Christian Churches in Ukraine and Their Relations 1991-2015

“Project Ukraine” under Threat – Christian Churches in Ukraine and their Relations 1991-2015

Alfons Brüning

Ukraine in the 1990s – The Yugoslavian Portent

The story to be told here starts in the early 1990s, and just as elsewhere in Europe it was not clear by this time whether it would end well. In late 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist, months after several of its former republics had declared themselves independent, and abolished the monopoly of the Communist party. Ukraine had adopted independence on August 21, 1991, and the act of this declaration had been supported by a vast majority throughout the former Soviet republic, both in its predominantly rural and pro- Ukrainian Western parts as in its industrialized and traditionally Russophile East.1 Yet this initial consensus turned out to be superficial, and it very soon gave way to expressions of inner tensions that had already existed for a long time. Nowhere were these tensions felt more strongly than in the area of church and religion. Already previous to the turnover of the late 1980s Ukraine had aptly been described as the Soviet Union’s Bible belt. Despite all persecutions by the atheist regime remnants of religious activity remained disproportionately strong, and also the signs of religious revival since the 1970s appear to have been felt more intensively here than elsewhere.2 In addition, Ukraine’s West- ern provinces (the regions of Galicia, Bukovyna, Zakarpatt’ia and Volhynia) anyway had fallen under Soviet rule a generation later, which means only

1 Cf. Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 168-169. 2 Viktor Yelensky, ‘Religiosity in Ukraine according to Sociological Surveys’, Religion, State and Society, 38 (2010), no. 3, pp. 213-227, esp. 213f. An illustrative case study concerning a particular wave of religious revival in the Eastern central city of Dnepropetrovsk, evoked among others by the “Western” rock opera “Jesus Christ Superstar” is provided by Sergei Zhuk, ‘Religion, “Westernization”, and Youth in the “Closed City” of Soviet Ukraine, 1964-1984’, Russian Review, 67 (2008), no. 4, pp. 661-679.

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after World War II. They had therefore not experienced the brutal persecutions of the 1930s. As the religious policy of the Soviet regime had changed meanwhile, they were now subject to a more pragmatic and utilitarian, albeit still anything but tolerant political course, that aimed at an exploitation and use rather than unconditional extinction of religion. Later, i.e. in the later years of the perestroika-policy under Communist party leader Mikhail Gor- bachev there was to be seen another subsequent liberalization of the party’s former guidelines towards religion. In 1988 the solemn celebration of the millennium of the “baptism of Kievan Rus’” by the Russian Orthodox Church had marked a significant change in the status of this religious organization in particular, but also of religious groups in general.3 Previously forced into a semi-legal existence determined rather by pragmatic tolerance than legal security, and with many activities banned into the underground, now churches and religious communities throughout the Soviet Union regained a secure and influential place in society. In the Orthodox Church in Ukraine this soon led to a split of the hitherto monopolized church structure under jurisdiction of the Moscow patriarchate into ultimately four branches of Christianity, all performing the liturgy according to the Eastern, Byzantine rite. Starting from 1989 (after a visit of party leader Gorbachev in the Vatican) it was first the Ukrainian Greek Catholic (UGCC, commonly named Uniate) Church that reclaimed a legal status independent from the structures of the Moscow patriarchate. This Eastern rite church once, four centuries earlier (in 1596) had placed itself under the jurisdiction of the Roman pope, a step that had never been recognized by other Orthodox churches. After World War II, when formerly Polish Western Ukraine (the provinces of Galicia, Zakarpatt’ia and Bukovyna) came under Soviet rule, under pressure of the NKVD a local synod in 1946 had declared the “return” of the Greek Catholic dioceses and parishes towards the Moscow Patriarchate – a step that forced many clerics and believers in disaccord with this measure into the underground. The Greek Catholics therefore for a large part had existed as a catacomb church structure, which now, in 1989, successfully claimed its re-establishment as an independent and legal religious entity.

3 Cf. Sabrina Ramet, ‘Religious Policy in the Era of Gorbachev’, in id. (ed.), Religious Policy in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), pp. 21-52.

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The Greek Catholic Church in the 19th century had been a stronghold of the formation of a modern Ukrainian national idea, but via its bounds with the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church it had also claimed Ukraine as an integral part of Europe and of the West, in often conscious dissociation from Moscow and the Orthodox in the Russian Empire. On the other hand, within its ranks it had an equally strong fraction of dissenters who instead put an emphasis on the Eastern, Byzantine heritage and therefore voted for closer connections with the Russian East, or at least for an independent Ukrainian Eastern Rite church. So the general options of a pro-European or Western orientation, Ukrainian nationalism and a favor for the Eastern rite and spiritual tradition had always been present also within this church.4 Despite all efforts especially of the church leaders since the early 20th century (like the widely respected Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyc’kyi, 1900-1944) to balance these tendencies, the inner tensions within the church in Galicia had never disappeared.5 As it would turn out after independence, even the hard times in the catacombs were not able to erase them completely.6

4 On the role of the Greek Catholic Church in the formation of Ukrainian national consciousness in the 19th century cf. John Paul Himka, The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge MA: Harvard Ukrainian Studies Fund, 1986); id., Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine. The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia 1867-1900 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill University Press, 1999); Jan Kozik, Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830-1848 (Cracow: Wyd. lit., 1973). On the Russophile fraction within the Greek Catholic Church cf. Anna Veronika Wendland, Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwi- schen Österreich und Russland, 1848-1915 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001). 5 For the history of the Greek-Catholic Church in the interwar period cf. A. Sorokowski, ‘The Lay and Clerical Intelligentsia in Greek-Catholic Galicia, 1900-1939: Competition, Conflict, Cooperation’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 24 (2002-03), no. 1-4, pp. 261-290; B. Budurowycz, ‘The Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, 1914-1944’, ibid., pp. 291-375, on nationalist tendencies and Sheptyc’kyi’s role in this situation cf. esp. pp. 325-339. 6 Whereas the church leaders and also, for example, the staff of the newly founded Ukrai- nian Catholic University in L’viv usually betray a pro-Western and democratic course, it is still a matter of debate to what extent nationalist tendencies are alive among the believers. Cf. the debates of Sophia Senyk, ‘The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values versus Nationalist Doctrines’, Religion, State & Society, 30 (2002), no. 4, pp. 317- 332, and Serge Keleher, ‘Response to Sophia Senyk The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church Today: Universal Values versus Nationalist Doctrines’, Religion, State & Society, 31 (2003), no. 3, pp. 289-306.

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It may be for this reason that after a liberation of the Soviet legislation had made it possible for many formerly Russian Orthodox parishes to chose their actual allegiance freely and to change their jurisdiction according to what they deemed fit, in the Ukrainian West only a part of the parishes and also several monasteries returned to the Greek Catholics, whereas others (like e.g. the famous Pochaiv Monastery) deliberately remained under Orthodox jurisdiction. Few of such decisions were unanimous even amongst the believers themselves, and struggles over jurisdiction, buildings and church property in some cases even ended in violent confrontation. The Russian Orthodox Church did not find it easy to give in to the loss of a significant amount of its former parishes, as Western Ukraine after 1946 had retained a higher concentration of (then) Orthodox parishes than almost every other region on former Soviet territory. To make things worse, a further equally significant amount of religious entities chose neither of the two camps recently established, but took the side of a third force, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). Already in 1989 the former Russian Orthodox priest Dmytro Yarema placed his parish under the jurisdiction of this branch of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the begin- nings of which date back to the aftermath of the October Revolution. In 1921 a group of clerics had declared its independence from Moscow, and established the core of a national Ukrainian church which was yet not canonically recognized. After the extinction of its remainders on Soviet Ukrainian territory through the Stalin era persecutions the church survived in its diaspora forma- tions especially in Western Europe, and in the United States and Canada. After its return into Ukraine, in 1990 the first All-Ukrainian Sobor of the UAOC was held in Kyiv, on the initiative and with active participation of Yarema. By 1994, the number of Eastern rite Churches in Ukraine had even increased to four, after the former Russian Orthodox Metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret (Denysenko), had openly left the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate in order to erect another separate, national Ukrainian Church. When asked about how to refer to this decision by their hierarch, a large number of former Russian Orthodox bishops in Ukraine had followed Filaret, while others pro- tested and remained with Moscow. Eventually, after all further negotiations had failed, the Moscow Patriarchate had defrocked and even excommunicated Filaret for causing a schism. In the eyes of Filaret himself, however, this act was uncanonical, and in 1995 he followed his predecessor Volodymyr (Roma- niuk) as Patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kievan Patriarchate

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(UOC-KP). In the meantime, UAOC’s leading figure Dmytro Yarema had become Patriarch of the UAOC, in succession of the old Mstyslav (Skrypnyk), a returned from exile who died in 1993. In short, together with the Major Archbishop of L’viv and head of the UGCC,7 and the Russian Orthodox patriarch of Moscow, since that year four Eastern rite branches competed about representing Ukrainian Christianity in its core. And theology and questions of faith were hardly the main matters which divided them. Pure theological issues were rather secondary in this play, at maximum a part among others in all existing disagreements. Their competition was rather about the main orientation of the country – Western oriented, independently national, or Russian oriented. More than elsewhere, competing cultural and national loyalties therefore where mirrored on the field of religion.8 Being aware of the threatening potential entailed in such tensions, many an observer by this time might have looked with concern on the events unfolding elsewhere in post-Communist Europe, in contemporary Yugoslavia – another multi-ethnic and multi-religious entity that fell apart after the end of Com- munism. The Yugoslavian example seemed to demonstrate openly, how inner tension of a complex society could be reduced to a simple clash of national ideologies, shaped alongside antagonisms not of language, but of culture and religion: Serbian versus Croatian, Catholic versus Orthodox, East versus West. Only at one given moment, from there came also humble signs of hope, which yet turned out failing, making a promise that was not kept. In the early 1990s, on the eve of the wars, the Catholic archbishop of Zagreb and the Serbian patriarch came together several times, and released several declarations,

7 The head of the UGCC in his internal correspondence also freely uses the title of patriarch, although officially this title and rank has not been granted to him through the Vatican so far, despite continuous efforts. 8 For a more thorough description of these developments in the years right before and after independence cf. Serge Keleher, ‘Out of the Catacombs: The Greek Catholic Church in Ukraine’, Religion in Communist Lands, 19/3-4 (1991), pp. 251-263; Friedrich Heyer, Kirchengeschichte der Ukraine im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2003), pp. 379-434; Zenon W. Wasylkiw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, in Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Lucian N. Leustean (ed.) (London/ New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 312-333, esp. 312-317. Some corrective details concerning the evolution of conflicts in the Western regions and the size of the parties involved are given by Andrii Yurash, ‘Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations in Galicia and their Influence on the Religious Situation in Ukraine’, Religion, State & Society, 33 (2005), no. 3, pp. 185-205, here esp. 197ff.

