n to X under the majority voting rule, X ~ Y if and only if v 0 . ¦i 1 i
Let X x1, x2, , xn T . Then, the quantile function of the profile X, Qx , is 1 2 ½ defined as Qx : ® , ,,1¾ o R , where Q x i n x i for all i 1, 2, ,n . Moreover, ¯n n ¿ the mean and median values of X are Px and mx , respectively.
2 We assume, without lost of generality, that n is odd which ensures that the median income exists. Moreover, our discrete framework converges to the continuous case as n tends to infinity. — 9 —
X x , x , , x X x , x , , x Let 1 2 m and 1 2 m be the ordered subvector of incomes below and above the median value mx , respectively. Then, a profile X is said to be symmetric if it satisfies the following property: D m , x D x ,m x j m1j x for every j^1,2,,m `, where D is the Euclidean distance. Let S be the set of all symmetric profiles.
Now, if X S the quantile function Qx will verify that Q p k Q p Q p Q p k x m x x m x x mx x mx , 1 2 n 1½ n 1 for every k ® , ,, ¾ , where pm is the population share up to the ¯n n 2n ¿ x 2n X Q p m median value of the profile . Note that x m x x . After presenting some basic definitions, we now show that majority voting over distributions that are symmetric under strictly increasing transformations yield the median voter’s preferences. The proof of Theorem 1 is in an appendix.
Theorem 1
Let X x1, x2,, xn T and Y y1, y2,, yn T be two distributions of an odd number n of positive incomes. Assume a strictly increasing transformation f that simultaneously generates X´ x´1 , x´ 2 ,, x´n S and Y´ y´1 , y´ 2,, y´n S , which are symmetric, where x´i f xi and y´i f yi for all i 1, 2, ,n . Then, majority voting over X and Y is fully characterized by the median income, i.e.:
X ~ Y m X m Y ,
X Y m X ! m Y ,
X % Y m X m Y . We offer a simple but illustrative example of this result. Assume that income is lognormally distributed. The lognormal distribution is a general function used traditionally to represent the distribution of income in the economic literature (see, among others, Aitchinson and Brown, 1957 and Cowell, 1995). Two reasons justify the general use of the lognormal distribution. First, the product of independent normal distributions converges asymptotically to a lognormal distribution (see Gibrat, 1957). Accordingly, we can view the income generation as the product of multiple factors over time. Second, lognormal distributions capture reasonably well the negative skewness that characterizes income distributions in practice3 .
3 The generalized beta, gamma, Sign–Maddala and Dagum distributions are other parametric distributions widely used to represent income distributions. — 10 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Let X x1, x2,, xn T and Y y1, y2,, yn T be lognormal distributions of income, where VX and VY are the corresponding standard deviations. If we apply the lognormal transformation to the distributions X and Y, we obtain the l l l l symmetric distributions Xl ln X aN (PX,VX ) and Yl ln Y aN(PY,VY ) , l l respectively. Note that m X exp(P X ) and m Y exp (P Y ) because of the symmetry of the distributions Xl and Yl , respectively. Income follows a lognormal distribution, so that the quantile functions associated with any percentile p >0,1 @are:
L 1 1 Q X p exp>P X ) p VX @ L 1 1 Q Y p exp>P Y ) p V Y @ (1) Where )1 p is the inverse function of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. This function )1 p is continuous and takes the following values: 0 p 0.5 1 ° ) ® 0 p 0.5 (2) ° ¯! 0 p ! 0.5 for all p >0,1 @4Ǥ
Assume that mX mY , then it is true that. It is clear from (1) and (2) that if L L VX !VY , all individuals below the median are better off under Y, while all L L individuals above the median are worse off under Y. That is, if VX !VY , we will have v p 1 for all p 0.5 and v p 1 for all p ! 0.5 . In the same manner, if L L VX V Y , we have v p 1 for all p 0.5 and v p 1 for all p ! 0.5 . In both cases, there is a technical tie under majority voting. Therefore, if (and only if) the median income remains constant, majority voting will be indifferent between X and Y. L L L L Now, assume that mX mY so PX PY , and VX !VY . Then, all individuals up to the median will be better off under Y, that is, v p 1 for all p d 0.5 . However, we can say nothing about individuals above the median. Therefore, society will L L vote for the profile Y. In the same manner, if mX mY and VX VY , it is true that v p 1 for all p t 0.5 . Yet again, under majority voting we will elect the profile Y. Finally, if mX ! mY , we can prove in an analogous manner that society will elect the profile X. The main assumption in Theorem 1 requires that the profiles over which society has to elect are symmetric under the same strictly increasing transformation. Let H be the class of distributions such that a function f exists
4 Note that in the continuous case, the population share of the median value exactly equals 0.5. — 11 —
which maps each element of H into a symmetric distribution. It is obvious that the larger the class H, the less restrictive is the assumption in Theorem 1. Accordingly, we need to ask for the amplitude of the class H. We answer this question empirically in Section 4. In particular, we test the symmetry of 509 real distributions for a particular class of strictly positive (and concave) transformations (the power transformation). The conclusion is that the assumption is not very restrictive in practice. Two final remarks about Theorem 1 are worth noting. Remark 1. Theorem 1 assumes that the transformation f is only strictly increasing. However, we show below that it is worth assuming that the relevant transformation to make the distribution symmetric is not only strictly positive, but also strictly concave. Remark 2. We can connect our framework with the literature on voting over taxes by assuming that profiles X and Y are post-tax income distributions from different tax systems. However, this line of research goes beyond the scope of the present paper.
3. AN EGALITARIAN SOCIAL DECISION-MAKER WHOSE 3. PREFERENCES ACCORD WITH MAJORITY VOTING
Assume an egalitarian social decision-maker (SDM) with a social utility-of income function U . In this manner, social preferences are disinterested or impersonal. Moreover, we assume that the form
1 n W X ¦ U xi n i 1 is the evaluation function of such SDM. Thus, the SDM evaluates utility in society as the average utility. That is, social welfare is an additive utilitarian function (see Kolm, 1969 and Atkinson, 1970). Note that the veil of ignorance (see Harsanyi, 1953) gives another interpretation of the last expression in terms of risk. The adopted evaluation function would represent the way impartial observers evaluate overall welfare according to its expected value. Now, bearing these assumptions in mind, and assuming the class W of additive utilitarian social evaluation functions, we find the following result:
Theorem 2
Let X x1 , x 2,, x n T and Y y1 , y 2,, y n T be two distributions of positive incomes. Assume a social welfare function W W and a strictly increasing and concave utility function U that simultaneously generates — 12 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
´ ´ X´, Y´ S that are symmetric, where x i U xi and y i U y i for all i 1, 2, ,n . The social welfare function is then fully characterized by the median income, i.e.:
W X W Y m X mY ,
W X ! W Y mX ! mY
W X W Y mX mY . Proof: Given the definition of the utility function U , we know from Section
2 that mX´ U m X . Moreover, we have mX´ P X´ because the distribution X´ is symmetric. Noting that W X PX´ , we arrive at the following result:
W X U mX . The social welfare function is a strictly increasing transformation of median income. Therefore, the social welfare function is ordinally equivalent to median income. This result shows that we can characterize additive utilitarian social welfare by the median income if we consider the appropriate transformation. The key fact to understand the result of Theorem 2 is Accordingly, we can use the median income as a proxy for social welfare. Further, applying median income instead of mean income implies that not only efficiency, but also equity, is considered. This constitutes an interesting result for fields like macroeconomics. We obtain the main result of the paper by putting together the results in Theorems 1 and 2. Namely, a particular additive and concave utilitarian social welfare function is consistent with the outcome of majority voting if the income distributions are symmetric under strictly increasing and concave transformations. In principle, majority voting and social welfare are different alternatives to aggregate individual preferences. The results in Theorems 1 and 2 together reconcile both approaches and provide a political economy rationale to the classical social welfare literature. We provide an illustrative example of this result. Assume an initial distribution of positive incomes X x1 , x 2 ,, x n T and the following family of power transformations:
x1H ° i 0 H z 0 f xi ®1 H ° H 1 ¯Inx i for all i 1, 2,,n . These transformations are strictly increasing and concave, where the parameter H is positive to ensure strict concavity. This family of power transformations has been used traditionally to model income distributions. For example, Schwartz (1985) examined the full family of power transformations using several years of US income data. He found that a transformation — 13 —
intermediate between the log transformation and no transformation, say H 2 3 , most closely approximated income distributions in the US. More importantly, the family f corresponds to the utility function used in Kolm (1969) and Atkinson (1970)5. In this framework, the parameter H represents the relative aversion to inequality (see Pratt, 1964, and Arrow, 1965) and the additive and utilitarian social welfare function is: 1 n x1H ° ¦ i 0 H z 0 ° n i 1 1 H W X ® ° 1 n Inx H 1 ° n ¦ i ¯ i 1 We now show that this social welfare function is an increasing transformation of median income (see Theorem 2). Owing to the symmetry of X´S , we have: 1 mX f >PX´ @ 1 where P 6n f x . Moreover, we know: X´ n i 1 i 1 1 ° 1 H x1H 0 H z 0 f xi ® i ° ¯exp x i H 1
Therefore, the median income mX is as follows: 1 n 1H °ª1 1H º °« xi » 0 H z 0 n ¦ °¬« i 1 ¼» mX ® ° ª1 n º °exp « In x » H 1 n ¦ i °¯ ¬« i 1 ¼» It is clear from the above that the social welfare function à la Kolm-Atkinson is an increasing transformation of median income. Therefore, we can conclude that under majority voting, society will elect the income distribution that provides greater social welfare (à la Kolm-Atkinson).
4. EMPIRICAL EXERCISE We illustrate these results with data drawn from the World Bank’s POVCAL database6. This database provides data on household disposable income (I) or
5 By assuming this utility function, both authors imposed homotheticity on the social welfare function. 6 See http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalSvy.html for detailed information on the structure of this data. — 14 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales consumption (C) per person for 116 countries over several years (see Table 1). Income values are in purchasing power parity (PPP)-corrected monthly US dollars. In addition, the distributions are population weighted and based on estimated Lorenz curves. First, we apply the power transformation specified in Section 3 to this data. For this transformation, we consider that H [0, 3] within two decimal points of accuracy. We then test formally each transformed distribution for symmetry using a consistent nonparametric kernel-based test developed by Ahmad and Li (1997). This intuitively appealing test deals directly with the symmetry issue and over the entire domain of the relevant density function. The procedure we use tests the hypothesis that a distribution is symmetric about the median.
Suppose we have a random sample of n i.i.d. observations of income Xi, i 1,,n i drawn from the distribution F and ordered such that X1 d X2 d d Xn . We ˆ know from Ahmad and Li (1997) that n h I2n converges to a normal ˆ distribution with mean 0 and variance I2n, where h is the smoothing parameter ˆ and I2n is as follows: n n 1 ª § Xi X j · § Xi X j ·º ˆI «K¨ ¸ K¨ ¸» , 2n 2 ¦¦ ¨ h ¸ ¨ h ¸ n h i 1 j z i ¬« © ¹ © ¹¼» where K is the kernel function; in our case, the Gaussian density. We estimate the variance V2 according to the following term:
1 1 n n § X X · Vˆ 2 K¨ i j ¸ . 2 ¦¦ ¨ ¸ 2 S n h i 1 j 1 © h ¹ 1 The chosen smoothing parameter is h sn D, where s denotes the standard deviation of the sample data. In simple density estimation D 5 , but for the above Ahmad and Li (1997) suggest a larger value. We provide the results for D 6. This ˆ test is one-sided as the alternative hypothesis states that the statistic I2n is positive. Therefore, assuming a 5% level of significance, the critical value is 1.645. We compute the critical values of the inequality aversion parameter H where symmetry is not rejected for each distribution (see columns H min and H max in Table 1). In Table 1, we reject symmetry when the values Hmin and Hmax are unspecified. We can see that symmetry is not rejected for 92.14% of cases (469 of the 509 cases), so we can state with little margin of error that the symmetry condition is generally accepted. Note that the symmetry condition could be rejected even in fewer cases if a more general class than the power transformation would have been used. — 15 —
After testing for symmetry, we check the amplitude of the class of distributions H. Recall that the larger the class H, the less restrictive is our assumption in Theorem 1 and 2 (the invariance of the f or U function). For this task we look for the range >H1,H2 @ that is contained in the majority of intervals >H min,H max@ for the different countries and years. In particular, we compute the number of intervals >H min,H max@ that contain a particular aversion parameter H. The results in relative terms are presented in Graph 1. Considering the number of distributions that are symmetric under an increasing and concave transformation (469) we obtain that the range [0.95, 1.06] is contained by the 80% or more of intervals >H min,H max@. In the same manner, the range [0.89, 1.14] is contained by the 70% or more of intervals >H min,H max@. This means that any of the aversion parameters in the range [0.95, 1.06] allow us to rank at least the 80% of cases in our sample. In other words, an egalitarian social decision-maker with an aversion parameter in the range [0.95, 1.06] can make a decision that is consistent with the median voter result over the 80% or more of distributions. It is worth noting that the value H 1 is inside the 81.02% of intervals >H min,H max@. That is, 380 distributions out of 469 can be ranked by the aversion parameter H 1.
