BALTBAT and Development of Baltic Defence Forces

Baltic Defence Review 2/1999

BALTBAT and development of Baltic Defence Forces

By Robertas Sapronas, the Head of the Multilateral Projects Section in the International Relations Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence

clear illustration to the international the rather unique features of BALTBAT prominence that the BALTBAT project both as a military unit and as a multina- Introduction has received since its official start in Sep- tional project and the ways in which tember 1994, when the Governments of BALTBAT has contributed to the estab- The aim of this article is not to once Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania concluded lishment of defence structures in the three again repeat the history of the Baltic a tri-national Agreement on the establish- Baltic States. Also, I will briefly describe Battalion (BALTBAT). The project should ment of a joint peacekeeping unit. Soon the status of the Baltic battalion project be rather well known for those who have after that a number of Western countries (Autumn 1999) and the dilemmas that the an interest in the Baltic security affairs. led by Denmark have offered support to Baltic and the Supporting states are fac- BALTBAT is often mentioned when dis- the undertaking, thereby turning it into ing when trying to define the future di- cussion takes place on successful examples a multilateral project. rection for the battalion. of regional defence co-operation in the This article will have a special focus on This article is based on the personal post-Cold War Europe and also whenever the role that the Baltic Battalion has played experience of the author gained during the major developments in the defence or, in some aspects, was expected to play, the last several years through the partici- forces of the three Baltic States are presented. in the development of the armed forces pation in BALTBAT Steering Group In the simple www.altavista.com query of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In par- meetings and being responsible for the BALTBAT received 324 hits. This is a ticular, I would like to discuss some of co-ordination of development of Baltic

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defence co-operation projects at the process was led on the one hand by vol- gion. Therefore, in their rhetoric towards Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence. unteers, who had little expertise to offer the Baltic States, representatives of NATO The opinions expressed in this article are but had plenty of good will and determi- and its member countries would always those of the author and do not necessar- nation, and, on the other, by the former choose careful wording and support only ily reflect the position of the Lithuanian Soviet Army officers who decided to sup- those practical co-operation activities that MND. port the establishment of armed forces in would be non-provocative to Moscow . their newly independent countries. Even Significant and comprehensive change if the latter group were in many cases came with the Brussels Ministerial meet- Context distrusted by the political leadership, they ing in January 1994 when NATO has launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) The Baltic Battalion is a unique project were the only military experts in the coun- programme - a set of co-operation activi- in several important aspects. The format tries. The defence budgets were minuscule ties for the new Europe. Training for in which it was developed and the objec- in each of the three states, while signifi- multinational peacekeeping operations tives that were pursued by the Baltic and cant defence assistance could hardly be under UN mandates became an objective the Supporting countries can be fully expected from the Western countries. In that all PfP countries, including Russia, understood only within the broader in- their judgement, this could undermine found possible to agree. Multinational ternational context of late 1993 and early the difficult process of involving Russia peacekeeping exercises became the major 1994. During this period BALTBAT into closer defence co-operation with the part of PfP field training activities and project was developed from a vague con- West. In general, before January 1994, the were generously sponsored by NATO and cept into a viable project of great visibil- Baltic States had only very limited and ad the United States. ity and political significance for the three hoc external defence co-operation. Baltic countries. For NATO this was a period of final- In the Baltic States, this was the time ising its strategies towards its former ad- Challenges when the Soviet troops had completed versaries in the East, first and foremost - their withdrawal from Lithuania and were Russia. With respect to the Baltic States, The architects of the BALTBAT project about to complete it from Latvia and Es- NATO has well understood Russias mes- fully took into account the context of the tonia. The armed forces in the three states sage that they had certain sensitivities PfP world of its early days. The Baltic were at the initial stage of creation. This as well as special interests in the Baltic re- battalion was a multinational unit trained

