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Non-Constitutional Approaches to Quebec Sovereignty Post-1995: a Workable Method In 0 Non-Constitutional Approaches to Quebec Sovereignty Post-1995: A Workable Method in Maintaining Constitutional Peace in Canada Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Student Number : 1002700151 March 27, 2018 Word Count : 2496 Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 1 Non-Constitutional Approaches to Quebec Sovereignty Post-1995: A Workable Method in Maintaining Constitutional Peace in Canada Quebec’s distinct national vision has posed problems for the ensemble of federal prime ministers throughout Canada’s history. The failures of constitutional agreements such as the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown Accord to reconcile this vision within the Canadian federation led to the “near death” experience of the 1995 Quebec referendum. As the result of these catastrophic failures, it is common political wisdom among post-1995 Canadian politicians to not embark on further constitutional forays. Each prime minister has dealt with the “Quebec question” in their own manner. Jean Chrétien employed Stéphane Dion’s strategies of “endiguement" and “contentement” to contain and confine Quebec while accordingly attempting ​ ​ ​ ​ to satisfy the province’s particular demands (Laforest, 2010). Stephen Harper advocated for a decentralist “open federalism” that endeavored on recognizing Quebec’s unique position within Canada while avoiding disputes with separatist politicians. In this essay, I will argue that both approaches were appropriate for their time periods and were effective in neutralizing popular support for sovereignty. These non-constitutional methods reflect the political exhaustion within the Canadian electorate for constitutional proposals, the rise of the left-right cleavage in Quebec (at the detriment of the federalist-sovereigntist axis), and the gradual loss of Quebec’s influence ​ ​ within Canada. The failures of the Meech Lake Accord (1990) and the Charlottetown Accord (1992) were undoubtedly political catastrophes for nearly all federal and provincial leaders involved. To some Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 2 extent, it led to to the political rout of the Progressive Conservative party in the 1993 federal election, who were reduced to 2 seats from 154. Provincial premiers associated with the Charlottetown Accord would go on to lose their following elections (Tanguay, 2004). This included Liberal Quebec premier Robert Bourassa, who would lose the 1994 election to the Parti Québécois under Jacques Parizeau, a separatist of the pur et dur variety. The failure of both ​ ​ accords presented an even greater threat besides the obvious political consequences at the federal and provincial level: the possibility of Quebec separating from Canada. However, the separatists would lose the referendum, but only by a thin margin: 49.42% for separating versus 50.58% against. Ever since these events, politicians at the federal level have commonly shunned constitutional approaches in large part out of fear of reaping the same consequences of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords. Shortly after the referendum, the federal Liberals under Jean Chrétien developed their Quebec approach. It was, in effect, a Plan A and Plan B strategy that aimed to prevent Quebec separatists from setting the conditions of a future referendum while simultaneously aiming to supplicate the tensions of the Quebec electorate (Inwood, 2012). The Chrétien government adopted the “Clarity Act” or Bill-C20 in 1999 which allowed the federal government to evaluate the acceptability of any future referendum question, as well as determine the winning conditions for the separatist option (Noel, 2011). This “hard-line” strategy was politically acceptable due to the close result of the 1995 referendum. Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 3 The Chrétien government attempted to appeal to the Quebec electorate by recognizing Quebec as a “distinct society” in the House of Commons. However, this was largely a symbolic gesture, as it was a federal recognition rather than a recognition inscribed in the constitution, a demand included in the Meech Lake Accord (Caron & LaForest, 2009). This strategy was largely successful in discouraging further referendums in the aftermath of 1995. It forced Quebec Premier Lucien Bouchard to set aside a future referendum unless “winning conditions” presented themselves (Inwood, 2012). Bouchard would later resign as premier in 2001, citing his inability to promote the option of sovereignty in the province. His successor, Bernard Landry, would go on to lose the 2003 election against the provincial Liberals (PLQ) under Jean Charest. There are nevertheless legitimate criticisms of Jean Chrétien’s approach, notably