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Return of the Manchurian Tigers: the Ruzhen Qing Dynasty

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Return of the Manchurian Tigers: the Ruzhen Qing Dynasty EAST ASIAN HISTORY: A KOREAN PERSPECTIVE Vol. 3. No. 6. 2005. 8. 27. 1 IC-14.S-4.5-0827 Return of the Manchurian Tigers: The Ruzhen Qing Dynasty THE MING CONQUERED BY THE MANCHU QING Wontack Hong Professor, Seoul University REFINING THE TRADITIONAL DUAL SYSTEM Nurhaci (1559-1626) organized his troops and their 1. A Manchu Warrior families into different groups of “banners.” He created four banners in 1601, each of a different color (either yellow, white, 1 See Spence (1990: 27) and blue or red), and appointed four of his kinsmen the lords of Crossley (1997: 207). these banners. Each of the four banners was split into two in About 150 families were organized 1616 (the year Nurhaci declared himself the Kahn of the Later into a company unit known as Jin), one being the plain banner and the other being bordered. “arrow.” Arrow units were combined into groups of about 50 The banners served as identification devices in battle, and to form regiments, with five membership in a given banner was used as the basis for regiments to the “banner.” population registration in daily life.1 Nurhaci incorporated conquered Nurhaci also refined the traditional dual system (of or surrendered tribal groups into the Former Yan, Norther Wei, Liao, Jin and Yuan) with a his own arrow-banner supra-tribal miniature civil administration in imitation of the Ming army of the hereditary military government. Educated Chinese who surrendered were offered class. See also Barfield (1989: 253). a chance to serve in the rapidly expanding Ruzhen bureaucracy. Senior Chinese officials who came over to Nurhaci’s side were Nowadays in the People’s offered marriage into his family, honorific titles, and high Republic of China, each province office. The Chinese administrators handled administrative tasks is divided into counties (xian) and of governing the Liao River basin, without interfering in the townships (xiang). In the Inner military activities of tribal banners.2 Mongolian Autonomous Region, however, counties are still called SA-DAE (SERVE THE GREATER) STRATEGY OF THE CHOSUN banners (qi) and townships arrows In the Korean peninsula, King Seon-jo (1567-1608) of (sumu). Chosun was succeeded by Kwang-hae-gun (1608-23) whose skillful foreign policy kept the Korean peninsula from being 2 See Spense (1990: 28). drawn into the conflict between the Ruzhen and the Ming. In 2 THE MANCHU QING REFINING THE DUAL SYSTEM Vol. 3. No. 6. 2005. 8. 27. the midst of his endeavor to enhance the Chosun’s state of military preparedness (by repairing defensive strongpoints, renovating weaponry, and instituting training programs), Kwang-hae-gun was removed from the throne and succeeded by King In-jo.3 In-jo (1623-49) switched to a pro-Ming and anti-Ruzhen policy. Lee (1984: 215) notes: “The Manchus now came to feel it necessary to eliminate the threat to their rear posed by Korea … before proceeding with their campaign against Ming.” Nurhaci’s eighth son, Hong Taiji (Tai-zong, 1627-43), was helped to power by Chinese advisers. In 1635, all of the Inner Mongolian tribes were incorporated into the Manchu state. Expeditions to the north also brought the wild Ruzhen tribes along the Amur River under control. Hong Taiji officially renamed the Ruzhens the Manchus in 1635, declared himself emperor of the Qing in 1636. 2. The Manchu Expansion Hong Taiji had invaded Chosun in 1627 with a 30,000 Crossley (1999: 131) man army, but withdrew his army in exchange for a Chosun’s pledge to do honor to Later Jin as would a younger to an older brother. In 1936, he demanded a suzerain-subject relationship. When the Chosun court refused to do so, Hong Taiji himself led an army of 100,000 men (consisting of the Manchu, Mongol and Chinese soldiers) and invaded Chosun. King In-jo surrendered in 1637, and vowed to sever his ties with the Ming dynasty, to pay homage to the Qing court, and to dispatch troops to assist the Manchu campaign against Ming, delivering his two sons as hostages. The Qing invasion was of short duration, but the northwest region through which the Manchus had passed was ravaged. When the Koreans maintained an adroit Sa-dae (Serve 3. Beijing under the Manchus was the Greater) strategy, yielding to the Stronger, be it the Qidans, divided into eight sectors, each the Ruzhens, the Mongols or the Han Chinese, the Korean sector serving as the residential dynasty could maintain its independent nationhood free from zone for one of the Eight the ravages of warfare. When the Koreans stood up against the Banners. Each zone was further divided into Manchu, Mongol, and Stronger, they suffered a wholesale destruction until they, Chinese banner neighborhoods. voluntarily or involuntarily, changed their stance. A Manchurian Elliott (2001: 103) force, in particular, could not leave the threat to their rear posed by the Koreans before proceeding with their campaign 3 Lee (1984: 215) against mainland China. 4 Spence (1990: 30-31) ENLISTING THE MONGOLS AS A JUNIOR PARTNER Vol. 3. No. 6. 2005. 8. 27. 