Graph 1 RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF THE AVERSION PARAMETER H CONTAINED IN AN INTERVAL [HMIN, HMAX]
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70 frequency
0.65
Relative 0.60
0.55
0.50
0.80 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.20 ɸvalue
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We check further this result by estimating the correlation between the evaluation function for a particular aversion parameter and the median income. We know from section 3 that the social evaluation function under consideration will be a strictly increasing function of the median income if the considered aversion parameter allows us to transform the income distribution into a symmetric distribution. However, we cannot compute such aversion parameter because we can only estimate an interval >H min,H max@ for which the distribution is symmetric under a strictly (and concave) transformation. Consequently, the class of distributions H over which we want to make comparisons with the same transformation will be wide if the correlation between the median income and the social evaluation function for a particular aversion parameter is large. We compute for every aversion parameter H, the correlation between the median income and the social evaluation function for all the distributions with an interval
>H min,H max@ that contains H. The conclusion is that the assumption is not very restrictive in practice. The optimal value H* is computed as the most probable H for which symmetry is not rejected. In Graph 1 we show that the optimal parameter H* generally ranges from 0.8 to 1.2. Therefore, the optimal inequality aversion parameter moves in the neighborhood of the log transformation H 1 . In addition, we test for normality of the transformed distributions at the optimal value of the parameter H. In particular, we use the Jarque–Bera statistic to measure the difference in the skewness and kurtosis of the series relative to the normal distribution. H 1 means that normality is rejected, while H 0 means that normality is not rejected. Note that the rejection of symmetry implies the rejection of normality, but not vice versa. We do not generally accept normality for our transformed data as we reject the null hypothesis of normality for 83.50% of cases (425 of the 509 cases). Finally, in Table 1 we provide the level of welfare W computed at the optimal value of the parameter H, the median income m , the mean income P and the Gini index. We can see that median income captures welfare empirically well. In fact, median income rather than mean income constitutes a good proxy for social welfare. Moreover, we know that not only efficiency but also equity explains social welfare. Consequently, the use of the median value could be of great interest to other fields like macroeconomics, where academics usually apply the mean income to represent an income distribution, and by doing so only consider efficiency.
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Graph 2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE OPTIMAL AVERSION PARAMETER
5. DISCUSSION
The issue of ranking distributions is implicit in the essence of the political economy literature. In fact, we can view changes in income distributions as the result of a political process, likely a majority voting mechanism. However, income distributions have been traditionally ranked according to a set of axioms, as represented by a social evaluation function, and this constitutes the essence of welfarism. This approach, however, is an ad hoc methodology based on a set of “desirable” assumptions or axioms. This paper attempts to reconcile both approaches and, in doing so, provide a political economy rationale to the classical social welfare literature. More specifically, we propose a set of sufficient conditions under which a particular additive and concave utilitarian social evaluation function is consistent with the outcome of majority voting. In particular, we restrict our attention to the class of income distributions that are symmetric under strictly increasing and concave transformations, where lognormal distributions are a particular case. In fact, as shown in the paper, symmetry, monotonicity and concavity are substantially more general assumptions than lognormality. An interesting potential consequence is the apparent stability of tax schedules in democratic societies. Tax schemes in democratic economies are viewed commonly as the outcome of a political process, say majority voting. We also — 18 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales observe that tax schedules are stable. However, a majority winner does not typically exist as electoral cycles are the rule (see Bucovetsky, 1991, Piketty, 1993, Hiddriks, 2001 and Grandmont, 2006). One possible explanation for this paradox emerges from this paper. Our main result states that the outcome of majority voting is consistent with the maximization of a utilitarian social evaluation function. This welfare function depends on an aversion parameter to relative inequality. Therefore, the stability of a tax system will eventually depend on the stability of the corresponding inequality aversion parameter. It appears reasonable to assume that the parameter of aversion to inequality in a society is stable throughout time. However, more research on this issue is required. We also provide an easy method to compute the aversion parameter to inequality in a society. In fact, we have calculated in our empirical exercise the aversion parameter to inequality for a panel of 116 countries. Our results provide an estimate of the order of magnitude that the aversion parameter can have in practice, and this may be useful for empirical researchers. This also opens new lines of inquiry, for example, numerical aversion parameters calculated in the manner proposed may be an appropriate input, amongst other factors, to measure the demand for redistribution. Finally, we propose the use of median income as a proxy for social welfare. The advantage of applying median income instead of mean income is that not only efficiency but also “implicit equity” is considered.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1 Provided that X´ and Y´ are symmetrically distributed, that is, X´ and, Y´S the quantile functions QX´ and QY´ satisfy: Q p k Q p Q p Q p k X´ m X´ X´ m X´ X´ m X´ X´ m X´ , (3) Q p k Q p Q p Q p k Y´ m Y´ Y´ mY´ Y´ m Y´ Y´ mY´ , (4) 1 2 n 1 ½ for every k ® , ,, ¾ . Note that QX´ pm mX´ and QY´ pm mY´ . ¯ n n 2n ¿ X´ Y´ Moreover, the gain function of passing from X to Y is as follows: 1 1 gi y i x i f Q Y´ i n f Q X´ i n , for all i 1, 2,,n . Note that the inverse of f always exists because the function f is strictly increasing. Consequently, we obtain the result of majority voting over X and Y by the following voting function: 1 1 1 f QY´ i n f QX´ i n ! 0 ° 1 1 vi ® 0 f QY´ i n f QX´ i n 0 , ° 11 f 1 Q i n f 1 Q i n 0 ¯ Y´ X´ for all i 1, 2,,n . Equivalently:
1 Q Y´ i n Q X´ i n ! 0 ° vi ® 0 QY´ i n Q X´ i n 0 , ° ¯ 1 QY´ i n QX´ i n 0 for all i 1, 2,,n . First, we prove that majority voting ends with a tie if the median incomes are equal, that is: n m m v 0. Y X ¦i 1 i We know that: 1 1 m Y m X { f Q Y´ pm Y´ f Q X´ pm X´ , or equivalently:
mY mX { mY´ mX´ . (5) Subtracting (3) from (4), we obtain the following expression:
>Q Y´ pm Y´ k Q X´ pm X´ k @ m Y´ m X´
mY´ mX´ >QY´ pmY´ k QX´ pmX´ k @,
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1 2 n 1½ for all k ® , ,, ¾. As we assume the median incomes for X and Y are ¯n n 2n ¿ equal, we can apply expression (5). We obtain the following:
QY´ pmY´ k QX´ pmX´ k >QY´ pmY´ k QX´ pmX´ k @ (6) 1 2 n 1½ for all k ® , ,, ¾. Expression (6) ensures that for any given k, two ¯n n 2n ¿ equidistant (from the median) individuals exist whose votes go in opposite directions. Moreover, the median income does not change from X to Y according to expression (5), so the median voter votes zero. Accordingly, the n number of positive and the number of negative votes are equal, i.e., v 0 . ¦i 1 i We now prove the majority voting result when median incomes are unequal: n m ! m v ! 0. Y X ¦i 1 i 1 1 We know that mX f mX´ and mY f mY´ . Therefore, the medians of the original distributions X and Y are ordinal equivalents to the medians of the transformed distributions X´ and Y´ , in particular, mY ! mX { mY´ ! mX´ .
Given that mY´ ! mX´ , there always exists a symmetric distribution Y´´S such that mY´´ mX´ , from which Y´ is obtained by giving the transfer
t mY´ mX´ to everyone. Consequently, from Y´´ to Y´ , all individuals improve so Y´ is strictly preferred to Y´´ , i.e., Y´ Y´´ . However, from X´ to Y´´ , we obtain a technical tie provided that the median value does not change (see the proof of (A)). In this case, the percentage of winners and losers is the same, in n 1 particular . Accordingly, from X´ to Y´ , an improvement for a percentage 2n n 1 of the population is guaranteed. However, the effect for another 2n n 1 percentage of the population is ambiguous. The result of majority voting 2n will decisively rely on the median voter. Overall, from X´ to Y´ more than fifty percent of the population win because the median voter changes his or her vote in favor of the profile Y´ . Consequently, the profile Y wins the election, i.e., n v ! 0 . ¦i 1 i n m ! m v 0 . Y X ¦i 1 i The proof is analogous to the proof of (B). Finally, we prove that the reverse is true, that is: n (A’) v 0 m m , ¦i 1 i Y X n (B’) v ! 0 m ! m , ¦i 1 i Y X — 22 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
n (C’) v 0 m m . ¦i 1 i Y X n We know from statement (A) that v z 0 mz m . Moreover, we ¦i 1 i Y X n have v d 0 m d m from statement (B). Therefore, if we consider ¦i 1 i Y X statements (A) and (B) together, we obtain statement (C’). In the same manner, we can infer (B’) from statements (A) and (C). Finally, we obtain (A’) by n considering v d 0 m d m from statement (B) and ¦i 1 i Y X n v 0 m m from statement (C’). In an analogous manner, (A’) can be ¦i 1 i Y X also obtained by considering statements (B’) and (C).
— 23 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
TABLE 1
Country Year H İmin İmax İ* W m ȝ Gini
Albania 1996 C 1 0.74 1.23 0.98 132.0 131.5 150.7 0.2782 Albania 2002 C 1 0.71 1.28 1.00 119.3 119.0 135.2 0.3246 Albania 2005 C 0 0.77 1.30 1.04 134.3 134.0 160.7 0.2886 Algeria 1988 C 1 0.85 1.44 1.15 92.6 93.0 122.7 0.3836 Algeria 1995 C 1 0.72 1.19 0.95 98.1 97.6 119.0 0.3483 Angola 2000 C 1 - - 0.83 35.3 34.5 60.4 0.5702 Argentina-Urban 1986 I 1 0.74 1.14 0.94 385.6 383.9 526.0 0.5126 Argentina-Urban 1992 I 1 0.78 1.06 0.92 277.5 275.0 381.2 0.4888 Argentina-Urban 1996 I 1 0.77 1.04 0.90 248.5 245.5 357.1 0.4332 Argentina-Urban 1998 I 1 0.79 0.97 0.88 230.9 227.9 337.5 0.4435 Argentina-Urban 2002 I 1 - - 0.86 156.2 153.4 237.8 0.4734 Argentina-Urban 2005 I 1 0.73 0.98 0.86 222.4 220.0 325.0 0.4867 Armenia 1996 I 0 0.86 1.29 1.08 75.1 75.0 104.9 0.3414 Armenia 1998 C 1 0.89 1.52 1.21 61.5 61.8 78.0 0.3224 Armenia 2002 C 1 0.97 1.62 1.30 63.2 63.5 80.5 0.4288 Armenia 2003 C 1 1.03 1.74 1.40 65.4 65.8 82.1 0.3468 Azerbaijan 1995 C 1 0.63 1.20 0.92 71.7 71.8 86.4 0.3540 Azerbaijan 2001 C 0 0.91 1.44 1.18 86.9 86.9 110.4 0.1652 Azerbaijan 2005 C 1 0.95 2.21 1.60 125.7 125.8 134.6 0.3422 Bangladesh 1991 C 1 0.78 1.56 1.17 31.4 31.4 35.6 0.2989 Bangladesh 1995 C 1 1.02 1.73 1.39 33.9 33.9 40.9 0.3005 Bangladesh 2000 C 0 1.05 1.65 1.36 34.7 34.7 41.9 0.2568 Bangladesh 2005 C 0 1.13 1.73 1.44 38.4 38.4 46.8 0.2957 Belarus 1988 I 1 0.47 1.29 0.88 282.8 282.7 304.4 0.2989 Belarus 1993 I 0 0.61 1.32 0.96 189.1 188.7 203.9 0.2924 Belarus 1997 I 1 0.65 1.19 0.92 89.5 89.3 98.8 0.2760 Belarus 1998 I 1 0.64 1.32 0.98 154.7 155.2 179.2 0.2251 Belarus 2000 C 1 0.71 1.34 1.03 176.0 176.0 204.9 0.2215 Belarus 2002 C 1 0.62 1.28 0.95 231.6 231.7 265.5 0.2580 Belarus 2005 C 1 0.55 1.21 0.88 276.9 276.6 309.8 0.2968 Benin 2003 C 0 0.92 1.41 1.17 39.7 39.6 51.7 0.3736 Bhutan 2003 C 1 1.03 1.27 1.15 62.8 62.4 92.1 0.4506 Bolivia 1997 I 1 0.7 0.98 0.84 113.5 112.4 192.9 0.5715 Bolivia 1999 I 1 - - 0.70 102.9 100.5 166.5 0.5646 Bolivia 2002 I 1 0.68 0.97 0.82 103.5 102.5 179.2 0.5616 Bolivia 2005 I 1 0.68 0.89 0.78 117.4 115.0 195.2 0.5676 Bosnia and Herz. 2001 C 1 0.67 1.39 1.03 307.7 308.0 350.2 0.2752 Bosnia and Herz. 2004 C 1 0.73 1.21 0.97 281.6 280.7 344.4 0.3513 Botswana 1985 C 1 - - 1.00 56.0 55.3 92.3 0.5286 Botswana 1993 C 1 1.00 1.22 1.11 62.2 61.7 115.1 0.5652 Brazil 1981 I 1 - - 0.93 110.3 108.2 188.1 0.5597 Brazil 1984 I 1 - - 0.96 95.7 93.8 167.4 0.5840 Brazil 1987 I 1 - - 0.91 119.9 117.4 211.3 0.5716 Brazil 1990 I 1 - - 0.87 133.4 130.1 239.2 0.5709 Brazil 1993 I 1 - - 0.89 139.2 135.9 243.6 0.5639 Brazil 1996 I 1 - - 0.87 155.1 151.0 268.8 0.5408 Brazil 1999 I 1 - - 0.90 146.5 143.6 252.9 0.5545 Brazil 2002 I 1 - - 0.91 152.3 149.4 261.2 0.5613 Brazil 2005 I 1 0.86 1.03 0.95 158.7 156.8 264.8 0.5711 Bulgaria 1989 C 1 0.57 1.39 0.98 472.5 472.5 515.1 0.3361 Bulgaria 1994 C 1 0.58 1.50 1.04 268.2 269.4 296.8 0.2850 Bulgaria 1997 C 1 0.82 1.64 1.24 134.9 135.2 154.1 0.2316 Bulgaria 2001 C 1 0.52 1.09 0.80 175.7 175.5 206.1 0.2392 Bulgaria 2003 C 1 0.61 1.39 1.00 178.0 178.7 204.6 0.2580 I: Income; C: Consumption; Herz.: Herzegovina.
Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Country Year H Em¡. w m Gini
B urkina Faso 1994 C LOó 136 1.22 24.6 24.6 38.6 03806 B urkina Faso 1998 e 1 L06 158 1.33 26.5 26.6 39.2 0.4351 B urkina Faso 2003 e o o.93 1.45 L2{1 34.5 34.6 45.7 0.4783 Burundi 1992 e o o.s4 138 1.11 21.3 212 25.8 03232 Burundi 1998 e o.67 12 1 0.94 18.1 18.1 23.9 0.4068 Burundi 2006 e 135 L63 1.49 22.6 22.6 28.5 03269 Cambodia 1994 e o 122 1.76 L5{1 38.7 38.8 5L8 03990 Cambodia 2004 e o u o 152 1.31 45.1 45.0 62.4 0.4299 Cameroon 1996 e 1 L06 L42 u: 37.4 37.4 55.4 0.4833 Cameroon 2001 e 0.93 129 1.1 2 53.4 532 75. 1 0.4267 Cape Verde 2001 e 0.94 122 L09 76.5 76.1 11 7.7 0.5957 Central AfricaRep. 1993 e 0.89 12.8 12.5 23.8 03888 Central A frica Rep. 2003 e 0.84 L09 0.91 30.4 30.1 41.1 0.523 1 Chad 2002 e 0.81 123 L02 3L4 312 40.6 0.5 172 Chile 1987 0.95 1.14 1.04 125.1 123.6 2 12.1 0.5260 Chile 1990 0.89 L1 7 L03 170.5 169.0 2822 0.524 1 Chile 1994 0.89 L1 7 L03 195.3 193.6 321.8 0.5244 Chile 1996 0.93 L14 L04 22 L8 219.9 366.5 0.5302 Chile 1998 0.9 1 L1 3 L02 234.3 23 L6 389.7 0.5365 Chile 2000 0.89 120 LOS 236.2 234.7 390.9 03708 Chile 2003 0.89 124 LO/ 234.6 234.1 3862 03509 China- Rur.~l 198 1 o 0.53 123 0.8E 19.0 18.9 20.7 02457 China- Rur.~l 1984 o 0.62 127 0.95 25.8 25.8 28.8 01662 China- Rur.~l 1987 o 0.63 1.14 0.8E 31.1 3LO 35.3 02958 China-Rur.~l 1990 e o o_9o 153 1.22 28.3 283 33.6 01962 China-Rur.~l 1993 e o o.9 t 151 1.21 30.3 303 36.3 03048 China-Rur.~l 1996 e o o.92 L44 l.lE 38.5 38.4 47.3 03293 China-Rur.~l 1999 e o o.92 1.4 1 1.1 1 37.8 37.7 47.4 03464 China- Rur.~l 2002 e o o.96 1.4 1 1.19 42.1 42.0 54.7 03273 China- Rur.~l 2005 e o o.9o 138 1.14 56.1 55.9 70.3 03398 China-Urban 198 1 033 1.4 1 0.81 39.7 39.8 41.7 0.1825 China-Urban 1984 0.43 152 0.91 45.5 45.5 47.8 0.1759 China-Urban 1987 033 138 0.8: 54.7 54.8 57.9 0.1993 China-Urb:m 1!:1!:10 e 1 o.s9 131 0.05 53.2 53.2 58.8 0.2531 China-Urban 1993 e 1 o.69 137 L03 64.0 63.9 73. 1 01802 China-Urban 1996 e o 0.1 1 134 L03 74.4 743 85.4 02866 China-Urban 1999 e o_7o 128 LO{I 84.7 84.6 99.3 03106 China-Urban 2002 e 0.75 133 L04 107.8 107.8 129.7 0.4440 China-Urban 2005 e 0.75 132 L04 130.8 130.9 159.9 0.5469 Colombia 1995 0.8 1 1.1 9 LO! 11 9.3 120.6 204.4 0.56 17 Colombia 1996 0.76 1.12 0.94 117.0 11 7.1 193.4 0.5146 Colombia 1999 0.77 1.1 2 0.94 104.3 104.3 178.5 0.5623 Colombia 2000 0.75 L07 0.91 109.6 109.0 184.5 0.5132 Colombia 2003 0.77 L03 0.9{1 126.3 124.6 218.0 0.4976 Colombia-Urban 1980 0.76 L07 0.92 116.8 116.5 204.8 0.5373 Colombia-Urban 1988 0.74 L04 0.89 14 1.5 140.2 2192 0.5324 Colombia-Urban 1989 0.80 1.12 0.96 146.4 145.3 2323 0.5476 Colombia-Urban 1991 0.74 L04 0.89 159.2 157.8 2392 0.5887 Comoros 2004 e 0.9 1 124 LOE 41.7 4L8 8L9 03038 Congo Dem Rep. 2005 e o.o1 038 0.11 48.8 48.7 50.2 0.4843 Congo Rep. 2005 e o.o t 031 0. 12 56.8 56.7 58.0 0.4829 Costa R.ka 198 1 0.62 0.88 0.7: 89.5 88.5 1223 0.4600 Cos t~ Ric-;¡ 1QRó O O?Q o 71 04<1 11ó ') 11 ó o DR Q 04óQ1 Costa Rica 1990 1 0.63 LOO 0.8{1 143.1 142.0 1923 0.4557 Costa Rica 1993 0.66 LO! 0.84 150.1 149.6 2062 0.4691 1: Inrome; C: Consumption.
— 25 — Country Year H w m Gini
Costa Rica 1996 0.67 1.01 0.84 164.0 162.8 227.5 03389 Costa Rica 1998 0.73 1.04 0.89 198.3 196.6 282.5 0.4468 Costa Rica 2000 0.70 1.06 0.8E 185.5 184.6 258.5 0.4530 Costa Rica 2001 0.75 1.07 0.91 210.8 208.8 310.5 0.4605 Costa Rica 2003 0.66 1.01 0.83 216. 1 214.2 311.5 0.4585 Costa Rica 2005 0.75 1.06 0.91 214.4 212.8 302.4 0.4052 Cote d'Ivoire 1985 e 0.83 1.07 0.9S 105.7 104.8 137.7 03939 COte d'Ivoire 1987 e 0.94 127 1.11 92.4 92.0 122.4 03623 Cote d'Ivoire 1988 e 0.79 121 1.00 78.8 78.5 98. 1 03611 Cote d'Ivoire 1993 o 0.86 132 1.09 67.9 67.6 85.7 03 588 COte d'Ivoire 1995 e o 0.86 131 1.09 63 .6 63.4 79.9 0.4 197 Cote d'Ivoire 1998 e o 0.90 136 1.1 3 61.8 61.7 85.9 03065 Cote d'Ivoire 2002 e 0.92 136 l.IS 64 .4 64.6 96.4 02858 Croatia 1988 0.52 133 0.92 472.7 472 .3 510.9 02713 Croatia 1998 e 0.59 127 0.93 458.3 458.0 510.8 02270 Croatia 1999 0.64 1.42 1.03 36 1.3 362.8 411.1 02655 Croatia 2001 e 0.72 131 1.02 366.4 366.0 429.1 0.1 921 Croatia 2005 e 0.65 129 0.91 604.0 603.7 688.9 02577 Czech Republi c. 1988 o 0.66 1.46 l.Ot 458.6 457.7 487.8 02504 Czech Republi c. 1993 o 1.08 1.89 1.50 363.7 364.4 423.9 02998 Czech Republic 1996 1 0.77 1.72 1.2S 430.1 433.4 490.7 02962 Djibouti 1996 e 0.0 1 0.59 0.21 158.8 157.3 165.7 0.5027 Djibouti 2002 e 0.0 1 0.50 0.23 98.7 98.0 102.4 0.4967 Dominican Rep. 1986 I 0.69 1.04 0.81 97.0 96.8 137.4 0.4829 Dominican Rep. 1989 0.90 1.1 7 1.03 105.5 104.5 160.7 0.4860 Dominican Rep. 1992 0.88 130 1.09 138.6 139.4 2162 0.47 17 Dominican Rep. 1996 0.79 1.1 2 0.9S 152.1 150.9 2213 0.4658 Dominican Rep. 2000 0.80 1.09 0.9S 189.6 187.9 292.4 0.4852 Dominican Rep. 2003 0.8 3 1.1 7 1.00 148.6 147.8 230.1 03107 Dominican Rep. 2005 0.85 1.1 1 0 . 9~ 158.4 156.9 236.7 03107 Ecuador 1987 0.0 1 030 0.12 200. 1 200.0 204.1 03083 Ecuador 1994 0.01 024 0.09 176.8 177.0 179.4 03103 Ecuador 1998 0.01 024 0.00 190.5 190.5 193.1 03078 E= dor 2003 1 0.0 1 02!! 0.11 263.8 263.4 268.7 03080 Ecuador 2005 1 0.0 1 025 0.09 239.6 239.5 2433 02905 Egwt 1990 e o o.96 1.54 1.2S 82.2 82.1 99.7 03126 Egypt 1995 C O LOS 1.80 l AS 79.9 80.0 96.4 03122 Egwt 1999 e u o 1.81 1.41 88.1 88.5 109.8 0.5036 Egwt 2004 e 1.03 1.76 1.4 1 89.6 90.0 110.4 0.5089 El Salvador 1989 0.55 0.94 0.73 130.6 129.5 175.8 0.4760 El Salvador 1995 0.71 1.09 0.90 11 3. 1 112.8 166.1 0.4598 El Salvador 1996 0.73 1.07 0.89 11 0.1 108.9 167.8 0.4805 El Salvador 1998 0.89 124.2 122.3 189.7 0.504 1 El Salvador 2000 0.65 0.97 0.81 141.8 14 1.0 211.1 0.5089 El Salvador 2002 0.64 0.95 0.79 138.2 137.2 2063 03624 El Salvador 2003 1 0.62 1.00 0.80 120.2 11 9.4 169.8 03610 Estonia 1988 o 030 0.98 0.63 410.9 410.2 433.6 03527 Estonia 1993 1 0.80 134 1.01 205.6 206.6 2683 02281 Estonia 1995 e o 057 1.09 0.83 198.3 197.7 2243 03819 Estonia 1998 e o.86 129 l.OE 225.0 224.0 285.7 02984 Estonia 2000 e 0.1 1 122 0.96 218.5 218.3 271.0 03674 Estonia 2002 e 0.12 12 1 0.96 213.6 212.8 264.0 02903 f.!;fon i~ ?004 e o 70 l ?l o Q/ ?4R fi ?4R R 10') 4 O?RRO E!hiopia 1981 e 0.95 1.68 1.33 30.7 30.9 37.8 03126 E!hiopia 1995 e 1.02 1.64 1.34 32.4 32.6 43.7 03766 I: Inc.ome ; C: Consumption.