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calling for a peaceful solution of arising conflicts. In particular, these calls formed a deliberate attempt to keep religion out of the clashes, when both parties involved openly agreed that no hostility or aggression could rightfully refer to or be justified through matters of belief. On the contrary, as religious leaders they authoritatively and jointly called for an immediate stop to all atrocities, release of prisoners and restoration of dialogue.9 As soon became clear, even this prophetically formulated appeal of high authorities did not have the effect it was meant for. Neither did it stop open war between Croatia and Serbia, and later on the territory of Bosnia, nor did it exert any measurable effect on the further course of the war events. After all, it was rather the question about the reasons for the failure, the apparent futility of even such univocal and coura- geous attempts to end violence that preoccupied analysts since then.10 At this time already many Ukrainians looked with concern to the situation in the Balkans, being vividly aware of a similar threat existing in their own country, which was so obviously also in a situation determined by both ethnic and religious antagonisms. It may well be that many efforts to install a fruitful and enduring dialogue, and to overcome existing boundaries undertaken since the early 1990s in Ukraine, which we are about to outline in some detail, were also inspired by the wish to make the right conclusions from a situation emerging elsewhere. The question is now, in autumn 2015, to what extent all these efforts were successful or whether they were equally doomed to failure from the onset.

Fighting the Demons of the Past: Pluralism and Memory

In Ukraine this is a puzzling question, against the background of recent developments. Because, despite all efforts into the opposite direction, about 20 years later the demons of war and violence nonetheless seem to return

9 ‘Message of Patriarch Pavle and Cardinal Kuharic following their Meeting in Geneva on 23 September 1992’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 12 (1992), no. 5, pp. 50-51 (online: http://www.georgefox.edu/ree/Pavle_Message_articles_previous.pdf [accessed 07-11-2014]). 10 Cf. Geert van Dartel, ‘The Nations and the Churches in Yugoslavia’, Religion State & Society, 20 (1992), no. 3-4, pp. 275-288; R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation (Oxford/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 72-80; Thomas Bremer, Kleine Geschichte der Religionen in Jugoslavien. Königreich – Kommunismus – Krieg (Freiburg: Herder, 2003), pp. 87-100.

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also to Ukraine. Many an observer familiar with both scenarios now, watching the events on the Maidan square and afterwards, felt reminded of the clashes in the Balkans years before, including the failure of good will declarations of religious leaders.11 True, during the crisis which started in late November 2013 with the protests in Kiev, the several branches of the Ukrainian churches of either Byzantine or Latin rite also published a number of similar declarations, jointly signed by all their heads. They call, first and foremost, for a peaceful solution of the conflicts that had occurred, and for a resumption of dialogue – in other words, to preserve the way dissent should be overcome in a civilized society, simultaneously warning that every use of radical means and violence would inevitably mean a serious threat to both societal interests and to Ukraine as a nation.12 Next to these public declarations, the images of priests holding up a cross and standing for hours in the cold on a stone cov- ered area between the front lines of the special police of “berkut” and the protesters belong perhaps to the most impressive pictures the events have generated. The stage in the middle of the Maidan every day saw prayers held by priests of various denominations. Monasteries (as the St Michael’s Monas- tery of the UOC-KP, located close to the Maidan in Kiev) opened their doors to offer shelter for protesters, and offered care for wounded. The UOC-MP offered the venue of the famous Monastery of the Caves for negotiations of the opposition leaders with the president. However, after the brutal clashes on the square of February 20, and against the background of the further course of events in Southeastern and Eastern Ukraine it might seem that these well intended and sometimes heroic endeavors were doomed to failure and fruitlessness, and the current situation also seems to give little signs of hope. Just like once in Yugoslavia, neither gestures nor words of good-will could prevent armed conflict.

11 Cf. the column of Peter Kuzmić, ‘Ukraine ‘Crucified’ between the East and West’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 24 (2014), no. 3, pp. 1-5. 12 Declaration of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations on December 10, 2013, (signed by Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) of the UOC-MP as head), on http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/statements/211-zvernennya-vseukrayinskoyi-rady-cerkov- u-zvyazku-z-suspilno-politychnoyu-sytuacieyu-v-ukrayini [last access 11-17-2014]. In English available in Ukraine-2014: Socio-political conflict and the Church. Positions of Reli- gious Figures, Experts and Citizens (Kiev: Razumkov Center, 2014), p. 11.

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There are, however, reasons for optimism and pessimism alike. Several things in fact are different from the situation 20 years ago. The current situation apparently recommends a certain subdivision of further explanations, and as it turns out, this would also result in a division between the more optimistic and more, say, skeptical further parts of this paper. It is a twofold story with one part up to, and another one after late 2013. Where are the breaks, and where the continuities between the two phases, is something difficult to assess. The development of the mutual relationship between the various branches of Christian Churches in Ukraine up to the beginning of the crisis in autumn 2013 seemed to deliver, despite all remaining tensions and conflicts, certain signs for optimism concerning what I would like to call the “project Ukraine” – in rough terms, this means the slow but sure establishment of a continuous and positive dialogue between a majority of religious denominations, on the ground of the values and the realities of a plural civic society. On the other hand, given current developments on the Crimea and in East- ern Ukraine of present days, the prospective of this “Ukrainian project”, its future is under severe threat, and the role of religion in the present confrontation can be manifold. To continue with the first, and more optimistic part: How did churches and religion develop in their mutual relations during the period of independence between 1991 and late 2013? A somewhat simplistic statement at the beginning might be that Ukraine is not Yugoslavia and differs from the latter in a couple of respects, and secondly, the Ukrainians in the early 1990s, apparently, were warned by the Yugoslavian example and closely watched the developments over there. After all, they tried, slowly but surely, to make their conclusions in order to prevent, despite all outward differences, a similar course of events. The first difference concerns the religious landscape itself. Whereas the confrontations on the territory of former Yugoslavia have often been described (adequately or not) as also a religious war, namely as a clash of Orthodox Serbians, Catholic Croatians and Bosnian Muslims, there is no similar and similarly simple religious fault line running through Ukraine – although over the years naming Ukraine a “borderland” has become commonplace among historians and political scientists alike. It even made it into popular schemes of a “clash of civilizations” (in particular those of the Latin West and the

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Orthodox East in Europe), the borderline between which is supposed to run, among others, right through the Ukrainian territory.13 In reality, however, there are not two opposed, but rather a multitude of differing parts. The scheme of a clear-cut division between a Ukrainian speaking East with pro-European Orientation, and a predominantly Orthodox East with a Russian speaking majority is simplistic both in terms of culture and of religion. There is no unique national narrative or identity on the territory of present Ukraine, neither are there just two. Instead, we have quite a number of various narratives, patterns of identity, ideas of nationhood and society all involved in a rather multi-faceted national discourse that enrolls since the emergence of the first autonomous Ukrainian state in 1991. First, a simple bipolar scheme clearly ignores the third one, namely an Ukrainian autonomous, “patriotic” option that is of much importance especially in many central regions, and also for several of the religious communities introduced above (like the UOC-KP and the UAOC in particular). Furthermore, it also ignores the role played by regional identities in the national discourse that has enrolled since 1991. There are not only those speaking Ukrainian and those speaking Russian, or those practicing Catholic or Western rites, opposed to those attending the Orthodox liturgy. A majority of the country’s population is bilingual at least, and a variety of self-identifications is possible. Rus- sian speaking people in the East can nonetheless often feel as loyal citizens of Ukraine. Crimean Tatars, mostly Muslims by the way, usually give preference to the Ukrainian state, also given their former negative experience with the Russians in the Stalin era (when they had been deported to Siberia, to return only after 1991). But there is also no unique answer within the country to the question where the actual centre of Ukrainian national culture should be located. Ukrainian speaking inhabitants of Kiev and Central Ukraine sometimes look with a mixture of amusement and suspicion on the pretension of the Western Ukrainians in Galicia and neighboring provinces (the so called zapadentsy) to represent the very core of “the Ukrainian” nation and tradition. The scale of such examples can be easily broadened. A close observer of, and

13 Suggestive in this respect, and apparently still of some influence beyond academia is Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order (London/ New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), esp. pp. 156-163.

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participant in the scene of a national discourse as the Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak had suggested – admittedly with some sarcastic humor – that there are actually not two, but twenty-two Ukraines.14 That might entail some provocative exaggeration, but not without reason, as the Ukrainian national discourse about “Who are we, and what will become of us?” includes a whole variety of opinions, of questions and answers. Apart from the latter, the “we” in this formula turns out to be decisive. Religious affiliation, on the other hand, plays an important part in this discourse. Actually, as for religion, the situation in the country is similarly pluralistic. Polls carried out by the Razumkov Center in Kiev in 2006 revealed a number of almost 73% of respondents who said to believe in God, but 62,5% said not to belong to any religious organization. These are figures which place Ukraine on a mid-place on an all-European scale.15 At the same time, Ukraine is a completely multi-religious country, if one keeps in mind the numerous churches, religions and religious groups of all types, registered, as it is pre- scribed, by governmental institutions. In January 2005 the State’s Council of Religious Affairs (Derzhkomitet Ukrainy u spravach relihii) counted therefore a number of 30.805 religious organizations, representing more than a hundred different faiths, directions, and churches.16 Christians, Muslims, Jews with over all seven different groups and orders, the Armenian Church, Lutherans, Swiss Protestants, Jehova’s Witnesses, the so called “Russian Inde- pendent Orthodox Church”, or the “Apocalyptical Orthodox Church” are to be found among them, and complete a rather colored picture of the modern Ukrainian society and its religious attitudes. Nonetheless, Orthodox or Eastern rite Christianity respectively is the strongest religious force in today’s Ukraine. Simultaneously it is here, where

14 Yaroslav Hrytsak, Strasti za natsionalismom. Stara istoriia na novyi lad [Passions behind Nationalism. An Old History imposed on a New Order] (Kiev: Kritika, 2011). Cf. Natalia Kochan, ‘“Oh, East is East, and West is West ...”: The Character of Orthodox Greek- Catholic Discourse in Ukraine and its Regional Dimensions’, in Eastern Orthodox Encoun- ters of Identity and Otherness. Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue, Andrii Krawchuk, Thomas Bremer (eds.) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 126-138. 15 Cf. http://razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=300 [accessed 06-28-2015]; see also Yelensky, ‘Religiosity in Ukraine’, pp. 215-216. 16 According to Ukrainian legislation it is the parish or single community which is supposed to register, and receives the status of a juridical entity, not the entire religious organisation.