56 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 for UN peacekeeping purposes and estab- known and highly visible project. The fore, both successes and failures of the lished in the former Eastern Bloc. The com- Battalion has become a symbolic expres- BALTBAT project were perceived to have bination of these features was making the sion of the determination of the Baltic much wider implications. BALTBAT project more than a politically States to anchor their security in the There was, however, another side to correct undertaking. BALTBAT has em- democratic Europe. At the same time, the BALTBAT than that widely exposed by braced the main concepts of the Partner- political engagement and practical support the mass media. In reality, the establish- ship for Peace ideology and therefore was rendered by the Western countries to ment of a modern Western-type multina- a kind of test case for the PfP itself. BALTBAT was perceived in the Baltics as tional battalion from scratch in the coun- The four Nordic countries, led by a clear indication of their earnest com- tries that basically had no regular armed Denmark, were with the BALTBAT project mitment to support the Baltic nations in forces, was a truly Herculean task. Look- from its early days. Without their sincere this endeavour. ing back to the early days of the project, interest and commitment to support the Stakes were also high on the side of one tends to conclude that even those who project, the Baltic States would not have the supporting states. Many of them have understood the complexities and difficul- been able to start it. The Nordic coun- invested a significant amount of resources ties involved in the project tended to un- tries have also done very much in order into the BALTBAT project. Some appar- derestimate them. Otherwise they prob- to promote the BALTBAT project inter- ently had to go through an intense inter- ably would not have started the project at nationally and soon the US, Great Brit- nal debate before concluding that secu- all. ain, Germany, France and a number of rity of the Baltic States in general and the Difficulties that were arising in the other Western nations decided to join the BALTBAT project in particular was worth process of project implementation were group of supporters of BALTBAT. This spending money on. Furthermore, hav- multiple and some of the problems have was certainly a very encouraging ing become the most visible part of West- remained there for years. Their analysis is beginning.The wide multinational frame- ern security engagement in the Baltic re- beyond the scope of this article but a few work in which BALTBAT found itself was gion, the progress in the development of observations should help the reader to helpful not only for wider distribution the BALTBAT project became important understand the nature of the problems of the financial burden related to the es- indicator as to the success of the Western faced by those who were responsible for tablishment of the Baltic Battalion. It has countries in their security co-operation the implementation of the BALTBAT turned BALTBAT into internationally with the Baltic States in general. There- project.

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First of all, the militaries in the three BALTBAT until national base for such routines. Those often had to be created Baltic States initially regarded the support was established. In other words, and adopted on a very short notice. BALTBAT project as a purely political the support which the Baltic States were These are only the more general sources creature with exclusively political objec- providing to BALTBAT, be it in terms of the problems faced by both the Baltic tives. For them participation in UN peace- of personnel training or logistic supplies, and Supporting countries in the process keeping operations could hardly be seen could not be much better than the gen- of establishment of the Baltic battalion. a priority task, given the threats, challenges eral level in the national forces and in The nature of these problems suggests that and financial limitations they were facing most cases was below the level required in the start of the project could be some- in the establishment of defence forces in BALTBAT. Therefore the development of what premature and that many of the their respective countries. Therefore the the project was depending on external practical problems could be made less BALTBAT project for the military leader- assistance in almost every aspect starting complicated if the Baltic States had more ship in the Baltic countries primarily as- with English language training and pro- experience of international defence co- sociated with a drain of their very scarce vision with personal munitions, to de- operation and international peacekeeping financial and human resources. They ployment and supplies in the mission area. at the start of the project. On the other tended to underestimate the potential of Thirdly, activities of BALTBAT were hand, BALTBAT could also be regarded the BALTBAT project to contribute to exposed to the lack or inadequacy of the as a shock therapy, which has suddenly the development of the national defences. legal base and administrative procedures exposed the three Baltic defence establish- In Lithuania, a separate division of the in the three Baltic countries. It was the ments to all the complexities involved in defence staff was responsible for the co- first multinational unit in the Baltic States. international defence co-operation, forc- ordination of the BALTBAT project, It included outside support with arms ing them to address a whole set of prob- thereby further contributing to the iso- transfers as well as frequent border cross- lems in a very short period of time. lation of BALTBAT from the rest of the ings of military vehicles and soldiers with Looking retrospectively, the question defence forces. weapons. Many things in the implemen- that arises is was it worth going through Secondly, with all political will and tation of the BALTBAT project were hap- all this in order to establish a UN peace- determination to ensure success of the pening in the Baltic States for the first keeping unit, which could hardly be con- BALTBAT project, the Baltic nations time and therefore often there were no sidered as a real priority for the security could not render adequate support to established procedures, regulations and of the Baltic States?