— 26 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Country Year H t.n¡p w m Gini
Elhiopia 1999 e o.ss 1.65 1.21 35.4 35.6 42.2 0.4015 Elhiopia 2005 e 1 o_96 1.72 1.35 42.4 42.6 50.7 0.4904 Gabon 2005 e o o.88 131 1.1{1 109.6 109.3 146.9 0.4579 Gambia 1998 e 0.95 26.6 263 39.9 03935 G:unbia 2003 e 0.86 1.1 7 1.02 54.2 53.9 78.3 03988 Georgia 1996 e 0.59 1.1 3 0. 8 ~' 134.1 134.3 164.1 03638 Georgia 1999 e 0.64 1.11 0.81 103.7 103.3 128.1 03736 Georgia 2002 e 0.67 1.1 5 0.91 81.7 81.6 104.8 0.4 172 Georgia 2005 e 0.65 1.11 0.8f 89.5 89.4 114.9 03471 Ghana 1987 e 0.7 1 124 0.9~ 37.6 37.6 45.9 03524 Ghana 1988 e 0.76 129 1.03 38.4 38.4 47.5 03719 Ghana 1991 e 0.8 1 129 1.05 37.6 37.5 47.9 0.40 16 Ghana 1998 e 0.77 1.02 0.90 48.3 47.9 62.0 03910 Gh:ma 2005 r. 0.73 1.1 5 0.94 57.3 57.1 76.3 0.5192 Guatemala 1987 I 0.82 1.09 0.95 36.4 36.0 62.7 0.53 12 Guatemala 1989 0.77 0.96 0.86 53.9 52.7 93.9 0.5 140 Guatemala 1998 0.78 1.16 0.91 100.2 100.0 164.5 0.5263 Guatemala 2000 0.8 1 1.19 1.01 106.0 106.8 173.9 0.5544 Guatemala 2002 0.76 1.06 0.91 106.4 105.5 172.4 0.5734 Guatemala 2006 0.83 1.13 0.9f 11 9.9 11 9.0 191.0 03471 Guinea 1991 e o.66 0.74 0.7{1 11.1 10.9 14.8 0.4 191 Guinea 1994 e o 0.9 1 134 1.1 3 47.9 47.8 63 .6 0.54 11 GninP.:l ? 00~ e O O!! R 1 ?Q 1 0~' /tí/ / tí 1 1tí 1 04'i10 Guinea-Bissau 1991 e 1 o.65 0.95 0.79 49.7 49.1 79.2 0.4660 Guinea-Bissau 1993 e o.94 1.40 l.IE 35.9 36.1 53.4 0.4256 Guinea-Bissau 2002 e o.78 132 1.05 38.7 38.7 47.8 0.4728 Guyana 1992 0.83 136 1.1{1 127. 1 129.5 1963 0.5657 Guyana 1998 0.63 1.14 0.8~ 132.5 132.6 177.6 0.5084 Haiti 2001 0.76 LOS 0.9{1 34.5 342 60.3 0.4989 Honduras 1990 0.81 1.03 0.92 46.8 46.1 79.0 0.5 193 Honduras 1992 0.7 9 0.97 0.8E 62.0 61.0 98.4 0.5479 Honduras 1994 0.78 1.05 0.92 70.3 69.6 114.0 0.53 12 Honduras 1997 0.74 1.1 1 0.92 103.6 103.0 161.0 0.5498 Honduras 1999 0.72 1.05 0.8~ 11 2.9 112.2 170.1 0.5285 Honduras 2003 0.88 1.04 0.9~' 95.7 943 152.7 0.53 11 Honduras 2005 0.7 1 0.97 0.84 95.6 94.5 156.9 0264 1 Honduras-U roan 1986 0.89 1.03 0 . 9~' 120.8 11 9.2 197.7 02949 Hungary 1987 0.58 1.60 1.1{1 432. 1 432.9 466.8 02061 Hungary 1989 o 0.81 1.57 1.19 415.2 414.7 466.0 02464 Hungary 1993 I 0.84 1.71 1.29 294.4 296.5 343.7 02702 Hungary 1998 e 0.57 136 0.91 230.4 230.6 254.0 02462 Hungary 1999 e 0.75 1.55 1.1 6 242.4 243.4 279.0 02709 Hungary 2002 e o_7o 1.43 1.06 292.9 292.8 330.6 02930 Hungary 2004 e o.7o 137 1.03 329.8 329.9 382.8 0365 1 India-Rural 1977 e 1.02 1.76 1.4{1 28.9 292 36.6 03258 India-Rural 1993 e 0.92 1.68 1.3 1 36.9 37.0 43.3 02778 India-Rural 2004 e 1.05 1.80 1.43 40.6 40.7 49.1 03349 lndia-Urban 1977 e 1 o.87 1.45 1.1 6 35.4 35.5 44.3 03444 lndia-Urban 1983 e o o.9o 1.48 1.2{1 38.9 38.9 47.7 03243 lndia-Urban 1987 e O LOO 1.48 1.24 39.6 39.6 50. 1 03455 lndia-Urban 1993 e o o.94 1.44 1.2{1 43.7 43.7 54.2 02704 lndia-Urban 2004 e o 0.97 1.41 1.19 47.6 47.5 61.4 03208 Indonesia-Rural 1984 e 0.11 1.46 1.12 31.3 31.4 36.4 02551 Indonesia-Rural 1987 e o o.93 1.66 1.3{1 29.6 29.6 34.4 03372 Indonesia-Rural 1990 e o.9o 138 1.14 35.5 353 40.3 02882 I: lncome; C: Consumption.
— 27 — Country Year H t.n¡p w m Gini
Indonesia-Rural 1993 e o o.s7 L64 u e 34.8 34.7 39.6 03844 Indonesia-Rural 1996 e o o.9o L64 1.2E 39.4 39.4 45.7 02868 Indonesia-Rural 1999 e 1 0.76 1.59 l.lf 36.6 36.7 4 LO 03258 Indonesia-Rural 2002 e o o_9s 1.71 1.34 45.5 45.5 52.1 02670 Indonesia-Rural 2005 e o.86 1.55 1.21 52.9 53.0 62.2 03389 Indonesia-U roan 1984 e 0.79 139 L09 35.0 35.0 42.3 02546 Indonesia-U roan 1987 e o o_s7 L44 u e 32.2 322 39.1 03441 Indonesia-U roan 1990 e 1 o.92 137 1.1 5 39.9 39.7 49.3 02694 Indonesia-U roan 1993 e o o.98 L45 1.22 40.0 39.9 50.3 03643 Indonesia-U roan 1996 e o o_9s L43 L21 46.4 462 59.9 02430 Indonesia-U roan 1999 e o L03 L64 1.34 43.8 43.8 55.7 03392 Indonesia-U roan 2002 e o L02 1.52 1.21 55.8 55.7 70.0 03745 Indonesia-U roan 2005 e o o_9s L46 L23 65.1 65.0 86.9 0 .4596 Ir:m 1986 r. 0.82 1.1 7 1.0(1 152.5 152.0 2203 0.4249 Iran 1990 e 0.77 1.18 0.91 146.2 145.6 1982 0.4189 Iran 1994 e 0.82 121 L02 168.8 168.0 228.7 0 .4307 Iran 1998 e 0.82 1.16 L OO 179.6 179.0 246.7 0.4668 Iran 2005 e 0.77 124 LOl 153.5 153.3 194.9 0.4404 Jamaica 1988 e 0.77 1.23 LOl 137.6 138.1 187.1 0 .41 15 Jamaica 1990 e 0.92 12 1 L06 161.7 160.5 217.9 03899 Jamaica 1993 e 0.66 1.19 0.92 12 L6 12 L6 147.8 0.4187 Jamaica 1996 e 0.85 138 1.1 2 14 L4 14 L9 187.8 03503 hrmir.:l 1QQQ e o!n 1 ?7 1 o~ 1!!1 Q 1R 1 tí ?'i1 4 04?'iQ Jamaica 2002 e 0.93 1.1 7 L05 182.4 180.9 2693 03643 Jamaica 2004 e o.9 1 1.22 LOI 188.5 187.4 267.0 03544 Jordan 1986 e 1 o.94 128 1.11 174.9 173.9 219.0 0.4 165 Jordan 1992 e o o.93 138 u e, 12 L6 12 L5 169.0 03522 Jordan 1997 e o o.9 1 L47 1.19 11 7.3 11 7.3 148.8 03787 Jordan 2002 e 1 o.88 130 L09 133.7 133.0 172.7 03439 Jordan 2006 e o o.94 L47 1.21 158.9 159.0 205.7 03339 Kazakhstan 1988 o 0.58 1.1 8 0.8E 302.5 30L6 3322 02560 Kazakhstan 1993 I 0.75 0.95 0.85 109.4 108.8 127.8 03320 Kazakhstan 1996 e o.68 L09 0.8E 113.4 112.7 135.9 03488 Kazakhstan 2001 0.74 1.2 1 0.9~ 13 L4 130.9 1532 03093 Kazakhstan 2002 e 0.76 122 L OO 101.1 100.8 123.0 0.4 114 Kazakhstan 2003 e 0.74 1.19 0.91 11 0.9 110.5 132.7 0.4573 Kenya 1992 e 0.89 126 L OE 49.3 493 85.1 0.5362 Kenya 1994 e 0.76 1.24 LOl 56.9 56.9 76.0 0.4073 Kenya 1997 e 0.96 132 1.14 69.4 69.1 95.1 03616 Kenya 2005 e 0.83 125 L04 74.4 74.4 108.4 03120 Kyrgyz Rep. 1988 I 1.52 167.0 167.2 193.7 03240 KyTgyz Rep. 1993 e 0.66 0.93 0.79 109.5 108.1 167.7 02557 KyTgyz Rep. 1998 e o.s4 1.22 L03 52.1 51.9 64.4 03535 Kyrgyz Rep. 1999 e o o.79 132 L06 68.9 68.8 84.2 0.5238 Kyrgyz Rep. 2002 e o.83 129 L06 48.6 48.4 57.4 03379 Kyrgyz Rep. 2004 e 1 o_s7 12 1 L05 60.8 60.5 72.6 03171 Lao PDR 1992 e o o.98 L64 1.32 35.7 35.7 42.8 02959 Lao PDR 1997 e 1 o.96 1.58 1.2E 38.2 38.4 48.1 03363 LaoPDR 2002 e o 0.97 1.56 1.21 41.2 412 50.4 03502 Latvia 1988 o 0.4 1 1.18 0.79 57 1.1 570.2 608.9 03507 Latvia 1993 0.83 132 L OE 172.8 172.2 195.5 02229 Latvia 1996 I 0.48 132 0.90 194.3 195.2 224.9 02683 Latvia 1998 e o.63 1.24 0.94 177.8 178.2 21 L8 03004 Larvia 2002 e 0.7 1 128 LOO 246.6 246.7 303.8 03286 Latvia 2004 e 0.69 121 0.95 284.4 284.3 3472 0.5126 1: Income; C: Consumption.