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old antagonisms are to be felt more than elsewhere, leading to a regrettable division of Eastern rite Christendom in Ukraine into four (notably not only two!) branches. Generally there is a much less degree of secularization, in comparison with some parts of Western Europe (such as the Netherlands or Eastern Germany, for example). In the post-communist society of Ukraine only 4 % of the whole population declare themselves openly as atheist, while 10,9 % are “nonreligious”. In general terms, 83,7 % of the Ukrainian population consider themselves Christians, with 54,3 % Orthodox, 11,1 % Roman Catholics, 2,7 % Protestants among them. One has to add, however, the interesting figures of about 16,9 % “independent” Christians. And one has to add 1,7 % Muslims, and 0,4 % Jews.17 Among the Orthodox denominations, still the strongest and most influential is the autonomous (since 1992) Ukrainian part of the Russian Ortho- dox Church (UOC-MP). In 2014 the UOC-MP counted 12.895 parishes throughout the country, including 532 on Crimea.18 After the dismissal of Filaret, as mentioned above, it had the Kievan metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan) at its head. Volodymyr had been born in the Khmel’nyts’kyi region in Central Ukraine, was completely bilingual and known for his personal favor for the writings of the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow patriarchate is still the most significant of the Eastern rite churches in Ukraine in terms of numbers of parishes, eparchies, believers and organizational strength. It holds the vast majority of parishes in the East and the South of Ukraine, but has some settlements also in Central Ukraine and in the West, among the latter also

17 Quoted figures are from 2005, but proportions have not significantly changed since then, neither in absolute terms nor in relations. Cf. Cerkvy Ukrainy: cyfry, fakty, tendencii – Derzhkomitet u spravakh relihii pidbyv statistychni pidsumky mynuloho relihiinoho roku v Ukraini – http://ua.proua.com/print.php?p=analitic/2005/03/10/1130146.html [accessed 08-31-2005]. For more recent accounts cf. National Security and Defense, no. 8 (92), 2007 (Kiev: Razumkov Center, 2007); and Viktor Yelensky, ‘Religiosity in Ukraine according to Sociological Surveys’, which betray comparable dimensions. Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, p. 320, gives the figure of 55 religious denominations, and 36.500 registered congregations. 18 Figures according to East-West Church & Ministry Report, 22, no.3, Summer 2014, p. 5; Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, p. 325. For the confessional picture as of 2009 cf. also Nikolay Mitrokhin, ‘Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life 2004-2009’, Religion, State & Society, 38 (2010), no. 3, pp. 229-251, here pp. 233-236.

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the famous Monastery of Pochaiv. The Metropolitan of Kiev is still among the most respected hierarchs in the Russian Orthodox church, and an important member in the Holy Synod in Moscow.19 This branch of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is still the only one to be recognized as canonical by the Ortho- dox world community, a fact which has some significance also in every day’s polemics. Metropolitan Volodymyr due to his balancing, “spiritual” and non-political profile and behavior20 all over the years had been a widely respected personality, but his weak physical condition (he was born in 1935) in recent years has often made it difficult for him to balance all inner tensions within his church. He died on July 5, 2014. The question about his possible successor was narrowly connected with that for the further orientation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, which meanwhile had within its ranks a pro-Russian and a pro-Ukrainian (autocephalous) wing competing with one another. The existence of these two wings reflects the inner development the UOC-MP has gone through especially in the years after the so-called “Orange Revolution” in 2004-5. Before this event, and despite the generally cautious acting of its head in the political arena, the UOC-MP had generally been identified with a pro-Russian orientation. Yet this pro-Russian, which also often implied anti-Western orientation of the clergy by all evidence was not equally shared by its flock, and by many of the parish clergy. During the “Orange Revolution” events of 2004-5 the clear votes (sometimes directly accompanied by defamation of the opponents and even threat of spiritual punishment) of many of its clerics in favor of the pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovich effectively had cost them much sympathies among the believers – perhaps not only because of different political orientations among the laymen, but through a general dismay evoked simply by such open engagement in political party struggle. Furthermore, also the Orthodox parishes were less and less homogenous in

19 In 2009 Volodymyr was among the favorite candidates for the Patriarchal see of the Moscow Patriarchate, but effectively withdraw his application, when he declared that he would prefer to remain Metropolitan of Kiev in a time, when the chance for a fruitful dialogue with other Christian denominations had significantly improved. – ‘Mitropolit Vladimir (Sabodan) fakticheskii otkazalsia ot vydvizheniia svoiei kandidatury na patriar- shikh vyborakh i prizval ne meniat’ status UPTs MP’, on http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/ ?act=news&id=68049&topic=624 [accessed 11-17-2015]. 20 In this respect he has often been compared to the Serbian patriarch Pavle, mentioned above. For a portrait of Volodymyr cf. Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, p. 322.

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their inner consistence – mixed marriages belonged to the picture, and occasional changes of jurisdiction of either believers or entire parishes also did. Not long after the events of 2005, there became known a number of priests who openly declared that a widening of the church’s autonomy status within the Moscow Patriarchate into full autocephaly, i.e. the creation of an independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine would be desirable. They were yet still cautious enough to add, that this future aim could only be achieved on canonical ways, i.e. searching for a kind of subsequent agreement from both the patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople, avoiding further schisms. On the other hand, their voice is still being countered by an equally strong pro-Russian, and at the same time strictly anti-Western wing within the same church. Curiously, stronghold of such fundamentalist orientation already previous to 2013 could be found in the Donbass region in the East, and around the monastery of Sviatohirsk.21 If the influence of this fraction has at least somewhat weakened over recent years, this is perhaps again not so much connected with their pro-Russian convictions itself, but with the uncompro- mising style of their argument and their involvement in politics. Even Met- ropolitan Volodymyr to so some extend countered their line when in recent years he more often than before dissociated himself openly from an overt and simplistic “politicization” of the spiritual tasks of the Church.22 In turn, the cautious striving for an independent Orthodox church in Ukraine among clerics of the Moscow Patriarchate apparently has rather little to do with those traces of Ukrainian patriotism or even ethnic nationalism which are still vital within at least some minor subgroups of the other Eastern Rite churches in Ukraine named above. When priests and clerics of this wing speak about “the people”, they mostly have in mind the civilians of the Ukrainian state in the way it existed now over 23 years, with a new generation born and grown within this framework. Among others, it is this mixed and colored society

21 Mitrokhin, ‘Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life’, pp. 240-242. 22 Cf. Katja Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church. Politics, Culture and Greater Russia (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), esp. pp. 107-122; Mitrokhin, ‘Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life’, pp. 243-244. According to some accounts given by Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, pp. 316-319, voices in favor of a national church independent from Moscow among the UOC-MP clergy, including metropolitan Volodymyr himself, had been heard occasionally already throughout the 1990s. The real change therefore probably needs to be seen in a growing distance towards politics, and sympathies for concepts of “civil society”, although still connected with a national state.

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with its often loose confessional bonds they also encounter in parish life. If in statements of this group “the church is always with the people”, this means to keep distance towards particular political parties or forces. It instead expresses a kind of pastoral connectedness with a civil society, and a commitment to corresponding ideas like democratic values and human rights. “The people” then in fact often coincides with concept of a “civil society”, and has little to do with an “imagined community” along the guidelines of classical nationalism. After all, this attitude was clearly mirrored in the presence of a number of UOC-MP priests and clerics among the protesters on the Maidan square since late 2013.23 The two other branches of Orthodoxy in Ukraine lack official recognition by the Orthodox oikumene, and in their self-understanding refer much more what they see as the national Ukrainian tradition of Christianity. This applies in particular to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which claims this specific tradition as the ground for its founding already in 1920. Key patterns in its self-understanding are terms like autocephaly, “ukrainization” and “collective structure” (sobornopravnist’). Notably, church services are held in Ukrainian here, not in Church Slavonic as it is still generally common within the UOC-MP. A constitutive element in this founding of a separated Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1920, still in the period of the revolutionary years after the fall of the Russian tsars, was the wish for independence from Moscow, nourished for decades before, among Ukrain- ian clerics and lay intellectuals. In their understanding, Christianity in Ukraine had to be, and traditionally was Orthodox, but also more “democratic” (the canonical term to be applied here would be “sobornyi” (communitarian)) and open, and with a stronger lay element than Russian Orthodoxy.24 One turning

23 Cf. Fr. Cyril Hovorun, ‘The Ukrainian Churches on the Barricades: The Building Force of the Civil Society’, Lecture delivered at Yale divinity school on April 3, 2014, on http://new.livestream.com/yaledivinityschool/hovorun/archives [accessed 11-20-2014]. I am grateful to Fr. Cyril for making the text of his lecture accessible to me. See also Fr. Georgii Kovalenko, ‘Civil society and the Church meet in each of us’, in Ukraine-2014. Socio-political conflict and the Church, p. 48. 24 Cf. Frank E. Sysyn, ‘The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Tradition of the Kyiv Metropolitanate’, in Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine, id., Serhii Plokhy (eds.) (Edmonton/Toronto: CIUS Press, 2003), pp. 23-39. The most comprehensive study concerning the pre-history of the autocephaly movement in the 19th century is Ricarda Vulpius, Nationalisierung der Religion. Russifizierungspolitik und ukrainische

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point in their view of Ukrainian church history is the subjugation of the Kievan metropolitan see to Moscow in 1686, which the autocephalists regard as non-canonical. They consider themselves, consequently, as subordinates of the Ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, as the Kievans had been up to the end of the 17th century. They share this view with a national oriented Ukrainian historiography.25 It is for this reason that hierarchs of the Auto- cephalous Church (and the UOC-KP, to be introduced below) continuously strive for good relationship to the Ecumenical patriarch, whom they regard as their primate.26 However, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople so far is quite cautious in this respect, avoiding any act of open interference in Ukraine’s complicated church affairs, which might sharpen the already existing tensions with the patriarchate of Moscow.27 Since 2000, after the death of Metropolitan Dmytrii (Yarema), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox

Nationsbildung 1860-1920 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2005). Traces of the idea of a more “democratic” structure of Ukrainian Christian tradition can be found already in the Romantic period before. These traces show among others some Polish influence, but this topic remains under-researched so far. Cf., for the time being, Alfons Brüning, ‘Religion and Nation: The Idea of the “Chosen People” in Writings of the Kievan Kyrill-and-Method Society in its European Historical Context’, in Confessiones et nationes. Discours identitaires nationaux dans les cultures chrétiennes. Moyen Age – XXe siècle, Mikhail V. Dmitriev, Daniel Tollet (eds.) (Paris: Éditions Honoré Champion, 2014), pp. 239-263. 25 Cf. on the events, described as a beginning of Russification of the Kievan metropolis, O. Subtelny, Ukraine. A History. (Edmonton/Toronto: CIUS Press, ²1998), pp. 193-194. A more detailed study defending the independence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the perspective of the UAOC is M. V. Charyshyn, Istoriia pidporiadkuvannia ukrains’koi pravos- lavnoi tserkvy moskovs’komu patriarkhatu [History of the subordination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to the Moscow Patriarchate] (Kiev: Venturi, 1995). 26 The UAOC for itself claims canonical status on the base of an act performed in occupied Poland by Dionisii Valedynskyi, Metropolitan of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which latter had been granted autocephaly in a tomos issued in 1924 by the Ecumenical Patriarch. Dionisii in 1940 appointed Ilarion (Ohienko) as bishop of Kholm and Podlissia, and four years later as Metropolitan. This act, in the view of the UAOC, further secured the apostolic succession and therefore completed the canonical status, regardless of the fact, that the church later had to escape from Poland and to reor- ganize in the US. Cf. Thomas Bremer, ‘Die orthodoxen Kirchen mit nicht-kanonischem Status (Ukraine)’, in Die orthodoxen Kirchen der byzantinischen Tradition, id., Hacik Rafi Gazer, Christian Lange (eds.) (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2013), pp. 115-120. 27 Nicholas E. Denysenko, ‘Chaos in Ukraine: the churches and the search for leadership’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 14 (2014), no. 3, pp. 242-259.

