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Non-Constitutional Approaches to Sovereignty Post-1995: A Workable Method in

Maintaining Constitutional Peace in

Joshua Nahmias

POL 316

Student Number : 1002700151

March 27, 2018

Word Count : 2496

Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 1 Non-Constitutional Approaches to Quebec Sovereignty Post-1995: A Workable Method in

Maintaining Constitutional Peace in Canada

Quebec’s distinct national vision has posed problems for the ensemble of federal prime ministers throughout Canada’s history. The failures of constitutional agreements such as the and the to reconcile this vision within the

Canadian federation led to the “near death” experience of the 1995 Quebec referendum. As the result of these catastrophic failures, it is common political wisdom among post-1995 Canadian politicians to not embark on further constitutional forays. Each prime minister has dealt with the

“Quebec question” in their own manner. Jean Chrétien employed Stéphane Dion’s strategies of

“endiguement" and “contentement” to contain and confine Quebec while accordingly attempting ​ ​ ​ ​ to satisfy the province’s particular demands (Laforest, 2010). advocated for a decentralist “open federalism” that endeavored on recognizing Quebec’s unique position within

Canada while avoiding disputes with separatist politicians. In this essay, I will argue that both approaches were appropriate for their time periods and were effective in neutralizing popular support for sovereignty. These non-constitutional methods reflect the political exhaustion within the Canadian electorate for constitutional proposals, the rise of the left-right cleavage in Quebec

(at the detriment of the federalist-sovereigntist axis), and the gradual loss of Quebec’s influence ​ ​ within Canada.

The failures of the Meech Lake Accord (1990) and the Charlottetown Accord (1992) were undoubtedly political catastrophes for nearly all federal and provincial leaders involved. To some Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 2 extent, it led to to the political rout of the Progressive Conservative party in the 1993 federal election, who were reduced to 2 seats from 154. Provincial premiers associated with the

Charlottetown Accord would go on to lose their following elections (Tanguay, 2004). This included Liberal Quebec premier , who would lose the 1994 election to the Parti

Québécois under , a separatist of the pur et dur variety. The failure of both ​ ​ accords presented an even greater threat besides the obvious political consequences at the federal and provincial level: the possibility of Quebec separating from Canada. However, the separatists would lose the referendum, but only by a thin margin: 49.42% for separating versus 50.58% against. Ever since these events, politicians at the federal level have commonly shunned constitutional approaches in large part out of fear of reaping the same consequences of the

Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords.

Shortly after the referendum, the federal Liberals under Jean Chrétien developed their

Quebec approach. It was, in effect, a Plan A and Plan B strategy that aimed to prevent Quebec separatists from setting the conditions of a future referendum while simultaneously aiming to supplicate the tensions of the Quebec electorate (Inwood, 2012). The Chrétien government adopted the “” or Bill-C20 in 1999 which allowed the federal government to evaluate the acceptability of any future referendum question, as well as determine the winning conditions for the separatist option (Noel, 2011). This “hard-line” strategy was politically acceptable due to the close result of the 1995 referendum.

Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 3 The Chrétien government attempted to appeal to the Quebec electorate by recognizing

Quebec as a “” in the House of Commons. However, this was largely a symbolic gesture, as it was a federal recognition rather than a recognition inscribed in the constitution, a demand included in the Meech Lake Accord (Caron & LaForest, 2009). This strategy was largely successful in discouraging further referendums in the aftermath of 1995. It forced Quebec

Premier to set aside a future referendum unless “winning conditions” presented themselves (Inwood, 2012). Bouchard would later resign as premier in 2001, citing his inability to promote the option of sovereignty in the province. His successor, , would go on to lose the 2003 election against the provincial Liberals (PLQ) under . There are nevertheless legitimate criticisms of Jean Chrétien’s approach, notably with respect to the

“sponsorship scandal”. The sponsorship program, launched by Jean Chrétien, attempted to promote Canada’s image in Quebec. However, the program was widely accused of corruption and patronage, which likely played a role in the loss of the federal Liberals to Stephen Harper’s

Conservatives in 2006 (Noel, 2011)..

Politicians in Ottawa have largely benefitted from the rise of the left-right cleavage in

Quebec in contrast to the previous federalist-separatist divide. Since Jacques Parizeau’s statement on the night of the referendum blaming the loss on “outside money and the ethnic vote,” the Parti Quebecois has gradually transitioned from ethnic-nationalism to civic-nationalism (Caron, 2013). Civic-nationalism essentially detaches history, culture, and language from the notion of nationalism while prioritizing territorial citizenship. This shift was especially clear under the leadership of André Boisclair, who criticized Canada on the basis that Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 4 the country held more “conservative” values that conflicted with Quebec’s social-democratic tendencies on environmentalism, criminal justice, and abortion (Caron, 2013). This was ​ ​ specifically the case in the beginning of Stephen Harper’s mandate as prime minister in 2006.