— 28 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Country Year H Em¡. w m Gini
Lesotho 1986 e o.s6 0.97 0.91 46.0 45.1 75.7 0541 S Lesolho 1993 e 0.92 34.1 335 59.8 05669 Leso!ho 1995 e 0.79 46.9 45.6 89.4 0.6169 Lesotho 2002 e o.74 0.92 0.83 46.6 45.8 70.4 OJ 66S L iberia 2007 e 0.10 131 L O! 21.1 213 26.8 03183 Lithuania 1988 I 0.46 126 0. 8 ~· 295.6 295.4 317.0 03517 Lithuania 1993 I 0.76 1.52 1.14 100. 1 101.2 122.8 02224 Lilhuania 1996 e o.66 132 LOO 205.2 205.9 243.1 03223 Lithuania 1998 e o.62 122 0.92 208.9 208.6 239.5 03156 Lithuania 2002 e o.67 124 0.9S 204.6 204 .3 240.5 02981 Lithuania 2004 e o.69 120 0.94 250. 1 249.7 304.9 03391 Macedonia, FYR 1998 e 059 L02 0.80 172.4 172.5 19L6 03805 Macedoni a, FYR 2000 e o.s6 LIO 0.83 143.0 142.7 168.8 03 821 Macedonia, FYR 2002 r. 0.72 LIS 0.93 222.7 221.5 280.4 02761 Macedonia, FYR 2003 e 0.74 Ll7 0.9S 215.9 214.7 273.4 0.46 18 Madagascar 19SO e 1.34 14.S 14.9 23.6 0.41 66 Madagascar 1993 e o.o 1 0.46 0.21 38.3 38.1 39.7 0.4084 Madagascar 1999 e o.86 Ll7 LO! 19.5 193 25.9 0.468 1 Madagascar 2001 e L03 21.2 2LO 30.9 OJ O!! Madagascar 2005 e L07 1.74 L42 27.6 283 40.9 03760 Mala\\i 1997 e o.94 1.4 1 LI E 17.9 18.1 27.7 0.4703 Mala\\Í 2004 e o 0.97 L4 7 1.22 25.3 253 33.3 03729 M~by:i~ 1QR4 ORó 1 ?1 104 1 'i7 'i 1'ió Q ?l~ 1 04óRO Malaysia 19S7 0.88 121 LOS 156.2 155.4 226.1 0.4550 Malaysia 19S9 0.89 124 LO/ 154.5 153.7 2212 0.4462 Malaysia 1992 0.90 LIS L03 168.5 167.3 24S.S 0.4627 i\•1al aysi a 1995 0.88 Ll6 L02 172.9 17L6 255.0 0.4699 Malaysia 1997 0.87 Ll4 LO! 213.8 212.3 317.8 0.4754 Malaysia 2004 0.79 Ll4 0.9~· 161.7 160.5 2022 03928 Mali 1994 e LOO 124 1.1 2 14.7 14.6 22.8 0380S Mali 2001 e 0.85 Ll4 LOO 31.7 3L5 41.1 0.4840 Mali 2006 e 0.82 124 L03 37.8 37.6 48.4 0.4304 Mauritania 19S7 e 0.60 0.98 O. lE 46.2 45.9 60.3 0.4628 Mauritania 1993 LO! 1.50 1.26 42.6 43.0 65.9 OJ83S Mauritania 1995 e 0.67 LIS 0.91 63 .1 62.9 77.8 03663 Mauritania 2000 e 0.8 1 Ll2 0.96 68.9 683 87.3 0.4776 Mexico 1984 e 0.88 LOO 0.93 103. 1 IOL9 143.7 0.4439 Mexico 1989 0.81 Ll4 0.91 153.8 152.7 250.9 0.4624 Mexico 1992 e 0.87 Ll2 LOO 16 1.5 160.0 246.9 0.4522 Mexico 1994 e 0.92 Ll6 L04 163. 1 161.7 254.6 05259 Mexico 1996 e 0.82 LIS LOO 132.8 132.4 195.1 0.495S Mexico 1998 e 0.79 L09 0.94 138. 1 136.S 201.7 0.4920 Mexico 2000 e 0.82 LIS LO! 160.8 160.6 249.6 0.4971 Mexico 2002 e o.8s LIS L02 159.4 !S8.4 238.7 0.4692 Mexico 2004 e 0.1 1 LIS 0.93 215.6 215.6 300.0 0.475S Mexico 2006 e 1 o_s7 122 LOS 217.4 216.5 319.1 03622 Moldova Rep. 1988 o 05 1 12S 0.8E 60.8 60.8 66.1 02397 Moldova Rep. 1992 0.73 0.89 0.81 73. 1 72.7 86.2 03477 Moldova Rep. 1997 e 0.67 Ll8 0.93 76. 1 76.1 93.9 03620 Moldova Rep. 1999 e 0.74 124 LOO 4 1.7 4L8 52.0 OJ60S Moldova Rep. 2002 e o.8o 121 LO! 72.2 72.0 90.0 03473 Moldova Rep. 2004 e 0.8 1 13S LOE 84.9 84.8 1053 03248 Mongolia 1995 e 0.67 LIO 0.8E 68.3 68.0 80. 1 OJ26S Mongolia 1998 e 0.47 L06 0.76 47.8 47.7 53.7 02996 Mongolia 2002 e 0.66 Lll 0.89 73. 1 72.8 85.5 OJ28S I: Income; C: Consumption_
— 29 — Country Year H w m Gini
Mongo tia 2005 e 0.60 u o 0.8S 62. 1 61.9 72.4 0394S Morocco 1984 e 1 0.84 L44 LI S 84.2 84.7 1102 03920 Morocco 1990 e o 0.9 1 134 Ll3 11 6.2 11 5.9 IS2.5 03744 Morocc.o 1998 0.87 128 LOE 98.1 97.7 127.6 03842 Morocco 2000 e 0.93 132 1.1 3 98.4 98.0 131.0 03846 Morocco 2007 e 0.93 L44 Ll9 11 6.6 11 6.8 I S7.0 0.42 50 Mozambique 1996 e 0.88 137 Ll3 20.2 202 28.4 0.4422 Mozambique 2002 e 0.94 1.4 5 L2{1 23.5 23.8 34.7 0.6901 Namibia 1993 LOS 44.0 43.5 118.9 03620 Nepa1 1995 o 1.03 LSS 1.29 28.7 28.7 37.5 0.4422 Nepa1 2003 e 1 U 9 L58 1.39 35.2 352 53. 1 0.2809 Nepa1-Rural 1984 o 0.88 1.49 Ll9 25.0 2S.O 29.1 03 525 Nepa1-Urban 1984 L2E 38.0 37.9 48.6 0.4204 Nicaragua 1993 0.72 LOO 0 .86 63.9 63.1 104.5 0 .4834 Nicaragua 1998 0.75 U 4 0.94 80.2 80.0 126.7 0.4990 Nicaragua 2001 0.7 9 U 6 0.91 82.2 81.9 123.4 0.5439 Nicaragua 2005 0.8 1 120 LO! 91.6 91.9 143.8 0.5 123 Niger 1992 e 0.84 1.48 Lll 26.7 26.9 33.8 0.4 187 Niger 1994 e 0.8S 127 LOt 22 .3 222 29.8 03480 Niger 2005 e 0.9 1 L40 Ll6 28.6 28.7 40.0 0.4033 Nigeria 1985 e 0.84 LOO 0.92 36.1 3S.9 45.3 03829 Nigeria 1992 e 0.70 0.79 0.74 40.6 40.0 S3.0 0.4446 Ni e~~ 1QQ(i e O Rl 1 ?Q 1 06 ?ó 4 ?ó 'i 1R O 0 44 'il Nigeria 2003 e 0.7 3 u o 0.91 29.3 29.1 38.8 0.2929 Pakistan 1987 e 0.92 156 L24 30.2 302 37.2 0.2786 Pakistan 1990 e o 0.86 L46 Ll6 3LI 31.0 37.8 0.2920 Pakistan 1992 e O U3 L83 1.5{1 51.4 515 62.4 02768 Pakistan 1996 o u o L86 L5{1 38.7 38.8 46.1 03162 Pakistan 1998 e 1.03 1.74 L4{1 48.9 49.1 60.8 03230 Pakistan 2001 e LOS 1.78 L43 44 .S 44.7 53.8 03239 Pakistan 2004 e 0.0 1 0.88 0.4{1 68.7 67.8 72.8 0.5480 Panama 1979 0.89 154.9 1S2.S 223.6 0.5347 Panama 1991 0.7 3 0.81 0.71 137.0 133.7 220.7 0.5479 Panama 1995 0.7 1 0.93 0.82 174.S 171.9 287.0 0.4791 Panama 1996 0.72 0.89 0.81 164.5 161.6 265.7 0.5545 Panama 1997 e 0.7 1 0.92 0.81 188.4 185.6 264.8 05530 Panama 2000 0.7S 0.96 0.8S 169.8 166.7 2783 05476 Panama 2002 0.86 166.2 163.1 273.0 0.476S Panama 2004 0.84 179.9 176.2 284.7 05564 Paraguay 1990 0.7 6 U! 0.94 11 8.7 118.0 ! SU 05187 Paraguay 1995 0.77 LOO 0.89 153.5 1SL6 267.4 0.55 16 Paraguay 1997 0.7 1 0.83 0.71 11 7.5 114.7 1883 05482 Paraguay 1999 0.69 LOO 0.83 142.S 14 1.0 234.0 03913 Paraguay 2002 0.70 LOO 0.8S 11 9.5 11 8.4 2015 0.5669 Paraguay 2005 0.73 L06 0.90 !S6.1 !S5 .2 2463 0.5239 Peru 1985 e 0.80 U 9 LOO 216.2 215.5 304.0 0.5007 Peru 1990 0.8S 134 Ll{l 180.3 181.3 2S0.8 0.4436 Peru 1994 e 0.83 u o 0.91 13S.9 134.9 187.4 0.4203 Peru 1996 0.7 1 U 2 0.91 12S. l 125.0 174.6 0.4382 Peru 2002 0.7 9 u o 0.94 123.2 122.2 1983 0.4487 Peru 2005 0.84 U 2 0.9E 139. 1 137.8 2153 0.4464 Philippines 1985 e LOO 130 LI S S0.2 so_o 67.5 0.4343 Philippines 1988 e LI S S5. 1 S4.7 73.7 0.430S Philippines 1991 e L04 12 4 Ll4 S6.4 S6J 79.0 03989 Philippines 1994 e LO! 12 0 Lll S9.5 S92 8L8 03969 1: Income; C: Consumption.
— 30 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Country Year H Em¡. w m Gini
Phi lippines 1996 e LO/ 69.9 692 97. 1 0.425 1 Phi1ippines 1997 e L03 122 1.1 3 70.3 69.9 10L8 0.4 176 Philippines 2000 e L06 1.18 1.1 2 69.4 68.9 1003 0.4463 Phi lippi nes 2003 e L06 71.2 70.7 99.5 0.4305 Philippines 2006 1.01 69.9 692 97.1 02713 Po1and 1985 0.56 135 0.96 30L6 301.9 332.7 03102 Po1and 1987 0.33 360.6 350.4 377.7 03181 Po1and 1989 0.58 127 0.93 383.7 383.5 427.7 03240 Po1and 1992 033 LOO 0.6: 177.8 177.5 199.0 03340 Po1and 1996 0.85 L46 1.1 6 11 2.8 11 2.8 136.4 03419 Po1and 1999 o 0.79 133 Loe, 246.2 245.6 295.5 02479 Po1and 2002 o 0.78 131 LO: 242.3 241.8 293.8 02653 Po1and 2005 o 0.79 1.29 L04 247.4 246.5 3023 03073 Romaní a 1989 032 1.1 5 0.73 323.8 324.5 3463 0.2978 Romanía 1992 039 1.11 0.74 213.2 213. 1 230.9 03091 Romaní a 1994 0.59 130 0.94 87. 1 873 98.6 03082 Romanía 1998 0.0 1 0.85 0.3E 139.3 137.2 1473 02312 Romanía 2000 0.60 122 0.91 102.3 102.3 1172 02527 Romaní a 2002 0.62 1.24 0.93 114.3 114.5 133.1 02808 Romanía 2005 1 0.72 138 LO: 158.8 159.3 187.8 02781 Rus si a 1988 o 0.44 1.18 0.81 133.8 133.6 144.0 02356 Rus si a 1993 0.77 12 1 LOü 198.4 200.0 290.8 0.4439 R n•o;í~ 1QQ(i o (iQ 1 1-) o Q? ?01 (i JO? O no~ o ~-) 1 Q Rus si a 1999 0.68 L09 0.89 151.3 150.6 1863 03687 Rus si a 2002 0.72 1.1 4 0.93 189.5 188.6 229.9 0.4622 Rus si a 2005 1 0.75 1.16 0.9: 239.5 238. 1 297.7 03695 Rwanda 1984 o L04 L66 1.3t' 32.6 32.5 38.5 0.4450 Rwanda 2000 o 0.92 135 1.14 22.3 223 32.4 02825 Senegal 1991 0.85 L07 0.9t' 26.8 26.5 43.0 0.5622 Senegal 1994 1 0.93 L46 1.21 35.4 35.6 48.2 0.5466 Senegal 2001 O LOO 1.45 1.22 4 1.9 41.8 57.0 0.5763 Senegal 2005 0.76 120 0.9E 51.6 5L4 65.9 03967 Sierra Leone 2003 0.97 120 L09 37.0 36.7 50.2 03836 S1ovakRep. 1988 o 0.65 1.55 l.lü 401.9 401.3 4293 03959 S1ovakRep. 1992 0.48 L63 LOe, 377. 1 378.1 402.6 0.5206 S1ovak Rep. 1996 020 1.1 7 0.61 325.0 324.7 349.8 0.4132 S1ovenia 1987 0.64 L42 L03 466.7 466.2 510.8 0.1 940 S1ovenia 1993 0.86 1.59 L23 468.9 469.4 550.1 0.1916 S1ovenia 1998 o 0.69 131 L01 545.4 544.9 620.7 02468 S1ovenia 2002 0.65 127 0.9t' 571.5 570.7 651.5 02871 S1ovenia 2004 0.7 1 132 L01 582.6 582.0 68 L4 03057 South A frica 1993 0.96 90.0 88.9 164.9 02326 SouthAfrica 1995 L03 87.0 85.9 150.9 02843 SouthAfrica 2000 1 0.9: 83.9 82.9 147.6 02799 Sri Lanka 1985 o 0.84 1.42 1.1 3 59.9 59.7 72.0 03907 Sri Lanka 1990 1 LOO 1.67 1.34 61.1 612 75. 1 03179 Sri Lanka 1995 o L01 1.5 1 1.21 64 .5 64.4 8L6 03132 Sri Lanka 2002 o L02 1.49 1.26 71.8 71.7 97.3 03434 St. Luda 1995 0.66 1.07 o.8e, 74.5 742 97.2 0.4 154 Suriname 1999 0.7 3 LOO 0.86 11 7.7 11 6.2 1802 0.5128 Swazi1and 1994 0.83 1.12 0.9E 17.5 173 3L6 0.4840 Swazi1and 2000 0.89 12 1 LO: 29.6 29.4 45.2 0.5700 Tajikistan 1999 0.65 132 LOü 40.8 40.9 47.9 03207 Tajikistan 2003 o 0.76 129 L03 46.7 46.6 55.5 03295 Tajikistan 2004 o 0.80 132 L06 60.5 603 73.0 03080 1: Income; C: Consumption.