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Church was headed by Metropolitan Mefodii of Ternopil.28 Mefodii himself passed away on February 24, 2015. On June 4, 2015 the synod elected the archbishop of L’viv, Makarii (Maletich) as its new head. Makarii is a former hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, who in 1989 turned over to the UAOC.29. Currently the Autocephalous church counts 1.247 parishes, including 10 on Crimea.30 Generally the basis of this church is in central and Western Ukraine, with about 67% of the parishes situated in this region, and a theological institute for the education of priests also in Ternopil. Next to the Autocephalists, and even more significant in terms of parishes, eparchies and members, is he Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Kievan patriarch Filaret (Denysenko) (UOC-KP). Filaret is a former member of the Russian Orthodox clergy and Metropolitan of Kiev in the 1980s, but was banished and excommunicated as a result of his separatist activities after 1992, as described above. Filaret is a smart and well trained theologian, but he also can perhaps more adequately be described as a political character, and right in this sense a major opponent of the current patriarch of Moscow, Kirill.31 He often looked for closer cooperation with the secular government and the acting presidents. In the public sphere in independent Ukraine he is to some extent a controversial personality, not only because his obvious taste for power and influence, but also for several shadows hanging over his past. His role as a KGB informer (not necessarily agent) during Soviet times is better explored, for whatever reason, than in most other cases of his con- temporaries in the Moscow patriarchate’s hierarchy.32 Rumors about him having broken his monastic vows, and having a mistress and children, and about a misappropriation of church funds were never confirmed, and never disappeared.33

28 A biographical abstract of him is delivered by Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, p. 323. 29 “UAPC obrala svoim predstoiatelem metropolita Makariia,” Ukrains’ka pravda, June 5, 2015, on http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2015/06/5/7070319/ [accessed 06-28-2015] 30 East-West Church and Ministry Report, 22, 2014, no. 3, 2014, p. 5. 31 Cf. the portrait given by Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, pp. 322-323. 32 Cf. Aleksandr Nezhny, Komisar D’iavola [Commissioner of the Devil] (Moscow, 1993), part II, pp. 145-177, pp. 195-217. 33 Mark R. Eliott, ‘The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Religious Life in Ukraine and Russia’, East-West Church & Ministry Report, 22, 2014, no. 3, pp. 6-16, here p. 8.

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As for the UOC-KP in general, it stands for a decisive national Ukrainian position. Accordingly, publications in church periodicals of this Orthodox branch frequently bear a staunch anti-Russian character.34 In theory or theology respectively, there is rather little which separates the Kievan patriarchate from the Autocephalists. Next to the Eastern rite liturgy, basic patterns of church structure and doctrine, they both share the claim to represent an independent church in an independent country, and their patriotic or on the spots even nationalist convictions, expressed among others in the use of Ukrainian vernacular in the liturgy. Talks with this other “national-Ukrainian” branch about unification already went on for some times until the mid 2000s, but seem to have reached a dead end some years prior to the 2013 events.35 The main reason for this failure apparently lies in continuous disagreement about the distribution of future posts. By all evidence, it is first and foremost the personality of Filaret and his personal vision about how a unite Ukrainian church should be generated which for the time being creates insurmountable obstacles. Filaret holds to his claim to guide also the united church, but is not only banned by the Moscow patriarchate, but excommunicated, and will hardly be acceptable for neither the Ecumenical patriarchate nor Moscow. Interestingly, the Autocephalists in recent years also insist on canonicity as a precondition not only for the united Ukrainian church, but also for the path to be taken to reach this goal.36 Finally, a specific vision about “Ukrainian Christianity” has also been developed by the fourth Byzantine rite church already introduced above, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). Formerly known as Uniates (a term, besides, which in the meantime is generally being avoided and perceived as negatively connoted and offending), the Greek Catholics continue to hold the service according to the Byzantine liturgy, but over the centuries have adopted a number of elements from Latin theology and liturgy. As

34 Examples have been gathered e.g. by Natalia Kochan (as in n. 13); cf. also Oleg Friesen, ‘Religion im Ukraine-Konflikt’, Ukraine-Analysen (Bremen: Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) no. 137, September 30, 2014, pp. 18-19. 35 Wasyliw, ‘Orthodox Churches in Ukraine’, p. 315; Mitrokhin, ‘Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life’, pp. 234-235. 36 ‘Deiaki kanonichni zasady stanovlennia edinoi Pomisnoi Tserkvy’ [Some canonical bases for the erection of a unified local church] on http://pritvor.kiev.ua/ec/analitics/ mefodiy-association [accessed 10-30-2014].

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stated before, whether they represent mainly an Eastern or Western Christian tradition (or the best of both) is a constant matter of controversy also within the church and its adherents and clerics. It is exactly on this ground, i.e. because of the need first and foremost to balance internal opposition that the Greek Catholics started to figure out their own concept of Christianity in Ukraine. On the other hand, the concept once developed also serves the purpose of integrating the Greek Catholics in both the context of the whole society and state in Ukraine, and the world map of Christianity. It defines their role and identity against a background of controversy between Eastern and Western churches, and continues to do so in search of a compromise and of an ecumenical task. No less than 95 % of the 3919 (as of 2014) Greek Catholic parishes are placed in the West of Ukraine, in Galicia, Bukovyna and the Zakarpatt’ ja region.37 The Greek Catholic Church is headed by the Major Archbishop of Kiev-Halych, who is simultaneously a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. Although in 2005 the Greek Catholic Church moved the residence of the Major Archbishop to Kiev, and built a large size cathedral there, his former main see in L’viv in Galicia remains a place of central significance. One reason for this is the Ukrainian Catholic University, the central institution of higher learning and of theological education of the Greek Catholics, which since the early 1990 exists in this city, and has gained influence and a good reputation over the years all over Ukraine. This is also true for the history department there, which was at the core of the institution’s founding after 1990, and where concepts of “Ukrainian Christianity” are particularly being specified and fostered.38 Until 2011 the Greek Catholic Church was headed by Cardinal Lyubomyr Husar; after his retirement the synod elected Svyatoslav Shevchuk as his successor. Shevchuk, born in 1970, previous to his election had worked as bishop of the diaspora community of the Greek Catholics in Argentina. Because of the years commonly spent in Buenos Aires, he is said to have rather good contacts to Pope Francis.39

37 East-West Church & Ministry Report, 22, 2014, no. 3, p. 5. 38 Cf. Alfons Brüning, ‘Die Ukrainische Katholische Universität in Lemberg’, Glaube in der 2. Welt (G2W), 53 (2004), no. 4, pp. 18-21. 39 ‘Argentinian Bishop Sviatoslav Shevchuk becomes New Head of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church’, Religious Information Service of Ukraine, March 25, 2011, on http:// risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/catholics/ugcc/41423/ [accessed 11-21-2014]; ‘Archbishop

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Recent years have seen the revival, partly also the adjustment of the “Kievan tradition” concept, bases of which had earlier been worked, out among others, by leading hierarchs of the Greek Catholic Church during the 20th century, like metropolitans of L’viv and Halych Andrii Sheptyc’kyi and Josif Slipyi. This idea of “the churches of the Kievan tradition” describes Christianity in Ukraine as representing a type profoundly shaped by a religious pluralism avant la lettre, generated through the borderland situation between East and West: Due to their historical experience of a continuous encounter of Eastern and Western theology, rite and culture, Christians on the territory of today’s Ukraine, according to this concept, have learned to live with both, and to combine fruit- fully the best elements in a process of mutual enrichment. Ukrainian Christi- anity is therefore destined to take over the role of a bridge between East and West, on the base of several centuries’ experiences in a zone of encounter that automatically generates formulas of compromise, and practical solutions for all kinds of existing controversies and differences. The concept consciously includes Christians also of other denominations, who are seen to be influenced by the same common past, and therefore combines an ecumenical approach with national overtones and notions of modern pluralism alike.40 Recent authors like the above-mentioned cardinal Lyubomyr Husar, former head of the Greek Catholic Church, have tried to adjust this concept directly to the present, multi-religious situation and to a general scale of post-secular phe- nomena in society (as the “non-confessional” religiosity described above).41

Ignoring the Demons of the Past: Religiosity and Interaction

Concepts like the above mentioned, among both Greek Catholics and Ortho- dox, obviously have been created in thorough reflection on central patterns of religiosity in Ukraine. Generally, Ukraine is a country where religion is of

says authenticity, simplicity mark his mentor, Pope Francis’, Catholic News Service, March 18, 2013, on http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/1301258.htm [accessed 11-21-2014]. 40 Antoine Arjakovsky, ‘Das Konzept der “Kiever Kirche” – ein Weg zur Annäherung der Konfessionen in der Ukraine’, Ost-West. Europäische Perspektiven, 10 (2009), no. 3, pp. 189- 194; Andrii Mykhaleyko, “Per aspera ad astra”. Der Einheitsgedanke im theologischen und pastoralen Werk von Josyf Slipyj (1892-1984). Eine historische Untersuchung (Würzburg: Augustinus bei Echter, 2009). 41 Antoine Arjakovsky (ed.), Conversations with Lubomyr Cardinal Husar. Towards a Post- Confessional Christianity (L’viv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press, 2007).