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would return to the national military changing the old habits and traditions units and would introduce Western types mostly coming from the Soviet army. Beyond of thinking, traditions and attitudes into Thereby BALTBAT would become an im- Peacekeeping the national defence forces. In other portant factor in the process of building words, the development of international Western type, NATO interoperable armed Indeed, those arguing that BALTBAT peacekeeping capabilities was far from forces in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. as a military unit has little direct military being seen an aim in itself. BALTBAT was 2. Provision of military support to the Baltic value for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania rather a means to assist the development States in a manner non-provocative to other have a point. As argued above, BALTBAT of the armed forces in Estonia, Latvia and countries. Western countries have different was masterminded as a politically uncontro- Lithuania. Below is a description of di- national policies, priorities and different versial project and its form was more rect and indirect side effects which the sensitivities when rendering defence re- shaped by the security environment than BALTBAT project was expected to have lated support of the Baltic States. How- by the security needs of the Baltic coun- on the national defence forces of the three ever, most of them find it politically easier tries. At the same time, and this is ex- Baltic States. and more attractive to support joint tremely important, the BALTBAT project 1. Westernization of the fledgling defence projects like BALTBAT than to render always had a much broader meaning for forces of the Baltic countries. This concept direct military assistance to the national its designers than merely the establishment encompasses a wide range of issues such armed forces of the Baltic countries. This of a tri-national peacekeeping unit. Even as introduction of tactical manuals and can be easily explained. Support rendered though an operational peacekeeping bat- operating procedures of defence forces of to the development of peacekeeping ca- talion had to be the final outcome of the the Western countries in the daily train- pabilities for UN missions and other endeavour, the most valuable result of the ing, spread of English language knowl- operations in the spirit of PfP could BALTBAT project had to be its spill over edge, replacing Soviet traditions with hardly be considered a controversial is- to the national defence forces of Estonia, Western military culture in its broadest sue by anyone. On the other hand direct Latvia and Lithuania. It was expected that, sense, etc. It was expected that BALTBAT transfers of military hardware and provi- having received Western type training and soldiers, after a period in the Baltic Battal- sion of combat training of Baltic mili- having experience of participation in in- ion, would return to key positions in tary units were likely to raise eyebrows in ternational operations, BALTBAT soldiers the national military systems and start the East. It seems that this consideration

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and initial success of the BALTBAT project this image in the West and also because to the project as for making a strong po- were the major incentives for the Baltic this makes matters so much more simple, litical signal. It is certainly an important countries to launch the other Baltic the Western states are readier to deal with factor, contributing to self-confidence of projects: the Baltic Naval Squadron - all three Baltic countries simultaneously the Baltic countries vis-?-vis potential BALTRON, the Baltic Air Surveillace rather than on the individual basis. There- threats in the East. Network - BALTNET, the Baltic Defence fore one could easily make a claim that it College - BALTDEFCOL. was the attitude of the Supporting coun- 3. Development of Baltic defence co-opera- tries rather than anything else that pro- Deploying BALTBAT tion. With their important differences moted defence co-operation Baltic States Though the BALTBAT project was notwithstanding, Estonians, Latvians and to the present level. highly visible, its political benefits were Lithuanians would admit that their coun- The BALTBAT project also has a re- undeniable, some other expectations re- tries are of comparable size, have similar markable multinational management struc- lated to the project have not materialised recent history, and share the same threats ture, which was later copied by the other to a full extent. In particular, BALTBATs to their security. Looking from outside, Baltic initiatives. The co-ordination of the influence on the national forces was rather the differences become even less visible, assistance and general management of the limited. Apart from the fact that the project while the similarities prompt the West- project takes place through the regular was developed in relative isolation from ern states to regard and treat the three meetings of multinational BALTBAT Steer- the rest of the armed forces of Estonia, Baltic countries as a single geopolitical ing and BALTBAT Military Working Latvia and Lithuania, many officers in the unit. Close Baltic defence co-operation is Groups, chaired by Denmark. A major- Baltic States judged BALTBAT training therefore a priori considered in the West ity of the participants are signatories to a and experience being irrelevant to the as a highly positive and even natural state Memorandum of Understanding concern- defence needs of the Baltic countries. In of affairs. On the other hand disagree- ing support to BALTBAT. Such a formal its worst, BALTBAT was seen as an artifi- ments, which unavoidably occur in the commitment made by a group of West- cial elite unit where the main motivation process, are regarded as irresponsible be- ern countries, which includes both NATO of the soldiers was financial benefit re- haviour on the part of the Balts and there- and non-aligned states, to support a spe- lated to service abroad and therefore they fore usually come under sharp criticism cific project in the Baltics, is important could hardly have any positive influence from the Supporting States. Because of not so much for the potential it brought on the national forces.