However, as some have argued, this notion of civic-nationalism may have served to

“dilute” the idea of nationalism. It has been criticized for dividing the sovereignist movement and driving out more conservative figures out of the Parti Quebecois, as well as contributing to the rise of the autonomist Action Démocratique du Québec (Bock-Côté, 2012). In his essay on ​ ​ the subject, Jean-François Caron convincingly disputes the effectiveness of Quebec’s social-democratic view of civic-nationalism, claiming that it has become as divisive to the separatist movement as ethnic-nationalism had been in the past (2013). By associating the idea of sovereignty around exclusively progressive values, the PQ had essentially excluded the nationalist and traditionally centre-right bleau electorate who were accustomed to voting for the ​ ​ party against the PLQ (Caron, 2013). André Boisclair was largely unsuccessful as PQ leader, and would lead the party to a humiliating loss to the PLQ in 2007, while receiving less seats than the

ADQ.The PQ would pursue an identitarian virage under the leadership of in an ​ ​ attempt to recover the lost ground ceded to the ADQ through civic-nationalism (Bock-Côté,

2012).

The debate on “reasonable accommodations” fueled the left-right cleavage in Quebec while benefiting the centre-right autonomist party: the ADQ. This cleavage on Quebecois identity would prove to be advantageous for the federalist side at the detriment of the sovereignty Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 5 option, which was increasingly relegated as being an issue among others (Wiseman, 2011). The

“reasonable accommodations” debate consisted of political tensions between visible and cultural minorities in the province and the francophone majority. This included a controversy on whether a YMCA gym in Montreal should have frosted up its windows for the benefit of a nearby

Hasidic Synagogue (Chiasson & Howes, 2012). The ADQ held an identarian position during the

2007 election, placing itself solidly against the accommodations, while the two other parties were less clear on their position towards the issue (Boily, 2008). Francophones voted en masse ​ for the ADQ partially as a result of this stance (Boily, 2008). Consequently, the party became the official opposition following the 2007 elections. Though it would be brought back to third party status in the 2008 provincial election, the rise of the ADQ demonstrated that the Quebec electorate–specifically francophones–had begun to translate their support for separatism into a different issue: protection of their french culture and identity. This has weakened the strength of the sovereignty debate, decreasing its presence in the political discourse of the province

(Bock-Côté, 2012).

Stephen Harper’s approach of “open federalism” has allowed for the decomposition of the separatist movement as well as the rise of the left-right cleavage. This vision was articulated in

Harper's famous “Quebec speech” in Quebec city in 2005. Open federalism was premised on several key points, including recognition of Quebec’s particular status within Canada as well as a respect for provincial fields of competence rather than “paternalistic federalism”(Caron &

LaForest, 2009). This lead to Harper advocating for a territorial vision of Canada rather than a pan-Canadian one. ’s pan-Canadianism viewed every province as equal under the Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 6 federation, with the individual citizen being the key component of the Charter of Rights and ​ Freedoms (Caron & LaForest, 2009). This vision denied Quebec as holding a distinctive place in ​ the federation, while according the right to government services in both French and

English. Stephen Harper rejected this vision, understanding that the rigidity of the pan-Canadian view led to discontent among Quebecois who believed their distinct language and culture set them apart from the other provinces (LaForest, 2010). This is why Harper recognized that the

“Quebecois form a nation within Canada.”(Caron & Laforest, 2009)

The recognition of Quebec as a nation within Canada had the effect of isolating the separatist movement, notably the Bloc Quebecois under . Duceppe was forced to applaud the measure – and similarly to the Parti Quebecois under André Boisclair – criticized the

Canadian government for its lack of “progressive values.” As Carl Vallée–counselor to Stephen

Harper at the time–effectively argues, Duceppe’s claim that Canada’s government is damaging

Quebec’s interests due to conservative policies “do not constitute an existential threat” to the federation (Vallée, 2017). In fact, several Quebecois separatists have opposed the Duceppe ​ ​ approach, challenging the existence of supposed progressive “valeurs québécoises.” (Bock-Côté, ​ ​ ​ 2011) Judging by the electoral collapse of Bloc Quebecois in the 2011 election to the NDP’s ​ “orange wave” in the province, it seems that Quebec voters preferred the “real thing” to the copy. Stephen Harper’s open federalism to a certain extent contributed to this outcome through his recognition of the province, thus taking away a grievance point from the separatists and forcing them to join the left-right debate.

Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 7 However, the recognition of Quebec as forming a nation within Canada has been criticized as inconsequential by certain academics (Caron & Laforest, 2009). Jean François Caron and Guy

LaForest argue that Harper’s open federalism is rather a modified continuation of the monist, pan-Canadian approach espoused by Pierre Trudeau rather than a true breakthrough (2009).

According to the authors, Harper’s approach represented “symbolic multinationalism” as compared to “consequentialist multinationalism,” the difference being that the former is purely cosmetic while the latter represents practical policy consequences (Caron & Laforest, 2009).