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great significance also for political and societal processes. This, at first, finds expression in a number of symbolic features. Symbols of the nation and the national state in Ukraine are quite often connected with what might be called the Ukrainian type of Christianity, mostly Orthodoxy. To give only some out of the many examples: The official little weapon of the Ukrainian state, the so called tryzub, was once the military field standard of the Riurikid princes of Kiev, of which the most important was prince Volodymyr (in Russian: Vladimir). Volodymyr, on his part, became a saint still claimed for Russian as well as for Ukrainian national heritage, when he had his people baptized in the Byzantine rite in 988 – the event of which the 1000 years anniversary in 1988 had lead to a revival of religion in the last period of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, any newly elected president of Ukraine, when introduced to his duties, gives his oath with his hand on the Peresopnytsia Gospel, the first edition of the New Testament in early Ukrainian vernacular, edited in 1555- 61. Different from many countries in Western Europe, but perhaps similar to the US, during election campaigns, suitable candidates are being closely examined in the public and the media for their religious background, and have to react accordingly: Also former president Yanukovich during the cam- paign in 2010 was eager to present himself as a devout Orthodox believer. As elements of his partly criminal past became known to the public, some Orthodox clerics started to back him with invocation of the Biblical parable of the repentant sinner.42 His later successor, interim president Oleksandr Turchynov, former head of the parliamentary fraction of Julia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland (batkivshchyna) party, was a Protestant preacher – occasionally a fact much to the pride of the Protestants in the country.43 The new president Petro Poroshenko, according to some “is driven by deep religious convictions. He is a member of Ukraine’s Orthodox Church [Moscow Patriarchate], and has financed the restoration of its buildings and monasteries. In high-level meetings he is often seen fiddling with a crucifix”.44 Candidates for political

42 Mitrokhin, ‘Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life’, p. 240. 43 Roman Lunkin, ‘The Ukrainian Revolution and the Christian Churches’, East West Church & Ministry Report, 22, 2014, no. 3, pp. 3-4. 44 Luke Harding, Oksana Grytsenko, ‘Chocolate tycoon heads for landslide victory in Ukraine presidential election’, The Guardian, May 23, 2014, on http://www.theguardian. com/world/2014/may/23/petro-poroshenko-heads-landslide-ukraine-election [accessed 12-05-2014].

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posts are usually keen to underline a certain devotion to conservative values, as, for example, their harmonious family life. To be religious in the views of a majority is first and foremost a question of moral convictions, which appear questionable to public opinion in case of atheism or a religious affiliation with what is viewed as obscure sects. In this sense, religiosity in Ukraine, similar to other areas of the former Soviet Union, bears characteristics of a post-soviet morality that somehow tends to give stability certain prevalence over freedom. Churches and religious organizations continue to enjoy the highest level of trust among the populations, placed in this respect on the scale highly above other institutions like the courts, the police or the media.45 Regardless however of a certain predilection for conservative models in social life, the level of religious freedom and religious tolerance in Ukraine is exceptionally high, and in this respect differs in a positive way from developments elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere. There is also no legislation granting a privileged status to any particular church, as it is the case for example with Orthodoxy in Russia, Bulgaria or Greece.46 On the other hand, the religious affiliation of a major part of the population is not as clear as the figures and images presented before might suggest. After all, it is a different thing to present oneself as being formally a believer of this or that church when asked by social scientists, or to effectively devote a part of one’s time during the week to prayer, visiting the service and practicing rituals. As for the Eastern rite, and similar to Russia, the number of those visiting the service at least once or twice a month is much lower than the high percentage (over 75%) of those identifying themselves as religious.47 Furthermore, religious affiliations in the practice of every day are much less sharply divided – the main instance for a local parish is the local priest (batiushka), and there are indications that many parishioners do not pay too much attention to the question to which branch of the Orthodox Church the latter actually belongs – a state of affairs, however, that might have started to change since late 2013. At any rate, changes of jurisdiction of single parishes have happened not only as exceptions, and for various reasons, so that “there are parishes which register under one jurisdiction, declare their allegiance to

45 Yelensky, ‘Religiosity in Ukraine’, pp. 218-220. 46 Ibid., pp. 221-222; Lunkin, ‘The Ukrainian Revolution and Christian Churches’, p. 1. 47 Ibid., pp. 214-216.

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another, and ignore both”.48 Generally many people used to follow the ideological disputes between the several churches with feelings of distance, sometimes dismay. They try to stay aside from what they see as mainly “political” struggles. So the general significance of what has been called “non- confessional Christianity” (not exactly according to the well-known “believing without belonging” pattern, but rather something like “believing with partial belonging”) seems to be rather important. Many present themselves, for example, just as “simply Orthodox”.49 Against this background there seems to be a certain base for what might be called “grassroots ecumenism” – at least, it would mean that a majority of believers in Ukraine up to late 2013 kept away from ideological struggles and contented itself with a peaceful coexistence with one another’s neighbors, colleagues and – last not least – family members of a different affiliation. The national question, on the other hand, even if only on a nominal level, does play a certain role in self-identification, which finds expression in the fact, that openly identifying oneself with the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate for many means to underline their connectedness with Russia in language and culture, whereas open belonging to one of the “national Ukrainian” Orthodox churches means to identify with Ukrainian language, statehood and, possibly, the vote for an independent “Ukrainian” church.50 This does not necessarily contradict the “grassroots ecumenism” just stated, because the difference between official affiliation and practice remains at force, and there are many nuances between the extremes of clear statements in favor of the one or the other “national” option. “Grassroots ecumenism” meanwhile may also be used to describe the relations of the named Eastern rite churches between one another. Sometimes these relations, especially on a bilateral base, in the past have developed according to the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. For example, there are cases of church buildings used jointly by parishes of both Greek Catholics and Ukrainian Orthodox of the Kievan Patriarchate or Autocephal- ists.51 In such cases which are noted especially from the Western provinces,

48 Mitrokhin, ‘Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Life’, pp. 235-236; see also Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, p. 107. 49 Yelensky, ‘Religiosity in Ukraine’, p. 217. 50 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 51 Such examples are given e.g. by Kochan.

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it seems that the common opposition towards the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, allegedly a kind of fifth column of the Kremlin working to undermine Ukraine’s statehood and society, delivers a certain base for mutual rapprochement. However, such rather sarcastic descriptions of the mechanism at work would probably not do justice to further processes of rapprochement, reconciliation and the emergence of a more than superficial modus vivendi that can be stated for the relation between the churches especially in areas with a mixed and colorful confessional landscape. After a period of confrontation, and even violence up to approximately the middle of the 1990s (the particular situation which delivered the reason for fears of following the Yugoslavian example) especially in the West, the scenery in most of these regions has significantly quieted, giving space for various examples of exchange, cooperation and joint appearances in the public sphere. The picture drawn by the religious scientist Andrij Yurash stated for the Galicia region in 2005 is probably still accurate: “A symbol, almost a cliché, about Orthodox- Catholic relations today is common participation in public activities at all levels, from the local town or village with several religious congregations to the oblast’ and even the regional level: prayers and blessings conducted by priests of the UGCC and one or other of the Orthodox churches, or even all of them together. Virtually all social, political and academic events today include such acts of worship; when organizing any kind of celebration it is the rule to invite bishops or priests of the various confessions, and this bears witness to the fact that the idea of inter-confessional cooperation and the recognition of the heterogeneous religious nature of Galicia today are taking ever deeper root”.52

To be sure, at least on a theoretical level tendencies of mutual rapprochement are still based on a vague idea of a “national Christianity” which mainly oper- ates with patterns of an ethnic and cultural nationalism. The coincidence of belief and national orientation has a long history in this country, where sources over centuries speak about the “Russian belief” (vera rus’ka, Orthodoxy) in

52 Yurash, ‘Orthodox-Greek Catholic Relations’, p. 200; see also the anthropological explorations on religiosity particularly in Western Ukraine by Vlad Naumescu, Modes of Religiosity in Eastern Christianity. Religious Processes and Social Change in Ukraine (Berlin: LIT, 2007).

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difference from – notably – the “Polish belief” (wiara ljacka, Catholicism).53 Although ideas of such character still seem to be at work among significant parts of common believers and the lower clergy (as a look in church periodicals can reveal), they are slowly but surely retiring from the scene. One crucial factor active behind this development lies in the fact, that too simplistic parallels between national affiliation and confessional orientation would exclude significant parts of the population from the scheme, both in historical perspective as with regard to the present pluralism. To give just two significant examples: When Catholicism historically was conceived as the “faith of the Poles”, where would the Greek Catholics, with their dominating Ukrainian language in liturgy and theology, Latin elements in teaching and ritual, but still keeping the Eastern rite, finally place themselves? Or, in order to look closer to the present situation, there exists, next to the numerous Orthodox parishes, also a large and ever growing number of Protestant communities all over the country, some of them also with a long history since the 18th century, and as catacomb churches in Communist times.54 The simplistic national scheme would just leave no place for these believers, who usually identify themselves equally as Ukrainians, despite their “different” or non- conventional religious orientation. A temporary summary of our observations therefore would have to state that on both practical and theoretical level old antagonisms at least in part have retired in favor of the “project of Christianity in Ukraine” – expressed in still a variety of theoretical and partly vague and incomplete approaches, and with patterns of ecumenism in every days life which are far from idyllic, but nonetheless a step forward. This “project” is less about “Ukrainian Chris- tendom” (as claimed distinct from both Western and Russian), but based on the experience of inhabitants (sometimes consciously perceived as citizens) in a country that existed for a generation. May it be ascribed to conclusions

53 On the role played by patterns of religion and the “Greek” or “Ruthenian” faith in Early Modern Ukrainian national consciousness cf. Teresa Chynczewska-Henel, ‘The National Consciousness of Ukrainian Nobles and Cossacks from the End of the Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Century’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 10 (1986), no. 3-4, pp. 377- 392. 54 A most comprehensive study on Protestants in Ukraine during and after communism is Catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted. Ukrainians and Global Evangelism (Ithaca NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2007)

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driven from such as the Yugoslavian example or just from the local historical heritage: During the first twenty-two years of independence, the churches and religious groups have reacted in various ways on the threats imposed by religious dividedness and pluralism in the country, and on the theoretical challenge that had emerged from oversimplified schemes inher- ited from the past. The reaction was twofold, encompassing both institutions and concepts. Finally, this is also true on an institutional level extending all over the country, not only over particular regions. A very important role in this respect has been played by the All Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO). It was established in 1996, as a “representative, inter-confessional consultative body with the aim of bringing together the efforts of churches and religious organizations for the spiritual renewal of Ukraine, for interchurch dialogue in Ukraine and abroad, for participation in the drafting of legislation relating to the state’s relation with churches and religious organization, and to carry out comprehensive charitable initiatives.” Today the council comprises 18 churches and religious organizations, representing over 95 percent of the religious network in Ukraine. In its begin- nings, the AUCCRO had direct links with the state – the State Committee on Religious Affairs convoked the founding meeting in 1996, and its representatives participated in subsequent council meetings, and their signature is also under some of its early statements. However, already in 1998 the council’s statute limited membership status exclusively to religious organizations. By the end of 2005 AUCCRO documents no longer included state signato- ries and a 2007 membership list was without state representatives. Over the years, this council has released a whole number of common declarations on matters concerning legislation, charity work, social justice and social ethics, but also – notably – about how to handle controversial historical memory and provide ethical interpretations of the past. Usually these declarations and appeals were signed jointly by all members of the council. They illustrate a rather far-going consensus that has been worked out – or just discovered – over time on a variety of topics. All of these topics are of clear relevance for the development of state and society in Ukraine, and a certain shared patriotism (which means a common concern for the future of the state where all the signing members and their flocks live in) is visible behind the various texts. On the other hand, the AUCCRO’s terms of reference do not foresee