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These allegations had at least some This shift in priorities required the armour, fire support and logistical capa- ground. Soldiers and officers serving in Baltic States to further concentrate on the bilities of the Battalion. Also, nobody BALTBAT Headquarters in Ada¿i, Latvia, quality of personnel and resources for a wanted to take greater risks than neces- and especially when deployed to an inter- possible deployment of BALTBAT rather sary. BALTBATs deployment had to be a national peacekeeping mission, were con- than to think about spreading the success and SFOR seemed to be more risky siderably better than their colleagues in BALTBAT experience into their national than most of the UN operations. the military units in the home countries units. As a result, the national defence Secondly, the size of BALTBAT at the were. Also, at some point in 1995-1996, systems were continuously working for time was about 700 military (authorised the original idea of the BALTBAT as a the BALTBAT purposes rather than vice strength 724), which also limited the project that in many ways could contrib- versa. Deployment to a mission became number of options among the existing ute to the development of the national the main criterion of success of the project UN peacekeeping operations. In most of defence forces appeared to become sub- and finding a mission for BALTBAT was them smaller size battalions were used, and ordinated at the project steering level to a major task of the BALTBAT Steering therefore it would be difficult to find a a need to find a suitable deployment. A Group throughout 1997 and first half of unit that the BALTBAT could replace. But primary objective of the project was to 1998. even if a place for BALTBAT deployment send the Battalion out for a mission soon Finding a deployment area for was found, the UN would have to approve after the end of the training programme BALTBAT was not an easy task consider- BALTBAT participation while another in 1997. Some of the Supporting States ing several important factors that had to nation would have to agree to withdraw saw BALTBATs deployment to a mission be taken into account and this limited its forces to provide space for BALTBAT. as being necessary in order to substanti- the number of possibilities. Firstly, All this suggested a rather lengthy and ate the success of the project and as a jus- BALTBAT was trained, equipped and cumbersome procedure. tification to the resources contributed to structured to perform classical UN op- Last but not least, the UN had to agree its development. The consolidation of erations. Therefore independent deploy- to deploy BALTBAT only for six months, training and the development of mission ment of BALTBAT to SFOR in Bosnia- as there was no other unit in the Baltic experience, which could then be fed back Herzegovina, which was rather peace en- States that could replace BALTBAT after into the Battalion (and into the national forcement than peacekeeping operation, its six-month turn. This meant that the forces) was a further motivation. was not acceptable due to the insufficient Baltic States were not in a position to

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provide for a sustained deployment, which attractive to the Baltic States than the practical reasons, the priority in the Bal- was one of important preconditions set UNIFIL as this was a NATO-led opera- tic States is given to participation in by the UN. tion. NATO-led operations. This development On the top of that, preliminary finan- was also due to the UNPROFOR/IFOR/ cial estimates of what would take for the SFOR lessons, which clearly showed that Baltic States to deploy full BALTBAT and Current modern peacekeeping requires more mo- to supply it with necessary logistics were Developments bile and better armed forces. Also, since rather speaking against this option. 1994 there has been clear development A detailed study prepared by the Where are we now with the BALTBAT in the attitudes of the Supporting coun- BALTBAT Military Working Group in project 5 years after its beginning? Sev- tries towards the Baltic States, making it summer 1998 on the possible deployment eral developments have to be discussed in politically easier for many of them to sup- of BALTBAT to UNIFIL in Lebanon has this chapter. port the development of defence capabili- highlighted those concerns. The solution First of all, since the end of 1997, ties beyond UN peacekeeping. that was found was probably optimal in BALTBAT is no longer trained for the Furthermore, in early 1999, the Baltic this situation. It was decided to rotate classical UN peacekeeping operations but States agreed to assign Initial Partnership BALTBAT contingents (national company is under development into a light infan- Goals (IPGs) to their national subunits plus staff element) within the Danish Bat- try battalion, ready for all types of peace in the BALTBAT as a part of their na- talion (DANBAT) in the SFOR opera- operations. This stage of development has tional contributions to the PfP Planning tion in Bosnia. This option took care of to be completed by the end of 2000. By and Review Process (PARP). This commit- all the major problems mentioned above. that time BALTBAT will acquire anti-tank ment requires that those subunits be de- Besides, co-operation with the Danes in and fire support capabilities, while NATO veloped in accordance with the require- peace operations had a relatively long his- rules and procedures will be used when- ments set by NATO and become fully tory (starting in 1994 for the Lithuanians ever applicable in the daily work of the NATO interoperable. Thereby BALTBAT and 1995 for the Estonians and Latvians battalion. is entering the mainstream of national and including a tour of duty for the The Baltic States welcomed this step efforts towards achieving NATO Lithuanian BALTBAT infantry company from the UN peacekeeping to more ro- interoperability of the national armed in IFOR). SFOR was also politically more bust capabilities. Both for political and forces of the three Baltic States.

