Government Assistance to the Financial

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Government Assistance to the Financial Economic Stabilization Advisory Group | February 27, 2009 Governmental Assistance to the Financial Sector: an Overview of the Global Responses (v5) Governments across the world have taken, and continue to take, a variety of extraordinary measures to protect the financial sector and prevent a recession. The measures fall into the following categories: guarantees of bank liabilities; retail deposit guarantees; central bank assistance measures; bank recapitalization through equity investments by private investors and Governments; and open-market or negotiated acquisitions of illiquid or otherwise undesirable assets from weakened financial institutions. The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview of the principal measures that have been taken in the major financial jurisdictions to support the financial system. The first version of this note was published on November 12, 2008. Since then, Governments in some jurisdictions have adopted further measures or amended measures previously adopted. The current version of the note takes into account those measures and is based on information available to us on February 27, 2009. This publication does not cover various new regulatory restrictions on short selling. A separate Shearman & Sterling LLP publication, “Global Clampdown on Short Selling: an Overview”, deals with those measures as adopted in the major financial jurisdictions. A copy can be obtained at: http://www.shearman.com/esag_011609/. LNDOCS01/590857.2 Table of Contents Page ARGENTINA.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 AUSTRALIA........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 AUSTRIA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 BELGIUM............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15 BRAZIL ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18 BULGARIA........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 CANADA.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 28 DENMARK........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 30 ESTONIA............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 33 FINLAND ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 34 FRANCE.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 37 GERMANY........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 41 GREECE3 ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 49 HONG KONG ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 53 HUNGARY........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 56 ICELAND ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 61 INDIA ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 66 IRELAND ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 84 ITALY................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 86 JAPAN ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 91 LUXEMBOURG ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 96 THE NETHERLANDS.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 98 NEW ZEALAND................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 102 NORWAY........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 105 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.................................................................................................................................................................................... 107 PORTUGAL....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 109 REPUBLIC OF KOREA..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 112 RUSSIA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 114 SLOVAKIA......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 122 SLOVENIA......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 127 SPAIN................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 131 SWEDEN........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 134 SWITZERLAND................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 138 UKRAINE........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 141 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (“UAE”).................................................................................................................................................................................. 144 UNITED KINGDOM..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
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