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a dialogue that would focus on core theological beliefs with the goal of religious rapprochement, and no such dialogue is planned. It would also be difficult to achieve particularly in Ukraine, given the absence of canonical recognition of some of the Christian denominations and the rather differing attitudes of churches and religious groups to the possibilities of a religious dialogue. However, precisely in light of this, the very existence of the AUCCRO is a remarkable achievement. Next to the consensus in a variety of questions documented in the texts, the council over the years has also provided a forum for personal encounter and for open debate. The effect of interpersonal relations grown by the time beyond religious and confessional borders, the growth of mutual respect despite continuing differences in matters of belief can hardly be overestimated.55 As it turned out, the bounds once established proved working still during the early crisis since late 2013: As mentioned earlier, it was exactly this institution which issued several calls for a peaceful solution of the emerging conflicts, signed by high representatives of almost all religious groups.56 All these elements and sketches combine for a picture of mutual rapprochement, elements of ecumenism on both official and practical level, and of prudent handling of pluralism at least, all of which that emerges out of an analysis of the developments between the declaration of Ukrainian independence and late 2013. Sure, this picture would be incomplete and perhaps inappropriately idyllic, would there not be mentioning also of still existing conflicts between religious groups, which already in this period came to the fore regularly. This concerned struggle over jurisdictions, material properties, historical narratives – what all could become more complicated in case of interference of state authorities and political forces, who often did not hesi- tate to use and misuse ideological antagonisms for their purposes.57 Yet

55 Cf. Andrii Krawchuk, ‘Constructing Interreligious Consensus in the Post Soviet Space. The Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations’, in Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness. Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue, id. and Thomas Bremer (eds.) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 273-302. 56 Cf. n. 11 above. 57 Some illustrative examples in this respect have been documented by Liliya Berezhnaya ‘Interkonfessionelle Konflikte um die Lavra von Potschajiv’, G2W, (2010), no. 6, pp. 18-20; ead., ‘Kiewer Kirchenstreit. Nationale „Erinnerungsorte“ im Fokus der Konfessionen‘, Osteuropa, 59 (2009), no. 6, pp. 171-188.

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despite such threats, a stable consensus seemed to have been reached over the old trenches of religious and national confrontation.

The Maidan Experience

Although that was hardly clear from the beginning, the protests since late November 2013 against the regime of president Yanukovych soon turned into a test case for what has just been outlined as the “project Ukraine”. It has been discussed whether the community of protesters that had, at first spontaneously, gathered on Independent Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti) in Kiev was representative of Ukrainian society – in a way it was, although certain segments have been overrepresented. In general, the Maidan community in sociological terms was rather close to the average of Ukrainian society, and not representing merely a peculiar subgroup. According to surveys carried out between December 2013 and February 2014, about a half of the protesters came from Kiev itself, whereas another half had subsequently arrived from the various regions of the country. An overwhelming majority of protesters indicated that they had joined the protests on their own initiative, and were not sent by any political party or NGO. Furthermore, most of the respondents said that their main reason to join the protests was their wish for a better life, not any ideological preferences. Agreement with the protests in the Western and Central regions was much higher than in the East and South including Crimea, but there was still between 20 and 27 percent of approval even in these latter regions, and more than a few of the protesters came also from there. The level of education of the protesters was somewhat above the average, as a majority had a higher professional or even academic qualifica- tion. It has therefore been presumed that, whereas in the Orange Revolution ten years earlier a significant part of the protesters had been students, the same reservoir now provided the country’s professional and intellectual middle class.58

58 Mykola Banakh, ‘Die Orange Revolution 2004 und der Euromaidan 2013/14: Gemein- samkeiten und Unterschiede’, Ukraine-Analysen (Bremen: Forschungstelle Osteuropa), no. 128, February 25, 2014, pp. 14-18. For results of sociological surveys see ibid., pp. 18-23, and no. 126, January 28, 2014, pp. 13-15; no. 125, December 10, 2013, pp. 20-21.

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After a first, and in most cases short period of decision finding, churches and religious groups played an increasingly visible role on the Maidan, especially after first brutal attempts of the government and the special police to dismiss the protests.59 It was after these first eruptions of violence, that the All Ukrainian Council clearly voted against any further escalation by use of force and oppression. The public call in the given situation could also be understood as an audible dissociation from more radical attitudes expressed elsewhere, because the public statements of particular churches were less homogenous and univocal. Especially from Orthodox clerics of the UOC-MP there were also heard rather critical comments on the protest movements, alongside with voices in support of president Yanukovych.60 Yet the general line followed by the UOC-MP was to keep and express neutrality with regard to political concerns, and to address people “on both sides of the barricades”. At least in keeping distance towards extremist and biased statements the Orthodox met with a similar strategy followed by other churches. For example, when in December 2013 the Greek-Catholic priest Mikhail Arsenich from the Ivano-Frankivsk region in a sermon openly called for the slaughter of Russians, Chinese, Blacks, Jews and Party of Region members (the party then headed by president Yanukovych), the church hierarchs hurried to condemn such invectives. The priest was punished with an enforced month-long season of repentance in a monastery. The Greek Catholic Major Archbishop Sviatoslav (Shevchuk) enjoined his priests not to back any political position.61

59 For a more detailed documentation concerning the role of the churches and religious communities during the protests on Maidan Square cf. Roman Lunkin, ‘The Ukrainian Revolution and the Christian Churches’, in East West Church & Ministry Report, pp. 1-5; Margarete Zimmermann, Michael Melnikow, ‘“Gott ist mit uns!” Die Kirchen und der Euromajdan’, Osteuropa, 64 (2014), no. 5-6, pp. 259-276. 60 A probably extreme example is the sermon of Metropolitan Pavel (Lebed’), of Cher- nobyl’ and Vyshgorod at the Kievan Caves, in presence of Yanukovych, who on this occasion (on January 22, 2014) went so far as to assure the president, “bearing a heavy cross”, of the support of the church “to the end”. Cf. http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_ news/24628-mitropolit-pavel-viktoru-yanukovichu-cerkov-s-vami-do-konca.html. His statement, as can be observed, led to immediate irritations even within the UOC-MP community, cf. http://www.religion.in.ua/news/ukrainian_news/24653-v-kievo-pecherskoj-lavre- utverzhdayut-chto-mitropolit-pavel-skazal-ne-sovsem-to-chto-ponyali-iz-ego-slov- prixozhane.html [both accessed 06-05-2015] 61 Lunkin, ‘The Ukrainian Revolution and the Christian Churches’, p. 3.

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The Greek Catholic church was yet generally less ambiguous – more positive – in its support of the protests than other religious communities. Most of them somewhat wavered between, or in a certain sense combined a basic approval of the demonstrations and their expressed requests, and a conciliatory mission that would try and bring the divided fractions together and to prevent further escalation. Where it occurred, support of the protests for some time created an atmosphere of a certain “spiritual unity” between various Christian churches. Clerics of different denominations described the Maidan protests as a “revolution of dignity”, initiated by members of a civil society in order to overcome both fear and oppression.62 Orthodox, Roman and Greek Catholics and Protestants in the sense just described found common purpose in supporting the Maidan demonstrations. Later on, the “Maidan experience” by participants was often reported as an exercise both in overcoming fear, and in ecumenical cooperation. The intensity of such experiences, and corresponding accounts even grew after the brutal turn of events after February 18, 2014. First, when Yanukovych forces tore down an ecumenical chapel, immediately there was erected a tent to serve as a funeral chapel for demonstrators killed by snipers. The number of such victims after February 20, 2014 increased to as many as nearly a hundred. Public memory soon turned these victims of repression and violence into martyrs in the name of a higher, if not to say a religious cause, and created the term of the “heavenly hundred” (nebes’na sotnia63), applying religious terminology in a broader sense.64 On 30 March in commemoration of those who had died, prayers were offered by bishops and clergy of several Orthodox branches, Roman Catholics and Protestant churches. The perceptions of the

62 Cyril Hovorun (UOC-MP), ‘The Church in the Bloodlands’, First Things, October 2014, pp. 41-44; Bishop Borys Gudziak (UGCC), ‘EuroMaidan: A Pilgrimage from fear to dignity’, interview with Bishop Borys Gudziak on http://www.communicantes.nl/ images/20140605%20Interview%20Borys%20Gudziak.pdf [last access 01-15-2015].; see also the account of archpriest Georgii Kovalenko (UOC-MP), “Ia buv na khrushchevs’kogo mizh barikadami i ‘berkutom’. Tsei dosvid dav vidchutt’ia real’nosti viry,” on http:// gazeta.ua/articles/people-and-things-journal/_a-buv-na-grushevskogo-mizh-barikadami-i- berkutom-cej-dosvid-dav-vidchuttya-realnosti-viri/545989 [last access 01-15-2015]; Irina Papkova, ‘Solidarity and Separation: Religious Spirit and the Euromaidan’, The Revealer, April 8, 2014, on http://therevealer.org/archives/19176/ [last acccess 01-16-2015]. 63 “Sotnia” (a unit of hundred) originally was a military unit of the Ukrainian Cossacks. 64 Cf. Zimmermann, Melnikow, ‘Die Kirchen und der Euromajdan’, p. 275.

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events were equally intense on all sides, but variously emphasized the spiritual, the ecumenical – and the national component of the Maidan experience. “When all is said and done, it is the Churches above all that are enabling Ukrainians to rediscover themselves as members of the same nation”.65

After the Maidan – Polarization, Diplomacy, Reconciliation

These aspects – the political, the spiritual and ecumenical, and the national component – of the protests in a way outlined the field within which the Maidan events were further being interpreted in the weeks and months after. In general there was a range of various interpretations, and often they led to inner divisions. Slowly but surely within religious communities now also those raised their voice, which had disapproved the Maidan protests more or less strongly and refused to participate. The general picture shows lines of division within various religious communities, next to new coalitions of hitherto separated camps. In rough terms again, a major fault line could be drawn between a pro-Russian and a pro-Ukrainian attitude – yet it is perhaps needless to repeat that this marks prevailing tendencies with a variety in detail rather than clear-cut oppositions. At any rate, this major fault line became stronger with the increasing interference of Russian politics into further developments within Ukraine. In fact, as has been argued with good reason, it was rather the confrontational “pro-Russian versus pro-Ukrainian” rhetoric now applied with increasing intensity, that worked suggestive in the sense, that it created the polarization rather than just mirroring it.66 Next to the Maidan itself, the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and the appearance of pro-Russian (the further the more originally Russian67) military forces in the Eastern districts around Doneck and Luhansk generated dividedness especially within those religious communities which had their branches in the post-Soviet sphere both in

65 Cf. Eliott, ‘The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Religious Life’, p. 8. 66 Ulrich Schmid, ‘Rhetorik als Waffe’, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 1, 2015; also on http:// www.nzz.ch/feuilleton/der-propagandistische-schein-vom-gegeneinander-1.18552592 [accessed 06-26-2015]. 67 For an analysis of the development of the pro-Russian separatist milieu in the Eastern provinces cf. Nikolay Mitrokhin, ‘Transnationale Provokation. Russissche Nationalisten in der Ukraine’, Osteuropa, 64 (2014), no. 5-6, pp. 157-174.