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A second important aspect is a gradual working on the establishment of the na- countries is especially relevant in the case decentralisation of the project and its tional battalions, which will act as feeder of BALTBAT, which has already celebrated anchoring within the national defence units for BALTBAT. Those national its fifth anniversary and is perhaps the structures. This development indicates a BALTBAT units will establish a clear rela- largest consumer of outside assistance. return to the original ideas about the role tionship between the BALTBAT project There is a general view among the Sup- of the BALTBAT project, i.e. BALTBAT and the development of the national porting States that the Baltic States should and support that is rendered to it by forces, changing the image of the Baltic by now have suitable structures to man- Western countries should be used for the Battalion as an isolated elitist unit. They age and support the Battalion. Besides development of the national defence forces will also allow the Baltic States to ensure releasing available funding for other as- in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In ac- sustainability of BALTBAT in a deploy- sistance projects, a fully nationally sup- cordance with the Political Guidance is- ment. Therefore the outside support to ported, effective and deployable sued by the Baltic Defence Ministers in the project should also gradually become BALTBAT is also seen by them as a valu- April 1999, in each of the three states na- decentralised with focus to the national able political and military signal of Baltic tional battalion size units will be estab- battalions. development and co-operation to send to lished and will be responsible for mili- The third tendency, which is impor- the wider international community. tary training up to the company level in tant not only in the BALTBAT but also accordance with BALTBAT standards. in the other Baltic projects, is the so-called Way Ahead They will also take over English language baltification process. In its essence, training and specialist training. The baltification means gradual reduction of Where are these tendencies leading the BALTBAT staff will remain in Ada¿i and external support and eventual transfer of BALTBAT project? What kind of will be responsible for training at the full responsibility for running the projects BALTBAT will we have in another five or battalion level and also for ensuring the for the Baltic States themselves. It is natu- ten years? These are the questions that will co-ordination and compatibility of train- ral that the Supporting countries would be addressed in the final section of this ing in the national centres. Thus, along like to establish some kind of timeline article. with the implementation of the plan of after which the Baltic States could con- The topic Way ahead for BALTBAT reorganisation of BALTBAT into a light tinue the projects without outside sup- has become almost a permanent agenda infantry battalion the Baltic States are port. This interest of the supporting item in BALTBAT Steering Group meet-

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ings in recent years. The ultimate answer ion in the future - BALTBAT as a peace Those two approaches are more theo- of what BALTBAT should look like in operations unit and BALTBAT as a training retical in their character. None of them the future should be coming from the unit. The first option indicates the focus could be implemented to the full extent Baltic States themselves. There have been of BALTBAT activities on deployment of as certain ramifications are imposed by numerous discussions held on the sub- the battalion or its subunits to interna- the already existing agreements between ject, a number of agreements have been tional operations, while the second on the the three Baltic countries and also between achieved and several important documents anchoring of the BALTBAT training each of them and NATO in the form of have been signed. However, there is still standards into the national defence forces. IPGs agreed for BALTBAT subunits. There- (Dec. 1999) no single coherent plan, which This separation hinges on the argument fore the final outcome of the BALTBAT would show how the political agreements that if a decision is taken to sustain development plan will have to be some- and objectives set for the Baltic battalion BALTBAT in an international mission or where in between those two extremes. could be implemented after the expiry of to keep BALTBAT as a high readiness Some explanations may be useful for bet- the present Memorandum of Understand- battalion, this will shape the BALTBAT ter understanding of the nature of the ing (end of 2000). The Supporting states development plan in all areas. This includes choice. that are willing to continue rendering assignment and rotation of personnel, assistance to the BALTBAT project would development of logistic capabilities, and BALTBAT as a also like to know in advance what kind requirements for outside support. Con- Peace Operations Unit BALTBAT they are being asked to sup- versely, if training of Baltic military per- port. Therefore the urgent task for the sonnel is chosen as a primary objective, The argument of this article is that if Baltic States is to prepare a BALTBAT the approaches in those areas will have to permanent participation in peace opera- development plan giving a clear indica- be different. The two concepts can be tions becomes one of the objectives of tion as to the expected end-result of the combined only to a limited extent as each BALTBAT, it is very likely to become the project. suggests different focus of efforts and dif- main one (especially if such participa- For the sake of having a more struc- ferent success criteria. Some of the spe- tion is not supported by adequate train- tural debate on the future of the cific implications of each choice are sum- ing structures at home). There are several BALTBAT, this article will elaborate on marised in Table 1 and commented on reasons for other objectives being subor- two possible models of the Baltic battal- below. dinated to it:

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IMPLICATIONS OF BALTBAT DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS TABLE 1

BALTBAT as a Peace Operations Unit BALTBAT as a Training Unit

Unit coherence; Professional growth of officers, NCOs and soldiers; Deployment readiness; Maximum number of officers, NCOs and soldiers SUCCESS CRITERIA Successful participation in peace operations; having completed BALTBAT training programme; Implementation of PARP IPGs; Widest and deepest possible spread of BALTBAT Independent deployment of battalion size unit; standards into the national forces;

Normal assignment 2 years; Normal assignment 4-5 years; Allows for better integration of the national Unification of the national personnel policies with differences within national and specialist COYs (but PERSONNEL respect to BALTBAT; not in BALTBAT HQ); ASSIGNEMENT Entry level requirements: high (ready for deployment Entry level requirements: low (ready for deployment after relatively short period of pre-mission training); after completion of BALTBAT training programme plus pre-mission training);

Standard annual infantry training programme in Mission oriented, no standard annual routine; accordance with BALTBAT standards; BALTBAT HQ focus: training of national contingents, BALTBAT HQ focus: training of staff officers in HQ, TRAINING mission planning; assistance to the training activities national BALTBAT Pre- deployment training requirements: low; units; Pre-deployment training requirements: standard;

Priority: development of deployment oriented Priority: improvement of the national logistic support LOGISTICS logistics; systems;

Requirement: lower Requirement: high Priorities: Priorities: National battalions and training programmes, ELT; including provision of equipment for training OUTSIDE SUPPORT Pre-mission training; purposes; Equipment for training and independent deployment; Development of national logistics system and Development of sustainability in a mission, including sustainability at home; logistical support; Further development of in-country ELT capabilities;

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• Firstly, in each of the Baltic States BALTBAT as a peace operations unit, one BALTBAT subunits in a mission and, ul- financial rewards for participation in an would see an increase of the level and timately, sustained deployment of the international peace operation are still con- quality of participation in such opera- entire battalion. siderably higher than for service in home- tions as its paramount objective. A In order to be successful in this en- based units. This difference is likely to (largely) self-supported deployment for deavour, BALTBATs training programme turn participation in a mission and fi- the whole BALTBAT seems to be a natu- should be shaped in such a manner that nancial benefits related to it into the main ral objective to aspire to. However, this the personnel and national subunits as- motive for joining BALTBAT (as it often can realistically be implemented only in a signed to BALTBAT already have suffi- was until now). very long term. The ambition to do that cient skills to be deployed right after a • Secondly, sending a unit into an in- in the shortest possible time (which would short period of pre-mission training. As ternational operation is a highly demand- be natural if BALTBAT is primarily a the number of such trained officers and ing task, which involves considerable risks peace operations unit) will require that NCOs is very limited, it will be wise to and has high international exposure. For the three Baltic countries concentrate their keep the trained personnel for longer NATO aspirants like the three Baltic na- efforts on the achievement of this task. It periods in order to sustain the high level tions, failures in this area would be least would have to happen, even if that has to of preparedness of the battalion and its wanted. Therefore, priority in the be done at the expense of other objec- subunits. In that case, personnel for the BALTBAT project would always be given tives of the project. main positions in BALTBAT should be to ensuring successful participation, even As was mentioned above, the decision assigned for approximately 4-5 years. if this requires taking resources (be it as to whether to have BALTBAT as a peace Longer assignments coupled with better human or financial) from other areas. operations or training unit will have im- quality of training and several turns in a Remarkable in this respect is the fact that plications on all key areas of the develop- mission may match well with the motiva- inadequate performance of BALTBAT ment of the project. Most importantly, it tion of the soldiers joining BALTBAT. soldiers is likely to have a much greater will automatically establish the criteria for The greatest challenge if this option is negative resonance than that of a stand- evaluating success of the project. In the exercised is to set tasks for BALTBAT HQ. ard national unit, because the project is first case, those will be the readiness of For as long as the Baltic States are not in widely known and praised. the battalion for being sent out to an a position to sustain battalion-level de- • Thirdly, in a development plan for international mission, performance of ployment, BALTBAT HQ will have little