— 31 — Country Year H t.n¡p w m Gini
Tanzania 1991 0.67 124 o.9e 27.4 27.4 32.S 03399 Tanzania 2000 0.74 125 L OO ISA ISA 22.3 03316 Thailand 1981 0 .94 120 L07 70.5 699 99.4 0.4067 Thailand 1988 L07 134 L21 73.3 73.0 103.6 0.4111 Thai1and 1992 0.00 0.00 1.24 100.1 99.7 1483 0.4386 Thailand 1996 L04 130 1.1 7 118.4 11 7.8 ! 6S2 0.4227 Thailand 1999 LIS 11 2.9 11 2.3 157.6 0.4466 Thailand 2002 L04 132 LH 122.2 12 L6 1672 0.4197 Thailand 2004 LO! 132 1.1 7 13S. l 134.6 IS6.0 0.4231 Timor-Leste 2001 0.97 129 1.14 36.S 36.6 48.4 03851 Togo 2006 0.85 130 L OE 4 5.5 45.4 55.6 03379 Trinidad and Tobago 1988 0.9S 192.9 193.1 263.5 0.4346 Trinidad and Tobago 1992 0.68 L09 O.SE 144.S 144.0 184.0 03951 Tunisia 1985 0.8 5 1.27 1.06 100.0 99.7 137.2 03986 Tunisia 1990 0.75 U 9 0.97 IIS.3 114.9 149.0 0.4209 Tunisia 1995 0.79 LI S LOO 114.3 114.1 151.5 03928 Tunisia 2000 0.82 123 L03 136.1 135.6 1792 0.4072 Turl
— 32 — Instituto de Estudios Fiscales
Country Year H !injp Em ;n E* w m !1 Gini
Venezue1a-Urban 2005 0.64 LOS 0.84 134.6 134.2 187.7 0.4746 Vietnam 1992 o LO! L47 1.24 3Ll 3U 39.4 03691 Vietnam 1998 o LO! 1.5 1 1.26 38.7 38.7 49.0 03475 Vietnam 2002 LOS 137 1.22 45.5 453 58.8 03 654 Vietnam 2004 L04 136 L 2{1 60.0 59.7 79.0 03800 Vietnam 2006 0.93 129 Ll1 63 .9 63.5 8L6 03440 Yemen Kep. 1991 UD Ll) LUl 1 llU.O !lO.!! J))_l 03011 Yemen Rep. 1998 0.69 122 0.9t' 75.2 752 89.6 03831 Yemen Rep. 2005 0.88 L49 Ll9 63.5 63.9 82. 1 03291 Zambia 1991 0.62 0.75 0.69 28.1 27.9 47.3 0.5121 Zambia 1993 0.81 0.86 0.84 26.9 26.5 4LO 0.4049 Zambia 1996 0.82 U8 LO! 29.6 295 44.4 0.4924 Zambia 1998 0.7 6 Lll 0.94 33.7 33.5 53.1 0.5144 Zambia 2002 0.89 137 Ll3 29.4 29.4 40.0 0.4790 Zambia 2004 0.74 L06 0.90 28.0 27.8 4L8 0.5792 1: Income; C: ConSUlllflli--
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REFERENCES
AHMAD, I.A. AND LI, Q. (1997): “Testing the symmetry of an unknown density function by the kernel method”, Journal of Nonparametric Statistics, n.º 7, pp. 279-293. AITCHISON, J. and BROWN, J.A.C. (1957): The Lognormal Distribution with special reference to its use in economics. Cambridge University Press. ALESINA, A. and RODRIK, D. (1994): “Distributive politics and economic growth”, Quaterly Journal of Economics, n.º 109, pp. 465-490. ARROW, K.J. (1950): “A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare”, Journal of Political Economy, n.º 58, pp. 328-346. – (1965): Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Helsinki: Yrjö Hahnsson Foundation. ATKINSON, A.B. (1970): “On the Measurement of Inequality”, Journal of Economic Theory, n.º 2, pp. 244-263. BLACK, D. (1948): “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”, Journal of Political Economy, n.º 56, pp. 23-34. BUCOVETSKY, S. (1991): “Choosing tax rates and public expenditure levels using majority rule”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 46, pp. 113-131. CARBONELL, O. and KLOR E. (2003): “Representative democracy and marginal rate progressive income taxation”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 87, pp. 1137-1164. COWELL, F.A. (1995): Measuring Inequality. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hemstead. CUKIERMAN, A. and MELTZER, A.H. (1991): “A Political Theory of Progressive Taxation”, in Meltzer, A., Cukierman, A. and S.F. Richard, Political Economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford. DALTON, H. (1920): “Measurement of the inequality of incomes”, Economic Journal, n.º 30, pp. 348-361. DE DONDER, P. and HINDRIKS, J. (2003): “The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 87, pp. 2491-2505. GIBRAT (1957): ” On economic inequalities”, International Economic Papers, n.º 7, pp. 53-70. GOUVEIA, M. and OLIVER, D. (1996): “Voting over flat taxes in an endowment economy”, Economics Letters, n.º 50, pp. 251-258. GRANDMONT, J-M. (2006): “Fiscally stable income distributions under majority voting and bargaining sets”, Advances in Mathematical Economics, n.º 8, pp. 215-230. — 35 —
HARSANYI, J.C. (1953): “Cardinal utility in welfare economics and theory of risk taking”, Journal of Political Economy, n.º 61, pp. 434-435. HINDRIKS, J. (2001): “Is there a demand for progressive taxation?”, Economics Letters, n.º 73, pp. 43-50. KOLM, S. (1969): “The optimal production of social justice”, in Margolis, J. and H. Guitton, Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and Consumption and their Relations to the Private Sectors, London: Macmillan, pp. 145-200. MARHUENDA, F. and ORTUÑO, I. (1995): “Popular Support for Progressive Taxation”, Economics Letters, n.º 48, pp. 319-324. MELTZER A.H. and RICHARDS, S.F. (1981): “A rational theory of the size of government”, Journal of Political Economy, n.º 89, pp. 914-927. PERSSON, T. and TABELLINI, G. (1994): “Is inequality harmful for growth?: theory and evidence”, American Economic Review, n.º 84, pp. 600-621. PIKETTY, T. (1993): “Dynamic voting equilibrium, political conservatism and income redistribution”, DELTA working paper 9310, Paris. PRATT, J.W. (1964): “Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large”, Econometrica, n.º 32, pp. 122-136. ROBERTS, K. (1977): “Voting over Income Tax Schedules”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 8, pp. 329-340. ROEMER, J. (1999): “The democratic political economy of progressive income taxation”, Econometrica, n.º 67, pp. 1-19. ROMER, T. (1975): “Individual welfare, majority voting and the properties of a linear income tax”, Journal of Public Economics, n.º 4, pp. 163-186. SCHWARTZ, J.E. (1985): “The utility of the cube root of income”, Journal of Official Statistics, n.º 1, pp. 5-19.
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SÍNTESIS
PRINCIPALES IMPLICACIONES DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
En este trabajo se propone un resultado que pone en relación la economía política y el bienestar. En concreto, se muestra como una función de bienestar social utilitarista es consistente con el resultado de una votación mayoritaria. De esta forma se puede justificar el uso de una determinada función de bienestar social por parte del gobierno en base a un proceso de votación. Para llegar a este resultado el único supuesto relevante que tenemos que exigir es que las distribuciones de la renta sean simétricas bajo una transformación positiva y cóncava. Un ejemplo de este tipo de transformación sería la conocida distribución lognormal aunque no la única. Una primera ventaja de esta metodología es que nos permite obtener el parámetro de aversión a la desigualdad directamente consistente con la votación mayoritaria. Una segunda ventaja de la metodología propuesta es que permite utilizar la mediana como una aproximación sintética al grado de bienestar de una economía. Estas ventajas son relevantes, no solo desde el punto de vista teórico, a la hora de modelizar, sino también prácticos, a la hora de calcular de forma sencilla no solo el nivel de bienestar de una economía sino también su aversión a la desigualdad de renta.
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NORMAS DE PUBLICACIÓN DE PAPELES DE TRABAJO DEL INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES
Esta colección de Papeles de Trabajo tiene como objetivo ofrecer un vehículo de expresión a todas aquellas personas interasadas en los temas de Economía Pública. Las normas para la presentación y selección de originales son las siguientes: 1. Todos los originales que se presenten estarán sometidos a evaluación y podrán ser directamente aceptados para su publicación, aceptados sujetos a revisión, o rechazados. 2. Los trabajos deberán enviarse por duplicado a la Subdirección de Estudios Tributarios. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Avda. Cardenal Herrera Oria, 378. 28035 Madrid. 3. La extensión máxima de texto escrito, incluidos apéndices y referencias bibliográfícas será de 7000 palabras. 4. Los originales deberán presentarse mecanografiados a doble espacio. En la primera página deberá aparecer el título del trabajo, el nombre del autor(es) y la institución a la que pertenece, así como su dirección postal y electrónica. Además, en la primera página aparecerá también un abstract de no más de 125 palabras, los códigos JEL y las palabras clave. 5. Los epígrafes irán numerados secuencialmente siguiendo la numeración arábiga. Las notas al texto irán numeradas correlativamente y aparecerán al pie de la correspondiente página. Las fórmulas matemáticas se numerarán secuencialmente ajustadas al margen derecho de las mismas. La bibliografía aparecerá al final del trabajo, bajo la inscripción “Referencias” por orden alfabético de autores y, en cada una, ajustándose al siguiente orden: autor(es), año de publicación (distinguiendo a, b, c si hay varias correspondientes al mismo autor(es) y año), título del artículo o libro, título de la revista en cursiva, número de la revista y páginas. 6. En caso de que aparezcan tablas y gráficos, éstos podrán incorporarse directamente al texto o, alternativamente, presentarse todos juntos y debidamente numerados al final del trabajo, antes de la bibliografía. 7. En cualquier caso, se deberá adjuntar un disquete con el trabajo en formato word. Siempre que el documento presente tablas y/o gráficos, éstos deberán aparecer en ficheros independientes. Asimismo, en caso de que los gráficos procedan de tablas creadas en excel, estas deberán incorporarse en el disquete debidamente identificadas.
Junto al original del Papel de Trabajo se entregará también un resumen de un máximo de dos folios que contenga las principales implicaciones de política económica que se deriven de la investigación realizada.
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PUBLISHING GUIDELINES OF WORKING PAPERS AT THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES
This serie of Papeles de Trabajo (working papers) aims to provide those having an interest in Public Economics with a vehicle to publicize their ideas. The rules gover ning submission and selection of papers are the following: 1. The manuscripts submitted will all be assessed and may be directly accepted for publication, accepted with subjections for revision or rejected. 2. The papers shall be sent in duplicate to Subdirección General de Estudios Tributarios (The Deputy Direction of Tax Studies), Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (Institute for Fiscal Studies), Avenida del Cardenal Herrera Oria, nº 378, Madrid 28035. 3. The maximum length of the text including appendices and bibliography will be no more than 7000 words. 4. The originals should be double spaced. The first page of the manuscript should contain the following information: (1) the title; (2) the name and the institutional affi liation of the author(s); (3) an abstract of no more than 125 words; (4) JEL codes and keywords; (5) the postal and e-mail address of the corresponding author. 5. Sections will be numbered in sequence with arabic numerals. Footnotes will be numbered correlatively and will appear at the foot of the corresponding page. Mathematical formulae will be numbered on the right margin of the page in sequence. Bibliographical references will appear at the end of the paper under the heading “References” in alphabetical order of authors. Each reference will have to include in this order the following terms of references: author(s), publishing date (with an a, b or c in case there are several references to the same author(s) and year), title of the article or book, name of the journal in italics, number of the issue and pages. 6. If tables and graphs are necessary, they may be included directly in the text or alternatively presented altogether and duly numbered at the end of the paper, before the bibliography. 7. In any case, a floppy disk will be enclosed in Word format. Whenever the document provides tables and/or graphs, they must be contained in separate files. Furthermore, if graphs are drawn from tables within the Excell package, these must be included in the floppy disk and duly identified.
Together with the original copy of the working paper a brief two-page summary highlighting the main policy implications derived from the research is also requested.