with respect to the “sponsorship scandal”. The sponsorship program, launched by Jean Chrétien, attempted to promote Canada’s image in Quebec. However, the program was widely accused of corruption and patronage, which likely played a role in the loss of the federal Liberals to Stephen Harper’s Conservatives in 2006 (Noel, 2011).. Politicians in Ottawa have largely benefitted from the rise of the left-right cleavage in Quebec in contrast to the previous federalist-separatist divide. Since Jacques Parizeau’s statement on the night of the referendum blaming the loss on “outside money and the ethnic vote,” the Parti Quebecois has gradually transitioned from ethnic-nationalism to civic-nationalism (Caron, 2013). Civic-nationalism essentially detaches history, culture, and language from the notion of nationalism while prioritizing territorial citizenship. This shift was especially clear under the leadership of André Boisclair, who criticized Canada on the basis that Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 4 the country held more “conservative” values that conflicted with Quebec’s social-democratic tendencies on environmentalism, criminal justice, and abortion (Caron, 2013). This was ​ ​ specifically the case in the beginning of Stephen Harper’s mandate as prime minister in 2006. However, as some have argued, this notion of civic-nationalism may have served to “dilute” the idea of nationalism. It has been criticized for dividing the sovereignist movement and driving out more conservative figures out of the Parti Quebecois, as well as contributing to the rise of the autonomist Action Démocratique du Québec (Bock-Côté, 2012). In his essay on ​ ​ the subject, Jean-François Caron convincingly disputes the effectiveness of Quebec’s social-democratic view of civic-nationalism, claiming that it has become as divisive to the separatist movement as ethnic-nationalism had been in the past (2013). By associating the idea of sovereignty around exclusively progressive values, the PQ had essentially excluded the nationalist and traditionally centre-right bleau electorate who were accustomed to voting for the ​ ​ party against the PLQ (Caron, 2013). André Boisclair was largely unsuccessful as PQ leader, and would lead the party to a humiliating loss to the PLQ in 2007, while receiving less seats than the ADQ.The PQ would pursue an identitarian virage under the leadership of Pauline Marois in an ​ ​ attempt to recover the lost ground ceded to the ADQ through civic-nationalism (Bock-Côté, 2012). The debate on “reasonable accommodations” fueled the left-right cleavage in Quebec while benefiting the centre-right autonomist party: the ADQ. This cleavage on Quebecois identity would prove to be advantageous for the federalist side at the detriment of the sovereignty Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 5 option, which was increasingly relegated as being an issue among others (Wiseman, 2011). The “reasonable accommodations” debate consisted of political tensions between visible and cultural minorities in the province and the francophone majority. This included a controversy on whether a YMCA gym in Montreal should have frosted up its windows for the benefit of a nearby Hasidic Synagogue (Chiasson & Howes, 2012). The ADQ held an identarian position during the 2007 election, placing itself solidly against the accommodations, while the two other parties were less clear on their position towards the issue (Boily, 2008). Francophones voted en masse ​ for the ADQ partially as a result of this stance (Boily, 2008). Consequently, the party became the official opposition following the 2007 elections. Though it would be brought back to third party status in the 2008 provincial election, the rise of the ADQ demonstrated that the Quebec electorate–specifically francophones–had begun to translate their support for separatism into a different issue: protection of their french culture and identity. This has weakened the strength of the sovereignty debate, decreasing its presence in the political discourse of the province (Bock-Côté, 2012). Stephen Harper’s approach of “open federalism” has allowed for the decomposition of the separatist movement as well as the rise of the left-right cleavage. This vision was articulated in Harper's famous “Quebec speech” in Quebec city in 2005. Open federalism was premised on several key points, including recognition of Quebec’s particular status within Canada as well as a respect for provincial fields of competence rather than “paternalistic federalism”(Caron & LaForest, 2009). This lead to Harper advocating for a territorial vision of Canada rather than a pan-Canadian one. Pierre Trudeau’s pan-Canadianism viewed every province as equal under the Joshua Nahmias POL 316 Professor David Pond March 27, 2018 6 federation, with the individual citizen being
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