3 5 According to Barfield (1989: 6), THE EIGHT BANNERS OF THE MANCHU, MONGOLS AND HAN the Mongol “banner princes were CHINESE: ENLISTING THE MONGOLS AS A JUNIOR PARTNER set apart from ordinary tribesmen The Manchus enlisted the Mongols as a junior partner who were not permitted to leave in conquering the mainland China and maintaining the empire. the boundaries of their districts.” According to Jagchid and Symons Hong Taiji established a parallel structure of eight Mongol (1989: 21), the Qing rulers banners in 1635.4 All the Mongols along the frontier, from implemented a quasi-feudal Manchuria to Gansu, were incorporated into the banner system of rewarding Mongol system. The descendants of Chinggis Khan received positions leaders with rank and territorial of rank in the Qing administration commanding their own domains based on their nobility, tribal people. The Qing rulers effectively divided and prestige, and how well they might immobilized the Mongols by organizing them under separate serve Qing causes. Manchu policy 5 fragmented the steppe by carefully leagues with assigned pasturage. The Qing dynasty depended delineating land holdings. As heavily on Mongol troops to defend its Inner Asian frontier. boundaries became demarcated, The Ruzhens’ sense of a shared identity with their Mongol the mobility of the nomads, which allies was based on the broad similarities in their cultures.6 had always been a key to their Ledyard (1983: 328) notes: “their attitude and policy power, was impeded. The Mongol toward the Mongols was much more friendly … the Manchus leaders became to seek greater influence and rewards from the enlisted them as active supporters and friends.” According to Qing court. Purdue (2005: 124), “intermarriage with Mongolian noble families further cemented alliance between the two peoples. … 6 See Elliot (2001: 75). From 1612 to 1615 Nurhaci and his sons together married six According to Jagchid and Symons Mongolian women. … Hong Taiji expanded the marriage (1989: 21), “as the Manchus alliance policy, marrying twelve of his daughters to Mongolian consolidated their rule over China, chieftains.” they were highly dependent upon Mongol auxiliaries to supplement Mobilizing the Han Chinese who had settled around their military forces.” the Liao River basin, Hong Taiji established two full Chinese Purdue (2005: 126) notes that “the banners in 1637, increasing the number to four in 1639, and successful incorporation of the then to eight in 1642, just in time for the conquest of China Eastern and Southern Mongols that began two years later. The Han Chinese knew how to cast during the early conquest period and use cannon and were practiced with muskets.7 After Han provided a substantial fund of Wu-di had conquered Old Chosun in 108 BC, a large number experience that the Manchus could use when they confronted of Han Chinese came to settle in the fertile Liao basin area. the more isolated, hostile, and The descendants of these original settlers joined the Qing autonomous Mongolian tribes military organization and came to constitute the core of the farther west.” Chinese Eight Banners, enabling the Ruzhen Qing rulers to conquer the entire mainland China.8 The creolized Chinese 7 Elliot (2001: 77) language of Liao-dong or rather the language of these Chinese bannermen, was taken to Beijing by the Ruzhen-Manchu rulers 8 According to Crossley (1999: and eventually became the so-called Mandarin, the official 56), the Nikans, the Han Chinese language of modern China. 4 THE EIGHT BANNERS: MILITARIZED SOCIAL ORGANIZATION Vol. 3. No. 6. 2005. 8. 27. By the early 1640s, the Manchu ruler finished who had lived around the Liao organizing a hereditary socio-military system for soldiers to River basin and consequently provide active combat duty on rotation, to register and protect played an important role in the creation of the empire, were their families, and to supervise work on their land. Banner units treated differently from those Han were organized along traditional tribal lines but were all Chinese who lived inside the personally attached to the emperor. The banner elites were Great Wall. After 1741, the Qing recruited from hereditary ranks of the Manchu, Mongol and state transferred most of the Han Chinese, and were trained to perform both military and Nikan bannermen to the Manchu civil tasks to further the ends of conquest and occupation.9 banners, and the Chinese banners The bannermen enjoyed booty in warfare, and stipends of rice were thereafter not distinguished from the Han Chinese civilian and cash in peacetime, and they also formed a talent pool from population. which individuals could be chosen as civil bureaucrats.10 The pre-conquest ideal of the bannermen as comprehensive state 9 Crossley (1999: 287) functionaries (soldiers, clerks, or officials) continued to shape The officer candidates were the Qing educational policies after the conquest.11 Elliott (2001: required to be proficient in 348) states that every Manchu man, woman, and child, with the horsemanship and archery and to sole exception of the emperor, belonged to the Eight contribute an examination essay in 12 either Manchu or Mongolian.
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