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ÚLTIMOS PAPELES DE TRABAJO EDITADOS POR EL INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS FISCALES 2004 01/04 Una propuesta para la regulación de precios en el sector del agua: el caso español. Autores: M.a Ángeles García Valiñas y Manuel Antonio Muñiz Pérez. 02/04 Eficiencia en educación secundaria e inputs no controlables: sensibilidad de los resultados ante modelos alternativos. Autores: José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Francisco Pedraja Chaparro y Javier Salinas Jiménez. 03/04 Los efectos de la política fiscal sobre el ahorro privado: evidencia para la OCDE. Autores: Montserrat Ferre Carracedo, Agustín García García y Julián Ramajo Hernández. 04/04 ¿Qué ha sucedido con la estabilidad del empleo en España? Un análisis desagregado con datos de la EPA: 1987-2003. Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 05/04 La seguridad del empleo en España: evidencia con datos de la EPA (1987-2003). Autores: José María Arranz y Carlos García-Serrano. 06/04 La ley de Wagner: un análisis sintético. Autor: Manuel Jaén García. 07/04 La vivienda y la reforma fiscal de 1998: un ejercicio de simulación. Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 08/04 Modelo dual de IRPF y equidad: un nuevo enfoque teórico y su aplicación al caso español. Autor: Fidel Picos Sánchez. 09/04 Public expenditure dynamics in Spain: a simplified model of its determinants. Autores: Manuel Jaén García y Luis Palma Martos. 10/04 Simulación sobre los hogares españoles de la reforma del IRPF de 2003. Efectos sobre la oferta laboral, recaudación, distribución y bienestar. Autores: Juan Manuel Castañer Carrasco, Desiderio Romero Jordán y José Félix Sanz Sanz. 11/04 Financiación de las Haciendas regionales españolas y experiencia comparada. Autor: David Cantarero Prieto. 12/04 Multidimensional indices of housing deprivation with application to Spain. Autores: Luis Ayala y Carolina Navarro. 13/04 Multiple ocurrence of welfare recipiency: determinants and policy implications. Autores: Luis Ayala y Magdalena Rodríguez. 14/04 Imposición efectiva sobre las rentas laborales en la reforma del impuesto sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 15/04 Factores determinantes de la distribución personal de la renta: un estudio empírico a partir del PHOGUE. Autores: Marta Pascual y José María Sarabia. 16/04 Política familiar, imposición efectiva e incentivos al trabajo en la reforma de la imposición sobre la renta personal (IRPF) de 2003 en España. Autoras: María Pazos Morán y Teresa Pérez Barrasa. 17/04 Efectos del déficit público: evidencia empírica mediante un modelo de panel dinámico para los países de la Unión Europea. Autor: César Pérez López. — 43 —
18/04 Inequality, poverty and mobility: Choosing income or consumption as welfare indicators. Autores: Carlos Gradín, Olga Cantó y Coral del Río. 19/04 Tendencias internacionales en la financiación del gasto sanitario. Autora: Rosa María Urbanos Garrido. 20/04 El ejercicio de la capacidad normativa de las CCAA en los tributos cedidos: una primera evaluación a través de los tipos impositivos efectivos en el IRPF. Autores: José María Durán y Alejandro Esteller. 21/04 Explaining. budgetary indiscipline: evidence from spanish municipalities. Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 22/04 Local governmets' asymmetric reactions to grants: looking for the reasons. Autor: Santiago Lago-Peñas. 23/04 Un pacto de estabilidad para el control del endeudamiento autonómico. Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera 24/04 Una medida de la calidad del producto de la atención primaria aplicable a los análisis DEA de eficiencia. Autora: Mariola Pinillos García. 25/04 Distribución de la renta, crecimiento y política fiscal. Autor: Miguel Ángel Galindo Martín. 26/04 Políticas de inspección óptimas y cumplimiento fiscal. Autores: Inés Macho Stadler y David Pérez Castrillo. 27/04 ¿Por qué ahorra la gente en planes de pensiones individuales? Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López-Laborda. 28/04 La reforma del Impuesto sobre Actividades Económicas: una valoración con microdatos de la ciudad de Zaragoza. Autores: Julio López-Laborda, M.ª Carmen Trueba Cortés y Anabel Zárate Marco. 29/04 Is an inequality-neutral flat tax reform really neutral? Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 30/04 El equilibrio presupuestario: las restricciones sobre el déficit. Autora: Belén Fernández Castro.
2005 01/05 Efectividad de la política de cooperación en innovación: evidencia empírica española. Autores:Joost Heijs, Liliana Herrera, Mikel Buesa, Javier Sáiz Briones y Patricia Valadez. 02/05 A probabilistic nonparametric estimator. Autores: Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 03/05 Efectos redistributivos del sistema de pensiones de la seguridad social y factores determinantes de la elección de la edad de jubilación. Un análisis por comunidades autónomas. Autores: Alfonso Utrilla de la Hoz y Yolanda Ubago Martínez. 14/05 La relación entre los niveles de precios y los niveles de renta y productividad en los países de la zona euro: implicaciones de la convergencia real sobre los diferenciales de inflación. Autora: Ana R. Martínez Cañete. 05/05 La Reforma de la Regulación en el contexto autonómico. Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez. — 44 —
06/05 Desigualdad y bienestar en la distribución intraterritorial de la renta, 1973-2000. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Antonio Jurado Málaga y Francisco Pedraja Chaparro. 07/05 Precios inmobiliarios, renta y tipos de interés en España. Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 08/05 Un análisis con microdatos de la normativa de control del endeudamiento local. Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez, Pedro Pascual Arzoz y Fermín Cabasés Hita. 09/05 Macroeconomics effects of an indirect taxation reform under imperfect competition. Autor: Ramón J. Torregrosa. 10/05 Análisis de incidencia del gasto público en educación superior: nuevas aproximaciones. Autora: María Gil Izquierdo. 11/05 Feminización de la pobreza: un análisis dinámico. Autora: María Martínez Izquierdo. 12/05 Efectos del impuesto sobre las ventas minoristas de determinados hidrocarburos en la economía extremeña: un análisis mediante modelos de equilibrio general aplicado. Autores: Francisco Javier de Miguel Vélez, Manuel Alejandro Cardenete Flores y Jesús Pérez Mayo. 13/05 La tarifa lineal de Pareto en el contexto de la reforma del IRPF. Autores: Luis José Imedio Olmedo, Encarnación Macarena Parrado Gallardo y María Dolores Sarrión Gavilán. 14/05 Modelling tax decentralisation and regional growth. Autores: Ramiro Gil-Serrate y Julio López-Laborda. 15/05 Interactions inequality-polarization: characterization results. Autores: Juan Prieto-Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 16/05 Políticas de competencia impositiva y crecimiento: el caso irlandés. Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Carlos Garcimartín y Luis Rivas. 17/05 Optimal provision of public inputs in a second-best scenario. Autores: Diego Martínez López y A. Jesús Sánchez Fuentes. 18/05 Nuevas estimaciones del pleno empleo de las regiones españolas. Autores: Javier Capó Parrilla y Francisco Gómez García. 19/05 US deficit sustainability revisited: a multiple structural change approach. Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio. Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 20/05 Aproximación a los pesos de calidad de vida de los “Años de Vida Ajustados por Calidad” mediante el estado de salud autopercibido. Autores: Anna García-Altés, Jaime Pinilla y Salvador Peiró. 21/05 Redistribución y progresividad en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: una aplicación al caso de Aragón. Autor: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta. 22/05 Estimación de los rendimientos y la depreciación del capital humano para las regiones del sur de España. Autora: Inés P. Murillo. 23/05 El doble dividendo de la imposición ambiental. Una puesta al día. Autor: Miguel Enrique Rodríguez Méndez. 24/05 Testing for long-run purchasing power parity in the post bretton woods era: evidence from old and new tests. Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández y Montserrat Ferré Cariacedo. — 45 —
25/05 Análisis de los factores determinantes de las desigualdades internacionales en las
emisiones de CO2 per cápita aplicando el enfoque distributivo: una metodología de descomposición por factores de Kaya. Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 26/05 Planificación fiscal con el impuesto dual sobre la renta. Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López Laborda. 27/05 El coste recaudatorio de las reducciones por aportaciones a planes de pensiones y las deducciones por inversión en vivienda en el IRPF 2002. Autores: Carmen Marcos García, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, Teresa Pérez Barrasa y César Pérez López. 28/05 La muestra de declarantes IEF-AEAT 2002 y la simulación de reformas fiscales: descripción y aplicación práctica. Autores: Alfredo Moreno, Fidel Picos, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, María Antiqueira y Lucía Torrejón. 2006 01/06 Capital gains taxation and progressivity. Autor: Julio López Laborda. 02/06 Pigou’s dividend versus Ramsey’s dividend in the double dividend literature. Autores: Eduardo L. Giménez y Miguel Rodríguez. 03/06 Assessing tax reforms. Critical comments and proposal: the level and distance effects. Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez y Jesús Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell. 04/06 Incidencia y tipos efectivos del impuesto sobre el patrimonio e impuesto sobre sucesiones y donaciones. Autora: Laura de Pablos Escobar. 05/06 Descentralización fiscal y crecimiento económico en las regiones españolas. Autores: Patricio Pérez González y David Cantarero Prieto. 16/06 Efectos de la corrupción sobre la productividad: un estudio empírico para los países de la OCDE. Autores: Javier Salinas Jiménez y M.ª del Mar Salinas Jiménez. 07/06 Simulación de las implicaciones del equilibrio presupuestario sobre la política de inversión de las comunidades autónomas. Autores: Jaime Vallés Giménez y Anabel Zárate Marco. 18/06 The composition of public spending and the nationalization of party sistems in western Europe. Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago.Peñas. 09/06 Factores explicativos de la actividad reguladora de las Comunidades Autónomas (1989-2001). Autores: Julio López Laborda y Jaime Vallés Giménez. 10/06 Disciplina credititicia de las Comunidades Autónomas. Autor: Roberto Fernández Llera. 11/06 Are the tax mix and the fiscal pressure converging in the European Union?. Autor: Francisco J. Delgado Rivero. 12/06 Redistribución, inequidad vertical y horizontal en el impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas (1982-1998). Autora: Irene Perrote. — 46 —
13/06 Análisis económico del rendimiento en la prueba de conocimientos y destrezas imprescindibles de la Comunidad de Madrid. Autores: David Trillo del Pozo, Marta Pérez Garrido y José Marcos Crespo. 14/06 Análisis de los procesos privatizadores de empresas públicas en el ámbito internacional. Motivaciones: moda política versus necesidad económica. Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 15/06 Privatización y liberalización del sector telefónico español. Autores: Almudena Guarnido Rueda, Manuel Jaén García e Ignacio Amate Fortes. 16/06 Un análisis taxonómico de las políticas para PYME en Europa: objetivos, instrumentos y empresas beneficiarias. Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 17/06 Modelo de red de cooperación en los parques tecnológicos: un estudio comparado. Autora: Beatriz González Vázquez. 18/06 Explorando la demanda de carburantes de los hogares españoles: un análisis de sensibilidad. Autores: Santiago Álvarez García, Marta Jorge García-Inés y Desiderio Romero Jordán. 19/06 Cross-country income mobility comparisons under panel attrition: the relevance of weighting schemes. Autores: Luis Ayala, Carolina Navarro y Mercedes Sastre. 20/06 Financiación Autonómica: algunos escenarios de reforma de los espacios fiscales. Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde, Javier Loscos Fernández, María Antiqueira y José Manuel Tránchez. 21/06 Child nutrition and multiple equilibria in the human capital transition function. Autores: Berta Rivera, Luis Currais y Paolo Rungo. 22/06 Actitudes de los españoles hacia la hacienda pública. Autor: José Luis Sáez Lozano. 23/06 Progresividad y redistribución a través del IRPF español: un análisis de bienestar social para el periodo 1982-1998. Autores: Jorge Onrubia Fernández, María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz, Santiago Díaz de Sarralde y César Pérez López. 24/06 Análisis descriptivo del gasto sanitario español: evolución, desglose, comparativa internacional y relación con la renta. Autor: Manuel García Goñi. 25/06 El tratamiento de las fuentes de renta en el IRPF y su influencia en la desigualdad y la redistribución. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 26/06 La reforma del IRPF de 2007: una evaluación de sus efectos. Autores: Santiago Díaz de Sarralde Míguez, Fidel Picos Sánchez, Alfredo Moreno Sáez, Lucía Torrejón Sanz y María Antiqueira Pérez. 27/06 Proyección del cuadro macroeconómico y de las cuentas de los sectores institucionales mediante un modelo de equilibrio. Autores: Ana María Abad, Ángel Cuevas y Enrique M. Quilis. 28/06 Análisis de la propuesta del tesoro Británico “Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU” y de sus implicaciones para la política económica en la Unión Europea. Autor: Juan E. Castañeda Fernández.