66 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 role to play, since training of the infan- deploying BALTBAT as a permanent par- cess of the project in this case is measured try companies and specialist subunits will ticipant of an international peace opera- not by the level of readiness of the unit be done nationally and in co-operation tion, makes it almost impossible for the but by the number of officers and NCOs with the nation providing foster unit in Baltic countries to give mission experi- trained in accordance with the BALTBAT the mission area. Moreover, the HQ may ence to the other national units. Even in standards and rotated back to the national become the only part of the battalion, a longer perspective, none of the Baltic forces. which will not be deployed and this can States could realistically sustain more than In this model Baltic personnel from make the service in the HQ less attractive. one deployment of this size. the other national military units would Alternatively, the HQ will be preoccupied be assigned to BALTBAT for a relatively with other tasks than the rest of BALTBAT. BALTBAT as a Training Unit short, one-two year, period. With the help Another important implication of this of BALTBAT Training Team (BTT), they choice is in the field of international sup- An alternative model to BATBAT as a would undergo there an intense training port. The highest priority will be sup- peace operations unit could be to have programme within the multinational en- port in one or another way related to BALTBAT as a training unit. Whereas for vironment in BALTBAT HQ and would deployment. Since the ultimate objective deployment to a mission area multinatio- return to continue service in the same, of this option is identified as sustaina- nality at the battalion or lower level may or higher, position in their national bility of a battalion level deployment in a inhibit its efficiency and even become a units. The main task of the BTT in this mission, the BALTBAT development plan risk factor, it is an asset for the purposes case would be to assist the professional should concentrate on the achievement of cadre training, in particular, for the development of officers and NCOs as- of this objective. Naturally, outside sup- officers working in BALTBAT HQ. In- signed to BALTBAT. port will be most required to ensure deed, the main difference of the two op- In this way BALTBAT could make a sustainability in a mission and therefore tions is that BALTBAT as peace opera- direct and very significant contribution may prove to be rather significant. Some tions unit has its main emphasis on a unit to the defence forces of Estonia, Latvia indications of the areas where external and its ability to act as a unit in a hostile and Lithuania as it would set the training support will be most required are identi- environment. BALTBAT as a training unit standards. Every year it would deliver a fied within the Table 1. focuses on people - soldiers, NCOs and large number of well trained military and The last point to be made here is that, officers - who are working in it. The suc- would involve significant parts of the ar-

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mies of the three states into Baltic co-op- • level and mode of participation in for conscripts may be of little additional eration. In general, this option would move peace operations (in the mid-term period); value for experienced professionals. For the project closer to some of the original Below there is the authors perception this reason, tri-national field training ac- ideas behind the BALTBAT initiative. of how these crucial issues can be man- tivities of the BALTBAT will require great aged to the advantage of each of the coun- efforts to make them reasonably useful for Finding a Right Balance tries and participants involved in the all the participants. But even if certain project. joint activities are agreed, most of the As was indicated above, the develop- First of all, there are good arguments training will have to done nationally. The ment plan for the BALTBAT project will in favour of making the project much multinational dimension of the project have to combine the two options. It is more decentralised. One of the impera- will first and foremost be ensured through clear that the Baltic States will be careful tives for greater degree of decentralisation BALTBAT Headquarters and Baltic Sup- not to put too much emphasis on par- is different national approaches to the port Group located in Ada¿i as well as ticipation in international operations, development of the national forces in each through the project co-ordination and which could make BALTBAT too differ- of the Baltic States and the role which management mechanisms established by ent and too isolated from the rest of the BALTBAT is expected to play in this proc- the three Baltic States. national armed forces. On the other, they ess. For example, Latvia plans to have its In the view of decentralisation of the will seek to maximise the benefits of the national BALTBAT unit consisting of project, BALTBAT HQ will have to place strenuous national efforts and the gener- professional soldiers, enlisted for a rela- more emphasis of the individual train- ous outside support, which has made tively long period; Lithuania would like ing and development of staff officers ap- BALTBAT the most capable unit in the this battalion to be just like other national pointed to the HQ. Another major task Baltic States for participation in interna- battalions i.e. with significant portion of of the HQ will be issuing of training tional missions. conscripts in it; Estonia seems have taken standards to the national companies and The critical issues that BALTBAT de- yet another approach. This indicates that specialist units and supervise their imple- velopment plan has to address are the fol- the level of preparedness and the needs mentation. Also, BALTBAT HQ could lowing: for training may vary significantly be- usefully assist the preparation of various • level of centralisation of the project; tween the participating nations. An exer- staff and field training activities in the • the role of BALTBAT HQ and BSG; cise programme that is very challenging national BALTBAT units. BALTBAT HQ,