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Russia and Ukraine, and had maintained close contacts and cooperation before. Mechanisms of division, to be sure, were at work throughout the country, and formed a threat and a problem for friends, families and relatives and parishes alike – numerous are the accounts of people who had decided “to leave politics aside” in order to keep bounds of family and friendship alive and not let them be destroyed by open considerations about the politically “right or wrong”. Yet hardly anywhere were these mechanisms more notice- able than among Protestants and Orthodox Christians. Protestant groups in Russia and Ukraine found it increasingly difficult to agree about ongoing events, when the Russians among them felt urged to demonstrate their “patriotic loyalty”, whereas in Ukraine Protestants in the person of interim president Oleksandr Turchynov even provided a leading pro-Ukrainian political personage.68 Even more visible was the split in case of the Orthodox of the Moscow Patriarchate. Some of its priests in Ukraine had openly supported the Maidan. The more tensions with Russia arose on the political stage, the more the common phrase “The church is always with the people” became a pro- Ukrainian and anti-Russian (at least anti-Putin) connotation in statements of higher clerics of the UOC-MP. On the other hand, it was more than rumor that made known the ideological and material support of some Orthodox monks and priests on Crimea and in the Eastern Region, particularly around the Sviatohirsk monastery, for pro-Russian separatist military forces – perhaps not a complete surprise for those familiar with the scenery already before the crisis.69 It is also in the occupied East where alliances between separatist forces and a “Holy Russia ideology” of whatever kind, according to information collected by both Brussels and Kiev based human rights organizations, has obviously led to numerous incidents of persecution, sometimes even killing of adherents of other confessions, Protestants in particular.70

68 Eliott, ‘The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Religious Life’, pp. 11-15. 69 (See n. 19 above); http://tsn.ua/ukrayina/u-donecku-proveli-hresniy-hid-za-sobiratelya- zemel-russkih-stryelkova-362404.html; http://ruskline.ru/tema/politika/vojna_v_novorossii/; Kerstin Holm, ‘Gottesmutter, hilf!’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 16, 2014, also on http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/rebellen-von-donezk-gottesmutter-hilf-13049058. html [last access 01-16-2015]. 70 Cf. ‘When God Becomes the Weapon. Persecution based on Beliefs in the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine’, Report prepared by Center for Civil Liberties and International Partnership for Human Rights in the framework of the Civic Solidarity Platform, released

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The general picture, to be accurate, shows atrocities from all sides and a serious deterioration of the human rights situation in the Ukrainian East in general, as can be concluded from a report to the OUN high commissioner already from mid July 2014.71 At the same time, the tone of mutual accusa- tions becomes sharper and more aggressive, leaving nuances and even remainders of formal politeness to notions of a simple and principal confrontation of “good against evil” and of a “clash of civilizations” which latter are seen as defined by their attitude towards religion.72 The Huntingtonian prophecy, as it were, fulfills itself. Next to the terrible fact of open violence even against civilians, it is the religiously charged ideological rhetoric adopted in such contexts which causes concern. The war situation also becomes manifest in a war of narratives and newly created “great stories”. The apparently “heroic” overtones of such stories, in the background of an open propaganda battle via the media, sometimes provoke feelings of involuntary distance with Western observers. Where narratives of the previous phase are used, they betray a tendency to lose their former inclusive character, and become more confrontational. In Western Ukraine, priests like the Greek Catholic Vasyl Rudeyko in statements give a more and more religious and sacramental meaning to both the events on the

April 2015, on http://ccl.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/When-God-Becomes-The- Weapon_6May2015_closed-for-editing.pdf [last access 06-02-2015]. 71 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, on http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ UA/Ukraine_Report_15July2014.pdf. [accessed 06-05-2015]. 72 Cf. the article by Mykola Cherenkov, ‘Threats to Religious Freedom in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis: Religiously Motivated Terrorism Against Non-Orthodox Denom- inations’, Christian Ethics Today, 23 (2015), no. 2, pp. 12-16. The author compares militant Russian Orthodox in the occupied regions of Ukraine with Islamic terrorists, and admittedly provides some evidence in favor of his argument. What is yet lacking, to my mind, is any attempt to contextualize these radicals within the entire framework of the Russian Orthodox Church. More nuanced also in this respect is for example Paul Noyer, ‘Putin’s Holy War and the Disintegration of the “Russian World”’, Forbes, July 4, 2015, also on http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulcoyer/2015/06/04/putins-holy-war-and-the- disintegration-of-the-russian-world/. [last access 06-26-2015]. The problem of a disproportionately growing influence of certain nationalist and authoritarian circles and voices within the ROC, and the difficulties, for various reasons, of the higher clergy to handle this phenomenon, is not new, and has earlier been addressed also by Russian Orthodox authors. Cf. for example Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church, especially pp. 61- 62, with further references.

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Maidan square, and the sacrifice of the “heavenly hundred”. Understandable as this might be, the merger of political and religious connotations in this new cult has evoked critical comments from the part of Western theologians, otherwise relating with much sympathy to the Maidan cause and the Greek Catholic Church.73 The earlier narrative of an inclusive “Kievan Christianity” in such new myths (the term to be understood in a scientific sense) acquires a more offensive notion as opposed to the “Russian World” ideology allegedly adopted by Ukraine’s enemies. Such oppositions are not entirely new, but the current situation strengthens antagonisms which in previous phases had been one out of many possible interpretations of existing narratives.74 Ukrainian historians familiar with such debates and their inherent threat of mobilizing emotions especially in a borderland like Ukraine have already warned of the misuse of old, and creation of new polarizing stories, emphasizing instead the need for caution, sobriety and historiographic accuracy.75 It should perhaps be remembered, that also the “Russian World” doctrine, increasingly adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church since the late 1990s, which apparently has some roots in Samuel Huntington’s civilizational theory popular at the time, initially also had some more inclusive, or even non- political connotations. By the time, however, anti-Western patterns in it had steadily grown stronger. But in both theory and practice the situation for the UOC-MP is perhaps the most difficult now. As it had representatives of opposite camps among its believers and even clerics, the church hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate subsequently took a course of neutrality and cau- tiousness in order to prevent the more than real danger of an inner split. In February 2014 the local Ukrainian synod of bishops of the UOC-MP had elected bishop Onufrii of Chernyvtsy and Bukovina as locum tenens of the elderly metropolitan Volodymyr, who due to his weak health condition was no more capable to execute his duties as primate of the UOC-MP. Onufrii

73 Cf. Heleen Zorgdrager, ‘Patriotism, Peace Building and Patrons in Heaven: The Ukrai- nian Greek Catholic Church in Times of War’, Paper presented at the Conference “The Churches and the War in Ukraine” in Tilburg (NL) on April 4, 2015. 74 Cf. Wilson, The Ukrainians, pp. 11-14; the idea of Ukrainian Christianity with its more “democratic” and “tolerant” features as opposed to authoritarian and mysticist Russia also exists in the tradition of the Autocephalous Church (UAOC), cf. Sysyn, ‘The Ukrainian Autocephalous Church’. 75 Cf. Andriy Zayarnyuk, ‘A Revolution’s History, A Historian’s War’, Ab Imperio, 1 (2015), pp. 449-479.

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is a native Ukrainian and familiar with the religious pluralism of the country not only through his affiliation with his eparchy in the Western region, but also through personal experience in his youth and childhood. A bishop of the Russian church already in 1992, Onufrii had resisted metropolitan Filaret’s call to separate from Moscow and could therefore be regarded as loyal by the Moscow patriarchate. But he acted now with a mixture of caution, pragmatism and – initially – a pro-Ukrainain stand, for which to take he apparently saw both the space and the need.76 Perhaps more illustrative than anything else for the difficulties faced by the Orthodox church in Ukraine was the ceremony held in the Moscow Kremlin on March 18, 2014 on occasion of the annexation – in Russian terminology the “reunion” – of the Crimea peninsula to the Russian state. Whereas the event was attended also by the religious leaders of all religious communities of the Russian Federation, including Protestants, Jews and Muslims, the patriarch of Moscow was absent. Only his old companion, metropolitan Iuvenalii of Kolomyia and Krutitsy, sat somewhere hidden in the background. Seen the widespread presumption of close ties between the patriarch and the Putin administration for many an observer the patriarch’s absence came as a surprise, but a second look was already sufficient to find out the reason for the hierarchs absence. Among the Ukrainian Orthodox the general attitude towards the Russian annexation was predominantly negative, and the patriarch just could not afford to risk a complete split – also for very practical reasons. Otherwise the Russian church would just have lost its most significant province: Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the losses of flock and parishes described earlier, there was still about a third of the approximately 30.000 parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate located on the territory of Ukraine. That alone was reason enough to act cautiously. Patri- arch Kirill therefore pointed out diplomatically, that he indeed saw Ukraine still as a part of the “Russian World”, but at the same time this term desig- nated a cultural sphere that extended beyond political borders.77 Further

76 http://www.pravoslavie.ru/english/68747.htm [last access 01-16-2015]. 77 Nikolay Mitrokhin, ‘Tserkovnyi neprikhod’, on http://grani.ru/opinion/mitrokhin/ m.226918.html [last access 01-16-2015]; for a general analysis see Katarzyna Jarzynska, ‘Patriarch Kirill’s Game over Ukraine’, in OSW Commentary, 144, August 14, 2014, on http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-08-14/patriarch-kirills- game-over-ukraine; Tadeusz A. Olszanski, ‘The Ukrainian Orthodox Church’ s Stance on