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29/06 Choosing to be different (or not): personal income taxes at the subnational level in Canada and Spain. Autores: Violeta Ruiz Almendral y François Vaillancourt. 30/06 A projection model of the contributory pension expenditure of the Spanish social security system: 2004-2050. Autores: Joan Gil, Miguel Ángel Lopez-García, Jorge Onrubia, Concepció Patxot y Guadalupe Souto. 2007 11/07 Efectos macroeconómicos de las políticas fiscales en la UE. Autores: Oriol Roca Sagalés y Alfredo M. Pereira. 02/07 Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: an analysis from the fiscal theory of the price level. Autores: Óscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 03/07 Contraste empírico del modelo monetario de tipos de cambio: cointegración y ajuste no lineal. Autor: Julián Ramajo Hernández. 04/07 An empirical analysis of capital taxation: equity vs. tax compiance. Autores: José M.a Durán Cabré y Alejandro Esteller Moré. 05/07 Education and health in the OECD: a macroeconomic approach. Autoras: Cecilia Albert y María A. Davia. 06/07 Understanding the effect of education on health across European countries. Autoras: Cecilia Albert y María A. Davia. 07/07 Polarization, fractionalization and conflict. Autores: Joan Esteban y Debraj Ray. 08/07 Immigration in a segmented labor market: the effects on welfare. Autor: Javier Vázquez Grenno. 09/07 On the role of public debt in an OLG Model with endogenous labor supply. Autor: Miguel Ángel López García. 10/07 Assessing profitability in rice cultivation using the Policy Matrix Analysis and profit efficient data. Autores: Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, Ernest Reig y Vicent Estruch. 11/07 Equidad y redistribución en el Impuesto sobre Sucesiones y Donaciones: análisis de los efectos de las reformas autonómicas. Autores: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta y Marta Melguizo Garde. 12/07 Valoración y determinantes del stock de capital salud en la Comunidad Canaria y Cataluña. Autores: Juan Oliva y Néboa Zozaya. 13/07 La nivelación en el marco de la financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas. Autores: Ana Herrero Alcalde y Jorge Martínez-Vázquez. 14/07 El gasto en defensa en los países desarrollados: evolución y factores explicativos. Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 15/07 Los costes del servicio de abastecimiento de agua. Un análisis necesario para la regulación de precios. Autores: Ramón Barberán Ortí, Alicia Costa Toda y Alfonso Alegre Val. 16/07 Precios, impuestos y compras transfronterizas de carburantes. Autores: Andrés Leal Marcos, Julio López Laborda y Fernando Rodrigo Sauco. — 48 —
17/07 Análisis de la distribución de las emisiones de CO2 a nivel internacional mediante la adaptación del concepto y las medidas de polarización. Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 18/07 Foreign direct investment and regional growth: an analysis of the Spanish case. Autores: Óscar Bajo Rubio, Carmen Díaz Mora y Carmen Díaz Roldán. 19/07 Convergence of fiscal pressure in the EU: a time series approach. Autores: Francisco J. Delgado y María José Presno. 20/07 Impuestos y protección medioambiental: preferencias y factores. Autores: María de los Ángeles García Valiñas y Benno Torgler. 21/07 Modelización paramétrica de la distribución personal de la renta en España. Una aproximación a partir de la distribución Beta generalizada de segunda especie. Autores: Mercedes Prieto Alaiz y Carmelo García Pérez. 22/07 Desigualdad y delincuencia: una aplicación para España. Autores:Rafael Muñoz de Bustillo, Fernando Martín Mayoral y Pablo de Pedraza. 23/07 Crecimiento económico, productividad y actividad normativa: el caso de las Comunidades Autónomas. Autor: Jaime Vallés Giménez. 24/07 Descentralización fiscal y tributación ambiental. El caso del agua en España. Autores: Anabel Zárate Marco, Jaime Vallés Giménez y Carmen Trueba Cortés. 25/07 Tributación ambiental en un contexto federal. Una aplicación empírica para los residuos industriales en España. Autores: Anabel Zárate Marco, Jaime Vallés Giménez y Carmen Trueba Cortés. 26/07 Permisos de maternidad, paternidad y parentales en Europa: algunos elementos para el análisis de la situación actual. Autoras: Carmen Castro García y María Pazos Morán. 27/07 ¿Quién soporta las cotizaciones sociales empresariales?. Una panorámica de la literatura empírica. Autor: Ángel Melguizo Esteso. 28/07 Una propuesta de financiación municipal. Autores: Manuel Esteban Cabrera y José Sánchez Maldonado. 29/07 Do R&D programs of different government levels overlap in the European Union. Autoras: Isabel Busom y Andrea Fernández-Ribas. 30/07 Proyecciones de tablas de mortalidad dinámicas de España y sus Comunidades Autónomas. Autores: Javier Alonso Meseguer y Simón Sosvilla Rivero. 2008 11/08 Estudio descriptivo del voto económico en España. Autores: José Luis Sáez Lozano y Antonio M. Jaime Castillo. 12/08 The determinants of tax morale in comparative perspective: evidence from a multilevel analysis. Autores: Ignacio Lago-Peñas y Santiago Lago-Peñas. 13/08 Fiscal decentralization and the quality of government: evidence from panel data. Autores: Andreas P. Kyriacou y Oriol Roca-Sagalés. 14/08 The effects of multinationals on host economies: A CGE approach. Autores: María C. Latorre, Oscar Bajo-Rubio y Antonio G. Gómez-Plana. — 49 —
15/08 Measuring the effect of spell recurrence on poverty dynamics. Autores: José María Arranz y Olga Cantó. 16/08 Aspectos distributivos de las diferencias salariales por razón de género en España: un análisis por subgrupos poblacionales. Autores: Carlos Gradín y Coral del Río. 17/08 Evaluating the regulator: winners and losers in the regulation of Spanish electricity distribution (1988-2002). Autores: Leticia Blázquez Gómez y Emili Grifell-Tatjé. 18/08 Interacción de la política monetaria y la política fiscal en la UEM: tipos de interés a corto plazo y déficit público. Autores: Jesús Manuel García Iglesias y Agustín García García. 19/08 A selection model of R&D intensity and market structure in Spanish forms. Autor: Joaquín Artés. 10/08 Outsourcing behaviour: the role of sunk costs and firm and industry characteristics. Autoras: Carmen Díaz Mora y Angela Triguero Cano. 11/08 How can the decommodified security ratio assess social protection systems?. Autor: Georges Menahem. 12/08 Pension policies and income security in retirement: a critical assessment of recent reforms in Portugal. Autora: Maria Clara Murteira. 13/08 Do unemployment benefit legislative changes affect job finding? Evidence from the Spanish 1992 UI reform act. Autores: José M. Arranz, Fernando Muñoz Bullón y Juan Muro. 14/08 Migraciones interregionales en España y su relación con algunas políticas públicas. Autora: María Martínez Torres. 15/08 Entradas y salidas de la pobreza en la Unión Europea: factores determinantes. Autores: Guillermina Martín Reyes, Elena Bárcena Martín, Antonio Fernández Morales y Antonio García Lizana. 16/08 Income mobility and economic inequality from a regional perspectiva. Autores: Juan Prieto Rodríguez, Juan Gabriel Rodríguez y Rafael Salas. 17/08 A note on the use of calendar regressors. Autor: Leandro Navarro Pablo. 18/08 Asimetrías y efectos desbordamiento en la transmisión de la política fiscal en la Unión Europea: evidencia a partir de un enfoque VAR estructural. Autor: Julián Ramajo. 19/08 Institutionalizing uncertainty: the choice of electoral formulas. Autores: Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba y Alberto Penadés. 20/08 A field experiment to study sex and age discrimination in selection processes for staff recruitment in the Spanish labor market. Autores: Rocío Albert, Lorenzo Escot, y José A. Fernández-Cornejo. 21/08 Descentralización y tamaño del sector público regional en España. Autor: Patricio Pérez. 22/08 Multinationals and foreign direct investment: main theoretical strands and empirical effects. Autora: María C. Latorre. — 50 —
23/08 Una aproximación no lineal al análisis del impacto de las finanzas públicas en el crecimiento económico de los países de la UE-15, 1965-2007. Autor: Diego Romero Ávila. 24/08 Consolidación y reparto de la base imponible del Impuesto sobre Sociedades entre los Estados Miembros de la Unión Europea: consecuencias para España. Autores: Félix Domínguez Barrero y Julio López Laborda. 25/08 La suficiencia dinámica del modelo de financiación autonómica en España, 2002-2006. Autores: Catalina Barceló Maimó, María Marquès Caldentey y Joan Rosselló Villalonga. 26/08 Ayudas públicas en especie y en efectivo: justificaciones y aspectos metodológicos. Autores: Laura Piedra Muñoz y Manuel Jaén García. 27/08 Las ayudas públicas al alquiler de la vivienda. un análisis empírico para evaluar sus beneficios y costes. Autores: Laura Piedra Muñoz y Manuel Jaén García. 28/08 Decentralization and spatial distribution of regional ecomonic activity: does equalization matter?. Autores: Santiago Lago-Peñas y Diego Martínez-López. 29/08 Childcare costs and Spanish mothers’s labour force participation. Autora: Cristina Borra. 30/08 Pro-poor economic growth, inequality and fiscal policy: the case of Spanish regions. Autores: Luis Ayala y Antonio Jurado. 2009 01/09 Does the balance of payments constrain economic growth?. Some evidence for the new EU members. Autores: Oscar Bajo-Rubio y Carmen Díaz-Roldán. 02/09 Imputación a valor de mercado de los rendimientos de la vivienda en Propiedad del IRPF. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Jorge Onrubia Fernández y María del Carmen Rodado Ruiz. 03/09 Income poverty and multidimensional deprivation: lessons from cross-regional analysis. Autores: Luis Ayala Cañón, Antonio Jurado y Jesús Perez-Mayo. 04/09 Reglas fiscales activas: el caso de España (1981-2007). Autor: Juan E. Castañeda Fernández. 05/09 Índices trimestrales de volumen encadenados, ajuste estacional y Bechmarking. Autores: Ana M.ª Abad, Ángel Cuevas y Enrique M. Quilis. 06/09 Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in OECD countries: matching spending wit revenue decentralization. Autores: Norman Gemmell, Richard Kneller e Ismael Sanz. 07/09 Una estimación del voto estratégico en las elecciones generales españolas, 2000-2008. Autores: Enrique García Viñuela y Joaquín Artés. 08/09 La tributación del transporte como instrumento frente al cambio climático. Autor: Miguel Buñuel González 09/09 The ins and outs of unemployment and the assimilation of recent immigrants in Spain. Autores: José I. Silva y Javier Vázquez. 10/09 Decomposing the determinants of health care expenditure: the case of Spain. Autores: David Cantarero Prieto y Santiago Lago-Peña. 11/09 La clase beta de medidas de desigualdad. Autores: Luis José Imedio Olmedo, Elena Bárcena Martín y Encarnación M. Parrado Gallardo. — 51 —
12/09 Right incentives to enhance efficiency in public expenditure. Autor: Tamón A. Takahashi Iturriaga. 13/09 Fiscal decentralization and public sector employment: a cross-country analysis. Autores: Jorge Martínez-Vázquez y Ming-Hung Yao. 14/09 Factores explicativos de los resultados de las Comunidades Autónomas Españolas en PISA 2006. Autores: José Manuel Cordero Ferrera, Eva Crespo Cebada y Daniel Santín González. 15/09 A proposal to empirically evaluate the sensitivity of the speed of convergence in the EU. Autoras: Sonia de Lucas Santos, Inmaculada Álvarez Ayuso y M.ª Jesús Delgado Rodríguez. 16/09 An assessment of the sustainability of current account imbalances in OECD countries. Autores: Mariam Camarero, Josep Lluís Carrion-i-Silvestre y Cecilio Tamarit. 17/09 Tax mimicking among local governments: some evidence from Spanish municipalities. Autores: Francisco J. Delgado y Matías Mayor-Fernández. 18/09 La desigualdad en las intensidades energéticas y la composición de la producción. Un análisis para los países de la OCDE. Autores: Juan Antonio Duro Moreno, Vicent Alcántara Escolano y Emilio Padilla Rosa. 19/09 On the sustainability of government deficits: some long-term evidence for Spain, 1850-2000. Autores: Oscar Bajo-Rubio, Carmen Díaz-Roldán y Vicente Esteve. 20/09 Who bears Social Security taxes? A meta-analysis approach. Autores: José Manuel González-Paramo and Ángel Melguizo. 21/09 Fostering the contributory nature of the Spanish retirement pension system: an arithmetic micro-simulation exercise using the MCVL. Autores: Ció Patxot, Guadalupe Souto y Jaime Villanueva. 22/09 Obtaining lifetime earnings patterns for Spain. Autores: Ignacio Moral-Arce, Ció Patxot y Guadalupe Souto. 23/09 Efectos del gasto militar sobre la rentabilidad de la industria de defensa en España. Autor: Antonio Fonfría Mesa. 24/09 El papel de la igualdad de género en la solución de la crisis económica. Autora: María Pazos Morán. 25/09 Inequality and polarization impact of the European redistribution architecture on the Spanish population: an analysis using microsimulation techniques. Autores: Xisco Oliver, Luca Piccoli y Amedeo Spadaro. 2010 11/10 Fostering delayed retirement in Spain: a micro simulation exercise using the MCVL. Autores: Ignacio Moral-Arce, Ció Patxot y Guadalupe Souto. 12/10 La imposición lineal de las sucesiones y donaciones. Análisis recaudatorio y redistributivo. Autores: Miguel Ángel Barberán Lahuerta, Julio López Laborda y Marta Melguizo Garde. 03/10 Popular support for egalitarian social welfare. Autores: Rafael Salas y Juan Gabriel Rodríguez.
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