68 Baltic Defence Review 2/1999 being relatively small and mobile unit, ers from BALTBAT HQ would become ance with BALTBAT standards and serv- could easily travel between the three na- the most valuable assets for national forces. ing in other national units. tions assisting the national BALTBAT unit What is said above on the role of To summarise the above, BALTBAT commanders in accordance with their BALTBAT HQ is based on the assump- should best meet the expectations related needs and could get direct impression of tion that in the mid-term period to the project if: the quality of the training activities. Quite BALTBAT will not participate in a mis- • the main focus of the project in the importantly, the national differences in sion on the battalion level. The experi- mid-term is on the establishment of one the approach towards the establishment ence of recent deployments suggests that BALTBAT standard infantry battalion in of the feeder battalions may be an ad- at the moment the Baltic States should be each of the Baltic States; vantage in terms of providing different able to send in turn their national com- • BALTBAT HQ concentrates on train- type of experience to the personnel in panies to an international mission with- ing and professional development of staff BALTBAT HQ and thereby contributing out pressing too much the national de- officers assigned to serve in the HQ and to the development of officers serving in fence establishments. This level of partici- assists in the implementation of the train- the HQ. Provided that each nation devel- pation in a mission should not be in- ing programmes in the three national ops some kind of standard training rou- creased until the Baltic States are fully units; tine for its national BALTBAT units, prepared for a long-term deployment of • the Baltic nations rotate one infan- BALTBAT HQ could also work in accord- the whole battalion, unless NATO calls for try company and a few staff officers in an ance with a standard annual training pro- a Baltic contribution in accordance with international mission. gramme. This programme could be tai- the agreed NATO IPGs. Instead the focus This option calls for outside support lored in such a way that upon comple- should be on the establishment of the to BALTBAT being centred on such areas tion it would provide the officers serv- three national BALTBAT units. The readi- as introduction of BALTBAT standard ing in BALTBAT HQ with a certain range ness requirements set within the IPGs training in the three national battalions; of experience and skills, first of all in terms should not be a real problem to meet provision of equipment to the national of mastering operational English language provided that the national BALTBAT feeder units of the same or similar type as and learning to work in accordance with units established in each state. If needed currently in BALTBAT and support to NATO staff procedures. Thereby, in a those could also be reinforced with offic- the establishment of a maintenance base; relatively short period of time, the officers, NCOs and soldiers trained in accord- long-term deployment of a company size

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unit from the Baltic States to an interna- year 2000, when BALTBAT will become As a result, some kind balance should tional mission. Baltification of the reorganised from a classical peacekeeping be found between the two objectives, project should be carried out gradually, unit to an infantry battalion. Current which as the article argues, are not en- starting with taking over all the training debate in the Baltic States is about the tirely compatible. This author suggests one activities, establishment for a maintenance future of the project, i.e. its development of the possible options for such a bal- base for the donated equipment, later tak- beyond the year 2000. This article seeks ance. The option requires that the main ing full responsibility for project to make a contribution to this debate by objective of the next stage of the sustainability at home, including procure- highlighting some of the main issues that BALTBAT development plan is establishment of the necessary equipment and have to be addressed or taken into con- ment of an infantry battalion (national weapons. This should be possible to sideration in the discussion on the fu- BALTBAT unit) in each of the Baltic States. achieve in a four-five year period. Par- ture of the BALTBAT project. The role of BALTBAT HQ should be re- ticipation in international operations and, This article argues that the project has defined, tasking it to concentrate on train- in particular, logistic support in a mis- a great potential to contribute to the de- ing of officers assigned to HQ and assist- sion area seems to be the only area where velopment of the defence forces in the ance to training of the national BALTBAT the Baltic States may have to look for Baltic States in accordance with the West- units. Participation in international op- additional support also in a longer per- ern standards. The precondition for that erations should be kept at the present - spective. is, and therefore the most important task i.e. company level. after the year 2000 should be, the anchor- Conclusion ing of the BALTBAT project in the na- 1 The author is most familiar with the situ- tional defence forces of the Baltic States. ation in the Lithuanian armed forces, but This article reflects the authors per- At the same time, BALTBAT is probably many of the concerns expressed in this article ception of the role BALTBAT project has the most capable unit in the Baltic States were shared by the militaries in Estonia and played in the development of the armed for participation in peace operations. Latvia. forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania Therefore in its development plan after since the project was launched in Septem- the year 2000 BALTBAT should reflect the ber 1994. The current stage of the project determination of the Baltic States to par- should be completed by the end of the ticipate in international peace operations.