They argue that Harper’s asymmetric treatment of Quebec in terms of language and culture can easily be applied to Alberta in terms of energy issues (Caron & Laforest, 2009). Thus, it can be concluded that this is de facto rather than de jure asymmetry, with Quebec being the only ​ ​ ​ ​ province to take advantage of it (Caron & Laforest, 2009).

Stephen Harper’s “non-paternalistic” open federalism approach was beneficial for other reasons, since it prevented squabbles instigated by separatists aimed to provoke the federal government. One such instance involved Pauline Marois, whose newly elected PQ minority government removed the Canadian flag from the salon rouge in the national assembly while the ​ ​ prime minister was in the province (Vallée, 2017). This created a media firestorm throughout ​ ​ Quebec, with observers predicting a backlash from the federal government. However, when questioned on the flag removal, Stephen Harper simply shrugged his shoulders and responded

“What can I say?” (Vallée, 2017). As a result, Marois was unable to make political hay out of the ​ ​ issue, which would have likely been to her benefit among the francophone electorate. With this response, Harper was able to diffuse a potential conflict and isolate an already weak PQ Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 8 government, which was hoping to nourish a nationalist-federalist fracture with provincial voters.

Instead of fighting with Ottawa–which would have been advantageous for the party–Pauline

Marois was forced to look inwards within the province. The result being that the PQ would lose the 2014 election to the PLQ, who would go on to form a majority government under Philippe

Couillard.

The employment of a non-constitutional approach to the Quebec question reflects the political reality that Quebec’s importance within the federation is diminishing. The idea of a

“Canadian duality” with respect to language, demographics and political strength seems to be a thing of the past (Castonguay, 1998). The percentage of francophones within the province has dropped progressively, with french as the mother tongue accounting for 79.1% of the province’s population in 2016 as compared to 81.4% in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2017a). Pierre Trudeau’s pan-Canadian vision does not seem to correspond with reality, with french as a first language outside of Quebec dropping to 3.8% in 2016 from 7.3% in 1951 (Statistics Canada, 2017a)

(Castonguay, 1998). This suggests that there has been a “territorialization of the french fact” that coincides more clearly with the PQ’s ideology on the issue (Castonguay, 1998).

It is important to note that Quebec’s demographic weight within the federation has been steadily decreasing, from 28.8 % in 1966 to 23% in 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2017a). British

Columbia and Alberta currently have a higher combined population compared to Quebec

(Boucher & Gagnon, 2013). This has significant implications with respect to political influence in federal elections. In 2011, the Conservatives were able to form a majority government without Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 9 a significant amount of seats from Quebec, reflecting the diminishing political importance of the province. This includes the fact that the province’s voters have historically “block-voted” for the party that best represents their interests (Boucher & Gagnon, 2013). However, this

“block-voting” phenomenon has been mitigated with the arrival of the Bloc Québecois in 1992.

The phenomenon had previously benefitted to a large extent the federal Liberal Party, whose

Quebec base of support was considered to be fundamental to their electoral success. However, since the repatriation of the constitution, this “block-voting” has successively benefited the

Progressive Conservatives, the Bloc Quebecois, and the NDP. The 2015 election revealed that the Quebec electorate is increasingly divided between party lines (Boucher & Gagnon, 2013).

This, in addition to the stagnation of Quebec’s demographics in relation to the rest of Canada, has contributed to the weakening of Quebec’s place in the federation. As a result, it is clear to see why federal politicians do not see the initiation of new constitutional negotiations with Quebec to be worth the political risk.

As of the present, history has proven the effectiveness of both Jean Chrétien’s and Stephen

Harper’s non-constitutional approaches to the question of Quebec. This is demonstrated by the absence of a third referendum on sovereignty, as well as the decreasing political relevance of parties in the separatist movement, including the Parti Quebecois and the Bloc (Changfoot &

Cullen, 2011). Chrétien and Harper’s non-constitutional methods to reduce the popularity of sovereignty were appropriate in the post-1995 era of political exhaustion. With the help of

Stéphane Dion, Chrétien was able to contain Quebec separatism through the adoption of the

Clarity Act in parliament. This discouraged the PQ, which was forced to focus on the left-right ​ Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 10 divide within the province. The debate on reasonable accommodations has had the effect of making the protection of Quebec’s cultural identity a political priority for the francophone electorate, and relegating sovereignty as an issue among others. Stephen Harper was able to neutralize separatist support through the recognition of Quebec as a nation within Canada, and ignoring attempts from separatist politicians to start conflicts with the federal government. This equally served in forcing the sovereignist parties to prioritize the left-right cleavage, which has proven to be at their detriment. The political power of Quebec has decreased throughout the passage of time, making it a reduced player within Canada. It is partially for this reason why federal politicians do not view constitutional methods as politically viable. Non-constitutional approaches employed by successive prime ministers post-1995 have proven to be effective in decreasing popular support for sovereignty within Quebec.

Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 11

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