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developments seemed to confirm his reason: In August, after the death of Volodymyr, the synod elected bishop Onufrii as the latter’s successor, and Onufrii soon in an interview took a conciliatory voice in favor of unity beyond political divisions, but left no doubt that he regarded the annexation of Crimea as illegal.78 Since then, Onufrii generally kept up with his course of strict political neutrality, trying hard to avoid any further splitting both within his church with its still competing wings, and in relation to Moscow.79 Nonetheless, there might be slight shifts in the general course. The fact that in April 2015 Onufrii dismissed a well-known supporter of a pro-Ukrainian course among the UOC-MP bishops, Oleksandr (Drabinko), from almost all of his duties, might testify either for his efforts to keep neutrality, or for a subsequent overweight of a non-national course oriented at the – supposedly politically neutral – „Russian World” ideologeme fostered also by the patriarchate.80 Although both seems plausible, some indications point rather to the latter interpretation, as during recent months, up to May 2015, also the tone of the Moscow patriarchate slowly but surely grew more anti-Ukrainian, accusing for example the Greek Catholic church of warmongering, and speaking of a war against Orthodoxy on the territory of Ukraine.81 Opposite to such new splits and tensions, there is not only the experience of the inter-confessional solidarity of the Maidan, but also signs of new rapprochement between religious groups – the one and the other running along the lines established earlier. For example, attempts to establish a united Ukrain- ian Orthodox Church according to the model of national patriarchs as in Bulgaria or Serbia have somewhat been intensified in recent months, leading to a new series of negotiations between representatives of the Orthodox

the Revolution and War’, OSW Commentary, 151, October 27, 2014 on http://www.osw. waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-10-30/ukrainian-orthodox-churchs-stance- revolution-and-war [last access to both 01-16-2015]. 78 http://www.pravmir.ru/mitropolit-onufriy-1-interview. 79 Cf. the analysis of Nikolay Mitrokhin, ‘Was There an Alternative? Metropolitan Bishop Onuphrius and his First Steps’, Euxeinos, 17 (2015), pp. 13-19. 80 http://www.pravmir.ru/mitropolit-aleksandr-drabinko-osvobozhdyon-ot-dolzhnosti- glavyi-otdela-vneshnih-tserkovnyih-svyazey-upts/ [accessed 06-02-2015]. On the person of Aleksandr see also http://drevo-info.ru/articles/11842.html [accessed 06-05-2015]. 81 Cf. http://www.pravmir.ru/patriarh-kirill-obratilsya-k-predstoyatelyam-pravoslavnyih- tserkvey-s-prosboy-vozvyisit-golos-v-zashhitu-pravoslavnyih-na-vostoke-ukrainyi/ #ixzz3AOtJ5woK [accessed 06-05-2015].

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branches in Ukraine. An important factor in this development apparently was the testament of the UAOC metropolitan Mefodii, published after his passing away on February 24, 2015. Mefodii explicitly recommended re-entering into negotiations with the UOC-KP and the pro-Ukrainian wing of the UOC-MP, which he then saw guided among others by bishop Oleksandr (Drabinko). Still essential for Mefodii, however, was the blessing of the Ecumenical patriarchate – he strongly disapproved the erection of a national church without it.82 At the same time, changes of jurisdiction by parishes apparently occur more often than earlier.83 Somewhat along the lines recommended by the late metropolitan Mefodii, negotiations go on especially between the two “Ukrainian” branches of Orthodox Christianity, the UAOC and UOC-KP, whereas the UOC-MP does not seem to play a significant role in it. The authocephalists apparently have to some extent given up their former resistance to the unification of the two churches under metropolitan Filaret – but they keep insisting on a unification on equal level, and on the possibility of Constantinople’s blessing. The new head, metropolitan Makarii, addressed the issue of a united Ukrainian church in his inauguration: “Unification is the basis of the Church, not simple fusion or addition”.84 Meanwhile talks between the UOC-KP and the UAOC have been terminated, and it is an open question whether the still existing obstacles can ever be surmounted.85 In the background, opinions remain divided about whether the project of a national Ukrainian Eastern rite church would have better prospective now than a couple of years ago also because even a realization of the project can be seen as just another case of old wine in new wineskins: Not only the question

82 Cf. Mefodii’s testament on http://mefodiy.org.ua/zapovit-duxovnij-blazhennishogo- mefodiya-mitropolita-kiivskogo-i-vsiyei-ukrainipredstoyatelya-uapc/ [last accessed 06-25- 2015] 83 ‘V Ukraine – parad perekhodov obshchin UPTs (MP) v UPTs KP’,Religiia v Ukraini, September 3, 2014, on http://www.religion.in.ua/news/vazhlivo/26751-v-ukraine-parad- perexodov-obshhin-upc-mp-v-upc-kp.html [accessed 06-28-2015] accounts for ten of such changes up to September 2014; Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West 4, 2014, pp. 8-9; ibid., 2, 2015, p. 4; concerning earlier debates about the project of a “national church” see Wilson, The Ukrainians, pp. 234-252. 84 ‘Саме об’єднання є основою Церкви, а не злиття чи приєднання’, on the website of the UAOC, cf. http://patriarchia.org.ua/?page_id=2265 [accessed 06-28-2015] 85 Cf. ‘UOC-KP officialy announce termination of dialogue with UAOC’, on http://risu. org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/orthodox_relations/60671/ [last access 01-21-2016]

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of ecumenical relation to neighbor confessions and churches, but also those concerning the relation between church and secular state and society would still wait for an answer. As it seems, society offers a set of answers itself. Beyond the official or quasi-official level, the crisis has produced a large number of small size, infor- mal initiatives and civil society organizations (CSO). Even before the crisis, civil society in Ukraine had been more developed than for example in Russia. The current situation – as of June 2015 – determined in particular by armed confrontation in the Eastern regions of Luhansk and Doneck provided a majority of such CSOs and initiatives devoted to support the Ukrainian army in a variety of forms. Several other organizations perform activities more devoted to restore the country’s political system and the collapsing economy. Another set of organizations and initiatives is working on various levels in order to revive or create dialogue and reconciliation. Although the number of such initiatives and CSOs active on this field is comparatively small, this does not mean that their aims are met with skepticism. On the contrary, a majority among the population supports their efforts.86 Existing surveys are yet of a necessarily incomplete and preliminary character, and in particular they give an unclear impression of the role played by churches and religious organizations in such efforts. Although their contribution is rarely mentioned explicitly, there are clear indications that this contribution is greater than suggested. Churches and religious communities appear as financiers of reconciliation initiatives and actions, parishes with their traditionally mixed nature have their own agenda of bridging conflicts, church institutions like seminaries or uni- versities (like the Greek Catholic UCU in L’viv) continue earlier exchange programs. The ambiguity between patriotism, war time confrontation and civil society and peace building efforts to some extent is mirrored in recent activities of the AUCCRO. When a delegation from the World Council of Churches (WCC) visited Ukraine and the AUCCRO in March 2015, the communiqué released soon afterwards still praised the “ecumenical spirit” prevailing in the sessions and among the members, and emphasized the role this institution

86 ‘Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine’, OSCE Thematic Report, 11 February 2015, esp. pp. 7-9; see also “Mapping of Dialogue Initiatives to Resolve the Conflict in Ukraine”, ed. International Centre for Policy Studies (Kiev: January 2015).

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would still have to play in the restoration of peace.87 In fact, the AUCCRO during the crisis continued to launch statements appealing to the inner unity of the country, on various occasions – even on the eve of the Russian invasion of Crimea the address to the Russian people still bore a conciliatory note.88 However, already about a month prior to the arrival of the WCC delegation the same institution had issued another statement concerning “the obligation to help with the defense of the fatherland”, that clearly calls every religious citizen of Ukraine, clergy and laymen, to fulfill his or her duties as volunteer soldier, chaplain, working in hospitals, organizing help for the people in the Donbas region or for refugees, or whatever the situation might require. Although the signing members also repeat their commitment to work for the restoration of peace, this latter statement marks a certain shift, as it mirrors an already existing front line.89 Ukraine is presently at a turning point – a turning point, by the way, also of significance for its relationship with its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a dimension that affects religious life, to put it cautiously. Questions about what might be called “political theology”, but also about historical narratives, about reconciliation or confrontation, down to those concerning every day’s life in pluralist societies occur from this situation. It is all these questions, not only the national ones, which give relevance to the “project Ukraine” since 1991. Still at the given moment this “project Ukraine” does have supporters from all religious denominations. But the “stories” created by the situation that occurred though and since the Maidan events become more polarizing. The inclusive concepts and conciliatory voices seem to be driven into the background – to some extent, perhaps, an inevitable phenomenon accompanying a situation of armed conflict as it exists on the territory of Ukraine. So are these voices still heard?

87 Cf. https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/public- witness/communique-by-wcc-delegation-to-ukraine [last access 06-30-2015]. See also the article by Peter Kenny, ‘Ecumenical Efforts in Ukrainian Peace Process to Keep Moving Ahead’, published March 19, 2015, on the same site, accompanying the visit, on http:// www.oikoumene.org/en/press-centre/news/ecumenical-efforts-in-ukrainian-peace-process- to-keep-moving-ahead [last access 06-30-2015]. 88 Cf. http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/statements/425-uccro-statement-defence-ukraine [accessed 06-30-2015]. 89 Cf. http://vrciro.org.ua/ua/statements/380-council-of-churches-statement-on-decision- of-russian-military-invasion [last access 06-30-2015]

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In the various layers of polarization lies a serious threat. Intellectuals usually do not fight battles, but many a battle is fought with the ready-made slogans and justifying theories made up by intellectuals, theologians among them. Those dealing with peace studies on a general level usually know about the crucial role churches and religious groups can play in a conflict, appearing as either fire extinguisher or, right the opposite, as accelerant.90 This proved true for Yugoslavia, for Ukraine, and elsewhere. Most religious wars do not start as such, but rather break out on the base of rather worldly antagonisms, such as social tensions, economic competition or a clash of political power – all of which Ukraine faces these days. The fact that religious organizations of all sides in Ukraine in their mainstream are still trying to avoid making things much worse through a religious-ideological mobilization can certainly be regarded as a first fruit of the developments during the preceding 20 years of independence. The “project Ukraine” with all its implications, and despite its incompleteness, should be able to lend some authority to more conciliatory slogans. Growing tensions which can be observed in recent months, however, also deliver reasons for concern. Right now, wavering between hope, realism and moments of despair, it is difficult to say, to what extent their efforts can contribute to a de-escalation in current events. Although there is significant potential for a stabilizing role which the churches and religious organizations can play, a realistic view on growing tensions includes also a portion of skepticism. But the fruits of the “project Ukraine”, the concepts and the conciliatory voices are there, they are needed, and they continue to be needed – maybe now, maybe sooner or maybe later.

Alfons Brüning Instituut voor Oosters Christendom Erasmusplein 1 6525 HT Nijmegen Nederland [email protected]

90 R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred; Andreas Hasenclever, A. De Juan, ‘Der Einfluss religiöser Traditionen auf politische Konflikte: Empirische Befunde und theoretische Perspektiven’, Die Friedenswarte, 82 (2007), pp. 19-48.

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Abstract

In its first part, this article tries to systematize information about religious life and societal activities of Christian communities, mainly the Eastern rite churches in Ukraine since Ukrainian independence in 1991. What emerges from this attempt is a picture consisting of manifold initiatives to bridge and overcome old antagonisms formerly vigorously active in a borderland society, starting from grassroots ecumenism, inclusive approaches towards religiosity, up to conciliatory historical narratives and joint socio-political organizations. This “project Ukraine” in various respects came under threat since the outbreak of the Maidan protests in November 2013, and the crisis that followed. The second part of the article therefore analyses further developments up to June 2015, and tries to explore the prospects of the named “project” and its potential for de-escalation and peace-building.

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